[Peetwo]

ATSB Ops inquiry update: Sandy open email submission.


Via email chain:

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Committee Secretary

Senate Standing Committees on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport
PO Box 6100
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600.                  

Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) inquiry submission, an open email. 

Dear Senators,

I wish to support those submissions that I’ve read in regard to the ATSB by Mr. Aisen, Mr. Hobbs and of Mr. Hilton, and contribute additional opinion. 

Obviously the ATSB’s report into the Mt. Gambier accident is flawed and serious questions must be raised as to the motives or reasons for such a poor report. 

Professional and private aviation industry personnel have been following the ATSB’s reports for many years, but more particularly since it became an independent Commonwealth corporate body in 2009. 

Many, and probably the great majority, now have little or no confidence that the ATSB is capable of producing reports of value. In reality the reverse is true, the Mt. Gambier report, as an example, can only confound those who would look for answers and constructive suggestions that might lead into new avenues for the safety of flight. 

Whilst I concur completely with the thoughtful and detailed analysis by the submitters as noted, my concern is to respectfully ask the Senators to consider the broader context and the failed model of governance as represented by the independent ATSB. 

Similarly the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, independent since 1988, has failed to live up to it’s legislated duty to provide, quote, “clear and concise” rules and regulations (see illustration). The result is the most astonishing demise of a once flourishing industry of General Aviation (GA). Though my critique of CASA may not be directly germane to the performance of the ATSB, it does provide a clear demonstration of a failure of governance, by that of the relatively unaccountable independent regulator. 

This points directly to the need for a greater degree of Parliamentary control. Without direct and constant accountability to a Minister, or some other Parliamentary body of responsibility, then it is apparent and unsurprising that such bodies can stray from their legislated purpose. 

Certain settings have clearly influenced the actions of such bodies, the fact that, unlike a Government Department, they can be sued, has contributed to the CASA attempt to micro manage, to control to an extreme degree. In addition, CASA has caused Parliament, inappropriately, to migrate practically all the rules into the criminal code with strict liability as the standard of proof to ensure maximum prosecution success. This of course has driven incident reporting to very low levels. Who wants to own up and then bear a criminal conviction with all that entails including loss of international travel ability? The fear of reporting mitigates against safety. 

The CASA attempt to ‘straight jacket’ the aviation industry into an inhuman model of perfection has caused the extraordinary decline of GA that has become so evident. It has failed to produce a safer level in flying. It is easily arguable that flying is less safe because of incompetent administration and rule making. 

It is my belief, as a senior instructor and experienced commercial pilot and former GA business owner operator, that the severe punishments available to authorities for even the most minor of infringements (and for some that don’t even exist in the USA) have a deleterious psychological effect on pilots. By exacerbating stress levels this can go some way to explain illogical actions. If we can say the Mt. Gambier accident was as a result of illogical decision making then I will argue that stress levels and the loss of adrenaline are factors that should be taken into account and explored thoroughly. I have witnessed these phenomena, and have been personally subject to same, as have practically all pilots to some extent. Even before flight loss of adrenaline can cause extreme weariness and loss of clear and timely decision making. 

As others have rightly stated, the Mt. Gambier report deals at length with the operations of Angel Flight and largely ignores the causal factors of the actual accident and possible future remedies to prevent similar occurrences. 

Remedies like the provision of portable synthetic vision which reduced weather related visual flight accidents in Alaska by 50% (Operation Capstone). 

Provision of flying schools and instructors to teach for the Instrument Rating, unhampered by CASA’s near impossible flying school paperwork and super expensive, unnecessary administrative structures could also have been noted for policy adjustment. 

Thanking you,

Sandy Reith 
Alexander C. (Sandy) Reith 
0438 85 88 20

New flying school comparison:-

Australia....Permit $50,000?+? Months or years to negotiate, various approved personnel. 

USA..........No permit, Instructor Rating & book $15.99. Start immediately. Better safety record. 

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plus: https://www.aph.gov.au/News_and_Events/Watch_Parliament

04/09/2019 2:45PM - 5:45PM AEST

Senate, Rural & Regional Affairs & Transport Legislation Committee (Operation of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, and in particular its report on the June 2017 crash of a flight conducted on behalf of Angel Flight Australia) Live

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

ATSB Ops inquiry: Hansard is out...  


Via the APH website: 

Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee
04/09/2019
Operation of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, and in particular its report on the June 2017 crash of a flight conducted on behalf of Angel Flight Australia

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

A star is born.

A simple, but accurate statement introduces the new ‘Chair’ of the RRAT.

“I couldn’t just go on yelling at the television. There is so much that can be done, so much than can be done better.”

Oh, Bravo.

The new Chair of the RRAT committee, Senator Susan McDonald is just what the doctor ordered. Calm, sensible, quiet, centred, effective; and, very, very ‘street savvy’. After the sheer frustration of the O’Sofullofit era; Ms McDonald is a breath of much needed fresh air.  

The slightly ‘left handed’ short notice hearing on the impositions CASA have loaded onto Angel Flight; while ignoring the real, long standing, multi victim safety case, of VFR into IMC; ably assisted by the lap dog ATSB went ahead as scheduled. , HANSARD for those who are prepared to read it is interesting. P2 has, once again dug the thing out of the dust bins and those interested in the survival of GA, as we know it should really find a quiet corner, a coffee and not only read it, but comprehend the Senate suspicions surrounding the extraordinary response from a caring; fully plugged in regulator. “We had to be seen to do something”  (Bollocks) More to follow on that as we sort Wheat from Chaff.

Meanwhile – the following quotes from the Chair should cheer the GA community; if for no other reason than at last, we have a RRAT chair worthy of the title. For context, read Hansard; and, consider one line from Crawford – in context. Eyes and ears open boy’s and girl’s.

CHAIR: No—I'm actually encouraging you because I think this is a very key point as to why that legislation was amended: to consider cost. By bringing forward any maintenance schedule, you're potentially increasing the cost for maintaining that aircraft to greater than within 100 hours. The cost of operating private aircraft in Australia is one of several reasons. People leave the industry and sell their aircraft. I think this is a very important point. I just want to check, Senator Patrick: is this not a question you've asked previously at another hearing?

CHAIR: If you refer back to the additional estimates day, Senator Patrick specifically asked Mr Carmody for the statistics and how those regulations would have altered those statistics. It's quite specific. Please respond, I would suggest, as a matter of urgency. I would also—

CHAIR: I would encourage you to review that objective in line with the reality of what's happening.

CHAIR: Mr Monahan, just to go on from that, did I understand correctly that you just said that most accidents in the private aviation space happened as a result of reduced maintenance or—

CHAIR: I guess what I'm interested in is that CASA has very high standards for its pilots and for the maintenance of its aircraft. I'm just hoping that CASA applies the same level of rigour to its own lists and internal processes.

And yes; I am encouraging one and all to do the bloody homework and help this RRAT committee to help this benighted industry be shut of the CASA incubus; the one who ‘hunts’.

Crawford: “That's a phrase that's often used. That's certainly not where we hunt.” 

Toot – toot – MTF when I and the BRB get through it all.

[Kharon]

Glib spin and Horse-Pooh.

CHAIR: Mr Monahan, just to go on from that, did I understand correctly that you just said that most accidents in the private aviation space happened as a result of reduced maintenance or—

Mr Monahan : No—

CHAIR: poor maintenance? Could you just explain your answer.

Mr Monahan : What I'm saying is that the accidents that happen through each sector of aviation have different themes. The No. 1 across the world, globally, is controlled flight into terrain.

Wiki - “A controlled flight into terrain (CFIT, usually pronounced cee-fit) is an accident in which an airworthy aircraft, under pilot control, is unintentionally flown into the ground, a mountain, a body of water or an obstacle. In a typical CFIT scenario, the crew is unaware of the impending disaster until it is too late”


BOTH the AF fatal accident involved Uncontrolled collision – i.e. the pilot lost control, (a crash) the collision a result of ‘loss of control’ due to spatial disorientation. Monahan further compounds the felony stating:-

Monahan - “That is flying into weather when you're not qualified, and what qualifies that.”

Patently misleading, as at the time of the collision, the pilot was clearly not in control. The following is (IMO) a deliberate deception, through use of mixed definitions related to two distinct and very different events. Loss of control in flight (Section 5 / p4) claimed more lives than CFIT. Many, many more than any mechanical issue.

Monahan – “That is the biggest accident, and the biggest killer of people. That's the first place you look. So you try to find ways to address the most likely case of mishaps in the future for a particular sector or cohort of pilots. That's the discussion.

Two clearly defined type of accident combined to support a denial of the real problem. For a classic CFIT see the ATSB report into the recent event in Tasmania. For a classic ‘loss of control in flight’ see ATSB Mt Gambier report.

The ‘discussion’ should be focused on answering the age old question:



What made the VFR pilot decide to attempt operations in the existing weather conditions?

CASA can wriggle and dance all they like; paper the entire planet with fatuous rules; but until they get a real handle on preventing VFR pilots tackling clearly visible IMC, then the problem will simply persist. There are solutions available which may not eradicate the recurrent events, but may reduce the incidences. They could begin with basic flight training – the current system is (IMO) counter productive – designed for auditing comfort through ‘tick-a-box’ paperwork – miles of it. This, stand alone has the potential to seed a future accident.

The type of Mumbo-Jumbo Aleck, Monahan and Crawford use to avoid dealing with root causes is mind numbing, the product of knee jerk, arse covering ‘do nothing’ just  to make it appear they are on the ball.

The Senators need substantive submissions from which ‘real’ questions may be asked. The AF inquiry provides a perfect platform to have the questions raised and answered.

Get on with it; talk is cheap - Ale cost real money. Handing over.

Toot – toot.

[Peetwo]

Glib spin and Horse-Pooh.

CHAIR: Mr Monahan, just to go on from that, did I understand correctly that you just said that most accidents in the private aviation space happened as a result of reduced maintenance or—

Mr Monahan : No—

CHAIR: poor maintenance? Could you just explain your answer.

Mr Monahan : What I'm saying is that the accidents that happen through each sector of aviation have different themes. The No. 1 across the world, globally, is controlled flight into terrain.

Wiki - “A controlled flight into terrain (CFIT, usually pronounced cee-fit) is an accident in which an airworthy aircraft, under pilot control, is unintentionally flown into the ground, a mountain, a body of water or an obstacle. In a typical CFIT scenario, the crew is unaware of the impending disaster until it is too late”


BOTH the AF fatal accident involved Uncontrolled collision – i.e. the pilot lost control, (a crash) the collision a result of ‘loss of control’ due to spatial disorientation. Monahan further compounds the felony stating:-

Monahan - “That is flying into weather when you're not qualified, and what qualifies that.”

Patently misleading, as at the time of the collision, the pilot was clearly not in control. The following is (IMO) a deliberate deception, through use of mixed definitions related to two distinct and very different events. Loss of control in flight (Section 5 / p4) claimed more lives than CFIT. Many, many more than any mechanical issue.

Monahan – “That is the biggest accident, and the biggest killer of people. That's the first place you look. So you try to find ways to address the most likely case of mishaps in the future for a particular sector or cohort of pilots. That's the discussion.

Two clearly defined type of accident combined to support a denial of the real problem. For a classic CFIT see the ATSB report into the recent event in Tasmania. For a classic ‘loss of control in flight’ see ATSB Mt Gambier report.

The ‘discussion’ should be focused on answering the age old question:



What made the VFR pilot decide to attempt operations in the existing weather conditions?

CASA can wriggle and dance all they like; paper the entire planet with fatuous rules; but until they get a real handle on preventing VFR pilots tackling clearly visible IMC, then the problem will simply persist. There are solutions available which may not eradicate the recurrent events, but may reduce the incidences. They could begin with basic flight training – the current system is (IMO) counter productive – designed for auditing comfort through ‘tick-a-box’ paperwork – miles of it. This, stand alone has the potential to seed a future accident.

The type of Mumbo-Jumbo Aleck, Monahan and Crawford use to avoid dealing with root causes is mind numbing, the product of knee jerk, arse covering ‘do nothing’ just  to make it appear they are on the ball.

The Senators need substantive submissions from which ‘real’ questions may be asked. The AF inquiry provides a perfect platform to have the questions raised and answered.

Get on with it; talk is cheap - Ale cost real money. Handing over.

Toot – toot.

Totally concur with all of the above but there is more, much more inside of this 'on the record' Hansard. For mine the most critical part of this public hearing was the ATSB session where Senator (growing legend) Patrick got the Dr Godley (Chelsea-Manning) to openly admit that not one single AF pilot was interviewed or surveyed in the course of their bollocks investigation. 

For the record, courtesy AOPA Oz - from about 01 hour 36 minutes: 

And for my quote of the hearing so far...

..CHAIR: I want to be very clear on this: you've taken responses from respondents who weren't answering a specific question on this and didn't know that their answers would be used towards this sort of report, and you've extracted those responses and extrapolated them in your report, which attributes the high accident rate to, in particular, 'pilots experiencing perceived or self-induced pressures'. It seems to me to be a fairly significant leap to take answers from respondents who weren't aware they were asked this question—not a specific question, and not a question directly in relation to this accident—and use them directly in relation to this accident...

GOLD, absolute GOLD! - Take a bow CHAIR...  

Coming back to the super spook Monahan's bollocks evidence, I draw attention to the following Hansard (for the record) passage from Angel Flight CEO Marjorie Pagani:

I challenged Mr Monahan about this when he came to my office on 28 November 2018 with a hastily scribbled bunch of notes and said: 'We're going to propose these new rules. They'll be published in five days.' I've been working with CASA for 1½ years. We had initiated safety training, mentoring, which CASA has now stopped. We had been putting into place a lot of safety procedures, which really were the responsibility of the regulator, and at no time were our plans criticised. They certainly said they'd like to see us move more quickly, but at no time did they ever mention this new set of rules. It was presented to me—not shown to me but told to me on 28 November. I said to Mr Monahan: 'What does this have to do with the accidents? It has no relationship to them, these rules.' He said to me, 'I agree, it isn't related, but we have to do something.' That was one day after they'd received a call from the ATSB asking, 'What have you done since the accident?'

No proper protocols were followed. The minister here, sadly, has been grossly misled by CASA. He's been told that there's been public consultation. You will see in your bundle of documents that there are about 10 pages of protocols for consultation that CASA is supposed to follow. It didn't follow any of them. He's also been misled in that—and I spoke to Mr McCormack about this—Mr McCormack had been told by CASA that it was only following the FAA. That is totally, 100 per cent wrong. Private flights in the USA are not regulated. We follow the Californian model, US Angel Flight West, the biggest operator, which does private flights—no regulations. There are so many ways that they have misled the minister, which is really unfortunate. I don't blame the minister. It is the responsibility of CASA (and his CASA-sexual aviation adviser) to properly inform the minister.

What we would like to see—and I hasten to add that when I challenged Mr Carmody at a meeting in Canberra, where various CASA executives and our directors were present, about why he was not following protocols on this, Mr Carmody's first answer was, 'Well, I have the power'  —that is, to issue an administrative directive without going through the protocols. I pressed further, and Mr Carmody's answer was, 'Well, Marjorie, because it's easy.'  That's what he said in front of his senior executives and me and one other director of Angel Flight. And, really, what CASA hasn't done, which we would welcome, is to get rid of this ridiculous document, which does not address any safety issue whatsoever related to these, and most, accidents, and send it to where it's supposed to go—to advisory committees, to industry, to proper industry consultations.

CASA says: 'We went to industry consultation. We set out this consultative document a few weeks before Christmas.' Then the responses came in. Within three working days after the responses—and there were a huge number of responses—they had the rules published. That seemed a bit odd, but how reliable are they? And Mr Greg Hood from the ATSB has also read these and clearly relied upon them, because that was raised at our last meeting. I have added to your documents just one example of these submissions where an ATPL commercial airline pilot, corporate jet pilot and very experienced private flying pilot put in a very lengthy submission of five pages. What came out from that same person on the website—and you have this in your bundle; I won't mention any names—is four lines. That was said to be this person's submission: four lines. (somewhere in HERE)

  
Typical but still unbelievable - 

Hmm...and what about the 'passing strange' Henwood connection:  https://auntypru.com/forum/showthread.ph...16#pid9916

Cursed curiosity bump got busy – so I managed to ‘scroll’ down to the gubbins.


“Last name (required)" quoth the document. There, neatly typed in was the name ‘Henwood’. An old Cornish name, something to do with wild birds and woodlands – but, I digress.  

Not a lot of the ‘Henwood clan’ in Australia, even fewer in aviation circles; fewer again in the list of qualified aviators. There is however a Henwood employed by the ATSB. We must all hope that the ATSB Henwood  (lead investigator) into the Mt Gambier AF accident; is not the writer of the submission. (If she did indeed provide a submission).  For many reasons, as it should cause a minor furore; the Australian paints a picture – HERE. But if (Big IF) the unqualified ‘Henwood’ was ‘lead investigator’ and the writer of the ‘response’ I imagine the very least that would happen would be a call to strike out the cosy MoU between CASA and Hood’s version of the ATSB. CASA could wind up deep in the snake pit – if they have used this one submission – pre-emptively – in their haste to clip the wings of Angel Flight. At very least, someone could do a bit of digging and find out just exactly how aeronautically and investigatively qualified Henwood is, to be ‘Senior Investigator’. Not too much info on the ATSB site.

-   

MTF? - Yes MUCH...P2 

ps Media release from Angel Flight CEO Marjorie Pagani:

Most of you would be aware that we appeared before a public inquiry (on Wednesday) into the ATSB and CASA, in relation to the ATSB Report and the CASA CSF Rules.

After many requests for an answer by Senator Patrick directed to the ATSB, they finally conceded that they had not interviewed one single pilot before reaching their conclusion that there was ‘perceived pressure’ on volunteer flights – a significant matter as this assumption was central to their findings.

CASA admitted its rules may be ambiguous, and conceded it was an error to include helicopters. It has been required by the Inquiry (for the second time) to provide its safety case within two weeks.

The Senate committee will consider the evidence at the close of the evidence.

We would like to express our appreciation to all of the RRAT committee, in particular Chair Susan McDonald (Qld) and Rex Patrick (SA) for steering this important investigation, and giving us the opportunity to present our data (by independent experts) which shows clearly that the ATSB report and assumptions are seriously flawed, and to require both agencies to be accountable for their actions, which have adversely affected the general aviation community, and the disadvantaged people of rural Australia.

We would also like to thank our volunteer pilot and hon. Safety Manager Dr Owen Crees, for his invaluable assistance, and Ben Morgan and AOPA for the tireless efforts directed to protecting the rights of pilots to fly without unnecessary and unfair restrictions and costs. I urge those of you not already members of AOPA to consider joining, to help strengthen this important advocacy organisation.

Regards,

Marjorie Pagani
Chief Executive Officer
Angel Flight Australia

[Kharon]

Ministerial Sanctioned collusion?



As the shades of Pel-Air watch a repeat performance; the industry shrugs, looks away and closes the hanger doors.

“The ATSB is governed by a Commission and is entirely separate from transport policy makers, industry operators, and from transport regulators such as the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).”

Sen.Patrick – “There is no way that the answer that was provided to the committee could ever be considered by anyone to be sufficient in terms of openness and transparency by the ATSB, as is required by this committee.”

Sen: Sterle: “Dr Godley, it says that of the '18 responses at least 12'—but how many of these pilots were Angel Flight pilots? Sorry, it's not that I don't believe you, but that doesn't mean anything to me.”

Dr Godley : No, this was CASA.

No matter which pilots ATSB allegedly claim to have contacted; how did they get the contact details? Who were these pilots? – We must hope they were not ‘in-house’ crew from CASA or, gods forbid, Hood was an interviewee. As Mr SP (Self promoting) Manning stated; there are all grades of pilot out there, “good” being a relative term. The whole ATSB session stinks to the high heavens.

Hood – “The ATSB, as Dr Godley has said, have had the ATSB aviation safety occurrence database in existence since 1969. We have periodically reviewed various sectors of the industry and compared their relative levels of safety, so we have flying training, RAAus, aerial agriculture and sports rotorcraft. We have a level of safety for those different sectors of the industry.

Apples and Banana’s comparison. WTD has the ‘relative levels of safety’ for those operations cited to do with the AF operation? All the above activities each carry an individual, inherent, different ‘risk’ matrix, they are different animals. For example, flight training for Agricultural operations cannot be mixed in, or used in comparison with say Sports rotorcraft. Each discipline, with the exception of RAAus, must be treated as a separate, isolated category having sod all to do with AF operations. RAAAus is ‘like for like’ as they are a parallel operation to GA ‘Private operations’. I note there is no ‘baseline’ accident/incident data for RAAAus presented as a legitimate reference. AF is (was) strictly a ‘private’ operation - not a separate category and must be seen for what it is – part of the general ‘private’ operation sector. Even comparing AF flights to ‘Private’ operations is drawing a long bow; AF aircraft would (on balance) do a bit more flying than the average privately owned aircraft. Doc. Cress have done over 500 flights for AF, it would be of interest to get some ‘real’ hard data on just how many flights/hours AF tasked aircraft do against the rest of the ‘private’ fleet. Apples with apples always seemed fair and reasonable to me.

Hood – “What we didn't have—and, in fact, what Angel Flight didn't have—is access to all the reported safety occurrences, because they weren't required to be reported to Angel Flight. So Angel Flight didn't have any great knowledge of the number of safety occurrences being experienced on their missions and neither did CASA or the ATSB.

What a load of bollocks. 

ATSB - “The TSI Act contains a scheme for the mandatory reporting of occurrences that are classified as Immediately Reportable Matters (accidents & serious incidents) and Routine Reportable Matters (incidents). It is from these initial reports that the ATSB makes a decision on whether or not to investigate.”

Hood – “We had to request the data from Angel Flight to get the schedules. We then matched that with the flight plan data and the aviation safety data and, using an algorithm, we were then able to extract the aviation safety occurrences that were being experienced with these types of flights. So what we've done in effect we had never done before for the community service flight sector. We have baselined the safety. Now we'll be able to measure it, just like we do for any of the other sectors of the industry, for improvements.

Bollocks. Confidential reporting has become an object of suspicion; avoided wherever possible, nonetheless, the ATSB claim to now be able to separate AF from Private Ops– how? Well, because AF had always been lumped in with the private sector and treated the same; until now. Without data reflecting the ratio of flights/hours of AF operations to private operations, the claim for extrapolated data becomes a nonsense. Given that a great number of ‘private’ operations operate without flight plan submission, whereas AF do presents yet another skewed line of data, not to mention an arse covering agenda.    



But I digress, I kicked off wanting to raise questions about the coy Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which began life after one or the other reports, after yet another inquiry into CASA and ATSB; Miller from memory (stand corrected) which is, to this day, totally and utterly misused. Parlayed into the comfortable, open ended scenario we see at work in the AF case.

Crawford: “Third, CASA independently analysed available accident statistics. This analysis compared the community service flight sector to the general private flying sector over a 10-year period. The CASA analysis determined that the fatal accident rate was 5.4 times higher for CSF than for ordinary private flights.”

We think it ‘mazing.

So did Sen. Rex. “There have been parallel activities taking place here. One of them is that the ATSB has been carrying out an investigation.”

One has to take in the whole transcript to get the big picture; it may well all be nice and legal, but it ain’t right. ATSB have no business being part of a department. They need to be independent, fully accountable to the Senate and free from any hint of collusion or bias and graded whiter than white. There are fart too many instances which have raised collective eyebrows. An outfit like ATSB should never, ever be in position where the actions of the organisation are challenged, let alone in a position to be potentially held in contempt, by industry and international peer groups. Which appears to be the road the HVH Hood is taking them.

The deeper one looks into the AF episode, as recorded on Hansard, more and more ‘little’ questions pop up; you know the sort of thing. Read a bit, then think a bit, and then – Hey, how come such and such happened, procedural stuff and quirky little odd pieces that don’t quite fit. Anyway, the BRB have it all now, pug marks and Tell’s will be traced and noted.

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Pagani –“No proper protocols were followed. The minister here, sadly, has been grossly misled by CASA. He's been told that there's been public consultation. You will see in your bundle of documents that there are about 10 pages of protocols for consultation that CASA is supposed to follow. It didn't follow any of them. He's also been misled in that—and I spoke to Mr McCormack about this—Mr McCormack had been told by CASA that it was only following the FAA. That is totally, 100 per cent wrong. Private flights in the USA are not regulated. We follow the Californian model, US Angel Flight West, the biggest operator, which does private flights—no regulations. There are so many ways that they have misled the minister, which is really unfortunate. I don't blame the minister.”

Marge may not be in a position to ‘blame’ the miniscule, but AP is; and we do – categorically. One major error; the beginning and the end of his credibility – he hired the same Casasexual who landed old Darren Chester in the pooh with this industry. His problem is simple, industry ‘know’ the value of the advice given; he was explicitly warned; yet he just keeps popping about in luxury jets, provided by the RAAF (Hi boys) oblivious to the constant warnings. That aside, trying to convince a mob at Wagga that he was ‘genuine’ was error number two. His aviation track record since has been abysmal – to the point of well deserved ridicule.

Only the minister can put a leash on the out of control watchdogs, decimating an industry. If he cannot do that, then he must resign or, seek assistance from higher up the food chain. Another option would be to get CASA off it’s beam ends and make ‘em build a CSF rule set, start with a clean sheet and square the whole thing up. What he cannot do is continue to ignore expert industry advice, anger, distrust, hostility and ridicule, while watching an industry disintegrate instead of blooming.

Not done with this; not by a long shot. MTF –

Toot – toot.

[Kharon]

Second verse; same as the first.

We – humans, have developed language and words to assist in avoiding confusion and accident. The word STOP for example cannot be confused with GO; you’d look askance at a fellah who passed you a hammer when you asked for a saw. It ain’t pedantic, we give things names to define exactly what we are talking about, vast dictionaries exist to assist in this, the legal profession ‘expert’ in their use of precise meaning. Only my opinion of course; but, when one addresses a panel of lay folk on matters aeronautical, such as a Senate committee, it seems reasonable to expect proper identification of the event under discussion. Aviation parlance is ‘technical’ and riddled with acronym. Clarity is essential, how else is anyone going work out what is being discussed? Calling a spade a hammer could be construed as misleading. Deceptive and dangerous even.

If the subtle misuse of a term or word leads to an incorrect ruling by a lay panel; then the matter becomes serious. In the case of the Mt Gambier accident, IMO, the misuse of the term CFIT is a serious matter; for regulatory changes, for one group only, have been made based on the use of this definition. This, standing alone has brought about significant changes which do absolutely nothing to address the cause of accident; or, even worse fail dismally to prevent a reoccurrence. Let me try to explain:-

Crawford: - “On the contrary, we are trying to fulfil our mandate and the public's expectations by ensuring these flights continue to be conducted without placing passengers at unnecessary risk. Our position on this has not changed.”

Wiki - “A controlled flight into terrain (CFIT, usually pronounced cee-fit) is an accident in which an airworthy aircraft, under pilot control, is unintentionally flown into the ground, a mountain, a body of water or an obstacle. In a typical CFIT scenario, the crew is unaware of the impending disaster until it is too late”

Crawford: - “In the case of CSF, we consider these factors in the context of two fatal accidents that resulted in the deaths of six individuals; the major causes of accidents in private operations being CFIT—controlled flight into terrain—landing incidents, pilot error, decision-making, and power plant or engine related problems; our regulatory responsibilities; the potential impact on the volunteer pilots; potential impacts on CSF operations; and approaches taken by other international regulators towards similar operations.”

There was absolutely nothing ‘controlled’ about the Mt Gambier accident. There is however a raft of very real statistics relating to the actual cause of many such accidents. ‘Loss of control’ mostly through entering Instrument flight conditions (IMC), by non instrument flight qualified pilots’. This is an old, widely recognised and well documented killer. There are miles of statistics and analysis of these events. All have three common threads running through the fabric of the accident; (i) the aircraft entered *IMC; (ii) the pilot lost control; (iii) the aircraft collided with the Earth; all were killed.

Once the pilot has become disorientated; its pretty much game over, unless lady luck takes a hand and the aircraft regains visual conditions, with time and space to affect a return of control. With ground clearance, it is possible to recover. Many of the accidents occur at low level, mostly because the pilot is trying to avoid the weather, picking the track to step around high terrain and avoid entering the weather. Such is ‘visual’ flight.

My point M’lud is a simple one. Why are both CASA and ATSB avoiding calling this accident for what it truly is and why, more to the point, have they generated phony statistics when across the globe, real data relating to a ‘loss of control’ in IMC are readily available. Australia has had it’s share of such accidents; that is where the real safety case lays – not in some confection of Angel Flight data. Ask for the real statistics – how many GA aircraft have been lost through this type of occurrence; and, how many of those were AF aircraft.  Then ask what ATSB and CASA have achieved in relation to a real reduction in the number of fatal accidents of this nature over the decades. The answer may just surprise you.

Yes Waiter; one more reality fix over here please.

Toot – toot.

[thorn bird]

" It was ever thus"

The Scottish Gentleman brings to my mind what I believe an apt description;
The Dictionary:
git  [ɡɪt]
noun British informal
an unpleasant or contemptible person:

“On the contrary, we are trying to fulfil our mandate and the public's expectations by ensuring these flights continue to be conducted without placing passengers at unnecessary risk. Our position on this has not changed.”

"fullfil our mandate" ?????

Turning to the dictionary again:

fulfil | fʊlˈfɪl | (US fulfill)
verb (fulfils, fulfilling, fulfilled)
1 achieve or realize (something desired, promised, or predicted):

mandate
noun | ˈmandeɪt |
1 an official order or commission to do something:

CAsA has eminently fulfilled it's own desires, promises to itself, but realised none of its own predictions.

What of the industry it feeds off, that it relies upon for it's existence, has CAsA fulfilled anything desired, promised or predicted to industry?


risk | rɪsk |
noun
a situation involving exposure to danger: flouting the law was too much of a risk | [mass noun] : all outdoor activities carry an element of risk.

Verb
expose (someone or something valued) to danger, harm, or loss: he risked his life to save his dog.

• act in such a way as to bring about the possibility of (an unpleasant or unwelcome event)
• incur the chance of unfortunate consequences by engaging in (an action)

Used as a noun:
We are exposed to danger getting out of bed in the morning or staying there as one chooses. Risk is almost impossible to quantify or measure. Statistic's help, but then there are statistics and damned lies. The ATSB and CAsA would appear to prefer the latter. Aviation, even the private sort, is statistically much safer than going by road, so one would imagine, logically, if CAsA's MANDATE was safety, they would be encouraging community service flights not attempting to regulate them into extinction.

Used as a Verb:
CAsA has therefore exposed people to danger and harm and acted in a way to bring about the possibility of an unwelcome event. Would CAsA take responsibility for unfortunate consequences of engaging in driving as opposed to flying?

[P7_TOM]

Fraught, trite and misleading. 

For your dictionary TB.

I will put almost 50 years of operational flying behind the following. Of all the ‘in flight’ operational manoeuvers pilots are faced with, the low level, VISUAL circling approach is the most difficult and potentially dangerous of all. For those not familiar; or, those who have not had the dubious pleasure, herewith a thumb nail sketch. Instrument pilots routinely, (during training/ testing) execute the procedure with ‘One Engine Inoperative’ (OEI); the aircraft is directed, in (simulated) cloud along a very narrow track, at a pre determined rate of descent (RoD) at a prescribed speed to reach the lowest point of a safe approach at a prescribed height. Routine on an approach which takes you to the landing end of the runway – one is either visual; (land) or not visual (Go around required). So far so good. However, when the approach path and the runway do not neatly align; or, there is only a one direction instrument approach and ground conditions indicate another landing direction; then a Visual Circling Approach is required. There are some strict, very practical rules governing the procedure. These requirements vary depending on the approach speed of the aircraft. For the sake of the exercise, lets use the one applicable to the AF aircraft. It is a ‘Class A’ aircraft, approach speed up to 90 Knots (Kias) indicated airspeed). Once (if) visual contact is achieved, Cat A must maintain at least 300 feet obstacle clearance, within a prescribed radius of 1.68 nautical miles. The ‘problems’ when operating under low cloud, about the same height as the circling minima are many. (i) Cloud base varies +/- with ‘lower patches’: (ii) Rain is unpredictable and it is possible to loose visibility for periods of time: (iii) intercepting a ‘standard’ glide path and effecting a stable approach can be hampered by terrain an/or the ambient conditions. In short, it is a skill set taught and practiced, it is not for the untrained, and it most certainly is not for the inexperienced VFR pilot. Which is exactly the scenario which unfolded.

P9 : - What the Kiwi's say.

Circling Approaches – The Risks.


The circling approach is one of aviation’s most hazardous procedures. A report published by the International Civil Aviation Organisation several years ago concluded that straight-in approaches (those aligned with the landing runway) are 25 times safer than traditional circling approaches. While the number of airports offering straight-in approaches has increased dramatically with the advent of GPS non-precision approaches, there are still many airports in Australia and around the world where visual circling is required. The risks can be reduced, but there are no shortcuts. Safe circling approaches demand detailed pre-flight planning, practice, a high degree of situational awareness, discipline, and a willingness to execute a missed approach at the first sign of trouble.

I read the ‘factual part of the ATSB report into the Mt Gambier accident with some horror; particularly the following paragraph:-

ATSB : At 1003, as YTM passed over the top of runway 36 in a westerly direction, the pilot made a CTAF broadcast ‘lining up for 36’, indicating that he intended to land on runway 36. Witnesses reported that the pilot then conducted a go around after initially touching down on runway 36, and witnesses reported then seeing the aircraft climb back into cloud. The pilot then broadcast on the CTAF ‘going around for runway 24’. After another two low-level turns over the airport, in which the aircraft was captured emerging from the cloud on closed-circuit television (CCTV) at low altitude, the aircraft landed on runway 29 at about 1008.


At 1000 hrs Z, the weather Obs were visibility 3400 (1.8 nms) meters/ 200 ft cloud base (90 kias = 1.5 nms/minute) – overcast. There were seasoned, experienced, qualified instrument pilots delaying flights or holding in the area because it was, essentially ‘unwise’ to attempt an approach in the existing conditions. Illegal has little to do with it, by the by; it simply wasn’t worth the time, aggravation or bother to make an approach and not ‘get in’.

And yet, the accident pilot persisted; ducking and weaving around low cloud, whizzing about in low visibility, looking for a sighting of a runway end, eventually landing on R29. I wonder if he realised it was not R 24.

We will never know the reason ‘why’, not really. We can surmise, speculate and reason away all we like; but we will never truly know ‘why’. P2 raised another puzzle; why didn’t he go for a Piddle? He certainly had time. Why didn’t he take off to the East, where the weather conditions were reported better? Why the rush? But the big question is why not cancel. “Sorry folks; but the weather is unsuitable, even the airlines are waiting; we can wait until it improves; or we can go to the Pub”.  

But, the greatest mystery of all is what the hell is ATSB playing at laying all this at the feet of Angel Flight? Did the pilot contact AF for advice? No. Was he pressured or instructed by AF to act in the manner ATSB describe? No. Then WTD is AF doing in the Dock? Individual criminal negligence is on the table here; not the way AF or any CSF do business. It begs a question or two don’t it. There are many causal links in the accident chain – unexamined. Why? While you’re at it, ask why only AF is in the gun, not all CSF operations.

Best crack on – the Kanuck’s are limbering up; my turn soon.

"As always my dear, the answer is the eternal ‘Yes please’ two more, the lad will arrive soon; thirsty as usual."

[Peetwo]

...I read the ‘factual part of the ATSB report into the Mt Gambier accident with some horror; particularly the following paragraph:-

ATSB : At 1003, as YTM passed over the top of runway 36 in a westerly direction, the pilot made a CTAF broadcast ‘lining up for 36’, indicating that he intended to land on runway 36. Witnesses reported that the pilot then conducted a go around after initially touching down on runway 36, and witnesses reported then seeing the aircraft climb back into cloud. The pilot then broadcast on the CTAF ‘going around for runway 24’. After another two low-level turns over the airport, in which the aircraft was captured emerging from the cloud on closed-circuit television (CCTV) at low altitude, the aircraft landed on runway 29 at about 1008.


...And yet, the accident pilot persisted; ducking and weaving around low cloud, whizzing about in low visibility, looking for a sighting of a runway end, eventually landing on R29. I wonder if he realised it was not R 24.

We will never know the reason ‘why’, not really. We can surmise, speculate and reason away all we like; but we will never truly know ‘why’. P2 raised another puzzle; why didn’t he go for a Piddle? He certainly had time. Why didn’t he take off to the East, where the weather conditions were reported better? Why the rush? But the big question is why not cancel. “Sorry folks; but the weather is unsuitable, even the airlines are waiting; we can wait until it improves; or we can go to the Pub”.  

But, the greatest mystery of all is what the hell is ATSB playing at laying all this at the feet of Angel Flight? Did the pilot contact AF for advice? No. Was he pressured or instructed by AF to act in the manner ATSB describe? No. Then WTD is AF doing in the Dock? Individual criminal negligence is on the table here; not the way AF or any CSF do business. It begs a question or two don’t it. There are many causal links in the accident chain – unexamined. Why? While you’re at it, ask why only AF is in the gun, not all CSF operations...

Devil's advocate: Hmm...despite the obvious illegalities involved (see P7 post above) in the maneuverings of the pilot on approach and final landing, followed by the departure into obvious non-VMC conditions, I am somewhat perplexed by the figure 2 to 3 track and aircraft maneuvering depictions??





Note in figure 2 that there would have presumably been much scud running and even at times penetration of cloud, yet never does the pilot's maneuverings approach any where near uncontrolled, reckless AOB or pitch movements suggestive of a VFR pilot panicking because he has inadvertently entered IMC. 

Now refer to figure 3 and it is the same thing, where except for an initial slight veering to the left of the centreline, followed by a couple of minor deviations to the right, the pilot then appears to make a decision to initiate a turn back to the airfield and sets up standard rate 1 turn to the left until 5 second panel 13, where the pilot IMO inexplicably loses control. Although there is no panel 14 it would appear that in less than 10 seconds the aircraft has gone from being in a standard rate turn and maintaining 200 ft agl (ie controlled flight), to pitching at least 30 degrees nose down and rolling slightly to the right. IMO this would introduce the possibility of a catastrophic event. However nowhere in the report (that I can find) was the possibility/hypothesis even remotely explored. 

Pilot information

The pilot obtained a Private Pilot (Aeroplane) Licence in December 2014, and held the appropriate aircraft endorsements required to operate YTM. His logbook showed a total aeronautical experience of approximately 530 hours. In the 90 days prior to the accident flight, he had conducted the three take-offs and landings required by Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) 61.395 to permit the carriage of passengers. At the time of the accident, he held a valid Class 2 Aviation Medical Certificate renewed on 6 June 2017. This included a requirement for reading vision correction to be available while exercising the privileges of the licence.

The pilot commenced training for a Night Visual Flight Rules (VFR) rating in December 2015; this included about 3.5 hours recorded as instrument flight time. The pilot completed a total of 12 hours of training in flight under night VFR between December 2015 and May 2016, however he did not obtain this qualification. The pilot did not hold an instrument rating and his logbook recorded a total of 7 hours of instrument flight time, the latest of which was 0.1 hours in simulated flight conditions during an aeroplane flight review on 29 November 2016.

The ATSB assessed whether the pilot may have been experiencing a level of fatigue known to have an effect on performance. Consideration was made of the pilot’s sleep obtained, time awake at the time of the occurrence, time on task, potential workload and environmental factors. Based on the available evidence, the pilot was very unlikely to have been experiencing a level of fatigue known to affect performance.

Medical and pathological information

The pilot’s medical records, post mortem examination and toxicological analysis identified no acute or pre-existing medical conditions that may have contributed to the accident.

The forensic examination of the pilot doesn't indicate any serious research into the pilot's flight experience and/or logged flights. I would have thought that given the flagrant disregard for the rules surrounding legal VFR flight that there would have been at least a thorough investigation into past flights conducted by this pilot into and out of Mount Gambier (what was obviously a local airport for him). Could it be that there was a pattern of deviance that for this pilot had become very much normalised? 

Hmm...much MTF me thinks?? - P2 

ps Also in regards to the disturbing and unbelievable waffle/weasel worded confection offered up by Dr Chelsea (Godlike) Manning as expert evidence at the Senate public hearing, I note the following off the Dock's self-flagellating linkedin page:

About

I have worked in transport safety for over two decades, mostly in aviation. With a human factors psychology background, I have applied analytical skills at the ATSB to aviation safety investigations, research and analysis of safety data. My role as Director at the ATSB now also incorporates rail safety as well as aviation. As Director I oversee transport safety investigations of incidents and accidents, safety studies (research), and the overall data strategy at the ATSB. Prior to the ATSB I worked in the safety department of Qantas in both safety analysis and human factors roles. This was from an original grounding of road safety research from a human factors psychology perspective at Monash University Accident Research Centre (including a PhD) and then at the University of Sydney.

---

Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Total Duration15 yrs

Director Transport Safety
Dates EmployedJun 2017 – Present
Employment Duration2 yrs 4 mos
Canberra, Australia

Director Transport Safety
Dates Employed Oct 2004 – Present
Employment Duration 15 yrs
Canberra, Australia

Assistant General Manager
Dates Employed 2004 – Jun 2017
Employment Duration 13 yrs
Canberra, Australia

Previously:
Senior Transport Safety Investigator
Manager Research
Manager Reporting and Analysis

Currently:
Assistant General Manager, Reporting, Short Investigations and Research

15 years??    - So that would mean he was involved in/or on the periphery of the Lockhart River tragedy; he was there for the PelAir cover-up and the Beaker adoption of the 'beyond all reason' investigative philosophy; he was there for the MH370 cock-up/cover-up etc..etc..etc - Hmm and Chelsea is not conflicted? FDS!

[Kharon]

Fair Call – However:-

P2 –“Note in figure 2 that there would have presumably been much scud running and even at times penetration of cloud, yet never does the pilot's manoeuvrings approach any where near uncontrolled, reckless AOB or pitch movements suggestive of a VFR pilot panicking because he has inadvertently entered IMC.”

Devils advocate right back atchya. Noted. Discuss; – the aircraft was certified for IFR. Feasible that there was a serviceable auto pilot on board and no doubt GPS. ATSB don’t think it worthwhile to mention how the aircraft was equipped. I can easily see someone at one of the ‘confidence’ benchmarks (500 hours), underestimating the inherent ‘risks’, overestimating their ability, backed up by auto flight and GPS accuracy taking a punt. Those patterns are very, very neat. There are two small clues to this being at least a start point for discussion:-

(1) “ATSB – Witnesses reported that the pilot then conducted a go around after initially touching down on runway 36, and witnesses reported then seeing the aircraft climb back into cloud.

Why? If it had been me, and I’d touched down after an approach like that (unlikely) there’d be no-way I’d go around, back into the murk. More likely I’d be behind the shed having a smoke, trying to sooth agitated nerve endings.

(2) “ATSB - The pilot then broadcast on the CTAF ‘going around for runway 24’. After another two low-level turns over the airport, in which the aircraft was captured emerging from the cloud on closed-circuit television (CCTV) at low altitude, the aircraft landed on runway 29 at about 1008.

Now he’s called for R24 and landed R29. IMO that is a clue to some sort of geographical disorientation – switched on bloke would have called the change – had he been aware of it.

Just saying…. There’s room for speculation on the approach pattern. The departure (as depicted) does appear to indicate a very small time period between what appears to be a controlled, descending left turn and the accident site. Hard to tell from the awful schematic, but; 200 feet a minute (FpM) descent rate is only 3.33 FpS. 600 FpM is 10 feet per second. 1200 FpM is 20 feet per second. So, ten seconds at 1200 FpM = 200 feet. That brings a descent angle of about 60˚+/-. Good-Oh, ATSB reckon 30˚from vertical.

ATSB – “Ground scars and evidence from the wreckage indicated that the aircraft impacted the ground nose down in an inverted attitude, approximately 30° from vertical, and that the engine was producing power at the time of impact.”

For the sake of discussion only: what if the trusty Auto Pilot gave up the ghost, in cloud? Is there enough time lapse for the pilot to not recognise an attitude change, become disoriented and loose control? You can imagine it happening – stressed pilot, believes the AP is running the show, peering out of the window, looking for breaks in weather – then the ‘Oh- crap’ moment when reality dawns – too late.

So glad ATSB didn’t bother to interrupt their hysterical investigator's ‘Air time’ to bother looking into possible causes; after all as she stated in her TV 15 moments of fame, we will be investigating Angel Flight (submission to CASA following) – and they did. I cheered when Rex Patrick pulled the Soppy, so Sympatico Hood up when he dared to blame the Senate for forcing them to look at ‘operators’ rather than flight crew – as they did in the disgraceful Pel-Air investigation. The crazy thing, which clearly demonstrates just how sycophantic ATSB under Hood has become is that they have gone after not once, but twice the wrong Fox. Pel-Air operator deserved a hammering; AF don’t. The Pel--Air pilot got flogged; all of the Mt Gambier pilot’s aberrations have become Angel Flight’s; who, by the way ain't an 'operator'.................

Hood needs to sort his carts and horses out methinks. Aye well, we shall hear what the Senate Committee think of it all in due course. Let’s hope they are not baffled by the Bullshit in another awful report; one of the many we have read lately; or not, depending whether the PR crew and Spin Doctors have finished applying the polish. A No Confidence call in the ATSB would be well justified and supported.

Toot – toot.

[Peetwo]

Butterfly wings and Tsunami.

Ref: https://auntypru.com/not-only-captive-cu...loving-it/

A highly technical, subjective debate. I prefer more down to earth examples of cause and effect; things the common man can readily understand. For instance, the click of a switch which launches a holocaust; or, the small, sharp tap of the conductors baton before a full orchestra bursts into glorious sound.

Dare I imagine that the sibilant rustle of paper being shuffled by a Senate committee secretariat in Canberra heralds the long awaited beginning of the demise of a truly evil empire? There’s money for it; reasonable odds for the punter early in the piece; and, some of the more adventurous IOS & BRB souls have already taken a plunge. Fair warning though; those odds will change as the start approaches; and once they are truly off and running the tote will close.

There are two events to consider; the ATSB Maiden Handicap and the CASA Race to the Bottoms cup. Much to consider before parting with hard earned. For a start, there are the preliminary events, not designed to test the runners and their connections. These seemingly sedate opening events are meant to test both mettle and suitability to the course. But, they are (to a Bookie) important. From these canters around the course, battle plans are laid, strategy formulated and final runners decided. Much like the opening stanzas of a concerto; a hint of what is to come. The first round begins in Sydney, open to the public, Wednesday, 4, September, 2019.

This will be a team event, not the final competition (Round one, if you will M’lud) - an introduction to the course. Each team will be given an equal amount of time to ‘test the running’ - get a feel for both track and hurdles.

From this, both connections and Bookies will gain a feel of what is to come, when the Balloon finally goes up and the competition is entered – in reality. Make no mistake boys and girls, the stakes are high and ‘the game’ being played ‘off track’ (behind the scenes) is well and truly afoot.

So, dear Anti Post sports, take care, pay attention, for not only will the odds be shifting, but so will the ‘team’ entered. Runners and tactics will be a constantly shifting bagatelle, which will present some serious challenges to the untested Senate team connections, hamstrung by the absence of Fawcett Prince (MTF).

Form guide and Tote odds to follow post first event.

Toot – toot.

TAAAF backs the Iron Ring in the 24th running of the Embuggerance Cup - 

Got a feeling the following bit of scuttlebutt coming out of Can'tberra will dramatically change the odds of the 24th Embuggerance Cup...  

Fresh (with embellishments -   ) off the RRAT's ATSB inquiry webpage:

---

  

---

Just so you don't think I made it all up...  : refer here - 6 The Australian Aviation Associations’ Forum (PDF 17 KB) 

Incoming me thinks?? - P2 

[Kharon]

"I s'pect I just growed. Don't think nobody never made me."

Time was on my side today, it allowed me to plod my way through the entire ATSB report; top to bottom. If, as we must, set aside the appalling tangle which exists regarding the categorising of operation (a right buggers muddle); many of the points raised by ATSB have some validity. A decade ago in the USA CSF, FAA and NTSB dealt with a very similar situation, I believe in a very fair, open, transparent and equitable manner. There were questions of law, operational transparency and, importantly – accountability. Serious matters all.

What the vengeance, could he not speak 'em fair?

History is always on hand and brings some balance to the argument; for instance:-

ATSB (p, 25 - PDF) "Part of the consultation included the publication of a discussion paper DP1317OS – Safety standards for community service flights conducted on a voluntary basis’ in August 2014, for industry consideration and input regarding community service flights, and how they should be regulated under the new CASRs."

ATSB - "At the time (2003) Angel Flight was established, it indicated to CASA that there was an expectation that 250-300 pilots would be conducting approximately 800 flights per year when fully operational. As these flights were being conducted as private flights, and were expected to constitute a small percentage of this regulated sector, CASA considered the overall risk impact was negligible, and a formal risk assessment was not conducted."

ATSB - “In the period 2008-2017, an average of 1,686 flights per year were being conducted, and as at June 2017 a pool of 3,180 volunteer pilots were registered. Since that time (2003) other operators providing similar flights have also been established.”

That is quite a hike in numbers with the risk factors increasing in line; ATSB go on:-

ATSB - “The paper identified that there was a lack of visibility of the conduct of community service flights, which in turn prevented a more informed view for evidence-based decision making in this sector of the industry. It proposed 10 main options for consideration, ranging from administrative options through operational requirements, with the potential to combine a range of the proposed options, or consider additional options suggested through the consultation process.”

Fair and reasonable. With this level of activity some kind of operational safety data analysis would be of benefit to all parties concerned. Almost any kind of Safety Management System (SMS) can and will identify the ‘one off’ hiccup, the development of an ‘unsafe’ trend; or, an identifiable operational ‘grey area’. All good stuff and with luck ‘correctable’ before the unmentionable hits the whirligig. Stitch in time etc. CASA ran into a brick wall:-

ATSB – “The submissions received in response to the discussion paper highlighted strong opposition to the prospect of any regulatory involvement in the sector, indicating that community service flying would no longer be financially viable if any of the options were applied. Based on the submissions received, no regulatory changes were initiated, with the flights remaining as private operations with no additional regulatory requirements and no additional organisational-based risk controls.”

Perhaps, with 20/20 hindsight this was not the best road to travel. With up to 3,180 pilots available, a variety of aircraft, schedules to keep and the vagaries of weather; a data base would be helpful. Not many chief pilots would like to ride herd on an operation like that; no matter the license standards of the pilots. So, it’s just like Topsy said. -

Finally, we get to the sticking point. Why is there so much ‘fuss’ and Senators asking questions? Many don’t believe that the AF/CSF imbroglio is much more than a stalking horse for a much bigger animal. Behind the smiles and cooperation, there exists not only a deep, well founded mistrust of the regulator, but derision for the way in which the regulator manages aviation. Add a serious, demonstrable lack of confidence in the ATSB, particularly under Hood, and almost any ‘event’ will trigger the hostility, the peasants reaching for pitch forks and torches. The ever present hope of reform of regulator and regulation has long burned bright in the dark places of aviation. So, the question is M’lud, how much of the CSF backlash is actually generated by the pitiful ATSB report?

To answer that question we must look at the credibility of ATSB – as seen by those who have been amazed by the ease at which a PC answer has been, eventually, provided and how often. We could ask the same question of CASA. Some of their past and indeed present actions have been met with anger, derision and a real rise in the distrust levels. These are facts; not faery tales I’ve whipped up to frighten the children.

Proof positive was provided today. TAAAF issued a statement. It should be able to stand alone, unchallenged as a righteous call. For, in essence it is a fair and reasonable call to bring in some form of controls, as much in CSF favour as anyone else’s. Much of what ATSB have stated and the CASA actions are fair and reasonable - but: and it is a big BUT; it will not be seen that way. Such is the schism of mistrust; TAAAF will be seen as catamite to CASA; Boyd branded a stooge and the divisions within the GA industry will deepen. Some will even say that that division was played for. But there is merit for the notion of an individual, dedicated 'category' for CSF operations. Makes perfect sense, get 'em legal, get 'em operationally uniform, give 'em a SMS - all good sensible stuff. Everyone should be behind a sane, sensible solution - Alas.............

Gloucester, we have done deeds of charity, made peace of enmity, fair love of hate, between these swelling wrong-incensed peers.

I say this M’lud: there are some very real, valid safety arguments being buried here. Lost in the swamps of Sleepy Hollow. CASA is distrusted, ATSB is compromised and the minister is played for Gods own fool. The world and it’s wife know this; industry know this. How much longer can government play at silly buggers. The problem Ostriches have was best explained in song.

The sexual life of the ostrich,
Is hard to understand,
At the height of the mating season,
It buries its head in the sand.
And if another ostrich finds it,
Standing there with its ass in the air,
Does it have the urge to grind it
Or doesn't it bloody-well care?

[Peetwo]

TAAAF backs the Iron Ring in the 24th running of the Embuggerance Cup - 

Got a feeling the following bit of scuttlebutt coming out of Can'tberra will dramatically change the odds of the 24th Embuggerance Cup...  

Fresh (with embellishments -   ) off the RRAT's ATSB inquiry webpage:

---

  

---

Just so you don't think I made it all up...  : refer here - 6 The Australian Aviation Associations’ Forum (PDF 17 KB) 

Incoming me thinks?? - P2 

"I s'pect I just growed. Don't think nobody never made me."

Time was on my side today, it allowed me to plod my way through the entire ATSB report; top to bottom. If, as we must, set aside the appalling tangle which exists regarding the categorising of operation (a right buggers muddle); many of the points raised by ATSB have some validity. A decade ago in the USA CSF, FAA and NTSB dealt with a very similar situation, I believe in a very fair, open, transparent and equitable manner. There were questions of law, operational transparency and, importantly – accountability. Serious matters all.

What the vengeance, could he not speak 'em fair?

History is always on hand and brings some balance to the argument; for instance:-

ATSB (p, 25 - PDF) "Part of the consultation included the publication of a discussion paper DP1317OS – Safety standards for community service flights conducted on a voluntary basis’ in August 2014, for industry consideration and input regarding community service flights, and how they should be regulated under the new CASRs."

ATSB - "At the time (2003) Angel Flight was established, it indicated to CASA that there was an expectation that 250-300 pilots would be conducting approximately 800 flights per year when fully operational. As these flights were being conducted as private flights, and were expected to constitute a small percentage of this regulated sector, CASA considered the overall risk impact was negligible, and a formal risk assessment was not conducted."

ATSB - “In the period 2008-2017, an average of 1,686 flights per year were being conducted, and as at June 2017 a pool of 3,180 volunteer pilots were registered. Since that time (2003) other operators providing similar flights have also been established.”

That is quite a hike in numbers with the risk factors increasing in line; ATSB go on:-

ATSB - “The paper identified that there was a lack of visibility of the conduct of community service flights, which in turn prevented a more informed view for evidence-based decision making in this sector of the industry. It proposed 10 main options for consideration, ranging from administrative options through operational requirements, with the potential to combine a range of the proposed options, or consider additional options suggested through the consultation process.”

Fair and reasonable. With this level of activity some kind of operational safety data analysis would be of benefit to all parties concerned. Almost any kind of Safety Management System (SMS) can and will identify the ‘one off’ hiccup, the development of an ‘unsafe’ trend; or, an identifiable operational ‘grey area’. All good stuff and with luck ‘correctable’ before the unmentionable hits the whirligig. Stitch in time etc. CASA ran into a brick wall:-

ATSB – “The submissions received in response to the discussion paper highlighted strong opposition to the prospect of any regulatory involvement in the sector, indicating that community service flying would no longer be financially viable if any of the options were applied. Based on the submissions received, no regulatory changes were initiated, with the flights remaining as private operations with no additional regulatory requirements and no additional organisational-based risk controls.”

Perhaps, with 20/20 hindsight this was not the best road to travel. With up to 3,180 pilots available, a variety of aircraft, schedules to keep and the vagaries of weather; a data base would be helpful. Not many chief pilots would like to ride herd on an operation like that; no matter the license standards of the pilots. So, it’s just like Topsy said. -

Finally, we get to the sticking point. Why is there so much ‘fuss’ and Senators asking questions? Many don’t believe that the AF/CSF imbroglio is much more than a stalking horse for a much bigger animal. Behind the smiles and cooperation, there exists not only a deep, well founded mistrust of the regulator, but derision for the way in which the regulator manages aviation. Add a serious, demonstrable lack of confidence in the ATSB, particularly under Hood, and almost any ‘event’ will trigger the hostility, the peasants reaching for pitch forks and torches. The ever present hope of reform of regulator and regulation has long burned bright in the dark places of aviation. So, the question is M’lud, how much of the CSF backlash is actually generated by the pitiful ATSB report?

To answer that question we must look at the credibility of ATSB – as seen by those who have been amazed by the ease at which a PC answer has been, eventually,  provided and how often. We could ask the same question of CASA. Some of their past and indeed present actions have been met with anger, derision and a real rise in the distrust levels. These are facts; not faery tales I’ve whipped up to frighten the children.

Proof positive was provided today. TAAAF issued a statement. It should be able to stand alone, unchallenged as a righteous call. For, in essence it is a fair and reasonable call to bring in some form of controls, as much in CSF favour as anyone else’s. Much of what ATSB have stated and the CASA actions are fair and reasonable - but: and it is a big BUT; it will not be seen that way. Such is the schism of mistrust; TAAAF will be seen as catamite to CASA; Boyd branded a stooge and the divisions within the GA industry will deepen. Some will even say that that division was played for. But there is merit for the notion of an individual, dedicated 'category' for CSF operations. Makes perfect sense, get 'em legal, get 'em operationally uniform, give 'em a SMS - all good sensible stuff. Everyone should be behind a sane, sensible solution - Alas.............

Gloucester, we have done deeds of charity, made peace of enmity, fair love of hate, between these swelling wrong-incensed peers.

I say this M’lud: there are some very real, valid safety arguments being buried here. Lost in the swamps of Sleepy Hollow. CASA is distrusted, ATSB is compromised and the minister is played for Gods own fool. The world and it’s wife know this; industry know this. How much longer can government play at silly buggers. The problem Ostriches have was best explained in song.

The sexual life of the ostrich,
Is hard to understand,
At the height of the mating season,
It buries its head in the sand.
And if another ostrich finds it,
Standing there with its ass in the air,
Does it have the urge to grind it
Or doesn't it bloody-well care?

Hmm...yes but??

I agree with the context of your argument "K", however you will remember that we covered off on the previous CASA look at CSFs (ie 2014). This included what we both agreed was an excellent concept introduced by CASA the SRP (Sector Risk Profile), which apparently St Commode and his acolytes were not so keen on...

References:  St Carmode the guru of bureaucratic obfuscation of aviation safety?? & Aviation – and the poison chalice piss take within?  

..According to the Fort Fumble R&S webpage the SRP concept mysteriously stopped at the small aeroplanes transport sector. Ironically the last official SRP to be produced was countersigned by St Carmode when he was in the Acting CEO role. Less than 2 months later CC was to become the latest CEO/DAS of Fort Fumble and since that time there has been no more SRPs published, including the promised SRPs in the above QON??

---

The "NOTE" above would seem to indicate that this 'sector analysis' concept is a recent innovation. However it doesn't take long to realise that this proactive regulator initiated concept has been in play since at least the 28/01/2015 - right click on pdf link HERE then click on properties, note date created. This places the 'sector analysis' concept at the very start of the brief period that Mark Skidmore was the CASA CEO.


Assuming that Skidmore was supportive of this sector safety risk analysis, his moniker on the bottom of the aerodrome sector analysis would seem to support this assumption, brings into play some other interesting parallels. -   

Rewinding to early 2015 it should be remembered that Skidmore was responsible for knocking the last CASA attempted Angel Flight embuggerance on the head (see previous post above):

CASA said on Friday people power had persuaded the regulator to maintain the status quo on how not-for-profit community service flights were regulated, with the present guidelines guidelines sufficient for now.

“We have listened to the feedback to CASA’s preferred option and we accept this is not the way to proceed,” Skidmore said in a statement.

“CASA is not proposing any changes to the existing regulatory requirements for community service flights at this time.”

    
Hmm...Shirley the previous CEO of CASA Mark Skidmore got his research (white hat) and stats crew to back up his decision with a relevant sector risk profile for Community Service Flights? And even if he didn't (due to the timing) Shirley St Carmode got his R&S crew to carry out the sector risk profile for the CSFs? 

---

Hmm...kind of begs the question - was there ever a SRP created that encompassed 'community service flights' -   

Maybe this explains the current bizarre imbroglio from both Fort Fumble and the Hooded Canary's Avery, ie they missed the perfect opportunity to put in place a SMS type arrangement based on a mutually agreeable, co-operative SRP. As a consequence of this missed opportunity they (FF & HCA) are now attempting to play catch up in a most unagreeable, toxic way -  

On the subject of the totally (IMO) unprofessional Jeff Boyd signed TAAAF statement, I note that there was no parallel publicly released media statement. One has to wonder whether all of the remaining 13 members of TAAAF were made aware that this statement would be sent as a submission to the ATSB Senate Inquiry??

Also on the subject of TAAAF, I note that the ALAANZ (Aviation Law Association of Australia & New Zealand) is listed as  a TAAAF member. As a passing strange coincidence, it just so happens that one of the association's council members also works for the ATSB...  

            
Hmm...if that's not a conflict of interest I don't know what is...
MTF...P2 

[Sandy Reith]

Quoting Karon; “For, in essence it is a fair and reasonable call to bring in some form of controls, as much in CSF favour as anyone else’s. Much of what ATSB have stated and the CASA actions are fair and reasonable..”

With the utmost respect, I suggest that we have plenty of existing controls and, unfortunately, Aviation Hearse, sorry, House, does not have the ability to contrive a sensible suite of rules fit for purpose.

There is, though, a great body of experienced personnel such as is found within the ranks of the excellent organisation of Angel Flight. There’s no doubt that in a better aviation world, much less surrounded by a high thicket of thorny criminal code strictures, we could more readily move to overcome some of the old risk problems of General Aviation as it is practiced in Australia.

We badly need a completely new Government approach, and certainly not a return to the ‘good old days’ (hidebound and inefficient benign paternalism). This is the Age of Information, its different, it’s a freedom to inform, explore and share advances that will outpace a regimented bureaucratic mentality by many orders.

[P7_TOM]

Yeah – but. A decade ago, in the USA the CSF worked with NTSB and FAA to create a ‘system’ which dotted all the I’s’ and crossed all the T’s’ – got it sanctioned (legal and tidy) and have never looked back. FAA happy, NTSB happy and CSF much better off for taking ‘control’ of it’s own destiny. Not in Australia; ‘the great body of experienced personnel’ pissed off with over regulation; failed to see ahead to the time when an accident occurred. Sooner or later; CSF would need to defend their operational safe guards. Facts, figures, data and ‘safety’ Brownie points. The USA version is almost ‘bullet proof’. Expect the worst and when it happens, have the defences in place.

I would have thought that “a ‘great body of experienced personnel’ would have realised what they would have to deal with – when the time came. Perhaps, a good place to start building defences would be based on the most inexperienced, unexposed, recently inducted pilot: educating and testing a knowledge of just how fast it can all turn to worms, the subtle pressure of ‘schedule’ and the ways in which last light, poor visibility and rotten weather can bring you to a accident.

ATSB and CASA have manipulated a fatal accident into a stand up brawl; this is wrong. Angel Flight have allowed this to happen – this is proving to be - unfortunate. The USA CSF took the same ‘problem’ jumped through the hoops and turned it into a plus; for all. In any future accident the USA version starts on the front foot. But then, they have sensible rules, a honest NTSB and a realistic regulator, not held ransom to political protection. Chalk and cheese – but that’s how I see it.

[Sandy Reith]

P7 Tom; “Angel Flight have allowed this to happen –”
To me that’s a bridge too far, they didn’t allow this accident to happen, and, as noted, we don’t live in the USA. There may opinion that regulation will prevent such accidents but what supports this opinion? I can’t imagine irrefutable evidence that regulations in the USA have saved their various CSF providers from accidents. It maybe that newly agreed regulations, where largely agreed between regulator and industry, are simply codifying improved practice.
Its obvious that our current regulatory environment contributes to the risk of accidents if only by the expense and difficulty of obtaining and maintaining the IF Rating. Other areas are more difficult to quantify and much comes down to opinion.

[Kharon]

Sandy – “To me that’s a bridge too far, they (AF) didn’t allow this accident to happen,”

That’s not what TOM meant, taken out of context. What was meant, and I agree with it, is that by not anticipating the worst case scenario and having a ‘robust’ defence for the organisation in place, the opening for the accident investigation to be turned around leading to a more restrictive operational regime than routine PVT operation was presented.

For instance, a clear policy and AF rules for flight planning under the VFR, keeping schedule and clear cut guidelines for what to do when conditions are marginal (or below). ATSB have repeatedly brought ‘pressure’ into play; but have only done the math on the sectors carrying passengers. Double jeopardy for AF and dirty Pool opportunity right there.

In the real world, when there is a complex schedule to keep, the pressure begins when the pilot gets out of bed in the morning. The clock rules. Now the night before a sensible bloke would (should if made SOP) check the weather forecast; then while having a coffee, log into NAIPS and see how the weather looked for the day ahead. This is when Go/No Go decisions need to be made; early.

The weather forecast for the accident day was ‘not good’. Below IFR/VFR minimums for the arrival time and likely to remain marginal for the morning – not too good for ‘schedule’. So, what does the AF Bible say? What is the SOP for this type situation? What are the AF rules for delaying a departure? Was the pilot aware of these rules and had he signed a paper, proving that he was aware? If he had, then AF is off the hook – the defences hold. The politics go away, life resumes as normal. Sound operational practice must be in place and seen to be effective - lest CASA write them for you, in strict liability terms.

A frame work which protects the operation is essential, you can bet on ATSB and CASA having a framework which will protect them against political pressure and awkward questions. Once questions are asked of the regulator “how did you allow this to happen?” they have a rock solid defence made to order. The second fatal AF accident caught them with their pants down, knee jerk response to follow.

My two bob’s worth.

[Kharon]

But Sandy, that’s my point.

Sandy – “With the utmost respect, I suggest that we have plenty of existing controls and, unfortunately, Aviation Hearse, sorry, House, does not have the ability to contrive a sensible suite of rules fit for purpose.”

Had the concept of ‘Sector Risk Profile’ (SRP) been adopted for AF/CSF instead of being side-lined in favour of Eastern Bloc style of ‘governance’, then CSF would not be spending time with the RRAT committee.

A SRP worked incredibly well for the Air Ag crew, Phil Hurst doing a sterling job on behalf of his membership. Had AF been given the opportunity of taking the same road, a sensible approach to the risks the sector faced; then, perhaps an accident may have been prevented; and, should the worst happen, then there would be no quarrel; and, perhaps the ATSB could have investigated the accident properly, instead of being catspaw for the CASA heavy mob.

History 1 - P2 – “I agree with the context of your argument "K", however you will remember that we covered off on the previous CASA look at CSFs (ie 2014). This included what we both agreed was an excellent concept introduced by CASA the SRP (Sector Risk Profile), which apparently St Commode and his acolytes were not so keen on.”  “Ironically the last official SRP to be produced was countersigned by St Carmode when he was in the Acting CEO role. Less than 2 months later CC was to become the latest CEO/DAS of Fort Fumble and since that time there has been no more SRPs published, including the promised SRPs in the above QON??

History 2 - “CASA said on Friday people power had persuaded the regulator to maintain the status quo on how not-for-profit community service flights were regulated, with the present guidelines sufficient for now.”

“We have listened to the feedback to CASA’s preferred option and we accept this is not the way to proceed,” Skidmore said in a statement.

“CASA is not proposing any changes to the existing regulatory requirements for community service flights at this time.”

Skidmore said this when there was every chance of a cooperative, equitable SRP was on the table. The rest is history now and the battle to prevent draconian ‘changes to regulatory requirements’ is on; for young and old. AF should be demanding a SRP be done, before the CASA sneak in some onerous, restrictive regulation. Because that's where CASA are heading, full steam.

Toot – toot.  

[Peetwo]

ATSB Senate Inquiry Update: 14/09/19

"..Had the concept of ‘Sector Risk Profile’ (SRP) been adopted for AF/CSF instead of being side-lined in favour of Eastern Bloc style of ‘governance’, then CSF would not be spending time with the RRAT committee..."

Exactly "K" and the point I was trying to make in my previous post - reference:

Maybe this explains the current bizarre imbroglio from both Fort Fumble and the Hooded Canary's Avery, ie they missed the perfect opportunity to put in place a SMS type arrangement based on a mutually agreeable, co-operative SRP. As a consequence of this missed opportunity they (FF & HCA) are now attempting to play catch up in a most unagreeable, toxic way -  

References:  [b]St Carmode the guru of bureaucratic obfuscation of aviation safety?? & Aviation – and the poison chalice piss take within?  [/b]

IMO to best sum up the ATSB's totally flawed report (yes another one -   ) let us refer to several extracts from John Raby's very good submission No.5 of the Senate Inquiry...

..The most important aim of accident and incident investigation conducted by an International Civil
Aviation Organisation, (ICAO) state must always be the prevention of a situation where accidents
of the type being studied are repeated. There must therefore be a sense of tragic failure for safety
investigators world wide when particular types of occurrences continue to recur and form such a
large proportion of fatal aircraft accidents...

...Perhaps it was this overriding sense of failure which lead the Australian Transport Safety Bureau,
(ATSB), to depart from best practice and try so desperately to lay the causal factors at the door of
a non aviation organisation such as the Angel Flight charity. To manipulate the statistical data in
the way they have in this report must be seen as a desperate attempt to lay blame rather than to
advance the search for answers which could lead to an improvement in the accident record and
save lives...

---

...In my view the ATSB has for reasons known only to itself decided to create doubt in the community
as to the value and safety of community service flights. To do this it has used a tiny part of the
data base which is not statistically significant in a very biased and selective manner.

It has done itself the industry and the community a disservice and missed an opportunity to add
value to the consideration of the real challengers of conducting travel flights to the VFR. The truth
is we are continuing to licence pilots both commercial and private who make fatally poor decisions
regarding weather in particular and their own skills and capabilities in general.

The report should be withdrawn and the task given to a truly independent body or group who could
honestly search for practical actions which could assist in reducing these type of aviation
accidents.

A truly complete and unbiased investigative process could lead to really worthwhile and life saving
recommendations and findings...

 On page 5 of that submission John Raby even offers up some practical safety recommendations very much akin to possible risk mitigation solutions that could have been discussed and debated (back in 2014) in the context of a well constructed and consultative SRP??    

Next back to that TAAAF thing??

I note that yesterday Hitch re-hashed the subject in his weekly LMH:

TAAAF's submission to the RRAT hearing on Angel Flight is very straight-forward and brief: they support the ATSB findings and the CASA restrictions placed on any community service pilot. Immediately having read this, I metaphorically checked the back of the page to see where the rest of it was. It's not like TAAAF to put in such a thin submission without the justification behind it, especially one that could be controversial within the associations' memberships. The industry is so divided over this issue that I can't really see consensus anywhere, and for TAAAF to achieve that would be a mighty effort indeed. But did they achieve it? Some straw-polling of members has revealed that the TAAAF secretariat did their homework with the membership before sending off the paper, but not all associations are 100% in agreement. Am I surprised? No. I have always considered TAAAF a micro-copy of the Australian aviation industry, and as the industry itself can never get togther on one issue, I could hardly expect that TAAAF would be able to do it either.

Read more at http://www.australianflying.com.au/the-l...R7qc4r4.99

Then with a Friday 5pm bombshell, Ben Morgan (backed by facts and figures derived from a phone ring around of his own) brought up the real elephants in the room...

A QUESTION OF INTEGRITY: TAAAF THROWS ATSB & CASA A LIFELINE

September 13, 2019 By Benjamin Morgan

---

AOPA Australia Executive Director BENJAMIN MORGAN reports.



Former CASA Chairman, Corporte Air representative and current TAAAF Chair, Mr Jeff Boyd, has left the general aviation industry stunned, springing to the defense of the ATSB and CASA, in a strongly worded statement of full support, on behalf of the members of The Australian Aviation Associations Forum (TAAAF).


The letter, signed by Mr Jeff Boyd as Chair, stated; “… we believe that the report is thorough and accurate, and addresses serious concerns held by many people in the aviation indutry for some time… the TAAAF also supports the new minimum standards recently published by CASA for the conduct of Angel Flights.”

The TAAAF statement of support was submitted to the Senate RRAT Inquiry, which held its first hearing in Sydney on Wednesday 4th September 2019.

Angel Flight and AOPA Australia have maintained that the ATSB report produced defective findings that were underpinned by false outcomes which were derived from wildly inaccurate and manipulated statistics, calling for the report’s withdrawal.


During the inquiry, the ATSB admitted that it had not interviewed any pilots in arriving at it’s conclusion; that community service flight pilots were operating under significantly more stress than pilots in other sectors.  The ATSB went on to admit that it had conflated findings from an unrelated survey to support it’s allegations of pilot pressure and stress.  When pressed on this issue, the ATSB argued that if it had surveyed or intervierviewd pilots specifically on the issue, they did not feel pilots would have given them honest answers.


Regarding the ATSB statistics, the investigator admitted that they did not have accurate data records and had based their report on estimated and modeled numbers, acknowledging that they did not include all Angel Flight’s undertaken during the statistical period used.  This modelling enabled the ATSB to produce a finding that alleged Community Service Flights to be 7 times more likely to be involved in a fatality, which sits in contrast to the reality that Angel Flight has experienced just two fatal accidents in 20 years spanning 40,000+ flights flown, which left the RRAT Inquiry panel questioning the statistical relevance of the ATSB’s claims.


And, the ATSB weren’t alone in their damning admissions.  CASA went on the record admitting that their legislative changes had no relevance to either of the two Angel Flight accidents, also stating that their changes would not have prevented either accident from occuring and would not stop similar accidents from happening again.


In view of the clear evidence given to the Senate RRAT Inquiry, which leaves no doubt as to the need to withdraw the ATSB report and CASA’s inappropriate legislative changes, it certainly raises serious questions as to how the TAAAF Chair, Mr Jeff Boyd, and it’s members could possibly have supported the ATSB and CASA at all.


Do Australia’s general aviation associations and bodies genuinely feel that it is appropriate or acceptable that the ATSB produce investigation reports based on manipulated data, conflated survey results – all without interviewing or surveying a single pilot or participant?  Its hard to imagine, but this is what the TAAAF have argued, which gives rise to serious quesitons.

Was the former CASA Chairman given a tap on the shoulder for support?  Was he called on to throw a lifeline to the ATSB and CASA?  Did the airline he works for bias his judgement?  Is the TAAAF statement supported by it’s members?  Does the TAAAF represent general aviation as it claims?


Over the past few days, AOPA Australia has reached out to the various members of the TAAAF, seeking to understand if each of the associations were in full agreement with the statement of support, which has revealed some telling facts;

According to the TAAAF letter to the Senate RRAT Inquiry, the association represents thirteen associations and bodies, claiming to be an alliance of the majority of Australia’s major aviation associations… these include;

• The Royal Federation of Aero Clubs of Australia (RFACA)
  
  
• Regional Aviation Association of Australia (RAAA)
  
  
• Australian Helicopter Industry Association (AHIA)
  
  
• Recreational Aviation Australia Limited (RAAUS)
  
  
• Aviation Law Association of Australia and New Zealand (ALAANZ)
  
  
• Aviation Innovation Centre
  
  
• Australian Women Pilots Association (AWPA)
  
  
• Australian Business Aircraft Association (ABAA)
  
  
• Australian Certified UAV Operators (ACUO)
  
  
• Antique Aeroplane Association of Australia (AAAA)
  
  
• Australian Sport Aviation Confederation (ASAC)
  
  
• Australian Association for Unmanned Systems (AAUS)
  
  
• Australian Warbirds Association Limited (AWAL)
  

A brief telephone investigation by AOPA Australia revealed that the majority of the TAAAF membership was either unaware, in disagreement or seeking to disassociate themselves from the statement of support.


These are our findings;

• TAAAF asserts that it represents 13 industry associations and bodies;
  
  
• Three (3) of the thirteen (13) member associations are entirely unrelated to manned general aviation in Australia;
  
  
• Two (2) of the thirteen (13) member associations were unavailable for comment;
  
  
• Five (5) of the thirteen (13) member associations were found to be disassociating themselves with the TAAAF statement of support, but did not want to indicate if they had agreed to its publishing;
  
  
• One (1) of the thirteen (13) member associations was n0t aware that they were a member of the TAAAF and did not understand why their association had been included in the communication;
  
  
• One (1) of the thirteen (13) member associations was aware of the statement, but did not want to provide any statement;
  
  
• And just two (2) of the thirteen (13) member associations stated that they were in full agreement with the TAAAF statement;
  

The above results, appear to contradict the TAAAF statement that it’s membership ‘fully-supports’ the ATSB & CASA, and if correct should be the basis on which the letter should be withdrawn, as it could be considered a gross misrepresentation and an attempt to mislead a Senate Inquiry, leaving significant doubts as to the integrity of the TAAAF and their claim to represent the general aviation industry.


Withdrawn or not, I have no doubt that there will be many pilots shaking their heads, all wondering as to the motivations of each of the industry associations involved.

Sadly, it does appear that the ATSB, CASA and now the TAAAF all share something in common.

BM: "..Sadly, it does appear that the ATSB, CASA and now the TAAAF all share something in common..."

Hmm..ironically this again brings me back full circle to my previous post, for it would seem that over at the ATSB 'H' is for 'conflict of interest'??

Henwood, Hood and Hornby - 

I fully support - minimum pilot experience and currency - minimum licensing requirements - minimum Class1 medical - all night flight to be using instrument procedures - aircraft maintenance to charter standards. The general public has not enough knowledge to make the call. The emotions involved lead pilots to make hasty and not always good decisions about their capabilities. I know everyone wants to help and be seen a hero but no-one wants their nearest and dearest to end up in a crumpled heap of metal in cumulogranite. The PATS scheme whilst less glamorous is adequate for most people's transport. A little extra input from doctors into the application assists in ensuring the patient gets transport appropriate to their condition.

---

What will it take to make a Hooded Canary sing?

Reference: http://www.auntypru.com/forum/thread-10-...ml#pid9354

---

First I note that Sandy's 'open email' submission has now been posted on the Inquiry webpage: 

7 Mr Alexander Reith (PDF 13 KB) 

Quote from that: "..Professional and private aviation industry personnel have been following the ATSB’s reports for many years, but more particularly since it became an independent Commonwealth corporate body in 2009..."

After digging around on the cyber-sphere it would seem that besides graduating from ANU in law; and then becoming a Dept graduate; leading to a career bureaucrat with multi-tasking roles (which include, but not limited to, sometimes acting as the Executive Director of Transport and an Aviation Accident Investigator/SME) inside of the ATCB; PH esq. was also the primary architect of the TSI Act 2009 amendment that saw the ATSB become a independent (code for 'law unto itself') statutory authority...

Ref: https://www.linkedin.com/in/patrick-horn...bdomain=au

---

Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Total Duration: 16 yrs 11 mos

Title: Manager - Legal and Governance
Dates Employed: Jul 2009 – Present
Employment Duration: 10 yrs 3 mos
Location: Canberra Area, Australia

I work to put the ATSB in the best position to be viewed as outstanding in its transport accident investigation field through leading the delivery of legal and policy advice. I created the ATSB’s corporate structure for the delivery of legal services to the Bureau. With my team I am responsible for:

• In house legal advice;
• Representation in coronial inquests;
• Preparation for litigation and challenges to administrative decision-making;
• Drafting of commercial contracts, intergovernmental agreements, legislative instrumen... See more

Title: Legal Policy Advisor
Dates Employed: Nov 2002 – Jun 2009
Employment Duration: 6 yrs 8 mos
Location: Canberra, Australia

During this period the ATSB was a Division of the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. I provided policy advice to the ATSB associated with legal matters. This included:

- Creating confidential reporting regimes for the aviation and maritime industries;
- Amending the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 to make the ATSB an independent statutory agency with a commission structure;
- Negotiating and drafting, through the International Maritime Organization, a mandatory Code for the Investigation for the Investigation of Maritime Casualties. I was awarded an Australian Public Service Australia Day Achievement medal for my work on the Code.

While employed within the Department I contributed to the delivery of corporate objectives as president of the Diversity and Equity Network. The network was given a Departmental Australia Day award

---

 
Hmm..no further comment - FDS!


MTF...P2