Accidents - Overseas

Pakistan to ground 150 pilots for cheating to get licenses
By MUNIR AHMED
an hour ago
https://apnews.com/3b9899d6f9d674fdb7b2d...SocialFlow

ALERT Around 40% pilots in Pakistan have ‘fake’ flying licences, says aviation minister
https://www.airlive.net/alert-around-40-...-minister/
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Nasty one; mid air collision in Alaska -Interesting to compare the ATSB attempt against the NTSB - time, motion and results.
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A Swedish cautionary tale.

Neatly told - of meat-bombers and aft CG control.

- HERE -
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A Swedish cautionary tale. P7's very 'tongue in cheek' deserves some expansion - from the UP - I've cribbed a post which, IMO is worth a read - HERE. I've had trouble with the 'formatting' of the copied piece - but stick with it -


Quote - “Depressing reading. Maybe even a $20 length of rope or a net barrier across the baggage shelf might have saved them.”

Golfer Alf X  (response edited for format) - What cock! CoG nothing to do with this incident despite the Swedish regulators (poorly informed) opinion. On prior flight the stall warning was sounding during climb near cloud (on youtube, or WAS, not now seemingly.) stall warning is an indicator of low speed, (incorrect attitude).

The jump master ordered jumpers forward off the parcel shelf. stall warning stopped, climb (at correct speed resumes) the change of CoG is NOT what is causal here, it is the trim speed being used. If jumpers move forward at a trim state, the effect is a lower nose attitude and increased speed. The CoG is not what changes the speed it is the trim condition and the attitude that controls speed, yes? The pilot COULD (if he had so chosen) trimmed nose up and gone back to the low speed case had he wished with accompanying stall warning, OR EVEN trimmed nose down even at the low speed AFT GOG case to obtain correct speed /attitude and trim condition, without moving the jumpers forward. it is attitude and trim (and power of course P+A=P) that determines speed NOT CoG

This is the fundamental flaw in the analysis of this report. a very basis misunderstanding of how an aeroplane works. It is attitude that controls speed (which then enables control) NOT CoG, CoG can be varied, but a pilot can maintain speed, by elementary principles, with the controls. Then trim and viola! Zut Alors!

The previously supposed likely cause, and in my very positive opinion most likely, having scrutinized the report in great detail, was:-

the low time pilot,
press on in scungy weather
skating over ever higher cloud tops,
not using full climb power when needed
asking for additional altitude (late) due to wheels in the murk
progressively getting slower (raising nose to maintain height or to climb, tut tut)
improperly using power, see above and power input RPM/MAP traces in the report
still trying to clear cloud by raising nose - and slowing further enters cloud,
pushes levers fully forward (finally) just as she stalls in IMC and rolls over (likely with controls fully back) steep nose down spiral dive still at full power still in IMC (high RPM as reported from audio analysis) very high speed, no visible reference, steep spiral continues
sees ground and

PULLS AS HARD AS HE CAN
BANG/BANG/BANG wings and tail in sequence all break off, engine stops
Game Over
NO REPLAY

Tell me how a piece of rope stops this chain of errors?, unless it was a tie down that was never unfastened before flight.

HD
Tim Tam and two Choc Frogs.  Well said that man....
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737-500 Lost at Sea.

Found a 'sensible' news report – HERE - . Plenty of speculation, little in the way of hard fact. Not the best way to start a new year. MTF.
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Just the facts Ma'am.

It may take a while for the story to emerge, but the good news is that the FDR has  been recovered from the Sriwijaya 737. The CVR memory is AWOL, but they seem confident that it will be found. Good report from the ABC – HERE.
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Why does this sound so familiar?

Courtesy Karlene Petitt... Wink


Quote:Thursday, January 21, 2021

Strength in Numbers

You are Not Alone! 
[Image: power%2Btogether.png]

Yesterday I spoke with the FAA and the subject of the ASAP program became a topic of discussion. The FAA investigators I spoke to, do not have access to these events. One of the inspectors said that ASAP was a successful program because of the anonymity. 

I asked, "Is it?"  

What indication identifies 
ASAP is a Success?

I proceeded to explain the numerous events that could have been complete hull losses, as they came within seconds of impact and the associated fixes that did not address the underlying problems. I explained that ASAP reports were at an all time high, and the fixes at an all time low. I shared that a retired FAA prosecuting attorney, who is now an Administrative Law Judge, held the same concerns regarding rise of ASAP reports without the associated fixes. 

Pilots need not be concerned, the FAA will not prosecute pilots for human factor errors.  Unfortunately, it appears the ASAP program may be protecting airline management, as the root cause of the major incidents are due to substandard training, scheduling related events resulting in fatigue, and known mechanical deficiencies. These events won't be adequately addressed, because of the ASAP program. Those who could enforce airline compliance are not allowed to see what is really happening. 

Point in example. The exact events that took down AF447 and the MAX crashes had occurred prior to those crashes and were reported as ASAP events. Nothing was done until after the same events resulted in crashes, where 574 people lost their lives. What about the Colgan Air crash of 2009, how many ASAP reports could have predicted that event? 

Tuesday's post was about Reporting Culture versus an ASAP program. But also, how to report safety concerns and how to protect yourself if the company decides to take action against you. You are not alone, so please don't fear trying to make the system safer for all. 

Accidents are not Surprise Events

They could have been prevented 

But they are hidden by the ASAP system

[Image: image.png]

"Status quo is Latin for, 'The mess we're in.' " Ronald Reagan

P2 - Hint: Dear Lachie + Three decades of Australia taking the piss out of ICAO + https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...ICAO_1.pdf

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Latest from the Flight Safety Detectives -  Wink

Anyone spot the parallels with the latest from the FSD crew??


[Image: ep53_300x300.jpg]

Episode 53

The NTSB investigation of the tragic 2006 crash of a single-engine Cessna 206 was attributed to pilot error. Although evidence has surfaced that questions that conclusion, the findings have not been changed and appeals have been denied.
Guests for this episode are Yatish Joshi, pilot Georgina Joshi’s father and an experienced pilot, and his wife Joan. They tell the story of their journey to find the truth.
The lack of NTSB resources devoted to general aviation accidents is a disturbing safety trend illustrated by this crash. Pilot error is the attributed cause in more than 85% of cases, potentially missing the true lessons that can be learned from thorough accident investigation.
Invisible Sky is a documentary created about this accident. John and Greg believe the film is important for everyone in the GA community to see, as well as anyone who is interested in aviation safety.



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ps Definitely required viewing, via Youtube:

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Episode 54 from the Flight Safety Detectives 

Again shows parallels, this time on regulation and oversight of the LSA/Recreational pilot sector... Wink  



[Image: Skyleader_GP_One__light_sport_aircraftb7445_300x300.jpg]


Episode 54 – Light Sport Aircraft Safety


January 27, 2021/in Episodes /

https://www.podbean.com/ew/pb-xf3y7-f8c89a (from approximately 13:00 minutes) 

Light Sport Aircraft are the focus of this discussion. Changes to FAA rules and regulations now under review could result in a major loosening of safety rules for affected planes.

The FAA is proposing to change the rules and regulations related to LSAs, allowing aircraft in the category to be larger and more complex. John, Greg and expert Jason Lukasik explore implications for flight safety.

While every maintenance bulletin must be followed on LSAs, the use of consensus standards can make the work more challenging.

Listener questions are answered related to the Piper PA28 Airworthiness Directive (Episode 50) and propeller safety (Episode 46). The discussion also covers recent general aviation accidents with fatalities.

Image credit: B H Conway, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons




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Kobe Bryant NTSB Final Report released.  

NTSB media presentation long but extremely thorough (ps you can skip through large slabs):


(Consider the Final Report took just over a year to complete then compare to any of the number recent higher profile AAI reports put out and/or currently being investigated by the ATSB. The comparison is like Chalk and Cheese -  Blush )

Next Indon NTSC Sriwijaya Air crash preliminary report: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-02-10/i...a/13142064




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FSD - Episode 56



[Image: pexels-rafael-cosquiere-2064123-1030x772.jpg]

Episode 56 – FAA Struggles Following 737 Max Issues
February 10, 2021/in Episodes /

Link: https://www.podbean.com/ew/pb-9qhnp-fa4dcd

The FAA has taken a hit following high-profile crashes of the 737 Max. Investigators and congressional hearings have laid the blame on the FAA aircraft certification process and its too-close relationship with Boeing. Will the agency be able to restore its reputation?


Guest is John Allen, Manager at Allen and Associates Consulting, LLC. His resume includes service in the US military as well as leadership roles at the FAA and JetBlue.


The discussion takes a candid look at the issues. They also explore the FAA’s leadership in many areas of aviation safety.


This episode offers an insider look at the internal workings of the FAA as well as the challenges of balancing safety and economics. They also explain the role of regulatory authorities around the globe.




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Courtesy Ch9 Under Investigation: https://www.9now.com.au/under-investigat.../episode-6



Ep 6 The Disaster Aircraft

Nearly 400 people lost their lives to a design flaw in Boeing's 737 Max that caused two crashes, but the aircraft is back in the skies and Australians could soon be stepping aboard.



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Parallel Hemispheres: A 'how to' on proper AAI by NTSB with B-17 crash final report.Rolleyes

Historical reference:

(10-04-2019, 12:13 PM)Peetwo Wrote:  Parallel hemispheres: Connecticut B17 crash? 

I have been watching and reading with much interest the unfolding tragic story of the B-17 crash at Bradley International Airport in Connecticut: 

Quote:WWII-era plane crashes in Connecticut

By Mike Hayes, Zoe Sottile, Meg Wagner and Veronica Rocha, CNN
Updated 0111 GMT (0911 HKT) October 3, 2019

 
Reference post from Alphabets:  

(10-03-2019, 07:15 AM)Kharon Wrote:  A matter of concern.

TOM called the meeting to order; the crew settled down. Item one is a matter of great concern. The needless head butting and hair pulling going on between RAA and AOPA. It is seen as counterproductive, destructive, divisive, irresponsible  and “bloody childish” (not my words). A solution is needed..

So, what to do? History and believe it or not, John Sharp (as Minister) provide the answer. Back in the day, when Sharp was in the hot seat and CASA still had some honourable, intelligent men working for them; a plan was made to accommodate all Part 149 outfits with a set of ‘standards’ which CASA generated and the Alphabet groups could administer. It was a fair and equitable solution; so much so that both Canada and the EASA adopted it, put in a level playing field, and have never been troubled again.

Perhaps it is time the Australian plan was adopted in Australia.

I need to do a bit of digging around and talk to some folk; to be sure the plan can work. If it all pans out, it will be up to the members of the individual groups to sit their ‘management’ down and tell ‘em to get behind it, unite and make it happen. I understand there is a letter to the minister on it’s way, outlining the plan. Ministerial credibility could be partially restored on his nod.

Let’s hope good sense prevails. More to follow as matters progress. Fingers crossed.

Toot – toot.



Mike Borgelt  Sandy Reith • 3 days ago

Bravo Sandy! I'm pleased that someone else gets it.

Of course there should be no split. The concept of these self administering organisations was pioneered by the failed organisational model of the GFA with its long declining and geriatric membership.

All Australian aircraft should be VH registered and all pilots be required to hold at minimum a Recreational Pilot's Licence, not some mickey mouse "certificate" from some private organisation which has "trained" pilots with instructors who may have as few as 100 hours total aeronautical experience...

...Instead we have CASA's Part 149 abomination which requires people to pay private monopolies even if the person already holds a RPL or higher qualification and appropriate ratings, tailwheel, glider etc. resulting in much higher costs and multiple periodic flight reviews. Part 149 has consumed many thousands of man hours at CASA and the private bodies and many of these people are not paid for their efforts.

Long bow perhaps but?  Rolleyes

The tragic last flight of the B-17 was part of a Collings Foundation Wings for Freedom tour:

"..The Collings Foundation is a private non-profit educational foundation located in Stow, Massachusetts, founded in 1979 by Robert F. Collings and Caroline Collings with a mission dedicated to the preservation and public display of transportation-related history, namely automobile and aviation history..."

Not that there should be any inference/comparison with our Australian Warbirds Association but IMO there are some passing strange parallels when you consider the ongoing Angel Flight imbroglio, the RAAus v AOPA bunfight and the CASA Iron Ring creation of Part 149... Huh 

In the States there is no requirement for a Part 149, apparently the regulatory side of things is incorporated (as MB suggests above) into the normal pilot licensing and aircraft registration rule set. These types of operations fall under either FAR Part 91 or Part 135 - end of.

However that doesn't mean that this tragic occurrence will not lead to an inevitable review/scrutiny of the safety risk mitigation deployed by these types of not for profit operations, highlighted perhaps by the following Christine Negroni article/blog:

   
Quote:Warbird Operators Worry After B-17 Crash As Senator Calls for Closer Scrutiny

October 3, 2019 

[Image: B-17-Nine-O-Nine-Collings-Foundation.jpg]

Having survived combat and oftentimes years of neglect, flying warbirds in America and their owners may be headed into a new battle. Triggered by Wednesday’s fatal crash of the Collings Foundation B-17 Nine-O-Nine at Bradley International Airport, Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal says more scrutiny is needed for passenger flights on historic aircraft...

Via Christine Negroni's blog 'Flying Lessons': https://christinenegroni.com/beyond-the-...-17-crash/

Quote:Beyond the Headlines, More Than Pilot Error in Fatal B-17 Crash

April 14, 2021 

[Image: B-17-crash-ntsb-photo.jpg]

The list of failures leading up to the crash of a World War 2-era B-17 in October of 2019 is lengthy, highlighting not just individual lapses but systemic ones, the National Transportation Safety Board has found.

Seven people died and five others were seriously injured when the 4-engine aircraft dubbed [i]Nine O Nine,[/i] struck approach lights short of the runway at Bradley International Airport in Connecticut then veered across the threshold slamming into vehicles and a deicing tank off the right side of the runway.  The pilot, Ernest “Mac” McCauley, 75, and co-pilot Michael Foster, 71, were killed along with five of the passengers who were on board to enjoy what is called a living history flight, as I reported for The New York Times.



Today you’ll read articles that tout the “cause” of the [i]Nine O Nine [/i]accident as pilot error and indeed investigators outline several decisions that exacerbated an already bad situation when McCauley noted rough handling on one of the right (number 4) engines and a failure to climb shortly after takeoff. At the same time, though, the final report, released on Tuesday includes the Collings Foundation, the aircraft owner, the Federal Aviation Administration and a practice of allowing revenue flights on aircraft that do not and cannot equal the safety standards travelers take for granted.



I’ve reported in the past on the improvements in aircraft cabin design and materials that have made it far more likely that passengers will survive an air accident. And while many people may think that surviving a crash is an anomaly, most accidents do not involve fatalities. The reduction in the loss of life in accidents shows how effective the improvements in airplane seats and cabin materials have been.



The push to make airplanes more protective began in the 1980s, after several accidents in which passengers were unable to escape the plane because of fire, smoke or debilitating injuries. But, pause here for a moment and take a gander at the cabin of the [i]Nine O Nine[/i] and ask yourself if any of the criteria below – gospel on an airliner – was met and the answer is obviously, “no”.


  • Does the seat protect a passenger’s head, spine and limbs

  • Does the belt confine the traveler within a protective space

  • Can the seat remain in its position

  • Do fabrics and cabin materials resist burning and smoke
[Image: B-17-interior-768x509.png]

Replacing authentic interiors with 21st Century airline seats contradicts the mission of organizations that preserve and share historic aircraft with the public. This is why modern advancements in safety [i]that can be instituted[/i] without undermining that noble cause ought to take high priority.

Safety Management Systems, a nearly 2-decade old concept that makes safety a top-down priority and deputizes as a guardian of safety every department and employee in an aviation company, is required for all airlines operating in the United States as well as being an international standard. But SMS is not required for operators like the Collings Foundation. Nevertheless, Collings did have an SMS program but it applied it only sporadically and in some cases ineffectively, according to the accident report.

The SMS did not lead the operator to detect that “the engine run-up checklist was inconsistent with the B-17 engine ground test checklist,” a failure the report suggests could have led the pilots to understand the engine problem before taking off.

Despite the fact that the five passengers killed on the [i]Nine O Nine[/i] paid $450 to be on the flight, they, like many others who participate in similar flights, “are likely unaware that these operations have less stringent requirements than other commercial aviation operations,” the NTSB notes. Changing that is one of the NTSB’s most wanted transportation safety improvements.

The entire report on the tragic and irreplaceable loss of seven people and a historic warbird can be found on the NTSB website. There you’ll read about the lapses of the pilot who was also the director of maintenance at Collings, the shortcomings of Collings and areas where the F.A.A. failed to assure that its regulations were being followed. As always there’s an unbroken chain of events leading to the fiery crash at Bradley Airport.
So see the [i]Nine O Nine[/i]‘s demise as just the consequence of one man’s mistake is not only wrong, it defeats the purpose of the investigation and it reduces the imperative of the board’s safety recommendation.

[Image: B-17-Ax-photo-1024x692.png]

Via the NTSB: 

Quote:https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Acci...r2103.aspx

Probable Cause

Analysis
Various revenue passenger-carrying operations are conducted under the operating rules of Part 91; as a result, these operations are not subject to the stricter safety requirements and surveillance that apply to other commercial aviation operations. The NTSB recognizes that it might not be practical or feasible for some Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operations, due to their mission, to be conducted under other established commercial operating rules (such as Part 135). However, operationally specific regulations are needed for commercial operations currently conducted under Part 91 to increase safety for members of the public who pay to participate in these activities.

The FAA had previously stated that passengers who are transported under Parts 121 and 135 "exercise no control over and bear no responsibility for the airworthiness or operation of the aircraft aboard which they are flown" and that, as a result, the "appropriate level of public safety is provided by…very stringent regulations and oversight under part 121 and part 135." However, even though passengers exercise no control over, and bear no responsibility for, revenue passenger-carrying flights conducted under Part 91, the FAA continues to allow these flights to be conducted under less stringent regulations and with little to no oversight. Further, some Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operations have the capacity to carry more passengers than Part 135 commercial air taxi and air tour operations and some Part 121 air carrier operations, all of which require operating certificates and operations specifications under Part 119.

The NTSB also recognizes that the types of Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operations are diverse. Nevertheless, the need for greater safety requirements and more comprehensive oversight applies to all of these operations, as discussed in the report.

As expected no BS, no pulling punches just a clear, concise report with safety recommendations based just on the facts and findings -  Wink

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NTSB Final Report Addison King Air Crash.

Via Blan Colirio:



LINKS:
NTSB Docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=99731

Final Report: https://www.youtube.com/redirect?event=v...9731%2Fpdf 


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In a Spin - via Aviation Week.

With the recent announcement of CASA lifting the restrictions on BRM Aero the following Av week article on stalls/spins is very topical... Wink    


All Aircraft Stalls/Spins Are Created Equally
Ross Detwiler June 15, 2021


[Image: boone_nc.screen_shot_2021-06-15_at_4.15....k=jcend5H4]

The rear-seat passenger was killed; the pilot and front-seat passenger were seriously injured in this April 2016 crash of a Piper PA-32-300 in Boone, North Carolina.

Credit: NTSB

Accidents resulting from loss of control or spin have been around since the Wright brothers. In the civilian world, stalls have been and, are still, taught as a maneuver. The area is cleared. The power is set. The airplane is configured. The attitude is set. “Wait for it. Wait for it. Recover.” I think that approach is necessary but needs careful briefing. It can create an attitude of: “There’s a lot to do before a stall happens.” Perhaps that has been why stalls/spins continue to be a problem.

A stall is a split-second phenomenon. Fortunately, recovery from a stall is a split-second action. The 2019 Airman Certification Standards (ACSs) for private and commercial pilots and the Practical Test Standards (PTSs) for flight instructors seem to agree. The ACSs lump almost all stalls together under the heading of power-on stalls. I don’t quite follow that logic. Nevertheless, someone put a lot of thought into the concept of how we’re training new pilots for these events. The standards fit easily into the way I’ve always thought about stall/spin phenomena.
From the FAA: A loss of control (LOC) accident involves an unintended departure of an aircraft from controlled flight. LOC can happen when the aircraft enters a flight regime that is outside its normal flight envelope and quickly develops into a stall or spin. It can introduce an element of surprise for the pilot.

In other words, airplanes are designed for certain altitudes, angles of attack, weights, centers of gravity, speeds, attitudes, and so forth. Note that the definition states that when the airplane goes outside of these parameters, it will stall or spin. There are a lot of things to consider, but they are only contributing factors to the stall or exceedance of the stall angle-of-attack of the wing. That exceedance is the only reason an airfoil stalls. Decreasing that exceedance is the only way an airfoil recovers from a stall.

With the hoped-for post-COVID-19 increase in demand for professional pilots and the decreasing input of ex-military pilots into the civilian world, a lot of the folks we are going to be hiring are coming from civilian schools. It should also be noted that the services are considering bringing civilian-trained pilots into the military through a shortened military curriculum. It’s important to understand the background new pilots arrive with at the civilian and military front doors.

But first, we’ll look at three incidents that were fatal to at least one person in each airplane. Since I want to concentrate on the discussion of stall/spin, this article’s NTSB excerpts contain only the introductory narrative and the probable cause finding.
[Image: Michigan.Screen%20Shot%202021-06-15%20at...k=Wl6c_B32]
Fatal crash of a Cessna 172 in Chesaning, Michigan. Credit: NTSB

(1) The pilot departed on a personal flight about 10 min. before the accident. According to a witness, the pilot was conducting touch-and-go landings at the airport when the engine "cut out" and the airplane went "straight down." Two other witnesses described a steep bank or a sharp turn before the airplane descended at a steep angle and impacted the ground and then a building. The pilot was fatally injured. Ground scars at the accident site and damage to the airplane were consistent with a left-wing-low attitude and the engine operating at high power at the time of impact. The airplane's steep bank and descent at a steep angle were consistent with a loss of control.

The examination of the airplane and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operations. Toxicology testing revealed the pilot was using a combination of phenobarbital and phenytoin at the time of the accident. Although these drugs can cause various impairing symptoms, the type of impairment that they cause is unlikely to lead to a sudden loss of control. Both drugs can be used to prevent seizures in patients with epilepsy. Although a seizure or other neurologic event causing sudden incapacitation could have occurred without leaving autopsy evidence, there was not enough available information to indicate that the pilot had an increased risk of such an event. Thus, the investigation could not determine, based on the available information, whether the pilot's loss of airplane control was related to a medical issue. The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident to be the pilot's loss of airplane control for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence.

(2) The airplane landed about 15 mi. south of Watsonville Municipal Airport (KWVI), California. No radio communications to or from the airplane were recorded at KWVI, en route or at Marina Municipal Airport (KOAR), California. No witnesses were identified who could provide information about the pilot's activities at KOAR in the minutes preceding the accident, including whether the accident takeoff was part of a touch-and-go landing, or was preceded by a full-stop landing. 

However, two witnesses observed the takeoff before the accident. One witness at KOAR, who was located about midfield, reported that he saw the accident airplane lift off, and stated that the landing gear retracted immediately after the airplane became airborne. That witness and another witness reported that they saw the airplane begin an unusually steep climb in an unusually high nose-up attitude. The airplane then pitched over to an approximately level attitude and began to yaw to the left. During that nose-left yaw, the nose and left wing dropped, and the airplane began a spin. The airplane spun to the ground, and a fire erupted immediately. Stall and loss of control during the initial climb occurred.
(3) The private pilot and two passengers were conducting a local flight from the pilot's home airport. One witness stated that his attention was drawn to the airplane due to its "very fast" landing approach. The airplane then disappeared from his view. Shortly thereafter, he saw a plume of smoke in the area of a golf course on the northwest side of the airport. Several witnesses on the golf course stated that the airplane appeared to be taking off, and noted that it was "struggling," that it was "too low," and was "bobbing up and down." The airplane impacted a stand of 75-ft.-tall pine trees and came to rest on the golf course, where it was consumed by a post-crash fire. The rear seat passenger was fatally injured; the pilot and front seat passenger received serious injuries. Neither the pilot nor the passenger could recall the events of the accident flight.

Post-accident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The landing runway measured 2,700 ft. long by 40 ft. wide. Given the witness’s observation of the airplane's fast approach speed, it is likely that the pilot initiated a go-around due to excessive airspeed and/or a lack of runway remaining on which to stop; however, it could not be determined when the pilot began the go-around maneuver. The airplane's low altitude as it climbed away from the runway suggests that the pilot may have initiated the go-around near touchdown or possibly even after touching down. Had the pilot started the go-around earlier, after recognizing the airplane's unstabilized approach due to excessive airspeed, he would have allowed more time to re-configure the airplane, establish a positive rate of climb, and clear the trees near the end of the runway. However, the late go-around placed the airplane in close proximity to the trees, from which the pilot subsequently failed to maintain lateral clearance.

Each of these incidents involves a stall/spin loss of control before the airplane crashed. Again, loss of control in flight is always preceded by a stall, often leading to a spin. As you can see from the photos, the results are not pretty.

Spins also have been a source of discussion ever since folks began flying. You can’t have a spin without a stall.
 
So, spins belong in this discussion.

In U.S. Air Force pilot training in the 1960s, we learned about spins and how to recover from them on gut-wrenching T-37 rides. (Yes, Virginia, grandpa had jets in the sixties.) The spin entry was made by setting a relatively low power setting, pulling the old Tweet to a nose-high attitude and, as it stalled, easing in full rudder in either direction while simultaneously easing the stick all the way aft.

The sturdy little beast would fall off on a wing and then, generally, come back around to the initial heading, nose up and seemingly pause. It was as if it were asking, “Are you sure?” If you continued to hold the stick back and the rudder in, the “ride” began in earnest. The airplane would drop the nose almost to vertical, then it would come back up to about 30 deg. below the horizon and enter a stable spin. As with all airplanes, if you let the nose lower, the rotation rate would increase as the airplane speed increased. The recovery went something like this:

(1) Check throttles idle.
(2) Stick full aft and hold, rudder and ailerons neutral.
(3) Determine direction of spin (turn needle).
(4) Full opposite rudder.
(5) One turn later, stick full forward and hold.
(6) Recover from the ensuing dive.

The fifth step usually resulted in a very uncomfortable, but very positive recovery.

But an interesting point to note was that the Air Force, even back in the 1960s, had another “spin” maneuver in the syllabus. This was called the “spin prevention.” That maneuver is the genesis for more discussion.

Editor’s note: This is the first of a two-part article. The next will be on spin prevention.


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Via Flight Safety Detectives: Episode 96 


Quote:Safety Training Needs a Retool – Episode 96
December 1, 2021/in Episodes


Safety training for the aviation community isn’t effective and needs an overhaul. Greg and John drive home this point by talking about the high rate of fatal accidents in November. Particular focus is on the accident that killed Blue Origin crew member Glen de Vries.

“We’re not reaching pilots and the aviation community with effective safety training,” John says. Greg adds that people don’t read manuals or safety material available from the FAA and NTSB.

Recent accidents involve a range of general aviation planes. Most wreckage is removed and stored for later evaluation, adding concerns that volatile evidence is being lost.

Recommendations to improve safety are slow coming in recent years. When safety findings are issued, the format isn’t effectively sharing the information.

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Via FSD: Episode 99

Quote:[Image: Beech_Duke_wreckage-1210x423.png]

Tis the Season for Aviation Accidents – Episode 99
December 23, 2021/in Episodes /



Winter weather and questionable piloting have led to another series of aviation accidents. Greg and John look at the initial information and stress the importance of not flying beyond your skills and knowledge.

One fatal crash took the life of their good friend Charlie Schneider, CEO of MYGOFLIGHT. They share the known details that led to the crash of his Cirrus SR22. They reflect on his dedication to general aviation and general aviation safety.

The NTSB has released the final report of the crash of a Beech B60 Duke. Greg finds that the NTSB investigation was thorough, and the report has good information. Among the findings – no preflight inspection and a homemade gust lock left in place.

“Bad things happen when you take a sick airplane into the air,” says Greg. John and Greg offer flight safety advice based on years of investigating the aftermath of accidents.


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[Image: ep102wellstonecrash.jpg]

Wellstone Crash Report Misses Important Safety Findings – Episode 102

January 26, 2022/in Episodes /


Even high-profile crashes can result in NTSB reports that miss important safety takeaways. The focus of this episode is the October 2002 crash that killed Senator Paul Wellstone and seven others. John, Greg, Todd and guest Dick Healing talk about facts that played a much greater role in the accident than the listed probable cause.

“There is no question that contributing factors were poor practices by the operator,” Healing says.

The charter operator’s organizational deficiencies set this flight up for failure before takeoff.

  • Pairing of two pilots with questionable skills
  • Lack of equipment such as cockpit recorders and proper manuals
  • Questionable FAA oversight

While the NTSB has highlighted these issues in final reports for large carrier accidents, they are only found in the docket of this investigation.

Listen to hear many findings not found in the report that are essential to air safety.
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FSD PODCAST: Episode 108; plus Oz go to ICAO on MH17?  



Malaysian Flight 370 Crash Update Plus War Impacts Aviation Safety – Episode 108



Malaysian Flight 370 crash update.

John shares the latest developments from a group in Australia advocating to move the search area to the south. Hear the evidence that points to the crash being a murder/suicide event.

Sanctions on Russian commercial aircraft and planes operated by Russian interests are in the news. Companies that provide support are cutting ties. Aircraft leases are being canceled.

Todd shares an update on his effort to update his pilot certification. His goal is to earn an instrument rating in a glass cockpit.

“One of the biggest changes is that the technology that was in airliners in the 1980s is now in general aviation aircraft,” Todd says. “I have a new perspective on the challenges general aviation pilots face with new technologies and systems.”



Foreign Minister Marise Payne Media Release:

Quote:Australia and the Netherlands initiate MH17 legal proceedings

Joint media release with:
  • The Hon. Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister
  • Senator the Hon. Michaelia Cash, Attorney-General, Minister for Industrial Relations
14 March 2022

Australia and the Netherlands today initiated legal proceedings against the Russian Federation in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in 2014.

We have maintained since May 2018 that the Russian Federation is responsible under international law for the downing of Flight MH17.

Today's joint action by Australia and the Netherlands is a major step forward in both countries' fight for truth, justice and accountability for this horrific act of violence, which claimed the lives of 298 victims, 38 of whom called Australia home.

Australia and the Netherlands will rely on overwhelming evidence that:
  • Flight MH17 was shot down by a Russian Buk-TELAR surface-to-air missile system;
  • the missile system was transported from Russia to an agricultural field in the east of Ukraine on the morning of 17 July 2014 – an area under the control of Russian-backed separatists;
  • the missile system belonged to the Russian Federation's 53rd Anti-Aircraft Military Brigade, and was accompanied by a trained Russian military crew;
  • from the launch site, the Buk-TELAR fired the missile that shot down Flight MH17, killing all 298 people on board;
  • the missile could only have been fired by the trained Russian crew of the Buk-TELAR, or at least by someone acting under their instruction, direction or control; and
  • the Buk missile system was returned to the Russian Federation shortly after the downing of Flight MH17.

In October 2020, Russia unilaterally withdrew from negotiations with Australia and the Netherlands regarding the downing of Flight MH17, and refused to return to the negotiating table despite repeated requests by Australia and the Netherlands.

The Russian Federation's refusal to take responsibility for its role in the downing of Flight MH17 is unacceptable and the Australian Government has always said that it will not exclude any legal options in our pursuit of justice.

Today's joint action under Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation is in addition to the Dutch national prosecution of four suspects for their individual criminal responsibility in the downing of Flight MH17.

Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine and the escalation of its aggression underscores the need to continue our enduring efforts to hold Russia to account for its blatant violation of international law and the UN Charter, including threats to Ukraine's sovereignty and airspace.

While we cannot take away the grief of those whose loved ones died as a result of Russia's actions, the Australian Government will pursue every available avenue to ensure Russia is held to account so that this horrific act never happens again.

[ENDS]


Plus courtesy 9NEWS, via Youtube:


MTF...P2  Tongue
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Accident or Darwin Awards Nominee?

Via the FSD:

Quote:Air Crash Not an Accident – Episode 121

June 22, 2022

Some air crashes are not really accidents. Todd and John characterize the focus of this week’s episode an event where a perfectly good airplane was destroyed.

“Some pilots have more money than brains, and this seems to be a case of that,” John says.

The 2021 air crash event involved a Cessna Citation flown by a single pilot. Although the pilot had experience in aviation, he had been denied a type rating for the plane and single pilot authorization by an Arizona flight school.

This fateful flight started in the Portland area. Before takeoff, the pilot was not fully responsive to air traffic control. That issue continued as the flight progressed to the Mount Hood area.

“Something was amiss and it wasn’t the aircraft,” Todd notes.

The flight ended with an extended spiral into the ground.

Also in this episode is advice related to restricted air space riles and risks and the need for student pilots to secure renter’s insurance.


Ref: Prelim Report link

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