[Peetwo]

Airport public self-serving safety risk mitigation obfuscation - Oz style?

Courtesy Clinton McKenzie, via the AvMad thread:

CM on a mission with CASA AvMad: Part II 

(For reference here is CASR 11.140: http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/...1.140.html)


CM then follows up personally with Dr A... :

Clinton McKenzie

I sent an email to Jonathan Aleck today, in the following terms, after a discussion on Monday (28 Aug 23). The content is a good SITREP. (I note that I said to Jonathan, in advance of our discussion, that I would not treat the content as confidential, and the discussion proceeded on that basis.)

Hi again, Jonathan

Thanks for the discussion on Monday afternoon (28 August 23). My understanding is that you have been asked by the CEO/DAS for advice on the question whether CASR 11.140 applies to medical certificates. I look forward to being informed by the CEO/DAS of CASA’s position after the CEO/DAS has had an opportunity to consider your advice.

In the interim, are you able to explain the ‘status’ of the position stated by CASA’s ‘Regulatory Guidance’ staff? We are apparently now in circumstances in which the CEO/DAS could conceivably settle on a position different than that stated categorically (twice) by ‘Regulatory Guidance’ staff in response to my question and follow-up. Do ‘Regulatory Guidance’ staff communicate with CASA’s authority?

Apart from my view that I consider the position expressed by CASA’s ‘Regulatory Guidance’ staff to be dubious as a matter of statutory interpretation, I wrote to the CEO/DAS about CASR 11.140 because I’m mindful of reports that CASA told the ATSB, in the course of the latter’s investigation of the evolution of the OLS at Essendon, that written confirmation given to the operators of Essendon by a CASA officer as to the interpretation of the applicable rules was wrong and had no legal validity. I hasten to add that I realise this is just one (hearsay) side of what will almost certainly be a story with at least three sides. Nonetheless, I’m disconcerted by any prospect of CASA subsequently resiling from the substance of written communications, on serious matters involving the interpretation of civil aviation safety rules, sent by CASA staff in response to questions about those matters. That’s why I said, in my email to you of 25 August 23, that: “I’m surprised that the DAS’s/CEO’s response [to my letter of 7 August 23] was anything other than to confirm what the ‘Guidance Centre’ has already told me.”

In any event, I reiterate my thanks for the discussion and that I look forward to being informed by the CEO/DAS of CASA’s position after the CEO/DAS has had an opportunity to consider your advice.

Regards

This quote from CM..."I wrote to the CEO/DAS about CASR 11.140 because I’m mindful of reports that CASA told the ATSB, in the course of the latter’s investigation of the evolution of the OLS at Essendon, that written confirmation given to the operators of Essendon by a CASA officer as to the interpretation of the applicable rules was wrong and had no legal validity"...is consistent with previous observations made by CM - reference Airport public safety risk mitigation - Oz style?

Clinton McKenzie

Quote:

The ATSB investigation details a 2003 email it uncovered, in which an Essendon Airport management officer advised that CASA had agreed verbally to the airport applying a strip width of 180 metres rather than 300 metres.

Quote:

“This should open up about 36,000 square metres of new land for development,” the email says.

Essendon Airport relied heavily on a letter from a CASA officer confirming that interpretation a month later, but CASA told the ATSB investigation that advice was wrong and had no legal validity.

This is another example of CASA apparently ‘disowning’ responsibility for its own officer’s inconvenient actions.

It appears that the only way in which to have confidence that anything written by any CASA officer is CASA’s position is to write to the CEO and seek confirmation that the CEO acknowledges and accepts that what the CASA officer said is CASA’s position.

The actual paper trail starts from chapter 6, page 30 of the bollocks ATSB DFO approval process cover-up report.

In the lead up to the 'clanger' (IE the differential interpretation of RW 26 OLS ICAO Annex 14 safety standards between a CASA officer and the CASA Legal Services Division), which ultimately led to the DFO being approved to be built in total non-compliance with international safety standards, we start from page 35 under the heading 'Approval of the masterplan':

 

The ATSB’s review of the CASA files for Essendon Fields Airport identified that there was likely further engagement with EAPL about CASA’s views on the proposal to reduce the runway strip width. This occurred at the time the master plan was sent to the Minister for Transport and Regional Services (the Minister) for approval. On 26 March 2003, a senior CASA officer obtained a briefing from other CASA officers about the previous correspondence between CASA and EAPL. The officer was advised in the briefing:

It is true that at a number of aerodromes equipped with ILS, due to terrain constraints, precision approach operations have been sanctioned where the runway strip widths are less than 300 m. This is allowed for in the standard and the reduced safety margin is recognised and sometimes compensated in the approach procedure. It should however be noted that this is a limitation imposed by site constraints. This is not the case for runway 08/26 therefore, it would be difficult to justify a reduction in the required standard especially for economic development reasons. This notwithstanding, the runway strip width may be reduced to 150 m if the ILS was decommissioned and replaced by a non-precision approach such as GPS.

Accordingly, before any action is taken to actually reduce the runway strip width to 150 m, CASA needs to be assured that appliable standards will not be breached, or a proper safety assessment is made for any non-compliance situation.

There was no evidence on the available files to show if any further advice was provided by CASA to either the Minister’s office or the Department. The Minister’s office was working to approve the master plan on 27 March 2003. On that same day, EAPL wrote to the Minister advising:

A provision of this draft Master Plan was a proposal to reduce the 08/26 runway strip width (for OLS calculation purposes) from 300 metres to 150 metres. This proposal’s intent was to seek a more suitable land envelope for the development of the Bulla Road Precinct.

…EAPL is now aware that this proposal has not yet attracted the support of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Accordingly, having reconsidered this matter and the process we undertook during the public consultation period to specifically address this issue, we have decided to withdraw the concept of reducing the runway strip width (for OLS calculation purposes) from 300 metres to 150 metres.

On 27 March 2003, the Minister approved the master plan with any references to reducing the runway strip width omitted. At the same time, EAPL published a 180 m runway strip width in the March 2003 version of the En Route Supplement Australia. 

ATSB observation41

The applicable aerodrome standards at the time required a strip width of 300 m for runway 08/26. Although EAPL, CASA and the Department were discussing the reduction of the runway strip width from 300 m to 150 m, there was no available evidence, which showed that EAPL had published a 300 m strip width. Rather, the 2001 aerodrome manual and 2003 En Route Supplement Australia indicated the strip width was 180 m.

In correspondence about the draft master plan, EAPL referred to reducing the runway strip width from 300 m for ‘OLS purposes’. Potentially, as set out in their 6 March 2003 letter to the Department, EAPL were seeking to differentiate the runway strip requirements from the OLS requirements. They published a 180 m runway strip width but believed they still had to locate the OLS transitional surface 150 m either side of the runway centreline.

Chapter 4 outlines ICAO’s view on how the standard for the transitional surface was constructed. ICAO’s view was that the location of the transitional surfaces was still determined by what the standard said the dimensions of runway strip width should be, which coincided with the width of the inner edge of the approach surface, and not what the published strip width was. This was consistent with EAPLs interpretation above that they would still require the ‘support of CASA’ to locate the transitional surface from a strip width less than 300 m despite the published runway strip already being less than that at 180 m. It was also consistent with CASA’s 2002 advice that a 300 m strip width was the origin for the transitional surface.

Which brings us up to CM's OBS above:

Essendon Airport Pty Ltd internal email

Records were obtained from EAPL and CASA covering the exchange on the applicability of MOS Part 139 and the required dimensions for the runway 08/26 strip width and associated OLS (below). The CASA files did not contain any further exchanges with EAPL on this matter. EAPL provided the following internal email dated 23 September 2003, where an EAPL office holder advised:

I’ve had some further correspondence with CASA this afternoon…

Following these discussions, CASA has agreed (verbally) to accept a 1-7 transitional surface from a 180 metre strip width, not the 300 metre Inner Edge [approach surface]. This will give us an additional 60 metres of depth across the 600 metre (or so) frontage. Importantly, this will not require any changes to the Master Plan because our runway width is already 180 metres. It is simply changing the past technical argument. There has been varying views even within CASA on this so we have 100% secure reason not to put in a variation to the Master Plan.

My view is that we can start development on 180 metres – without any approvals – as it is based off the existing specifications – but we have successfully argued a different interpretation…

This should open up about 36,000 square metres of new land for development.

Then FFWD to Chapter 6 pg 40 where we get to the final 'clanger' with CASA Legal's interpretation:

Subsequent positions on compliance with the standards

Chapter 8 documents a period from 2012 when questions were raised through CASA audits about compliance with the aerodrome standards for the runway 08/26 strip width and OLS. Since that time, CASA and EAPL have expressed varying views on compliance with the aerodrome standards during the master plan and major development plan processes and the construction of the Bulla Road Precinct development. Evidence showing the progression of these views is set out below.

Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s position on compliance

2015 recommendation form

Chapter 8 details CASA’s implementation in 2015 of instrument 153/15, which approved obstacles within a 300 m wide runway strip and required EAPL to declare the strip width as 300 m. The CASA recommendation form that led to issuing the instrument, stated that:

Runway 26 at Essendon Aerodrome is serviced by an Instrument Landing System and thus is a precision approach runway. Its status as a precision approach runway has hence remained unchanged since 1971. The ICAO Annex 14 standards require a 300 metre strip width to be provided for a Code 3 or Code 4 precision approach runway.

In 2003, Essendon Aerodrome wrote to CASA requesting clarification of the runway strip width requirements for Runway 08/26. [A CASA officer] from Aerodrome Standards responded via letter and stated that a transitional surface based upon a published 180 wide strip was acceptable. No mention was made of the actual strip standard published under the ‘Rules and Practices for Aerodromes’ which was in place at the time and the Manual of Standards Part 139 – Aerodromes.

The advice in CASA’s letter of 2 October 2003 was not supported by an official legal instrument. As such, it was subsequently assessed by the Legal Services Division as having no legal validity.

A separate assessment from the Aerodromes team has also concluded that the advice provided from [the officer] was incomplete and incorrect as it only referenced the Obstacle Limitation Surface based on published information and not the required standard for the actual strip

Upon the transition of Essendon Aerodrome to a Certified Aerodrome in 2005, the compliant strip width was not reinstated as part of this process. The Direct Factory Outlet (DFO) building [Bulla Road Precinct] was constructed at the aerodrome post Certification and was opened in October 2005.

We then go full circle back to that un-named CASA officer (ref pg 44)....  :

2022 ATSB draft report consultation

In response to consultation on the third draft of this report, EAPL advised the ATSB on 8 November 2022 that the section in the report on the varying positions on compliance with the standards:

…does not accurately record that EAPL sought confirmation from CASA on the compliance status [the 2003 letter from a CASA officer] and acted in accordance with CASA’s guidance on the same.

With respect to the absence of any evidence of a concession being obtained under the RPAs, EAPL advised:

It is important context that it appears no record that any concession was sought.

There are two possible reasons for this:

1. Either a concession was sought, and granted, but the records were not duly transferred; or
2. A concession was not required as the aerodrome operator and CASA agreed that the standard of RPA 7.17.7 applied.

EAPL provided an alternative position to the need to have met practicability requirements:

There was no requirement in the MOS Part 139 (2003) for the runway to meet the practicability requirements, as the runway was an existing facility. Under the quoted extracts from that version of the MOS Part 139, no modification was required unless specifically directed by CASA or upgrading the runway to a more demanding aircraft. Neither such trigger occurred. An existing facility was only required to continue to comply with the standard that was applicable to it. That standard was the standard when it was constructed, i.e., the APEIs, which it continued to comply with.

A lack of clarity around whether, in the interim when the RPAs were the prevailing standards, a concession was required or the facility ought to have been grandfathered, does not change the requirement under the MOS Part 139.

EAPL further stated:

By virtue of the issuance of an aerodrome certificate to EAPL by CASA [May 2005], based on the aerodrome manual contents and the facilities physical characteristics, including the condition and published information regarding the runway strip width, it was reasonable for EAPL to take confidence that they were indeed compliant at the time of issue and at the time of the construction of the Bulla Road Precinct.

I note that, through all the decades of vomitus self-serving, system gaming, duck shoving, blame shifting, bureaucratic arse-covering [etc..etc] that is all now factually documented in the ATSB investigation report (now dubbed a safety study); there has never been an actual safety risk mitigation review/study conducted by any of the many interested parties and responsible authorities, into the possible implications of a high performance bizjet pile driving into the DFO during peak trading hours...

On 21 February 2017 these parties received a very real wake up call on why it is perhaps not the best idea to bend the rules on internationally accepted safety standards and going ahead and building a shopping centre in close proximity to active airport runways. If you wish to be further enlightened please refer to Essendon DFO accident: No MSM speculation here Christine?

   



Reality check dismissed??!! -   



 MTF...P2