[Peetwo]

HAPPY NEW YEAR MINISCULE - L&KS Bruce RHOADES and the IOS...  

Much to be ashamed of minister.

Of all its flaws - and there are many - the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s greatest problem may well lie within its very title.

It was once known as the Civil Aviation Authority but now this regulatory authority has been burdened with the oxymoron of “safety.”

Apart from the confusion it creates in the minds general community because of its branding collision with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau CASA’s title is, quite simply, an absurd contradiction in terms.

CASA’s self-appointed role as a Big R law enforcement agency ensures it actually works to undermine the aspiration of safer skies.

It is clearly a regulatory enforcement agency which has never embraced “safety” as its primary mandate.

I have extracted some excerpts from the Professional Aviation Investigation Network Report 3rd Aug 2017 that expose a hostile and adversarial relationship between the GA industry and the Regulator (CASA). 

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PAIN Report.

"In general, it must be stated that the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has an unique approach to ICAO compliance, with record number of ‘notified differences’. Many of the notifications may, at face value, seem insignificant."

It is our opinion that the noted differences are structured to support the complex, contradictory, flawed rule set in place.Reform of this rule set has been in train for thirty years, with successive government ministers and directors of civil aviation promising to complete the task ‘within the next three years’.
 
This is an important consideration as it reflects on the operational approach taken to both open reporting of ‘incident’ or event; and, the tangible fear of prosecution.

Australia’s Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) are founded on the ‘criminal code’ and ‘strict liability’; this, standing alone, provides a strong disincentive to openly reporting safety related matters. This attitude is reflected in the government safety bodies approach to ICAO compliance and reporting.

Reference: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...ICAO_1.pdf

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So it is hardly surprising to witness the industry’s adoption of a culture of “never Reporting incidents or accidents” when the obvious option for survival lies with concealment and in-house fixes.

It’s more disturbing than ironic to see CASA has developed a similar culture of not reporting all accidents to ICAO (as required by annexe 13) which might result in a downgrading of Australia’s overall safety approval by ICAO.

The Australian Government has in fact been lying by failing to submit reports to the International Civil Aviation Organisation, as required since 2009.

Over 30 years this has had a major negative impact on aviation safety in this country...

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https://auntypru.com/and-thus-i-clothe-m...-villainy/ 

....Late start this morning – much to consider and read; mostly to do with Bruce Roades and his run in with at the CASA gristmill. The story begins with tragedy, a failed engine leading to an air accident, ending with a fatality. A raw day for all concerned; services swung into action and did their usual sterling work (thank you – once again); ATSB arrived ‘on-site’ and began the task of ‘investigation’. This is what we have become used to after an accident; the ATSB attempts to define what happened, why and place, when required, some form of advisory or recommendation designed to prevent a reoccurrence. The CASA often buy in, they are quite entitled to run an investigation; there are matters which they need to be across, matters of law and operational well being. So the scene is set...

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 Oz aviation, safety compromised by political and bureaucratic subterfuge?

http://www.auntypru.com/forum/thread-167...ml#pid8362

Update 01/01/19 : Bruce Roades' - FINAL BATTLE.

FEDERAL ICAC NOW! 



TICK TOCK MINISCULE - Your days are numbered...

In a kind of follow up/update to the above, the following was shared via the PAIN network...  

Courtesy Dafydd Llewellyn:

What’s wrong with CASA (and the Aviation Industry)?
 
By D. J.  Llewellyn
(See attached resume)
 
General Statement:
 
The recent airing of the accident to VH-WTQ on the 7:30 report of 29/10/2018 exposes issues that have been progressively driving the Australian General Aviation industry into the ground for the past three decades. Our Politicians have been too busy getting themselves re-elected to either understand them, or to do anything useful about them. The only effective constructive step in this time was the initiative of John Sharp, who set in motion the Review of Regulations (i.e. the Australian Civil Aviation Regulations)  in 1996.  CASA has managed to delay anything significantly more than the implementation of Part 21 of the new regulations, which was achieved within the lifetime of the steering committee of the review.
 
There is a very poor overall culture in the relationship between CASA and the aviation industry; the attitudes are adversarial on both sides.  This means that operators will attempt to fix problems in-house, rather than letting CASA know about them, for fear of punitive action; the adverse effects of that on overall safety needs no explanation.  This was not the case when I joined the (then) Dept of Civil Aviation, in 1970.  I have watched the deterioration in the relationship progressively develop from then to the present day, from both sides. 
 
The largest single cause of this deterioration was the formation, 1n 1995 by the Keating Government, of CASA as a corporate entity, which could “sue and be sued in its corporate name”  (S8 (2) © of the Civil Aviation Act 1988).  This is in marked contrast to bodies such as the American Federal Aviation Agency, which is immune from litigation.  As a consequence, CASA employees cannot offer friendly advice, because they could be held liable for the results;  so the industry is deprived of advice from the very people who are best qualified to give it. 
 
The operators of  VH-WTQ had applied for, and received, an Operator’s Certificate, to perform the operation in which the aircraft was engaged when the accident occurred.  I would suggest that a very pertinent question is whether or not a CASA Flight Operations Inspector  actually went on a demonstration flight with the operators of VH-WTQ;  because if one did, I venture to suggest that he might have advised them to move their landing area on the beach a quarter of a mile South, so that in the event of an engine failure, the pilot did not need to turn 180 degrees, but could put the aircraft down straight ahead, on the beach.  I have frequently conducted aircraft performance climb tests* which started from a similar position and height over a beach, but I always had miles of beach ahead of me, for exactly this reason.  Hindsight is always 20/20 of course, but evidently no such advice was given.  It could perhaps have been; but S8(2)© cultivates a closed-mouth attitude amongst CASA staff.
 
*Because such tests are normally conducted over water, to avoid turbulent air due to convection over land;  the start point needs to be as close to sea-level as possible.
 
The present structure:
 
Australia is a signatory to the Chicago convention on International Civil Aviation.  CASA is the body charged with  carrying out Australia’s responsibilities as a signatory member of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, ICAO, which is established in Montreal. 
 
CASA has been responsible for  providing and policing  regulations that  satisfy the requirements of ICAO, and the Civil Aviation Regulations follow (or should follow) from the Articles of that convention, set out in the annexes of the ICAO convention or in ICAO manuals, Chapter 1 of the ICAO document which outlines the safety obligations of the State, contains the words: 



 
Despite this,  the Morris report (“Plane safe”) 1995, concluded that the role for CASA was that of a policeman.   And  the functions of  the CAA were split between CASA and Air Services Australia as a consequence.  But CASA has – apart from the Review of Regulations 1996 , initiated by the then Minister, John Sharp – both drafted regulations, AND enforced them.  This is contrary to the principle that the police enforce laws made by Parliament; they do not create laws.  Yes, it is true that regulations drafted by CASA are “disallowable instruments” and must “lay on the floor” of the Parliament for a period, for anybody in the Parliament to question them – but who in Parliament has the expertise to challenge that sort of thing? So whilst the form of the procedure is followed, the fact is that Parliament rubber-stamps whatever CASA puts forward.
 
So we have the dilemma that ICAO requires both that suitable regulations for Civil Aviation must exist; and they must also be enforced.  The error  in our legislation is that the responsibility for both these functions has been placed on CASA.  The answer is to separate these two functions so that the policeman does not also write the law.  
 
In 1996, the Review of Regulations was guided by the Civil Aviation Legislation amendment bill 1995;  that Bill never passed into law, unfortunately, because it embodied the principle of reducing the number and complexity of the regulations wherever possible.  In particular, it asked the question, “can the purpose of the proposed regulation be achieved instead by education”.  CASA can do one of two things; it can write regulations, and then wait until somebody breaks one, and jump on him. That is the lazy man’s way; but S8(2)© of the Act  leaves CASA no alternative. 
 
Or it can make its presence felt around the industry, by offering helpful advice.  That requires that the various inspectors visit the operators from time to time, and offer friendly advice, based on experience.  On Bankstown airport, many years ago, there was a very experienced airworthiness surveyor, who was well known in the local industry.  When any other airworthiness surveyor strolled around the aerodrome, all the hangar doors were shut; but when this one surveyor took a stroll, they’d remain open. His method was to drop in, and pass the time briefly; and if he spotted something, say something like – “I had that problem a while ago; what worked for me, there, is”  . . . .   or he’s say, “I’ll go and see what I can find on that in our library”.  He was, in terms of safety achieved, more valuable than about seven of the other sort.
 
Of course, the Regional libraries have long since been disposed-of, in the interests of saving costs.
 
This means, CASA needs to attract first-class experienced experts, who do NOT sit in its offices all day every day.  This costs money;  but one must not bind the mouths of the kine who tread the grain.
 
It will be difficult to correct this after all the decades of antagonism; but the antagonistic way has been tried, and it is counter-productive.
 
The current situation can be summarised as follows:
 
1.           CASA is full of Civil Servants who know full well that they can simply delay any proposed modifications to their modus operandi until there is a change of government – and so they have been able to resist almost all attempts to change the way aviation is regulated for the last 30 years, because they have only to delay for three years or so, before they get a new director – who will hardly have time to learn the ropes before he is replaced.  The “Old guard” within CASA can be likened to the political religious right in the LCP;  they “know” what is “right” and resist change to the point of political suicide.  They are able to resist the efforts of the appointed director of CASA – because they can out-stubborn him. The mass of aviation law is very large and complex, and it requires technical expertise as well as legal expertise to understand it; nobody coming in “cold” can expect to do so comprehensively in three years – and this is why successive directors of CASA have such difficulty.
 
Why is the period of appointment so short?  Presumably, because one man alone cannot be given extraordinary power for an extended period.  But one man alone can at least make decisions, whereas a board of directors is likely to spend most of its time arguing, and get nothing done.  We have tried both models, and neither of them has worked.  So what should we do?
 
Firstly, there is no substitute for competence.  And no one man can be fully competent in all facets of aviation. And everybody wants to protect his means of earning a living.  So, unless you can find a few Gods, who are omniscient and do not need to earn a living, no single entity can be put in such a position.  The closest model that works, is the High Court; so set up a panel from which three experts can be drawn to “sit” on each issue.  The size of the panel will depend on the number of issues – and there are plenty in Aviation at present.  The Privy Council (which has no seats – members are required to remain on their feet) might be a suitable precedent to move decisions along.  The members of such a panel need to have, or to have access to, a great depth of  knowledge of both the Regulations, and the technical issues involved.
 
So this is step 1:  Create a panel of technical advisers to make the decisions, and  include on it the Director of Aviation Safety, who should have the power of accountable veto;  and make the Director of Aviation Safety responsibility for carrying out those decisions.
 
         
2       When there is a cause for prosecution, CASA briefs the Crown Prosecutor; however I have been called as an expert witness on several occasions where it was obvious that CASA had managed to get the case heard by a stipendiary magistrate who was favourably disposed to the official viewpoint.  I have also experienced two cases where the CASA Flight Operations Inspector concerned was clearly out of his depth with the technical issues.  There is really no excuse for such incompetence.  It seems that FOIs may be promoted on the basis of the number of successful prosecutions they record, and the FOIs are not always even-handed in their presentation of the “facts”.
 
These cozy arrangements have resulted in a number of rogue operators being hunted out of aviation; but they have also resulted in questionable practices leading to persecution of otherwise harmless operators. The net outcome has been a substantial number of people deciding that aviation is no longer a viable area for business. 
 
We see this in action in the case of the operators of VH-WTQ;  the CASA FOIs cancelled the operator’s certificate and withdrew the pilot licences, on the grounds that the pilot performed unauthorised aerobatics – which cannot have had any effect whatever on the subsequent engine failure – and it is questionable whether what is shown in the film from the on-board camera of the manoeuvres concerned in any way exceeded what one might encounter in a more usual flight in turbulent conditions;  and because they alleged that the pilot should have landed straight ahead in the water, rather than attempt a turn.  That, in a fixed-undercarriage aircraft, would result in a somersault of the aircraft, which would end up inverted in the water; it is doubtful whether any of the occupants would survive that.
 
         So step 2 is to re-direct or re-train the FOIs so they steer operators towards safe practices, rather than waiting for them to put a foot wrong, and then seeking to prosecute them.  Obviously, there will be “rogue” operators from time to time, and the FOIs have a public expectation that they will prevent rogue operators from placing the public at risk.  This is tempered by the recognition, in law, that some aspects of aviation constitute “Hazardous recreational activities” and accordingly, people who elect to engage in them are electing to accept the risk. 
 
         The introduction, in 1998, of the Experimental purposes for which an aircraft may be allowed to fly, was a major change in philosophy;  prior to this, CASA took the position that it was “my brother’s keeper” in regard to all aviation activities.  Its introduction necessitated  that CASA be given an immunity from liability for the safety of persons on board such aircraft.  This principle may need to be extended to some other classes of operation; arguably, landing on a beach is a somewhat hazardous operation – at least, by comparison with landing on the prepared surface of an airfield.
 
         One cannot help wondering whether CASA’s efforts are being spent in the most effective way;  the point made by Mr. Bruce Rhoades that the Cessna 172 – because the first model of the type was certificated to a 1948 standard, and subsequent models have been “grandfathered” to a major extent, did not have upper body restraint for the rear seat occupants – begs a question:  The original standard provided only seat belts, for all seats.  The danger of this became very obvious at least thirty years ago.  Australia issued an Airworthiness Directive in about 1968, requiring upper body restraint for the front seat occupants only, of all aircraft certificated to this early standard – I recall this, because I was given the task of designing the anchor points for the upper body restraint on the Beech 35 model aircraft.   I suppose it seemed “a good idea at the time” – but automotive standards have long since gone way past this.  Why has there been no “catch up” ?  The efforts of the FOIs in hunting small operators of essentially hazardous recreational activities would seem trivial by comparison.
       

1. D.J.  Llewellyn
   

DJ Llewellyn submissions: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...iation.doc & https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...oncern.doc


MTF...P2