A curious collection:-
Of small wonders, troubling coincidences and well spun faerie tales. There is also some 'Bollocks' to deal with first – the BRB did that last evening. P7 kicked it off by reading a post from a 'professional' – in the airport operations field:
“..I think this article misses a number of key points. Take into consideration the aircraft that crashed was a Beech 200 Kingair and only requries a strip width of 140m overall under the CASA Part 139 rules - not 300 which is a requriement for a an A380 sized aircraft. The weight of the aircraft exceed takeoff (but did not contribute to the crash) it was put down to the flight control trim tabs being set incorrectly...(added to)...Ironically ICAO are looking to reduce the runway strip width and OLS standards. and they will certainly be a lot different to the ones we have now..."
Spelling errors aside, it is worth examining some of the points made and questioning the disingenuous motivation for making the same. In short - “Bollocks”: called loud and long.
“Beech 200 Kingair and only requries a strip width of 140m overall under the CASA Part 139 rules - not 300 which is a requriement for a an A380 sized aircraft.”
True enough – but (big one) this has SFA to do with 'runway classification' does it. ICAO requirement for 'space' is predicated on the classification of the runway, not the aircraft which may or may not use it. Runway 17 code 3 – Runway 26 code 4.
P2 - “Hmm...what Simon says maybe technically correct from a CASA Part 139 rule set POV (Ref: CH6 para 6.17 Table 6.17 (4)). However what Simon says neglects the fact that runway 17 is a code 3 (non-precision) runway and runway 26 is a code 4 (precision approach) runway, which (even under the 468 pg CASR Part 139 MOS) requires a runway strip width of 280m.”
The next statement “it was put down to the flight control trim tabs being set incorrectly” - takes us into the world of 'funny about that'. Does it not strike anyone else as 'passing strange' that the 'full up elevator' trim tab (ATSB) was discounted and attributed to bouncing off the parapet wall; but the full left rudder trim was attributed to pilot error? WTD – take a look at the airframe schematics then wonder at the breathtaking audacity and convenient assumption parlayed into fact, the directors edited version gainsaying the IIC considerations?.......... .
If you discount the assumption that the rudder trim was off (for a moment) and consider the event from line up to time up – there are a couple of items which have been glossed over; the take off roll never looked 'right' the deviation began very early at low speed**, the acceleration 'reluctant'; the 'Mayday' calls began almost immediately with no serious attempt at correction made from power on to the full stop on the DFO roof. Now I could, under oath in court, provide a collective statement from a dozen seriously experienced Be200 pilots (call it 25,000 + hours, on -type'). All agree there were at least three sensible options a pilot could take – when the 'something not right' moment happened. When that happened is part of the puzzle, I digress. Option one about 40 knots – quick check – reset trim if out – or power off and exit runway. Option two at 80 knots – all good? No – then power off and exit. During the short period the flight lasted there were multiple, viable, routine options available to meet a basic rule of flying – safely go – safely stop. Not one of the standard options available was initiated; repeated Mayday calls the only action. Why?
P7. (buts in) ** I wonder if anyone checked the fine pitch stops / governor, just to eliminate etc.? curious is all...
Speculation here - on a coincidence – the events and actions taken at Mt Hotham occurred between 0800 and 0900; the Essendon event within the same time frame. The pilot was (ATSB report) taking 'multiple' medications to manage diabetes. There are side effects to this regime and when the medication was taken surely begs, at very least a serious question or two. Admittedly, it is a stretch and could be entirely coincidental – but the lack of positive action on that day at Essendon demands answers; the swift, glib Hood pronouncement of 'full left rudder' will not stand against the actions of a competent, qualified experienced pilot, in control of himself and his aircraft. Overloaded and full left rudder on take off – Bollocks.
That the DFO is encroaching on a safety margin; that the parapet wall is cynically designed and built to within a whisker of the margins to protect the precinct or that the DFO was involved becomes academic. Take a look at the overhead picture – the mosaic view – there is nowhere to go once clear of that end of the runway – nowhere that will not involve carnage. Legal build or not – don't signify, CASA have no business allowing anything to operate from that runway that does not have 'guaranteed' single engine performance.
Aye, spare a thought for the Coroner trying to sort this little lot out: can he/she find the Pea in this shell game?
Toot – toot....
Of small wonders, troubling coincidences and well spun faerie tales. There is also some 'Bollocks' to deal with first – the BRB did that last evening. P7 kicked it off by reading a post from a 'professional' – in the airport operations field:
“..I think this article misses a number of key points. Take into consideration the aircraft that crashed was a Beech 200 Kingair and only requries a strip width of 140m overall under the CASA Part 139 rules - not 300 which is a requriement for a an A380 sized aircraft. The weight of the aircraft exceed takeoff (but did not contribute to the crash) it was put down to the flight control trim tabs being set incorrectly...(added to)...Ironically ICAO are looking to reduce the runway strip width and OLS standards. and they will certainly be a lot different to the ones we have now..."
Spelling errors aside, it is worth examining some of the points made and questioning the disingenuous motivation for making the same. In short - “Bollocks”: called loud and long.
“Beech 200 Kingair and only requries a strip width of 140m overall under the CASA Part 139 rules - not 300 which is a requriement for a an A380 sized aircraft.”
True enough – but (big one) this has SFA to do with 'runway classification' does it. ICAO requirement for 'space' is predicated on the classification of the runway, not the aircraft which may or may not use it. Runway 17 code 3 – Runway 26 code 4.
P2 - “Hmm...what Simon says maybe technically correct from a CASA Part 139 rule set POV (Ref: CH6 para 6.17 Table 6.17 (4)). However what Simon says neglects the fact that runway 17 is a code 3 (non-precision) runway and runway 26 is a code 4 (precision approach) runway, which (even under the 468 pg CASR Part 139 MOS) requires a runway strip width of 280m.”
The next statement “it was put down to the flight control trim tabs being set incorrectly” - takes us into the world of 'funny about that'. Does it not strike anyone else as 'passing strange' that the 'full up elevator' trim tab (ATSB) was discounted and attributed to bouncing off the parapet wall; but the full left rudder trim was attributed to pilot error? WTD – take a look at the airframe schematics then wonder at the breathtaking audacity and convenient assumption parlayed into fact, the directors edited version gainsaying the IIC considerations?.......... .
If you discount the assumption that the rudder trim was off (for a moment) and consider the event from line up to time up – there are a couple of items which have been glossed over; the take off roll never looked 'right' the deviation began very early at low speed**, the acceleration 'reluctant'; the 'Mayday' calls began almost immediately with no serious attempt at correction made from power on to the full stop on the DFO roof. Now I could, under oath in court, provide a collective statement from a dozen seriously experienced Be200 pilots (call it 25,000 + hours, on -type'). All agree there were at least three sensible options a pilot could take – when the 'something not right' moment happened. When that happened is part of the puzzle, I digress. Option one about 40 knots – quick check – reset trim if out – or power off and exit runway. Option two at 80 knots – all good? No – then power off and exit. During the short period the flight lasted there were multiple, viable, routine options available to meet a basic rule of flying – safely go – safely stop. Not one of the standard options available was initiated; repeated Mayday calls the only action. Why?
P7. (buts in) ** I wonder if anyone checked the fine pitch stops / governor, just to eliminate etc.? curious is all...
Speculation here - on a coincidence – the events and actions taken at Mt Hotham occurred between 0800 and 0900; the Essendon event within the same time frame. The pilot was (ATSB report) taking 'multiple' medications to manage diabetes. There are side effects to this regime and when the medication was taken surely begs, at very least a serious question or two. Admittedly, it is a stretch and could be entirely coincidental – but the lack of positive action on that day at Essendon demands answers; the swift, glib Hood pronouncement of 'full left rudder' will not stand against the actions of a competent, qualified experienced pilot, in control of himself and his aircraft. Overloaded and full left rudder on take off – Bollocks.
That the DFO is encroaching on a safety margin; that the parapet wall is cynically designed and built to within a whisker of the margins to protect the precinct or that the DFO was involved becomes academic. Take a look at the overhead picture – the mosaic view – there is nowhere to go once clear of that end of the runway – nowhere that will not involve carnage. Legal build or not – don't signify, CASA have no business allowing anything to operate from that runway that does not have 'guaranteed' single engine performance.
Aye, spare a thought for the Coroner trying to sort this little lot out: can he/she find the Pea in this shell game?
Toot – toot....