Chuckle (evil type) “K” is out on the river and left behind the following research notes. I know he has moved deeper into the “bloody amateurish dogs breakfast” and sworn never to read ‘Schedule 2’ again, ever; but I like the following. They are rough draft 'working' notes (and I dare not edit them) but it would be a shame to leave it parked on the PAIN computer, headed for the ‘notes’ file; so E&O accepted. It will no doubt cost me a pint or two, but life is short. Herewith - the part of the post that was left behind from this mornings ‘ramble’:-
Quote:It is impossible to examine the ‘practical; without touching the ‘standards’ section of the MoS, in order for us to progress beyond the theoretical to the practical, it become necessary to examine the ‘underpinning’ tenets. So:Toot toot (always wanted to do that.......
Vol 1 – Schedule 1 page (p) 2.
Section 8 - (a) a flight crew licence with an aircraft category rating, a flight crew rating on a licence, or an endorsement on a rating;
8 - (a) a flight crew licence with an aircraft category rating.
8.4 - For subsection 8.3, the unit coded document containing the requirements of the unit of competency is the document in Schedule 2 which has the same unit code.
Vol 2 – Schedule 2 p75. Index:-
Section 2. Common standards. p81.
C2 p83. C2.3 Post flight actions. (a) shut down aircraft. Is possibly the ‘best’ example of the lack of ‘operational’ understanding contained within this section. Many companies have SOP and manufacturers also have some requirements. Invariably there is a checklist of some description to complete prior to ‘shutting down’ the aircraft. These SOP and checklist items are as important as any other essential checks. To meet the prescribed ‘standard’ it seems one should park and shut down. This typifies problems with ‘over prescription’ of the home made variety. If you intend to be ‘prescriptive’ then all bases must be covered; if on the other hand you wish to satisfy the requirements of the SOP and AFM; then there is no point in ‘prescribing’ anything other than exactly that. Post flight procedure complete as per;;;; in the next section we see a nod toward this, © as a variable. FFS this is not ‘variable’ at the whim of some ATO or FOI it’s the bloody law. Then I read section 4 – (a) standard operating procedures for the category, and class or type of aircraft and the operator; this is considered as ‘underpinning’ NO IT IS NOT. It is the first and foremost measurement of a satisfactory ‘shut down and secure’ actions, a mandated process.
C3 – Blah, blah blah should be a separate stand alone item, required to be complete before going anywhere near an aircraft. Bin.
C4 – Manage the fuel.
C4.1. Clearly not drafted by someone who has to carry a payload this is not even an acceptable prescription for a flight school exercise. From day 1, payload will determine the uplift available; the TOW will determine the landing weight, this will affect the route chosen if an intermediate stop is required. Then we must consider suitable and acceptable alternates, return to land in the event of, the weather for that return and the landing weight on return; VMC into IMC and departure alternates. You cant just prescribe ‘half the job’ and call it a ‘competency’. If one was asked to demonstrate ‘competency’ in determining a fuel plan for the proposed operation on a given day with a specifics, and could do it properly then competency could be measured; but outside of flight school, and even in training, the fuel plan ‘competencies’ prescribed do not test the ability to manage fuel, just how to comply with the ‘law’. Valueless as presented. Bin.
C5 – I flatly refuse to waste time on this section; NTS 1, NTS 2 and MCO to that list. Bollocks and waffle. These parts have basis to cast in law under a disallowable instrument. Sure as the (rough) basis for a ground training modules, an ‘underpinning’ structure but as law – Jesus wept. Bin, bin, bin.
NAV - (e) except for the RPL navigation endorsement and the PPL, calculate and document critical point (CP) and point of no return (PNR) locations; Best laugh I’ve had in years. Why not use ‘release’ points – cockpit operational control in stead. Much more practical. CP in a single engine is ‘moot’; PNR between two overland points is a variable depending on many factors. Whereas operational control formulates a ‘plan’ – E.g. as it will be very close to last light at the destination, should I be delayed I will divert to XYZ at time 00:00. Or; if the weather is not VMC at the Rodeo gap; I will divert to the destination via ABC and I will carry additional fuel to cover the possible diversion. PNR eh? What about using radius of action modified in flight against actual conditions and considering varying the SGR – can’t do that in a lightly. Yes; yes you ca ever climbed as high as you can into a tail wind, backed off the power and had a rails run; never dropped down as low as was safe to minimise a headwind ? Course you have and it’s much better than launching with some mythical point in mind from which there is no return. Yet they still wonder how come a West-wind went swimming one dark and stormy. IMO the entire ‘navigation’ section is valuable only up to first slo navigation exercise; after that this law is useless and as a minimum standard, dangerous. Who writes this dribble? PNR haw, haw, haw.
Schedule 2 has bored me rigid, it is fine as a flight school operations manual, it really is. If the neophyte can attain and remember the basic standards set down it will form good habits, early in the piece on which a professional work ethos may be built; for PPL and above particularly those who operate the more sophisticated aircraft – it’s a puff piece which may convince the odd politician who cares ask to see what we spent the money on; but to fool a hard eyed professional outfit it has as much hope as a snowflake landing on the houseboat boiler. Bin. Bin Bin.