[Peetwo]

Recommendations and inquiry lessons from the past ignored in favour of political expediency -  

 Under the TSI Act the ATSB can compel an individual/ unincorporated association/ Federal or State/Territory agency to respond to a 'safety recommendation':

Responses to reports of, or containing, safety recommendations
            (1)  This section applies if:

                    (a)  the ATSB publishes a report under section 25 in relation to an investigation; and

                    (b)  the report is, or contains, a recommendation that a person, unincorporated association, or an agency of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, take safety action.

            (2)  The person, association or agency to whom the recommendation is made must give a written response to the ATSB, within 90 days of the report being published, that sets out:

                    (a)  whether the person, association or agency accepts the recommendation (in whole or in part); and

                    (b)  if the person, association or agency accepts the recommendation (in whole or in part)--details of any action that the person, association or agency proposes to take to give effect to the recommendation; and

                    ©  if the person, association or agency does not accept the recommendation (in whole or in part)--the reasons why the person, association or agency does not accept the recommendation (in whole or in part).

            (3)  A person commits an offence if:

                    (a)  the person is someone to whom a recommendation is made in a report published under section 25; and

                    (b)  the person fails to give a written response to the ATSB within 90 days setting out the things required by paragraphs (2)(a), (b) and © (as applicable).

Penalty:  30 penalty units.

            (4)  Subsection (3) applies to an unincorporated association as if it were a person.

            (5)  An offence against subsection (3) that would otherwise be committed by an unincorporated association is taken to have been committed by each member of the association's committee of management, at the time the offence is committed, who:

                    (a)  made the relevant omission; or

                    (b)  aided, abetted, counselled or procured the relevant omission; or

                    ©  was in any way knowingly concerned in, or party to, the relevant omission (whether directly or indirectly or whether by any act or omission of the member).

     
The ATSB publish all their safety recommendations and make public all the subsequent responses until a point in time when they consider the SR matter to be closed - see HERE.

In OTSI world there appears to be no legal requirement for SR recipients to even acknowledge the OTSI issuance of a SR, let alone actually making public any safety actions implemented in response to the SR.

However whilst OTSI doesn’t have the power to enforce a response to their safety recommendations, the Minister does and it’s written in the PTA Act 1990:

151  Recommendations arising from investigations

        (1)  The Minister, in consultation with TfNSW, may, by written notice, direct a person who carries on a ferry service to comply with a recommendation contained in a report on a transport safety investigation or transport safety inquiry provided to the Minister under this Part.

        (2)  A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with a requirement of the Minister under this section is guilty of an offence.
        Maximum penalty—1,000 penalty units.

Hmmm...in the 32 years that the PTA Act 1990 has been in force I wonder how many times the Minister has enacted a section 151?   

Next, in the process of doing some research for Aunty on the history of transport safety inquiry and the implementation of recommendations in NSW (OTSI, TFNSW, RMA, Transdev etc..etc) as a parallel to the Commonwealth (ATSB, CASA, Airservices, AMSA), I came across this intriguing SMH article from 15 years ago:

Call to hand over Sydney Ferries to ATSB

May 22, 2007 — 1.49pm

Federal authorities should take over the running of Sydney Ferries until the organisation gets its ship in order, the NSW opposition says.

NSW opposition transport spokeswoman Gladys Berejiklian said the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) should be called in to sort out cultural, management and safety issues that are plaguing Sydney Ferries.

Ms Berejiklian said the opposition, in its submission to the Special Commission of Inquiry into Sydney ferries, called on Commissioner Brett Walker SC to consider bringing in the ATSB.

"For too long the state government has ignored the recommendations made by OTSI (Office of Transport Investigations), the state agency looking at safety issue in Sydney Ferries," she said.

"For too long the state government has ignored the cultural, management and safety issues plaguing Sydney Ferries, and for too long the state government has allowed these issues to be swept under the carpet."

The opposition also renewed its calls for the inquiry to be made public to ensure it was "open and transparent".

Ms Berejiklian said the terms of reference must be extended to cover the two fatal accidents which occurred in January and March this year.

Hmm...I wonder if the current Coalition incumbent Minister has the same take on the clusterduck  that is  Sydney Ferries (ie Transdev)?? 

Moving on, I went to the reference that was the 'Special Commission of Inquiry into Sydney Ferries'.

The inquiry was conducted by well known Barrister Bret Walker SC and is a particularly heavy read of over 400 pages (WOW!) - 

These were the recommendations:

RECOMMENDATIONS

1 It is recommended that the Government undertake to pay a price fixed
by a service contract to a private-enterprise corporation for the provision
of ferry services pursuant to a service contract as required by the
Passenger Transport Act 1990 but on a provisional basis, that is, until it
proves to be no more expensive than a.SOC providing ferry services
pursuant to a service contract as required by the Passenger Transport
Act 1990. This means, it is recommended that:
a. processes should be started as soon as possible to offer a
comprehensive service contract, including fleet replacement
responsibilities, to the market;
b. if bids from the market compare favourably with the financial and
quality performance of SFC as a.SOC providing the same service,
the best (not necessarily the cheapest) bid should be accepted by
the Government; and
c. if bids from the market do not compare sufficiently favourably with
the prospects offered by SFC continuing as a SOC, SFC could
continue to provide the service subject to a statutory contract.
(Chapter 1)

2 It is recommended that a coordinating body is established, whose role it
is to ensure the transport network is properly integrated. In particular,
such a body must ensure that timetables are properly coordinated
across modes. In default of agreement between service providers, it
should be empowered to determine changes for all of them. (Chapter 2)
3 It is recommended that an access agreement is negotiated between the
operator of Sydney ferry services, whether it be SFC or a private
operator, and NSW Maritime which:
a. gives the operator priority access to all wharves to which access is
required in order to operate ferry services in accordance with
current and future timetables;
b. enables the operator to install ticket machines, CCTV systems, PA
systems, help points and customer information systems where
appropriate;
c. enables, in appropriate locations, the operator to berth vessels
overnight and implement appropriate security arrangements;
d. enables the operator to display appropriate signage on the
wharves; and
e. establishes clear and practicable responsibility for maintenance.
(Chapter 3)

4 It is recommended that commuter wharves be standardized. The
operator of Sydney ferry services, whether it be SFC or a private
operator, and NSW Maritime must work together in relation to the redesign
and standardization of commuter wharves, to ensure that
wharves are appropriately designed to accommodate SFC’s operational
requirements, particularly with a view to the specifications of a
replacement fleet. (Chapter 3)

5 It is recommended that, when current access agreements in relation to
Jetty 6 expire in January 2008, new access agreements are negotiated
with commercial operators on the basis that Jetty 6 must be reasonably
available for use by the operator of Sydney ferry services, whether it be
SFC or a private operator, during the morning and afternoon peak hour.
(Chapter 3)

6 It is recommended that King Street wharf be developed as an extra
operational hub to Circular Quay and a new entry point to the city for
ferry passengers. The term ‘operational hub’ requires that all necessary
infrastructure is put in place for King Street wharf to operate as an
alternative to Circular Quay. This requires:
a. replacement of the current floating pontoon with a different wharf
structure which includes appropriate disabled access;
Recommendations 336
b. a ticket office, ticket machines and barrier gates;
c. security measures to protect vessels berthed overnight and
infrastructure such as ticket machines;
d. appropriate crew and staff amenities; and
e. facilities to service vessels such as sewerage pumps, access to
shore power and fresh water. (Chapter 3)

7 It is recommended that, in planning the redevelopment of the foreshore,
the Government explicitly consider a range of possibilities for ferries
including an additional facility at White Bay or even, depending upon
land use considerations, an entirely new facility including a new
Shipyard. Any decision in relation to the future location of SFC’s
operations including its Shipyard should be made in consultation with the
Office of the Coordinator General. (Chapter 3)

8 It is recommended that SFC disaggregate its service reliability figures
including on time running and services that actually run so that separate
statistics for each of Manly, Inner Harbour and Parramatta River are
kept. (Chapter 3)

9 It is recommended that Division 2 of Part 3 of the Passenger Transport
Act 1990 (Ferry service) is amended so as to make it consistent with
Division 3 of Part 3 of the Passenger Transport Act 1990 (Regular bus
services) in these respects:
a. removing the distinction between commercial and non-commercial
contracts;
b. removing those provisions which confer upon a contract holder
exclusive rights, potentially in perpetuity, to operate passenger ferry
services on a particular route or in a particular region;
c. removing the provision that allows the terms of a service contract to
prevail over Government’s standards of safety and maintenance
and any relevant legislative standards or requirements; and
d. inserting a provision, equivalent to sec 28C which overcomes the
equitable doctrine against penalties and allows agreed penalties to
be enforced against providers of passenger ferry services for a
failure to meet minimum service standards set out in the service
contract. (Chapter 5)

10 It is recommended that the Portfolio Minister give a written direction to
the Board pursuant to sec 35K of the Transport Administration Act 1988
or sec 20P of the State Owned Corporations Act 1989 on the grounds of
public safety or that it is necessary for the public interest that SFC take
all steps necessary for it to obtain one EBA with all afloat staff. (Chapter
8)

11 It is recommended that the Balmain Shipyard performance indicators be
disaggregated to properly understand whether there are sufficient
vessels available to service all routes, and if not which routes will suffer.
(Chapter 11)

12 It is recommended that, in consultation with NSW Maritime, SFC review
the safety management system to achieve the following goals:
a. an integrated safety information system which;
i captures all hazards, OH&S incidents, audit results, noncompliance
findings and near-miss reports (‘incidents’);
ii guarantees and delivers feedback;
iii permits confidential reporting;
iv enables the costs of incidents to be calculated and reported
upon;
v consistently defines incidents which are to be reported within
SFC;
vi permits the accurate reporting of ‘reportable incidents’ to
NSW Maritime which are required to be reported pursuant to
legislative obligations and the MOU;
vii enables the implementation of corrective action to be
monitored;
viii permits measurement of outcomes; and
ix is capable of systemic analysis.
b. a just culture in which there are clear lines drawn between
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour and which encourages and
rewards the provision of essential safety-related information;
c. document control;
d. effective communication of lessons learned from incidents;
e. robust and scheduled internal audits;
f. regular external audit; and
g. effective tracking of training undertaken by staff to ensure only
those fully and up-to-date qualified to crew vessels, do so. (Chapter
10)

13 It is recommended that, in relation to its KPIs, SFC categorize the
significant and reportable incidents by reference to:
a. the nature of the incident e.g collision with wharf, collision with
other vessel, collision with submerged object, other collision,
grounding, near miss etc;
b. whether any injury or fatality resulted and the seriousness of any
injury;
c. whether any damage to property including a vessel occurred and if
so, the seriousness of any damage; and
d. minor vessel incidents including near misses. (Chapter 10)

14 It is recommended that a new fleet be procured in accordance with the
process outlined in Chapter 13. The overall aim of the replacement is to:
a. provide capacity for more routes and more frequent services on
existing routes;
b. enable the large vessels to shorten travel time to and from Manly;
and
c. maximize environmental suitability, efficiency and economic
maintenance. (Chapter 12)

15 It is recommended that the existing high speed JetCat service to Manly
is discontinued. (Chapter 12)

16 It is recommended that existing ferry services on the upper Parramatta
River, between Rydalmere and Parramatta, are discontinued. (Chapter
12)

17 It is recommended that the devising of a specification for a replacement
fleet, and the terms of a service contract including the obligation to
deliver a replacement fleet, should urgently address all matters relevant
to a sensible risk allocation between government and a contractor –
including those set out in Chapter 13. (Chapter 13)

Hmm..other than recommendation 1 I am not sure how many have been implemented; or what progress has been made on the other 16 recommendations?

However I do make the observation that the implementation of recommendation 1 is proving to be problematic, especially in the areas of vessel survey, addressing identified latent risks, Transdev SMS and incident reporting standardisation across all Federal/NSW Govt agencies and departments. 

Chapter 9 & 10 of the 'Special Commission of Inquiry into Ferries' IMO should be required reading. After reading those chapters then ask yourself the question, on the available evidence, what has changed? What has been done to mitigate the many systemic marine safety issues that were identified in that inquiry conducted over 15 years ago?

MTF...P2