Er -That’s the wrong way to tip er rary.
“But, but there’s Choc frog in it for him” P2 muttered: “what’s the hold up?” “You may want to up the ante” say’s P7 “try Ale – works like a charm”. Or so the story goes anyway. Truth is it takes hours to join the dots; do the reading, check the facts and then translate the whole thing into ‘Muggle-speak’. “Can’t do ‘em all at once” says I; P2 nods and say’s “that suits me, if we can just chip away at the pile, it’ll get done”. “Start on the ‘red’s” say’s P7. So it was agreed; each ‘red’ goes to the network – the responses have to be read and the ‘majority opinion’ presented – “Begin at the beginning” said the King of Hearts.
18 November 2009: ATSB notified of accident and ATSB subsequently notify CASA. The ATSB decide to carry out an investigation and CASA decide to run a parallel investigation, initiated 19 November.
What for and why? The last recorded ‘pseudo’ parallel investigation we can find is the ‘Lockhart River’ event; and even that could not be classified a truly parallel. What is ‘passing strange’ is that there was a song and dance about the role CASA played in operational approvals – led to a mighty big inquiry. Nothing of value to industry came of that expenditure. So we must wonder what prompted (goosed some say) CASA to leap into action under the auspices of a not yet operational MOU, under a brand new Manager of such things. It may well be the first ‘parallel investigation’ in the history of Australian aviation. So why the ‘rush’? ATSB would have plodded their way through the event, come up with some form of answer, maybe even hand balled it over to the CASA front row – something along the lines of “look here – we think the pilot broke a rule or two – you blokes want to check it out?”. That would smack of the normal, the routine and reflect past actions. White had James hung, drawn and bloody near quartered before the aircraft was settled on the ocean floor. Interesting in that context - at least when you consider this:-
23 November 2009: Richard White MALIU correspondence to ATSB Director Aviation Safety Investigations, Ian Sangston notifying CASA will be conducting a regulatory investigation into the actions of the flight crew. Note that there is no reference to 'parallel investigations' under either the 2004 or 2010 MOU (ref link - #122 & #28).
It becomes intriguing when you weigh in
20 November 2009: Quote from page 97 of Pel-Air MKII Final report - "The ATSB asked CAAF for ATS records for the flight and the weather information that was provided to the flight crew of VH-NGA. CAAF forwarded the request to the ATS provider and then obtained the records in December 2009 to pass on to the ATSB. This included copies of the 0630 METAR, 0800 SPECI and 0830 SPECI."
Within 24 hours ATSB had the ‘official’ record of the flight information provided by CAA Fiji Nadi (Nandi). The ‘majority’ wonder why the BoM/ Air Services list of ‘available’ weather reports differs from the CAAF version. The 0739 and the 0803 critical forecasts existed, a simple cross check would have begged the questions – why did the flight crew not receive them? Did the Fiji ATC actually receive them? These reports are pivotal – with them the decision to divert became option one; without the information – the flight was doomed.
23 November 2009: Richard White receives from Airservices Australia the complete list of Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs) applicable to the occurrence flight timeframe. This included the Nadi non-relayed 0803 AMD TAF, which appears to be underlined (ref link - #122 & #85 ).
By Nov 23, 09 White had the complete list of weather reports; it must have been a clear as crystal that the flight never received that crucial information. So why persist; even more intriguing is why this information was tarted up and slipped into a report as being ‘received’? That is was not received is bad enough; but to obfuscate the fact to imply that the reports were made available and ignored by the captain is just a little bit naughty.
There, that should get a seeker of truth going, the links provided by P2 provide some fairly easy to follow bread crumbs. You will need to refer back to Post #31 to access those links in the chronology. Having ‘an opinion’ is a thing you are entitled to; having an informed opinion is a thing you need – so they say.
Toot - toot...MTF
“But, but there’s Choc frog in it for him” P2 muttered: “what’s the hold up?” “You may want to up the ante” say’s P7 “try Ale – works like a charm”. Or so the story goes anyway. Truth is it takes hours to join the dots; do the reading, check the facts and then translate the whole thing into ‘Muggle-speak’. “Can’t do ‘em all at once” says I; P2 nods and say’s “that suits me, if we can just chip away at the pile, it’ll get done”. “Start on the ‘red’s” say’s P7. So it was agreed; each ‘red’ goes to the network – the responses have to be read and the ‘majority opinion’ presented – “Begin at the beginning” said the King of Hearts.
18 November 2009: ATSB notified of accident and ATSB subsequently notify CASA. The ATSB decide to carry out an investigation and CASA decide to run a parallel investigation, initiated 19 November.
What for and why? The last recorded ‘pseudo’ parallel investigation we can find is the ‘Lockhart River’ event; and even that could not be classified a truly parallel. What is ‘passing strange’ is that there was a song and dance about the role CASA played in operational approvals – led to a mighty big inquiry. Nothing of value to industry came of that expenditure. So we must wonder what prompted (goosed some say) CASA to leap into action under the auspices of a not yet operational MOU, under a brand new Manager of such things. It may well be the first ‘parallel investigation’ in the history of Australian aviation. So why the ‘rush’? ATSB would have plodded their way through the event, come up with some form of answer, maybe even hand balled it over to the CASA front row – something along the lines of “look here – we think the pilot broke a rule or two – you blokes want to check it out?”. That would smack of the normal, the routine and reflect past actions. White had James hung, drawn and bloody near quartered before the aircraft was settled on the ocean floor. Interesting in that context - at least when you consider this:-
23 November 2009: Richard White MALIU correspondence to ATSB Director Aviation Safety Investigations, Ian Sangston notifying CASA will be conducting a regulatory investigation into the actions of the flight crew. Note that there is no reference to 'parallel investigations' under either the 2004 or 2010 MOU (ref link - #122 & #28).
It becomes intriguing when you weigh in
20 November 2009: Quote from page 97 of Pel-Air MKII Final report - "The ATSB asked CAAF for ATS records for the flight and the weather information that was provided to the flight crew of VH-NGA. CAAF forwarded the request to the ATS provider and then obtained the records in December 2009 to pass on to the ATSB. This included copies of the 0630 METAR, 0800 SPECI and 0830 SPECI."
Within 24 hours ATSB had the ‘official’ record of the flight information provided by CAA Fiji Nadi (Nandi). The ‘majority’ wonder why the BoM/ Air Services list of ‘available’ weather reports differs from the CAAF version. The 0739 and the 0803 critical forecasts existed, a simple cross check would have begged the questions – why did the flight crew not receive them? Did the Fiji ATC actually receive them? These reports are pivotal – with them the decision to divert became option one; without the information – the flight was doomed.
23 November 2009: Richard White receives from Airservices Australia the complete list of Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs) applicable to the occurrence flight timeframe. This included the Nadi non-relayed 0803 AMD TAF, which appears to be underlined (ref link - #122 & #85 ).
By Nov 23, 09 White had the complete list of weather reports; it must have been a clear as crystal that the flight never received that crucial information. So why persist; even more intriguing is why this information was tarted up and slipped into a report as being ‘received’? That is was not received is bad enough; but to obfuscate the fact to imply that the reports were made available and ignored by the captain is just a little bit naughty.
There, that should get a seeker of truth going, the links provided by P2 provide some fairly easy to follow bread crumbs. You will need to refer back to Post #31 to access those links in the chronology. Having ‘an opinion’ is a thing you are entitled to; having an informed opinion is a thing you need – so they say.
Toot - toot...MTF