[Peetwo]

#P666: "YES PLEASE!!"- Patience Grasshopper

 First I want to go back to that JSCOT inquiry report (see my post #5 above) and in particular under the sub-heading Fuel Policy, paragraphs 2.40 to 2.42 :

2.40 The Norfolk Island incident was followed by another low fuel incident in June 2013, when two passenger aircraft bound for Adelaide were diverted to Mildura due to poor weather in Adelaide. Poor weather in Mildura, which had not been forecast, combined with the aircraft having insufficient fuel to divert to another airport, caused the pilots of the aircraft to land at Mildura under conditions that breached Civil Aviation Regulations.47

2.41 The ATSB investigation of this incident was not complete at the time this Report was drafted.

2.42 Further, in 2012, the ICAO amended the Annex to the Chicago Convention relevant to in-flight fuel management (Annex 6 Part I) to improve: the definition of a minimum fuel emergency; and procedures for protecting final fuel reserves. In particular, the operator and pilot-in-command of an aircraft are required to continually ensure that the amount of usable fuel remaining on board is not less than the fuel needed to proceed to an airport where a safe landing can be made with the planned final reserve fuel remaining upon landing.48

Footnote 48 takes you to a number of relevant links in regard to the amended ICAO Annex 6:

http://www.ifalpa.org/store/doc9976.pdf

http://www.ifalpa.org/store/amend36.pdf

http://www.ifalpa.org/downloads/Level1/B...20fuel.pdf

 These events (i.e. PelAir, Mildura) then prompted CASA to start yet another project to again review the regulatory requirements for 'fuel policy':

2.43 To deal with the issues arising from these events, CASA has initiated a project to implement new regulations relating to fuel management. The project proposes to:

• in light of the ICAO amendments, amend regulations on fuel and operational requirements, including provisions for diversion to an alternate airport for flights to isolated airports;
  

• expand the relevant regulations to provide guidance to pilots on when and under what circumstances to consider a diversion;
  

• change the regulations on fuel planning, in-flight fuel management, and the selection of alternate airport to include the methods by which pilots and operators calculate fuel required and fuel on board; 　
  

• specify that the pilot-in-command or the operator, must take reasonable steps to ensure sufficient fuel and oil will be carried to undertake and continue the flight in safety;
  

• require consideration of a ‘critical fuel scenario’ taking into account an aeroplane system failure or malfunction which could adversely affect flight safety;
  

• publish internal and external educational material along with conducting briefings where necessary.49
  

 
Ironically there has been several attempts (projects) by CASA to fiddle with the regulations dealing with 'Fuel Policy', long before the ICAO proposed and then amended Annex 6 Part 1...

This brings me finally to the answer to my QON... - Remember this Gobbles (note the answer is in bold red)??    

Senator FAWCETT: There is actually a broader issue, though, Mr McCormick. There is no closed-loop system so that recommendations that are made by ATSB, that CASA agrees—particularly we have seen a number where, in a coroner's court, the coroner has said, 'We'll close out this issue, because ATSB made a recommendation and CASA said they will do it,' and then a decade later there is has been no action. Is that an issue for the travelling public? I hear you that you were not there for that whole 10 years, but we are talking about a system now, not personalities. Is the system not working as it should?

Mr McCormick : I cannot speak for what happened in 2000. I only got here in 2009. But we have in place now a system where we do track all the recommendations—since 2009 and on-hand at the moment there are 121 recommendations that were made by coroners. There are 16 of those outstanding. Some of them are unfortunately beyond our ability to do, where the coroner may have made quite a reasonable finding but it is impossible for us to implement. Some others we have under review as well. We do have the safety recommendations of the ATSB. We do track those; we have been doing that since I have been here, and we know exactly how many of those are outstanding as well.

Senator NASH: Was anybody at the table employed by CASA in 2000?

Senator FAWCETT: Mr Boyd, were you around?

Mr Boyd : Yes, but not in that position.

Senator NASH: Anybody else? Mr Farquharson? Dr Aleck?

Dr Aleck : I was in Montreal.

Senator FAWCETT: You've got an alibi! Going to the terms of reference here, though, looking at an ATSB report into this incident at Norfolk Island, here are two regulatory issues, one to do with the categorisation of aeromedical flights—and that should have been upgraded to charter so there was more protection granted, and that did not occur—and that we should be more prescriptive about fuel requirements for remote islands. I understand that Pel-Air has actually implemented that, post your special audit, and I understand CASA has undertaken again to look at that issue—both of which point to the fact that here is a regulatory issue that, if implemented 10 years ago, either of those, this accident probably would not have happened. As the regulator, don't you think that the ATSB report should have covered those factors? I know it is not for you to tell them how to do their report, but you are the regulator. Should they have not considered those broader regulatory issues as part of this report? Are you surprised they did not?

Or at approximately 05:15 here:

Okay so here is the rub, for the better part of two decades our main Muppet ICAO representative in Montreal was none other than Dr Aleck. If nothing else this should have provided much continuity when it came to international agreements, compliance and harmonisation of regional air services rules and regulations.

However in referring to the Department table on comparative notified differences to ICAO (over 4000 for Oz in March 2014), even Blind Freddy can see that if anything we have been drastically going backwards in adhering and respecting the agreed international ICAO aviation safety standards. And the main Muppet responsible for allowing that to happen and for apparently writing most of the weasel worded notified differences, was Dr Aleck.

Coming back to the "Fuel Policy", here is an example of the wonderful work our Muppet in Montreal has been doing in regards to the now four year amendment to Annex 6:

Annex VI reference:

4.3.4.2 En-route alternate aerodromes

En-route alternate aerodromes, required by 4.7 for extended diversion time operations by aeroplanes with two turbine engines, shall be selected and specified in the operational and air traffic services (ATS) flight plans.

4.3.4.3 Destination alternate aerodromes

4.3.4.3.1 For a flight to be conducted in accordance with the instrument flight rules, at least one destination alternate aerodrome shall be selected and specified in the operational and ATS flight plans, unless:

a) the duration of the flight from the departure aerodrome, or from the point of in-flight re-planning, to the destination aerodrome is such that, taking into account all meteorological conditions and operational information relevant to the flight, at the estimated time of use, a reasonable certainty exists that:

1) the approach and landing may be made under visual meteorological conditions; and

2) separate runways are usable at the estimated time of use of the destination aerodrome with at least one runway having an operational instrument approach procedure; or

b) the aerodrome is isolated. Operations into isolated aerodromes do not require the selection of a destination alternate aerodrome(s) and shall be planned in accordance with 4.3.6.3 d) 4);

1) for each flight into an isolated aerodrome a point of no return shall be determined; and

2) a flight to be conducted to an isolated aerodrome shall not be continued past the point of no return unless a current assessment of meteorological conditions, traffic and other operational conditions indicate that a safe landing can be made at the estimated time of use.

---

4.3.5 Meteorological conditions

4.3.5.1 A flight to be conducted in accordance with the visual flight rules shall not be commenced unless current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions along the route or that part of the route to be flown under the visual flight rules will, at the appropriate time, be such as to enable compliance with these rules.

4.3.5.2 A flight to be conducted in accordance with the instrument flight rules shall not:

a) take off from the departure aerodrome unless the meteorological conditions, at the time of use, are at or above the operator’s established aerodrome operating minima for that operation; and

b) take off or continue beyond the point of in-flight re-planning unless at the aerodrome of intended landing or at each alternate aerodrome to be selected in compliance with 4.3.4, current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions will be, at the estimated time of use, at or above the operator’s established aerodrome operating minima for that operation.

4.3.5.3 To ensure that an adequate margin of safety is observed in determining whether or not an approach and landing can be safely carried out at each alternate aerodrome, the operator shall specify appropriate incremental values for height of cloud base and visibility, acceptable to the State of the Operator, to be added to the operator’s established aerodrome operating minima.

Note.— Guidance on the selection of these incremental values is contained in the Flight Planning and Fuel Management

Manual (Doc 9976).

4.3.5.4 The State of the Operator shall approve a margin of time established by the operator for the estimated time of use of an aerodrome.

Note.— Guidance on establishing an appropriate margin of time for the estimated time of use of an aerodrome is contained

in the Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).

4.3.5.5 A flight to be operated in known or expected icing conditions shall not be commenced unless the aeroplane is certificated and equipped to cope with such conditions.

4.3.5.6 A flight to be planned or expected to operate in suspected or known ground icing conditions shall not take off unless the aeroplane has been inspected for icing and, if necessary, has been given appropriate de-icing/anti-icing treatment.

Accumulation of ice or other naturally occurring contaminants shall be removed so that the aeroplane is kept in an airworthy condition prior to take-off.

Note.— Guidance material is given in the Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations (Doc 9640).

     
Okay now to Dr A's recently updated notified differences to those references:






As can be seen all bar one of the notified differences fall into the - Less protective or partially implemented not implemented - category. This is despite there still being an active project - OS 09/13 (Ps the 09 means it has been active since 2009) - that now includes a stipulation to consider the November 2012 amendment to ICAO Annex 6 Part 1:

..The amendment to the ICAO Annex 6 standards will be considered, and where appropriate, incorporated into the relevant legislation/advisory publication. In addition it is anticipated that there will be guidance material for operators who can demonstrate a particular level of performance- based compliance. The intent is to provide a bridge from the conventional approach to safety to the contemporary approach that uses process- based methods and Safety Risk Management (SRM) principles...

  
Hmm...no comment required me thinks -



MTF...P2