Many are trying to understand this:-
CHAIR: I am just trying to understand why the operator can't continue to manage their fatigue and their flying hours in the way that they've been able to do previously, using common sense, using the practical industry requirements. Remember, this is a small part of the industry but very important
Ms Spence: Essentially, we want to demonstrate that you can be an outcomes based regulator through using the FRMS but that does require us to be able to do our side of it and say, 'Yes, we think this delivers a safe outcome on the basis of the proposal that's been put to us.'
Bollocks: what in the world would Spence or Crawford know about operational risk analysis?
Ah, there's the rub. An operator may have a legitimate requirement for say an extended duty period on a regular basis. It may well be a carefully considered and scripted system, designed to suit and accepted by the crew. It may have worked very well – under exemption – for donkey's years with a strong safety record to back up the system. Then, it is submitted for CASA approval – enter the 'specialist consultants'. Ex CASA – their very expensive version of the SMS or the F&D is the only one which will be accepted. (Arses covered).
There is a high risk element associated with 'fatigue'. There is an even higher risk element when a SMS fails. These are the two victims of an inflexible system. To this equation you may add operator attitude – overt and covert – to the mix. A classic example is found in the Pel-Air debacle. In the CASA accepted and approved operations manual there is no attempt at a 'risk matrix'. A long flight, requiring a fuel stop at an island notorious for chancy weather, the alternate a long march away with the associated 'fatigue' accumulator of uncertainty and additional flight time – ignored. Communication problems not a factor, despite being a known possibility; no flight following, no support. Then, the crew have problems getting food and adequate rest. Then the imperative pressure to move the patient. Holes in the cheese begin to align. The rest is history. A high risk flight, no support and a potential fatigue trap. That crew should have only had one problem – to find a phone, call the base, declare fatigue and waited until the next day – the patient was stable and comfortable in hospital. So where was the support? Where was the fatigue matrix? Where was the flight following which could have advised – Norfolk looks marginal – best come back through New Cal? Except that solution was fraught – the French were not happy with it (story for another day).
CHAIR: But if they've had these exemptions for a long time, they've not had a problem and they've got a proven track record, is the limit under the new exemption allowed to be carried over into the new rules
The problems do not lay in the flight and duty rules Senator; they lay within the approval system. They lay within poorly constructed rules, applied as seen by individuals with NDI about operational management. Rules may serve to sketch out the basic requirements – serve as a starting point – but they fall way short of 'understanding' operational risk. The blind compliance CASA demand and support with criminal law, using 'strict liability' to prevent tailor made risk analysis to each operational type must be addressed – and soon.
CHAIR: My experience to date, though, is that most operators are very reluctant to come to you with a specific requirement, because it doesn't always work out well for them. That's the reason why people don't want to give evidence publicly. I'm just telling you that. That's feedback. This is why you have operators that are saying, 'I'm terrified of telling CASA that I need to manage things differently because I may well be managed out of profitability or practicality
Spot on – nearly. CASA are empowered by the Commonwealth only to ensure compliance with the ICAO. They are not empowered to micro manage industry; yet they do. Listen; once again, carefully to the silver tongued Scot as he clearly defines the intent to 'manage' industry risk and fatigue strategy – through CASA approval only for those who comply with their version. Crawford could not find a cat in a cat-house with a spotlight; yet the RRAT seem quite happy to bandy words and be led around like obedient children visiting a museum. Ayup; the 'mystique' of aviation safety weaves it's magic as scared politicians happily avoid any blame.
There is your Catch 22 Senator – Heads they win – Tails you loose. What's not to enjoy eh?
![[Image: 10815878_0.jpg]](https://virginiatech.sportswar.com/post_images/vtfootball/00/00/00/10/81/58/78/10815878_0.jpg)
CHAIR: I am just trying to understand why the operator can't continue to manage their fatigue and their flying hours in the way that they've been able to do previously, using common sense, using the practical industry requirements. Remember, this is a small part of the industry but very important
Ms Spence: Essentially, we want to demonstrate that you can be an outcomes based regulator through using the FRMS but that does require us to be able to do our side of it and say, 'Yes, we think this delivers a safe outcome on the basis of the proposal that's been put to us.'
Bollocks: what in the world would Spence or Crawford know about operational risk analysis?
Ah, there's the rub. An operator may have a legitimate requirement for say an extended duty period on a regular basis. It may well be a carefully considered and scripted system, designed to suit and accepted by the crew. It may have worked very well – under exemption – for donkey's years with a strong safety record to back up the system. Then, it is submitted for CASA approval – enter the 'specialist consultants'. Ex CASA – their very expensive version of the SMS or the F&D is the only one which will be accepted. (Arses covered).
There is a high risk element associated with 'fatigue'. There is an even higher risk element when a SMS fails. These are the two victims of an inflexible system. To this equation you may add operator attitude – overt and covert – to the mix. A classic example is found in the Pel-Air debacle. In the CASA accepted and approved operations manual there is no attempt at a 'risk matrix'. A long flight, requiring a fuel stop at an island notorious for chancy weather, the alternate a long march away with the associated 'fatigue' accumulator of uncertainty and additional flight time – ignored. Communication problems not a factor, despite being a known possibility; no flight following, no support. Then, the crew have problems getting food and adequate rest. Then the imperative pressure to move the patient. Holes in the cheese begin to align. The rest is history. A high risk flight, no support and a potential fatigue trap. That crew should have only had one problem – to find a phone, call the base, declare fatigue and waited until the next day – the patient was stable and comfortable in hospital. So where was the support? Where was the fatigue matrix? Where was the flight following which could have advised – Norfolk looks marginal – best come back through New Cal? Except that solution was fraught – the French were not happy with it (story for another day).
CHAIR: But if they've had these exemptions for a long time, they've not had a problem and they've got a proven track record, is the limit under the new exemption allowed to be carried over into the new rules
The problems do not lay in the flight and duty rules Senator; they lay within the approval system. They lay within poorly constructed rules, applied as seen by individuals with NDI about operational management. Rules may serve to sketch out the basic requirements – serve as a starting point – but they fall way short of 'understanding' operational risk. The blind compliance CASA demand and support with criminal law, using 'strict liability' to prevent tailor made risk analysis to each operational type must be addressed – and soon.
CHAIR: My experience to date, though, is that most operators are very reluctant to come to you with a specific requirement, because it doesn't always work out well for them. That's the reason why people don't want to give evidence publicly. I'm just telling you that. That's feedback. This is why you have operators that are saying, 'I'm terrified of telling CASA that I need to manage things differently because I may well be managed out of profitability or practicality
Spot on – nearly. CASA are empowered by the Commonwealth only to ensure compliance with the ICAO. They are not empowered to micro manage industry; yet they do. Listen; once again, carefully to the silver tongued Scot as he clearly defines the intent to 'manage' industry risk and fatigue strategy – through CASA approval only for those who comply with their version. Crawford could not find a cat in a cat-house with a spotlight; yet the RRAT seem quite happy to bandy words and be led around like obedient children visiting a museum. Ayup; the 'mystique' of aviation safety weaves it's magic as scared politicians happily avoid any blame.
There is your Catch 22 Senator – Heads they win – Tails you loose. What's not to enjoy eh?