[Peetwo]

Dear Betsy RE: Bring back Lachie; & where's the ICAO report please?

Sorry to All - However we seem to be stuck in at least a 5 year Ground Hog Day and things are only getting worse...  

Ref:

The 2023 ICAO focused safety audit and assessment

In February 2024 ICAO completed its final report following a focussed aviation safety audit held in September 2023. The report reaffirmed that Australia has an effective aviation safety oversight system. The report highlighted areas where Australia could more fully realise the benefits of closer alignment with ICAO’s standards and practices and these areas will be responded to through corrective action plans agreed with ICAO and updates to our State Safety Program (SSP) and National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) this year. ICAO also undertook a State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment in September 2023. ICAO assessed Australia as having a mature aviation safety system overall that proactively identifies, manages and mitigates safety risks.

Refer to correspondence (24/02/18) from Lachie (and my reply), a former Senior Bureaucrat, from the Department of Infrastructure in the Aviation and Airports division, with the title of Director International Standards: 

Dear Lachie -

Correspondence from the Department of Infrastructure etc..etc:

---

Dear P2,
 
In responding to this chain of correspondence I have tried to summarise some questions for ease of reading.
 
For questions on the provision of accident reports, the ATSB remains committed to meeting its international obligations in providing reports to ICAO, noting it has already acknowledged the circumstances relating to previous delays.  The ATSB requested a full audit from ICAO in relation to their implementation of Annex 13 which was conducted in April 2017.  This resulted in no findings relating to its reporting processes.  ICAO is not currently awaiting any further reports from the ATSB.
 
In relation to the recruitment of Australia’s nominee to the Air Navigation Commission, this was advertised publicly.  As per Departmental policy this was advertised on the APS Jobs website as well as the Seek website from 16th May to 2nd June.  The nominee to the ANC is a non-ongoing employee with the Department.  There is no conflict of interest in the role, as they are providing Australian expertise to an international aviation body which focuses on defining global standards to facilitate safe and efficient international air services.
 
For comments on filing of differences, as per Article 38 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), of which Australia is a signatory, we file a range of differences with ICAO. Airservices Australia regularly publish these in the Aeronautical Information Publication available on their website.  Australia takes a proactive and conservative approach, updating its differences often and reporting any point of difference to allow operators the information they need to conduct safe operations.
 
Due the subjective nature of filing differences, the comparison of numbers of differences is not regularly used as a measure.  State’s safety oversight arrangements at ICAO are benchmarked through an assessment process leading to an effective implementation score.  Australia was assessed in October 2017 by ICAO auditors and while the results are yet to be made public it places Australia in the top 10 States for safety oversight compliance. 
 
An earlier email refers to a trigger of 20 aviation fatalities for an audit, however this is not the case.  ICAO maintain their own risk profile for conducting audits and accident rates are compared, particularly relative to air traffic volumes.  This is one factor along with outcomes from recent assessments, State’s level of updating differences, responding to ICAO correspondence, aviation growth, political stability and maturity of safety systems amongst others.
 
Regards,
 
Lachlan Phillips
Director International Standards
Aviation Environment Branch | Airports & Aviation Division
Department of Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities
T: +61 2 6274 6869 | M: +61 432 756 844 

---

& my reply... 

---

Dear Lachlan,



Thank you for responding to my questions which were originally addressed to our permanent representative to ICAO Sam Lucas to be forwarded to the ICAO Secretariat. For your ease of reading, and in order to properly summarise what we (PAIN) require from the department, I have attempted to address each of your ‘summary points’ in an abbreviated Q&A paragraph format. 
    

To begin you said: 

“..For questions on the provision of accident reports, the ATSB remains committed to meeting its international obligations in providing reports to ICAO, noting it has already acknowledged the circumstances relating to previous delays…The ATSB requested a full audit from ICAO in relation to their implementation of Annex 13 which was conducted in April 2017.  This resulted in no findings relating to its reporting processes.  ICAO is not currently awaiting any further reports from the ATSB…” 

Q/ When you said - ‘circumstances relating to previous delays’ - did you mean the ATSB response to Karen Casey in the DIP process to the VH-NGA re-investigation final report? (See attached at ATSB response to K3)


Your response and the ATSB DIP reply comment fails to address the identified safety concern that was relayed to Sam Lucas in PAIN’s supportive report for and on behalf of Karen Casey (see attached).

Quote:
 Due to the Norfolk inquires, serious investigations began in 2015. This revealed that a ‘modified’ PDF copy of the preliminary Pel-Air ditching report did exist on the ICAO data base. Tracking of the document shows no changes were made. It appears that the document was ‘on-file’ within the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) from ‘created’ date - 15 January 2010; but, was not provided to the ICAO before 10 November, 2015.
 
Further investigation of preliminary and final reports between 2009 to 2015 revealed that almost every report entered between 2009 and 2011 was uploaded by an ATSB officer during the same week the ‘modification’ of the Pel-Air ditching took place.
 
There exist four (4) examples of the 2009/2010 reports which were, apparently, submitted to ICAO ADREP in the first week of November 2015, presumably by an ATSB data input officer.
 
These are attached as PDF copies. To allow a determination of when the PDF copy of the [i]occurrence report was actually created, click on FILE, go to 'Properties' in the drop down box and click. Then view date 'created' date.[/i]
 
Research indicates a ‘selective’ approach to reporting and categorising of incident and accident.
 
The PAIN data base reflects the manipulation of categorisation and subsequent lack of reporting clarity – even where an investigation as actually been carried out. ICAO reporting aside, the significant, progressive reduction in SR made since the fatal accident at Lockhart River, 2005 is of grave concern to the industry.     
 
For your information PAIN has access to both the ICAO iSTARS ADREP and ECCAIRS databases, to which there is considerable evidence that these reports are not being properly disseminated to industry.
 
Now it could be, as you say and have obviously been led to believe, that these ICAO reporting aberrations have been addressed from the ATSB/Australian end. This would then suggest that the disconnection of Australian AAI reports being made publicly available could be somewhere in the downstream communication with ICAO. Therefore the ATSB excel file (see attached), containing 108 ATSB completed investigations between November 2015 till November last year, could provide a valuable reference for both Australia and ICAO to cross reference to check the integrity of the ADREP system and the downstream dissemination of these valuable air safety reports.
 
You said:
 
“..In relation to the recruitment of Australia’s nominee to the Air Navigation Commission, this was advertised publicly.  As per Departmental policy this was advertised on the APS Jobs website as well as the Seek website from 16th May to 2nd June.  The nominee to the ANC is a non-ongoing employee with the Department.  There is no conflict of interest in the role, as they are providing Australian expertise to an international aviation body which focuses on defining global standards to facilitate safe and efficient international air services…”
 
Comment: Thank you for that, I guess I didn’t go back far enough inside of the Seek website to which I regularly refer. On the comments on COI I guess I’ll have to agree to disagree but PAIN will be actively monitoring the performance of Mr Tiede in both his roles. Especially in light of the ongoing ATSB/Coroner investigation(s) into YMEN B200 DFO accident and it’s tie in with the Senate Inquiry into the Airport Amendment Act 2016 and the 41 pages of Australian notified differences to ICAO Annex 14 Vol 1 (see attached pic).
 
You said:
 
 “…For comments on filing of differences, as per Article 38 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), of which Australia is a signatory, we file a range of differences with ICAO. Airservices Australia regularly publish these in the Aeronautical Information Publication available on their website.  Australia takes a proactive and conservative approach, updating its differences often and reporting any point of difference to allow operators the information they need to conduct safe operations. 

Due the subjective nature of filing differences, the comparison of numbers of differences is not regularly used as a measure.  State’s safety oversight arrangements at ICAO are benchmarked through an assessment process leading to an effective implementation score.  Australia was assessed in October 2017 by ICAO auditors and while the results are yet to be made public it places Australia in the top 10 States for safety oversight compliance…”  

Comment: I am fully cognisant of the Airservices AIRAC publication but disagree with some of the premises and assumptions that you make in the above paragraphs.
 
To begin here is the link for the latest ASA notified differences AIRAC: http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/...7-h136.pdf
 
I guess it could be argued that the AIP SUP does allow operators the information they need to conduct safe operations ?? However whether that information can be easily disseminated when you consider the many 100s of pages and thousands of notified differences that AIP SUP links to is an entirely different matter.
 
In comparison please refer to the five pages of GEN 1.7 of the Singaporean CAAS AIP:  https://www.caas.gov.sg/docs/default-sou...1feb18.pdf
 
The following is a quote from the KC_ICAO_1 PDF (see above or attached) which we believe summarises why it is that we have such a huge number of notified differences to ICAO and why we think this is a significant safety issue concern:
 
“.. In general, it must be stated that the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has an unique approach to ICAO compliance, with record number of ‘notified differences’. Many of the notifications may, at face value, seem insignificant. It is our opinion that the noted differences are structured to support the complex, contradictory, flawed rule set in place. Reform of this rule set has been in train for thirty years, with successive government ministers and directors of civil aviation promising to complete the task ‘within the next three years’. This is an important consideration as it reflects on the operational approach taken to both open reporting of ‘incident’ or event; and, the tangible fear of prosecution. Australia’s Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) are founded on the ‘criminal code’ and ‘strict liability’; this, standing alone, provides a strong disincentive to openly reporting safety related matters. This attitude is reflected in the government safety bodies approach to ICAO compliance and reporting…”
 
PAIN understands that the department policy is to place very little importance on notified differences being a ‘measure’ on aviation safety standards of ICAO signatory States.
 
Reference: 1.2 Supplementary to submission 1 (PDF 60 KB) 
 
Did the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development collate and analyse the differences lodged with the ICAO by Serbia and Vanuatu when their respective Memoranda of Understanding and proposed Air Services Agreements were being negotiated?
 
No. Air services arrangements provide an economic framework in which airlines can consider serving a market. Differences lodged by States, among other more pertinent kinds of safety-related information, may be taken into account by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority in the assessment of applications for the operation of foreign aircraft into and out of Australia.
 
Regards
Gilon Smith
Director (a/g), Air Services Negotiations
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development
gilon.smith@infrastructure.gov.au Ph: 02 6274 6634

 
However the above departmental answer to the QON would seem to have been contradicted in the other supplemental submission:  1.1 Supplementary to submission 1 (PDF 78 KB) 
 
“..The process of notification of differences provides a structured way for each State to communicate its aviation rules by measuring itself against the neutral framework of the ICAO standards…”
 
Q/ Given this conflict in interpretation of notified differences as a ‘measuring’ stick of aviation standards and the fact that the department was obviously responsible for creating the Serbia/Vanuatu/Australia 10696 notified differences table, for the benefit of the Senate RRAT committee and industry stakeholders, would it not be possible for the department to collate a similar table for say the top 50 ICAO signatory States?
 
Q/ For the benefit of the committee would it be possible (in camera if required) for the department to forward the:
 
a/ 2017 ICAO audit report of the ATSB;
b/ The 2009 FAA IASA audit report of the CASA;
c/ The 7 December 2009 CASA Board minutes;


Finally, considering the positive feedback the department has received from ICAO’s October 2017 audit, would it be possible for the committee to view that report prior to it’s public release? Would it also be possible for the department to suggest that CASA invite the FAA IASA auditors back to audit and compare whether all the 2009 FAA IASA audit findings have been properly and proactively addressed? 
  
PAIN and associates look forward to your response and welcome the dialogue the department has opened up with industry.
 
Kind regards,

P2

I believe not one of the multiple of serious safety issues we (PAIN) uncovered back then has been addressed and if anything the drift away from compliance with ICAO international safety standards has gotten far worse. At least (six years ago) we had someone (Lachie) whose job it was to create the illusion that we cared about appearing to be more closely aligned with the ICAO SARPs...

Question to add to above (to hopefully Lachie's replacement??), can we please have a copy of the latest ICAO audit report??   

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

ICAO compliance: The Exemplar (Singapore) vs the Normalised Deviant (Australia) -

First an excellent article from the North Carolina University Journal of Law (Fall 2004), titled 'Compliance & Enforcement in International Law: Achieving Global Uniformity in Aviation Safety'. This article is well worth a full read for a layman's better understanding of the original spirit and intent and international legal obligations for compliance with the ICAO Annexures standards IE SARPs:

PG 10: "..Article 12 of the Chicago Convention requires every
contracting state to keep its regulations uniform, to the greatest
extent possible, with those established under the Convention. 29
Article 37 of the Convention attempts to achieve uniformity in air
navigation, by requiring that every contracting state cooperate in
achieving the "highest practicable degree of uniformity in
regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to
aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in
which uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation."3
The sentence that follows provides that, "[t]o this end [ICAO]
shall adopt and amend from time to time... international
standards and recommended practices and procedures" addressing
various aspects of air navigation.31 Therefore, ICAO's 188
member states have an affirmative obligation to conform their
domestic laws, rules, and regulations to the international leveling..

..standards adopted by ICAO.32

In 1948, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution encouraging
contracting states to adopt "so far as practicable, the precise
language of those ICAO Standards that are of a regulatory
character .... ICAO has drafted its Annexes in a way to
"facilitate incorporation, without major textual changes, into
national legislation. 34 Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing),35 Annex 6
(Operation of Aircraft),3 6 and Annex 8 (Airworthiness of
Aircraft) 37 require ICAO's 188 member states to promulgate
domestic laws and regulations to certify airmen, aircraft, and
aircraft operators as airworthy and competent to carry out safe
operations in international aviation.3

" Subject to the notification of
differences, the legal regime effectively assumes that states are in
compliance with these safety mandates. 39 Thus, although member
states retain the right to restrict particular aircraft from their
skies,4

" they lose the right to ignore the safety mandates of the..

..governing international organization - ICAO." This assumption
of universal compliance goes further with the Chicago Convention
requirement that an airman or operator certificate, or certificate or
airworthiness, issued by one contracting state shall be recognized
as valid by all others.42

Under Article 33, states are obliged to recognize the validity of
the certificates of airworthiness and personnel licenses issued by
the state in which the aircraft is registered, so long as the standards
under which such certificates or licenses were rendered are at least
as stringent as those established under the Chicago Convention.43
But this principle of mutual recognition works only if all states are
implementing the SARPs with an equal degree of diligence. Too
often, it is too difficult or impossible to tell." The negative
implications of Article 33 are that if a state fails to comply with
"the minimum standards which may be established from time to
time pursuant to this Convention,, 45 then other states are not
obliged to recognize the validity of the certificates of
airworthiness issued by the delinquent state, and may therefore
ban such aircraft from their skies. This is an important incentive
for compliance with the international obligations established by
ICAO.."

Perhaps this article should be required reading for Betsy, Su_Spence, Harfwit Popinjay and their bloated minions...

Especially when you consider the following WWC (weasel word confection), from Betsy's Department of everything website under the heading of 'Australia and ICAO', where it states:

As a foundation member of ICAO, Australia has contributed significantly to ICAO – including as a Part 1 State of Chief Importance on the ICAO Council - for more than 70 years. Australia participated in the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation, and was one of the first States to ratify it.

Since ICAO’s inception, Australia has demonstrated a strong commitment, dependability and leadership in the international civil aviation sector.

We work collaboratively with the international community, regional neighbours and the ICAO to enhance standards and guidance for safety, security and facilitation, air navigation, and environmental protection.

In particular, in the Asia Pacific region where air travel is vital to the economic development and social connectivity of the Pacific Islands, Australia works closely with our Pacific neighbours through providing capacity and capability building assistance on transport safety, air navigation and security issues.

Australia has maintained a Permanent Mission in Montreal for ICAO since 6 June 1945, and is represented on the ICAO Air Navigation Commission. We were successfully re-elected to Part I of the ICAO Council at the 40th Assembly in Montreal in September 2019 as one of the States of chief importance in air transport.

If Betsy & CO want an incentive to truly uphold any of that waffle and their commitment to harmonisation and compliance with ICAO SARPs, then perhaps the following extract from AMROBA's latest Newsletter will provide examples and motivation for a rethink on the current (take the piss) strategy/policy when it comes to international diplomacy on Aviation safety standards:

Differences with ICAO Annexes

The 2023/2024 ICAO audit/report “highlighted areas where “Australia could more fully realise the benefits of closer alignment with ICAO’s standards and practices (SARPs)” and these areas will be responded to through corrective action plans agreed with ICAO”. 

Those “corrective action plans” should be made public. It has nothing to do with security or secrecy. AMROBA has been recommending adoption of ICAO standards for 20 years.  Differences lodged with ICAO are very misleading to any other nations assessing our differences. For instance, Annex 1, Chapter 4 difference:

This is misleading information being provided to ICAO and other nations, stating Australia has competency-based training and qualifications but not working with ASQA or recognising AQF AME qualifications for helicopter and unpressurised aeroplanes in regulatory requirements.

All the major regulatory systems “provide specific guidance material on the design and development of training programs for aircraft maintenance personnel, especially EASR Parts 66/147 that were partially adopted.” 

By government not providing specific guidance material on the design and development of training programs for aircraft maintenance personnel, compliance with ICAO SARPs have not been implemented, nor has harmonisation with EASR Parts 66/147 A & B regulations.

• Australia now has a critical shortage of aircraft maintenance personnel.
• Australia is not a major regulatory system.

The USA, EU, Canada, Brazil, UK are major regulatory systems.

It is no wonder why ICAO stated that Australia (industry) would benefit from adopting SARPs.

Remember, past CASA CEOs stated they would urgently realign Part 21 with FAR Part 21 but have done nothing.

Ever since CASA decided to use EASA regulations as the model for CASRs, the differences with the ICAO Annexes SARPs have continued to rise.  Why haven’t governments met the intent of the Convention?
“ICAO: These ICAO standards are essential because they ensure uniformity and consistency across the global aviation industry. When countries adhere to ICAO SARPs, they can be confident that their aviation practices meet internationally recognized safety criteria. This uniformity is particularly crucial for international flights, where aircraft and personnel from different countries must operate seamlessly together.
ICAO monitors member states’ compliance with its safety standards and recommended practices through safety oversight audits and reviews.
These audits identify areas where member states may be falling short in implementing safety standards and recommend corrective actions. This proactive approach ensures that countries continuously work towards improving their aviation safety systems and practices.
The harmonization of aviation safety standards promotes global connectivity by removing barriers and ensuring compatibility among aviation systems worldwide. This enables smoother international travel, trade, and cooperation, ultimately benefiting economies and societies around the globe.”
• Why is government/CASA living in the past?  Nobody knows.
• Why won’t they look to the future?   Nobody knows.  
• Why won’t they implement ICAO SARPs?  Nobody knows.

ICAO provides courses for NAA staff on how to “Plan and Implement ICAO SARPs.” 

Next, let's rewind to page 1 for the original intent of this long running thread and with reference to the infamous UP Senate Inquiry thead...

Newsflash: JQ is Gobble's new chopper pilot in Montreal!

I was half way up Mt Noncompliance contemplating yet another FF crevasse followed by a geyser of FF pony pooh, when lo and behold JQ and Gobbles were hovering above me in a shiny new Bell 406. Gobbles manned the winch and within minutes I was pass the FF PNR onwards and upwards….we proceeded to a point 343 metres above sea level and this is what we found…



Note: Creamy touched on this NCN briefly but perhaps it needs a bit more exploring to test the FF veracity on their proposed actions/inactions (by proxi notified differences) and it is also relevant in regards to the inquiry i.e. Flight recorders err OBRs…err CVRs!

1) FF said they were going to file a difference with ICAO by 31 October 2008! Did they?
Well after much teasing, fluffing, huffing and puffing mixed in with a series of expletives (FFS there must be literally thousands of notified differences to ICAO!) while reading over the extremely convoluted AIP SUP H12/11, I finally think I’ve found it in the Annex 6 section.
Here is what it says at Para 3.6.3.4.2.2…“No standards are specified in Australian legislation for the preservation of flight recorder records.”

"..Okay so the reason for creating this thread is to; a) kick around and review Murky's latest bollocks SSP; b) attempt to scale (ICAO) Mount Non-compliance and establish whether c) it is possible to reign in the significant growth of NCNs prior to the upcoming ICAO/FAA audit..."

So the thread has developed since September 2016 highlighting that, when it comes to compliance with ICAO, Australia is clearly taking the piss with it's notification of differences lists to ICAO SARPs.

Extract from post #8:

..It is worth noting that of the listed 10,696 notified differences from the three countries, 4024 were from Australia, this is a disturbing 38% of the total. But what is more disturbing is the figure in the 'Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented' category (in other words the 'up yours' category... ), which was an UDB 2078, compared to 41 Serbia & 9 Vanuatu... :

4024 notified differences for Australia?? Recently I had collated from the 2015 AIP GEN 1.7 SUP that notified differences had grown to a total of 3116. However in actual fact between the 2011 SUP the figure had grown to 4024 but due to the loose ICAO arrangement of only listing NDs every 3 years this was missed. So from my approximate estimate from 2011 to 2014 the NDs had grown by 2500.

This means that in actual fact in the period between 10 February 2014 till November 2015 the Department has managed to reduce the notified differences by 908.

Still got a long way to go but perhaps this highlights more than anything else the impact that the Senator Fawcett inquisition had way back on the 10 February 2014...

Okay so that was the ND count back then and I believe, for a brief period, the total of NDs actually dipped below 3000 and less than 300 pages. However I have now conducted a rough count (with tired eyes maybe skipping or adding here and there?) and unfortunately the total ND count is on the way up again with over 400 pages and 3100 notified differences - see here: https://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip...ndards.asp if you wish to verify.

The worst example of non-compliance with any of the Annexes was by a country mile Annex 14, with 69 pages and a 1024 NDs... I guess that's what you get when a Government and it's bloated Bureaucracy decide that is an acceptable safety risk to build massive shopping centres alongside active ILS runways...

Incidently when you review the 'Safety Audit Results: USOAP interactive viewer' for the latest self-assessed results for Australia for 'Aerodromes', Betsy and his Minions believe we are over 87% compliant with ICAO - UDB??

Next, Singapore has been a member State of ICAO since 19/06/1966, therefore a mature enough signatory State (IE working under the ICAO SARPs for more than 50 years) and in our region for a 'Chalk & Cheese' comparison. Therefore I refer you to the following AIP Singapore CAAS link: https://www.caas.gov.sg/docs/default-sou...y-2024.pdf

So therefore their GEN 1.7 totals 4 pages...









For Annex 14 there are 5 notified differences - WOW 5 vs 1024...

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

ICAO compliance: Normalised Deviant (Australia) - TICK TOCK!! FAA (IASA) audit??

Latest from KC and AMROBA...

Via AP emails:

To all members, 

Making regulations to give effect to the ICAO (engineering) SARPs would provide benefits to the engineering sectors.

We all know that.

The government’s adopted harmonisation policy in the 1990s was on target to achieve these benefits.

CASA 2003/4 decision to go EASRs changed all that. 

The engineering benefits cannot be achieved with multiple differences lodged with ICAO against Annex 8, in particular.

When will government policy return to be in compliance with the SARPs? 

The first step is to adopt ICAO defnitions so we all use the global aviation terminology and meanings.

We are not unique, just another civil aviation country that is more focused on being unique and not harmonised. 

Maybe the recent ICAO audit findings may change government policy. 

Many say we would be better off if we kept the ANRs/ANOs 

Read the attached document that we will be putting on the website.

 Ken Cannane

Executive Director

AMROBA

Phone: (02) 97592715

Mobile: 0408029329

www.amroba.org.au

Safety All Around.

Ref: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...-1-pdf.jpg



 

Plus today, KC with a work in progress...

ICAO Compliance numbers

"As I put the numbers in it is alarming..."

Ref: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...ance-1.pdf

P2 in reply to numerous recipients -  :

FYI (see attached) plus:

1.  ICAO compliance: The Exemplar (Singapore) vs the Normalised Deviant (Australia)

2. Mushrooms v Bubble Heads (Round 28).

Q/ How much has been lost (over the last 20+ years) from our GDP in earnings from lost potential international aeronautical industry export and domestic aviation productivity, with the draconian, isolationist,  internationally disharmonised aviation standards and Big-R regulatory policy of the Australian Aviation Safety Bureaucracy?

Q/ How long before ICAO are forced to call in the FAA IASA team to properly audit Australia?

Ref: https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/iasa 

---

The traveling public expects aviation to be the safest mode of transportation around the world, and the FAA's International Aviation Safety Assessment program – called IASA – is one of its proven, longstanding instruments to make sure those expectations are met.

Through this shared commitment among the FAA and civil aviation authorities around the world, the IASA program helps identify areas to strengthen aviation safety oversight and meet the United Nation's International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards.

When another country's air carrier flies into the U.S., or codeshares with a U.S. air carrier, they must meet safety standards set by the ICAO. Through the IASA program, the FAA focuses on a country's ability, not the ability of individual air carriers, to adhere to those international safety standards and recommended practices.

You can find more details about these standards and practices such as personnel licensing; operation of aircraft; and, airworthiness of aircraft, within the ICAO "Chicago Convention".

Specifically, the IASA program assesses and determines a country's compliance with these international standards on the ICAO's eight critical elements of effective aviation safety oversight in the ICAO Document 9734, Safety Oversight Manual. Those eight critical elements include:

1. Primary aviation legislation
   
2. Specific operating regulations
   
3. State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions
   
4. Technical personnel qualification and training
   
5. Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety critical information
   
6. Licensing, certification, authorization, and approval obligations
   
7. Surveillance obligations
   
8. Resolution of safety concerns
   

The IASA program is administered by the FAA Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (AVS), Flight Standards Service (AFS), International Programs and Policy Division (AFS-50). Supported by the FAA's Office of International Aviation (API), these divisions further work with countries who request additional assistance based on the IASA program's findings.

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

KC updates ICAO Compliance Numbers -

Via the AP email chains:

"..I have updated the differences chart.

Each part/volume is linked to the ASA website.

Have added department/agency responsible for each annex. 

Makes interesting reading.."

Ref: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...ance-3.pdf



As another point of comparison for ICAO compliance, the following is the current list of NDs for the State of Qatar... - Ref: https://aim.gov.qa/eaip/2018-09-13-AIRAC...en-GB.html

GEN 1.7 DIFFERENCES FROM ICAO STANDARDS, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

1. ANNEX 1 — PERSONNEL LICENSING, Eleventh Edition, July 2011:
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 Annex 1, 4.3.2 and 4.4.1.4 exceeds Qatar had adopted Class 1 medical certificate for air traffic controllers instead of Class 3 Qatar has adopted more stringent medical requirements for ATCOs.
2. ANNEX 2 — RULES OF THE AIR, Tenth Edition, July 2005: NIL differences.
3. ANNEX 3 — METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE FOR INTERNATIONAL AIR NAVIGATION, Eighteenth Edition July 2013:
NIL differences
4. ANNEX 4 — AERONAUTICAL CHARTS, Eleventh Edition, July 2009:
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 Chapter 4 Not applicable Intentionally left blank SARPS not adopted in the national regulation for the State of Qatar
2 Chapter 5 Not applicable Intentionally left blank SARPS not adopted in the national regulation for the State of Qatar
3 7.6.3 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
4 7.8.2 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
5 8.8.2 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
6 9.8.2 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
7 10.8.2 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
8 11.3.3.2 Not applicable Intentionally left blank Recommendation not adopted in the national regulation for the State of Qatar
9 11.4 Different in character Recommendation not adopted 210 x 148mm (A4 as the standard size of paper for IAC)
10 11.9.2 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain
11 12.4 Different in character Recommendation not adopted 210 x 148mm (A4 as the standard size of paper for IAC)
12 16.7.12.1 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain.
13 17.7.12.1 Not applicable (not applicable) Due to local terrain.
14 Chapter 18 Not applicable Intentionally left blank SARPS not adopted in the national regulation for the State of Qatar
15 Chapter 20 Not applicable Intentionally left blank SARPS not adopted in the national regulation for the State of Qatar
5. ANNEX 5 — UNITS OF MEASUREMENT TO BE USED IN AIR AND GROUND OPERATIONS, Fifth Edition, July 2010: NIL differences.
6. ANNEX 6 — OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT, Part 1 – Ninth Edition, July 2010:
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 6.2.2.1 Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented Implementation date is 31 December 2018 instead of 31 December 2016 for halon-free extinguishers Implementation date is 31 December 2018
7. ANNEX 6 — OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT, Part 2 – Eighth Edition, July 2014:
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 Section 2- 2.4.2.3 Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented Implementation date is 31 December 2018 instead of 31 December 2016 for halon-free extinguishers Implementation date is 31 December 2018
8. ANNEX 6 — OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT, Part 3 – Seventh Edition, July 2010:
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 Section II 4.2.2.1 Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented Implementation date is 31 December 2018 instead of 31 December 2016 for halon-free extinguishers Implementation date is 31 December 2018
2 Section III 4.1.3.2 Less protective or partially implemented or not implemented Implementation date is 31 December 2018 instead of 31 December 2016 for halon-free extinguishers Implementation date is 31 December 2018
9. ANNEX 7 — AIRCRAFT NATIONALITY AND REGISTRATION MARKS, Sixth Edition, July 2012: NIL differences.
10. ANNEX 8 — AIRWORTHINESS OF AIRCRAFT, Eleventh Edition, July 2010: NIL differences.
11. ANNEX 9 — FACILITATION, Fourteenth Edition, October 2015: NIL differences.
12. ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Vol I – Sixth Edition, July 2006: NIL differences.
13. ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Vol II – Sixth Edition, October 2001: NIL differences.
14. ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Vol III – Second Edition, July 2007: NIL differences.
15. ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Vol IV – Fifth Edition, July 2014: NIL differences.
16. ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Vol V – Third Edition, July 2013: NIL differences.
17. ANNEX 11 — AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES, Thirteenth Edition, July 2001: NIL differences.
18. ANNEX 12 — SEARCH AND RESCUE, Eighth Edition, July 2004: NIL differences.
19. ANNEX 13 — AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION, Tenth Edition, July 2010: NIL differences.
20. ANNEX 14 — AERODROMES, Vol I – Sixth Edition, July 2013: NIL differences.
21. ANNEX 14 — AERODROMES, Vol II – Fourth Edition, July 2013: NIL differences.
22. ANNEX 15 — AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION SERVICES, Fifteenth Edition, July 2016.
No. Annex Provision Difference Category Details of Difference Remarks
1 5.1.1.1 Partially implemented Item (u) – pertaining to volcanic activity No volcanic activity in the State of Qatar.
2 5.2.3 Not applicable SNOWTAM No snow in the State of Qatar.
3 5.2.4 Not applicable ASHTAM No volcanic activity in the State of Qatar
4 5.3.4 Partially implemented ASHTAM is excluded ASHTAM not being issued by the State of Qatar.
5 7.1.1.1 Partially implemented Item (20) not adopted. Snow plan is omitted in the list.
6 7.1.1.2 Not applicable Snow plan Not applicable due to local climate.
23. ANNEX 16 — ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Vol I – Seventh Edition, July 2014: NIL differences.
24. ANNEX 16 — ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Vol II – Third Edition, July 2008: NIL differences.
25. ANNEX 17 — SECURITY — SAFEGUARDING INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE, Ninth Edition, March 2011: NIL differences.
26. ANNEX 18 — THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY AIR, Fourth Edition, July 2011: NIL differences.
27. ANNEX 19 — SAFETY MANAGEMENT, First Edition, July 2013: NIL differences.

Hmm...fairly close to the Singaporean version of GEN 1.7, plus it includes the NDs for PANS-OPS:

29) PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (PANS-ATM, DOC 4444) 16th Edition Amendment 7A: NIL differences.

30) PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS Volume I - Flight Procedures, 5th Edition Amendment 7: NIL differences.

31) PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS Volume II - Construction of Visual and Instrument Flight Procedures, 5th Edition Amendment 7: NIL differences.

Hmm...funny how the QatarGATE matter had nothing to do with Aviation Safety - see HERE (from the Conversation) - but merely a protection racket for Qantas and any form of serious international airline competition in the Oz airline market?? Seriously if Qatar wanted to take the Albo Government to task it would be easy enough for them to expose our serious non-compliance issues in regards to our obligations to be as closely compliant to the ICAO SARPs as 'one of the States of chief importance in air transport' - UDB!

MTF...P2

[Kharon]

Things that make you go Hmmm!

Its not really idle speculation, more of an 'I wonder' or a 'what if'  - more the sort of thing you'd bring up at the Pub; hardly worthy of a scribble, but curious to see what wiser heads may have to say. Here is the 'Line' which started the notion; that, the FAA video and P2- HERE - which set me to thinking about Australia's 'differences' lodged' with ICAO.

"Therefore, ICAO's 188 member states have an affirmative obligation to conform their
domestic laws, rules, and regulations to the international levelling"..

Now, its not only Qantas who operate in the USA, there are other States which are really ICAO and IASA compliant; have to be, 'them's the 'rooles'. In turn, other national carriers who are 'used' to operating in ICAO/IASA 'compliant' countries come to Australia, with the expectation of systems and aerodromes etc. being on a par. Yet they are not. How many flight crew have read through the hundreds of pages of 'differences' and, more to the point, how many 'operators' have ploughed their way through those differences and drafted 'special' procedures and warnings for flight crew operating into Australian airspace and aerodromes?

Of course, non of this matters in day to day routine operations; esoteric perhaps, maybe even irrelevant on a routine - just another shift at the mill day: operationally. Until something goes wrong and the casual world of 'routine' operations ends up in a court. Just suppose a 'difference' - practice or procedure was deemed the radical (or even partial) cause of a hull loss (for example) - what then? Insurance legal top dogs don't mess about; if there is even a slim argument that an Australian 'difference' was part of the causal chain, that would be exploited? Could an ICAO or IASA compliant national carrier be held to account for being 'non compliant' with their own 'systems' operating into a national system which is non compliant? See the turn about - the national carrier's book work says 'Thou shall't not'  - but due to the 'differences' - technically (legally) - are they in breach of their own tenets? A lawyers picnic I reckon.

It is the horror story at Essendon which prompted the thoughts; well that and the DFO parked within the runway confines and the foreign aircraft turning up for service at Bombardier. The intriguing part is what is 'causal' - aircraft hits building - building responsible for causing damage; but not party to the cause for the event? No brainer; the building is arguably 'illegal' - (lost cause) - but not responsible for the aircraft hitting it: i.e. not 'causal'. Intriguing ain't it.



Ref: https://www.australianflying.com.au/late...ice-centre



Ref: https://auntypru.com/essendon-dfo-accide...christine/

Anyway; too much time spent already on the legendary 'Chicken and Egg' argument. Just needed to file and forget these stray notions.

Toot - toot.......

[Peetwo]

Things that make you go Hmmm! - Part II

Previous:

Its not really idle speculation, more of an 'I wonder' or a 'what if'  - more the sort of thing you'd bring up at the Pub; hardly worthy of a scribble, but curious to see what wiser heads may have to say. Here is the 'Line' which started the notion; that, the FAA video and P2- HERE - which set me to thinking about Australia's 'differences' lodged' with ICAO.

"Therefore, ICAO's 188 member states have an affirmative obligation to conform their
domestic laws, rules, and regulations to the international levelling"..

Now, its not only Qantas who operate in the USA, there are other States which are really ICAO and IASA compliant; have to be, 'them's the 'rooles'. In turn, other national carriers who are 'used' to operating in ICAO/IASA 'compliant' countries come to Australia, with the expectation of systems and aerodromes etc. being on a par. Yet they are not. How many flight crew have read through the hundreds of pages of 'differences' and, more to the point, how many 'operators' have ploughed their way through those differences and drafted 'special' procedures and warnings for flight crew operating into Australian airspace and aerodromes?

Of course, non of this matters in day to day routine operations; esoteric perhaps, maybe even irrelevant on a routine - just another shift at the mill day: operationally. Until something goes wrong and the casual world of 'routine' operations ends up in a court. Just suppose a 'difference' - practice or procedure was deemed the radical (or even partial) cause of a hull loss (for example) - what then? Insurance legal top dogs don't mess about; if there is even a slim argument that an Australian 'difference' was part of the causal chain, that would be exploited? Could an ICAO or IASA compliant national carrier be held to account for being 'non compliant' with their own 'systems' operating into a national system which is non compliant? See the turn about - the national carrier's book work says 'Thou shall't not'  - but due to the 'differences' - technically (legally) - are they in breach of their own tenets? A lawyers picnic I reckon.

It is the horror story at Essendon which prompted the thoughts; well that and the DFO parked within the runway confines and the foreign aircraft turning up for service at Bombardier. The intriguing part is what is 'causal' - aircraft hits building - building responsible for causing damage; but not party to the cause for the event? No brainer; the building is arguably 'illegal' - (lost cause) - but not responsible for the aircraft hitting it: i.e. not 'causal'. Intriguing ain't it.



Ref: https://www.australianflying.com.au/late...ice-centre



Ref: https://auntypru.com/essendon-dfo-accide...christine/

Anyway; too much time spent already on the legendary 'Chicken and Egg' argument. Just needed to file and forget these stray notions.

Toot - toot.......

While on the subject of the Bombardier facility at Essendon Fields airport, Bombardier is a recognised first class Canadian aircraft manufacturer, with a long and proud history of producing a economically competitive and ICAO safety compliant commercial aviation product. Therefore it is with interest that I reviewed the latest 132 page Canadian Transport iteration of the AIP GEN, which includes GEN 1.7 and the 37.5 pages (refer from pg 26) of NDs that Canada submits to ICAO...   

Out of interest there are 9 pages of NDs listed under Annex 14: (ref: GEN 1-50 to GEN 1-60):

Things that make you Hmmm??

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Things that make you go Hmmm! - Australian Non-compliance with Annex 11 TIBA??

Via IFALPA: https://www.ifalpa.org/media/4060/24sab0...rspace.pdf

Operations in Australian Traffic Information
Broadcasts by Aircraft (TIBA) Airspace
Operations in Class A, C, D or E Airspace without ATC Services

NOTE
This Safety Bulletin was distributed by IFALPA Member Association AusALPA. IFALPA
believes it to be relevant to the global pilot community and is reproducing it here for
your information. In all cases please follow the guidance of your operator and local
regulator.

Please review and share widely wherever relevant.

ATTACHMENTS
Four (4) page Safety Bulletin, Operations in Australian Traffic Information Broadcasts by
Aircraft (TIBA) Airspace – Operations in Class A, C, D or E Airspace without ATC Services
24AUSALPASAB01, April 2024

©2024 The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations. This publication is provided for information purposes only, in all cases pilots should follow their company’s guidance and procedures. In the interest of flight safety, reproduction of this publication in whole or in part is encouraged. It may not be offered for sale or used commercially. All reprints must credit IFALPA.

---

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Things that make you go Hmmm?? - AIP GEN 1.7 rest of the World continued/-

The latest ICAO member State publication (I can find) that summarises both the importance and principles of a member State being compliant with the ICAO standards and notifying a difference to those standards, is from the Oman PACA (Public Authority for Civil aviation) December 2019 document 'Procedures Manual for the Notification and Publication of Significant Differences':

1. Foreword

These procedures have been adapted from ICAO Doc 10055 Manual on Notification and
Publication of Differences and associated procedures in Doc 8126.

Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) are technical specifications adopted by the
Council of ICAO in accordance with Article 37 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation
(Chicago Convention) in order to achieve "the highest practicable degree of uniformity in
regulations, standards, procedures and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and
auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation".

SARPs are critical to ICAO Member States and other stakeholders, given that they provide the
fundamental basis for harmonized global aviation safety and efficiency in the air and on the
ground, the worldwide standardization of functional and performance requirements of air
navigation facilities and services, and the orderly development of air transport.

Furthermore, ICAO publish Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) which are documents
approved by the ICAO counsel and recommended to states for worldwide application. As such
they attempt to make air navigation services uniform across the world.

The establishment and maintenance of international Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs), as well as Procedures for Air Navigation (PANS), are fundamental tenets of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation and a core aspect of ICAO’s mission and role in ensuring
civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport
services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and
economically.

While the implementation of Standards is considered, by definition, obligatory, the Chicago
Convention also recognizes, through Article 38, that there are instances when this is impracticable
or it is necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing from those established by Standards.

When this occurs the State is required to notify the difference to ICAO and publish details of the
difference in the National AIP to provide flight crews, and other stakeholders, with information
which is essential to international operations, and which is not readily available.

Oman's GEN 1.7 consists of 3 pages: https://www.caa.gov.om/upload/files/AIP%...%201.7.pdf

Also from the Middle East, Jordan's CAA has 6 pages: https://carc.gov.jo/pdf/GEN_1.7_Diffrenc...edures.pdf

Nepal, a developing Asian country, also has a 6 page GEN 1.7: https://e-aip.caanepal.gov.np/_uploads/_...48eb67.pdf

Much MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Chalk & Cheese: Annex 11 notified differences - USA v Oz

Courtesy KC of AMROBA fame..

Annex 11 – CASA/FAA lodged Differences.

Aviation Comparisons – Annex 11. If it wasn’t so important it would be humorous. How, after 77 years complying with the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, we still cannot get it right?

The following are Annex 11 definitions and references to Annex requirements...

(Although the comparison between CASA and the FAA (in number at least) seems relatively similar, there is IMO a stark difference in the principles and subsequent potential safety risk in the context of the notifications that have been submitted.)

Here is the Oz ND list (a fairly reasonable 4 pages): https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...EP2023.pdf

However I now want to focus on TIBA, which falls under Chapter 4 para 4.2.2:

4.2.2 Flight information service provided to flights shall include, in addition to that outlined in 4.2.1, the provision of information concerning:

a) weather conditions reported or forecast at departure, destination and alternate aerodromes;

b) collision hazards, to aircraft operating in airspace Classes C, D, E, F and G;

c) for flight over water areas, in so far as practicable and when requested by a pilot, any available information such
as radio call sign, position, true track, speed, etc., of surface vessels in the area.

Note 1.— The information in b), including only known aircraft the presence of which might constitute a collision hazard to the aircraft informed, will sometimes be incomplete and air traffic services cannot assume responsibility for its issuance at all times or for its accuracy.

Note 2.— When there is a need to supplement collision hazard information provided in compliance with b), or in case of temporary disruption of flight information service, traffic information broadcasts by aircraft may be applied in designated airspaces. Guidance on traffic information broadcasts by aircraft and related operating procedures is contained in Attachment B.

Here is the Oz ND for that paragraph:

Partially implemented. In Class E and Class G
airspace, a VFR aircraft is provided specific
information concerning collision hazards
(traffic information) only if: a. the aircraft is
within surveillance system coverage and b. the
pilot is receiving a surveillance information
service (the aircraft is identified)

This is the ICAO Annex 11 Attachment B - 1. Introduction and applicability
of broadcasts:

1.1 Traffic information broadcasts by aircraft are intended
to permit reports and relevant supplementary information of an
advisory nature to be transmitted by pilots on a designated
VHF radiotelephone (RTF) frequency for the information of
pilots of other aircraft in the vicinity.

1.2 TIBAs should be introduced only when necessary and
as a temporary measure.

1.3 The broadcast procedures should be applied in
designated airspace where:

a) there is a need to supplement collision hazard information provided by air traffic services outside controlled
airspace; or
b) there is a temporary disruption of normal air traffic
services.

1.4 Such airspaces should be identified by the States
responsible for provision of air traffic services within these
airspaces, if necessary with the assistance of the appropriate
ICAO Regional Office(s), and duly promulgated in aeronautical information publications or NOTAM, together with
the VHF RTF frequency, the message formats and the
procedures to be used. Where, in the case of 1.3 a), more than
one State is involved, the airspace should be designated on the
basis of regional air navigation agreements and promulgated
in Doc 7030.

1.5 When establishing a designated airspace, dates for the
review of its applicability at intervals not exceeding 12 months
should be agreed by the appropriate ATS authority(ies).

This is the Skybrary reference for TIBA: Traffic Information Broadcasts by Aircraft (TIBA)

Designation of TIBA Areas

ICAO envisages that TIBA procedures should only apply in designated airspace where either it is necessary "to supplement collision hazard information provided by air traffic services outside controlled airspace" or "there is a temporary disruption of normal air traffic services". In the former case, if more than one Member State is involved in a designation, it is expected that it will be promulgated in ICAO Doc 7030. Airspace and frequency designation for TIBA is considered to be the responsibility of the Member State and should be promulgated by means of a NOTAM which details the message formats and procedures to be used. ICAO also expects that TIBA designations will be reviewed at intervals "not exceeding 12 months". It is accepted that if a TIBA procedure is being introduced because of a temporary disruption to the provision of ATS in controlled airspace, then one or more frequencies normally used for that purpose in the designated airspace may be used for TIBA.

Hmm...so I guess legally Betsy, Su_Spence and Harfwit could argue that they are operating TIBA airspace within compliance of the ICAO SARPs. However whether they are operating TIBA within the original spirit and intent of the SARPs IMO should be severely scrutinised by ICAO and the FAA IASA, given the heightened potential for a safety incident occurring in such compromised self-separating airspace (or I guess, we could notify a further difference to Annex 11 Attachment B )??

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Chalk & Cheese: Annex 6 Part II  - FAA vs CASA

Courtesy KC... : Annex 6 Part II CASA-FAA Differences



KC comment:

"..Looking at this comparison between Australia and USA lodged differences to this Annex, one can come to one conclusion.

It must be harder for government to “use different words”; “not defined”; “does not define that term”; etc., instead of adopting the Annex SARPs and the global aviation language used by ICAO and other nations like the FAA. 

The list of differences is staggering when compared to the FAA differences. 

Leave it to you to make your own opinion. 

To me, any government agency that is this far out of touch with the Annex SARPs need to be re-focused..."

MTF...P2 

[Sandy Reith]

Ken Cannane’s sterling work shines light where no one in government is looking, much to their shame.
The only addition to make to Ken’s thorough analysis would be rather than “re-focussed” much better would be re-cast the whole structure as it is well proven to be totally unviable and not fit for purpose.
This means start by restructuring all aviation back where it belongs in a Westminster responsible government which is within a Department with Minister at head.

[Peetwo]

Courtesy KC & AMROBA...

Via the AP emails:

Aviation Regulatory Reform – Convention Obligations and Responsibilities


I, and many ex-regulators, cannot believe the unique state of compliance with the Convention Annexes text that aviation requirements contrast so much from the global civil aviation language. It is almost though regulatory reform no longer considers Australia’s obligations under the Chicago Convention; an international treaty ratified by Australia before many participants were born.

Looking at the differences lodged, there is a constant theme that government is unwilling to adopt the global civil aviation language, abbreviations, definitions that manufacturers and other NAAs include in their documentation that Australian aviation participants use daily. 

Excerpts from AG presentation at a seminar on treaties

“A treaty is an international agreement concluded in written form between two or more States (or international organisations) and is governed by international law. A treaty gives rise to international legal rights and obligations.

·       By ratifying the Convention (treaty), Australia voluntarily accepts legal obligations under international law.

·       Australia must implement parts of treaties in domestic law to ensure they can meet their treaty obligations.

·       A failure to get it right domestically is no defence internationally.

·       One method is to give the force of domestic law to the actual text of the treaty or the operative parts of the treaty.

·       Another method of implementing treaties by statute is to include a fairly short provision along the lines that the statute is subject to Australia's obligations under international law, including those under treaties to which Australia is a party.

This is a subject which will only grow in importance as treaties are used to create international regimes and standards on an expanding range of matters, which in turn will need to be implemented by Australia.”

Under Article 37, Australia is obliged to “collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation.”

ICAO, in 1948, made a resolution, supported by Australia, to draft all Standards and Recommended Practices so member States could adopt straight into legislation.  This was re-supported by Australia in 1992.

• The AG Department presentation above stated this in one option.
  

Using this AG policy to use the actual treaty Annex text to fulfil our treaty obligations, how hard is it to adopt the SARPs without lodging any differences with ICAO?

If the actual text was used, our differences would be minimal.

To check this concept we compared CASA & FAA differences lodged for:

Annex 6, Part II General Aviation,

Annex 6, Part III Helicopters and

Annex 8,

Text of each Annex is available from the following site.

Annex 6, Part II, General Aviation Aeroplane Operations select and read text.

Annex 6, Part III, Helicopter Operations select and read text.

Annex 8, Airworthiness of Aircraft select and read text.

As anyone will understand if they read the treaty annexes, they are minimum safety standards, not maximum, written in plain English, easy to adopt.

 

Regulaty reform simplified process:

1. Adopt Convention text
   
2. Review to ensure not in conflict with other Australian laws.
   
3. Amend to harmonise with other Australian laws.
   
4. Submit for consulation.
   

 

Ken Cannane

Executive Director

AMROBA

Phone: (02) 97592715

Mobile: 0408029329

www.amroba.org.au

Safety All Around.

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Airport Noise Inquiry: AFAP AQON response to ICAO tailwind standards etc.

Via RRAT IMPACT AND MITIGATION OF AIRCRAFT NOISE webpages: Additional Documents

4  Australian Federation of Air Pilots, response to written questions from Senator Canavan, and Senator McKenzie (received 6 May 2024)

2. Question received after AFAP evidence on 15 April 2024:

• Can you please respond to evidence provided by the Brisbane Airport
Corporation, around 3pm at the public hearing on 15 April 2024, regarding
safety standards on tail and crosswind limits?

Based on the transcript from around 3pm, the AFAP assumes that the evidence provided by
the Brisbane Airport Corporation (BAC) to which the Committee refers is:

Senator COLBECK: But it's an international standard of five.

Mr Coughlan: The international standard's at five. There are airports overseas that at night
do allow higher, for noise management. But it's an individual case for that airport.

Senator COLBECK: What was the basis of your submission to increase it to seven? What
were the drivers for it, and who did you consult with?

Mr Boyle: There have actually been three applications over the last decade to restore the
10 knots—or to increase the tailwind limit. Following its removal, Airservices applied to CASA
for 10 knots. That was rejected. BAC followed up with an application for 10 knots that was
rejected around 2017. In 2022, post-opening—we now have more data on the operation of the
runways—the decision was made to submit a safety case for seven knots, as that was seen as
being a compromise between the five and the 10. We believe we would still get improvement in
SODPROPS from seven knots. The safety case was actually prepared and submitted by
Airservices, and they did consult widely. There may have been some confusion this morning
because AusALPA were consulted on the safety case twice in February 2022. They made 11
individual submissions, all in opposition to the safety case. But they were certainly—

Senator COLBECK: So the position hasn't changed?

Mr Boyle: They were certainly consulted.

Senator COLBECK: I suppose, in the safety sense, this goes to a particular perspective
in relation to a standard being a standard being a standard. That's why I asked the question about
the number of airports in Australia that have a variation to the ICAO standard and the actual
desirability of that.

Mr Boyle: To put that into context—

Senator COLBECK: I understand you're trying to resolve some problems. I get that side
of it.

Mr Boyle: In terms of standards, ICAO has around 11,200 standards across the aviation
business. If a country wishes to operate to a different standard, they file a difference with ICAO
because individual CAAs or CASAs make their own assessments. At the moment, out of that
11,200, Australia has filed 4,280 differences with ICAO—so, of the 11,000 standards, we are
different in 4,000 areas. From our perspective, we then don't understand from a risk perspective
why you would not consider an application for seven knots on its merits.

Senator COLBECK: Just because there's been a whole range filed doesn't take away from
the point about the consistency of the standard and not having to, from an operational perspective,
look at variations all the time in an operational sense. That's why I asked the specific question
about the desirability of it. Just because somebody has done it doesn't necessarily make it more
desirable.

Mr Boyle: I don't disagree with you. I think global standards are a good thing, particularly
for an industry like aviation. It is a global market or a global activity, so having consistency is
important. Having a single standard, however—five knots—that applies to a very short grass
runway in Papua New Guinea versus our 3.6 kilometre runway in Brisbane with extensive wind
measurement—air traffic control sometimes seems to be challenging, and taking a risk based
approach on an individual or airport basis seems reasonable particularly when the outcomes for
the community could be so significant.

The general thrust of BAC’s evidence appears to be that:

1. The AFAP (via AusALPA) was consulted in detail over the safety case for an increase
in the tailwind limit for Brisbane Airport; and

2. It is common and usual to move away from ICAO standards.

The AFAP’s response to the above BAC evidence is as follows:

1. As per our response to the first question, having reviewed our files, we accept that
AusALPA was aware of an intention to develop a safety case and included in industry
engagement by ALARP Solutions over what it referred to as a risk review of the proposal
for a 7kt tailwind limit which would then lead to a safety case.

2. AusALPA did not see or review the safety case and AusALPA has still not been provided
with the safety case.

3. The description of AusALPA’s consistent opposition to any move away from the ICAO
standard on tailwind limitations without significant and overwhelming justification is
accurate.

4. The evidence from BAC that of approximately 11,000 ICAO standards Australia has
filed differences to approximately 4000 ICAO standards is not a reason to file more.

5. The provision under the Chicago Convention for a nation State to file differences is
provided with an intention that there are genuine reasons for the State to do so and the
provision is not meant to be considered as an equally viable option as to the alignment
of the States regulations with the ICAO standards. Differences are meant to be the
exception, with States needing to provide reasons for this need.

6. Consistency of standards is very important for safety and the interoperability with the
rest of the world. Australia as an aviation State has a significantly greater number of
differences filed in comparison to other nations.

7. The broad characterisation of Australia having over 4000 differences to over 11,000
ICAO standards is also misleading. The vast majority of these differences are minor
wording differences that achieve the same result. Changing the tailwind limit for the
selection of a runway would be a major difference that reduces safety and is completely
different to most of the 4000 differences which are minor wording differences in our
legislation.

8. The AFAP is concerned that BAC is attempting to create plausibility for another
difference (in this instance a significant safety difference) to be filed and added to the
already excessive list of differences.

While on the subject ICAO and non-compliance with the SARPs etc., I note that last week Betsy and his merry band of FUF(s) squeaked out, with absolutely zero fanfare from the FUF or miniscule DK media spin doctors, the following request for industry feedback on the DRAFT 2024 ICAO SSP and NASP: Australia’s aviation State Safety Programme and National Aviation Safety Plan 

..We’re seeking your feedback on proposed updates to both the State Safety Programme (SSP) and the National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP). These documents outline Australia’s aviation safety oversight systems and enhancement activities.

---

..The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requires each member State to implement an SSP to demonstrate its aviation safety systems and framework, in addition to a NASP outlining planned national level improvements to address identified aviation safety risks and enhance safety.

The SSP and NASP represent Australia's response to the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the Asia Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Plan (AP-RASP), and importantly fulfil Australia's commitment to Annex 19 – Safety standards requirements under the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

The SSP and NASP are reviewed every three years to align with the review and updating cycle of the GASP and the AP-RASP.

In case you think you may have missed the announcement, here's the links for the Betsy and Dicky King MR pages:

Media resources

• Ministerial media releases and speeches
  
• Departmental media releases and speeches
  

However it was mentioned on social media:

AusGov Infrastructure
@AusGovInfra

✈️ Have your say on proposed updates to our aviation State Safety Programme and the National Aviation Safety Plan. ?These documents outline Australia’s aviation safety systems and activities.

Have your say by 31 May: https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/have-y...afety-plan

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

Bollocks - & I wonder?

Mr Boyle: "There have actually been three applications over the last decade to restore the 10 knots—or to increase the tailwind limit. Following its removal, Airservices applied to CASA for 10 knots. That was rejected. BAC followed up with an application for 10 knots that was rejected around 2017. In 2022, post-opening—we now have more data on the operation of the runways—the decision was made to submit a safety case for seven knots, as that was seen as being a compromise between the five and the 10. We believe we would still get improvement in SODPROPS from seven knots. The safety case was actually prepared and submitted by Airservices, and they did consult widely. There may have been some confusion this morning because Aus ALPA were consulted on the safety case twice in February 2022. They made 11 individual submissions, all in opposition to the safety case. But they were certainly" etc.— Bollocks..........


I wonder? - Is it a waste of time and energy to even try to explain, in 'lay' language to office bound bubble dwellers why there are very sound safety/ legal and operationally based needs for a 'maximum' tail wind 'standard. The subject is not overly complicated, but requires a modicum of common (or garden) sense. I shall, with apologises to those who do actually 'fully' understand the 'safety' implications, dip my thumb nail into the tar pot and construe. (Stop here if you get it)....;

First let us paint a picture; surrounding our aerodrome there is some rising terrain; nothing spectacular; just rising terrain ahead, Cairns in Qld - for example.

For ease of 'numbers' lets use a working example of 120 knots (222.21 kph). So, from the beginning of the runway to overhead the terrain; we have 10 miles to work with. Basically (*) to get an aircraft 'airborne'; it requires airflow, relative to 'over the wings' - forward speed less than tail  wind speed is useless for 'lift'. Relative to wing performance airflow, is provided by the power plant (engines); if there is a 10 knot 'headwind', then then, insofar as 'wind over wing' the engines are 'ahead' and, bonus, the opposing 'head wind' slows the aircraft speed 'over the ground' - so it is a win win. A little more time before reaching the terrain i.e. a better height to distance ratio. Clearly desirable when confronting 'rising terrain' ahead. As the wind direction moves left or right from straight ahead; this 'achieved' climb gradient equation reduces - this is a 'cross-wind' situation - the climb gradient numbers don't change very much - but; there is a reduction and a slight increase in the distance of runway used. Once again, not critical, but worthy of consideration when factoring take off weights and terrain clearance.

Routine stuff; done a million times everyday - world wide; very nearly safe as houses. Nearly that is until something goes pear shaped, and Murphy is dealt a hand.  There are many opportunities for this to happen; but of greatest concern must be the 'engine failure' case- ranked only second to structural failure - think of Sully and the Sea Gulls. An engine failure at the most critical juncture during a take off is always a major consideration and allowances are made (reduced weight = reduced payload) to accommodate the event; this is a 'cost' to operator factor which is universally enforced; part of the game. With an 'engine out' - a 'head wind' is an essential element; the climb gradient (height for distance) is severely reduced. Once gain, this is all factored into the calculations to ensure, as far as possible, that aircraft and terrain are properly and legally separated. Only makes legal, operational and common sense.

The 'handy' 10 knot 'headwind' for take off becomes a critical part of the 'safety' equation. A 10 knot tail wind is liability - for starters; the aircraft must be going forward at 10 knots before the over wing airflow begins to create the essential 'lift'. The 'lift' from the wing is generated by the 'relative' (front to rear airflow) NOT the speed the aircraft is travelling at. Zero lift at 10 knots indicated.

You can see the quandary - it is always a compromise even with a headwind. Tail wind take off demands the aircraft 'get ahead' of the ambient wind before the wings can generate the essential 'lift'. This 'reduces' the useful runway distance available distance required (to reach 10 knots); which naturally takes the aircraft closer to obstacles ahead and reduces the climb gradient ratio.

All logical, factored and 'accommodated' within 'safe' boundaries before take off is initiated. So far so good, all neat and tidy, working within 'fixed' parameters, even down to the accurately calculated margins:based on the critical engine failure case (for transport aircraft).

So what's the fuss about 'tail wind' operations? The internationally adopted 'Five Knot'  standard is a 'considered' maximum' weighted on the side of 'a wide range of non quantifiable variables. Amongst these, consideration is given 'averages' things like the performance of engines which are not brand new, air-frames which have covered many miles, completed many take off and landings, handled by many different pilots. So, yes, there is a 'conservative' element within the equations; and, rightly so. Exceptions? operationally - yes: but mostly approved, fully 'justified' and with limitations applied - not all aerodromes are 'equal'. 

Which brings us to landing the aircraft at the other end - this, believe it or not, has an increased 'risk' element; and is - with a 'tail wind component - probably the part of the flight which has the least 'predictable' outcome. There are some situations when there is a strong, gusty cross wind, 'quartering' behind; quite often with associated turbulence. Flight crew can manage these conditions; but - (always a but) the distance required for the landing run is, once again, carefully calculated. Predicted on the aircraft weight, producing a 'speed' margin and based on using a specific 'area' of the runway (touch down zone). Should the aircraft stray outside of these parameters, then 'safety' (legal and operational) is compromised. Not just in terms of running off the end of the runway; this is the least likely result. The 'danger' zone is where the aircraft is 'dirty' - landing flap, engines spooled down, landing gear extended - low energy and high workload to deal with should (a) the final approach need to be terminated at low level and an engine fails during the process. This is the highest category of risk. Aye; Mathematically low probability, but it has, does and will happen again. This is where the insidious, inherent dangers of allowing operations with increased tail wind component truly reside. The overshoot may be masterfully managed; low, slow and 'dirty' - engine failure - massif (big) reduction in climb gradient - rocks and trees and other stuff - much closer now- Tick Tock and Murphy rules.

ICAO standard is a 5 knot maximum; world wide.

“Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.”

Believe it or not; this time honoured, many times proven adage applies to governing bodies, airport operators and idiot air traffic managers who think they, in pursuit of the holy dollar, can, with impunity decide they know better and are prepared to roll the dice. The polite response is a firm 'No', not on my command; the alternative (recommended) response is 'Piss off - and boil your bottom' or word to that effect.

With my sincere apologies to those actually know what they are talking about:-

Toot - toot.

[Peetwo]

SSP & NASP 2024 DRAFT Consult a sham??

I noted that 4 days ago on social media Su_Spence decided to promo the SSP NASP DRAFT consult...err why??

Civil Aviation Safety Authority
49,476 followers
4 days ago

Have your say on proposed updates to Australia's aviation State Safety Programme and the National Aviation Safety Plan.

These documents outline Australia’s aviation safety oversight systems and enhancement activities.

Find out more: https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/have-y...afety-plan

Perhaps the response so far has been underwhelming?? -  Normally CASA & CO wouldn't care too much about the consult numbers, after all it is just a tick in the box routine. However this particular version is under scrutiny from the ICAO USOAP audit team and therefore needs to be properly disseminated and assessed by an otherwise disengaged industry??

Here is the DRAFT SSP for those interested in providing input - https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...p-2024.pdf

While doing so keep this line in mind...

"...Both the draft State Safety Programme 2024 and draft National Aviation Safety Plan 2024 include enhancements recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) following its assessment of Australia’s safety oversight systems in September 2023..."

Hmm...bit hard for punters to assess those 'recommended enhancements' when we haven't yet seen the ICAO audit report??

Next, some input from KC...

Makes it clear that agencies talk directly to ICAO but is it right that AMSA & CASA go thru minister to access industry.

Airsevices and ATSB has direct access to the industry?

KC

It is also worth considering the Su_Spence regime's (read Dr Aleck) cynical word salad document for the current Fort Fumble strategic direction on international engagement...

Reference: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...o-2025.pdf

INTRODUCTION

Mindful of Australia’s overarching international commitments and global strategic interests, CASA approaches its international engagement in a manner consistent with its obligations under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (the Act), the Minister’s Statements of Expectations, the goals and objectives set out in CASA’s Corporate Plan, responsibilities outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding of Australia’s Agencies Involved in Civil and Defence Aviation in relation to the management of aspects of international activities, and the Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding in relation to arrangements for Australia’s participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization.

CASA personnel actively participate in meetings, conferences, workshops, panels, seminars and similar events convened by foreign national and international organisations across the globe. They serve as members of, and often chair, important international advisory, decision-making and policy-setting bodies. The knowledge and experience of CASA’s experts in a range of technical, operational and regulatory areas is widely recognised and respected. CASA’s contributions to the development of technical, operational and regulatory standards and practices at the global and regional levels are highly valued, and CASA’s continuing participation in these kinds of activities is frequently sought.

What a load of BOLLOCKS! 

Had to laugh at these bits...

"..In making decisions to align Australian practices or procedures with those of other jurisdictions, or recognise foreign permissions or authorisations, CASA will exercise discretion and consider global strategic interests and the impact of these decisions on Australia’s international commitments, consistent with CASA’s obligations under the Chicago Convention and other international agreements but with safety as the most important consideration, consistent with section 9A of the Act..."

"...Contributing to and influencing the development of new and amended Standards and Recommended Practices for inclusion in the Annexes to the Chicago Convention and associated guidance materials though membership of ICAO Technical Panels and Working Groups, tasked and overseen by the Air Navigation Commission..

...identify ICAO Secondments to contribute to the work of ICAO as well as providing strategic benefit to Australia through providing international leadership in this field and significant influence in the future of the ICAO USOAP CMA.."

Perhaps our over 4000 NDs to ICAO SARPs could be used as a benchmark for future amendments to all the SARPs?? - 

Much MTF...P2 

[Sandy Reith]

Thanks to Peetwo, shining light on the extraordinary incompetence of CASA is valuable to say the least. The all too clever and wordy statements from CASA are the same cut and paste ‘motherhood’ pronouncements that are stock in trade from a regulator that needs to be wound up.

[Peetwo]

Oz Aviation GROUNDHOG DAY (again): Albo's historical culpability on destroying an industry? 

Reference from Senate Estimates thread Budget Estimates 2024-25 Program; & AQON update?? 

Program link: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...5/RRAT.pdf

CASA:

Senator Janet Rice asked:

• Please provide, in table form, an annual breakdown of technical staff employed by CASA
from 2010 onwards.
• Could the breakdown please also include numbers of specific types of technical staff,
such as flight operations inspectors and airworthiness inspectors.

Answer:
An annual breakdown of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) workforce by aviation
technical classification for the period 2010-2023 is shown in Table 1 below. Organisational
alignment to move administration functions out of the technical division has occurred,
which has resulted in fewer total staff numbers, but maintains the functional and technical
deliverables.

Taking in that bureaucratic AQON waffle, to seemingly excuse the disturbing figures in the above table, which reveals that CASA is top heavy with bureaucratic administrative minions, while the tech crew numbers have stagnated and as a total are dropping off - IE 19 less tech crew than a decade ago.

Which brings me to why this is significant and relevant to this thread -   

First reference is to this March 2010 Gobbledock UP thread post, which features an old Ben Sandilands (RIP - ) article: 

Australian Safety Downgrade ??   

I am not sure whether this has been posted yet, but Sandilands has his information correct here. What an embarrassment and a farce. Although the FAA has a lot to answer for itself as its own backyard is a sloppy mess, but one has to wonder where things are headed in AUS? Lockhart River, Brasilia’s, Westwind’s, next ???

And the amazing thing is that even though the FAA and ICAO have shone a mighty large torch on the AUS Regulator, they still have maintained a line of inaction and sat on their hands! The government has not offered up one extra cent of funding, Fort Fumbles training for employee’s remains almost unheard of, and they are trying to cut back on FOI training and currency, they are cutting staff numbers by the week and those that aren’t made redundant are bailing faster than they can replace them, and there has been nil stable management leading the ship for years. Focus is not based on safety but is based upon budgets.

Oz aviation keeps rolling the dice on air safety

by Ben Sandilands

US Federal Aviation Administration audit of airline safety oversight in Australia that CASA welcomed last November has not gone smoothly, and could see this country downgraded by the American agency to the same untrustworthy category as parts of the third world.

In fact the results in November were sufficiently adverse to require further examination by the FAA in this country in coming weeks, this time without the spin evident in the only press release to come from CASA on this topic.

When asked to comment on reports by Washington DC sources that the FAA audit process had found insufficient progress had been made in fixing the deficiencies identified in a damning 2008 audit of Australian safety oversight by ICAO:

“The United States Federal Aviation Administration is conducting a review of Australia’s air safety systems. This review began late last year and is continuing.

Representatives from the Federal Aviation Administration visited Australia late last year and are scheduled to visit Australia again soon.

The review is looking at aspects of Australia’s aviation safety regulation and safety oversight framework. It is part of the United States’ routine international audit program of all nations whose airlines fly into US airspace.”
The CASA response doesn’t address the issues.

The original ICAO report, leaked to Crikey last May, found that CASA was under funded, was out of touch with its obligations under international aviation treaties, was incapable of identifying or understanding critical issues involving air safety, and was in part reliant on staff who were inadequately trained or otherwise incapable of dealing with key safety compliance matters.

As then reported, the final draft of the ICAO audit, the one that was waved around as a rapturous endorsement of Australian safety oversight by the Infrastructure and Transport Minister, Anthony Albanese, was in fact a negotiated summary of satisfactory outcomes that were contingent on extensive remedial work by CASA to a timetable that expired at the end of last year.

The appendices to the report, which outlined the incompetency of CASA, made grim reading, and while some of the ICAO mandated remedies were made as required, the FAA was always going to insist, whether invited or not, on finding out whether the nitty gritty of competent and comprehensive safety oversight had been achieved in full in Australia.

As yesterdays report on the ATSB failure to prosecute Jetstar for a blatant and determined refusal to comply with the law on reportable safety incidents illustrates, safety compliance and its oversight in Australia is non-existent by US standards.

We’re all flying in the lucky country, and the dice just keeps being rolled, again and again, on safety failures that attract serious penalties in the developed aviation world.

If CASA isn’t as lucky with the FAA as it was with ICAO, and it deems our safety oversight to be diminished, it will be the Australian carriers who are punished, as they will then be blocked from increasing their services to the US until their regulatory oversight is upgraded, and their flights and ground operations will come under ‘enhanced’ surveillance in America.

They will also, inevitably, be labelled in the US media, as less safe than US carriers.

Here we are over 14 years later and apparently we are still 'rolling the dice on aviation safety'...

Next reference is to the following 2 year old series of AP posts:

  Albo's (Great White Elephant Paper) contribution to the decimation of GA industry?? &  Albo's historical culpability on destroying an industry? 

Plus this Albo pic:



And...

...And despite mentions in dispatches by former DAS McCormick in his 2009-2010 AR review...

(ref: Pg 10-14)

Technical training was identified as an issue by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) in its 2008 audit and in the US Federal Aviation Administration’s International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) audit. We have responded by developing a comprehensive technical training and professional development program to enhance staff capability in areas such as leadership, regulatory skills and technical expertise.

---

&..
An audit of Australia’s air safety system by the US Federal Aviation Administration’s IASA program confirmed that Australia has retained its Category 1 IASA rating. The FAA was invited by Australia last year to conduct the audit of aviation safety regulation and oversight. Australia’s overall system of aviation safety oversight was found to meet applicable international standards.

...it was not once touched on in the 'message from the Chair', by then Chair Allan Hawke.

Although he did mention the extra funding facilitated by government in the 2010-11 Budget by gouging an extra 4 cent per litre fuel levy from industry, supposedly provided to fix the FAA issues. 

Extract from Hawke's message (note the 'cop out' Bureaucratese weasel words -  ) :

..The Board of CASA has now been in operation for the full year covered by this report. Appointed by the Minister and charged with the principal responsibility of ensuring that CASA conducts its business in a proper, effective and efficient manner, I believe that the Board has partnered and supported the CASA executive team and staff to deliver the
demanding agenda set for the Board by the government.
While CASA’s functions are specified in the Civil Aviation Act 1988, its direction has been set by the 2009 National Aviation Policy Statement (the White Paper) and the 2010
Australian Airspace Policy Statement. The White Paper makes the explicit statement that: ‘…the government is committed to ensuring that it [aviation] remains as safe as it can be. Safety remains the number one priority of the government in aviation’. The Board has therefore approached its tasks mindful not only that safety is the paramount aviation priority of the government, but that the industry must also have this priority as the foundation of their sustainability and future growth.
The Minister has made it clear that CASA needs to be a firm, fair and effective regulator. The announcement of additional funding in the May 2010 Budget was welcome and will be used to strengthen oversight of the industry. CASA’s organisation is now settled and aligned more closely with the Civil Aviation Act and the Board is satisfied that resources are appropriately directed toward CASA’s core functions. The Board has also noted that through the leadership of the Director of Aviation Safety and his executive team, there are now improved governance arrangements designed to provide the foundation for more consistent action and advice to industry concerning the
interpretation and application of legislation...
A subject that I wish to highlight this year is CASA’s achievement in regulatory development. Australia already has exacting aviation regulations, but these must be
continually reviewed, refined and enhanced. This year the Board has reported substantial progress to government in a number of regulatory areas, including the requirement for safety management systems, human factors training for regular public transport operations, drug and alcohol management plans, and the preparation of a new suite of maintenance regulations. We are pleased with these achievements but also aware that the task of ensuring that Australia’s aviation regulations are relevant, effective and aligned with international best practice is an enduring and challenging responsibility. What we consider to be the optimum means of achieving the best possible safety outcomes today will no doubt be succeeded by better approaches in the future...

And an extract from Albo's speech:  http://anthonyalbanese.com.au/category/m...hes/page/9

---

...CASA, the nation’s independent aviation safety watchdog, will recruit almost 100 additional frontline staff with the $89.9 million in new funding provided by the Budget. This extra investment in safer skies will be funded via a small increase in the aviation fuel excise, from 2.8 cents per litre to 3.5 cents per litre. The Government considers this to be a reasonable and responsible step considering the industry’s continued growth depends on the public’s ongoing confidence in its safety standards. Following the ICAO and FAA audits this investment in CASA’s staff and training is critical, and will strengthen the organisation’s oversight of the industry. Aviation safety should be bi-partisan, and the Government puts the safety of passengers ahead of other interests...

---

Reading that load of old codswallop and keeping in mind this extraordinary 'power shot' statement from McCormick in the (above) No.27 AQON...

"...Consistent with the functions of the Board and it's relationship with the Director of Aviation Safety, who has statutory responsibility for all regulatory decision-making, at subsequent Board meetings the Director has continued to keep the Board informed of the high-level changes and internal reforms he had initiated, or intended to initiate, to address operational and organisational improvements, including those cited in the answer to question 25..."  

...you begin to get an impression of the untrammelled power that both the Board and the Minister had gifted McCormick, all apparently in the pursuit of achieving the government policy of 'all care but no responsibility' for aviation safety... 

Now fast forward to 'here & now' with a different government, a new minister and a professional bureaucrat for a CASA CEO.

Q/ Then ask the question what has changed? Answer: Not much - 

Q/ Now ask what happened to the money ($89.9 million back then) that was gouged and continues to be gouged (reportedly +$120 million & climbing) from industry, supposedly to fix the deficiencies discovered in the FAA IASA 2009 audit?

Hmm...sounds like a question for Senate Estimates... 

Now refer back to the table in the AQON which doesn't reflect at all the '100' extra tech staff (that were supposed to be hired over a four year period in the forward estimates)...  

Hmm...I wonder if the ICAO and FAA IASA audit teams now know that for the last 15 years CASA has taken the piss on the serious findings and subsequent recommendations of both the ICAO and FAA IASA audits? - 

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

AMROBA Breaking News: 'Safety All Round'

Courtesy KC, via the AP email chains...

To all members

“Safety All Around” has been AMROBA’s motto since we started.

Australia’s ICAO audit this year found that Australia would ‘benefit’ by complying with Convention Annexes.

• Note carefully, using “benefit” is diplomatic speak for saying we would have a “safer” aviation system if we were compliant with the Annexes “Safety” Standards and Recommended Practices. (SARPs)
  

These are Safety Standards and Practices developed by ICAO working groups of professional specialists, agreed to by ICAO member States, Australia included, mainly to reduce the possibility of aircraft accidents and incidents.

What we cannot understand is why government condones lodging thousands of differences to these accident and incident reducing Safety Standards and Practices.

The latest Breaking News raises this issue.

Important in Engineering is using a universal language, terminology, and definitions so mistakes are not made by interpretation.

Australia, as a leading ICAO nation, should be 100% compliant with SARPs like Singapore.

No wonder, our global recognition as a safety regulated aviation nation is waning, we don’t have global recognition of the Australian Release Certificate after 25 plus years.

Maybe the next government, whoever is in charge, will focus on safety for all by global harmonisation.

 

Ken Cannane

Executive Director

AMROBA

Phone: (02) 97592715

Mobile: 0408029329

www.amroba.org.au

Safety All Around.
 

MTF...P2 

[Sandy Reith]

Ken Cannane is the tireless standard bearer for a logical reform of Australia’s aviation regulation.

The lack of political interest is a blot on our body politic and we need a concerted effort to gain the attention of MPs.

[Peetwo]

The EAP CASA's GWEP (Great White Elephant Project)

Two days ago I received correspondence from CASA's Branch Manager of the Communications Branch, in regards to my 26 July FOI disclosure log enquiry, which said:

Enquiry

I note that the CASA FOI Disclosure log has recently been updated (from 6 March entry onwards) and reformatted.

Unfortunately the new format does not include links for the FOI publicly released documents and has omitted the previously released (prior to 26 February entry) PDF weblinks . In case this is an administrative oversight issue, would it be possible for all the new entries to have their released documents PDF web linked (hyperlinked)?

If this is for some reason not possible, could you at least release the documents for the 6 March 2024 entry: " Reports relevant to CASA's restricting of technical staff since 2010; 2021 CASA APS Employee Census Results; 2023 CASA APS Employee Census Results; Psycho-social safety climate survey conducted by University of South Australia in 2019 for CASA; The Internal Audit Report EAP - Enterprise Aviation Processing; and the most recent interim ICAO report on CASA. Exemption(s) applied: Full release..", Thank you in advance P2

This was the Branch Manager Amanda Palmer, of the Comms Branch reply (with attachment):

OFFICIAL 

Hi P2 

Please find attached disclosure records in relation to the 6 March 2024 FOI release.

Regards,

Amanda

Amanda Palmer (she/her)

Branch Manager

Communications Branch

CASA\Stakeholder Engagement Division

Attachment reference: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...h-2024.pdf

FWD to page 30 of this document, under the title: 

Enterprise Aviation Processing
(EAP) System

Internal Audit Report
Date: 11 November 2022

FFWD to page 38, where it says:

3.1 What is the Enterprise Aviation Processing System?

The EAP system is a software system created for aviation regulators to manage their regulatory safety and security oversight responsibilities in accordance with the Standards and Recommended Practises issued by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in accordance with the Chicago Convention. EAP is a modular, configurable and scalable system that can provide a wide range of functionality, including the management of aviation related licencing, aircraft certification and registration, accident and incident management, and other functions. At the time of this audit, over 30 countries around the world use EAP to manage their aviation regulation requirements, including New Zealand, Thailand, Austria, Switzerland, France and Australia. At the time of this audit, EAP comprised over 40 separate, fully integrated modules covering aviation regulators’ remits, which can be deployed in total, or in part, to meet an individual regulator’s needs. EAP is designed to manage tasks associated with accepting applications, making assessments, issuing approvals, together with subsequent continuing oversight (surveillance).

 
Hmm...(the parts in bold) how's that working out? Well according to this internal audit absolutely abysmally...  

4.1.2 Findings

4.1.2.1 Overall, CASA’s implementation of the EAP Project has not met timescales, costs, quality and scope targets as specified in the original 2011 project plan, and does not appear to be meeting performance targets for the EAP Five Year Strategy

As discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, when CASA purchased EAP initially, it made a number of incorrect assumptions, including that EAP could be used to drive change from a distributed regulatory operating model to a centralised “national” operating model. These incorrect assumptions resulted in EAP implementation being significantly behind schedule, over budget, and not delivering the functionality specified in the 2011 EAP Implementation Project.

Specifically, between EAP’s purchase in 2011 and the forecast end of the EAP Five Year Strategy:

• timescales for EAP implementation have not been achieved. The 2011 EAP Implementation Project identified an implementation timeframe of two years (mid-2011 to mid-2013) to implement 19 EAP modules. Based on the EAP Five Year Strategy, the new implementation timeframe is mid-202535
• EAP costs are significantly higher than intended originally. The original budget was $9.1 million to implement 19 modules.36 As at 30 September 2022, based on CASA’s financial records, CASA had expended $39.5 million on implementing EAP. However, actual EAP implementation costs are likely significantly higher than this figure37
• the quality and functionality of the EAP system has not been delivered as intended originally. Significant required EAP functionality has not been delivered to date, with some elements not being delivered at all. Functionality elements not delivered to date include: surveillance; organisational approvals; medical; and workflow distribution.38 At the time of the audit, Internal Audit was advised a decision on whether to use the EAP Medical Module had not been made, despite CASA having purchased this module in 2011
• CASA’s EAP scope is not up-to-date. CASA has not maintained an up-to-date record of the extent to which it intends implementing the EAP modules (or parts of modules) it has purchased, and what functionality these modules will provide.39 Also, CASA does not have an up-to-date record of which EAP modules it has implemented to date. 40

Although CASA recognised the need to develop a national regulatory operating model41 it continues to manage EAP implementation as a series of annual projects rather than an ongoing change program. This is despite a significant amount of work remaining to consolidate distributed regulatory systems and processes into a national operating model. 42 As a result, CASA’s approach to assessing the effectiveness of EAP implementation:

• has not provided CASA’s Executive and Board with a meaningful analysis of EAP implementation performance (time, cost and quality) against the original 2011 EAP Implementation Project Plan
• does not provide CASA’s Executive and Board with meaningful analysis of CASA’s ongoing performance (time, cost and quality) against the EAP Five Year Strategy.

While formal analysis of CASA’s performance against the EAP Five Year Strategy has not been completed to date, based on interviews and document reviews, it is highly likely that EAP implementation is behind schedule, and will not be completed by 2025 (as specified in the EAP Five Year Strategy).

4.1.2.2 Although EAP benefits have been identified since 2018, these benefits are inconsistent between documents and are not mapped to outputs and outcomes as specified by better practice

Under better practice, benefits management refers to the management actions and reviews that are put in place to ensure that the project’s outputs and outcomes are achieved and that the project’s expected benefits are realised. Previous reviews of the management of EAP Projects (see Section 3.6, Table 3.1) identified that EAP benefits management required significant improvement.

To be managed effectively, project benefits must be mapped to project outputs and outcomes, as well as to the entity’s strategic objectives. Undertaking benefits mapping is essential to provide meaning and context to benefits statements, as mapping links each project’s deliverables against the overall benefits of EAP implementation. This is shown in Figure 4.1 below.

 
Over a decade past the original planned implementation timeline with a cost blowout of over 600% and what have we got to show for it? - zero, zip, zilch, nada!

MTF...P2