[Peetwo]

Diarrhea theory -   

(WARNING: Long post with a number of dots & dashes to follow -  )

Reference from Mick Mack's thread:

Via the SMH:

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Aviation safety inspectors claim staff shortage amid CASA restructure


By Patrick Hatch
December 9, 2019 — 12.00am

Federal transport minister Michael McCormack has declared "full confidence" in the nation's cash strapped aviation safety regulator amid claims a restructuring of the agency has led to a dangerous shortage in frontline inspection staff.

The Civil Aviation and Safety Authority is facing a $3.4 million budget shortfall this financial year, amid uncertainty around domestic aviation fuel excise revenue. Revenue from the 3.5¢-a-litre excise tax has been flat because major airlines Qantas and Virgin Australia have been limiting the number of domestic flights they offer in a bid to ensure stable profits.



CASA also faces a growing workload from international flights, which do not pay the excise tax.

Professionals Australia claimed there are 41 unfilled technical air safety positions at CASA, representing a 25 per cent reduction in airworthiness, pilot and safety systems inspectors over the past three years.

CASA said its inspector numbers have only fallen by eight, from 151 to 143. But the union claimed a further 33 positions are vacant due to inspectors being taken off front-line duty through secondments, special projects and acting roles.

"CASA has refused to fill these positions and has informed staff it has no intention of filling them until an anticipated restructure has taken place," said the union's Australian government group director Dale Beasley.

History has shown repeatedly what happens when standards slip. We are on a slippery slope towards degraded safety standards.

Mr McCormack, who is also deputy prime minister,  said in a statement he had "full confidence in CASA’s ability to perform its industry oversight obligations and ensure aviation safety.”

A CASA spokeswoman said the agency was in the process of "transforming the way we operate to provide more consistent and standardised safety oversight", and was developing a new "oversight model" that would identify staff roles and capabilities.


One CASA inspector, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not permitted to talk about the organisation publicly, said the staff shortage was forcing inspectors to cut corners and adopt “box ticking” approach to safety checks.

“We’ve got a huge number of people in CASA who have zero faith in management and genuinely believe that we’re setting ourselves up for a catastrophic event,” he said.



“We set a high standard, but that’s what first world aviation safety requires.

“History has shown repeatedly what happens when standards slip. We are on a slippery slope towards degraded safety standards.”

The resourcing gaps meant CASA has been unable to carry out inspections of overseas maintenance facilities, and unacceptable delays , Mr Beasley said.

CASA's latest corporate plan said it expected to run at a $3.4 million deficit in this financial year, and that it would try to balance its budget during "challenging" forward years.

CASA was to present a "detailed review" of its activities and funding requirements ahead of the government's Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook, in a fortnight. CASA's spokeswoman said this review was likely to be considered in the next federal budget.

Labor's federal transport minister Catherine King said the union's claims were "extremely concerning", and Mr McCormack "must explain how he thinks this level of resourcing is sufficient to keep Australians safe.”

The government earlier this year amended the Civil Aviation Act so that CASA must now "consider the economic and cost impact on individuals, businesses and the community" of its safety regulation. This followed an outcry from smaller aviation operations who claimed they were being strangled by red tape.

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Plus:

Aussie lives at risk from understaffed air safety workforce

A couple of takeaways from that article: It is unprecedented in recent history to have; a) someone breaking ranks internally with comments like this..

“We’ve got a huge number of people in CASA who have zero faith in management and genuinely believe that we’re setting ourselves up for a catastrophic event,”

and for b) the unions to combine to back up those comments so stridently :

According to Professionals Australia – ACT Branch and Australian Government Group director Dale Beasley:“Right now, these technical air safety staff are struggling to cover 41 vacant positions and have been doing so for 18 months. It’s an unacceptable risk for air travellers and is unsustainable for air safety staff,”

&...

Australian Federation of Air Pilots industrial and legal officer Paul Ferguson said CASA was not giving flying operations inspectors sufficient support, with flying training falling short of maintaining pilot qualifications...

...“Stalled recruitment has resulted in significant staff shortages, which is now compromising the effectiveness of CASA.”

Even if the unions are just typically playing the 'safety card', the unity of these high powered unions would suggest that this is not the case of one or two disgruntled technical/inspectorate staff and that there is a high probability of underlying systemic issues here that any real over-sighting Minister should be concerned about given the abysmal track record of this regulator in the last thirty odd years (think Monarch, Seaview, Lockhart, ICAO/FAA audits, PelAir etc..etc).

This got me thinking about where you might possibly find recent evidence of poor, possibly duplicitous, regulatory oversight (ie 'tick-a-box' audits etc.) possibly masking/covering up, real systemic safety issues? Then I thought of confidential reporting ie ASRS or REPCON. ASRS reports are not generally published but some REPCON are, so I then referred to the ATSB Aviation REPCON webpage: https://www.atsb.gov.au/repcon_reports/?mode=Aviation

The last two were dated and effectively closed off back in July:

1) https://www.atsb.gov.au/repcon/2018/ar201800096/

2) https://www.atsb.gov.au/repcon/2019/ar201900052/

I will come back to number 1) because there are IMO some real conflicting issues and parallels which are worthy of further exploration - .

Number 2) however particularly perked my interest because it was dealing with Airservices Australia and the reporter was obviously a Senior and current serving ATCO that had some real concerns about the changed management structure and oversight/supervision of the live 24 hr, 7 day a week air traffic control system. Also this is one area, based on past experience and evidence where CASA leave it to the ASA SMS to handle, could possibly show CASA oversight as being merely a tick-a-box routine:

Reporter's concern

The reporter has advised that Airservices has recently replaced Air Traffic Control Line Managers with Operations Line Managers (OLMs) in some locations. The OLMs were initially responsible for oversight and decision making regarding non-operational matters. However, in at least one location, OLMs are now involved in reviewing ATC incidents, delegating operational tasks to controllers and overseeing remedial management processes.

The reporter is concerned that the lack of any ATC experience will result in OLMs assigning operational duties to a controller not best placed to complete the task, due to the OLM not having the understanding of the complexities or procedural requirements of a particular task.

In addition, the reporter queries how OLMs are able to determine the appropriate remedial action for controllers, or ascertain which controller requires the remedial action in case of handover issues, when the OLM has no experience operating as a controller in a complex operational environment.

   
Now the response from AirServices management was fairly atypical but the CASA response IMO was not so atypical and was more akin to making sure that in hindsight that the CASA technical crew had covered the potential liability of CASA if this matter was ever to turn to custard:

Regulator's response (Regulator 1)

CASA is satisfied that the change in management of “operational matters” is not generating any additional safety concerns.

CASA conducts regular risk-based surveillance and auditing of Airservices to ensure compliance with CASR 172. CASA has not identified any compliance issues or safety concerns related to the changes in management structure or manager responsibilities.

CASA notes that an ATS provider must, at all times, maintain an appropriate organisation with a sound and effective management structure to enable it to provide, in accordance with the standards set out in the Manual of Standards and the standards set out or referred to in Annex 11, the air traffic services covered by its approval. This is an area subject to surveillance and auditing by CASA but there have been no findings or indications that recent management changes are impacting the level of ATC service provision, compliance or safety.

CASA notes that an ATS provider must have, at all times, enough suitably qualified and trained personnel who are able to supervise the provision of any air traffic service that it provides. CASA considers safety and compliance for provision of ATC services from a systemic perspective which includes assessment of management capability. CASA has not identified any issues in relation to manager roles.

CASA notes that MOS 2.2.2.1 requires the Airservices Operations Manual to contain a description of the chain of command.  OPSMAN172 mentions the position of Operations Line Manager and there is reference to ATC Line Managers. CASA is satisfied that there is no evidence that would justify a safety finding regarding OLMs.

CASA inspectors recently determined that the OLMs they interviewed were highly qualified and experienced in staff management. The OLM was responsible for the training portfolio but was not involved in determining what training a controller may need. The OLM was only responsible for organising the training and keeping adequate records.

CASA notes the need to ensure unqualified and untrained managers are not assigned responsibilities based only on experience or familiarity. These positions should be adequately trained as managers in those areas relevant to their accountabilities.

CASA does not have evidence that supports the issues identified in the REPCON. Whether the use of a manager without an ATC licence is compliant with the regulations is a matter of judgement. The regulations do not rule out such a manager, but they do require them to be suitably qualified and trained

   

Hmm...do I get a hint of some Dr A influence in that response?

However for ASA and CASA the matter would appear to have been effectively closed and dropped into the infamous bottomless cyber-pit of obscurity...

That was until I got to the bottom of the page and read this...

 Last update 11 December 2019 

...keeping in mind this trolling of mine through the ATSB website was conducted yesterday at approximately 9 am EDST??

Now I am not big on conspiracy theories but the probability of it just being a coincidence that some ATSB numpty was effectively reviewing the same cyber-binned REPCON as myself at pretty much the same time would have to be virtually zero?

It is worth noting that in light of the SMH and Yahoo Finance articles on Monday, that the ATSB now has skin in the game because if we are now to have (God forbid) another Seaview, Lockhart type accident where lack of proper regulatory oversight was an issue then the ATSB would potentially be in the gun for not picking up the warning signs?? 

Which will eventually bring me back to REPCON 1) but first read this: NTSB: Fatal FlyNYON flight was exploiting ‘loophole’ in regs

...The board also identified several contributing factors to the accident, including Liberty and NYONair’s “deficient safety management, which did not adequately mitigate foreseeable risks associated with the harness/tether system.” The NTSB’s investigation confirmed that, as previously reported by Vertical, Liberty pilots were aware of and repeatedly voiced concerns about hazards including the passenger harness and tether system. However, Liberty’s upper-level managers, notably director of operations Patrick Day, Sr. — the father of NYONair CEO Patrick Day, Jr. — “were disengaged from day-to-day operations and did not advocate for the pilots’ concerns.”

The NTSB found that Liberty improperly allowed NYONair to influence the operational control of Liberty’s FlyNYON flights, and that Patrick Day, Jr. “chastised the pilots and deprioritized their concerns.” Homendy highlighted several such exchanges, including one in which Day declared that FlyNYON’s motto is “rubbin’ is racing” — a reference to the Days of Thunder adage about playing rough — and said that pilots “just can’t get their snowflake feelings hurt.”

The board also had harsh words for the FAA’s “inadequate oversight” of commercial passenger-carrying operations conducted under Federal Aviation Regulations part 91. At the time of the accident, Liberty and NYONair were conducting their doors-off flights as “aerial photography” flights, exempting them from the stricter regulations that normally apply to air tour operations. Despite concerns raised by other FAA inspectors, the principal operations inspectors for Liberty and NYONair decided they didn’t need to evaluate these doors-off operations.

Consulting with the FAA’s legal department, the NTSB found that the agency intended “aerial photography” to include “only business-like, work-related aerial operations” — such as those conducted by trained professional photographers, not tourists wanting to take cell phone photos of their feet. NTSB investigator David Lawrence noted that FAA inspectors should have conducted the same due diligence: “Had they done that, they would have gotten the same legal interpretation that we received, [which] said this is not aerial photography, it was an air tour.”

The board highlighted how NYONair deliberately exploited the aerial photography loophole, advising its personnel to avoid the words “tour,” “route,” and “sightseeing,” and to instead use the words “custom,” “photo flight,” and “photography.”

“These companies were knowingly exploiting a loophole to avoid stronger regulation and oversight and people died because of it,” Sumwalt emphasized. The NTSB wants the FAA to establish clear definitions for the terms “aerial work” and “aerial photography” that specify only business-like, work-related aerial operations, as originally intended.

The FAA is currently allowing FlyNYON to conduct its tour operations under part 91 and part 136 with a letter of authorization (LOA. Liberty is no longer performing the doors-off flights). While part 136 imposes some additional requirements on the company, those fall far short of the part 135 safety rules that most passenger-carrying operations must comply with.

The NTSB revived a recommendation it initially made to the FAA in 1995 that all air tour operations be conducted under part 135. In 2007, when the FAA instead introduced part 136 — allowing small operators to conduct local tour flights without part 135 regulatory burdens — the NTSB marked its recommendation “closed – unacceptable action.”

“In this particular accident, [Liberty and NYONair] were operating under an egregious interpretation of current regulations — there’s no doubt about that,” said board member Homendy. “However, now NYON is operating under part 91 and 136 and an LOA, which is exactly what the NTSB opposed in [2007] when we closed this recommendation. Unacceptable.”

Sumwalt echoed, “Why is the FAA not requiring that higher level, that higher standard of care? . . . I think we need to take a hard line and say that by George if you’re going to charge people to go up for an air tour, it will be conducted on your part 135.”

Note that the NTSB do not in anyway hold back from chastising the regulator for not properly oversighting this operator and allowing the operator to exploit a loophole in the regs.    

MTF? - Definitely