The noble Art - Embuggerance.

In the strictest liability -  Dodgy

Quote:[Image: DwodddOUYAA4jYy.jpg]


(01-14-2019, 05:59 AM)Kharon Wrote:  From the ABC -

Do not reverse onus of proof for black economy crimes say experts.

This is going to get interesting – let’s see how the great unwashed, long suffering, voting Australian tax payer likes a dose of CASA style ‘strict liability’. Are the nations ‘earners’ going to put up with it? My bet, they won’t realise what’s happening until it’s far too late to change it. I hope someone is paying attention. Guilty until proven innocent – I can see the public just loving the crap out of that. One thing though, whichever party offers to strike out the ‘new’ regulation will win a landslide election.


(01-14-2019, 04:56 PM)Gobbledock Wrote:  You kids just can’t be trusted....

Interesting article Mr Ferryman, thank you for posting it. It really gets to the heart of one the big issues affecting aviation. From Kharons previous post and the article link;

“Tax experts and business lobbies have hit out against a Treasury proposal to reverse the onus of proof — that is to say that someone is guilty until they prove themselves innocent — as part of a bid to stamp out illegal cash economy activity.”

Our very own Dr Voodoo, having presided over CAsA’s legal department for a long long time and having had a front row seat at the trough for almost 25 years at CAsA is famous (infamous) for saying; “aviators are guilty of something, it’s just that most of them haven’t been caught yet”. Yes, sadly fools like Aleck are conditioned to believe that those who work in aviation are guilty of some form of nefarious criminal activity in which severe punitive actions must be applied, even when proof of no wrong doing has been discerned.

‘Guilty until proven innocent, and even if proven innocent you are still guilty’! Just ask Bruce Rhoades, Paul Phelan, Karen Casey, the late Gerald Repacholi, Shane Urquhart and a host of other operators who have been belted by CAsA and it’s endless bucket of legal money or have had their plight crushed as they try to find justice for the death of their loved ones and loss of their business. Terry, Jonathan and other members of The Golden West Mafia are a testimony to this perverted Government mindset. Ironic considering endless Politicans and senior bureaucrats are constantly getting pinged themselves for being lying, deceitful, despicable shonks. I guess it takes a thief to know a thief, hence their mistrust of us avaition IOS innocents.

Tick Tock

Well caught GD - Choc Frog......P7.

Funny coincidence Gobbles but while doing some trolling on the AusALPA submissions web page - ref: - I note that even the Sky Gods have some rather large reservations about strict liability and the penalty provisions contained within the draconian Australian aviation safety rule set - as prescribed by Dr A and the CASA Iron Ring: ref -

Quote:Strict Liability

AusALPA views the Government’s approach to strict liability in civil aviation law to be an unrealistic and unhelpful use of this type of provision. It represents an overly simplistic approach to compliance that focuses on pilots without sufficient, if any, regard to operational circumstance or safety outcomes. A recent example of this type of unfairness was CASA’s pursuit of the pilot involved in the Westwind ditching off Norfolk Island as distinct from the neutral approach that CASA adopted towards the operator, as revealed by the Senate Inquiry.
We recognise that there is a place for strict liability offences and that the unusually high level of regulation in aviation will likely result in a higher than normal number of such offences.

However, there seems to us to be an increasing propensity to deliberately reduce complex systems to a series of simple isolated factors whose purpose is primarily to support strict liability penalty provisions, rather than to address the real safety outcomes, when those factors are part of a dynamic and interactive operational environment. This “tail wagging the dog” approach to compliance and enforcement often means that few organisational malaises are redressed or even mitigated and those who have the greatest influence and control over corporate culture inevitably escape attention, let alone sanction.

AusALPA has no evidence to date that suggests in any discernible way that CASA, DIRDC or any of the Attorney-General’s portfolio agencies have done any review or reconsideration of the wholesale application of strict liability provision to civil aviation offences.

That situation was, and remains, unacceptable to us.

We have been told that a review has been planned at some future date. We have also been told that the review will be conducted separately from the operational teams developing the rule sets and, most likely, exclusively by legal practitioners from the various Government entities involved in producing civil aviation legislation. AusALPA is strongly opposed to this approach.

Any review of strict liability provisions in civil aviation law must be conducted primarily as an operational activity in the first instance. Secondly, any relevant legal advice should preferably come from external sources such as the Australian Law Reform Commission rather than from the people who may well be motivated to minimise change and to preserve the status quo. In any event, such a review is essential and urgent.

Penalty Provisions

In 1990, when the CAA licensing rules were rewritten to become Part 5 of the CARs, the operational drafters reviewed each provision and applied maximum penalties drawn from the range of 5, 10, 15, 25 and 50 penalty units. Judgement on proportionality was applied very carefully, both to reflect the balance between administrative and safety outcomes as well as to provide guidance to the courts on the relative severity of the offence.

Today, we find that what were once considered to be minor offences, indicated by low range penalties, have morphed into major offences attracting the maximum allowable penalties of 50 penalty units. There are very few, if any, offences that vary from this apparently default level of maximum penalty.

AusALPA can find no public evidence of a formal process that changed the original risk and preservation of evidence assessments to a penalty scheme for which virtually every offence attracts the allowable maximum. The complete lack of transparency of such deliberations can only create distrust among those most affected. This is particularly so when the regulations appear to have adopted a much narrower class of persons committing offences, in many cases removing operators from the spotlight. It is far from clear to us why CASA has chosen to resile from adopting the broadest range of potential offenders, reflective of a true safety systems focus.

Has CASA withdrawn from providing guidance to the Courts on relative severity of offences, leaving the Courts to determine proportionality simply on the basis of the arguments presented in each case? Has the concept of system safety fallen out of favour within CASA in preference to targeting only pilots, many of whom have no real or effective protections whatsoever in preserving their livelihoods when faced with conflict between safety and commercial outcomes?

AusALPA strongly asserts that there must be a transparent process that re-examines all of the penalty provisions in accordance with a publicly available doctrine and that includes relevant stakeholders. Once again, this review process must be an operational review rather than a legal practitioner’s review in the same vein as we set out above for the review of strict liability provisions.

Strict Liability and Penalty Review Timing

AusALPA considers both these reviews to be urgent.

Part of the development of any new rules must be demonstrations of good faith by the regulator that the imposition of penalties, both administrative and criminal, are the outcome of well-considered, systematic and proportionate assessments of the gravity of each offence. It is critical that the reviews are not seen to be self-serving internal processes, since the required collateral outcome is the building of trust in the way that the regulator meets its duty to the Australian public, rather than to itself.

MTF...P2  Cool

(01-01-2019, 11:35 AM)Peetwo Wrote:  HAPPY NEW YEAR MINISCULE - L&KS Bruce RHOADES and the IOS... Rolleyes  

(12-14-2018, 05:49 PM)BRhoades Wrote:  [Image: bedd0ddbec1068790ab4ece108f2aa71.jpg]

Much to be ashamed of minister.

Of all its flaws - and there are many - the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s greatest problem may well lie within its very title.

It was once known as the Civil Aviation Authority but now this regulatory authority has been burdened with the oxymoron of “safety.”

Apart from the confusion it creates in the minds general community because of its branding collision with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau CASA’s title is, quite simply, an absurd contradiction in terms.

CASA’s self-appointed role as a Big R law enforcement agency ensures it actually works to undermine the aspiration of safer skies.

It is clearly a regulatory enforcement agency which has never embraced “safety” as its primary mandate.

I have extracted some excerpts from the Professional Aviation Investigation Network Report 3rd Aug 2017 that expose a hostile and adversarial relationship between the GA industry and the Regulator (CASA). 

[Image: 6334714-16x9-large-e1518307151504.jpg]

PAIN Report.

"In general, it must be stated that the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has an unique approach to ICAO compliance, with record number of ‘notified differences’. Many of the notifications may, at face value, seem insignificant."

It is our opinion that the noted differences are structured to support the complex, contradictory, flawed rule set in place.Reform of this rule set has been in train for thirty years, with successive government ministers and directors of civil aviation promising to complete the task ‘within the next three years’.

This is an important consideration as it reflects on the operational approach taken to both open reporting of ‘incident’ or event; and, the tangible fear of prosecution.

Australia’s Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) are founded on the ‘criminal code’ and ‘strict liability’; this, standing alone, provides a strong disincentive to openly reporting safety related matters. This attitude is reflected in the government safety bodies approach to ICAO compliance and reporting.


So it is hardly surprising to witness the industry’s adoption of a culture of “never Reporting incidents or accidents” when the obvious option for survival lies with concealment and in-house fixes.

It’s more disturbing than ironic to see CASA has developed a similar culture of not reporting all accidents to ICAO (as required by annexe 13) which might result in a downgrading of Australia’s overall safety approval by ICAO.

The Australian Government has in fact been lying by failing to submit reports to the International Civil Aviation Organisation, as required since 2009.

Over 30 years this has had a major negative impact on aviation safety in this country... 

....Late start this morning – much to consider and read; mostly to do with Bruce Roades and his run in with at the CASA gristmill. The story begins with tragedy, a failed engine leading to an air accident, ending with a fatality. A raw day for all concerned; services swung into action and did their usual sterling work (thank you – once again); ATSB arrived ‘on-site’ and began the task of ‘investigation’. This is what we have become used to after an accident; the ATSB attempts to define what happened, why and place, when required, some form of advisory or recommendation designed to prevent a reoccurrence. The CASA often buy in, they are quite entitled to run an investigation; there are matters which they need to be across, matters of law and operational well being. So the scene is set...

 Oz aviation, safety compromised by political and bureaucratic subterfuge?

Update 01/01/19 : Bruce Roades' - FINAL BATTLE.


[Image: DvyPExpUYAE8fap.jpg]

TICK TOCK MINISCULE - Your days are numbered... Rolleyes

In a kind of follow up/update to the above, the following was shared via the PAIN network... Wink 

Courtesy Dafydd Llewellyn:

Quote:What’s wrong with CASA (and the Aviation Industry)?
By D. J.  Llewellyn
(See attached resume)
General Statement:
The recent airing of the accident to VH-WTQ on the 7:30 report of 29/10/2018 exposes issues that have been progressively driving the Australian General Aviation industry into the ground for the past three decades. Our Politicians have been too busy getting themselves re-elected to either understand them, or to do anything useful about them. The only effective constructive step in this time was the initiative of John Sharp, who set in motion the Review of Regulations (i.e. the Australian Civil Aviation Regulations)  in 1996.  CASA has managed to delay anything significantly more than the implementation of Part 21 of the new regulations, which was achieved within the lifetime of the steering committee of the review.
There is a very poor overall culture in the relationship between CASA and the aviation industry; the attitudes are adversarial on both sides.  This means that operators will attempt to fix problems in-house, rather than letting CASA know about them, for fear of punitive action; the adverse effects of that on overall safety needs no explanation.  This was not the case when I joined the (then) Dept of Civil Aviation, in 1970.  I have watched the deterioration in the relationship progressively develop from then to the present day, from both sides. 
The largest single cause of this deterioration was the formation, 1n 1995 by the Keating Government, of CASA as a corporate entity, which could “sue and be sued in its corporate name”  (S8 (2) © of the Civil Aviation Act 1988).  This is in marked contrast to bodies such as the American Federal Aviation Agency, which is immune from litigation.  As a consequence, CASA employees cannot offer friendly advice, because they could be held liable for the results;  so the industry is deprived of advice from the very people who are best qualified to give it. 
The operators of  VH-WTQ had applied for, and received, an Operator’s Certificate, to perform the operation in which the aircraft was engaged when the accident occurred.  I would suggest that a very pertinent question is whether or not a CASA Flight Operations Inspector  actually went on a demonstration flight with the operators of VH-WTQ;  because if one did, I venture to suggest that he might have advised them to move their landing area on the beach a quarter of a mile South, so that in the event of an engine failure, the pilot did not need to turn 180 degrees, but could put the aircraft down straight ahead, on the beach.  I have frequently conducted aircraft performance climb tests* which started from a similar position and height over a beach, but I always had miles of beach ahead of me, for exactly this reason.  Hindsight is always 20/20 of course, but evidently no such advice was given.  It could perhaps have been; but S8(2)© cultivates a closed-mouth attitude amongst CASA staff.
*Because such tests are normally conducted over water, to avoid turbulent air due to convection over land;  the start point needs to be as close to sea-level as possible.
The present structure:
Australia is a signatory to the Chicago convention on International Civil Aviation.  CASA is the body charged with  carrying out Australia’s responsibilities as a signatory member of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, ICAO, which is established in Montreal. 
CASA has been responsible for  providing and policing  regulations that  satisfy the requirements of ICAO, and the Civil Aviation Regulations follow (or should follow) from the Articles of that convention, set out in the annexes of the ICAO convention or in ICAO manuals, Chapter 1 of the ICAO document which outlines the safety obligations of the State, contains the words: 

[Image: Dx_WWsjVAAAzRp6.jpg]

Despite this,  the Morris report (“Plane safe”) 1995, concluded that the role for CASA was that of a policeman.   And  the functions of  the CAA were split between CASA and Air Services Australia as a consequence.  But CASA has – apart from the Review of Regulations 1996 , initiated by the then Minister, John Sharp – both drafted regulations, AND enforced them.  This is contrary to the principle that the police enforce laws made by Parliament; they do not create laws.  Yes, it is true that regulations drafted by CASA are “disallowable instruments” and must “lay on the floor” of the Parliament for a period, for anybody in the Parliament to question them – but who in Parliament has the expertise to challenge that sort of thing? So whilst the form of the procedure is followed, the fact is that Parliament rubber-stamps whatever CASA puts forward.
So we have the dilemma that ICAO requires both that suitable regulations for Civil Aviation must exist; and they must also be enforced.  The error  in our legislation is that the responsibility for both these functions has been placed on CASA.  The answer is to separate these two functions so that the policeman does not also write the law.  
In 1996, the Review of Regulations was guided by the Civil Aviation Legislation amendment bill 1995;  that Bill never passed into law, unfortunately, because it embodied the principle of reducing the number and complexity of the regulations wherever possible.  In particular, it asked the question, “can the purpose of the proposed regulation be achieved instead by education”.  CASA can do one of two things; it can write regulations, and then wait until somebody breaks one, and jump on him. That is the lazy man’s way; but S8(2)© of the Act  leaves CASA no alternative. 
Or it can make its presence felt around the industry, by offering helpful advice.  That requires that the various inspectors visit the operators from time to time, and offer friendly advice, based on experience.  On Bankstown airport, many years ago, there was a very experienced airworthiness surveyor, who was well known in the local industry.  When any other airworthiness surveyor strolled around the aerodrome, all the hangar doors were shut; but when this one surveyor took a stroll, they’d remain open. His method was to drop in, and pass the time briefly; and if he spotted something, say something like – “I had that problem a while ago; what worked for me, there, is”  . . . .   or he’s say, “I’ll go and see what I can find on that in our library”.  He was, in terms of safety achieved, more valuable than about seven of the other sort.
Of course, the Regional libraries have long since been disposed-of, in the interests of saving costs.
This means, CASA needs to attract first-class experienced experts, who do NOT sit in its offices all day every day.  This costs money;  but one must not bind the mouths of the kine who tread the grain.
It will be difficult to correct this after all the decades of antagonism; but the antagonistic way has been tried, and it is counter-productive.
The current situation can be summarised as follows:
1.           CASA is full of Civil Servants who know full well that they can simply delay any proposed modifications to their modus operandi until there is a change of government – and so they have been able to resist almost all attempts to change the way aviation is regulated for the last 30 years, because they have only to delay for three years or so, before they get a new director – who will hardly have time to learn the ropes before he is replaced.  The “Old guard” within CASA can be likened to the political religious right in the LCP;  they “know” what is “right” and resist change to the point of political suicide.  They are able to resist the efforts of the appointed director of CASA – because they can out-stubborn him. The mass of aviation law is very large and complex, and it requires technical expertise as well as legal expertise to understand it; nobody coming in “cold” can expect to do so comprehensively in three years – and this is why successive directors of CASA have such difficulty.
Why is the period of appointment so short?  Presumably, because one man alone cannot be given extraordinary power for an extended period.  But one man alone can at least make decisions, whereas a board of directors is likely to spend most of its time arguing, and get nothing done.  We have tried both models, and neither of them has worked.  So what should we do?
Firstly, there is no substitute for competence.  And no one man can be fully competent in all facets of aviation. And everybody wants to protect his means of earning a living.  So, unless you can find a few Gods, who are omniscient and do not need to earn a living, no single entity can be put in such a position.  The closest model that works, is the High Court; so set up a panel from which three experts can be drawn to “sit” on each issue.  The size of the panel will depend on the number of issues – and there are plenty in Aviation at present.  The Privy Council (which has no seats – members are required to remain on their feet) might be a suitable precedent to move decisions along.  The members of such a panel need to have, or to have access to, a great depth of  knowledge of both the Regulations, and the technical issues involved.
So this is step 1:  Create a panel of technical advisers to make the decisions, and  include on it the Director of Aviation Safety, who should have the power of accountable veto;  and make the Director of Aviation Safety responsibility for carrying out those decisions.
2       When there is a cause for prosecution, CASA briefs the Crown Prosecutor; however I have been called as an expert witness on several occasions where it was obvious that CASA had managed to get the case heard by a stipendiary magistrate who was favourably disposed to the official viewpoint.  I have also experienced two cases where the CASA Flight Operations Inspector concerned was clearly out of his depth with the technical issues.  There is really no excuse for such incompetence.  It seems that FOIs may be promoted on the basis of the number of successful prosecutions they record, and the FOIs are not always even-handed in their presentation of the “facts”.
These cozy arrangements have resulted in a number of rogue operators being hunted out of aviation; but they have also resulted in questionable practices leading to persecution of otherwise harmless operators. The net outcome has been a substantial number of people deciding that aviation is no longer a viable area for business. 
We see this in action in the case of the operators of VH-WTQ;  the CASA FOIs cancelled the operator’s certificate and withdrew the pilot licences, on the grounds that the pilot performed unauthorised aerobatics – which cannot have had any effect whatever on the subsequent engine failure – and it is questionable whether what is shown in the film from the on-board camera of the manoeuvres concerned in any way exceeded what one might encounter in a more usual flight in turbulent conditions;  and because they alleged that the pilot should have landed straight ahead in the water, rather than attempt a turn.  That, in a fixed-undercarriage aircraft, would result in a somersault of the aircraft, which would end up inverted in the water; it is doubtful whether any of the occupants would survive that.
         So step 2 is to re-direct or re-train the FOIs so they steer operators towards safe practices, rather than waiting for them to put a foot wrong, and then seeking to prosecute them.  Obviously, there will be “rogue” operators from time to time, and the FOIs have a public expectation that they will prevent rogue operators from placing the public at risk.  This is tempered by the recognition, in law, that some aspects of aviation constitute “Hazardous recreational activities” and accordingly, people who elect to engage in them are electing to accept the risk. 
         The introduction, in 1998, of the Experimental purposes for which an aircraft may be allowed to fly, was a major change in philosophy;  prior to this, CASA took the position that it was “my brother’s keeper” in regard to all aviation activities.  Its introduction necessitated  that CASA be given an immunity from liability for the safety of persons on board such aircraft.  This principle may need to be extended to some other classes of operation; arguably, landing on a beach is a somewhat hazardous operation – at least, by comparison with landing on the prepared surface of an airfield.
         One cannot help wondering whether CASA’s efforts are being spent in the most effective way;  the point made by Mr. Bruce Rhoades that the Cessna 172 – because the first model of the type was certificated to a 1948 standard, and subsequent models have been “grandfathered” to a major extent, did not have upper body restraint for the rear seat occupants – begs a question:  The original standard provided only seat belts, for all seats.  The danger of this became very obvious at least thirty years ago.  Australia issued an Airworthiness Directive in about 1968, requiring upper body restraint for the front seat occupants only, of all aircraft certificated to this early standard – I recall this, because I was given the task of designing the anchor points for the upper body restraint on the Beech 35 model aircraft.   I suppose it seemed “a good idea at the time” – but automotive standards have long since gone way past this.  Why has there been no “catch up” ?  The efforts of the FOIs in hunting small operators of essentially hazardous recreational activities would seem trivial by comparison.

  1. D.J.  Llewellyn

DJ Llewellyn submissions:

MTF...P2  Cool

AF embuggerance update: 14 Feb '19 - 'In a nutshell'. 


(02-13-2019, 10:05 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  ...Note the way Fort Fumble carefully manipulate the stats to make it appear that industry dissension is from an irrelevant minority... Dodgy    

Quote:C.9 Consultation process

17 (8%) respondents commented on the perception that CASA had failed to follow its
consultation process.

The following are examples of comments from respondents:

Changing regulations without proper regulatory process by the CEO of CASA without
Parliamentary scrutiny thereby curtailing the rights of pilots to exercise the full
privileges of their licenses. (ANON-Z7UJ-QXZT-7)

The Authority has deliberately bypassed proper processes and in effect, is seeking to
add a new licence category, and a new maintenance category, for private flights and
private/CPL and ATPL pilots. This is occurring without adhering to settled and wellpublished procedures – all of which were designed to ensure proper industry consultation: and all of which CASA has, on many occasions, championed. (ANONZ7UJ-QXE7-N)

I object to the fact that no proper consultation took place with either the industry and I
see the proposal as an attempt to bypass the NPRM process by seeking to implement
a direction and not amending the relevant regulations AFTER DUE PROCESS. CASA
did in this case not complied with the to the 2015 Statement of Expectations publicised
by the Board of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, which includes a requirement for
CASA to consider the economic and cost impact on individuals, businesses and the
community in the development and finalisation of new or amended regulatory
changes.(which also includes proposed directives like th e present one) CASA has
also not complied in my view with their obligation to adopt a proper, fair and
transparent process, by publishing proposed Directions immediately upon the rising of
Parliament, with the closing date set prior to the resumption of Parliament. In this case
CASA also failed in my view to adhere to the proper regulatory processes, whereby
long-standing Regulations, which confer fundamental rights on pilots and aircraft
owners (being the rights to exercise the full privileges of their licences and aircraft use)
are sought to be changed by the direction of CASA. This in my view is an attempt not
to make the proposals subjected to Parliamentary scrutiny as would be the case if they
were tabled as proposed Regulations. (ANON-Z7UJ-QXEA-Y)

Given that CASA has now deemed CSF’s to be a ‘sector’ worthy of specific and unique directions, which impact significantly upon the rights of pilots and owners to fly and operate their machines according to current regulatory requirements, then it is incumbent upon the Authority to heed its own recommendations before publishing a set of directions without industry or ‘sector’ consultation. It is insufficient that it has written the directions without consultation nor proper analytical process, to now stand behind the one month ‘consultation’ feedback process (which has no statutory mandate in terms of changing the directives pursuant to the consultation), or that it may now be embarking on a data analysis or risk analysis subsequent to the issuance of the proposed directions. (ANON-Z7UJ-QXEC-1)

It is not reasonable for this proposal to be the first action the regulator takes in relation to CSFs, when it hasn’t even bothered measuring the effectiveness of the lessintrusive and less-disruptive alternatives required by Regulatory Philosophy principle 9. (ANON-Z7UJ-QXES-H)

See responses here:

Started the arduous task of reading many of the public submissions/comments and already I am beginning to see much more dissension to the Angel Flight embuggerance than CASA would have us believe.

But then I guess much like the Colmar Brunton industry survey - see + - it is very easy to write a weasel word confection to deceive the average punter reading that purely by association the overall majority of respondents were supportive of the CASA embugerance of AF... Dodgy

Quote:17 (8%) respondents commented on the perception that CASA had failed to follow its consultation process.
However in reality, going through the individual comments, it does not take long to get a general picture that industry and Angel Flight users are totally aghast and disgusted at the underhanded tactics by CASA, over the Xmas/New Year holiday period to ram home a 30 day consultation process - example:

Allen - My daughter has been assisted by Angel Flight in over 100 flights. Any proposal that threatens the survival of such organizations is completely unacceptable. Angel Flight has been tremendously informative in regard to information in relation to safe travel in small aircraft. Every pilot (and there have been many) has been courteous, well informed and VERY experienced. There have been times when flights have been cancelled due to concerns in relation to weather conditions. this has been at the instigation of the pilot or in some instances where we have been unsure of the weather by myself. It is time for CASA to stop hiding behind its title and put a real name of the PERSON who is behind this underhanded approach to regulation change so that they can be counselled in regard to the ramifications of these outrageous and unnecessary changes that are being proposed . Whoever it is should try living in an area remote from major services and experience the exhaustion and tears that accompany long road or rail trips , and the difference that air transport can make to someones life. This is especially so for those with medical conditions. I should point out that Angel Flight is also extremely clear in its requirements with regard to passenger suitability and the restrictions small aircraft provide. Angel Flight also prefers a support person travel with the person to assist wherever necessary. It is also made very clear that this is not a Medical flight service but rather a helping hand to get where you need to go. This assistance is provided FREE OF CHARGE to those like my daughter who need it. Where we live there is NO RAIL anyway so that argument as an alternative is bogus .Where we are is minimum of three and a half hours drive to Canberra and six and a half hours to Sydney. These are straight through times and do not allow for the necessary regular stops due to pain and discomfort. CASA is well aware of the time difference air travel makes. Thank you for your consideration of this information Yours FaithfullyRedacted text Allen
However putting aside the highly charged emotive reactions and comments, IMO for a true in a nutshell appraisal (so far) you cannot go past the excellent 'big picture' submission from Associate Professor Chris Andrews Wink

Assoc Prof Andrews
Holder – CPL SECIR

I wish to make the following points regarding the operation of Angel Flight.


Angel Flight makes a positive and humanitarian input to the benefit of Australian people. I speak from the perspective of a pilot, and consider that this proposal (which is not a consultation, but a notification) takes aircraft operations down a very dangerous administrative path, with implications far beyond Angel Flight operations. CASA needs to consider very carefully taking administrative regulations down this path for reasons outlined below. In a supposed climate of consultation, removal of administrative burden, and fair transparent rule making, this proposal entirely negates this, and ought to fill pilots with dread. It is a dangerous precedent for further CASA action “justified” on similar principles. The most dangerous are … the regulating of flights based not on pilot qualification; the restriction on fully qualified pilots on exercising the functions that they are fully licenced for, based only on passenger characteristics; and the danger of setting CASA up for potential legal action with such unwise actions.

I have read the submission of the Angel Flight organisation. I have no personal knowledge of the discussions between CASA and Angel Flight, so I do not enter that conversation. If what is stated is correct, that is the lack of fulfilment of procedural requirements for new regulations, then CASA must immediately withdraw this proposal and re-enter under proper procedures.

Much of what Angel Flight’s submission states echoes my own feelings, and I will only highlight my own specific points. I support the Angel Flight submission, and look forward to it getting full examination, supported by many such as myself.

1. A major concern

A major item that stands out – like the proverbial sore thumb (!) – is the lack of discussion justifying this proposal, and in particular the lack of data in support of any change. Indeed, no data at all. And the lack of any data that changes will in fact achieve what is purported.
I make a point below that the CASA attitude is “if it moves, regulate it”. An important requirement for CASA is to know when NOT to regulate something, and this is one of those occasions. CASA has a very bad name for interference, to no good purpose other than to increase administrative, financial, and curtailment burdens. This is a case where CASA’s best compliance with fair open and transparent processes is to do nothing, and in particular, because there is no need to do anything.

In particular, CASA gives no indication of:

a. Why Angel Flight requires any regulation. i. What is it in the operation that allegedly falls short? I cannot find anything.
ii. What are the figures supporting i above? What is the water tight data, reliably collected and stated, that justifies the interference?
iii. What supports any safety examination of Angel Flight? I believe it to be an enviable record.
b. What are the tight figures comparing Angel Flight with other community service activities here and overseas?
c. How, specifically, do the proposed regulations address each of these, if they exist – tightly argued and justified and supported by hard data?
d. What are the figures justifying the claim that the proposed protocols improve the operation of Angel Flight, and aviation in general, beyond further destruction of GA?
e. What is the justification, in tight argued terms, that these propositions further CASA’s gazetted aims?

As these proposals are presently presented, they smack of ill consideration, unjustified beyond a gut feeling that someone somewhere thinks it might be a good idea. No argument beyond subjective opinion has been forthcoming.

The implications of this proposal go far beyond Angel Flight alone, as stated below, probably unwittingly. There are particular precedential consequences for discrimination, licencing, the validity of licencing, the paradigm shift in characterising flights by their passengers rather than their pilots, maintenance, as well as the more general rolling of the eyes at another needless foray of CASA to regulate something which should not be regulated.
2. A safe operation

Angel Flight conditions of carriage are well known, and well communicated. They are well known to passengers, and well accepted by pilots. There is no need for their restatement in any additional form.

The safety of Angel Flight is very well established. There have been far fewer mishaps on Angel Flights than in general in GA. Far Fewer. The commitment and responsibility of Angel Flight pilots are legion and contribute to this. Angel Flight pilots, in fact, self-select into a safer and more responsible population than the general pilot population.

Angel Flight qualifications and standards are clearly stated and rigorously complied with. It is a self-regulating operation with an enviable record and there is no reason to interfere with this. And particularly in this way with so many wider implications.

This proposal smacks of the CASA attitude of “if it moves, regulate it”. There is no justification for interference, and there is absolutely no argument that any new regulation will improve a close to perfect safety record or any other record.

Item 1 – If figures exist to the contrary of that just stated, CASA must transparently submit them, and open then to wide scrutiny.

Until the need, and justification for “improvement”, can be clearly demonstrated, CASA has no reason for involvement, and interference under these circumstances is resented, as killing a fine operation.

Item 2 – CASA needs to justify why any regulation at all is needed, and justify why any proposed regulation will improve any safety criteria.

Item 3 – CASA needs to divest itself of the worrying propensity to interfere in things working well under their own regulation, and to recognise when a working item should be left alone.

3. Licence by passenger rather than pilot

This proposal concerns pilots operating, and specifically required to be operating, and agreeing mandatorily to operate, within the terms of their licences. Pilots are carrying out operations entirely within the terms of their licences. Do bus licencing authorities impose conditions on bus licensees after they have been issued with a bus licence?

CASA is now adding conditions on top of existing licences. This may be actionable in law. In particular, if an Angel Flight passenger is carried, then certain requirements have to be met altering an existing licence which is exercised entirely within its proper terms.

This is an entire paradigm shift in licencing. While aimed at ostensibly Angel Flight, it is a true thin end of a wedge that will fill any pilot with dread.

This has the precedential possibility of changing licence conditions pilot-wide without appropriate canvassing and implementation. It, too, may be actionable. There is danger in singling out Angel Flight passengers, and also may be actionable on discrimination grounds. One fears that if CASA might succeed in this area, it will have its sights set on arenas which are more truly what it is aiming at. For this reason, it is important to put one’s foot down now.

Item 4 – CASA must reject the notion that pilot operations depend on passenger characteristics rather than pilot qualifications beyond the current position – e.g. with regard to fare paying and RPT requirements, none of which is relevant to Angel Flight.

Item 5 – CASA must declare what other operations it will apply provisions to, other than Angel Flight

Given the idea that operations are proposed to depend on passenger rather than pilot qualifications, the door is open by precedent to interfere in other operations, perhaps like:

a. I decide to go to a church weekend away in my private plane, and offer a lift to my friends.
b. Me as a pilot taking my work mates sightseeing
c. Me travelling to a work engagement in my private plane, rather than drive, and offering a lift to my friends.
d. In a similar way,me offering a lift to friends from point A to point B as I personally am happening to fly my aircraft in lieu of my driving or using other transport.

And so on, to name just a few examples. All these are under the legitimate terms of my licence, and able to be characterised by a passenger population rather than a pilot qualification. It is obvious how ludicrous a situation this leads to, but CASA is leaving this door wide open.
Is a CPL or ATPL holder going to have to characterise his flight on whether he is carrying his football team, or his musician friends, or film stars, and so on, rather than any other group of passengers.

4. Licence conditions

The Angel Flight operation is carried out strictly in terms of a pilot’s licence, legally and stringently obtained. Angel Flight adheres to this rigidly, and even limits operations within the given licence structure (experience requirements, day vs night requirements, instrument vs visual requirements, and so on). This further says that self-regulation is stringent and shows excellent results. Exams and flight tests have had to be passed, and operational activities are dictated by the terms of a licence.

With this proposal, CASA is tacitly saying that a given licence is inadequate. It is tacitly saying that for a long time that it has ignored establishing and promulgating inadequate licensing. Angel Flight pilots operate strictly within the terms of their licences, and now find that CASA does not trust the licence that CASA itself has issued.

Given that CASA considers its licence to be inadequate, it needs to come into the open. The fix is to rework the licence requirements, not to impose requirements on single operation activities and thereby patchwork over the inadequacies.

Item 6. CASA must look at the basic implications of the proposal and not to restrict individual activities, when it is tacitly saying any problem is deeper. If the existing licence is inadequate, given pilots operate scrupulously within the terms of their licence, then CASA must look at licence qualification process. However, if existing licensing is indeed adequate, then CASA has no business making this sort of proposal.

I have heard it said that some instructors, CFIs, etc, are worried that a particular individual, though licenced, is such a bad pilot that they wouldn’t trust them to carry any passenger, let alone an Angel Flight passenger. This is a matter for examining the licencing process and certainly not for the restriction of Angel Flight. CASA needs to look at the root problem and not concentrate on “symptoms” by restricting Angel Flight, and if it tries to catch this problem in this way, is entirely missing the proper focus.

5. Maintenance

It is agreed, also by CASA, that the maintenance burden on GA is part of the burden killing GA. CASA has recommended new classifications and requirements for maintenance. Angel Flight pilots and owners, if undertaking activities other than Angel Flight, are perfectly entitled to take advantage of these new requirements.

But by undertaking Angel Flight, CASA forces pilots and owners out of the categories available to them, and forces them into the higher charter category maintenance.

This is a case of:

a. Inadequate thought given to a patchup proposal, and the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing, given the much wider implications, and
b. A case of maintenance compliance being driven by a passenger class, and not a pilot/owner entitlement, when it should be driven by aircraft need, with no aircraft being superior or inferior to another as far as care is concerned, regardless of passenger group.

Item 7 - CASA must resolve the clash with other regulations so that pilots and owners are not denied their natural rights available in other provisions

Denial of natural rights also may well be actionable.

6. Conclusion

I support the terms of the Angel Flight organisation submission, and it should be read in addition, adding a further voice to it.
CASA has been pursuing Angel Flight for some time. It tried to enter a proposal in the past. It was withdrawn. It is time CASA recognised that this is not a sphere in which it ought to be involved. If it is serious about supporting and enhancing GA activities, it should recognise where action is not required. And action is not required where
a. increased administrative burden limits laudable activities – to no good end in safety or otherwise;
b. regulation diminishes the properly licenced rights of individual pilots;
c. a demonstrably safe activity will not lead to enhanced safety if this proposal is implemented;
d. proposals impose extra conditions on pilots/owners outside their existing licences, thus modifying their licence conditions surreptitiously.

It is my view that if this proposal was implemented it would be easy to mount legal action on the basis of:

a. Discrimination legislation
b. Adding non-agreed conditions to existing licences
c. Limiting options otherwise allowed by right, and even recommended, by CASA, to pilots and owners

CASA must be extremely cautious with what it is proposing, as the implications are likely to be actionable, and extend far wider than Angel Flight. This probably comes from a poorly considered patch-up attempt to address “symptoms” rather than a root cause.

I strongly recommend that this proposal not be proceeded with.

Associate Professor Andrews
CPL and CIR holder.

It is interesting to note that Associate Professor Chris Andrews is also a medical doctor and a 15 year CASA approved DAME, who also made this excellent submission to the CASA Avmed review in 2017:

MTF...P2  Cool

Angel Flight embuggerance update: 15/02/19

In the HoR yesterday the Angel Flight Embuggerance legislative instrument was finally tabled:

Quote:Title - Civil Aviation Act 1988—Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998—Civil Aviation (Community Service Flights - Conditions on Flight Crew Licences) Instrument 2019—CASA 09/19—F2019L00134

Source - House of Reps

Date - 14-02-2019

Parliament No.45

Tabled in House of Reps - 14-02-2019


Instrument link:

; & Explanatory Statement:


The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has assessed that community service flight operations have a higher risk of an accident or incident due to the existence of risk factors that are not usually present in baseline private operations. The purpose of the instrument is to mitigate this risk by placing conditions on flight crew licence holders conducting such operations that relate to requirements on the pilot (licence requirements, aeronautical experience, recency and medical fitness), operational and notification requirements and aircraft maintenance requirements.


Section 98 of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (the Act) empowers the Governor-General to make regulations for the Act and in the interests of the safety of air navigation. Relevantly, the Governor-General has made the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR) and Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (CAR).

Regulation 11.068 of CASR allows CASA, for subsection 98 (5A) of the Act, to issue a legislative instrument that imposes a condition relating to a matter mentioned in that subsection on a specified class of authorisations. Authorisations include flight crew licences, ratings and endorsements.

Overview of instrument

The main object of the Act is to establish a regulatory framework for maintaining, enhancing and promoting the safety of civil aviation, with particular emphasis on preventing aviation accidents and incidents.

Community service flights are non-emergency flights that primarily transport people to specialist medical treatment and are coordinated, arranged or facilitated by an entity for a charitable purpose or community service purpose. These flights are conducted by volunteer pilots under conditions that can be challenging. Pilots can operate from a variety of unfamiliar locations in varying weather conditions with no organisational oversight or safety support from a certificated air operator. Pilots conducting such operations might become subject to self-induced pressure to start or complete a flight because of a passenger’s medical condition.

The lack of organisational safety risk mitigators and the reliance on individual pilot assessments regarding a pilot’s acceptance of a volunteer flight, and the flight’s commencement or continuance, results in an increased need for pilots in command to be experienced and operationally recent. CASA has assessed that persons travelling on aircraft conducting community service flights are subject to flight operations of increased risk compared to charter or regular public transport flights. Although such persons are informed that these flights are not charter or regular passenger transport flights, there remains doubt regarding whether a non-aviation professional adequately understands the specific risks posed by this kind of operation.

Since 2011, community service flight accidents have resulted in 6 fatalities. To take account of the elevated risks, CASA considers it is appropriate to establish a regulatory baseline that provides clarity regarding an appropriate minimum safety standard. The instrument is intended to introduce reasonable and proportionate additional safety measures.

The instrument places conditions on the licences of flight crew members that conduct community service flights. The conditions introduce safety measures in relation to pilot licensing, medical fitness, and aeronautical experience. Operational requirements include that community service flights at night must be conducted using instrument instead of visual procedures. A community service flight can only be conducted in an aeroplane, and aeroplanes with a lower standard of airworthiness are excluded. There are also enhanced maintenance requirements for some aircraft.

Via the Shame or Fame for McCormack thread:


The CAsA v Angel Flight issue can no longer be swept under the carpet. The CAsA DAS and Board have failed to deliver on the Ministers SOE, a very serious and legal non-compliance.

I have copied this directly from Miniscule Chester, his Statement of Expectations for the Board of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority for the Period 27 March 2017 to 30 June 2019, and  I am highlighting these sections;

1. “I also expect the Board to facilitate effective interaction between CASA and the industry”. As Ben Morgan succinctly pointed out - FAIL
2. “CASA consider the economic and cost impact on individuals, businesses and the community in the development and finalisation of new or amended regulatory changes”  - FAIL
3. “CASA undertake effective and ongoing engagement with the aviation industry to create a collaborative relationship between CASA and industry based on a foundation of mutual understanding and respect” - FAIL

The CAsA DAS, Board Chair and current Minister for Infrastructure must be removed immediately!!!!!

Via the AOPA Oz thread:

(02-14-2019, 07:02 AM)Peetwo Wrote:  Via the ABC News yesterday:

...Disallowance still possible in Federal Parliament

Today's announcement is not a change of regulation.

CASA said it was a "licence condition" of the sort for pilots volunteering to fly medical patients.

The changes will come into effect on March 19 but must also follow an approval process through both houses of Federal Parliament.

If any MP raises a motion of disallowance against it, a debate and vote will be brought on which would decide whether the new conditions would continue.

So far, Queensland MPs Bob Katter and Lachlan Millar have voiced their concerns over the new standards...

This brings me to the possibility of there being a disallowance motion; or being legally challenged through the Parliamentary processes - ref:

The disallowance process

The Act provides the framework for the standard disallowance regime, which is reflected in the standing orders. The key features are as follows:
  • within 15 sitting days after tabling a senator or member of the House of Representatives [but in practice usually the former] may give notice of a motion to disallow the instrument (in whole or in part) (s42);
  • if the motion is agreed to, the instrument is disallowed and it then ceases to have effect;
  • if a notice of motion to disallow the instrument has not been resolved or withdrawn within 15 sitting days after having been given, the instrument is deemed to have been disallowed and it ceases to have effect;
  • disallowance has the effect of repealing the instrument – if the instrument repealed all or part of an earlier instrument then disallowance also has the effect of reviving that part of the earlier instrument;
  • an instrument 'the same in substance' cannot be made again (s46–48):
    • within 7 days after tabling (or, if the instrument has not been tabled, within 7 days after the last day on which it could have been tabled) (unless both Houses approve);
    • while it is subject to an unresolved notice of disallowance; and
    • within 6 months after being disallowed (without the approval of the House that disallowed the regulation).
Figure 1: Usual disallowance system

[Image: Brief-Guide-19_Disallowance.jpg?la=en]

Also of interest from the above Parliamentary reference link are these sections:

4. Regulations and Ordinances Committee

This committee, established in 1932, scrutinises all instruments of delegated legislation to ensure that they:
  • are made in accordance with the enabling Act, the Legislation Act and other applicable Acts;
  • do not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties;
  • do not make rights and liberties of citizens unduly dependent on administrative decisions that are not subject to independent merits review;
  • do not contain matter more appropriate for an Act of Parliament.
For further information about the committee, see chapter 15 of Odgers' Australian Senate Practice, or the committee's web pages.

5. Human Rights Committee

Statements of compatibility with human rights must be included in the explanatory statements for legislative instruments (s15J). The Joint Committee on Human Rights examines all instruments against seven specified international human rights conventions and reports its findings to both Houses. For further information, see the committee's web pages.

From the explanatory statement this is the blurb on the Human Rights (s15J) requirements:

[b]Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights[/b]

Prepared in accordance with Part 3 of the
Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011

[b]CASA 09/19 — Civil Aviation (Community Service Flights — Conditions on Flight Crew Licences) Instrument 2019 [/b]
This legislative instrument is compatible with the human rights and freedoms
recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of the
Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.
[b]Overview of the legislative instrument[/b]

A community service flight is defined in the instrument as one that transports a person (the patient) for the purpose of receiving non-emergency medical treatment. There is no charge to a patient or persons accompanying the patient to provide support or assistance. The flights are coordinated, arranged or facilitated by an entity for a charitable or community service purpose.
Community service flights are conducted by volunteer pilots under conditions that can be challenging. Pilots can operate from a variety of unfamiliar locations in varying weather conditions with no organisational oversight or safety support from a certificated air operator.
CASA has assessed that community service flight operations have a higher risk of an accident or incident due to the existence of risk factors that are not usually present in baseline private operations. The purpose of the instrument is to mitigate this risk by placing conditions on flight crew licence holders that relate to requirements on the pilot (licence requirements, aeronautical experience, recency and medical fitness), operational and notification requirements and aircraft maintenance requirements.
In essence, the conditions introduce safety measures in relation to pilot licensing and medical fitness, aeronautical experience and recency of experience. The conditions also impose operational requirements and enhanced aircraft maintenance requirements for certain aircraft. Among other things, a pilot of a community service flight is required to submit a flight notification to Airservices Australia.

Human rights implications

The instrument engages the right to protection against arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Right to protection against arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy

Article 17 of the ICCPR provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to unlawful attacks on honour and reputation. It further provides that everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Section 10 makes it a condition on a flight crew licence that the pilot must not pilot an aeroplane operated for a community service flight unless the pilot submits a flight notification that identifies the flight as a community service flight. A flight notification involves the provision to AA of the name of the pilot. Flight notification information is required for safety regulatory purposes so that the pilot of an aircraft can be identified if necessary. Flight notification information is also used for search and rescue and recovery operations in the event of an incident, and to investigate incidents.

Reasonableness, necessity and proportionality

The requirement to submit a flight notification involves activities of one or more of the collecting, recording and storing of personal information. This is reasonable as it relates to data and information that is required to promote the safety of persons on a community service flight for search and rescue purposes in the event of an incident. The flight notification requirement also upholds the integrity of the safety regulatory scheme that protects the individuals on a flight by ensuring that information is available about who is performing activities affecting safety and demonstrating that they are appropriately authorised.

There are no other sources of the information available that will adequately and efficiently serve the regulatory purposes.
The requirements are also proportionate as they operate to ensure the fulfilment of safety objectives which are required to ensure the protection and safety of the individuals on the flight, and seek only the minimum information to identify persons with safety-related responsibilities.
The protections afforded by the Privacy Act 1988 continue to apply.

To the extent that the instrument limits the privacy-related rights in Article 17 of the ICCPR, those limitations are reasonable, necessary and proportionate for safety purposes, consistent with the objects of the Act.


This legislative instrument is compatible with human rights and, to the extent that it may limit human rights, those limitations are reasonable, necessary and proportionate to ensure the safety of aviation operations and to promote the integrity of the aviation safety system.
Civil Aviation Safety Authority

Not so sure about compliance with the Human Rights requirements, the CASA statement does seem somewhat contrived and cherry picked to suit a (their) purpose?? However the section under'Regulations and Ordinance Committee' I would of thought is of interest from a legal perspective?? Especially when you consider the bollocks and misleading statement under the sub-heading of 'consultation':


CASA published a Discussion Paper in December 2014 that sought responses from the aviation community and public to assist CASA in its consideration of non-regulatory and regulatory options for enhancing the safety of community service flights. CASA did not proceed to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at that time, but decided to continue to monitor the operation of community service flights.

Formal consultations on a draft of the instrument were conducted by CASA from 18 December 2018 through to 31 January 2019. CASA received 233 responses from this consultation. All comments were read and assessed to determine areas of agreement and disagreement with the draft proposal, and the justifications provided for changes to the draft. This feedback highlighted that the proposal as consulted did not in all cases reflect requirements that were necessary, proportionate and cost-effective to mitigate the risks presented by the conduct of community service flights as private operations.

In response to the feedback CASA made significant modifications to its proposal in relation to the kinds of aeroplanes that may be used to conduct a community service flight, multi‑engine aeroplane pilot experience requirements and aircraft maintenance requirements. With respect to the latter, the proposal that aeroplane engines must be maintained in accordance with the standards applicable in commercial charter operations was removed. Other changes intended to improve and clarify the intent of the instrument were also made. CASA has also published a Summary of Consultation document that identifies and categorises the comments received, and how CASA has responded to these.

Rumour is that there is a small but growing conga line of concerned HoR independent pollies that are prepared to submit a motion for disallowance in next week's sitting of the House of Reps, so I guess there will be much MTF..P2 Cool

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