Senate Estimates - 2017-18.

Disallowance motion.

Must be soon; the Senate to decide if the CASA preferred method of dealing with Angel Flight is to sent down to the lower house for final tick; or, if it is to be binned.

We must all hope good sense prevails: the ‘instrument’ will not enhance ‘safety’. The only sensible course of action is to disallow the instrument; demand that ATSB and CASA do a thorough, detailed, impartial Sector Risk Profile (SRP) analysis and start again. This time working with CSF providers to reduce or even remove some of the ‘real’ threats.

So say a unanimous BRB.
Reply

ATSB inquiry update: Angel Flight submissions.

Via the inquiry webpage:


Quote:Angel Flight - ATSB (PDF 4695 KB) 

ATSB REPORT A0-2017-069: ANGEL FLIGHT OVERVIEW


Angel Flight has been looking forward to this report for more than two years, hoping that it would
help to identify all of the factors that contributed to the accident and provide some constructive
guidance on how to reduce the risk of another similar event. Unfortunately, what we have is not
a comprehensive analysis of the accident but a detailed investigation of Angel Flight that uses
biased statistics to paint Angel Flight as an inherently unsafe organization.

There are numerous deficiencies in the ATSB statistical analyses that have led to incorrect conclusions
about both accident rates and occurrence rates. A critical aspect of any statist ical analysis is
ensuring data sets are properly matched, and this is where the report is most deficient.

Overview

It is obvious to any reasonable person that the accident was the result of the pilot taking off in
weather for which he was neither qualified nor competent. However, there appears to be no
investigation of the factors that may have led to his decisions, apart from an unjustified
assumption of operational deficiencies within Angel Flight....




Angel Flight - CASA (PDF 1697 KB) 

ANGEL FLIGHT AUSTRALIA OVERVIEW STATEMENT RE CASA LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENT 09/19 FOR

SUBMISSION TO SENATE INQUIRY


The entire process of introducing CASA 09/19 was unreasonable, poorly managed, delivered no

identified safety benefit, and contradicted most of the principles that underpin CASA's regulatory
philosophy - significantly, CASA has conceded that none of the Rules addressed, nor would have
prevented, any community service accident (or other identifiable accident):


1. Issuing the draft one week before Christmas and limiting the time for comments to the peak
January holiday season was totally unreasonable and minimised the opportunities for
feedback from the aviation and wider communities. None of the draft rules had been raised
noir discussed with Angel Flight, notwithstanding communications, meetings and
correspondence between Angel Flight and CASA (on a voluntary basis), and inviting CASA to
Angel Flight offices to observe all processes and view all documents. The hastily-prepared
Rules were presented (orally - no written document was provided) to Angel Flight by Chris
Monahan on 28 November, the day after the ATSB had called to request advice from both
Angel Flight and CASA as to what actions had been taken since the June 2017 accident. When
at this time CASA (Monahan) was challenged about this, his response was to acknowledge
that the Rules as proposed did not have any relationship to the accidents, but that "we had to
do something". This conversation occurred at the Angel Flight office on 28 November 2018.

2. The draft of the Legislative Instrument was issued with undue and unprecedented haste, only
days after the closing date for submissions. CASA purported to rely upon the Consultation
Responses in formulating its Rules. This was highly selective and lacked transparency and
integrity - a single example will suffice to illustrate this:

Response 614317021 by experienced ATPl/Airline/Corporate Jet/Ught Aircraft (twin}
owner/operator {HP R .... ) is attached to this overview. The submitted response by the pilot
comprises 4xA4 pages typed in single-line spacing. The CASA- published submission did not
represent what the pilot wrote (and is also attached): the latter comprises only a single
paragraph, unrepresentative of the actual submission of this pilot. This has flowed on to
the ATSB - CEO Mr Greg Hood has (in a pre-publication meeting in Canberra on 19/8} stated
that he had read all of the submissions to CASA as part of his information.


3. The Instrument initially excluded helicopters although there was no safety reason for doing
so, and an amendment was hastily issued to rectify this deficiency. At no time had Angel Flight
(during any of the meetings with CASA nor in any correspondence) been given any notice of
the proposal to ban helicopters, and CASA was well aware that Angel Flight arranged volunteer
helicopter flights to remote locations, particularly in Queensland and NSW, during flood
events.


4. Contradictory statements were made about the definition of a community service flights. At
Senate Estimates, CASA agreed that positioning legs were also community service flights. Mr.
Monahan said "If you're going to be reimbursed by the CSF then, in that case, yes. It goes under
that construct.". All legs are co-ordinated, and fuel reimbursed, by Angel Flight. The only
possible explanation for reducing the flight numbers by more than half (and substantially
reducing flight hours) is to ensure a statistical justification for the Rules.


5. The limitations on passengers mean that, for example, a parent taking a child for medical
treatment could not take another child who did not have a medical condition, even when
there was no care available for the second child while the parent was absent. When this was
questioned, the response was "It is CASA's understanding that CSF are scheduled in advance,
often by several weeks which should give sufficient time for families to make any necessary

arrangements, such as for those who cannot accompany the patient on on CSF''. Clearly, the
author (CASA's Chris Monahan), has little appreciation of the limited services available in rural
areas. The advice to pilots on the CASA web site is now "The decision on whether the carriage
of ..... a support person or persons chosen by the patient is considered necessary to provide the
required support or assistance is a matter for the reasonable judgement of the pilot-incommand".


It is unlikely that CASA has jurisdiction to impose upon a pilot the requirement to
assess the emotional or psychological state of a passenger for this purpose, and nor should
that be the responsibility of a pilot.


6. The same limitation on passengers meant that Angel Flight could not continue its pilot
mentoring program. CASA initially advised that a second pilot could be carried only "so long
as the other pilot qualifies to be a co-pilot of the aircraft and has such duties in relation to the
CSF''. That statement differs from the current advice on the CASA web site, which now permits
carrying additional operating crew. "The decision on whether the carriage of operating crew
.... is a matter for the reasonable judgement of the pilot-in-command in exercising their
responsibiflties, under regulation 224 of CAR, to ensure the safety of the aircraft, persons and
cargo carried on the aircraft." The mentoring programme implemented at the initiative of
Angel Flight was lauded by CASA at the time. Clearly the observation by a new volunteer pilot,
of the processes, safety culture, and operation of the charity is beneficial - and was never
intended to be a co-pilot or technical training role. There is no plausible explanation for the
curtailing of this mentoring initiative.

7. One of CASA's stated principles is that "CASA will adopt a regulatory approach based on a
sound assessment of the level of risk associated with particular aviation operations."

However, the risk analysis employed in justifying the Instrument was totally invalid. CASA
claimed at Senate Estimates that" it is four or five times less safe to fly with Angel Flight
than it is to fly with your mate". That claim was based on data obtained from the BITRE
annual survey of general aviation activity. However:

• It is individual aircraft owners, not Angel Flight, who report aircraft usage to BITRE and,
for most owners, it is difficult, often impossible, to determine the aircraft hours used in
community service flights because is no way of recording the purpose of a flight in the
aircraft log book.

• BITRE has requested data on community service flights only since 2014 and their records
show an average of only 46 aircraft reported CSF activity each year, with average annual
flying hours of 1775. The figures for Angel Flight in the corresponding period are 207
aircraft and 3111 hours. It would be impossible to extrapolate the four years of BITRE
data to 10 years and expect to have reliable data, as CASA claimed. And these figures did
not take into account any other community service or 'fun flight' operation, and nor was
there any matching definition of what constituted a community service flight, in the BITRE
surveys. It has been admitted by the ATSB that the BITRE data is further unreliable
because the survey is not completed by all pilots - and the non-compliance rate is high.

• BITRE define community service flights as "flights provided on a voluntary basis for public
benefit", a broader definition than now applied by CASA and one which would include not
only Angel Flight but Little Wings, Wings4Kidz, Funflight, flights for Cancer Kids and
various local events organized by aero clubs and other organisations.

8. The DAS has previously stated (Ref.: CASA Briefing June 2018) that "In aviation, we don't need
more rules - we probably need fewer", yet this Instrument introduced more regulation with
no demonstrated safety benefit.

9. The Instrument is contrary to the "Statement of Expectations for the Board of the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority" published 15 April 2015 that requires CASA to consider the economic and
cost impact on individuals, businesses and the community in the development and finalisation
of new or amended regulatory changes. There is no evidence that the possible increase in
maintenance costs for owners using CASA Schedule 5 were considered.

10. CASA's approach to this matter is also contrary to both the spirit and the letter of the
Australian Government Guide to Regulation (Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2014). That guide makes clear that non-regulatory alternatives
must be properly considered and that safety benefits need to be quantified - not just
subjective.

11. CASA's approach to this matter is also contrary to the recommendations of The Aviation Safety
Regulatory Review (ASSR), which recommended that the principles of future rule
development should:

  •  adhere as closely as possible to the substance of rules in other developed jurisdictions
(US, New Zealand, Europe, and Canada) to ensure compatibility, facilitating bilateral
recognition agreements and efficient international operations; and
  • include unique Australian provisions only when absolutely necessary, and only when
the Steering Commitee formally agrees to their inclusion.

12. During the course of a meeting 11 January 2019, in Canberra between Angel Flight CEO
Marjorie Pagani, Angel Flight Director Bruce Sackson, Shane Carmody, Chris Monahan and
senior executive staff, Mr Carmody was challenged (by Angel Flight CEO) as to why CASA
had chosen to by-pass the usual protocols for regulatory reform. Mr Carmody responded
firstly with "I have the power", and when challenged further on this issue, responded with
''because it's easy".


However, the fundamental deficiency with the Instrument is that none of the additional rules would
have prevented, or even reduced the potential for, the only two Angel Flight fatal accidents (Nhill and
Mt. Gambier) that have occurred more than 16 years. In both cases, the pilots and aircraft involved
met or exceeded all of the new requirements. Mr Monahan conceded this at a meeting with Angel
Flight CEO Marjorie Pagani in the offices of Angel Flight, on 28 November 2018 and subsequently has
reaffirmed this in answers to the Senate Estimates Committee.

Angel Flight has consistently implored CASA to revisit the training for pilots in respect of Human
Factors, Threat and Error Management, and Weather-related incidents, prior to the issue of licences.
This has been ignored. CASA has added to its post-licence seminar program some additional human
factors modules, but nothing has been done to address the cause of these accidents, or any of the
many VFR into IMC events which occur annually in Australia.

The value of the Legislative Instrument is accurately reflected in a recent letter to the editor of
Australian Flying (September - October 2019), unrelated to either Angel Flight or the Legislative
Instrument, which says "Instead of changing the rules, CASA should concentrate on why pilots
bend the rules or do not understand the consequences of their actions" and further that "Changing
the rules will have little impact on pilot behavior".
Now why does 8 thru 12 sound oh so familiar... Huh
Hmm...ah yes now I remember -  Dodgy
Ref: CASA embuggerance of APTA & GB update

Quote:..initiated a process in October 2018. That process was a complete reversal of previous CASA policy. It came instantly, and with absolutely no warning. The entire process could have been avoided had CASA decided to inform me or meet with me. The associated impact on my business and the gross waste of taxpayer funds achieving that objective, has been truly disgraceful and unacceptable. My experiences may be shared by others in Industry, and if so, it requires a Royal Commission, it really does.


Those actions and decisions

• Were in clear breach of almost every element of CASAs own Regulatory Philosophy.
• In breach of the PGPA Act which requires these personnel to use public funds and resources responsibly.
• Breach the requirements of Administrative Law, Procedural Fairness, and Natural Justice.
Were quite simply. Not well intentioned, and certainly not based on safety considerations.
• Bullying and Intimidating in their nature.
Cannot be supported by any clear or concise legislation, and that is a requirement placed on CASA...(for more refer to above link)
 
MTF...P2  Tongue

Ps On P7 post, the Disallowance Motion(s) is up for debate on Thursday: 


Quote:Thursday, 19 September


To be moved by Senator Patrick:
  • Civil Aviation (Community Service Flights –Conditions on Flight Crew Licences) Amendment Instrument 2019 [F2019L00554]; and

  • Civil Aviation (Community Service Flights -Conditions on Flight Crew Licences) Instrument 2019 [F2019L00134].
Reply

A very short debate.

Thursday, 19 September

To be moved by Senator Patrick:

• Civil Aviation (Community Service Flights –Conditions on Flight Crew Licences) Amendment Instrument 2019 [F2019L00554]; and

• Civil Aviation (Community Service Flights -Conditions on Flight Crew Licences) Instrument 2019 [F2019L00134].


It was a very short discussion last evening; one of the shortest on record for the BRB. Not even a note of dissention from the E-mail ‘loops’ although some very good suggestions were made, (some not printable). So, in short dear Senators, the collective opinion of many:-

(i) - The ‘Amendment Instrument’ should be disallowed; the logic and data provided in support is considered deeply flawed. Deemed completely irrelevant to improving the ‘Safety’ of CSF operations. 

(ii) - Without a Sector Risk Profile (SRP) being conducted, the data supporting ‘the Instrument’ cannot be considered as a meaningful solution to any perceived operational safety matter. It is of little practical value and considered to be without probity.

(iii) The Mt Gambier accident report, standing alone, is deeply flawed, on many levels. This matter needs to be addressed. This considered particularly important as any future proposed changes to CSF operations will be based against the accident report.

To what end this gross manipulation of accident, operational and statistical data and has been presented remains a mystery to the professional aviators.

Toot – toot.
Reply

(09-17-2019, 08:51 AM)Kharon Wrote:  A very short debate.

Thursday, 19 September

To be moved by Senator Patrick:

• Civil Aviation (Community Service Flights –Conditions on Flight Crew Licences) Amendment Instrument 2019 [F2019L00554]; and

• Civil Aviation (Community Service Flights -Conditions on Flight Crew Licences) Instrument 2019 [F2019L00134].


It was a very short discussion last evening; one of the shortest on record for the BRB. Not even a note of dissention from the E-mail ‘loops’ although some very good suggestions were made, (some not printable). So, in short dear Senators, the collective opinion of many:-

(i) - The ‘Amendment Instrument’ should be disallowed; the logic and data provided in support is considered deeply flawed. Deemed completely irrelevant to improving the ‘Safety’ of CSF operations. 

(ii) - Without a Sector Risk Profile (SRP) being conducted, the data supporting ‘the Instrument’ cannot be considered as a meaningful solution to any perceived operational safety matter. It is of little practical value and considered to be without probity.

(iii) The Mt Gambier accident report, standing alone, is deeply flawed, on many levels. This matter needs to be addressed. This considered particularly important as any future proposed changes to CSF operations will be based against the accident report.

To what end this gross manipulation of accident, operational and statistical data and has been presented remains a mystery to the professional aviators.

Toot – toot.


To buttress up the BRB verdict please refer the original (not redacted or edited by CASA) Reiss consultation submission (Consultation Draft for Proposed Safety Standard - CSF) on pages 17 to 22 of the Angel Flight - CASA submission 

Extract from page 4 of the Reiss submission:

Quote:...It would appear CASA has made a subjective decision without supporting

evidence and without following normal well-published procedures.

aj. Bypassing the Notice of Proposed Rule-Making (NPRM) process

b/. Bypassing recommendations of the ASSR, in particular:
Not adhering as closely as possible rules in other similar jurisdictions USA,
New Zealand, Europe and Canada.
Not developing unique Australian regulations except when absolutely
necessary and only when the steering committee agrees to them.

c/ Not considering the impact on individuals, businesses and the community
when developing or amending regulations. This is clearly spelt out as a
requirement in the 2015 Statement of Expectations for the Board of the
CASA

d/. Changing regulations without proper regulatory process by the CEO of
CASA without Parliamentary scrutiny thereby curtailing the rights of
pilots to exercise the full privileges of their licenses.

e/. CASA claims to hold a philosophy of ensuring that its "Actions and
Decisions are Informed, Consistent, risk Based, Evidence Driven and
without bias" Their actions over this matter do not support their
espoused philosophy.

f/. Further adding changes to the Aviation Medical Questionnaire/ Assessment
process to introduce a requirement for pilots to indicate if they intend to
do Angel flights - since when did it become a requirement for a pilots
medical, whether Class 1 or Class 2 to asses the health of the passengers.

g/. To describe the changes to maintenance standards as slightly enhanced is
farcical, the changes from AD/ENG/4 amendment 11. Requirement 1 to
requirement 2 will impose major cost penalties requiring perfectly
serviceable engines to be overhauled on Calender life, 80% of private
owners will have engines that are at half engine hour TBO, running on
condition and at peak engine performance and reliability. The cost
Involved in the case of a twin-engine aircraft will be well in excess of
$100,000 and in many high performance singles well north of $70,000.

Surely if it is considered safe for Flying Schools to operate to Aerial Work
Requirement 1 then it is also safe for private CFS flights. Lifting
maintenance standards to "Arial Work" would be an acceptable standard as

most privately owned aircraft are at present being maintained to this
standard. The proposal to require Charter category maintenance will
result in 80% of present aircraft owners withdrawing from CFS and most of
the more experienced owner pilots will be lost to CSF's for no safety
benefit There have been no accidents in Angel Flight operations related to
engine failures or maintenance issues.

Mike Busch a highly respected GA Maintenance Engineer, he is a recipient
of FAA National Aviation Technician of the year and has written many
papers on engine maintenance, is of the opinion that many thousands of
hours of engine operating experience have proven that engines that are
calendar expired are more reliable than freshly overhauled engines,
provided of course that they are maintained, correctly, cylinder leakage
tests conducted and SO hourly oil and filter changes performed,
spectrographic engine oil analysis can also be used to determine engine
condition.

h/. None of the proposed changes have any bearing or relationship to the two
accidents that occurred and Angel Flight have put in procedures above and
beyond the CASA's license standards for private pilots, or even
commercial pilots.

I can only assume that CASA have made an arbitrary decision, which is neither
evidence based, nor that will make any real contribution to aircraft safety, simply
to shut down the Community Service Charities. The irony of this is that many
country people will die prematurely simply because they cannot access specialist
medical treatment in Capital Cities, because they cannot afford any other form of
safe air transport, but then I can only assume that the CASA's Philosophy is that
ultimate air safety can be achieved by grounding all aircraft, forget community
benefit and the life saving health benefits of CSF.

I often meet people who have been able to access often life saving treatment that
that they could not have afforded were it not for Angel Flight. Their gratitude is
reward enough for the cost and effort that my skills and aircraft provide.

This great service must not be killed off by an over zealous regulatory
environment that will not enhance safety. The community benefit is far too
important to be closed down by bureaucratic intransigence, without this service
many country people will not be able to afford specialist treatment.

H Phillip Reiss

Now keep in mind that the excellent 5 page contribution from Mr Reiss was reduced to the following by the CASA... Dodgy 


Quote:I agree with minimum experience requirements and flights at night to be
conducted under IFR and pilots to be suitably qualified. I also consider a Class 2
medical should be required. I don't consider maintenance standard should be the
same as for charter, aircraft maintained to CASA Private category is adequate.
 
Hmm...no further comment required - UDB!  Angry

Addendum: Dr Gates submission No.10

Quote:Summary Remarks


The ATSB report on the Angel Flight accident at Mt Gambier fails to entertain other explanations for the primary cause of the crash beyond the spatial disorientation hypothesis when, given the age of the pilot who was 78, other potential aged-related catastrophic events possibly of a vascular nature, should have been included in the evaluation process. Absence of evidence to support a medical problem does not necessarily mean evidence of absence of a medical problem. The fact that the pilot was able to successfully manoeuvre to a landing through inclement conditions not consistent with VFR would suggest that less weight should be given to this factor in the analysis and that it should possibly be treated as a contributing factor through cognitive load which could have increased the demands on his vascular system leading to a catastrophic event notwithstanding a Class 2 medical pass. Our report suggests that consideration now be given to more rigorous medical/neuropsychological assessments of pilots over seventy or 75 but ONLY following an independent Amicus Curiae report which examines in detail this complex area and the adequacy of current investigative procedures in ascertaining accident cause.

Our report also has concerns, canvassed by others, about the adequacy and appropriateness of the statistical analysis of accidents reflected in the ATSB inquiry into Angel Flight and the recommendations which flow from that. In view of the fact that VFR into IFR accidents are a problem across the board, a requirement for an IFR rating for Angel Flights might be a useful interim measure but this does not deal with the problem of those who are risk takers and the increased frequency of vascular events with age which might lead to catastrophic failure while at the controls of an aircraft as a lone pilot.

We are also not clear about the risk models being used by ATSB, CASA and the parent department in assessment of accident and accident risk. It would appear that different models are being used which in some cases may be putting the public at risk and disadvantaging others. We ask that a clear statement be made with regard to risk assessment for aviation and that this statement be assessed independently in the Amicus Curiae. Our particular concern relates to the fact that economic consideration may be being put ahead of public safety with regard to risks to aviation in certain circumstances. There does not appear to be equity in assessment of risk.

We are prepared to discuss our report if it would be useful in improvement of aviation safety in Australia.


A/Prof. Gordon Richard Gates, MSc., PhD.
President
Evans Head Memorial Aerodrome Committee Inc.
Reply

ATSB Inquiry update - 18/09/19: CASA AQON... Dodgy

Via the APH inquiry webpage: 

Quote:[Image: pdf.png] Questions taken on notice at a public hearing in Sydney, NSW on 4 September 2019 by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Answers received 17 September 2019.
Hmm...in reference to AQON 2, have you ever read such a complete and utter weasel worded load of BOLLOCKS... Huh
Quote:Community Service Flights Senate Inquiry – Questions on Notice – ‘Initial

thoughts’ on CASA’s approach to the application of the proposed amendment to
section 9A of the Civil Aviation Act
Question:
Page 31 – Hansard Proof
Senator PATRICK: . . . . When the new bill [Civil Aviation Amendment Bill 2019] comes
through, how do you intend to change the approach of CASA? Maybe that's for Mr Crawford.
Dr Aleck: May I take that on notice? The analysis of what sorts of things you take into
account and how you weigh them up is not, strictly speaking, a legal issue.
Senator PATRICK: Sure.
Dr Aleck: What we're looking at now is: what would our obligation be if those provisions
become law? Bear in mind that they are prefaced by: 'subject to the safety requirements'—
Senator PATRICK: Of course. Safety is paramount.
Dr Aleck: Right.
Senator PATRICK: But now there's a new consideration for you.
Mr Crawford: Yes, and we're well aware of that.
Senator PATRICK: I think the committee would be interested in your initial thoughts on that,
even though the legislation hasn't gone through the lower house.

Answer:

CASA is carefully considering the most appropriate approach to take in relation to the
requirements set out in the proposed amendment to section 9A of the Civil Aviation Act. We
are doing so with a view to giving meaningful and fair effect to those provisions, if and when
they should become part of the law. In developing this approach, CASA has regard to:
(a) the scope of the proposed amendment, which focuses on the development and
promulgation of aviation safety standards under paragraph 9(1)© of the Civil
Aviation Act, noting that ‘aviation safety standards’ is a defined term in the Civil
Aviation Act;
(b) the object of the proposed amendment, which is recognised in the Explanatory
Memorandum accompanying the bill as reflecting existing regulatory practice;
© the explicit provisions of the proposed amendment, which specify the matters CASA
is expected to consider (namely, the economic and cost impact of the standards
being developed and promulgated), and the risks CASA is expected to take into
account when developing or promulgating aviation safety standards (namely, the
risks associated with the relevant industry sector(s), which the proposed standards
are meant to address); and 
(d) CASA’s obligation to ensure that, in all cases, the safety of air navigation remains the
most important consideration.

If the amendment as it currently appears in the bill is adopted, these ‘initial thoughts’ are
expected to inform and govern the way in which CASA proceeds when determining the
nature, scope and depth of the particular approach we will take in any given case to identify
and evaluate the facts and circumstances relevant to the development and promulgation of
aviation safety standards in that case.

So in other words (I think??) 'nothing to see here'; i.e business as usual, nothing will change...  Dodgy
MTF...P2  Cool
Reply

"business as usual, nothing will change..."

Yes P2 nothing will change.

Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.

Some would therefore suggest CAsA is insane.

I would suggest they are far from insane because they act in their interest and their interest is far removed from industries expectations.

CAsA don't give a twopenny toss about the industry. The industry is just a convenient conduit for their make work public enterprise, free from controls, checks and balances. Their formula is well proven and has worked very well in protecting their enterprise from any form of effective accountability. Simply waving the "safety" banner is enough to cower any political interference, a bit like holding up a crucifix to a vampire.

It is in their interest to keep the industry subjugated and suppressed. A vibrant, viable industry is far more capable of forcefully tempering their excesses, one simply has to look at the USA to see that in action

On the surface CAsA has proven to be a very inept manager of the regulatory process, tens of thousands of pages of regulations that have not achieved so called safety outcomes any better than the USA with under a thousand pages.

But are they really that incompetent?

Could it be that the "reformed" regulations written in such an ambiguous, convoluted, voluminous way were deliberately written that way? As a form of command and control, impossible to fully comply with therefore everyone would be at some point non compliant placing everyone involved in the industry under a Damoclean Sword to be raised or lowered as pleases.

The cost to industry is irrelevant, the contraction of participation in the industry because of it are irrelevant, the threat to safety because of it are irrelevant. The massive squandering of taxpayers money is irrelevant.

The only thing of relevance to CAsA is maintaining the status quo, which explains why CAsA views the industry as a threat and continues a never ending war with it.
Reply

ATSB inquiry update - 19/09/19:  ATSB AQON.. Rolleyes

Via APH website: [Image: pdf.png] Questions taken on notice at a public hearing in Sydney, NSW on 4 September 2019 by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Answers received 18 September 2019.

All faily ho..hum with typical non-plussed answers but I did find AQON 4 perplexing more for what it didn't say?


Quote:4. Did the ATSB say on television after the accident that the ATSB was investigating Angel Flight?

The ATSB did an onsite press conference the day after the accident. By this time, news reports had already identified Angel Flight and the pilot.

At the press conference, the ATSB Investigator In Charge advised the following:

“On the morning of the accident the pilot landed at Mount Gambier. The pilot was organised by the charity Angel Flight to transport two passengers from Mount Gambier to Adelaide.”

“The ATSB has sent four investigators to the site where we will examine the accident site, the wreckage and interview witnesses.”

“We will examine other factors such as
• the pilot experience
• the airworthiness of the aircraft
• weather conditions
• and the coordination of the charity flight.

However, it is also important to remember that we are not going to speculate at this point on the circumstances surrounding the accident. The role of the ATSB is to conduct no-blame investigations with the aim of improving transport safety.”

The Investigator In Charge was asked a question as to whether she knew what kind of experience, accreditation or training was required to qualify to be a pilot for the Angel Flight service. The Investigator In Charge responded:

“that will just be part of our investigation, that is something we will cover during the course of our investigation.”

This response is consistent with a number of questions the investigator in charge was asked about mayday calls, mechanical issues and weather conditions. The Investigator In Charge made it clear that the ATSB would not be speculating as to cause.
 
MTF..P2  Tongue
Reply

 Sic'em-REX withdrawal of CSF instrument DM No.1 - WTD??

Quote:Withdrawal

[Image: image]

Senator PATRICK (South Australia) (15:33): Pursuant to notice given yesterday, I withdraw business of the Senate motion No. 1 standing in my name for the next day of sitting, proposing the disallowance of the Civil Aviation (Community Service Flights—Conditions on Flight Crew Licences) Amendment Instrument 2019.


It seems I was not the only one through the week to be somewhat bemused by the sudden withdrawal by Senator REX of one of his CSF Amendment Instrument DMs... Huh

Via the LMH:

Quote:Senator Rex Patrick created a bit of a stir this week when he withdrew his motion to disallow the new community service flight regulations. Patrick has been a champion of CSFs since this whole thing kicked off, and is the driving force behind the senate inquiry, so it was probably right that the industry's eyes went wide when he withdrew his motion only one day before it was due to be debated. However, it looks to be a procedural thing. Patrick had both Motion 1 and Motion 2 in play, withdrawing Motion 1 and postponing Motion 2 until 16 October. Questions to the senator have not yet been replied to, but I am confident that Angel Flight's hero has not deserted them. The senate hearing is still open and the matter of the legitimacy of the data CASA used to justify the new regulations is still to be tested in the Federal Court. The latest there is that the matter has been adjourned to a date yet to be announced.

Read more at http://www.australianflying.com.au/the-l...CXwPgMx.99

Also related from "K" this am... Wink     

(09-21-2019, 08:52 AM)Kharon Wrote:  Question time – for the minister.

Why is ‘Mr Bi-Pass’ (Scots Git) conducting a pogrom to find a ‘leaker’? No names, no pack drill: BUT, it seems the powers that be at ‘REX’ ain’t happy and want a scalp. No signs of influence being brought to bear is there minister?

Why has one Nutall been suddenly and ‘voluntarily’ “returned” to industry? Although only the God’s would know who would hire him now. Could the minister explain just how he intends to talk his way out of ‘Buckley’ Bun Fight’ without being scorched and demonised in the media? Do tell, for it is curious we are. 


Why have CASA backed down on AF but decided to keep the AF ‘instrument’ on the books but in a much diluted iteration? Is this so as not to further embarrass the miniscule; before the Senate Committee have a serious go at it?
_____________________

Think on fool. Because. One day – y’gonna get caught – that’s why. Another Minister caught with his pants down? Duckling Minister scared of the ‘myth’ and just short of being publicly humiliated, courtesy of rogues and charlatans, with no idea why. Aye, there’s smart, competent leadership for you….

Get a grip and tame the beast; or RESIGN minister. Before you stand shamed, known only as glove puppet to CASA’s tame advisor, fool forever. You could of course get smart, hire a real advisor. Your call – don’t care; either way the headlines will be interesting, entertaining and shame the government.

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Toot – toot.


Still working on getting a satisfactory explanation from the REX office, in the meantime hopefully the scuttlebutt and speculation (Hitch and "K" above) is on the money... Huh  


MTF...P2  Tongue

Ps On the (acting) PM puppet and his puppet masters...from the Auntypru Google image archives... Big Grin 

[Image: D2fwtxKUYAE-1XN.jpg]

Ref: Shame or Fame for McCormack.

[Image: Dj1rjZtV4AQsYpK.jpg]

Ref: Michael McCormack on Twitter: "A great welcome from the West ...

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Ref: Vainglorious Ventriloquism and Vaudeville acts. | AuntyPru

Pps Definitely much, much MTF... Tongue
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Had to smile.

Took a peep at the UP thread on the recent fatal Mooney crash. The mountains west of Coffs down to the Hunter Valley are not, by world standards ‘high’. But that is a relative term; low cloud and rising terrain are a potential trap for all aircraft, no matter the operating class. Anyway – Sunfish had a mini rant about this and that – but, for mine, brought out one, single point worthy of serious consideration:-

Sunny - And another thing...,,CASA and their lapdog, the ATSB, sunk the slipper into Angel Flight for far less reason. Where is the special report into East Coast transit airspace and procedures that force small aircraft into flying over water or mountains instead of along the coast with at least the possibility of a safe forced landing? More people have been killed by the current East Coast airspace rules than Angel Flight ever did.

A fair call and spot on. It could be taken a step further by a responsible independent ATSB. Instead of the hysterical, fatuous, flawed attack on CSF operations; why is there not an ‘in-depth’ study of VFR into IMC, designed to reduce (within tenable limits) the annual carnage caused by this Oh so preventable accident scenario?

Gods know what the Angel Flight debacle has cost; in real time and money, Senators by the hour ain’t cheap. No one minds the money being spent when there is a ‘result’. But, to see  the money squandered on a report and rules change, which affects SFA in the way of improved safety outcomes, is disgraceful. When you start to add up the cost of ‘the investigation’, the cost of CASA dreaming up bloody silly rules, the price tag for production of same, the cost of a Senate inquiry, the cost of generating a disallowance motion, the cost of parliament and the secretariat: all required to support a stupid response to a nonsensical analysis, you have to wonder at the value of the resultant mess. What has been achieved? SFA is the answer. Disgusting and beneath contempt.

Anyway, Onya Sunny, gold star for a neat bomb, in a nutshell.

Toot – toot
Reply

Historical dots, dashes and a Harfwit's 2 year itch??

Reference posts:

(09-27-2019, 07:11 AM)Kharon Wrote:  
(09-26-2019, 08:21 PM)P7_TOM Wrote:  Considerations and Courtesy.

With a Mooney and a Chopper down in the vicinity of RAAF Williamstown; I sneaked a look at the Unspeakable Prune. The poor old ATCO’s are, once again, in the gun. Anyone who would care to take the time to actually ‘read’ the restrictions and liabilities and punitive oversight rules these folk work under would actually be more inclined to congratulate ‘em for turning up to work every shift. It is a tough job; and, in busy sector/area like Sydney or Melbourne; it is fair to say that they are every bit as frustrated and hacked off as the aircrew.

Back in 2017 the ABC tried to get the message out – without much luck. Halfwit wanted a new system; couldn’t pay for it, so the ‘Bean counters’ set to work and (pardon the hated expression) ‘down sized’ to the bone and a little beyond. Profit was needed to bring on the now outdated “One Sky”. Consultants cost lot’s and lot’s; and, if only ‘consultants’ were the problem cost then it could have been managed. Alas, there was more; much more draining the budget – but we’ll never see that exposed to the light of day. All gone and forgotten now; well, until there’s a ‘proper’ inquiry.  Anyway – FWIW, try and deal politely and professionally with the boys and girls manning the consoles; it ain’t their faulty towers shit fight. Not by a long shot.

Updated 15 Feb 2017, 10:25am

Job cuts have left the government body responsible for air-traffic control in Australia in crisis, with senior Airservices officials providing damning accounts that the organisation is now "a huge risk to public safety".

Key points:

• Airservices staff fear it could take 'blood on their hands' before changes are made
• More than 700 jobs have been cut from the organisation to date as part of cost-cutting
• Senator Nick Xenophon is demanding an immediate cease of the retrenchments

"It's only a matter of time before we have a major aviation incident," one Airservices executive has told the ABC.

We captured the Halfwit, his accountant mate and a mystery guest leaving the Never Tell Motel on camera.

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Had to smile.

Took a peep at the UP thread on the recent fatal Mooney crash. The mountains west of Coffs down to the Hunter Valley are not, by world standards ‘high’. But that is a relative term; low cloud and rising terrain are a potential trap for all aircraft, no matter the operating class. Anyway – Sunfish had a mini rant about this and that – but, for mine, brought out one, single point worthy of serious consideration:-

Sunny - And another thing...,,CASA and their lapdog, the ATSB, sunk the slipper into Angel Flight for far less reason. Where is the special report into East Coast transit airspace and procedures that force small aircraft into flying over water or mountains instead of along the coast with at least the possibility of a safe forced landing? More people have been killed by the current East Coast airspace rules than Angel Flight ever did.

A fair call and spot on. It could be taken a step further by a responsible independent ATSB. Instead of the hysterical, fatuous, flawed attack on CSF operations; why is there not an ‘in-depth’ study of VFR into IMC, designed to reduce (within tenable limits) the annual carnage caused by this Oh so preventable accident scenario?

Gods know what the Angel Flight debacle has cost; in real time and money, Senators by the hour ain’t cheap. No one minds the money being spent when there is a ‘result’. But, to see  the money squandered on a report and rules change, which affects SFA in the way of improved safety outcomes, is disgraceful. When you start to add up the cost of ‘the investigation’, the cost of CASA dreaming up bloody silly rules, the price tag for production of same, the cost of a Senate inquiry, the cost of generating a disallowance motion, the cost of parliament and the secretariat: all required to support a stupid response to a nonsensical analysis, you have to wonder at the value of the resultant mess. What has been achieved? SFA is the answer. Disgusting and beneath contempt.

Anyway, Onya Sunny, gold star for a neat bomb, in a nutshell.

Toot – toot

Being a bit quiet around here of late, P7 and P9 are both obviously victims of bored minds that are both genetically connected and at times (somewhat bizarrely) on parallel wave lengths -  Huh  

To begin with this particular case of 'passing strange' coincidences I'll first refer a Sic'em'REX post which was in reply to this Guardian article: Home affairs accused of 'simply ignoring its obligations in law' over FOI

Quote:HOME AFFAIRS WEAK ON TRANSPARENCY

After Home Affairs failed to answer a Freedom of Information (FOI) request of mine within the stautory time frame, I put a question on notice to the Home Affairs Minister.

The response to my question shows that Home Affairs is not taking FOI seriously. It reveals a very clear pattern in which the Department obstructs public access to information by simply ignoring its obligations in law.

Mr Pezzullo, the Secretary of the Department and person with statutory responsibility for Home Affairs' FOI compliance, has spoken out strongly against the leaking of offical information. That said, it is clear that his position on transparency of government information is consistent. He doesn’t want information to be released unlawfully - or lawfully.

I then noted the following 'comment in reply' to the REX post:

Quote:The avoidance of FOI or RTK requests is an art form in Government departments and instrumentalies. The Labor and LNP governments are not pressing for these releases to be made. It is time for the respective ministers to step up to the plate on this. The departments have as much to hide from the public representatives as the public. Bring on a broad ranging inquiry. Especially #casa.

This comment in turn got me thinking and trolling through the cyber dustbins to a point in time over 2 years ago with this AP post of mine: 

 Harfwit's FOI disclosure log update

And this Senate Estimates video segment of the same year:

   

Effectively NX (with some help from anonymous sources -  Big Grin ) shamed the Harfwit into becoming more publicly transparent with his obligations under the FOI Act. Unfortunately, as we all know, appearances of being compliant with the FOI Act quite often masks the reality i.e the Govt agency just get smarter at O&O'ing their tracks... Dodgy 

This brings me to another rewind moment to almost 4 years ago, where the former information Commissioner Professor McMillan handed down a decision that called 'bollocks' on Fort Fumble's blatant attempts to take the Mickey Bliss out of the FOI Act and at the same time subsequently dodge trying to fill the great craters (air safety issues) appearing in the Airservices/Defence Dept OneSKY trough fund (P7/P9 post above)... Confused 

Ref: Risk mitigation Oz aviation (ASA/CASA/ATSB) style Part I


Quote:P2 comment: My personal fav from the Prof McMillan decision:


Quote: Wrote:29. It is not necessary that I fully consider the application of s 11A(5) to the remaining documents in light of my earlier findings that those documents are not conditionally exempt. I note, however, that had this arisen for decision there would be weighty public interest factors in favour of disclosure. They include that air safety is a matter of substantial public interest, and that the findings of a government regulator about the performance of another government agency are equally a matter of substantial public interest. The public debate that could ensue from release of those findings would be a healthy development that is more likely to enhance rather than impair air safety.

Well done that man & well said.. [Image: wink.gif]

From that I assumed (wrongly apparently) that the additional information released should now be publicly available via the CASA FOI Disclosure log.
     
Hmm...and what's changed -  Huh

MTF...P2  Tongue

Ps Sic'em'REX:


...but don't stop with Home Affairs... Wink
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Regulatory ‘Dark matter?

Why does this ring a great big bell? I just can’t quite remember where I’ve heard it before…..

Executive Summary.

Red tape is the single biggest barrier to economic prosperity and opportunity in Australia. Each year red tape reduces economic output by $176 billion, which is around 10 per cent of GDP.

1 Red tape is undermining Australia’s international competitiveness. For example, Australia is ranked 77th out of 140 countries for the burden of government regulation by the World Economic Forum.

2Red tape is in turn a key reason why new private sector business investment is just 11.5 per cent of GDP, which is lower than it was during the Whitlam-era. Low levels of business investment are a key cause of sluggish productivity growth and slow wages growth.

For the first time in Australia this report analyses and develops a methodology for measuring a category of red tape that to date has been ignored. This category of red tape is described as ‘regulatory dark matter’ which refers to publications by government agencies that seek to influence the behaviour of regulated actors (such as businesses) but lack adequate democratic oversight. These publications are not necessarily bound by law, but nonetheless have a regulatory effect which results in a greater red tape burden faced by individuals and businesses.

‘Regulatory dark matter’ is defined as “regulatory actions taken by departments and agencies that are subject to little scrutiny or democratic accountability.” This broad definition includes two commonly used categories in the Australian context: legislative instruments and quasi-regulation. Regulatory dark matter, particularly quasi-regulation, is also often referred to as “soft law” in the Australian context.

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RD II: Not our Indaba – however. Shy

Previous reference:

(04-03-2019, 08:05 AM)Kharon Wrote:  AMSA v RRAT. Round 1.

No video of this hit out; the Hansard is published, about 20 pages of solid reading to plough through. Nothing whatsoever to with matters aeronautical – but of interest as a guide to what we may expect when CASA gets a turn. I know not many will read the Hansard – but for me it was (a) a required task and (b) it provides an insight to how Government agencies ‘think’ and operate; so in that sense, valuable. However, I have selected a few passages of play which reflect the Committee’s mood – in the matter being discussed. The session should be a wake up call for the ASA, ATSB and CASA, IMO there is a push on to upset the cosy, easy going attitude in which these agencies have cocooned themselves for far too long. It could just be that that the insulation against serious questioning, with venom is failing and the isolated splendour of ‘Safety’ as an endless trough is ending. We can only hope. Brockman, Gallacher, Patrick and Sterle were not there to kill spiders; it was good work by a fine team. Some of Glenn Sterle’s bowling is worth a few minutes, the closing remarks in particular.

Anyway – FWIW:–

ACTING CHAIR: because we're going to be back here, guaranteed—safer bet than Winx. Colleagues, if you want to have a chat outside, we can suspend for a minute and have a chat.

Mr Kinley: Thanks, Senator. I would like to make a short opening statement. But, before I do that, we did, of course, listen to the hearings in Perth for this inquiry. I would like to say that we apologise for not doing better in keeping our communications open with Mrs Nicole Mills. We did listen, in particular, to her evidence, and we will certainly do better in future. We will follow up on her suggestion to nominate a contact officer in such cases as this. What I do need to work out is what would be the appropriate training for our officers to be able to handle those sorts of issues properly and sensitively.

Prosecuting matters under the national law though remains complex and difficult, and AMSA recently met with the CDPP to discuss these ongoing issues. One matter we will be seeking legislative amendments for is to allow at least two years to commence proceedings rather than the one year now allowed under the Crimes Act for offences warranting less than six months imprisonment. We also suggest that the offences under the act be examined to consider if they're adequate for a matter involving a fatality. In this regard I would draw the committee's attention to the uncommenced amendments to the national law act that were intended to align the act with the health and safety laws with similar offences and penalties.

ACTING CHAIR: If you want to overrule me, that's fine. We'll do a count very quickly. I want everything on the record. We have deaths that have not been investigated by this mob, and all we've seen—you can smile as much as you like, Mr McKenzie, and whisper in your mate's ear or whatever you want to do. You people really are on the verge—I tell you: if I was the minister, none of you would even be sitting here unless you started owning up to whose incompetence led to this.

ACTING CHAIR: Mr Kinley, I'll talk to you, as the CEO, about what we have learnt recently in your term as the CEO, taking over under the national law. What brought this to our attention was the very unfortunate death of Mr Mills. As I said earlier, we're not going to stop here, because we know there have been so many more. For the families out there I'm going to mention Glen Wilson; Ryan Donohue; Ian Thompson; Paul McVeigh; Leila Trott; Murray Turner; Mason Carter; Chad Fairley; Andrew Kelly; Allan Russell; John Rodgers; Matthew Roberts; David Chivers; Martin Cunningham; one person on the Seabring; three people on a night raid, Luke Murray, Daniel Bradshaw and Tim Macpherson; Ben Leahy; Adam Bidner; Adam Hoffman; Zach Feeney; Chris Sammut; Eli Tonks; Harry Evans; Shalina Abdul Hussien plus about twenty more people who I'm not able to name, because no-one seems to collect the information. All these people have been killed on Australian vessels since AMSA took responsibility for the national system in 2013.

After what we learnt about the death of Mr Mills, I have absolutely no confidence that AMSA has done everything that it could have done to secure safety. I've got no confidence about the safety of workers or members of the public on other vessels. You could say that you've inherited a system that is a basket case, poor safety culture—all of that. What I don't understand where the plan is to improve this situation is. Looking at these numbers, they have got to be about the same as, or worse than, other dangerous industries, and it has been a priority industry for focus and action for Safe Work Australia. They have industry plans; they have safety codes of practice. I ask: where is your action and focus? All I see is vessels cobbling together—in my own words—their own safety management systems. I believe a lot of rules are made up, and they put as many people as they like on a vessel. If they don't like the basic rules that are there, I'm told they can go and talk to their mates on the AMSA board and get an exemption. When they do get in trouble or someone is killed, in my view, AMSA looks the other way.

I looked at your annual report hoping to find something to indicate that you have a plan. I'll talk about the chairman's report. I see that you have a new computer system, that there are plans to maintain your workforce, to deal with oil spills, for ship-sourced garbage, for new navigation systems, and that there have been important meetings in London. There is nothing about fatalities until you get to page 54. On page 54 it tells me that there were nine fatalities just last year, and this is not a huge industry. This was in your KPIs, coded amber, which I saw on page 12 is classified by AMSA as a 'minor' issue. There's nothing in there about what you're going to do to fix it. On page 23 it says that operators will be encouraged to take responsibility for safety outcomes. I can tell you all that that's not a plan to save people; that's a plan for more deaths, like the unfortunate death of Mr Mills.

People are dying and it looks to me like no-one is held accountable and, worse, no-one thinks that it's a problem that should be fixed. I hope that you're not willing to look the other way. I believe the minister has been trying to look the other way—that's my view, not the committee's—but I'm not going to look the other way and I know that the committee won't either. Election or no election, as I said earlier, we will get to the bottom of this. We will be looking at your marine orders, your legislation and your operation—everything that you do or don't do—and we will fix this. I'll leave it at that.

That concludes today's hearing. With the approval of my colleagues, we've set 15 April for questions on notice. Thank you very much.

Toot – toot….

New Chair, new members, old members and Sterlo with shit still on his liver.... Wink 

Some very interesting and historical regulator parallels (AMSA v CASA) from the Hansard of last week's Brisvegas public hearing into the performance of AMSA  (Senate inquiry MKII)... Huh 

Quote:25 Sep 2019 Brisbane, QLD (HTML & PDF) Program [Image: pdf.png] Submissions  [Image: pdf.png]


On AMSA implementing and overseeing SMS:


Pacific Maritime Lawyers Pty. Ltd.

 Senator STERLE: ...So my question is: can you point to any other specific countries that the committee should be looking towards as examples of best practice with regard to implementation of safety management systems?


Mr Kavanagh : Other nations? Thank you for the question. I'm not sure I can give an opinion about other nations. Certainly—

 Senator STERLE: [/url]Or examples.

Mr Kavanagh : Certainly, the UK, and Australia, I have to say, were at the forefront of the international ship management code, which is the big-ship version of what we're talking about. It is internationally accepted, and every ship that comes into Australia is compliant with that code. So I think there is universal acceptance and international implementation of international ship management codes and safety management systems, however you want to describe them.

The real challenge for Australia and the domestic commercial vessel jurisdiction, which is what we're talking about, as I understand it, is that the application to the small-ship world, if you like, is uneven. There are some very significant challenges with that. When you're talking about international shipping, there are minimum international standards and training and qualifications, and there are a whole lot more resources, financial and otherwise, and support systems to ensure the implementation of those systems. When you are talking about sometimes very small businesses operating commercial vessels, those resources are not the same; they're not available. And the quality of safety management systems, in my experience, varies very widely. That's a real challenge. When you're hanging your hat—in the legislation and indeed your whole regulatory system—on an effective safety management system as being the primary defence against incidents of this nature, then you really need to make sure the quality of those safety management systems is appropriate to the operation of that vessel.

[url=https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2Fe68%22;querytype=;rec=0]Senator STERLE: 
You noted in your submission that AMSA provides very limited support for the development of a safety management system. What further steps could AMSA take to engage with vessel owners and masters regarding the importance of SMSs?

Dr Marinac : What I would suggest, without wanting to be too philosophical, is that the place to start here is with a regulatory philosophy and regulatory approach. If AMSA continues to see itself as we certainly see it, acting as an enforcement regulator, as a compliance based police of the industry, then there is less space in which the industry could be having sensible conversations with AMSA about what a positive SMS should look like; what sort of content should be in the SMS; and, where things go wrong, the chances of the learning from each error to be disseminated elsewhere throughout the industry. There is a significant risk for a maritime operator in having a discussion with AMSA about things that are going wrong or things that can be improved, when, at the same time that they're having that conversation, they're well aware that they're talking to their potential prosecutor. So, if the approach taken by AMSA was more in accordance with its public statements, more about cooperation with the industry and a cooperative approach to safety, then that would achieve a more effective outcome than a compliance based, prosecution based approach to regulation.

In the same way, we are talking about applying safety management systems to an incredible variety of vessels undertaking an incredible variety of functions in an incredible variety of circumstances. So it's going to be impossible under any circumstances to really regulate in detail what those safety management systems should look like. If ever there were an area that was crying out for principles based regulation, this is it, because no two boats are the same, no two voyages are the same and no two emergencies are the same, so the safety management system has to be designed to anticipate those as best as possible, in the knowledge that the safety management system will never completely anticipate everything once things start to go wrong.

What all of that means in our view is that the less AMSA looks like a Commonwealth version of the water police, the better, and the more AMSA is able to sit down around a table and talk about safety with the operators of the vessels before anything goes wrong, the better. Some of the mechanisms already exist in the legislation—for instance, the enforceable undertakings. At the moment, we're not aware, in any event, of enforceable undertakings being used at all. So, if we have an operator who says, 'This is a problem; this has gone wrong,' what we would like them to be able to do is to go to AMSA and say, 'This is the problem we've had; this is where it's not going right,' for them to be able to enter into an enforceable undertaking which protects them from prosecution in relation to that but also enables them to have a sensible conversation with the regulator about how to make sure these things don't go wrong again...

...Mr Kavanagh : I have a couple of things that I might say about that. The first is that, clearly, you're right. The safety management system is the key, and, clearly, the safety management system in place on that vessel on that day was inadequate. It was inadequate both in its form and in its implementation. I don't think I'm saying anything controversial there; that's certainly what the coroner gave a view upon.

In my experience, and I include in my experience 10 years as a state regulator of marine safety, the overwhelming majority of incidents are caused by operational error—the failure to implement the safety management system. Yet, and this was also the case in the states, the great majority of the resources are put into the structure of the vessel—making sure that the number of lifejackets is right, that the design is adequate and so on. It's looking at the kit, if you like. I'm not saying that's wrong to do—of course the boats need to be seaworthy; that's absolutely the foundation—but it's also easy to do that.

Senator STERLE: That's right.

Mr Kavanagh : It's easy to see whether the vessel is seaworthy or not. It's much harder, as a regulator, to verify that the operation of the vessel is safe and that the implementation of the SMS is being done in accordance with what the SMS says. That's exactly the cause of this incident in my view.

So that leads you to the place where AMSA as a regulator is spending the great majority of its time. Please indulge my reading out the figures for the first 12 months of the AMSA supervision of the national system: 3,000 vessel permissions, 4,500 operating permissions, 3,100 exemptions, 10,300 certificates of competency, 9,000 certificates issued, reflecting the new survey regime. There were also 1,500 inspections and 400 SMS verifications. I'm not entirely sure what an 'SMS verification' means, but if you're only looking at 400 out of tens of thousands of vessels—that's actually where the safety is and that's actually where this incident happened—I suggest that perhaps the allocation of resources needs to be looked at. We're doing the paperwork fine, there are a lot of people on boats with pieces of paper, but perhaps the safety management systems and the way that they're being conducted needs to be looked at.

  


From Maritime Union of Australia session:

Senator RENNICK: The previous witnesses are, I think, pushing a safety management system. What's your view on that?

Mr Keane : It's interesting that they're pushing safety management. I went to a consultation for the fishing industry with local fishermen at Jervis Bay the other day. They sat there and spent a considerable amount of time with the guys. The people who were representing AMSA were quite good. They were very patient with the guys and went through how to do a risk assessment and how to do the safety management systems. One of the guys in the room said: 'Mate, this is all good, but the blokes you have in this room are the only guys who are actually concerned with safety. What are you going to do with the cowboys? They're not going to be here. They're not going to learn that.' Safety management systems are quite good and it's about common sense. We agree with it across the board, but it must be underpinned by decent regulation. There really isn't an industry in the country now that doesn't do some risk assessment for everything they do, but there should be some minimum standards that they have to comply with. That example—

Senator RENNICK: The issue with the safety management system is that it's not compulsory.

Mr Bray : It's not and it doesn't do anything. It's not until after the event when something goes wrong and they have to prosecute. The Spirit of 1770 is a prime example. That guy was prosecuted for using his phone rather than the radio, because it was written that way in the SMS. It's ludicrous; it's madness. But that's what these guys will be facing when they're just learning how to do this. That was for guys who were fishing inshore—basically not going more than a mile or two out, like a lot of lobster divers and that sort of thing. There are the regulations—and remember: they have to do their own systems. Compile that out when you go onto trading vessels—proper commercial vessels that are carrying cargo. If they're allowed to have their own minimum safety standards or are allowed to take somebody on board who's done a three-day course to become a GPH and, all of a sudden, they can work 200 miles out to sea—that was never the intention of the GPH course, but that's what's going to come out of some of this. It's quite funny that, when we're talking about doing risk assessments and safety management service, I want to know who's done the risk assessment on making some of these changes from AMSA's position, because we don't see any data that backs up any need for these changes. They're deregulating the industry and dumbing down our qualifications...



Senator Brockman and the MUA on self/over regulation in comparison to CASA: 



Mr Keane : We think there are some complications with this where they're trying to appease the fishing industry and not overregulate what they do. There's an ability to split that off. I think we mentioned that in the submission. We're not adverse to that. But, once you're talking about a DCV that's carrying cargo or an oceangoing vessel, they have to have those minimum requirements as a regulation.

Senator RENNICK: Thank you.

Senator BROCKMAN: On the same area, this committee is trying to tackle what you brought up in passing, Mr Bray, in your opening statement: the role of CASA and the airline industry. But we hear—this committee in particular pretty constantly hears—from the general aviation sector that the level of regulation is actually strangling them and general aviation is in decline as a result. Do you have any views as to whether a more prescriptive regime would actually potentially weaken the sector rather than strengthening it?

Quote:...There are problems with the legislative framework. Responsibility is split between the DCV Act and the Navigation Act. I just want to draw your attention here: imagine if passenger planes flying between Perth and Sydney were subject to different safety regulations to a plane flying from Sydney to Bangkok, that if Virgin could do their risk assessments and decide that one pilot was sufficient, that a steward or stewardess didn't need to do safety training and have first aid certificates, that the plane needed to be inspected thoroughly only every five years or that they could hire a pilot with a recreational licence and no experience other than with a single-engine Cessna. It sounds ludicrous, yet this is the case with commercial vessels in Australia. Responsibility is split between AMSA and the WHS regulators. AMSA say they are not a safety regulator; state safety regulators say they're not maritime regulators. There's a clear gap in the understanding, hence leading to some of the confusion amongst not only the employers but also the workers, who have a duty of care to themselves, their workmates and their colleagues on board the vessels. That's a significant problem...

Mr Keane : You'd have to ask: would any of the people that are raising those concerns agree to dumb down the training for their pilots? A couple of us went before the Productivity Commission and we were talking to them about general stuff and how the act has gone since it was implemented—they had to do their own review. We raised then some of the issues that we've raised here today. One of the people on the committee that came out of the industry said, 'We would not consider that if it were the aviation industry.' He said that could not be considered in the aviation industry. Yet we do it every day on vessels that are carrying passengers, carrying equal numbers—all that sort of stuff. So, to answer your question, I don't think dumbing down any part of the training or dropping qualifications can benefit any industry particularly.

Senator BROCKMAN: No. I wasn't talking about qualifications in particular. I was talking about the level of oversight, the level of bureaucracy and the level of box-ticking that inevitably comes with increased regulation.

Mr Bray : As a seafarer—and I spent 19 years on various vessels in various parts of the industry—I would say that we can always look at improving the bureaucracy and the efficiencies around red tape. There's no issue with that. One of the things that I remember seafarers largely complained about when they were at sea was that they had their job to do and then they had to do the paperwork. Those functions were getting more and more overbearing and it was leading to issues in relation to fatigue. So in fact those bureaucratic processes and the paper shuffling were in themselves placing a greater burden on safety.

However, having said that, seafarers were professional in every standard, in every way. I wouldn't say that they behaved that way 100 per cent of the time, but in their life on board a ship, when they went to sea, they knew that the best lifeboat was the ship that they were on and not the lifesaving apparatus that you were reliant on. In that way, they went about their roles diligently. If you asked a seafarer back then, they would tell you that, yes, they had the shits with the bureaucratic processes—no doubt. But, if you said to them, 'Let's go after efficiencies and erode some of the safety standards or conditions or the professionalisms under the qualification', you would have got kick-back and concern.

I will give you this example. I left the Aurora Australis in 1996. I had spent five years on there. That's the icebreaker that goes down to Antarctica. Three of those crew members were in my bridal party when I married my wife. I left the ship and they sailed and it caught fire on that next trip. They had to fight the fire. It was an engine room fire. They spent 24 hours fighting the fire because the fuelling process for the fire was a split fuel hose. So the fuel was spraying out and they couldn't get down to shut the fuel off, so it was just spraying out and melting the ship, down there at sea. They got the fire out eventually—someone got in and risked their life and shut the fuel down—and they had to rebuild two melted engines to get back to sea. One of the things that they all said in the debriefs was: had they not been trained and had the safety systems in place on that ship, it wasn't only the crew that was facing loss of life; there were 109 expeditioners on board at that particular time.

I can only go back to those work colleagues of mine, who are my friends in personal life as well. They say to us that it was a time when the investment in training, knowledge and process actually worked. They never want to have a second go at trying it, but it worked at the time and it didn't fail them then. Our job, and our obligation, is to make sure that it doesn't fail for a future cruise in those particular circumstances...



Anyhow for what it's worth (IMO), well worth a read...P2  Tongue
Reply

Angel Flight Inquiry report tabled -  Rolleyes

Well I'll be, this must be the world's quickest turn around on a Senate committee inquiry report since forever? Well at least since the Heff left the building... Wink 

https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...report.pdf

Quote:List of Recommendations

Recommendation 1

1.74 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority amend the Civil Aviation (Commercial Service Flights – Conditions on Flight Crew Licences) Instrument 2019 to remove the provisions for additional aeroplane maintenance requirements, which are beyond those required for airworthiness in the general aviation sector.

Recommendation 2

1.78 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority amend the Civil Aviation (Commercial Service Flights – Conditions on Flight Crew Licences) Instrument 2019 to clarify what constitutes the 'operating crew' for a community service flight, particularly as this relates to additional pilots and mentoring arrangements.


My ROFLMAO moment -  Big Grin

Courtesy of Dr Aleck: 


Quote:1.42 Dr Jonathan Aleck, Executive Manager of Legal and Regulatory Affairs at CASA, laid out the objective of CASA's approach to this issue:

'"..Our objective here is not to specifically address what caused those two accidents; it's to address what kinds of things can cause incidents and accidents of this kind. We're being prospective. If we were to wait for sufficiently robust data to support an evidence based decision for every individual decision we took in this space, we would have to wait for a dozen or more accidents to occur..."



Also from the report it would appear that additional correspondence has been tabled and reviewed within the last week and a half which in the scheme of things is IMO significant:

Quote:[Image: pdf.png] Correspondence from Angel Flight, dated and received 29 September 2019, regarding a safety recommendation from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

(my bold)




September 26, 2019


We have been requested by Angel Flight Australia to write to your committee, outlining our operation and the minimum requirements we demand for volunteer pilots flying for our organization. We operate in a similar fashion to Angel Flight Australia, and we assisted them in the setting up of that charity using our model.

All of our coordinated flights are under Part 95 category, and as such, there are no regulatory requirements imposed by the FAA other than the standard rules which apply to private flights in the USA. In 2012 the FAA published a set of recommendations; however, these were not enacted into law. We have chosen to adopt some of the recommendations: there are different rules for commercial operators who seek exemptions from the commercial rules, but these do not apply to us as we operate only under the private flight category.

To date we have undertaken 82,000 missions- defined as the passenger-carrying leg only (and approximately 140,000 flight sectors including the positioning and return flights). Although about 75% of our pilots hold instrument ratings, many of our flights are conducted under the VFR flight regulations. The climates in the Southwest US is similar to much of Australia, and VFR flight is suitable. Occasionally weather is bad enough to make conditions not suitable to fly under IFR.

The minimum standards we require are on the following page.

Sincerely,


Cheri Cimmarrusti
Associate Executive Director

Angel Flight West




[Image: pdf.png] Correspondence to the committee from Angel Flight West (US), dated 26 September 2019, regarding its minimum standards for operation. Received 27 September 2019.




ATSB SAFETY RECOMMENDATION


The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that Angel Flight Australia
takes action to enable it to consider the safety benefits of using commercial flights
where they are available to transport its passengers.

ANGEL FLIGHT RESPONSE

Angel Flight has considered the recommendation carefully and has determined that
it maintain its current policy of giving priority to using private flights where possible
and to continue to use regular public transport flights when private flights are
cancelled or unavailable, and for transfers between capital cities.

The reasons for our decisions are:

Angel Flight rejects the claim in the ATSB report that, for Angel Flight
passenger carrying flights, the “fatal accident rate was more than seven
times higher per flight than other private flights” as invalid.

A valid analysis addressing passenger risks would require comparison of
passenger carrying Angel Flights and other passenger carrying private
flights. Since no such data are available for other private operations, the
only reasonable comparison is between all Angel Flight operations and all
other private operations. Even then, results must be treated cautiously
because an unknown proportion of private operations involve circuit
training and short local flying whereas all Angel Flight operations involve
flights with an average sector length of 1.5 hours.

The analysis in Table B2 on page 69 shows that, when all Angel Flight
sectors are included, the fatal accident rates are 0.5 and 0.2 per 10,000
flights for Angel Flight and other private flights respectively, and the
difference is not significant. Furthermore, when all accidents are included,
the rates are 1.1 and 1.5 per 10,000 flights for Angel Flight and other
private flights respectively.

Angel Flight rejects the claim in the ATSB report that “community service
flights conducted on behalf of Angel Flight Australia (Angel Flight) had
substantially more occurrences …… per flight than other private operations”
as invalid.

ATSB has compared Angel Flight operations, approximately 95% of which
operate to and from Class C and D airspace with other private operations
where an unknown, but undoubtedly much lower, proportion of flights are
in controlled airspace. Angel Flight has been unable to find any data that
would permit a valid comparison of similar operations for other private
flights.

The ATSB report acknowledges, in the Safety Summary, that “The types of
occurrences where flights organised by Angel Flight were statistically overrepresented
(as a rate per flight) compared to other private operations
were consistent with these operational differences.” However, the report
then immediately ignores the vastly different operating environments and
claims that the difference “indicated an elevated and different risk profile in
Angel Flight”.


Still reading and absorbing the report but so far my takeaways from this are;

(a) this committee is motivated and clearly much more focused on cutting through the bureaucratic waffle, than what we saw under the Chairmanship of Barry O'Obfuscation -  Wink 

(b) around the recommendations, clearly the CASA have cut a deal with the Senate to again water down the CSF instrument. Must be about time that the whole instrument was binned and Dr Aleck was sent off with his golden parachute to play with his last remaining marbles... Huh   

Incoming... Rolleyes


MTF...P2  Tongue

Ps I note, that despite the AF response correspondence to the ATSB's SR being sent at least 1 week ago, there has been no corresponding update published on the ATSB website: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inv...069-si-01/
Reply

Dovetails, Ale and a quiet half hour.

Having been slave to “K’s” workbench all day, it is most pleasant to sit in a very comfortable chair, Ale at my elbow, cool breeze through the excellent ‘Judas Gate’ in the new stable door; workshop swept and things put to rights; tools clean - finished tidy. Time to catch up with AP. Dutifully read the Gazette: this paragraph prompted one of those ‘reflective’ periods, where you try to puzzle out how an accidents (multiple – annually) of the type under discussion just keep happening.

Bollocks! – pure, plain, simple, unadulterated balderdash. The ‘things’ which have caused multiple, recurring deaths are (a) bad weather; (b) low cloud and rain; © bad weather, low cloud, bad planning and Oh! Bad weather and rising terrain. Did I mention flight continued into unsuitable weather condition? Now not even a demi god of convoluted Bollocks can control that phenomenon. There was a King, name of Canute from memory, who tried to turn back the tide. He had about as much luck with that as Aleck has controlling the weather; despite his ‘god complex’.

Tiz troo. The answer of course is a simple one, pilots keep doing it and a combination of bad luck, bad judgement, bad weather and vertical dirt at a higher level than the aircraft keep claiming victims; but of “what” - exactly.

Many, many years ago (when the sky was misty and the Earth was soft) a very young TOM, newly qualified PPL, building hours toward CPL was returning an owners aircraft (peerless PA28) to home base. Log book notes departure Lismore (NSW East coast) to Bankstown (Sydney secondary); the weather a typical South Easterly ‘stream’. Low cloud; lots of rain, poor visibility and a headwind to boot. Coastal was planned, in those days ALL flights were ‘full reporting’ and one had to either be ‘on time’ or amend ETA – or else. Ye Gods: the China graph pencil, plastic covered WAC; six minute marks and the ‘splay’ (off track lines) – Ah me.

Anyway – I had all the Notams and a weather brief; so off I toddled. Worked toward the coast, amended times as requested and required; being conscious of losing time, lowering cloud and stepping around rain bands. Always; with the voices of half a dozen experienced instructors repeating their advice; - “can you get out of this to a safe landing?”. Time to shorten a long story: with a defined  ‘back door' and estimate to a viable aerodrome always available; I pushed on, lower, slower and short on official daylight. Legal, sure, but not a consideration under dark, lowering skies and horrible weather. Got to the point where I thought OK, if I can’t see (whatever it was) – the next landing option is Aero Pelican at Swansea – very close to home – however. No money, no kit, not even a jacket, I stepped around a rain band, pulled the pin and lobbed into Aero Duck. Even the ‘Pro’ IFR guys flying RPT in the ‘big iron’ C 402 were sitting it out. “Good call youngster” said the lovely chap who marshalled me a parking spot – “best stay with us tonight, grab your gear and let’s get TD out of this bloody rain”. I was blown away, introduced to some of the big guns an given a beer. Happy, happy day’s end. Turned out the chief pilot had been listening to the area VHF – “we listened all the way, thinking if you had any chance of becoming a decent pilot, you’d pull in here; well done” and he shook my hand. Said he rather do that than be at the burial.

“Get to the point old fool” (from the other side of the fireplace). Ah, yes: the point.

The system in those days and the demands of pilot navigation (primitive) ensured that I ‘pay attention’. ETA for a position report at Big Hill needed to be within two minutes. The ‘situational awareness’ created by that; and, the sound, solid advice of qualified, experienced instructors and, being exposed to ‘weather flying’ from the get go; and tales told in the ‘Crash Comic’ and; clear instruction in ‘weather’ assessment; and, DCA examiners who expected you to ‘know’ what you were about, all added up to string of ‘right’ decisions. Later that evening a PA 28 R ‘spun’ out of cloud with oil all over the cowling and windscreen. Lucky ATC and the RAAF were on deck – that also landed at ‘the Duck’. No one went near that aircraft with a Brolly and a handshake.

I rest my case – FWIW. We old folk do tend to ramble on a bit. “Yes boy; silly question; and now, where has DT hidden the cigars this time? (Wink: the dogs always know – they do)…

[Image: single-frothy-pint-beer-burning-600w-483277990.jpg]
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World Class – My Ass.

“It is not titles that honour men, but men that honour titles.”

Never been known as being particularly ‘bright’ ;’tis is often remarked by certain older family members that I tend toward trust, benefit of doubt, even playing fields and fair play. Recently graphically demonstrated by my upbeat hope that once O’Sofullofit had departed the fix; the RRAT committee may get matters aeronautical ‘sorted’ – good and proper. Great hopes I had of Patrick, Brockman, Sterle, Rennick and the new chair McDonald would shape up. They got off to a good start in the Race to the Non Event cup; but died in the run home. Two pitiful, pointless, laughable mini slaps with a wet lettuce for CASA (which they will enjoy). And then this abomination:-

“The committee’s final report said the work of the ATSB in accident investigation was “considered… to be world class”.

In which world? On which planet – in which asylum would that idiotic, uneducated, pig-ignorant, politically motivated statement be believed? Well, nowhere in my world is there anything else but contempt for this RRAT committee – and I serve notice; the IOS, BRB, PAIN and most of the remaining sane people I know are just a tad ‘pissed-off’. And so, without further ado – RRAT go on the list of those who have, through ineptitude and worse become fair game. They need to be treated as hostile to the emancipation of the aviation industry. There is only one road open now – a total industry howl of protest. Well, it’s that or shuffle off in your chains, grateful for the crumbs and for not being flogged - today.

Well, I hope that RRAT bunch of wet sock wavers all sleep soundly, with a clear conscience tonight, replete in the knowledge they have dealt with a serious safety matter as well as any child would deal with street gang. Pathetic don’t come into it – Disgusting may get a mention, disgraceful, dishonest, fraudulent, and a whole bunch of other unsavoury words will be uttered at the next BRB round – but IMO ‘distrust’ will steal the march. For that is what has been gained – in Spades, redoubled……….MTF – Oh, you can betcha ya Super on it.

Hitch – “Accusing politicians of political interference with each other is a bit like accusing a football team of deliberately disrupting the opposition team's ability to score. It's basically what they exist to do. Oddly enough, I find myself in the position to have to make that very accusation in the lee of the RRAT report into the ATSB's report into the Angel Flight crash at Mount Gambier. Somehow, an inquiry into the ATSB resulted in recommendations that had nothing to do with the reason the inquiry was called. Ironically, in doing so, the RRAT has committed the same crime that they were investigating. Just as the ATSB investigated a pilot's actions and found against Angel Flight, so the RRAT has investigated the ATSB and found against CASA. As the matter was self-referred to the Senate, there are no terms of reference, leaving the RRAT to conclude whatever they want. I am going to speculate now. "Aviation safety" are two words no-one likes to hear raised in either the red room or the green room because it can only make powerful people look bad. I suspect those people may have pressed the RRAT into making a couple of wishy-washy recommendations and ignoring the bare-bones problems that this whole saga has exposed. I would demand an inquiry into the inquiry, but from where do we get the confidence that the outcome would have any integrity?

“If an injury has to be done to a man it should be so severe that his vengeance need not be feared.”

Toot – P2 pinched my title Dodgy  –Toot.
Reply

(10-11-2019, 07:22 PM)Kharon Wrote:  World Class – My Ass.

“It is not titles that honour men, but men that honour titles.”

Never been known as being particularly ‘bright’ ;’tis is often remarked by certain older family members that I tend toward trust, benefit of doubt, even playing fields and fair play. Recently graphically demonstrated by my upbeat hope that once O’Sofullofit had departed the fix; the RRAT committee may get matters aeronautical ‘sorted’ – good and proper. Great hopes I had of Patrick, Brockman, Sterle, Rennick and the new chair McDonald would shape up. They got off to a good start in the Race to the Non Event cup; but died in the run home. Two pitiful, pointless, laughable mini slaps with a wet lettuce for CASA (which they will enjoy). And then this abomination:-

“The committee’s final report said the work of the ATSB in accident investigation was “considered… to be world class”.


In which world? On which planet – in which asylum would that idiotic, uneducated, pig-ignorant, politically motivated statement be believed? Well, nowhere in my world is there anything else but contempt for this RRAT committee – and I serve notice; the IOS, BRB, PAIN and most of the remaining sane people I know are just a tad ‘pissed-off’. And so, without further ado – RRAT go on the list of those who have, through ineptitude and worse become fair game. They need to be treated as hostile to the emancipation of the aviation industry. There is only one road open now – a total industry howl of protest. Well, it’s that or shuffle off in your chains, grateful for the crumbs and for not being flogged - today.

Well, I hope that RRAT bunch of wet sock wavers all sleep soundly, with a clear conscience tonight, replete in the knowledge they have dealt with a serious safety matter as well as any child would deal with street gang. Pathetic don’t come into it – Disgusting may get a mention, disgraceful, dishonest, fraudulent, and a whole bunch of other unsavoury words will be uttered at the next BRB round – but IMO ‘distrust’ will steal the march. For that is what has been gained – in Spades, redoubled……….MTF – Oh, you can betcha ya Super on it.

Hitch – “Accusing politicians of political interference with each other is a bit like accusing a football team of deliberately disrupting the opposition team's ability to score. It's basically what they exist to do. Oddly enough, I find myself in the position to have to make that very accusation in the lee of the RRAT report into the ATSB's report into the Angel Flight crash at Mount Gambier. Somehow, an inquiry into the ATSB resulted in recommendations that had nothing to do with the reason the inquiry was called. Ironically, in doing so, the RRAT has committed the same crime that they were investigating. Just as the ATSB investigated a pilot's actions and found against Angel Flight, so the RRAT has investigated the ATSB and found against CASA. As the matter was self-referred to the Senate, there are no terms of reference, leaving the RRAT to conclude whatever they want. I am going to speculate now. "Aviation safety" are two words no-one likes to hear raised in either the red room or the green room because it can only make powerful people look bad. I suspect those people may have pressed the RRAT into making a couple of wishy-washy recommendations and ignoring the bare-bones problems that this whole saga has exposed.

I would demand an inquiry into the inquiry, but from where do we get the confidence that the outcome would have any integrity?

Good call Hitch - Hear Hear!

“If an injury has to be done to a man it should be so severe that his vengeance need not be feared.”


Toot – P2 pinched my title Dodgy  –Toot.
Reply

Very well said K! After 29 months of querying the methods and accountability of ATSB I was excited by this inquiry. Unfortunately, I might just continue to do what I've been doing all along - keep banging my head against the hardest wall I can find. The higher echelons of government will continue to protect their own and to hell with the real issues at stake.
Reply

Somewhere, over the Bullshit, Pigs may fly.

1.12 As part of its report into the 2017 crash, the ATSB considered the safety record of CSFs more broadly, including those conducted on behalf of Angel Flight. The ATSB found that CSFs had more occurrences,6 accidents and fatal accidents per flight than other private operations, and that the fatal accident rate was more than seven times higher than other private flights.7 With regard to Angel Flight,

Hood - Chief Commissioner of the ATSB, concluded that:
By any measure, there is a different and elevated risk for community service flights operated by Angel Flight Australia compared to other private flying operations and commercial air transport.8



Well, there’s a great big statistical surprise. I mean WoW! Angel Flight do a lot more hours – per annum – than almost any ‘private’ pilot/ aircraft owner’ does. It seems fair and reasonable to conclude that if AF fly more - the number of “occurrences” – carefully not listed – would increase as a factor of more hours spent airborne. An aircraft and pilot which flies say 4 times a month, is a lot more exposed to an ‘occurrence’ than a pilot who only flies four times a year – In a rent-a-wreck, to impress the latest squeeze, with a quick junket around the training area. AF pilots operate in the real world of real aviation; weather, schedule and other folk to consider – of course they are more exposed. It could be taken as a gaining of experience – just as it is for new start commercial pilots, who make every Duck up known to senior pilots and even manage to invent some new ones. I’d say any pilot body being exposed to real conditions would make mistakes – it is the mistakes and the exposure and the learning from such which separate real pilots from the hanger Queens. Senior Qantas captains know this, for once upon a time, they too, were wide eyed innocent children, flogging about the bush, making every mistake known to aviation kind – but they learned their craft and were much improved by that learning.

1.17 Mr Hood confirmed to the committee that with regard to its processes, the ATSB takes:...a no-blame approach to investigations and we focus on systemic safety factors, not on the one-off actions of individuals. We seek to understand what regulatory and organisational risk controls could be put in place to reduce the chance of future incidents and accidents.

No, no blame, not at all – except Hood and his Catamites decide to ‘blame’ the AF system. As if Marj Pagani was the Madam Lash of aviation; “do this flight -- or else”. What a load of hooey. Marj would be the first to say – don’t go if you doubt you can do it. Why – well it’s simply good business practice – if nothing else. Folk in the bush do not tolerate faery stories; they need to get to treatment. They are well used to delay and understand, better than city folk, what bad weather; or a breakdown means. They can deal with it, resourceful and connected they can, with prior warning find an alternative way to travel – so can Marj. Reputation for reliability is all – on the land. “We seek to understand” say’s Hood. I say BOLLOCKS.

I’m not going to get into the Godley game. Using bullshit to baffle brains is beneath contempt. The Senate amateurs may have been ‘Hoodwinked’ by this barrage of cleverly concocted ‘numbers’ – afraid to challenge an ‘expert’. But the ‘expert’ statisticians ain’t. All this baffled, bewildered and inept committee need to do is whistle up an ‘independent’ (or two) statisticians and get an alternate ‘expert’ opinion; to be sure - to be sure. It is that bloody simple.

There are many who would like to know exactly what this committee is up to. Where’s the fire and brimstone Sterle brings to his own pet hobby horse of Road Transport? Would he tolerate this level of pure Pony-Pooh for ‘his’ darling truck drivers. Not in a million. What a fraud; what a disappointment and what a load of old cobblers.

Bugger it – enough. I shall drown the unbelievable; have an Ale with the disappointment, toast the destruction of faith in the RRAT; and flush away the disgust along with the output from the input.

Not good enough Senators; nowhere near acceptable. How’d you like it if I flew my aircraft in the same careless, expeditious, half-assed, inept manner? 

“Quickly Bar-keep; lest I vomit from the stench emanating from the pile of garbage I’ve just waded through – I thank you – good man.”

[Image: D05ZtSnWoAAfBWZ.jpg]
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(10-13-2019, 07:52 PM)P7_TOM Wrote:  Somewhere, over the Bullshit, Pigs may fly.

1.12 As part of its report into the 2017 crash, the ATSB considered the safety record of CSFs more broadly, including those conducted on behalf of Angel Flight. The ATSB found that CSFs had more occurrences,6 accidents and fatal accidents per flight than other private operations, and that the fatal accident rate was more than seven times higher than other private flights.7 With regard to Angel Flight,

Hood - Chief Commissioner of the ATSB, concluded that:
By any measure, there is a different and elevated risk for community service flights operated by Angel Flight Australia compared to other private flying operations and commercial air transport.8



Well, there’s a great big statistical surprise. I mean WoW! Angel Flight do a lot more hours – per annum – than almost any ‘private’ pilot/ aircraft owner’ does. It seems fair and reasonable to conclude that if AF fly more - the number of “occurrences” – carefully not listed – would increase as a factor of more hours spent airborne. An aircraft and pilot which flies say 4 times a month, is a lot more exposed to an ‘occurrence’ than a pilot who only flies four times a year – In a rent-a-wreck, to impress the latest squeeze, with a quick junket around the training area. AF pilots operate in the real world of real aviation; weather, schedule and other folk to consider – of course they are more exposed. It could be taken as a gaining of experience – just as it is for new start commercial pilots, who make every Duck up known to senior pilots and even manage to invent some new ones. I’d say any pilot body being exposed to real conditions would make mistakes – it is the mistakes and the exposure and the learning from such which separate real pilots from the hanger Queens. Senior Qantas captains know this, for once upon a time, they too, were wide eyed innocent children, flogging about the bush, making every mistake known to aviation kind – but they learned their craft and were much improved by that learning.

1.17 Mr Hood confirmed to the committee that with regard to its processes, the ATSB takes:...a no-blame approach to investigations and we focus on systemic safety factors, not on the one-off actions of individuals. We seek to understand what regulatory and organisational risk controls could be put in place to reduce the chance of future incidents and accidents.

No, no blame, not at all – except Hood and his Catamites decide to ‘blame’ the AF system. As if Marj Pagani was the Madam Lash of aviation; “do this flight -- or else”. What a load of hooey. Marj would be the first to say – don’t go if you doubt you can do it. Why – well it’s simply good business practice – if nothing else. Folk in the bush do not tolerate faery stories; they need to get to treatment. They are well used to delay and understand, better than city folk, what bad weather; or a breakdown means. They can deal with it, resourceful and connected they can, with prior warning find an alternative way to travel – so can Marj. Reputation for reliability is all – on the land. “We seek to understand” say’s Hood. I say BOLLOCKS.

I’m not going to get into the Godley game. Using bullshit to baffle brains is beneath contempt. The Senate amateurs may have been ‘Hoodwinked’ by this barrage of cleverly concocted ‘numbers’ – afraid to challenge an ‘expert’. But the ‘expert’ statisticians ain’t. All this baffled, bewildered and inept committee need to do is whistle up an ‘independent’ (or two) statisticians and get an alternate ‘expert’ opinion; to be sure - to be sure. It is that bloody simple.

There are many who would like to know exactly what this committee is up to. Where’s the fire and brimstone Sterle brings to his own pet hobby horse of Road Transport? Would he tolerate this level of pure Pony-Pooh for ‘his’ darling truck drivers. Not in a million. What a fraud; what a disappointment and what a load of old cobblers.

Bugger it – enough. I shall drown the unbelievable; have an Ale with the disappointment, toast the destruction of faith in the RRAT; and flush away the disgust along with the output from the input.

Not good enough Senators; nowhere near acceptable. How’d you like it if I flew my aircraft in the same careless, expeditious, half-assed, inept manner? 

“Quickly Bar-keep; lest I vomit from the stench emanating from the pile of garbage I’ve just waded through – I thank you – good man.”

[Image: D05ZtSnWoAAfBWZ.jpg]

P2 edit: It would appear that Doc Gates is also "somewhere, over the bullshit" -  Rolleyes 


[Image: doc-gates-1.jpg]


[Image: doc-gates-2.jpg]



See HERE for the full Doc Gates letter to the (Dirty) RRAT committee - Wink



Also very much related and from an international perspective from long time tireless MH370 follower/researcher Mike Chillit... Wink 

Via Twitter:

Quote:[Image: z5nVU24M_400x400.jpg]

Mike Chillit @MikeChillit·Oct 13

My opinion, which won't get you an empty cup at Starbucks, is that a number of your important agencies are way to close to the politicians who control them. Pols never want shoddy work to rub off on them. It's how governments and agencies find ways to stay mediocre at best.
 
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Of Stocks and Bond(age).

Gold Standard?  Don’t think so. One must hope that the DRRAT committee has noted the world wide rush by international safety agencies to adopt the ‘new’ investigative benchmark created by the ATSB investigation of Angel Flight (Aus). I’d bet there are representatives from AF (USA) speeding their way to Australia to make sure they are ‘full bottle’ on the new way; and, madly amending their manuals as we speak.

Of course EASA, FAA and CAA have already made legislative changes, to reflect the wisdom of Jonathan (where’s me marbles) Aleck. The wonderful, carefully constructed rules developed by CASA for AF will become international ‘best practice’ for dealing with cowboy outfits.

But, it will be at the NTSB where the really big changes will occur. How could any responsible, first world Safety authority ignore the stellar logic and brilliant conclusions of the ATSB in light of a report from the Australian DRRAT committee.

Ayup: I can really see all that happening. Can you imagine our very own HVH Hooded Canary standing up in front of the ICAO chair and his international peers; telling ‘em all what a wonderful job ‘his’ team of Catamites did on the Mt Gambier accident; and, just to add the gravy, wave this DRRAT committee report up as an exemplar of how to handle an inquiry.

A honest man would hide his head in shame; but, and it is a great big BUT children, a honest man would rather chew his leg off than be party to this shameless aberration. Another big BUT is how can the DRRAT committee be part of this gross distortion? Can they define exactly ‘how’ the ATSB report improves aviation safety? Can they provide a cost analysis to show what this pantomime of deception has cost the public?

I’d put the whole cast and crew in the Stocks and let the public pelt ‘em with rubbish – let ‘em know how it feels to have garbage thrown at you.

Doc. Gates summary is a little more eloquent, polite and educated:-

a. It is not clear how The Report reached the decision that its (the ATSB) work “is, by and large, considered by the committee to be world class”. Respectfully, the Senate did not review the work of the ATSB against any international standard or comparison that would permit it to draw such a conclusion. The conclusion goes well beyond the evidence available to it in this inquiry. This is a decision based on opinion, not evidence. It is not clear how the committee reached this decision.

b. The very fact that The Report draws attention to the problem that the ATSB did not interview any Angel Flight pilots (section 1.25), and that there are potential problems with the statistical analysis of the data by ATSB which still seem to not be fully understood by ATSB should raise, in our view, significant questions about the “world class” conclusion.

c. It is not clear how the conclusion was reached that “Nothing in this report is a criticism of ATSB’s investigation into any particular incident” when in fact the inquiry was ‘particularly’ into the 2017 Angel Flight accident. Respectfully, The Report is replete with identified problems with the ATSB investigation which, in our view, remain unresolved.

Toot – toot…
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