By George, some have got it

10 Feb

Bravo – Finally, some sense from two Prune posters.  At long last, after only 3181 posts, sweet logic, pragmatic professional thinking and cool sense prevail; finally.  Halle-bloody-lujah… 😀 ..

Ian W – Pprune – At one stage in my ‘career’ I qualified as an ISO-9000 auditor. One of the things that was expressed to me during the training was that procedures were not required for everything, only where it was really essential the procedures were not varied. Or to put it another way one of the more experienced QA instructors said:

You go to audit some companies and they have several tables all covered with procedure manuals 2 or 3 deep. You go into others and they hand you a single slim folder. You know immediately which company actually follows their procedures.

I think that this has application in the aviation world. Less by rote procedures and more capable personnel will make a better more professional airline which in the long term will be safer and more profitable.

Unfortunately, that message has not percolated through to ‘management’ and tickboxes and inhibition of original thought are seen as the way to do it. That inevitably leads to the:
if there isn’t a procedure for it – you are not allowed to do it‘; and,
I have learned all the procedures in the manual and the boxes have all been ticked, so I don’t need to know anything else.’

 Q0283 @ Pprune 1nvestigative approach taken by the KNKT/NTSC ?

What I would like to understand is the huge difference between how the AirAsia and the latest TransAsia accidents are treated by the respective national authorities (both acting under ICAO Rules).

In the AirAsia case the (investigation) authorities have published few preliminary facts (radar, FDR and CVR data). But have published some short ‘final opinion’ conclusions( {we know what happened} “ we have the ‘key‘ “ – and – “it was not a suicide”).
In the TransAsia case the (investigation) authorities have already published many preliminary facts (radar, FDR and CVR data). And have published a ‘preliminary factual’ conclusion (one engine out and the second good one shut down too).

From a professional personal point of view you learn much much more from getting the preliminary facts yourself, struggle with them to find probable cause and contributing factors, and then compare these when preliminary, interim and final reports are published. The main learning moments being where the professional official report either confirms or rejects your professional personal conclusions.

From that professional viewpoint you can only be very very happy with the approach taken by the Taiwanese ASC. And at the same time negatively surprised by the approach taken by the Indonesian KNKT/NTSC.

In context, the Taiwanese ‘political’ risks appeared to be much greater than the Indonesian ones. Declaring the pilot a hero ( while keeping the ‘from hero to villain pilot’ case after rolling the 747 in mind ). Possibly shutting down the good engine too (keeping the UK 737 case in mind). And the mainland Chinese passengers (keeping general politics and MH370 emotions in mind).

In the Indonesian case no-one, not a single mention on PPRuNe I think, suggested a suicide. And no-one expects an investigation team to have the ‘key’ in an early stage. There is a lot of information that can be published without having any political overtones. Publishing the MH370 take-off fuel weight for instance would also have harmed no one, on the contrary one could even say.

Is there a PPRuNe member who has an informed opinion on this. And can give us a better understanding of how the Indonesian investigation might view its own QZ8501 approach.


So very nice to see the ‘real deal’ at work, always a pleasure.  Bravo! and, thank you gentlemen.

Toot toot.


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