Of attributable Bollocks and:-
Squibs purporting to be 'Bombshells'.
I have cribbed the quoted 'text' from a News.com article, by Liam Beatty. We can readily forgive the journalistic naivete as the thick coat of gloss and ATSB mumbo jumbo would mislead many of those who have a nodding acquaintance with air operations - even at the professional level. There, compliance is paramount with 'grey-ish' letter law; the first question asked of any operation "is it legal"? Is it "safe"? (whatever that may mean) is rarely asked of a 'routine' matter. The precursor is a notion that if it is 'legal' then, it must be 'safe'; or, at least able to be 'seen' to be during the 'investigation' then all is well. Enter ATSB Bollocks #1.
ATSB Bollocks #2 - "An investigation into a horror helicopter crash which killed five people in Victoria has concluded the flight should have been cancelled because of weather conditions."
Well; this was a 'commercial' operation, the paying passengers would have an expectation, even if pre warned, to get where they want to go. Unless the 'operations' staff (meet and great) can declare, categorically, that the weather conditions totally preclude departure - even then eyebrows will be raised. Out will come the I-phones calls will be made and weather conditions checked. Best result, seasoned travellers will wait' or reschedule, they understand; the not so much crew will haul off in a huff, find another operator and have a 50/50 chance of securing a ride. Such is human nature. However, as most 'commercial' VFR operations will do; they will launch and compare the 'actual' conditions to the 'forecast' conditions; maybe they squeak through; maybe they don't; such is the game of VFR operations, and much depends on many complex factors. But, on the day's forecast, provided the passengers were happy to accept that the weather was forecast as 'sketchy' and the possibility of a return to base was on the cards; then it would be acceptable to go and see what conditions really were. That 'risk' element quite operationally sensible and commercially acceptable.
ATSB Bollocks #3 - "A new report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau released this week found Mr Neal and the second pilot were not qualified to fly in rough weather and held concerns about the conditions before the trip."
Tricky one this; not concerned enough to exercise 'command prerogative though. 'Inadvertent' or 'deliberate' entry into cloud? That is the question. Clouds ain't invisible; nor is good old terra firma; particularly of the mountainous kind. Take a look through the cockpit window; is there a gap between cloud and the bricks or is there not? No, then can we step around it? It is a yes or no question. Are you above the lowest safe height for operating in cloud? It is a yes or no question. If one cannot 'see' a clearly defined 'road ahead' then one is obliged to turn away into 'suitable' conditions; or 'better' than that ahead. It is 'unwise' to persist into cloud without a safe height and/or wriggle room, thereby intentionally closing the only exit available - that being the one you just left behind.
ATSB Bollocks #4 - "The first helicopter broadcast to Mr Neal he planned to perform a U-turn, with Mr Neal descending and hovering as the first pilot turned back."
Consider this situation; carefully, from the beginning, start at the very basic level. Begin with the CASA accepted 'operations manual' find the section which defines company policy and the 'does, don'ts of operational procedures/practice. Now then, turn to the page which outlines 'tandem' or 'formation' or 'following' where two aircraft are dispatched to the same destination; in sketchy weather conditions under the Visual Flight Rules. Can you find a clearly enunciated section defining the procedure for when the 'lead' aircraft has 'inadvertently' entered cloud and is reversing track? No? Think on it. The 'following aircraft is in close proximity to the same 'weather'; can't descend too much due to 'the bricks'; can't climb lest the aircraft 'inadvertently' enters 'cloud' - so that aircraft is 'boxed-in' on track trying to peer into cloud to see the opposite direction aircraft emerging from that same area. Russian roulette? anybody? OK, so now try to find the section which outlines a 'sensible' approach to this scenario. What about say a 12 minute delay between the two aircraft? Say based on 80 knots; that provides a 16 mile separation and, the all important 'time' element for the lead aircraft to safely leave the cloud which had been 'inadvertently' entered, with the following having time, space and visibility to avoid the 'opposition'. There are several different ways to avoid increasing the risk to an unacceptable level; whichever 'system' is used can be tailor made to suit the proposed operation. This accident is the second of it's kind now. Have the ATSB or CASA come up with suggestions, solutions or even some sage operational advice?
ATSB Bollocks #5. "Records retrieved from Mr Neal’s craft indicated he then attempted to perform a “steep turn” to exit the cloud quicker, but instead plunged to the ground and struck an old growth tree before bursting into flames."
The high body count, world wide due to similar situations is worthy of note; it is one of the longest standing 'events' and continues 'unabated'. Research shows a couple of clearly defined 'patterns' of experience level and of early 'training'. Many of these pilot's encounter with 'real' weather' is their very first; often actions are based on previous encounters with a lighter weight (for wont of better) of weather; got away with it before - so, push on and chance my (dumb) luck. Many start and finish their training in 'good' conditions; sat in the crew room during the 'bad'. Weather flying 'experience' reduced to reading and listening. Only my opinion, but I believe that aspirant pilots need to 'educated' from the 'get-go' in weather appreciation and operation. (End of Hobby horse ride)...
ATSB Bollocks #6. "A new report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau released this week found Mr Neal and the second pilot were not qualified to fly in rough weather and held concerns about the conditions before the trip."
What a pointless, artificial cop out. There was no surprise 'found' about the qualifications - it was clearly printed on their bloody licence. VFR - Visual Flight Rules. The requirements for 'legal' operation clearly, with criminal penalty attached, are spelled out in the regulations. I sincerely doubt there is a pilot in the world who has not 'pushed' the specified limits or at least given them a gentle nudge; however. As DRS Bader said;
“Rules are for the obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men.”
There are times when a gentle 'bending' of a rule may be forgiven; but the thoughtless persistence to continue on, until immersed in cloud, without instrument training or 'auto' something (enter temptation sans 'clear thought' for the way ahead) is piss-potical, in the extreme. Nuff said methinks.
ATSB Bollocks #7. “The significant deviation of the pitch attitude during the turn was likely unintentional and the result of inadequate pilot control due to a lack of instrument flying training and artificial stabilisation,” the report found.
Words fail here; its just twaddle, chicken feed for the media vultures. ATSB is devolving into a top cover PR machine; lots of 'stuff and nonsense' but very skinny (anorexic) when it comes to solutions or resolution, let alone aiding and abetting prevention of repeat performances. Why does ATSB even exist? Gods know CASA have enough 'top cover' and the media will write and promote anything which titillates and sells advertisement.
That is it: rant over. My apologies to my peers and betters who actually know and understand the state of play; but to my simpleton's mind it is clear that this farcical, disingenuous, dangerous approach to and lip service paid to 'real' safety outcomes needs some 'delicate' adjustment of the scales; with big hammer. Standing by for incoming.
Toot - toot.....
Squibs purporting to be 'Bombshells'.
I have cribbed the quoted 'text' from a News.com article, by Liam Beatty. We can readily forgive the journalistic naivete as the thick coat of gloss and ATSB mumbo jumbo would mislead many of those who have a nodding acquaintance with air operations - even at the professional level. There, compliance is paramount with 'grey-ish' letter law; the first question asked of any operation "is it legal"? Is it "safe"? (whatever that may mean) is rarely asked of a 'routine' matter. The precursor is a notion that if it is 'legal' then, it must be 'safe'; or, at least able to be 'seen' to be during the 'investigation' then all is well. Enter ATSB Bollocks #1.
ATSB Bollocks #2 - "An investigation into a horror helicopter crash which killed five people in Victoria has concluded the flight should have been cancelled because of weather conditions."
Well; this was a 'commercial' operation, the paying passengers would have an expectation, even if pre warned, to get where they want to go. Unless the 'operations' staff (meet and great) can declare, categorically, that the weather conditions totally preclude departure - even then eyebrows will be raised. Out will come the I-phones calls will be made and weather conditions checked. Best result, seasoned travellers will wait' or reschedule, they understand; the not so much crew will haul off in a huff, find another operator and have a 50/50 chance of securing a ride. Such is human nature. However, as most 'commercial' VFR operations will do; they will launch and compare the 'actual' conditions to the 'forecast' conditions; maybe they squeak through; maybe they don't; such is the game of VFR operations, and much depends on many complex factors. But, on the day's forecast, provided the passengers were happy to accept that the weather was forecast as 'sketchy' and the possibility of a return to base was on the cards; then it would be acceptable to go and see what conditions really were. That 'risk' element quite operationally sensible and commercially acceptable.
ATSB Bollocks #3 - "A new report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau released this week found Mr Neal and the second pilot were not qualified to fly in rough weather and held concerns about the conditions before the trip."
Tricky one this; not concerned enough to exercise 'command prerogative though. 'Inadvertent' or 'deliberate' entry into cloud? That is the question. Clouds ain't invisible; nor is good old terra firma; particularly of the mountainous kind. Take a look through the cockpit window; is there a gap between cloud and the bricks or is there not? No, then can we step around it? It is a yes or no question. Are you above the lowest safe height for operating in cloud? It is a yes or no question. If one cannot 'see' a clearly defined 'road ahead' then one is obliged to turn away into 'suitable' conditions; or 'better' than that ahead. It is 'unwise' to persist into cloud without a safe height and/or wriggle room, thereby intentionally closing the only exit available - that being the one you just left behind.
ATSB Bollocks #4 - "The first helicopter broadcast to Mr Neal he planned to perform a U-turn, with Mr Neal descending and hovering as the first pilot turned back."
Consider this situation; carefully, from the beginning, start at the very basic level. Begin with the CASA accepted 'operations manual' find the section which defines company policy and the 'does, don'ts of operational procedures/practice. Now then, turn to the page which outlines 'tandem' or 'formation' or 'following' where two aircraft are dispatched to the same destination; in sketchy weather conditions under the Visual Flight Rules. Can you find a clearly enunciated section defining the procedure for when the 'lead' aircraft has 'inadvertently' entered cloud and is reversing track? No? Think on it. The 'following aircraft is in close proximity to the same 'weather'; can't descend too much due to 'the bricks'; can't climb lest the aircraft 'inadvertently' enters 'cloud' - so that aircraft is 'boxed-in' on track trying to peer into cloud to see the opposite direction aircraft emerging from that same area. Russian roulette? anybody? OK, so now try to find the section which outlines a 'sensible' approach to this scenario. What about say a 12 minute delay between the two aircraft? Say based on 80 knots; that provides a 16 mile separation and, the all important 'time' element for the lead aircraft to safely leave the cloud which had been 'inadvertently' entered, with the following having time, space and visibility to avoid the 'opposition'. There are several different ways to avoid increasing the risk to an unacceptable level; whichever 'system' is used can be tailor made to suit the proposed operation. This accident is the second of it's kind now. Have the ATSB or CASA come up with suggestions, solutions or even some sage operational advice?
ATSB Bollocks #5. "Records retrieved from Mr Neal’s craft indicated he then attempted to perform a “steep turn” to exit the cloud quicker, but instead plunged to the ground and struck an old growth tree before bursting into flames."
The high body count, world wide due to similar situations is worthy of note; it is one of the longest standing 'events' and continues 'unabated'. Research shows a couple of clearly defined 'patterns' of experience level and of early 'training'. Many of these pilot's encounter with 'real' weather' is their very first; often actions are based on previous encounters with a lighter weight (for wont of better) of weather; got away with it before - so, push on and chance my (dumb) luck. Many start and finish their training in 'good' conditions; sat in the crew room during the 'bad'. Weather flying 'experience' reduced to reading and listening. Only my opinion, but I believe that aspirant pilots need to 'educated' from the 'get-go' in weather appreciation and operation. (End of Hobby horse ride)...
ATSB Bollocks #6. "A new report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau released this week found Mr Neal and the second pilot were not qualified to fly in rough weather and held concerns about the conditions before the trip."
What a pointless, artificial cop out. There was no surprise 'found' about the qualifications - it was clearly printed on their bloody licence. VFR - Visual Flight Rules. The requirements for 'legal' operation clearly, with criminal penalty attached, are spelled out in the regulations. I sincerely doubt there is a pilot in the world who has not 'pushed' the specified limits or at least given them a gentle nudge; however. As DRS Bader said;
“Rules are for the obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men.”
There are times when a gentle 'bending' of a rule may be forgiven; but the thoughtless persistence to continue on, until immersed in cloud, without instrument training or 'auto' something (enter temptation sans 'clear thought' for the way ahead) is piss-potical, in the extreme. Nuff said methinks.
ATSB Bollocks #7. “The significant deviation of the pitch attitude during the turn was likely unintentional and the result of inadequate pilot control due to a lack of instrument flying training and artificial stabilisation,” the report found.
Words fail here; its just twaddle, chicken feed for the media vultures. ATSB is devolving into a top cover PR machine; lots of 'stuff and nonsense' but very skinny (anorexic) when it comes to solutions or resolution, let alone aiding and abetting prevention of repeat performances. Why does ATSB even exist? Gods know CASA have enough 'top cover' and the media will write and promote anything which titillates and sells advertisement.
That is it: rant over. My apologies to my peers and betters who actually know and understand the state of play; but to my simpleton's mind it is clear that this farcical, disingenuous, dangerous approach to and lip service paid to 'real' safety outcomes needs some 'delicate' adjustment of the scales; with big hammer. Standing by for incoming.
Toot - toot.....