[Peetwo]

Finally the Budget Estimates QON have been answered, here is the ASA AQON  - 7Airservices.pdf.

First one that relates to all three of the dodgy ass agencies was the Nx QON on the Melbourne v Essendon tower 'breakdown in air traffic control coordination'  incident. 

From the ATSB SMH thread:

[quote pid='2364' dateline='1444606473']

Question no.: 102


Program: n/a

Division/Agency: Australian Transport Safety Bureau

Topic: Breakdown in air traffic control coordination

Proof Hansard Page: 21 (28 May 2015)

Senator Xenophon, Nick asked:

…

Senator XENOPHON: No. I am not trying to do circle work. This is important. Will the ATSB at least look at the publicly available information on WebTrak out of the two airports for that three-hour period to see whether there was a loss of separation assurance?

Mr Dolan: We thought it was more effective to ask Airservices to take a look at the tapes and to provide us with their view as to whether there had been a loss of separation assurance.

Senator WILLIAMS: How long would it take you to look at what Senator Xenophon is requesting? How long would it take you to look at that information? A couple of hours?

Mr Dolan: Possibly. It would need to be done by someone with air traffic control experience so that they could understand it, and we have a range of priorities that we have got our limited air traffic control expertise focused on. This is a matter of the management of limited resources.

Senator XENOPHON: Could you please, Chief Commissioner, take on notice whether the ATSB will be taking this matter any further, at the very least, to look at the WebTrak for that three-hour period out of the Essendon and Melbourne airports, and also whether it would look at radar tapes? Also, it appears, from what has been put to me, that there is a fundamental issue that Airservices did not give you the full story initially.

Mr Dolan: In terms of not being informed of a three-hour period, that is true.

Senator XENOPHON: Does that not worry you, Mr Dolan?

Mr Godley: Could I just clarify something, Senator? We did have one of our air traffic control investigators review the whole three hours. What happened was that after the repcon we got back to Airservices. They reviewed the tapes and said there was no loss of separation or loss of separation assurance. Our ATC investigator then reviewed the three hours. She determined that there was a potential loss of separation between two aircraft. But, due to the limitations of WebTrak, she could not be sure.

…

Answer:

The ATSB does not intend taking any further action on this matter, noting that an ATSB air traffic control specialist did review the WebTrak information for the entire period following receipt of the REPCON and that the ATSB is satisfied with the response provided by both Airservices Australia and CASA to the REPCON report (see http://www.atsb.gov.au/repcon/2013/ar201300090.aspx).

REPCON

Mode

Aviation
Reference No.
AR201300090
Date reported
18 November 2013

Concern title
Possible loss of separation due to a breakdown of coordination

Concern summary
The concern related to the potential of a loss of separation or loss of separation assurance as a result of a breakdown of coordination between Essendon tower and Melbourne tower.

Industry / Operation affected
Aviation: Airspace management
Concern subject type
Aviation: Air Traffic Control

Reporter's concern
The reporter expressed a concern that a breakdown in communication, which occurred in November between Essendon Tower and Melbourne Tower, may have resulted in a loss of separation assurance or potentially a loss of separation between aircraft operating at Melbourne and Essendon.

Operator's response (Operator 1)

Airservices Australia (Airservices) appreciates the opportunity to respond to the reported concern regarding a breakdown in communication between Essendon and Melbourne.
Airservices confirms that the breakdown of communication was reported via Airservices Corporate Integrated Reporting and Risk Information System (CIRRIS).

The reported occurrence involved Melbourne Terminal Area Control who received coordination from Essendon Tower advising that they could not separate overshoots with Melbourne traffic due to the cloud base. The breakdown of communication occurred as the Melbourne Terminal Area Control passed the information to the Melbourne Approach Controller but failed to receive acknowledgement of the coordination resulting in the Approach Controller being unaware of the need to identify Essendon arrivals to Melbourne Tower.

A preliminary investigation confirmed that the documented procedure was not correctly followed in that the controller concerned failed to confirm acknowledgement of the coordination.

The investigation determined that no systemic issues existed and the potential safety impact that may have resulted from the breakdown of coordination was understood by the controller. Nonetheless, the Check and Standardisation Supervisors of the involved ATC group have been tasked with reviewing the coordination requirements with the aim of identifying potential opportunities to minimise the likelihood of a similar breakdown of communication reoccurring.

In the interim a temporary console display has been created to highlight separation responsibility for Essendon traffic arriving from terminal control unit (TCU) airspace.
With reference to the reporter's concern that the occurrence may have resulted in a loss of separation (LOS) or a loss of separation assurance (LOSA), Airservices can confirm that there was no LOS or LOSA occurrences during the time of the breakdown of communication.

Regulator's response (Regulator 1)

We note that there was no loss of separation and CASA does not intend to take any direct safety action with regard to this matter; however CASA will use this information to complement other information that informs us of Airservices Australia safety risk profile.
 



Last update 24 March 2014

Hmm...wonder what variety of wet lettuce the Senate Committee will choose to slap Dolan with this time...FCOL  

[/quote]
True to form it would seem that Sir A & Harfwit (& maybe even Hoody?) have had no hesitation in throwing Dolan & the ATSB straight under the bus...

Senator XENOPHON: As a result of the Cirrus, were the radar tapes kept longer?

Mr Hood: I would have to take that one on notice but, in relation to your previous conversations with the ATSB and with CASA in relation to, 'why didn't the Cirrus notify a three-hour breakdown in coordination?'; Cirruses are submitted as an immediately notifiable. So we try and notify incidents that have occurred in the air traffic management system as soon as practicable, which will not have all of the details in there. So when the Cirrus was submitted, we may not necessarily have known that coordination was null and void for the three-hour period.

…Mr Hood: What would normally happen, and where the human error was made, is that the terminal area controller would have instructed the approach controller, 'Make sure you stagger the aircraft arriving 16 with the aircraft arriving 26 at Essendon,' such that in the event of a missed approach there is separation applied. What I am saying is there was another level of defence in that set-up where, even when that human error was made, had there been a go-around—the aerodrome is 11.3 kilometres away—there would have been additional coordination.

…
Answer:

Radar data is recorded and maintained in accordance with the CASA Manual of Standards Part 172 which requires retention for a minimum of 30 days.

This incident was reported and reviewed in accordance with Airservices’ normal safety management processes.

The incident highlighted an opportunity for introducing improvements to documentation and procedures which were subsequently implemented.

The recording was kept for 30 days while the reviews were concluded, however other data, including some radar positions which allow the detail of the event to be reviewed, was retained.

 
It would seem that CASA also were standing by at the same bus stop:

Senator XENOPHON: How can your colleagues say that it is just about Essendon. That is completely disingenuous.

Mr Cromarty: I did not say that.

Senator XENOPHON: You said it is about Essendon. It also involves Melbourne, obviously.

Mr Cromarty: The REPCON was about communications between Essendon and Melbourne.

Senator XENOPHON: Right. And aircraft are taking off at the same time—

Mr Skidmore: I do not know the full details of it, but they might be taking off in different directions.

Senator XENOPHON: No, they were not. They were taking off where they could have intersected about five or eight kilometres out.

Mr Skidmore: I am prepared to take it on and have a look at it for you.

Senator XENOPHON: Will I know by tomorrow morning?

Mr Skidmore: Regarding?

Senator XENOPHON: These matters. Or will it take longer than that?

Mr Skidmore: I will do my best to find out for you.

Senator XENOPHON: I would be very grateful…

Answer:

Yes, CASA will be looking beyond what was looked at in the response to Question on Notice 174 from the Additional Estimates 2014-15, regarding Cirrus Report #ATS-0125061.

However that answer, & the ASA answer, seems to contradict certain parts of the next AQON by CASA??

Senator XENOPHON: My understanding was this: there was an initial report—the Cirrus. It was not investigated, there was a frustration and there was a confidential report by an air traffic controller, or someone in the sector, who said that this is quite serious, and it was escalated at that level. Could you at least look at the sequence of events as to what occurred?

Mr Skidmore: Certainly. We can look at the sequence of events and provide you with the information.

Senator XENOPHON: CASA was reliant on Airservices assurances that nothing untoward had occurred. Can I ask that you look at these matters, because of the concerns that have been expressed to me directly by people who are worried about raising this publicly for their careers. They say that that three hour period was very problematic. ATSB relied on WebTrak, which is something that a journalist told me this morning they rely on to track the PM's plane. It is not exactly a forensic tool. It is not the same as a radar tape. Would CASA be looking at the radar tapes as to whether the information provided to CASA from Airservices was robust and adequate enough? If you could take that on notice as well.

Mr Skidmore: Certainly.

Answer:
CASA was satisfied with the information provided by Airservices at the time in relation to the REPCON on the incident, and as no Loss of Separation (LOS) or Loss of Separation Assurance (LOSA) was reported by Airservices or through the Cirris database, CASA did not require further explanation.

CASA’s Annual Reports provide the number of cancelled, suspended or varied pilots and air operator certificates.

CASA has not cancelled, suspended or varied Airservices’ operating certificate in relation to CASA requirements regarding the conduct of Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO). CASA’s oversight of LAHSO has revealed no breaches of the Part 172 regulations.

CASA has not cancelled, suspended or varied the licences of air traffic controllers and their managers regarding land and hold short operations beyond the published wind limits. While there was some ambiguity in the procedures relating to runway selection and wind criteria, this has now been rectified by Airservices.

It is not an offence to fail to report an unknown loss of separation.

CASA would be unable to review the radar tapes due to the time elapsed since the incident.

Hmm..interesting??


MTF?- Definitely..P2