Airports - Buy two, get one free.

Joining the dots & dashes on the DFO cover-up?

Quote:...ATSB has now gained a world wide reputation of being an ‘arse covering’ glove puppet, a catamite to those who hold sway. Look back to Lockhart River, look back to the Pel-Air debacle, take a close look at MH 370. Then take a very close look at the Hood credentials to run the ATSB. When you’ve done with that, take a very close look at NASAG and the DoIT involvement in the selling off of aerodromes. I say there is more chance of an ‘error’ to be found there, than in Quartermain’s pre take off preparations...


So glad that the BRB are taking up the cause on what I believe to the most disgusting ATSB Final Report cover-up to date (that includes the 1st and 2nd iteration of PelAir investigations).

Quote:...For a start, with two healthy engines and an old lady flying the aircraft, it would have been, with a simple rudder out of trim condition, easily ‘flyable’ for the short period it would take to correct the error. It would climb like a homesick angel, despite the ‘sideslip’ mumbo-jumbo Hood dragged out of his sorry arse. This incident began on the runway – the take off path clearly defines this; the rest is history. We need to know what, exactly was going on in that cockpit. Something had gone awry – but what and why?...

This brings me to another huge aberration with this bollocks report - first a reference from a 'Search 4 IP: 

(10-09-2018, 11:28 AM)Peetwo Wrote:  The HVH YMEN DFO faery tale grows... Huh    


Reference P7 Accidents - Domestic post: http://www.auntypru.com/forum/thread-103...ml#pid9398 

Quote:..I note, with some amusement, that the ‘experts’ on the UP are finally catching on. Shan’t bother you all with the posts – but, to further elaborate the abysmal ATSB performance in support of only the gods know what; a quote directly from the Be20 bible.

“The engine driven fuel pump (high pressure) is mounted on the accessory case in conjunction with the fuel control unit (FCU). Failure of this pump results in an immediate flame-out.”
 The primary boost pump (low pressure) is also engine driven and is mounted on the drive pad on the aft accessory section of the engine. This pump operates when the gas generator (N1) is turning and provides sufficient fuel for start, take-off all flight conditions except operation with hot aviation gasoline above 20, 000 feet altitude, and operation with cross-feed.

The minister should be asking his experts to clearly define what actually happened that day, at Essendon. They could, in turn, ask the ATSB what the hell they are playing at. Better yet, he could bring in the IIC and ask him; on oath, (in camera) if he can – hand on heart – provide a little more ‘fact’ than the Hood faery story. I’d expect some folk in the USA would value anything a little better than the current Wild Ass Guess (WAG) which claims, without any convincing supporting data or proof, 100% Pilot error. 

The simple truth minister is the ATSB management have NFI; the ‘tin-kickers’ might; but there is not enough evidence here to support any claim other than supposition. The bloody aircraft hit a building and burned, killing 5; that is fact – after that – well, you pay your money and take your chances...

Not exactly sure why but the last time I looked the mods over on the UP are still mulling over whether to approve Grogmonster's NTSB report attachment... Huh

Quote:Grogmonster:

Some frightening similarities here people. Not Rudder Trim !!!!
Attachments Pending Approval
[img=16x0]https://www.pprune.org/images/attach/pdf.gif[/img]
 
NTSB report on Wichita Crash.pdf


Lead Balloon: 

Pending approval, here’s some of the report:


Quote:The airline transport pilot was departing for a repositioning flight. During the initial climb, the pilot declared an emergency and stated that the airplane "lost the left engine." The airplane climbed to about 120 ft above ground level, and witnesses reported seeing it in a left turn with the landing gear extended. The airplane continued turning left and descended into a building on the airfield. A postimpact fired ensued and consumed a majority of the airplane.

Postaccident examinations of the airplane, engines, and propellers did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Neither propeller was feathered before impact. Both engines exhibited multiple internal damage signatures consistent with engine operation at impact. Engine performance calculations using the preimpact propeller blade angles (derived from witness marks on the preload plates) and sound spectrum analysis revealed that the left engine was likely producing low to moderate power and that the right engine was likely producing moderate to high power when the airplane struck the building. A sudden, uncommanded engine power loss without flameout can result from a fuel control unit failure or a loose compressor discharge pressure (P3) line; thermal damage prevented a full assessment of the fuel control units and P3 lines. Although the left engine was producing some power at the time of the accident, the investigation could not rule out the possibility that a sudden left engine power loss, consistent with the pilot's report, occurred.
A sideslip thrust and rudder study determined that, during the last second of the flight, the airplane had a nose-left sideslip angle of 29°. It is likely that the pilot applied substantial left rudder input at the end of the flight. Because the airplane's rudder boost system was destroyed, the investigation could not determine if the system was on or working properly during the accident flight. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the pilot failed to maintain lateral control of the airplane after he reported a problem with the left engine. The evidence also indicates that the pilot did not follow the emergency procedures for an engine failure during takeoff, which included retracting the landing gear and feathering the propeller.

Anyway for the benefit of those IOS and BRB members interested, here is some links for the quoted NTSB final report into the 30 October 2014 B200 fatal accident at Wichita, Kansas (Report No. - CEN15FA034): 

  1. https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviat...4112&key=1
  2. https://aviation-safety.net/database/rec...20141030-0
  3. http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2016/02/be...g-air.html

Quote:NTSB Identification: CEN15FA034
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, October 30, 2014 in Wichita, KS
Probable Cause Approval Date: 03/01/2016
Aircraft: RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY B200, registration: N52SZ
Injuries: 4 Fatal, 2 Serious, 4 Minor.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The airline transport pilot was departing for a repositioning flight. During the initial climb, the pilot declared an emergency and stated that the airplane "lost the left engine." The airplane climbed to about 120 ft above ground level, and witnesses reported seeing it in a left turn with the landing gear extended. The airplane continued turning left and descended into a building on the airfield. A postimpact fired ensued and consumed a majority of the airplane. 

Postaccident examinations of the airplane, engines, and propellers did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Neither propeller was feathered before impact. Both engines exhibited multiple internal damage signatures consistent with engine operation at impact. Engine performance calculations using the preimpact propeller blade angles (derived from witness marks on the preload plates) and sound spectrum analysis revealed that the left engine was likely producing low to moderate power and that the right engine was likely producing moderate to high power when the airplane struck the building. A sudden, uncommanded engine power loss without flameout can result from a fuel control unit failure or a loose compressor discharge pressure (P3) line; thermal damage prevented a full assessment of the fuel control units and P3 lines. Although the left engine was producing some power at the time of the accident, the investigation could not rule out the possibility that a sudden left engine power loss, consistent with the pilot's report, occurred.

A sideslip thrust and rudder study determined that, during the last second of the flight, the airplane had a nose-left sideslip angle of 29°. It is likely that the pilot applied substantial left rudder input at the end of the flight. Because the airplane's rudder boost system was destroyed, the investigation could not determine if the system was on or working properly during the accident flight. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the pilot failed to maintain lateral control of the airplane after he reported a problem with the left engine. The evidence also indicates that the pilot did not follow the emergency procedures for an engine failure during takeoff, which included retracting the landing gear and feathering the propeller.

Although the pilot had a history of anxiety and depression, which he was treating with medication that he had not reported to the Federal Aviation Administration, analysis of the pilot's autopsy and medical records found no evidence suggesting that either his medical conditions or the drugs he was taking to treat them contributed to his inability to safely control the airplane in an emergency situation.


The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
  • The pilot's failure to maintain lateral control of the airplane after a reduction in left engine power and his application of inappropriate rudder input. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to follow the emergency procedures for an engine failure during takeoff. Also contributing to the accident was the left engine power reduction for reasons that could not be determined because a postaccident examination did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation and thermal damage precluded a complete examination.

[Image: 20141030-0-C-1.jpg]



 
The first and most obvious question is why was this final report not listed in the ATSB's 'related occurrences' section of the VH-ZCR final report -  Huh 

Probably because it didn't fit the HVH faery tale:


Quote:Related occurrences

A review of the ATSB’s occurrence database and the United States’ National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) online database identified three potentially similar accidents that involved an aircraft taking off with the rudder trim not correctly set.
  
After reviewing the NTSB accident reports, phots and video footage, IMO there is absolutely no debating the remarkable similarities in the two accidents. What makes it worse is that I suspect that the ATSB investigation team have actually referred to the NTSB report as some of the investigatory methodology is remarkably similar.

Example: 

Quote:..The NTSB conducted a sideslip thrust and rudder study based on information from the surveillance videos. This study evaluated the relationships between the airplane's sideslip angle, thrust differential, and rudder deflection. Calculations made using multiple rudder deflection angles showed that full right rudder deflection would have resulted in a sideslip angle near 0°, a neutral rudder would have resulted in an airplane sideslip angle between 14° and 19°, and a full left rudder deflection would have resulted in an airplane sideslip angle between 28° and 35° airplane nose left. Calculation of the airplane's sideslip angle as captured in the image of the airplane during the last second of flight showed that the airplane had a 29° nose-left sideslip, which would have required the application of a substantial left rudder input...


https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inv...-2017-024/

.
..Following witness observations of a significant left yaw, the ATSB attempted to define the aircraft’s sideslip and roll angles at different points along the flight path using video footage from CCTV and a vehicle dashboard camera. Still images were extracted from the CCTV and dashboard camera footage, and the location of the aircraft was determined using ADS-B data at points A through G (Figure 16). ZCR’s track was determined at each point using ADS-B data...

...Analysis of the roof impact marks indicated that:

  • the aircraft had a heading angle of about 86 ⁰ (T)

  • the ground track was about 114 ⁰ (T)

  • the aircraft was at a sideslip angle of about 28⁰ left of track

  • the aircraft was slightly left-wing and nose-low with a shallow angle of descent at the initial roof impact

  • after the initial impact, the aircraft rotated left on its vertical axis until the fuselage was about parallel with the rear parapet wall of the building...

P2 comment - I note in the case of the Wichita accident that on 26 October 2016 Flight Safety International filed a lawsuit against 12 different companies associated with the King Air crash: http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2016/10/be...g-air.html


Quote:FlightSafety files lawsuit over 2014 King Air crash 

WICHITA, Kan. FlightSafety International has filed a lawsuit, naming more than 12 companies (19 defendants total) it says contributed to the October 2014 fatal crash of a Beechcraft King Air near Wichita's Mid Continent Airport, now known as Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport.

On Oct. 30, 2014, a Beechcraft B200 Super King Air crashed into a flight safety training center building near the airport, killing the pilot and three people inside the training center.

Among the defendants in the lawsuit are Textron Aviation, Yingling Aircraft, Beechcraft Corporation, Hartzell Propeller, Inc., Pratt and Whitney Engine Services, Inc. and the plane's previous owner.

Investigators say the pilot failed to maintain control of the King Air after a reduction in power to its left engine.

Source:  http://www.kwch.com 

After once again reading the Wichita accident report - https://www.ntsb.gov/about/employment/_l...034&akey=1 - and in particular under the 'Medical and Pathological' section :

Quote:MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION 

This 53-year-old pilot had been an air traffic controller for more than 20 years at ICT and retired in 2013. Since his first medical certification in 1980, the pilot had reported thyroid disease, hernias, and recurrent symptomatic kidney stones to the FAA. Beginning in 1997, he had episodes of anxiety and depression, which required intermittent treatment with medication. During the first episode, he was unable to work for a certain time. A second episode began in October 2013 and continued through the accident date. He did not report his recurrent anxiety or his use of buspirone and escitalopram to the FAA. However, he visited his primary care physician about 1 month before the accident and was noted to be stable on the medications. In addition, the pilot had a procedure to treat kidney stones in 2013 that he did not report to the FAA. 

On November 3, 2014, the Regional Forensic Science Center, Sedgwick County, Kansas, performed an autopsy on the pilot. The cause of death was determined to be thermal injuries and smoke inhalation and the manner of death was determined to be an accident. According to the autopsy report, a thin plastic medical catheter was identified in the pilot's pelvis, but it was not further described in the report. The Regional Forensic Science Center also conducted toxicology testing of the pilot's heart blood, which identified carboxyhemoglobin at 39 percent, but no other tested for substances were found.

Toxicology testing performed by the Bioaeronautical Research Laboratory at the FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute identified buspirone and citalopram and its metabolite n-desmethylcitalopram in the pilot's heart blood and urine. In addition, the carboxyhemoglobin was 35 percent; no ethanol, cyanide, or any other tested for substances were identified. Buspirone, also named BuSpar, is an anxiolytic prescription medication. Buspirone is different from other anxiolytics in that it has little, if any, typical anti-anxiety side effects, such as sedation and physical impairment, but it does carry a warning, "May impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks (e.g., driving, operating heavy machinery)." Citalopram is a prescription antidepressant, also named Celexa, which carries a warning, "May impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks (e.g., driving, operating heavy machinery)."

From the ATSB YMEN DFO accident report:
Quote:Medical and pathological information  The pilot held a Class 1 Aviation Medical Certificate that was valid until 20 May 2017. The pilot was required to wear distance vision correction and have available reading correction while exercising the privileges of his licence. The pilot’s CASA medical records indicated that he was diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes in 2007. At the time of the accident, the pilot was reportedly on multiple oral medications to manage his diabetes and was considered to have met the CASA requirements for maintaining his medical certificate.

The records also showed that, as part of the pilot’s annual medical requirements, an echocardiogram was performed in 2016, which revealed an abnormal mitral valve. This was repaired in July of that year, with a post-operative follow-up identifying nil issues. CASA subsequently reviewed the pilot’s medical history and he was advised on 4 February 2017 that he could continue exercising the privileges of his licence, but should cease flying if there was a change in his treatment or condition.

The pilot’s post-mortem examination established that the pilot succumbed to injuries sustained during the impact sequence. Mild to moderate coronary artery atherosclerosis22 was noted, along with signs of mitral valve annuloplasty.23 There was no evidence, however, of any significant natural disease which may have caused or contributed to the accident. Further, the toxicology results did not identify any substance that could have impaired the pilot’s performance or that were not noted in the pilot’s CASA medical records. While post-mortem results for the passengers were not provided to the ATSB at the time of writing, given the injuries sustained by the pilot and the results of his post-mortem, the accident was not survivable. The pilot’s family described him as being fit for his age and indicated that he regularly exercised.

Plus the quote on that bizarre, abnormal Mayday call: 

Quote:MAYDAY call

The MAYDAY call broadcast by the pilot of ZCR shortly after take-off was reviewed by the ATSB. No additional information regarding the nature of the emergency was identified. In addition, the ATSB’s assessment of the pilot’s speech characteristics was unable to provide any further information.

Not sure why there is no analysis material/documentation highlighting the methodology used in the ATSB assessment of the pilot's speech characteristics but even as a layman I would have thought there was considerable significance in the pilot giving a non-standard Mayday call -  i.e x7 Mayday's, instead of x3, without any information in regards to the nature of the emergency - at the most critical point of the accident flight (remembering pilots are consistently trained in an emergency situation to prioritise - aviate, navigate, communicate).    

Keeping the Wichita accident report and the non-standard Mayday call in mind, I can't help but think that the YMEN DFO accident pilot Max Quartermain may not have suffered a physical incapacitation but rather a mental incapacitation (like the Wichita pilot obviously did), some sort of cognitive block which did not allow him to react or assess and then act appropriately (ANC) to the abnormal/emergency situation he found himself in - just saying... Huh  


MTF...P2  Cool
Reply

A duty of care.

Sydney Morning Herald – Choc Frog awarded.

Seems at least the SMH and the AFAP  are prepared to tackle the serious, 60 y.o. problems facing public safety around Australian airports. Civilized, developed, responsible places, like Europe, UK and the USA have adopted rules and developed safeguards against the possibility of an aircraft colliding with a ‘close in’ buildings.  Well done SMH; will that story be available to the citizens of Melbourne, through the Age we wonder?

The simplest, safest way to resolve this issue is easily done – Boycott the Essendon DFO – shop elsewhere. Watch how quickly things change then. The other option of course is to wait until there is another major incident; that’ll fix it.

What can’t happen is that the ATSB be allowed to continue ‘investigating’. They are a bit short in the credibility department – just a bit: with a very spotty track record.

Toot – toot……
Reply

A duty of care. - Part II


[Image: Dw_bGZtVAAARsic.jpg]

Ref:

(01-16-2019, 05:33 AM)Kharon Wrote:  Sydney Morning Herald – Choc Frog awarded.

Quote:Essendon Airport DFO plans call safety planning into question


[Image: 1113e378aaa73452e3c5ce608df57110d474f64f]
By Patrick Hatch
16 January 2019 — 12:05am


The way buildings around Australia's airports are approved is under fresh scrutiny after it emerged that Essendon Airport’s DFO shopping centre complex was built closer to a runway than recommended under international and Australian safety guidelines.


The nation’s largest professional pilot association has called the situation at Essendon a "significant safety compliance anomaly", and said that it raised questions about whether safety has been compromised.


[Image: e21f4201ffad3f4ec4fc414c80f6ec8ff288e07c]

The planning approval for Essendon's retail precinct has been called into question. CREDIT:MICHAEL DODGE


It comes as the Australian Transport Safety Bureau is close to completing a major investigation into how Essendon's DFO complex was designed and approved. The probe was launched in the wake of a fatal crash in 2017 when a light aircraft ploughed into the rear of the centre.

“The very fact that it was allowed to be built is a safety concern for our system," said Captain Marcus Diamond, a safety and technical officer at the Australian Federation of Air Pilots (AFAP).

"It means that inappropriate buildings can be built not just at Essendon, but at other airports.


"There’s more risk, and we need to know how that was justified.”


DFO sits within recommended buffer zone


[Image: 2230123_1547522994967.jpg]
Source: AFAP 




The family of trucking billionaire Lindsay Fox and businessman Max Beck acquired a 99-year lease on Essendon Airport in 2001 for $22 million, and set about developing retail and commercial buildings around the airport.

That included the DFO complex built south of the main runway in 2005.



The wider airport precinct is now reportedly worth more than $1 billion, and is home to a hotel, car yards, offices, a whisky distillery and other commercial property, with other developments in the pipeline.
It had been expected at the time of the purchase that aviation activities would cease at what used to be Melbourne's international airport.



[Image: db4cb65d7aeb02f3297947d8426ec18f940093ac]

The 2017 plane crash into the DFO has promoted regulators to investigate how the shopping centre was approved. CREDIT:SEVEN NEWS

But it is today Australia's largest corporate jet base, and home to Victoria's police and emergency air services and other aviation operations.

Documents released to the AFAP under freedom of information laws show the DFO building was approved by then-federal transport minister John Anderson on the condition that it did not adversely impact on “navigation aids or operational activities” at the airport


But the AFAP has challenged whether that is what occurred, after discovering in planning documents also released under FOI that the DFO sits just 128 metres from the centre of the runway.

That is within the 150 metre flyover area - essentially a buffer zone - either side of the runway's centre line that would form a 300 metre "runway strip width" recommended by the United Nation's aviation safety body, the International Civil Aviation Organization.


[Image: f62a69022a9df9f83b8cbd155583d3fe599e81a2]

Five people were killed in the 2017 plane crash.CREDIT:JUSTIN MCMANUS

Two large water tanks, light poles and fencing also sit within the 300 metre zone, which is intended to safeguard aircraft if they run off the tarmac during take-off or landing.

As a member nation, Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is expected to try to keep its own safety standards in line with ICAO's.

The AFAP said that when the DFO was approved in 2004, CASA's standards allowed the runway to have a strip width of less than 300 metres, but only if a detailed safety case was put forward and all relevant stakeholders were consulted.

The pilots body has been unable to access that safety case, with an FOI request met with the response that there was no such document. CASA and the airport could not say if one was ever produced.


More buildings?

CASA later implemented the 300 metre standard in its own rules, and in 2015 granted an “instrument” that had the effect of retrospectively approving the DFO building, while ordering Essendon to still tell pilots it had a 300 metre strip width.

That width is given to pilots in official operational material and informs operators what aircraft they can use, as well as how they are insured.

So concerned about the objects within the buffer zone, the AFAP has issued a safety bulletin to pilots warning that the strip width was closer to 230 metres.

Essendon Airport now wants to narrow the strip width back to 180 metres, and started consulting late last year with operators at the airport about how that could affect their operations.


[Image: 85ae518d5afd3241f5135121dc94d2d9dda2f3fc]
Essendon Airport is home to Victoria's emergency services air wings. CREDITTongueAUL JEFFERS

Some operators have raised concerns that narrowing the width could lead to more buildings being built close to the runway, or otherwise interfering with operations or safety, according to one operator who declined to be named.

The AFAP's Captain Diamond said that the airport was "trying to narrow the runway strip width even more without proper safety analysis and will allow even more inappropriate buildings to infringe the international standards".

A spokesman for Essendon Fields Airport said it had "always operated within all applicable aviation safety regulations", but declined to comment in more detail on matters that were subject to the ATSB's investigation.

It said that its main runway had operated with the strip width of 180 metres from 1972 to 2015, and that the DFO and other objects were not within the restricted area when they were approved and built.

CASA 'too busy' to check plans

Other documents released to AFAP under FOI show the federal government approved the DFO development on the condition that the airport would consult with CASA about its plans and comply with any of its safety requirements.

But letters from CASA to the airport released under FOI say it did not have time to check the DFO plans.


“Gathering the information required for the authority’s assessment of whether every item in a Draft Master Plan will be compliant with civil aviation safety requirements would be time-consuming and expensive,” one letter says.

[Image: f39c895c7c9b41e8750374c228a1069b524aa455]

Essendon is Australia's biggest private jet base.
CREDIT:JOE ARMAO

A CASA spokesman said the DFO building was marked on charts and equipped with hazard lights.

"The current runway width is not compromising safety," he said.

CASA declined to answer why it ordered the airport to publish a 300 metre strip width or if that needed to be updated.



Safety probe

In February 2017, a Beechcraft King Air light aircraft turned sharply to the left shortly after takeoff and crashed into the southern end of the DFO, killing all five people on board.

The aircraft hit the southern end of the building - well outside the disputed runway buffer zone.



Quote:CASA letter to Essendon Airport

It appears to CASA that gathering the information required for the Authority's assessment of whether every item in a Draft Master Plan will be compliant with civil aviation safety requirements would be time-consuming and expensive, and inconsistent with the purpose of the Master Plan in any case. Any such assessment itself would be extremely time-consuming and as Draft Master Plans can change and have very long lifetimes, much of the work may ultimately be unnecessary...

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau found that pilot error was to blame, but while looking into the crash, decided to launch a separate investigation into how the DFO complex was approved "from an aviation safety perspective".


That probe is nearing completion, with its final report currently out for review by the parties involved ahead of its public release.

The AFAP's probing of Essendon Airport has prompted AusALPA - a body it is part of which represents more than 7000 professional Australian pilots on safety matters - to look carefully at what it considers inappropriate developments at a number of other airports.

Captain Diamond said the Essendon Airport example showed the approval processes for buildings around airports needed tightening, at a time when many airports were building around their airstrips.

“There needs to be a review and we need to have robust assessment processes that at the moment are being abridged or avoided in the planning stages," he said.

"We need to tidy that up and have the regulations much more firm in protecting both the airspace around airports and the physical characteristics of airports."


Airports including Brisbane, Canberra and Cairns have and continue to build new hotels, office blocks and other buildings around their airports.

“These sorts of developments are pretty standard around airports around the world,” said Canberra Airport's managing director Steven Byron.

“There is a very rigorous process,” including consultation with airlines, regulators and the public, he said.

Brisbane Airport said the planning processes in place ensured that aviation operation safety and efficiency were not compromised by developments.

The federal department of infrastructure, which also had to approve the DFO building, directed questions to CASA.

Seems at least the SMH and the AFAP  are prepared to tackle the serious, 60 y.o. problems facing public safety around Australian airports. Civilized, developed, responsible places, like Europe, UK and the USA have adopted rules and developed safeguards against the possibility of an aircraft colliding with a ‘close in’ buildings.  Well done SMH; will that story be available to the citizens of Melbourne, through the Age we wonder?

The simplest, safest way to resolve this issue is easily done – Boycott the Essendon DFO – shop elsewhere. Watch how quickly things change then. The other option of course is to wait until there is another major incident; that’ll fix it.

What can’t happen is that the ATSB be allowed to continue ‘investigating’. They are a bit short in the credibility department – just a bit: with a very spotty track record.

Toot – toot……

Hmm...sorry to burst your bubble "K" but why is the AFAP coming out swinging on it's own and not united with AIPA under the AusALPA banner? 

Also, why is there no mention about, the recently signed by our dopey NFI miniscule, NASAG NASF Guideline... 
 
Quote:Ref - https://auntypru.com/forum/showthread.ph...41#pid9741

..National Airport Safeguarding Framework (NASF) Guideline I on Public Safety Areas (PSAs) was agreed by Ministers at the Transport and Infrastructure Council on 9 November 2018... 

...which the AFAP helped contribute to under the AusALPA banner in their letter to Dear Old Lachie from October 2017: ref - https://www.aipa.org.au/media/1136/17-10...-zones.pdf

Quote:AusALPA quotes:

 ...While we note that DIRD has been trying to get agreement from the States on PSZs for about a decade, AusALPA strongly suggests that the NASAG should closely ponder on the irony that we in Australia will still not have national PSZ planning restrictions in place some 60 years after the Le Maitre Committee in the UK provided all the necessary public safety policy considerations. NASAG should take no comfort in Australia’s good fortune in regard to major aviation accidents and certainly should not continue to prevaricate in establishing a universally stringent set of safeguarding rules..

...The proposed Guideline appears to be ignoring this issue as well as the fact that any future planning restrictions will have a material effect on property values, especially where lucrative redevelopment options will now be prevented. AusALPA suggests that these economic consequences, while regrettable, are nevertheless necessary for the greater public good...

...AusALPA is particularly concerned about this quote from the Covering Document and its apparent influence on the Draft Guideline: 


Quote:Data collated by the International Civil Aviation Organization indicates that, while statistically very low, accidents that occur during the take-off or landing phase are most likely to occur within 1km before the runway on landing or within 500m beyond the runway end on take-off.

...We are concerned because the dataset and the basis for these conclusions are not identified in the document and are not readily found in extensive internet searches. For example, the only ICAO work cited in the early NLR studies (see NLR CR-2000-147) was a 1980 document, since withdrawn. Our own research into the accident location data suggests that the unsubstantiated “most likely to occur” statement is statistically and evidentially problematic, particularly in regard to take-off overshoot and landing undershoot accidents. We have attached two pages extracted from NLR CR-2000-147 that amply demonstrate the inaccuracy of this unsubstantiated and misleading assertion...

When you read the very legitimate concerns of AusALPA back then (25 October 2017), then consider that the (now signed) NASF Guideline I (PSAs around airports) would appear not to have altered in any shape or form, by the secretive (behind closed doors) NASAG committee, Shirley one has to be suspicious that the AFAP has not mentioned one word about the 60+ year deficient public safety zone policy around airports? Just saying! - In the interests of Duty of Care of course... Rolleyes 
 

MTF..P2  Cool
Reply

CAsA- The biggest joke in aviation

From the article;

“Planning documents also released under FOI that the DFO sits just 128 metres from the centre of the runway”.

Unbelievable that this could even occur. It is abhorrent that this building received any form of approval or sign off in the first place. And it is a safety issue that any person flying in and out of Essendon should consider. The current building location poses minimal risk when all goes perfectly in the air. But when the shit hits the fan, which it did, these people may not have died had the building not been where it shouldn’t have been. 128m from the centre line? Seriously? How big are the aircraft using that runway? How strong are Melbourne’s winter crosswinds? How easy is it for an aircraft to become unstable and drift a few hundred metres left or right of the centre line during bad weather, an engine out, or a stall???? Talk about a reduced safety margin.

And this;

“The AFAP said that when the DFO was approved in 2004, CASA's standards allowed the runway to have a strip width of less than 300 metres, but only if a detailed safety case was put forward and all relevant stakeholders were consulted.
The pilots body has been unable to access that safety case, with an FOI request met with the response that there was no such document. CASA and the airport could not say if one was ever produced”.


That’s right. That’s because no safety case was submitted, no robust risk assessment undertaken, a simple and quick sign off was granted. It would be interesting to know if there are any connections between Local, State and Federal Government employees, the land owner, the DFO developer and any other party. This development gained approval too quickly. Was there some pork barrelling going on? Perhaps Council or State elections? Paper bags for anybody perhaps?

And this;

Letters from CASA to the airport released under FOI say it did not have time to check the DFO plans. “Gathering the information required for the authority’s assessment of whether every item in a Draft Master Plan will be compliant with civil aviation safety requirements would be time-consuming and expensive,” one letter says.

Well there you go! The Big R Regulator has all the time in the world to bully industry, pick at nonchalant pithy little items in an Ops Manual, but holy shit when it comes to putting a big concrete public shopping complex within 128 metres of the runway centre line of a large size airport the CAsA don’t have time to assess it!!!! Pure gold. But disgusting. What the effing hell are we taxpayers paying these muppets to actually do???

Carmody, you’re the CEO mate. You are sitting in the chair. You own this. You need to go!!

TICK TOCK
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AFAP, CASA and NASAG.

Hand in glove? It is no secret who ‘owns’ the AFAP nowadays – not at all. AusALPA provided a balanced, sensible submission related to ‘building’ tall stuff within internationally recognised boundaries – designed to keep the unsuspecting public safe, shopping at the airport DFO while the kids play about in the designated play area. I’m not sure how many AFAP casasexuals, CASA delinquents, Departmental Yes-men; or, even high rolling ‘developers have pulled the bodies of  burned alive, dead children out of the wreckage of an aircraft smash – but perhaps the experience would sober them – just a bit - perhaps.

“Essendon Airport now wants to narrow the strip width back to 180 metres, and started consulting late last year with operators at the airport about how that could affect their operations.”

FFS - Maths; for idiots 101.

120 knots = 222 Kph.
140 knots= 259 Kph
160 knots= 296 Kph

An aircraft with a landing speed of 130 knots is doing 240 Kph on touchdown (ish); should a tyre blow out even at 100 knots (185 Kph) and directional control is lost – that aircraft will cover 180 meters in just under four seconds. How long - remind an old man - was the entire King Air flight - in seconds - before it rudely collided with a building?

180 K per hour = 3 Kph a minute – 3000 meters/ 60 = 50 meters per second – 3.6 seconds – BOOM.

Let’s look at a take off; rotate at a gentle 120 knots = 222 Kph – 3.7 K per minute. 61.6 meters PER SECOND. The aircraft is 2/3 the way down the runway at the point of engine failure. This equates to a whisker under three seconds to transit the 180 wide zone – FROM ONE SIDE TO THE OTHER. Half that when there is 90 meters either side. The King Air which hit the DFO normally is doing somewhere between 100 and 130 knots (240 K –ish) at about the same height as the DFO. How much time has a pilot got to regain control, sort out and shut down a failed engine – not bloody much is the right answer. The ‘codes’ and ‘standards’ adopted by the real world acknowledge the ‘abnormal’ event and have taken steps to mitigate the risk of carnage on a grand scale. But, Australia does seem to so enjoy a good, big BBQ -    

“These sorts of developments are pretty standard around airports around the world,” said Canberra Airport's managing director Steven Byron. BOLLOCKS & PONY-POOH.

“That is within the 150 metre meter fly-over area - essentially a buffer zone - either side of the runway's centre line that would form a 300 metre "runway strip width" recommended by the United Nation's aviation safety body, the International Civil Aviation Organization.”


“Two large water tanks, light poles and fencing also sit within the 300 metre zone, which is intended to safeguard aircraft if they run off the tarmac during take-off or landing.”

“CASA later implemented the 300 metre standard in its own rules, and in 2015 granted an “instrument” that had the effect of retrospectively approving the DFO building, while ordering Essendon to still tell pilots it had a 300 metre strip width.”


“The AFAP said that when the DFO was approved in 2004, CASA's standards allowed the runway to have a strip width of less than 300 metres, but only if a detailed safety case was put forward and all relevant stakeholders were consulted.

Letters from CASA to the airport released under FOI say it did not have time to check the DFO plans. “Gathering the information required for the authority’s assessment of whether every item in a Draft Master Plan will be compliant with civil aviation safety requirements would be time-consuming and expensive,” one letter says.

P2 – “Hmm...sorry to burst your bubble "K" but why is the AFAP coming out swinging on it's own and not united with AIPA under the AusALPA banner?”  Also, why is there no mention about, the recently signed by our dopey NFI miniscule, NASAG NASF Guideline...

Good questions P2 – good luck getting them answered. You’ll need it. Although it will be great fun to watch the ‘responsibility ball’ game of musical chairs again – that could be a hoot.

“Yes please” (No need to order for the BRB, the staff understand our needs very well). A simple smile, nod and payment usually satisfies. Priceless antique system – Service I believe they called it.

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I’m forever blowing bubbles -

P2 - Nah Mate: me bubbles is all in good wurkin’ order, no problems there; the ‘bump of curiosity’ however is working overtime. Shirley is right to be suspicious; this from the SMH rang a few bells and whistles:-

SMH – “It comes as the Australian Transport Safety Bureau is close to completing a major investigation into how Essendon's DFO complex was designed and approved. The probe was launched in the wake of a fatal crash in 2017 when a light aircraft ploughed into the rear of the Centre.”

P7 - "Letters from CASA to the airport released under FOI say it did not have time to check the DFO plans. “Gathering the information required for the authority’s assessment of whether every item in a Draft Master Plan will be compliant with civil aviation safety requirements would be time-consuming and expensive,” one letter says.

Given the ATSB’s piss poor analysis of the accident, the way the Witchita accident was ignored, the rapid, unsupported claim ‘the pilot dun-it’ and the lack-lustre performance of the ATSB management; it leads one to wonder why was the ATSB selected to ‘investigate’. What ‘expertise’ can they offer in the black art of air space design?

You can see why my ‘bubble’ is still floating – the SMH article was good work – corroboration from the AFAP seems, at face value, to be reasonable and it gets the story published; so far so good. The AFAP actually did the ‘right thing’ and Diamond is a ‘white hat’. But bringing the AFAP any deeper into this sorry saga will raise deep seated, long held suspicions. CASA are up their collective Hocks in the approval of this building as are the DoIT. Many rice bowls to protect and ‘alliances’ to maintain; not to mention the big money interests. Not one of these outfits can afford the slightest whisper of culpability in allowing this DFO to be built where it is. Hell I can just about hear the insurance legal Eagles sharpening their talons and beaks from here – as a counterpoint to the tramping of politicians feet as they head for the exits, dragging their safety nets and golden parachutes with ‘em.

Yet responsibility for the investigation rests on the shoulders of the Hood ATSB. Am I worried? – Oh, you bet I am. I doubt I’d trust Hood as far as I could kick him, given the chance. This is a matter of great importance – Australia trails the world best practice by 60 years; the development around airports since privatisation has been uncontrolled. The Essendon DFO accident was a wake-up call; the investigation needs to be independent, unimpeachable, free from any hint government agency involvement. A Royal Commission working with the USA ‘code’ as a guide would reveal the unprecedented ‘risk’ Australians live with in the vicinity of aerodrome ‘high risk’ areas.

We were very, very lucky at Essendon – got off very lightly. The worst case scenario at Essendon would have seen Australia’s very worst ever aviation disaster. Is Hood the right man to entrust with this task?

Aye well; that’s up to you to decide. You’d need four good men, a strong horse and I’d have to be legless before you could get me (or mine) into that airport DFO.

Toot – toot….

[GD - your follow up post moved to the SBG page - HERE ]
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Aeroplanes can ruin your stock....

Spotlight has teamed up with a group of Essendon Airport DFO retailers to sue the owner of a plane that plunged into the shopping centre, killing five people on board and ruining more than $6 million worth of stock. More here;

https://www.theage.com.au/national/victo...50t3z.html

Quote:Spotlight chases crashed DFO plane owner for millions in ruined stock
Tom Cowie


By Tom Cowie
23 January 2019 — 7:40pm


Spotlight has teamed up with a group of Essendon Airport DFO retailers to sue the owner of a plane that plunged into the shopping centre, killing five people on board and ruining more than $6 million worth of stock.

A volley of writs filed in the Supreme Court in the past week continues the legal fallout from the crash, after the families of the four American tourists killed in the disaster said they planned to sue the dead pilot's estate for millions of dollars over the February 2017 tragedy.


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Damage to the Spotlight store at DFO after a plane crash that killed all five on board.CREDIT:AAP

Spotlight has joined brands Herringbone, Victoria Station and Oz Design Furniture in suing the Bendigo-based company that owned the plane.

The crash left a gaping hole in the side of the shopping centre and the toll of the damage has now been revealed in court documents.

In its statement of claim, Spotlight said the explosion ignited a fire that activated the sprinkler system, damaging or destroying stock.


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The B200 erupts into a huge fireball after crashing into the roof of Essendon Airport DFO.CREDIT:NINE NEWS

The sewing and crafts chain is seeking a further $850,000 for damage to the premises, business interruption and marketing costs to advertise the store's reopening after it was closed for eight months.

The other three companies are suing for loss of profits totalling about $45,000 while their DFO outlets were closed in the immediate aftermath of the crash.

The doomed B200 Super King Air was connected to an opaque web of companies before it crashed, raising concerns about the flight's insurance coverage and who would be held responsible legally.

Separate entities owned the plane, operated it, flew it, maintained it and chartered it.

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Analysis of the plane's wreckage from a report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.CREDIT:

The plane was registered to Bendigo-located company BB1544 Pty Ltd, which is owned by businessmen Dr Chris Richards and Andrew Hoare.

Dr Richards told The Age he was unaware of the latest legal action and that it was a matter for his insurance company. Previous action brought by the victims' families against the company is understood to have been settled.

The companies based at DFO claim in court documents that a lawyer representing BB1544 Pty Ltd had already admitted liability for loss, damage and destruction caused by the accident.

Under Commonwealth legislation, the owner of the aircraft can be found liable for a crash even if it is not the operator of the flight.

[Image: f4525fd58408b02e333ee0450f013b0a8cb91a40]
Four victims of the plane crash: Pilot Max Quartermain, and golfers Russell Munsch, Glenn Garland and Greg De Haven.

At the time of the disaster, the flight was operated by Corporate & Leisure Aviation, a separate company in the name of pilot Max Quartermain.

An investigation released by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau in September last year established that pilot error was to blame for the crash, after the plane's directional control system was mistakenly set to veer left before take-off.

A pre-flight checklist by Mr Quartermain should have discovered that the aircraft's rudder trim was in "full nose left position", the bureau found, which resulted in the aircraft plunging into the roof of DFO almost immediately after take-off.

The check should have also identified that the plane's voice recorder wasn't working before the flight.

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John Washburn, from Texas, was the fifth victim of the Essendon Airport disaster.CREDIT:FACEBOOK

Mr Quartermain was killed in the crash, along with American tourists Greg De Haven, Glenn Garland, Russell Munsch and John Washburn, who were flying to King Island to play golf.

The widows of the four men said they planned to seek compensation when it was revealed that pilot error was the cause of the crash, with the potential payout running into the millions of dollars.

The law firm representing the four companies from DFO declined to comment while the matter was before the courts.

‘Safe stocktake sales for all’

P2 -WTF? Absolutely despicable, now it becomes plainly obvious why it was the Hooded Canary so blatantly and IMO fraudulently slated all blame for this tragic accident on the pilot... Angry     
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Productivity Commission releases wet lettuce DRAFT report into Airports.

Ref: https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/...2019#draft  

Here is the A4ANZ damning take on that weasel worded confection:

Quote:[Image: Dyq_GheUcAAXVib.jpg]


MTF...P2  Cool
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