08-07-2017, 09:29 PM
Redactions or RED ACTIONS - that is the question?
From the quoted Hansard (above) Senator Fawcett said: "..I accept that. I also accept that so far you have not had a look at the fatigue special audit, because that is still being redacted prior to being distributed..."
On review of the referred to document - 09 CASA_Doc 10_Web - i.e. Ben Cook's Special Audit of Pel-Air FRMS;
(a) I firstly verified Senator Fawcett's statement that the tabling of the audit report was being redacted as the 'created' date/time matches - 15/02/2013 11:15:30 AM;
(b) this gave me a perfect opportunity to observe the redaction methodology of the Senate RRAT committee compared to the redactions in the other 8 documents received on the 10 October 2012.
This comparison has led me to the conclusion that the other 8 documents were redacted merely to protect the identity of innocent (coalface) parties (e.g. 'ATSB' or 'CASA' Officers) versus executive or middle management identities (e.g. McCormick, Sangston). Whereas the RRAT Secretariat do not discriminate and adhere strictly to privacy and/or FOI Act rules; and
© the copy of the Ben Cook FRMS audit report is also interesting as it has many overlayed highlighted sections (paragraphs and sentences), examples:
This highlighting would seem to indicate that this document copy has been reviewed and IMO reflects an investigative process often employed by an individual(s) tasked with extracting evidence/data that maybe relevant to the systemic causal chain of the accident/incident investigation.
This would appear to also match the inferences and concerns highlighted in three of the preceding documents/emails:
Does this possibly indicate that the reviewer had only recently been leaked (April-May 2012)the Ben Cook FRMS Special Audit report and this only further heightened his/her concerns on the lack of ATSB investigative coverage on fatigue and the FRMS in the (at that stage) DRAFTED final report...
As a point of interest on the former ATSB Chief Commissioner Beaker's take on whether fatigue of the flight crew, in particular PIC DJ, was a causal factor to the ditching, it is worth rehashing this part of an 11 November 2012 (indignant) Beaker correspondence to the former Senate RRAT committee Secretary Stephen Palethorpe - reference: Supplementary Submission(PDF 271KB):
- No comment -
MTF...P2
From the quoted Hansard (above) Senator Fawcett said: "..I accept that. I also accept that so far you have not had a look at the fatigue special audit, because that is still being redacted prior to being distributed..."
On review of the referred to document - 09 CASA_Doc 10_Web - i.e. Ben Cook's Special Audit of Pel-Air FRMS;
(a) I firstly verified Senator Fawcett's statement that the tabling of the audit report was being redacted as the 'created' date/time matches - 15/02/2013 11:15:30 AM;
(b) this gave me a perfect opportunity to observe the redaction methodology of the Senate RRAT committee compared to the redactions in the other 8 documents received on the 10 October 2012.
This comparison has led me to the conclusion that the other 8 documents were redacted merely to protect the identity of innocent (coalface) parties (e.g. 'ATSB' or 'CASA' Officers) versus executive or middle management identities (e.g. McCormick, Sangston). Whereas the RRAT Secretariat do not discriminate and adhere strictly to privacy and/or FOI Act rules; and
© the copy of the Ben Cook FRMS audit report is also interesting as it has many overlayed highlighted sections (paragraphs and sentences), examples:
This highlighting would seem to indicate that this document copy has been reviewed and IMO reflects an investigative process often employed by an individual(s) tasked with extracting evidence/data that maybe relevant to the systemic causal chain of the accident/incident investigation.
This would appear to also match the inferences and concerns highlighted in three of the preceding documents/emails:
Quote:15 Advice from the UK Civil Aviation Authority to CASA providing an assessment of the fatigue scores for the accidental flight (dated 11 December 2009), received 10 October 2012;(PDF 881KB)
16 Internal ATSB email- reviewer wanting to look more closely at FRMS and re-interview pilots (dated 24 May 2012), received 10 October 2012;(PDF 535KB)
17 Internal ATSB email- reviewer indicating they can't deviate at this point and they have to work with what they have (dated 24 May 2012), received 10 October 2012;(PDF 360KB)
Does this possibly indicate that the reviewer had only recently been leaked (April-May 2012)the Ben Cook FRMS Special Audit report and this only further heightened his/her concerns on the lack of ATSB investigative coverage on fatigue and the FRMS in the (at that stage) DRAFTED final report...
As a point of interest on the former ATSB Chief Commissioner Beaker's take on whether fatigue of the flight crew, in particular PIC DJ, was a causal factor to the ditching, it is worth rehashing this part of an 11 November 2012 (indignant) Beaker correspondence to the former Senate RRAT committee Secretary Stephen Palethorpe - reference: Supplementary Submission(PDF 271KB):
Quote:Fatigue
In considering the potential for fatigue to have affected the flight crew's performance,
the investigation considered evidence acquired through interviews with the pilot and
copilot, from the operator's duty records and from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(CASA) investigation report. Based on this evidence, a number of the ATSB's human
factors investigators were involved in the examination of whether fatigue was a factor in
the occurrence.
By way of background, fatigue modelling is useful for assessing the probability of crew
fatigue when developing crew rosters but, because of individual differences, it is not
possible to determine an individual's level of fatigue at any point in time based on the
retrospective use of a fatigue modelling tool alone.
The determination of whether fatigue was a factor was made more difficult by the
changing reports over time about the amount of rest obtained by the pilot in command
(PIC) while in Samoa. The ATSB placed more weight on the contemporaneous
recollection by the PIC that he slept for most of the reported 8-hour rest period in the
hotel in Samoa.
On testing, the hypothesis that the PIC was significantly fatigued at the time of receipt of the 0800 SPEC! could not be proven to the level of likelihood used as a standard by the ATSB. The ATSB nevertheless concluded that the flight crew were experiencing some level of fatigue on the flight to Samoa. If the PIC only had 4 hours sleep in Samoa, as was later reported, then it is more likely he was experiencing fatigue on the return flight at a level likely to have had at least some effect on performance. (Pages 14 and 15 of the investigation report refer.)
- No comment -
MTF...P2