[Peetwo]

Now, for the shell game.

Watching the committee deal with the CASA crew in the eternal quest for a ‘straight’ answer, listening to the usual slippery spiel, even the ‘Montreal’ alibi was dragged in, Skidmore declaring ‘before my time’ as an out, is becoming ridiculous.  Sterle managed his temper very well and with some assistance managed to get the points related to ‘Exemptions’ expressed, if not answered.  He is very aware that part of the iron grip CASA have on industry is ‘approval’ and ‘exemption’.  The issuing of either creates a very subtle form of pressure to ensure cooperation, is wide open to suspicion and friction.  Not to mention confusion, as the subjective interpretation of regulation begs serious questions about the shape, form, spirit and intent of a ‘law’.  

Much has been said about the differences in ‘treatment’ applicants receive from CASA.  For instance, we know of one operator (of many) who waited almost two years and spent well over $AUD 100,000 to obtain an Air Operators Certificate (AOC); currently we are sniffing around a very ugly rumour, which appears to be related to some old mates who wanted a fast, inside track to an AOC and received it in record time at very little cost or inconvenience.   This industry is way too small to prevent a rumour like that being exposed as either a fairy story or somewhere closer to the truth.  We shall see; I digress, but Glen Sterle summed the situation up neatly.

Senator STERLE: That is what I am asking. There are a few familiar faces around the table who were. This is what I am trying to find out. We have this every time with CASA, I tell you. You know the pea? You know when you just move those pots around? We should just get rid of the pots. Does anyone know? How do you know what happens? Dr Aleck, you have been around a long time.

The chalk..

By way of comparison, I found the following quote in the AMSA session.  I only publish it to highlight the absolute difference in style and delivery between a professional outfit and a man who knows his onions and the pathetic dribble we get from the same paygrade ‘Shamateurs’ from CASA.

Senator CONROY: When was the decision of HP Ship Management to remove the ratings and tapering crew? When did the event at approximately 1 am on 30 January 2016 come to your attention?

Mr Kinley: I would have to take the exact time and date on notice but it would have been sometime in December. We were advised in December that the company were wishing to amend their safe manning document for the ship in order to change the category of seafarers from integrated ratings to ratings, engine room and deck.

Senator CONROY: Could you explain those different categories again please. Mr Kinley: Apparently I normally sit here with a dumb look on my head, so I will try to answer your questions—that is Senator Sterle's comment from the last hearings. I will try to answer your questions as best I can.

Senator EDWARDS: I will bring it to his attention in the Hansard; he is not listening.

Mr Kinley: The Portland was manned, as most Australian ships are, with engineer officers, deck officers and integrated ratings. Integrated ratings are ratings that are skilled to work either on deck or in the engine room. It is not a terribly common way to do it in the world, and most of the other ships that we see come to Australia have ratings deck and ratings engine room. That is permitted in Marine Orders, and Australia, in Marines Orders 73 schedule 1, there is the ability to have integrated ratings or to have ratings deck and ratings engine room. The operator of the Portland applied to us, under Marine Orders 21, to have their minimum safe manning document amended to change from having integrated ratings to having ratings deck and ratings engine room. Around the same time they also indicated to us that they were intending to apply for certificates of recognition for foreign ratings, and indeed they did for ratings of Indian nationality. That is in accordance with Marine Orders 70 division 4; we have an agreement in place with India to recognise their qualifications. We processed those applications as we would for any other application for that sort of matter

&..the cheese

There speaks an honest man, on top of his job, supported by a crew who know their business.   Chalk and cheese.

Making an ass-out-of-u-&-me

Gold "K"..solid gold, yep Sterlo was in fine fettle the other evening, the lead up (from about 01:00 minute in video) was also worth regurgitating as it further highlights how 'on-song' he truly was.. :

Mr Skidmore : It is something we would have to ask VARA. We would have put the legislation out, but it is Virgin who interpret that and make a determination. - Can you believe that statement? Isn't that the definition of 'regulatory capture'? - UFB!

Senator STERLE: No, but you are the boss.

Mr Skidmore : I am not the boss of Virgin. - Probably the most honest thing Oliver said all night.

Senator STERLE: I wish I could get away with that with the coppers when they were hassling the shit out of me as a truck driver. I wish I could use that excuse: 'You didn't ask me. Come and ask me first. I will tell you what speed I was doing.' You are the regulator. That is all I am asking. - Solid Gold

Mr Skidmore : We put the legislation out and then we try and educate people and get them to follow the legislation and the regulations.

Senator STERLE: Right. So all I want to know is, when they knew that they had to come to 4 February—

Mr Skidmore : I can only assume that it was when the legislation was put in power and the dates were identified.

Senator STERLE: It is dangerous to assume here, Mr Skidmore, because people remember what you assume in further estimates down the track. Would you like to take it on notice and come back? - You can take that to the bank..

Mr Skidmore : We can come back and tell you when the regulation was put into power.

Senator STERLE: Right. And do I assume—which is always deadly—that VARA would have known from that very day that by 4 February 2016 they had to have the ADSB? - Another 'solid GOLD'

Sterlo is obviously well briefed and onto the the Fort Fumble obfuscation & double-standard 'exemption' game. 

"...But it is only for 3 months for a handful of old banger Fokker 50s...what's your point??.."

Oliver is trying to downplay & plead ignorance on the whole affair but the good Senator is not going to have a bar of it and for good reason to:

Instrument number CASA 08/16


I, MARK ALAN SKIDMORE, Director of Aviation Safety, on behalf of CASA, make this instrument under subparagraph 9B.12 (a) of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 (CAO 20.18) and regulation 11.160 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998.
[Signed M. Skidmore]
Mark Skidmore AM
Director of Aviation Safety
20 January 2016

Authorisation and exemption — aircraft operating without ADS-B transmitting equipment and carriage of Mode S transponder equipment (Virgin Australia Regional Airlines)

1          Duration
                 This instrument:
(a)   commences on 4 February 2016; and
(b)   expires at the end of April 2016, as if it had been repealed by another instrument.

2          Application
                 This instrument applies to the aircraft mentioned in Schedule 1 operated by Virgin Australia Regional Airlines Pty Ltd, Aviation Reference Number 075986 (the operator).

3          Authorisation
                 I authorise the operator of an aircraft mentioned in section 2 to operate the aircraft without automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) transmitting equipment.

4          Exemption
                 A person using an aircraft mentioned in section 2 at Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne or Perth aerodrome is exempt from compliance with paragraph 9E.4 of CAO 20.18 in relation to the requirement to carry a serviceable Mode S transponder.

5          Condition
                 A person, who is using an aircraft to which this instrument applies, must ensure that all I.F.R. flight plans for the aircraft in Australian airspace are annotated in Item 18 with “RMK/CASA ADSB EXEMPT” (quotation marks omitted).
Note   If this annotation is not included in a flight plan, the Airservices Australia automated systems will reject the flight plan.

Schedule 1          Aircraft
                 An aircraft of an aircraft type mentioned in column 1 with the registration mark in column 2 of an item in the following table:

Item
Column 1
Aircraft type
Column 2
Registration mark
1
Fokker F50
VH-FNA
2
Fokker F50
VH-FNB
3
Fokker F50
VH-FND
4
Fokker F50
VH-FNE
5
Fokker F50
VH-FNF
6
Fokker F50
VH-FNH
7
Fokker F50
VH-FNI
8
Fokker F50
VH-FSL

 Hmm...so OST personally signed this exemption a little over 3 weeks ago - short term memory loss perhaps..

Wonder why OST didn't suggest that VARA operate a couple of their ATR-72-600s over the routes in the interim??

Oliver's comment about Virgin making their own determination, I wonder if that is what happened to the nearly two year ATSB investigation - AO-2014-032 - i.e. he has let Virgin & ATR get it sorted before the topcover ATSB releases their Final Report...

Updated: 10 June 2014


The occurrences

Flight control occurrence

On 20 February 2014, Virgin Australia Regional Airlines was operating an ATR 72 aircraft, registered VH-FVR, on two scheduled passenger flights from Sydney, New South Wales (NSW) to Canberra, Australian Capital Territory and return. This was to be followed by a charter flight to Narrabri, NSW and return.

The applicable forecasts and reports did not anticipate any significant weather with the only concern to the flight crew being an expected crosswind of up to 30 kt for landing at Canberra. This was taken into account when the captain decided to be pilot flying for the first sector.

Pushback at Sydney was on time at about 1435 Eastern Daylight-saving Time[1] but take‑off was later than planned due to a long taxi and holding for traffic. The departure, climb and cruise were normal. For the descent into Canberra the crew selected a slower airspeed due to the possibility of turbulence. No significant turbulence was encountered until the normally-expected amount of mechanical turbulence on late final approach into Canberra.

The turnaround was conducted within the allocated time and the return flight to Sydney departed Canberra at 1612 with the first officer as the pilot flying. A steeper-than-usual climb was carried out to reduce exposure to turbulence. Other than expected turbulence during the first 1,500 ft, there was nothing significant during the climb to flight level (FL) 170[2].

During cruise the captain was in radio contact with the operator’s personnel who requested that departure from Sydney for the next sector be brought forward by 5 minutes. The captain expressed his concerns about the limited time available for the turnaround to the first officer.

The crew conducted a routine brief for the anticipated arrival to runway 16 Right, which was expected to be standard except for commencement of descent 5 NM (9 km) earlier to compensate for a tailwind. The captain noted that they needed to be cognisant of managing airspeed during the descent as a result of the anticipated decreasing tailwind.
The first officer commenced descent with the autopilot engaged in vertical speed mode and a target airspeed of 235 kt (15 kt less than the maximum operating speed of 250 kt). The descent was stable and smooth.

On first contact with Sydney Approach the crew were assigned runway 16 Left. This was different to the briefed runway and required a change of instrument approach diagrams and navigational aid frequencies.

At the appropriate points the seatbelt sign was turned on and the transition-down checklist carried out. The checklist was held at the last item awaiting a report from the cabin that it was secure.

At 1640 and about 8,500 ft, the crew noticed the airspeed going up quickly and the speed trend excessively high. The first officer reduced engine power and used touch control steering to temporarily disconnect the autopilot before manually raising the nose to control the speed. The aircraft felt ‘heavy’, requiring the first officer’s two hands on the controls to move from the then -4° pitch angle (aircraft nose-up/down). The first officer expected that the pitch correction would be sufficient to arrest the speed trend.

The captain was unsure if the first officer’s control inputs were sufficient to avoid an overspeed so put one of his hands on the controls and disconnected the autopilot to raise the nose further. The captain believed he indicated his intention to take over control and while the first officer could not recall it being verbalised he was aware of the captain’s actions. The first officer recalled that he took his hands off the controls, releasing touch control steering in the process. Shortly after, concerned about a high nose-up attitude, the first officer put his hands back on the controls. To both crew members, what happened next was unexpected and unclear.

Suddenly, the crew felt high positive g,[3] the controls felt different and spongy, and cockpit warnings activated. The crew then verified that the aircraft was under control at a stable attitude and speed. It was level or in a slight descent at an airspeed of about 230 kt.

One of the cockpit warnings was ‘pitch disconnect’, indicating the left and right elevator control systems had been decoupled. This allowed for independent movement of the elevators via the captain and first officer control columns.

The crew consulted the pitch disconnect checklist and worked to identify which control column was free and working normally. Although both controls were free, it was decided that the captain would be pilot flying. During this process an intermediate airspeed around 200‑210 kt was selected before reducing the airspeed to below the 180 kt specified in the checklist.

At some point the cabin crew called the cockpit and advised that the senior cabin crew member had injured her leg and that it might be broken. In the next contact with air traffic control the crew asked for an ambulance to be available after landing. The crew also made a PAN[4] call and requested runway 16 Right to minimise taxi time on the ground. Air traffic control agreed to that request.

The captain flew the approach to runway 16 Right manually with airspeeds, power settings and configurations that were typical of any day-visual approach and landing. After landing and a slight delay the crew taxied the aircraft to the assigned bay (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Aircraft taxiing onto the bay (still image copied from closed circuit TV footage)

Source: Sydney Airport (edited by the ATSB)

After shutdown the crew completed cockpit tasks including reconnection of the two elevator control systems and the captain checked on the condition of the cabin crew member. Airport firefighters provided first aid until an ambulance arrived at the bay 10 minutes after the aircraft parked. The cabin crew member was transported by ambulance to a hospital. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) was advised initially of a turbulence-related event and, based on the nature of the injuries sustained by the flight attendant, commenced an investigation.

Post-occurrence maintenance

Two aircraft maintenance engineers working for the company that provided contract maintenance services to the operator were in attendance at the aircraft. The crew advised the engineers that they weren’t sure what had happened but that the pitch controls had disconnected, with a possible overspeed. From the onboard equipment, the engineers were able to establish that there had not been an overspeed but a vertical load factor of 3.34 g was recorded that exceeded the acceptable limit for the aircraft weight.

One of the engineers took the opportunity to conduct a preliminary walk-around visual inspection and did not observe any aircraft damage. The flight crew entered the pitch disconnect in the aircraft’s technical log and, after a request from the engineers for more information, added that the aircraft had sustained moderate turbulence.

The aircraft was removed from further service that day and towed to a distant parking area to allow for the resulting maintenance inspection to be carried out. The two engineers on duty, one of whom was the senior base engineer, had come in early at 0600 to work on a grounded aircraft. Given this start time and the resulting already long day, the engineers considered that they needed assistance to complete their remaining tasks, which now included an inspection of VH-FVR. An engineer on his rostered day off agreed to come into work to assist with the inspection.

This engineer arrived at work at about 1900 and, after a discussion with the duty engineers, understood that the aircraft operator (maintenance watch) had received the data from the aircraft’s quick access recorder and requested a turbulence inspection after a pitch disconnect in moderate turbulence. He also understood at the time that one of the duty engineers had done quite a detailed walk-around of the aircraft in daylight and found no signs of defects.

The aircraft manufacturer’s job card for a turbulence inspection specified a general visual inspection of the fuselage, stabilisers and wings with more detailed inspections if any anomalies were found. A detailed inspection of the wing attachment fittings was also required irrespective of the results of the general visual inspection.

Over the course of the evening the non-rostered engineer and one of the duty engineers worked on disassembling some of the aircraft interior to access the wing attachment fittings. The duty engineers left at 2200, leaving the non-rostered engineer to complete the task. At about 2300 the engineer borrowed a nearby stand to provide a platform at about wing height. While on the stand positioned behind the left wing near the fuselage, the engineer inspected the upper surface of the wing, rear fuselage and tail by torchlight. The engineer finished work shortly after and returned to work at 0600 the next morning.
No defects were identified from any of the inspections and the aircraft was returned to service the next day.

Suspected birdstrike

Subsequent to the occurrence on 20 February, the aircraft was operated on 13 sectors, the last of which was a scheduled passenger flight from Sydney to Albury, NSW on 25 February 2014. On descent into Albury the aircraft passed in close proximity to birds, which alerted the captain to the possibility of a birdstrike. There were no indications that a bird had struck the aircraft but on the ground, the aircraft’s pitch trim system fluctuated abnormally.

The captain conducted a walk-around inspection with an expectation of bird damage to the left side of the aircraft. The only abnormality found was a deformity to a fairing at the top leading edge of the vertical stabiliser, which might have been the result of a birdstrike. The captain advised maintenance watch who dispatched an engineer to inspect the aircraft.

The engineer used scissor lift equipment to inspect the tailplane and confirmed that the fairing might have been damaged by a bird but that there was also significant structural damage on top of the tailplane. The aircraft was grounded and the ATSB advised.

Later information from the operator suggested that the damage to the tailplane might have been a result of the occurrence involving VH-FVR on 20 February 2014. On this basis, the ATSB combined its investigation into the aircraft damage identified in Albury with its investigation into the earlier flight control occurrence.

The flight crew of the earlier pitch‑disconnect flight and the engineers involved in the post-flight maintenance were interviewed and the damage to the aircraft was inspected at Albury. The ATSB downloaded data for the pitch-disconnect flight and subsequent flights from the flight data recorder and data for the pitch‑disconnect flight and last flight from the cockpit voice recorders that were installed in the aircraft for those flights.

Initial examination

An initial examination of the recorded data showed that when the airspeed approached 240 kt, at about 8,500 ft during the descent into Sydney on 20 February, the first officer used touch control steering and manually pitched the aircraft up. The airspeed increased again and then both the first officer and captain pulled on the control column. Shortly after, when the vertical load factor was increasing through 1.8 g, the first officer began to push the control column. The differential force on the control column that resulted from the captain and first officer applying an opposing force exceeded the differential force required to generate a pitch disconnect. Each pilot was then controlling the elevator on their side of the aircraft in opposite directions for a brief period before the first officer released his control column.

The aircraft manufacturer inspected the aircraft and found broken carbon plies, cracked joint sealant, and deformation in and around the area where the horizontal stabiliser attaches to the vertical stabiliser (Figures 2 and 3). There was also some minor damage to the rudder. The damage was assessed as being consistent with an overstress condition. Subject to further assessment and non-destructive testing, the aircraft manufacturer recommended replacement of the horizontal stabiliser, elevators, and vertical stabiliser.

Figure 2: Tailplane external damage (indicated by marks and stickers)

Source: ATSB          
 
Figure 3: Left tailplane attachments (fairing removed)

Source: ATSB
Ongoing investigation

The investigation is continuing and will include review of the:

• meteorological data
  
• data from the flight data recorder
  
• data from the cockpit voice recorder
  
• closed circuit TV footage
  
• aircraft operator’s procedures and training
  
• aircraft maintenance records
  
• maintenance organisation’s procedures and equipment
  
• arrangements between the aircraft operator and maintenance organisation
  
• aircraft manufacturer’s maintenance instructions
  
• information as it becomes available during the repair process.
  

 
That could also explain the nearly 3 year delay with the Mildura Fog Duck-up (AO-2013-100); or the continued 'no comment' on how the CASA ALIU 'parallel investigation' into a couple of serious Jetstar incidents - AO-2015-139 - that occurred at the tail-end of 2015.

Courtesy Australian Aviation:

Separately, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has launched its own probe into the two Jetstar flights, which would run in parallel to the ATSB’s investigation and focus on “regulatory compliance and relevant ongoing safety of flight issues”.

“This investigation is focusing on the root causes of the passenger loading errors, relevant systems and processes and Jetstar’s subsequent actions,” CASA said in a statement.

“The travelling public can be assured CASA will take all appropriate actions to ensure Jetstar maintains robust and appropriate systems and processes to ensure passenger loading mistakes do not recur.”

 
Why does the Oliver show of goodwill & professed CASA oversight actions - in the above incidents - not fill me with a lot of confidence that all the potential safety risks will be identified by the ATSB/CASA & effectively mitigated .

Oh well we must just have faith that the safety departments of these airlines has made their own determinations that mitigate the risk...

MTF...P2