[Peetwo]

Join the dots...

Reference above post:

Hi Alpha,

Your arguments are correct however they beg some questions, who analyses the existing system, how do they do it, and will the result become available to the public? I will only address Ballina.

ATSB will undoubtedly avoid the airspace and procedures aspect, the latent issues, as they normally do. In their defence I believe that is because they lack the expertise to make the analysis and have to rely on CASA and Airservices. Both of these organisations, however, have an over-riding goal, to protect their Minister (Information source two senior CASA executives). Hence they have a vested interest in defending the status quo. This is because, by default, they are obeying their ministerial statement of expectations, and, in terms of this argument, the Airspace Act/Regulations, and the Ministerial Airspace Policy Statement. It follows that if the Minister does not tell them to do something differently, then he/she has accepted that they are operating in accordance with his/her expectations.

Airservices has refused to release the safety analysis that it claims was done to justify SFIS at Ballina. CASA should have evaluated that analysis before approving the change from their recommended CA/GRO to SFIS. Why? Because the nature of the SFIS was argued to be simply an extension of the Class G (F?) traffic information service. However, it removed the CA/GRO's capability to visually monitor the circuit area and in particular the runway. This is arguably the most critical area for safety. I would like to see how Airservices treated that removal in their safety matrix and what CASA replied. Incidentally, the last CASA OAR review of Ballina airspace was 16 Aug 2017. There is no published analysis for the latest changes by Airservices.

The other obvious problem with traffic information services is radio clutter. This is particularly true in Australia where pilots have been taught for years that unalerted see and avoid does not work. To keep it simple, each pilot now has to make all the recommended calls, other pilots need to respond to those calls to affect separation, and the SFIS controller has to record the calls and make judgments about how the aircraft are related to each other, and then presumably make more calls to alert the pilots. Add to this the new requirements that force VFR pilots to become "full reporting" before taxiing and the increase in the radius of the MBZ to 15NM (10NM contains 78.5 Sq NM, and 15 NM contains 176.7 Sq NM) now there is a recipe for radio congestion!

It would be interesting to see the safety score on the matrix for that and what mitigation was suggested. The rules do not seem to contain any implemented mitigation other than "let's hope nothing goes wrong" and if it does then again we can say "All of the parts of the airspace system WERE NOT functioning as they should have been". As I understand the US system, it leaves VFR pilots to concentrate on flying, navigation, and watching for traffic, not talking continuously. (Old ATC advice to young controllers - you can't think while your mouth is open) IFR flights are controlled until they must proceed visually and are provided with traffic information on VFR when it is available.

Hopefully, I have demonstrated that there are at least two potential problems with the current Australian system and indicated how the US system has already identified those issues and mitigated them. There is of course much, much more, but time and space preclude going on. 

An now this:

Mangalore aeronautical study

Overview

The Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) is conducting an aeronautical study of the Mangalore area in Victoria as outlined in the terms of reference, provided below.

The study will review the airspace within a 25 nautical mile area of Mangalore, including nearby aerodromes, Puckapunyal, Graytown, Euroa and Locksley Field, up to 8500 feet above mean sea level.

The OAR will be looking at traffic types and density from over the last 5 years and considering the feedback from the Australia Transport Safety Bureau’s report into the mid-air collision that occurred in 2020, should the final report be released before the conclusion of the study.

The study will evaluate the suitability of the airspace, including efficient use, equitable access for all users, appropriateness of the airspace classification and the existing services and facilities provided by the air navigation service provider.

Documents for review

You can view the terms of reference and a copy of the consultation below. 
If you would like to provide further feedback, please email OAR@casa.gov.au. Feedback submitted by email will be considered but cannot be published publicly. 

Further information about airspace regulation and the airspace change process is available on the CASA website.

Why your views matter

Why we are consulting

We would like to hear your experiences about flying in the Mangalore area and how proposed future airspace change may affect you.

In the consultation, we will ask questions relevant to the airspace and provide you with an opportunity to share further feedback.

What happens next?

Once the consultation has closed, we will register and review each submission received through the online response form. We will make all submissions publicly available on the Consultation Hub, unless you request your submission remains confidential. We will also publish the final report on our website.

Information about how we consult and how to make a confidential submission is available on the CASA website.

To be notified of any future consultations, subscribe to our consultation and rulemaking mailing list.

Plus EWH, via the LMH:

Following the on-schedule implementation of Surveillance Flight Information Service (SFIS) at Ballina last month, a similar service due to go live at Mangalore this week didn't happen at all. Instead, CASA launched a review of the airspace; not a common occurence for an airport that has no RPT and no tower. Right now I am asking myself what this review is going to reveal. It will show that Mangalore is a busy training airport in an area of heavy sport and recreational traffic situated at an aviation pinch-point that is difficult for through traffic to avoid if the weather over the ranges is unsuitable. Mountains to the east, prohibited airspace to the west; Mangalore is the only safe way through. Airservices thought SFIS was the answer, but that makes radio mandatory, which angried-up the glider pilots that use the region as their playground. Spies keep telling me that consultation didn't go so well, which has delayed the SFIS date and prodded CASA into the review. But what can it change? One thing that would go a long way to easing congestion would be to remove or relocate the VOR. The Melbourne region used to have VORs at places like Yarrowee, Cowes and Wonthaggi where training schools could go to practice VOR procedures. They're gone now, leaving Mangalore or Avalon as the most practical options, and even they have issues with booking slots. Most schools prefer Mangalore, which draws more traffic to the pinch-point. Airservices, CASA and the industry as a whole needs to address this issue and find a solution that results in less demand on that VOR. And for that matter, they could have a look at the need for VOR training full stop.

Hmm...I wonder how far off the final report is for ATSB AAI AO-2020-12 (the fatal Mangalore midair collision)? 

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Status: Active 


Phase: Final report: Internal review 

Investigation progress update published 24 February 2021

The investigation into the mid-air collision involving Piper PA-44-180 Seminole VH-JQF and Beech D95A Travel Air VH-AEM near Mangalore, Victoria, on 19 February 2020, is continuing.

The investigation is currently in the ‘Examination and analysis’ phase. During this phase, evidence is reviewed and evaluated to determine its relevance, credibility and relationship to other evidence and to the occurrence.

ATSB investigators have so far gathered and analysed numerous information sources including:

• on-site aircraft examination at the two sites where the aircraft were located
  
  
• witness statements
  
  
• weather observations and forecasts
  
  
• recorded flight data
  
  
• aircraft component inspection
  
  
• operational and maintenance documents
  
  
• personnel licence and medical records
  

Further analysis is occurring on:

• airspace and air traffic control procedures
  
  
• visibility from both aircraft
  

Last update 29 July 2021

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I do believe there is much..much MTF -