I solemnly swear I am up to no good…
The bump of curiosity started itching again; Kosrae, the NDB/DME approach and the ATSB report demanding a good scratch. It is the ‘dive and drive' comment (aspersions) which create the irritation – it is just so wrong, you have to wonder why the ATSB set about their work in the manner they adopted. Passing strange I call it. Rough research on a beer coaster follows:-
Lets take it as a given that one way or another – the flight arrived at the ten mile fix at 1500 feet, properly configured for the approach leg. Consider that at 10 nms on an ILS the ‘averaged’ height is around the 2500 foot (AGL) mark (give or take) the Sydney 34 ILS has you at 1600’ @ 5 nms. The approach flown at Kosrae is a laid back affair with 1000 foot advantage and five additional miles – when compared to an ILS approach. The approach profile begins ‘below’ a standard 3˚ height/distance profile; which excludes any need to be shoving the nose down, trying to slow up and maintain the profile – quite the reverse, you can actually maintain height and 'fly' to intercept the Korsae profile. If the approach was not off-set that is exactly the way to do it. So why attack the crew with a D&D bull-pooh accusation?
Furthermore, close inspection of the NDB track sets the approach to runway 05 up very nicely; becoming visual anywhere between 5 and 3.5 miles makes for an easy roll onto final – in essence a doddle; however, closer in at 500 feet/2.9 miles is a little tight for a transport jet – with a load of passengers in the back - but you can see why the ground proximity warning would get ‘antsy’. Not a problem if visual. Landing on the 23 runway is a whole different ball game; but then, when the winds favour the 23 runway – the ‘dry’ season is in – I digress.
Dive and drive approach considerations aside, the real potential threat is the miss-set altimeters (and the vagaries of the NDB). Human factors at work perhaps? Go figure, its an important flight – must be ‘smooth’ and seamless; low transition (5000’?) no SOP for such things and then becoming visual – the temptation to break off early to make a longer, smoother final approach, attention focussed on the landing – that is the next event – the approach is ‘complete’ and forgotten. Then back into IMC – the whole flight deck attitude must change now, from expectation of an easy night landing to potentially an approach to minima, close in and tight. 500 feet @ 2.9 miles ain’t a lot of wriggle room, not in marginal conditions, not with piles of bricks lurking within the cloud, not with the EGPWS bleating; time to go around – and they did. Safe as houses..
I won’t bang on anymore about this – it just annoys me that the ATSB have missed so many of the attending elements to this flight and loaded it all back onto the crew. Not a stellar crew performance I’ll grant you; but the human factors and possibly fatigue played a role in this event – and ATSB dismiss those elements with a totally inaccurate condemnation of ‘dive and drive’; which, by inference is not only technically wrong but most politically incorrect. This from an outfit that claims not to lay blame – Bollocks.
I just hope that a fatal accident which could have been prevented by ATSB doing their job properly and thoroughly never occurs. The smooth, glib, deceptive nature of ‘reports’ disguising the core elements and ignoring the radical causes is becoming a normalized deviance – this, as any safety manager will tell you is not a good thing; not at all.
Save file and close it – forever.
Toot – but then there’s the Canberra incident - toot.
The bump of curiosity started itching again; Kosrae, the NDB/DME approach and the ATSB report demanding a good scratch. It is the ‘dive and drive' comment (aspersions) which create the irritation – it is just so wrong, you have to wonder why the ATSB set about their work in the manner they adopted. Passing strange I call it. Rough research on a beer coaster follows:-
Lets take it as a given that one way or another – the flight arrived at the ten mile fix at 1500 feet, properly configured for the approach leg. Consider that at 10 nms on an ILS the ‘averaged’ height is around the 2500 foot (AGL) mark (give or take) the Sydney 34 ILS has you at 1600’ @ 5 nms. The approach flown at Kosrae is a laid back affair with 1000 foot advantage and five additional miles – when compared to an ILS approach. The approach profile begins ‘below’ a standard 3˚ height/distance profile; which excludes any need to be shoving the nose down, trying to slow up and maintain the profile – quite the reverse, you can actually maintain height and 'fly' to intercept the Korsae profile. If the approach was not off-set that is exactly the way to do it. So why attack the crew with a D&D bull-pooh accusation?
Furthermore, close inspection of the NDB track sets the approach to runway 05 up very nicely; becoming visual anywhere between 5 and 3.5 miles makes for an easy roll onto final – in essence a doddle; however, closer in at 500 feet/2.9 miles is a little tight for a transport jet – with a load of passengers in the back - but you can see why the ground proximity warning would get ‘antsy’. Not a problem if visual. Landing on the 23 runway is a whole different ball game; but then, when the winds favour the 23 runway – the ‘dry’ season is in – I digress.
Dive and drive approach considerations aside, the real potential threat is the miss-set altimeters (and the vagaries of the NDB). Human factors at work perhaps? Go figure, its an important flight – must be ‘smooth’ and seamless; low transition (5000’?) no SOP for such things and then becoming visual – the temptation to break off early to make a longer, smoother final approach, attention focussed on the landing – that is the next event – the approach is ‘complete’ and forgotten. Then back into IMC – the whole flight deck attitude must change now, from expectation of an easy night landing to potentially an approach to minima, close in and tight. 500 feet @ 2.9 miles ain’t a lot of wriggle room, not in marginal conditions, not with piles of bricks lurking within the cloud, not with the EGPWS bleating; time to go around – and they did. Safe as houses..
I won’t bang on anymore about this – it just annoys me that the ATSB have missed so many of the attending elements to this flight and loaded it all back onto the crew. Not a stellar crew performance I’ll grant you; but the human factors and possibly fatigue played a role in this event – and ATSB dismiss those elements with a totally inaccurate condemnation of ‘dive and drive’; which, by inference is not only technically wrong but most politically incorrect. This from an outfit that claims not to lay blame – Bollocks.
I just hope that a fatal accident which could have been prevented by ATSB doing their job properly and thoroughly never occurs. The smooth, glib, deceptive nature of ‘reports’ disguising the core elements and ignoring the radical causes is becoming a normalized deviance – this, as any safety manager will tell you is not a good thing; not at all.
Save file and close it – forever.
Toot – but then there’s the Canberra incident - toot.