[Peetwo]

AMSA comical 'lessons learnt' on Sydney Harbour Emerald Ferry incident. -   

Still trying to track down a copy of the associated incident report and I'm not sure why AMSA are all of a sudden investigating Sydney Harbour DCV incidents, inside of what is normally OTSI turf?? However for the amusement of interested readers, the following is a AMSA LinkedIn post acknowledging their publication of a safety lesson report:

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
23,477 followers
4d •

This month’s safety lesson report highlights the importance of ensuring all crew, including new employees, are provided appropriate training on a vessel’s safety management system, and understand the practical application and their responsibilities.

Every month we share an overview of a domestic commercial vessel incident investigation and the safety lesson you can learn to ensure safe operations on board your vessel.

Read the monthly safety lesson: https://ow.ly/yYbS50Q1iTi

#SafeSeas

Here is the 'safety lessons' report...

Safety Lessons from Marine Incident Investigation (AMSA Report) No.22 - October 2023

---

Passenger vessel flooded after access door was left open.

Overview

A passenger ferry was returning from its scheduled service when an unanticipated wave raised its stern and caused its bow to dive under the water. Water rushed over the bow and a significant amount came through the forward portside access door and into the passenger compartment. The master immediately reduced speed, which expelled most of the water overboard. 

The forward portside access door had been left open by a crew member who was attempting to alleviate sea sickness among some passengers. The action of leaving the door open during the voyage was contrary to the vessel’s survey requirements. Signage requiring the door to be kept closed when underway was reportedly not seen by crew members. This resulted in water entering the vessel creating a potentially unsafe situation. 

What happened

At about 14:45, a Class 1 vessel was ferrying passengers back to its city quay on a scheduled service. This service was busier than usual as it was covering for an unavailable service. The conditions were reported as about 1.25 to 2.5m wave height with the vessel speed about 20 knots. 

A significant amount of water entered the vessel over the bow and through the open forward portside access door. The master stated that conditions at one point were such that the stern of the vessel lifted out of the water higher than expected, pushing the bow lower in the water.

The water ingress lasted 10 seconds in total. There were no injuries to passengers or crew and subsequent inspection identified no damage to the vessel. A crew member had left the access door open to alleviate passenger sea sickness, which allowed water to enter the vessel.

Signage was in place above the forward portside door, cautioning crew that the door was to remain closed ‘when underway’. The crew member reported having not seen the signage. The action of leaving the forward portside access door open during the voyage was contrary to the vessel’s survey requirements and the master was not aware that the crew member had left it open.

Investigation findings

The investigation identified the following contributory factors:

• A review of crew member induction records identified that crew members were made aware of the location of the vessel’s safety management system (SMS), however they were unlikely to know all the requirements in the SMS unless provided with guidance from master/s.
  
• The master’s handling of the sea state was deemed to be within acceptable parameters. However, the master had been recently certified competent and was new to the vessel, which may have impacted vessel handling. 
  

The company was advised to consider putting in place risk control measures to ensure doors remain closed, including the installation of sensors with visual/audible alarms in the wheelhouse monitored by the master/crew, and signage on the door at a suitable visual height.

Safety message

Owners must ensure that all crew, including new employees, are provided appropriate training on the vessel’s SMS and understand the practical application and their responsibilities in relation to this. This requirement is addressed in s6D, Schedule 1 of Marine Order 504 - onboard induction, familiarisation, and training. 

Owners must ensure that crew also understand the vessel’s certificates of survey and any conditions in which the vessel is operating under. 

Safety information on this topic

Marine Order 504 – certificates of operation and operation requirements – national law

Certificates of Survey (CoS)

In other NSW OTSI/TfNSW news I note that the Chief Investigator has jumped ship for a gig as the Chief Executive of the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator:

Dr Natalie Pelham GAICD
Chief Investigator and CEO at Office of Transport Safety Investigations
4d •

I am delighted to be joining the ONRSR and to have the opportunity to influence rail safety at the national level. The former CEO and Regulator Ms Sue McCarrey made a considerable contribution to rail safety particularly in establishing a well respected regulator. I look forward to working with the ONRSR team to build on that legacy and to drive further safety and efficiency reforms for the industry.

National Rail Safety Regulator appoints new Chief Executive

The search for Australia’s next National Rail Safety Regulator is over, with Dr. Natalie Pelham appointed Chief Executive of the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR).

Dr. Pelham will take on the role from Sue McCarrey who left ONRSR in December last year. Dr. Pelham will be leaving her current role in New South Wales’ Office of Transport Safety Investigations, where she has been Chief Investigator since January 2021.

Dr. Pelham will be the third National Rail Safety Regulator appointed in Australia following the formation of ONRSR in 2013, when the seven state and territory regulatory bodies were brought together under the national banner.

In that time the Australian rail industry has benefitted from a range of national reforms including a consolidated accreditation process and a risk-based national work program of audits and inspections.

ONRSR has also overseen significant improvements to the quality and availability of rail safety data now being harnessed to drive improved decision making by industry and governments alike.

Dr. Pelham will start with ONRSR in early November.

Quotes attributable to Federal Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government Minister Catherine King:

“Rail connects communities and is a major carrier of goods in Australia, being responsible for around 49 per cent of our total domestic freight – making it an important part of our economy and way of life.

“ONRSR plays an important role enforcing and promoting safe railway operations, to ensure that all those working on and using railways get home safely after each shift or trip.

“The Albanese Government is committed to ensuring a safe and productive rail industry in Australia. I welcome Dr. Pelham to this vital role and look forward to continuing to work with ONRSR as they continue to promote and improve national rail safety.”

Quotes attributable to South Australian Minister for Infrastructure and Transport Tom Koutsantonis:

“Dr. Pelham has more than 25 years in the public service leading significant safety regulation, policy, strategy and reform at both state and national levels.

“Dr. Pelham will be a very strong leader for ONRSR and most importantly a wonderful advocate and activist for rail safety.

“Her experience across the regulatory spectrum gives her the ideal skillset and under her leadership ONRSR will continue to deliver for the people of Australia.

“I look forward to working with her and progressing an exciting national rail safety agenda.

“A great deal has been achieved over the first decade of national rail regulation and there is great potential for us to drive further safety and efficiency reforms for the rail industry.”

I also note that the NSW Minister for Transport Jo Haylen has got herself into a spot of political bother within her Ministerial office...

Transport Minister Jo Haylen fighting for political survival after chief of staff resigns over scandal

ByAlexandra Smith and Max Maddison
Updated November 3, 2023 — 4.53pm first published at 12.53pm

NSW Transport Minister Jo Haylen’s chief of staff has sensationally quit after it emerged the junior public servant parachuted into the office was doing political work while on secondment, including collating a list of Coalition backflips and organising a barbeque to celebrate Labor’s election win.

Scott Gartrell, a long-term Labor staffer, resigned on Friday afternoon as a tranche of documents were tabled to parliament which showed that Transport for NSW employee, Kieren Ash, engaged in political work while in Haylen’s office.



Gartrell arranged for Ash to be seconded to Haylen’s office just weeks after the junior bureaucrat had run Labor’s unsuccessful election campaign in the inner west seat of Balmain during the March state election.

The resignation will put intense pressure on Haylen, who has faced heavy criticism for the appointment of Transport Secretary Josh Murray, who has long links to Labor, as well as the role of public servants in her office with party ties.

A government source with knowledge of the details of Gartrell’s resignation said Haylen did not ask him to leave, and it was his own decision.

Documents released through the parliament late on Friday show that Ash was appointed to the position of department liaison officer. That position has strict requirements, including not undertaking any work that could be seen as political.



Gartrell, in his capacity as Haylen’s chief of staff, declared that Ash would not be required to undertake any political work and would be excluded from any political conversations.

“I ... will not require the DLO to perform party political activities, and will exclude the DLO from any meetings where political matters are discussed,” Gartrell signed on April 27.

However, other documents obtained by the Herald disclose that Ash was corresponding with lobbyist firm GRACosway on the launch of a Beam e-scooter trial in conjunction with Transport for NSW and Armidale Council – work outside the scope of DLOs. “I imagine the minister would be more than happy to feature on a media release,” he wrote on July 5.

In other emails, Ash referred to government MPs as “our Labor colleagues” and agreed to help organise a barbeque in Haylen’s Summer Hill electorate to celebrate 100 days of the Minns government.

On May 10, Ash circulated a “backflips timeline” with a list of Coalition MPs who were responsible during their time in government, including former transport minister Andrew Constance and former planning minister Rob Stokes.

Ash also emailed staff asking for “any notices of motions for our colleagues for the next fortnight of parliament” and made a range of suggestions, such as the return of the Freshwater ferries, and “maintenance/cleaning insourcing”.

Ash also drafted lines on how Haylen should respond in parliament to questions about transport from Coalition MPs, including new members, suggesting the minister say “it’s their mess we inherited [from the former government] and we were elected to fix”.

Ash’s appointment drew the attention of then-acting transport secretary Howard Collins, internal documents previously released to parliament revealed.

An email between transport officials on July 4 showed that Collins raised concerns about Ash sticking to the boundaries of the role when Gartrell asked to extend his time in the minister’s office from three to 12 months.

“Howard raised with Scott his concerns to ensure Keiran [sic] adheres to the parameters of the scope of a DLO role,” the email states.

In a statement made before Gartrell’s resignation, Haylen said: “After being made aware of the existence of a number of documents, my office has subsequently written to the Secretary of Transport for NSW to request that the department look into whether some actions conducted by a DLO in the minister’s office were in line with their employer obligations.

“It is clear that the practice of requesting Departmental Liaison Officers from TfNSW, whilst not against the rules, has created questions around the role of DLOs and their relationship with the ministerial office,” Haylen’s statement said.

Haylen has asked her department head to investigate Ash. However, the minister was forced to write to Murray on Friday in his “employer capacity for all necessary action” after the release of the emails indicated that he may have broken the rules of his employment.

The opposition seized on the latest revelations engulfing Haylen and said the investigation into Ash should be conducted by the Public Service Commissioner Kathrina Lo, not Murray.

Opposition transport spokeswoman Natalie Ward said, “the investigation is nothing more than an attempt to throw a junior staffer under the bus to protect a minister.”

“Does any reasonable person think Josh Murray, the minister’s handpicked secretary is really going to find the minister committed any wrongdoing?,” Ward said.

“A controversially Labor appointed secretary is investigating the minister who got him the job regarding an operative her office requested doing political activities – it doesn’t pass the pub test.”

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

AMSA loses the plot on Navigation...

Via YouTube:

CHAIR: Let's go to the Australian Maritime Safety Authority. Welcome, and thank you very much. No opening statements.

Senator McDONALD: Mr Kinley, I'm sorry to go straight to the heart of this. We were short of time at the last estimates. This had been raised by a number of senators—there are some very concerning issues around the tender process. I have a couple of articles here that I want to table. Here we are at quarter to 11, and I'm deeply concerned about the safety of Australia's maritime industry and our shipping lines. We're investing in submarines, but the actual nuts and bolts of protecting ships through these processes has, I think, not been done to a good standard of the project. Minister Catherine King has referred the AMSA procurement process of the aids to navigation contract to the Auditor-General, Mr Grant Hehir. However, he has now resigned, so it has no oversight.

Chair, you'll remember the process we went through with AMSA with that terrible situation off the coast in Western Australia. It has not been an organisation that I've been culturally confident in, but what do we do? Here we are at five to 11, I'm very worried we're going to have deaths as a result of this very poorly managed process and, once again, the Senate's going to miss out on having any inquiry. Last time, we tried to bring AMSA back, and we said: 'No, no, don't worry. We're having another estimate in February.' But here we are with two minutes.

CHAIR: I can't apologise for—

Senator McDONALD: No, I'm not suggesting it's your fault, but I'm just saying: what do we do? This is the Senate's only opportunity to hold this organisation to account on something that could threaten the lives of maritime workers and of infrastructure—

Mr Kinley : Can I say something?

Senator McDONALD: No, I don't think we've got time, unfortunately.

Mr Kinley : I did lodge an opening statement with the committee—I'm hoping that's been tabled—which goes to these matters and the alarmist claims made by an unsuccessful tenderer for this process—

Senator McDONALD: That is, in a nutshell, the issue that we want to explore, and yet we are not going to get an opportunity to do this. If there are deaths as a result of this or loss of equipment—

Mr Kinley : There won't be deaths as a result of this. The network will be maintained to the same standards as it has been maintained to in the past.

Senator McDONALD: I don't think you can say that.

Mr Kinley : We are in the market again now for the services—

Senator McDONALD: Only one company tendered for this work because of the highly specific nature of the—

Mr Kinley : No, that's not correct. You are taking what they have said about the work. We have a lot of in-house expertise. We run major contracts in house as well as our maintenance contract—

Senator McDONALD: Running a contract is a very different issue to going out and running equipment that has been not managed by AMSA for 20 years.

Mr Kinley : There are around 480 aids to navigation in our network. There are thousands of aids to navigation around the country in ports run by states and other organisations, and we're confident with the revised approach to our market that we have made as of last Friday, when our first tranche of contracts went out.

Senator McDONALD: Thank you for raising last Friday, because I asked questions on notice after last estimates. They were due on 15 December. On Friday I received my response—eight weeks late—and nine of the same answers were just copied and were incomplete. The disrespect to the Senate and this process is extraordinary. Chair, I don't know how we resolve this but I am deeply dissatisfied with this.

CHAIR: I do, I know. What we have to do is manage our time, and, unfortunately, that hasn't happened. We have two days of this portfolio coming in May, and I urge our committee to be mindful as we are. We have people coming in to ask questions, and they can. We've run out of time. I share your frustration but, unfortunately, that was the—

Senator McDONALD: I'm going to ask for a spillover for this agency.

CHAIR: No. I will not be available. We can talk about this after.

Senator CANAVAN: We can talk about that later.

CHAIR: I don't want to waste any more time. We had an agreement this morning that was going perfectly, and the regular members of this committee—

Senator McDONALD: What I want to have on the record

Senator McKENZIE: There's no one here—

CHAIR: I said the regular members of this committee had a very good arrangement and, unfortunately, that has gone. We are wasting more of your time. We are not going to get to the other agencies.

Senator McDONALD: I want to say on the Hansard record that this is an issue that is too serious to be allowed to be left for another three months. I think the way that the agency has responded to the Senate, and this sort of response, is not good enough.

Senator McKENZIE: I might have a suggestion. I know we're going to discuss the spillover date offline, but maybe when we come back to a sitting week, we could find some time as a committee to have this particular agency—

CHAIR: There are plenty of things that are available to the committee, as we all know, and we'll talk about that. Mr Kinley, we'll be back in touch.

Mr Mick Kinley, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Maritime Safety Authority Opening Statement 12 February 2023:

Australian Maritime Safety Authority Opening Statement Additional Estimates 12 February 2024


At our previous appearance, the Committee had explored a procurement by AMSA for 2 distinct but
linked services of roughly equal value. Emergency towage capability, which attracted healthy
competition and has since proceeded to contract, and aids to navigation maintenance which has
since been put back to the market in a revised form.

The Committee wrote to me on 8 November 2023 regarding our previous appearance and
“concerns” raised by stakeholders and I responded on 17 November 2023 explaining why those
concerns were unfounded and incorrect.

Following our previous appearance, we also received 15 questions on notice on our approach to
market for services to maintain our aids to navigation.

I would like to provide some background for the Committee.

AMSA is responsible for around 480 maritime aids to navigation for coastal navigation (States and
Ports look after ports and internal waters where there are thousands more). Maritime aids to
navigation are exactly that; an aid to navigation. While ships primarily rely on electronic charts and
satellite positioning the lights, radar beacons and other daylight visual aids we provide are an
important means of verifying location and should global positioning systems fail would be critical
back up.

We rely on numerous contractors to maintain and operate our network. The same service provider
has delivered our lower-value planned maintenance and response to outages for over 20 years. The
model has been effective although performance of the contractor has not been without challenges –
particularly in recent years.

In planning early for the end of the current contract on 30 June 2024, AMSA undertook a request for
information process through AusTender in January 2022. Enough companies provided a response so
that we released the open tender in August 2022 for services from 1 July 2024 expecting healthy
competition.

We were surprised when only one tender for aids to navigation services was submitted. In
accordance with our procurement evaluation plan, the tender was assessed against the technical
requirements and on the information provided did not give AMSA confidence that the necessary
contract services would be delivered as required. The evaluation committee comprised three AMSA
employees with appropriate skills and experience who independently assessed the tender against
each criteria and were then brought together with the independent probity adviser to moderate and
agree on the overall scoring.

No Board member or Executive member was involved in the scoring. As you would expect, the
Executive had effective oversight of the procurement, and a full and detailed report was provided to
our Board.

Given this unexpected result considerable work has been undertaken to re-evaluate our approach to
this work and approach the market again to ensure these services will be provided into the future.

Reapproaching the market with the same model would most certainly bring a repeat result.

In development of the new model, an active risk register has been maintained along with treatments
of those risks and the AMSA Board has been kept appraised of the results of the approach to market
and revised approach.

Our key objective remains that the aids to navigation will be maintained to achieve levels of
availability specified by the International Association of Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse
Authorities of which AMSA is Australia’s national member and active contributor to their standards.

The first tranche of tenders – dividing the national task geographically and functionally – were
released on AusTender last week. Our detailed planning shows we will have contracts in place by 1
July 2024 with contingencies should there be delays.

The network is robust, maintenance intervals are 2 years for many sites and AMSA has in-house
skilled staff who manage an annual capital works program of similar value to the national
maintenance contractor for major overhauls or refurbishment of sites beyond minor maintenance
undertaken under the national contract.

The original approach to market composed two parts – aids to navigation maintenance and
emergency towage capability. The Emergency Towage Capability component was awarded in
December 2023 to Smit Lamnalco for an enhanced capability from the current 82 tonne bollard pull
vessel to a 100 tonne bollard pull vessel from 1 July 2024 while a purpose built fuel efficient vessel of
120 tonne bollard pull is completed for the remainder of the contract.

AMSA is committed to probity and compliance with the Commonwealth Procurement Rules and
achieving value for money for industry and the community. Our procurement and contract
management has been reviewed recently by the ANAO and we were proud of the positive report
that resulted. An unsuccessful tenderer in a procurement is specifically afforded rights under the
Government Procurement (Judicial Review) Act should they feel our procurement does not comply
with those rules, and we know the unsuccessful bidder for the original aid to navigation
maintenance work is aware of that process.

Crispin Hull article tabled by Sen McDonald:









Hmm...perhaps trouble afoot for Kinley & CO with the Senate RRAT Committee?? -

While on the subject of other matters of transport safety, I note that tomorrow in the NSW Senate Estimates, for the first time in it's short 20 year history, OTSI will be appearing??





Hint: Could be worth a bit of a gander...

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

ATSB Wallan XPT derailment report Dorothy Dixar in NSW Estimates - RIP! 


Ref: https://auntypru.com/sbg-1-03-20-quatrai...n-sadness/

Via Hansard:

The CHAIR:  Yes, I can come back to it, though. Are there questions from the Government? The Hon. Dr SARAH KAINE:  Minister, could you please provide an update on the inquiry into the Wallan tragedy, which I think was in 2020?

Ms JO HAYLEN:  Thank you very much for the question. I did want to take this opportunity to mark this important tragedy across our rail network. Four years ago this week, two people were killed and 61 were injured—eight seriously—when the Melbourne-bound XPT derailed 40 kilometres away from arriving at its destination. It can only have been an absolutely terrifying experience for the 162 passengers and crew on board who had already travelled 12 hours on the XPT. They were within sight of home on their journey.

The investigation found that the train left the tracks at 115 kilometres an hour on a passing loop where it should have been travelling at just 15 kilometres. The Wallan incident has identified a number of safety risks and issues that were documented in the ATSB's report, which was handed down in August last year. I confirm that NSW TrainLink is focused on delivering improvements and working with all parties to improve and implement the safety recommendations.

Today the matter is being heard in the Melbourne Magistrates' Court as we approach sentencing in relation to this incident. I make clear that my thoughts and the thoughts of the Transport family are with those families of TrainLink driver John Kennedy and ARTC pilot Sam Meintanis, who were killed in their jobs on that terrible night. The victim impact statements are expected to be heard in court today. TrainLink CEO Dale Merrick is attending on behalf of the New South Wales Government. I know as a Transport team we will continue to always look for opportunities to do better. I confirm, of course, that safety must always be our number one priority.

The Hon. Dr SARAH KAINE:  Thank you, Minister.

Plus in pictures (from 01:30:30)

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

First appearance (ever) of OTSI at NSW Estimates? - 

Via Hansard: 

The CHAIR:  Mr Modrouvanos, how are you?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  I'm well. How are you?

The CHAIR:  I'm sure it can be very exciting sitting there all this time without getting asked a question. I understand that the Office of Transport Safety Investigations is investigating the derailment that occurred in early December in Bylong, the coal train. Are you aware of that investigation?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Not Murrumbo on the Ulan line?

The CHAIR:  Yes.

JIM MODROUVANOS:  No, we're not investigating that.

The CHAIR:  There have been reports that you're investigating it along with the Australian Rail Track Corporation. Actually, this report states it was derailed 80 kilometres west of Muswellbrook in the Bylong Valley.

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Where have you—

The CHAIR:  I thought I did see that on your website.

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Okay.

The CHAIR:  Do you investigate coal train derailments, then, in terms of safety in New South Wales, just broadly?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Yes.

The CHAIR:  Why would you not be investigating that, then?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  We don't necessarily investigate every incident.

The CHAIR:  Of course.

JIM MODROUVANOS:  It would depend on what the nature of that particular incident was. That is one where I think you'll find that we deployed. We went out and had a look at that incident. We made a determination following that not to further investigate.

The CHAIR:  Because I understand that was one where it derailed but there was a grassfire during a very hot day in December that was caused by that derailment. Did that occur?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  That's correct, yes. There was a wildfire that resulted from the derailment. It was a very hot day and the track buckled because of the heat on that particular day, which led to the derailment— that's right—and then the fire spread into the adjacent national park.

The CHAIR:  That's right. Is it your understanding, then, that during those very hot days with coal trains going, they're starting to cause or are causing grassfires as a result of the braking? Is that an occurrence that happens, or was it the derailment that caused the fire?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Our understanding was that it was the derailment that actually caused the fire.

The CHAIR:  Are there instances of coal trains themselves braking and the sparks causing fires on very hot days, especially in that kind of grassland country? Is that also an issue?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Not that I'm aware of. The major factors around that one was how ARTC was managing the traffic on that day because of the heat. So they could reasonably anticipate that there might be some track buckling because of just how hot it was and how hot it had been for a number of days.

The CHAIR:  By the sounds of it, though, if you're saying that that was being managed because the rail lines were buckling, that the train went over rail lines that had buckled anyway, that's what caused the derailment.

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Yes.

The CHAIR:  What's the difference between the ARTC investigating that and you investigating that? Why did the Office of Transport Safety Investigations—you went out there but chose not to investigate?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  There are a number of different acronyms. The ARTC is the network operator, so ARTC is the Australian Rail Track Corporation, so they're operating the network. As a chief investigator, I have a number of different avenues. One avenue would be to investigate. Another avenue would be to call upon the operator's report and assess how the operator has responded to the incident and form a view on that. Following assessment of that, we formed a view that a safety alert would be appropriate, so we put an alert out to all operators specifically around managing hot temperature conditions. These sorts of derailments do occur and it's just a question of whether systemically—we look for more systemic recommendations which are more applicable to the broader industry. In that particular case, we formed the view that factually there was enough there to make a conclusion around the management of hot temperature conditions, so we didn't proceed to further investigate.

The CHAIR:  So the management of hot temperature conditions and those kind of systemic issues, is there a temperature at which the current tracks as they're built now are likely to buckle? Is it that clear in terms of, is it 42 degrees, 38 degrees?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Generally there is a figure and it's based on a forecast figure. So in the metropolitan area there's a thing called a Wolo. It's a telegraphic code. Once the forecast figure is above a certain temperature, then automatically speed is reduced. If line speeds are 100 kilometres an hour, for example, it's reduced to 80 kilometres an hour.

The CHAIR:  What temperature is that?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  I'll have to take that one on notice. I can't remember that particular standard off the top of my head. I used to head the standards organisation.

The CHAIR:  And it's just temperature?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Temperature, and it also depends on the nature of the structure of the rail, whether it's concrete sleepered, timber sleepered, the weight of the rail et cetera, so it varies. ARTC would have their own code, so it would be within ARTC's safety system whatever that number is.

The CHAIR:  Okay, and so they're slowed down but is there a particular point then as well—and I've been approached by the community out near Bylong actually with concerns about the potential for these trains to cause fires on these very, very, very hot days where you're almost not allowed, understandably, to do anything that would cause a spark. Is there a point at which the coal trains don't or should not travel if the lines are buckling, or is going a certain pace safe enough? Do you know what I'm saying?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Yes.

The CHAIR:  The days are getting hotter and the number of very hot days is going to increase. I am wondering, from your perspective as the Acting Chief Investigator for the Office of Transport Safety Investigations, is there a point or a heat level where we should just say, "It's too unsafe for this to occur"?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  It's not really a judgement I can make because of the variables involved. The operator is accountable for their safety management system. It's for them to make the appropriate assessments and determine what the safe operating profile is of that network and to manage to that profile. We were concerned that they had lost some focus and they weren't managing to that profile, and that's why we put the alert out to remind people that you have these provisions within your safety management system and you need to adhere to these, particularly in remote areas such as on the Ulan line there. They would have something in their system to manage that and it could comprise all the factors that you've described.

The CHAIR:  Was that the day that you issued that alert you were just mentioning? Or was it that week?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  We would've issued the alert some days later, because it's quite a remote area.

The CHAIR:  After the derailment?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Yes, after the derailment. Because it's a remote area, my staff took some time to get up there. The fire was ongoing so we couldn't approach the site for a little while. Following that, we released some safety information to the industry.

The CHAIR:  By releasing safety information to the industry, that included the—was it an instruction, direction? Or is that the ARTC—the instruction or direction to travel at a lower speed?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  I'm the investigator. I can offer recommendations. I don't have the power to issue directions. That would be—the ARTC as a network owner would have to implement their own risk controls. Failing that, the National Rail Safety Regulator is the regulatory authority that could issue directions if they saw fit.

The CHAIR:  Your recommendations in relation to this derailment—are they public? Who did you give them to?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  They'd be on our website.

The CHAIR:  So they are public. That's good. You're not used to hearing that in budget estimates these days. Mr Modrouvanos, the number of derailments as a result of the heat and rail lines buckling—is it relatively common? Do you have figures on that?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  We would have figures in terms of what has been reported to us. These types of incidents are reported to the National Rail Safety Regulator and then we're notified following those reports. So we would have some of those figures. Certainly, I've only been there a relatively short time and that is the only one I've seen in that period. But we have had other derailments for other causes that have occurred as well.

For pictures refer from 05:46:45 here:

Via msn.com :

Firefighters control grassfire sparked by after coal train derailment in NSW


The derailment occurred on Wednesday last week. (Supplied: NSW RFS)
© Provided by ABC News (AU)

New South Wales firefighters have controlled a grass fire that was sparked from a coal train that derailed on Wednesday.

Twenty-six carriages of an empty coal train derailed about 80 kilometres west of Muswellbrook in the Bylong Valley.

The crash sparked a grassfire that was controlled on Sunday after burning nearly 40 hectares.

Nine local brigades and a water-bombing aircraft were deployed to fight the fire.

Under the extreme heat of the past few days, the fire spread into steep terrain around the railway line.

RFS Remote Area Firefighters and National Parks and Wildlife Service joined the effort, working with hand tools along the southern line of the fireground.

A RFS spokesperson said there were still 10 fire fighters, including Remote Area Firefighters, and a water-bombing aircraft working to "mop up and black-out" the fire on Sunday afternoon.

"It is burning along a ridge line and in some slightly inaccessible terrain, hence the Remote Area Firefighters," the spokesperson said.

The Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) said no one was injured but 26 wagons were derailed in the event.

It said no time frame had been put on the reopening of the rail line.

The office of National Rail Safety Regulator and Office of Transport Investigation (NSW) will investigate the incident.

Hmm...interesting the Acting Chief Investigator Modrouvanos mentions...

"..Following assessment of that, we formed a view that a safety alert would be appropriate, so we put an alert out to all operators specifically around managing hot temperature conditions.."

...however on review of the 'Rail Safety Alerts and Safety Advisories' webpage there would appear to be no such safety alert; or safety advisory issued??

Rail Safety Alerts
There are currently no Safety Alerts to display for rail.

Rail Safety Advisories

• 13 September 2022 - Safety Advisory - Locomotive sandbox fixing arrangements
  
• 27 June 2022 - Safety Advisory: Unknown functions in locomotive breaking systems
  
• 29 March 2022 - Safety Advisory: Safety critical communications by rail safety workers
  
• 9 August 2021 - Safety Advisory: Light Rail Vehicle (LRV) pantograph failure
  

Hmm...I'd say there's some potential embarrassment there for the Acting Chief of OTSI?? - 

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

OTSI catching up?? -

First appearance (ever) of OTSI at NSW Estimates? - 

Via Hansard: 

The CHAIR:  Mr Modrouvanos, how are you?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  I'm well. How are you?

The CHAIR:  I'm sure it can be very exciting sitting there all this time without getting asked a question. I understand that the Office of Transport Safety Investigations is investigating the derailment that occurred in early December in Bylong, the coal train. Are you aware of that investigation?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Not Murrumbo on the Ulan line?

The CHAIR:  Yes.

JIM MODROUVANOS:  No, we're not investigating that.

The CHAIR:  There have been reports that you're investigating it along with the Australian Rail Track Corporation. Actually, this report states it was derailed 80 kilometres west of Muswellbrook in the Bylong Valley.

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Where have you—

The CHAIR:  I thought I did see that on your website.

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Okay.

The CHAIR:  Do you investigate coal train derailments, then, in terms of safety in New South Wales, just broadly?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Yes.

The CHAIR:  Why would you not be investigating that, then?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  We don't necessarily investigate every incident.

The CHAIR:  Of course.

JIM MODROUVANOS:  It would depend on what the nature of that particular incident was. That is one where I think you'll find that we deployed. We went out and had a look at that incident. We made a determination following that not to further investigate.

The CHAIR:  Because I understand that was one where it derailed but there was a grassfire during a very hot day in December that was caused by that derailment. Did that occur?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  That's correct, yes. There was a wildfire that resulted from the derailment. It was a very hot day and the track buckled because of the heat on that particular day, which led to the derailment— that's right—and then the fire spread into the adjacent national park.

The CHAIR:  That's right. Is it your understanding, then, that during those very hot days with coal trains going, they're starting to cause or are causing grassfires as a result of the braking? Is that an occurrence that happens, or was it the derailment that caused the fire?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Our understanding was that it was the derailment that actually caused the fire.

The CHAIR:  Are there instances of coal trains themselves braking and the sparks causing fires on very hot days, especially in that kind of grassland country? Is that also an issue?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Not that I'm aware of. The major factors around that one was how ARTC was managing the traffic on that day because of the heat. So they could reasonably anticipate that there might be some track buckling because of just how hot it was and how hot it had been for a number of days.

The CHAIR:  By the sounds of it, though, if you're saying that that was being managed because the rail lines were buckling, that the train went over rail lines that had buckled anyway, that's what caused the derailment.

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Yes.

The CHAIR:  What's the difference between the ARTC investigating that and you investigating that? Why did the Office of Transport Safety Investigations—you went out there but chose not to investigate?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  There are a number of different acronyms. The ARTC is the network operator, so ARTC is the Australian Rail Track Corporation, so they're operating the network. As a chief investigator, I have a number of different avenues. One avenue would be to investigate. Another avenue would be to call upon the operator's report and assess how the operator has responded to the incident and form a view on that. Following assessment of that, we formed a view that a safety alert would be appropriate, so we put an alert out to all operators specifically around managing hot temperature conditions. These sorts of derailments do occur and it's just a question of whether systemically—we look for more systemic recommendations which are more applicable to the broader industry. In that particular case, we formed the view that factually there was enough there to make a conclusion around the management of hot temperature conditions, so we didn't proceed to further investigate.

The CHAIR:  So the management of hot temperature conditions and those kind of systemic issues, is there a temperature at which the current tracks as they're built now are likely to buckle? Is it that clear in terms of, is it 42 degrees, 38 degrees?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Generally there is a figure and it's based on a forecast figure. So in the metropolitan area there's a thing called a Wolo. It's a telegraphic code. Once the forecast figure is above a certain temperature, then automatically speed is reduced. If line speeds are 100 kilometres an hour, for example, it's reduced to 80 kilometres an hour.

The CHAIR:  What temperature is that?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  I'll have to take that one on notice. I can't remember that particular standard off the top of my head. I used to head the standards organisation.

The CHAIR:  And it's just temperature?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Temperature, and it also depends on the nature of the structure of the rail, whether it's concrete sleepered, timber sleepered, the weight of the rail et cetera, so it varies. ARTC would have their own code, so it would be within ARTC's safety system whatever that number is.

The CHAIR:  Okay, and so they're slowed down but is there a particular point then as well—and I've been approached by the community out near Bylong actually with concerns about the potential for these trains to cause fires on these very, very, very hot days where you're almost not allowed, understandably, to do anything that would cause a spark. Is there a point at which the coal trains don't or should not travel if the lines are buckling, or is going a certain pace safe enough? Do you know what I'm saying?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Yes.

The CHAIR:  The days are getting hotter and the number of very hot days is going to increase. I am wondering, from your perspective as the Acting Chief Investigator for the Office of Transport Safety Investigations, is there a point or a heat level where we should just say, "It's too unsafe for this to occur"?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  It's not really a judgement I can make because of the variables involved. The operator is accountable for their safety management system. It's for them to make the appropriate assessments and determine what the safe operating profile is of that network and to manage to that profile. We were concerned that they had lost some focus and they weren't managing to that profile, and that's why we put the alert out to remind people that you have these provisions within your safety management system and you need to adhere to these, particularly in remote areas such as on the Ulan line there. They would have something in their system to manage that and it could comprise all the factors that you've described.

The CHAIR:  Was that the day that you issued that alert you were just mentioning? Or was it that week?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  We would've issued the alert some days later, because it's quite a remote area.

The CHAIR:  After the derailment?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  Yes, after the derailment. Because it's a remote area, my staff took some time to get up there. The fire was ongoing so we couldn't approach the site for a little while. Following that, we released some safety information to the industry.

The CHAIR:  By releasing safety information to the industry, that included the—was it an instruction, direction? Or is that the ARTC—the instruction or direction to travel at a lower speed?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  I'm the investigator. I can offer recommendations. I don't have the power to issue directions. That would be—the ARTC as a network owner would have to implement their own risk controls. Failing that, the National Rail Safety Regulator is the regulatory authority that could issue directions if they saw fit.

The CHAIR:  Your recommendations in relation to this derailment—are they public? Who did you give them to?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  They'd be on our website.

The CHAIR:  So they are public. That's good. You're not used to hearing that in budget estimates these days. Mr Modrouvanos, the number of derailments as a result of the heat and rail lines buckling—is it relatively common? Do you have figures on that?

JIM MODROUVANOS:  We would have figures in terms of what has been reported to us. These types of incidents are reported to the National Rail Safety Regulator and then we're notified following those reports. So we would have some of those figures. Certainly, I've only been there a relatively short time and that is the only one I've seen in that period. But we have had other derailments for other causes that have occurred as well.

For pictures refer from 05:46:45 here:

Hmm...interesting the Acting Chief Investigator Modrouvanos mentions...

"..Following assessment of that, we formed a view that a safety alert would be appropriate, so we put an alert out to all operators specifically around managing hot temperature conditions.."

...however on review of the 'Rail Safety Alerts and Safety Advisories' webpage there would appear to be no such safety alert; or safety advisory issued??

Rail Safety Alerts
There are currently no Safety Alerts to display for rail.

Rail Safety Advisories

• 13 September 2022 - Safety Advisory - Locomotive sandbox fixing arrangements
  
• 27 June 2022 - Safety Advisory: Unknown functions in locomotive breaking systems
  
• 29 March 2022 - Safety Advisory: Safety critical communications by rail safety workers
  
• 9 August 2021 - Safety Advisory: Light Rail Vehicle (LRV) pantograph failure
  

Now rectified...

Via OTSI website: https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/publications...advisories

8 March 2024 - Safety Advisory SA0124 - Consideration of extreme weather events in safety management systems
Download (PDF 0.56MB)
Safety Advisory SA01/24 - Consideration of extreme weather events in safety management systems

(PDF Created: 3/7/24, 8:32:48 AM)

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Senator McDonald QON for AMSA??

Via RRAT Additional Estimates webpage:

234 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber234

Question

The article ''Government loses its way over navigation'' cites national security, and the discrepancy between spending billions on nuclear submarines and defence hardware to defend Australian waters, yet not awarding a contract for the maintenance of the Aids to Navigation network which provides national safety and security to the international shipping lane between the Great Barrier Reef and basically the entire eastern seaboard, through which 18000 vessels navigate each year.

a) Is it correct that AMSA has not renewed the Navigation Aid contract to AMS Group, which has provided this safety, security and maintenance service with a 100% KPI performance since 2001?
b) Is it correct that AMS Group was the only tenderer?
c) Is it correct that 13 other companies put in expressions of expressed interest?
d) Which organisation has been awarded the contract?

235 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber235

Question

1. Of the10 questions I submitted, the exact word-for-word answer was given for nine of them, all referencing commercial sensitivity and a ''lack of desire'' to provide further comment. The only distinct response still hides behind a reference to commercial sensitivity and does not answer the question. What is being hidden and why?
2. Did the Minister and/or the Department have input into these AMSA answers?
3. If so, when and why
4. In the nine exact same answers provided, the advice is that the ''current contract for aids to navigation maintenance remains in place until 30 June 2024 and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority will ensure the network is maintained appropriately after that date.'' It took 15 weeks from the date I submitted my written questions on 31 October 2023 for the answers that didn't answer anything to be published. If we use 15 weeks as the benchmark for questions to be answered, I calculate that 15 weeks from today's date of 23 February 2024 is 07 June, just three weeks before 30 June and the completion of the current contract for aids to navigation maintenance.

a) Should I expect answers to my current round of questions by the next Senate Estimates?
b) Is 15 weeks the usual time that AMSA or the Department or the Minister takes to respond to queries

237 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber237

238 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber238

239 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber239

Question

1. Has a new CEO of AMSA been identified?
2. Is the new CEO start date 01 July 2024?

240 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber240

241 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber241

Question

1. Are you aware that Minister Catherine King has referred the AMSA procurement process of the Aids to Navigation contract to the Auditor General, requesting that the Australian National Audit Office undertake an urgent assurance review? Noting that a statement was issued on Monday 12 February regarding Mr Hehir's resignation effective as at Friday 15 February, I presume that this review will continue - can this be confirmed by the Department and Minister?
2. When will the urgent ANAO review be finalised?

242 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber242

Question

Is AMSA and the Department and the Minister confident that there will be no lowering of standards or heightened risk with international shipping through the Great Barrier Reef from 01 July?

243 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber243

Question

ABC Far North Queensland interviewed Crispin Hull, The Canberra Times journalist, and Mark Morrow, Executive Director of AMSA on 20 November 2023. Mr Morrow assured listeners that there was no threat to the navigational aids or system that exists in North Queensland.

Does AMSA and the Department and the Minister remain confident that there is no threat to the safety of the network and particularly the Great Barrier Reef?

244 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber244

Question

The Canberra Times published an article on 27 November last year - ''Government loses its way over navigation''.

a) What was the AMSA reaction to that headline, or the Department or Minister's reaction?
b) Did AMSA or the Department or the Minister contact The Canberra Times to discuss or respond to the article

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Senator McDonald QON for AMSA??

Via RRAT Additional Estimates webpage:

234 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber234

Question

The article ''Government loses its way over navigation'' cites national security, and the discrepancy between spending billions on nuclear submarines and defence hardware to defend Australian waters, yet not awarding a contract for the maintenance of the Aids to Navigation network which provides national safety and security to the international shipping lane between the Great Barrier Reef and basically the entire eastern seaboard, through which 18000 vessels navigate each year.

a) Is it correct that AMSA has not renewed the Navigation Aid contract to AMS Group, which has provided this safety, security and maintenance service with a 100% KPI performance since 2001?
b) Is it correct that AMS Group was the only tenderer?
c) Is it correct that 13 other companies put in expressions of expressed interest?
d) Which organisation has been awarded the contract?

235 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber235

Question

1. Of the10 questions I submitted, the exact word-for-word answer was given for nine of them, all referencing commercial sensitivity and a ''lack of desire'' to provide further comment. The only distinct response still hides behind a reference to commercial sensitivity and does not answer the question. What is being hidden and why?
2. Did the Minister and/or the Department have input into these AMSA answers?
3. If so, when and why
4. In the nine exact same answers provided, the advice is that the ''current contract for aids to navigation maintenance remains in place until 30 June 2024 and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority will ensure the network is maintained appropriately after that date.'' It took 15 weeks from the date I submitted my written questions on 31 October 2023 for the answers that didn't answer anything to be published. If we use 15 weeks as the benchmark for questions to be answered, I calculate that 15 weeks from today's date of 23 February 2024 is 07 June, just three weeks before 30 June and the completion of the current contract for aids to navigation maintenance.

a) Should I expect answers to my current round of questions by the next Senate Estimates?
b) Is 15 weeks the usual time that AMSA or the Department or the Minister takes to respond to queries

237 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber237

238 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber238

239 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber239

Question

1. Has a new CEO of AMSA been identified?
2. Is the new CEO start date 01 July 2024?

240 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber240

241 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber241

Question

1. Are you aware that Minister Catherine King has referred the AMSA procurement process of the Aids to Navigation contract to the Auditor General, requesting that the Australian National Audit Office undertake an urgent assurance review? Noting that a statement was issued on Monday 12 February regarding Mr Hehir's resignation effective as at Friday 15 February, I presume that this review will continue - can this be confirmed by the Department and Minister?
2. When will the urgent ANAO review be finalised?

242 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber242

Question

Is AMSA and the Department and the Minister confident that there will be no lowering of standards or heightened risk with international shipping through the Great Barrier Reef from 01 July?

243 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber243

Question

ABC Far North Queensland interviewed Crispin Hull, The Canberra Times journalist, and Mark Morrow, Executive Director of AMSA on 20 November 2023. Mr Morrow assured listeners that there was no threat to the navigational aids or system that exists in North Queensland.

Does AMSA and the Department and the Minister remain confident that there is no threat to the safety of the network and particularly the Great Barrier Reef?

244 https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloade...nNumber244

Question

The Canberra Times published an article on 27 November last year - ''Government loses its way over navigation''.

a) What was the AMSA reaction to that headline, or the Department or Minister's reaction?
b) Did AMSA or the Department or the Minister contact The Canberra Times to discuss or respond to the article

Addendum: AMSA Spillover Hearing

Monday, 25 March 2024

Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, excluding Communications and the Arts
Program (PDF 137KB)

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

AMSA spillover hearing: 25/03/24

Senator McDonald's recall of AMSA to Estimates in a spillover hearing seemed to be somewhat of a storm in a teacup. However the soon to be departing AMSA CEO Mr Kinley's attitude was very defensive, disrespectful and almost dismissive of Senator McDonald's line of questioning. Perhaps Kinley has reached his use by date?

Hansard quote:

Senator McDONALD: ..Mr Kinley, are you leaving us soon? Your contract has just been extended.

Mr Kinley : I will be finishing up at the end of September.

Senator McDONALD: Why did you do a three-month extension? What was the reason for that?

Mr Kinley : The board asked. That period of the year is end-of-year financial statements, all the things that happen at the end of the financial year. We have a relatively new chair, a relatively new chief operating officer, so I'm happy to stay and I agreed and the minister extended me for those three months. There's nothing sinister. I've been in the organisation 30 years and I'm very happy with what the organisation does. It's great.

Senator McDONALD: We've talked for an hour. I've skated across the surface of what I'm trying to unpack. I think that the ANAO, by being asked to do a procedural audit, have shortchanged both AMSA and the taxpayer by not doing a technical review of the tender process. I think this is a very big gap in the decision-making. My sense from your faces that you disregard my views on this matter, but like it or not I am a Senator for the country and I do have the right to make that recommendation, that a procedural review has not been an adequate way to assess whether or not this is the best use of taxpayers' money and whether or not the outcome will be the best for the nine regions.

I truly am disappointed you are so unhappy to be providing these answers. I was trying to get to the bottom of how this tender project has happened for a company that has been providing a high level of KPIs for over 20 years. Through an internal process there's been a series of issues that we have touched on that I think demonstrate some sense of bias. I think your lawyers have provided very good advice in your process, but the technical assessment I think has been an oversight by the minister and the ANAO not to have carried that out. I hope we don't find out—after you have departed, Mr Kinley, it will be somebody else's problem—that the cutting up of the country into these nine regions has resulted in lesser service or a lesser compliance.

CHAIR: I was going to say that I'll take that as a statement, but Mr Kinley, did you wish to answer that before we say sayonara?

Mr Kinley : All I will say is that, if there was any evidence of bias, any form of corruption or anything within this organisation, I would deal with it and I would refer it to the National Anti-Corruption Commission—

Senator McDONALD: I'm not suggesting corruption—

Mr Kinley : I have said the same to AMSG. They have legal recourse under the Commonwealth procurement (judicial review) legislation and they've chosen not to do that. They can refer people to the NACC if they think there is evidence of wrongdoing, but instead there are just random conspiracy theories being thrown around. I think it's just unfortunate that that is the route they have chosen to take—engaging with lobbyists and all the other things they're doing.

Senator McDONALD: I have not met with any lobbyist, you can be assured. As a representative for the country, I think these are not unreasonable questions. This is a contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

Mr Kinley : And I am determined that we will get value for money for the punters who are paying for this. They're actually levy payers—I was going to say taxpayers. We take our responsibilities to deliver—

Courtesy ParlView, via Youtube:

Tabled Docs:  

Senator Susan McDonald Navigation Aid examples25 March 2024PDF - 141KB 
Senator Susan McDonald Aids to Navigation map 25 March 2024 PDF - 90KB 

Next update from NTSB investigation - 'Francis Scott Key Bridge struck by Cargo Ship Dali':

And B-roll videos of initial investigation:

MTF...P2