[Peetwo]

PNG AIC gold star award for AAI into Air Nuigini Flt 73 - 





Refer to the PNG AIC Air Nuigini Flight 73 report and reference from page 15, plus recommendation 9 page 71: https://auntypru.com/wp-admin/upload.php?item=4254 

1.10.3 Airport Emergency Plan Manual

The investigation found that the Chuuk International Airport, Airport Emergency Plan (AEP) and rescue and fire-fighting resources did not meet the ICAO Annex 14 Volume 1, Standards with respect to responding to accidents occurring in water adjacent to the aerodrome.

The AEP that was current at the time of the accident was dated 9/11/2011. (11 September 2011)

The AEP did not meet documentation convention (Standards) as required by ICAO:

• it was not a controlled copy;
• it did not have a version number and issue date on each page; and
• there was no amendment sheet for listing amendments.

The AEP procedures were inadequate for use in an emergency operation, especially during a rescue operation involving an aircraft accident in water.

The last emergency exercise conducted prior to the accident was in August 2017. It was conducted on land and within the airport perimeter.

The post-exercise report did not provide evidence that the airport emergency response equipment and personnel would be effective in handling an actual emergency situation that might occur outside the airport perimeter “in water”. The report mentioned the Pohnpei and Kosrae airports, but also did not address the exercising of the AEP outside the airport perimeter of those airports.

Article 38 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation imposes an obligation on Contracting States to notify ICAO of differences between their national regulations and practices and the International Standards contained in the Annex and any amendments thereto if the State cannot comply with a Standard.

Furthermore, the provisions of Annex 15 require the publication of differences between a State’s national regulations and practices and the related ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices through the Aeronautical Information Service, in addition to the obligation of States under Article 38 of the Convention...etc

---

4.2.9 Recommendation number AIC 19-R08/18-100482 to Federated States of Micronesia, Division of Civil Aviation.

On 8 February 2019 the PNG AIC issued the following recommendation:

The PNG Accident Investigation Commission recommends that the Federated States of Micronesia, Division of Civil Aviation, as a contracting State to the Convention on International Civil Aviation:

(a) should ensure that Chuuk International Airport meets ICAO Annex 14 Standards with respect to Airport Emergency Planning and specialist rescue services (equipment and personnel) for an emergency situation that might occur outside the airport perimeter in water; or
(b) should ensure that if the State is unable to comply with the Standards of Annex 14 as identified in (a) above, it will file the difference with ICAO between a State’s national regulations and practices and the related ICAO Annex 14 Standards and Recommended Practices, and publish the filed difference(s) through the Aeronautical Information Service.

& the response:

4.2.9.1 Federated States of Micronesia, Division of Civil Aviation Safety Action

On 7 May 2019, the Federated States of Micronesia, Division of Civil Aviation informed the PNG Accident Investigation Commission of its safety action to address the safety deficiencies identified in Safety Recommendation AIC 19-R08/18-1004.

The FSM DCA provided copies of the Notification of Differences filed with the International Civil Aviation with respect to the State’s inability to meet the ICAO Annex 14 Standards for Airport Emergency Planning and specialist rescue services (equipment and personnel) for an emergency situation that might occur outside the airport perimeter in water. The FSM DCA also notified ICAO of difference relating to the State’s inability to meet the ICAO Annex 14 Standard for Runway Safety End Area at Chuuk International Airport runways 04/22.

On 8 May 2019, the FSM DCA informed the AIC that they were progressing having these differences publishing in the State’s Aeronautical Information Service documents, and raising with the US FAA for issuing NOTAMs.

The statement about notifying a difference on the RESA SARP is interesting because Australia also has a notified a difference on the RESA SARP:

Annex 14 Para 3.5.4 & 3.5.5

3.5.4 Recommendation.— A runway end safety area should, as far as practicable, extend from the end of a runway

strip to a distance of at least:
— 240 m where the code number is 3 or 4; or a reduced length when an arresting system is installed;
— 120 m where the code number is 1 or 2 and the runway is an instrument one; or a reduced length when an arresting
system is installed; and
— 30 m where the code number is 1 or 2 and the runway is a non-instrument one.
3.5.5 The width of a runway end safety area shall be at least twice that of the associated runway.

(Note 3.5.5 is particularly relevant to the latest proposed YMEN master plan: see https://auntypru.com/forum/showthread.ph...0#pid10430 )

---

The ND: Australia requires the RESA to be provided at the end of the runway strip and is to extend for the distance of 90m for a code number 3 or 4 runway used by air transport aeroplanes. In all other cases, the minimum length of the RESA is to be 60m for Code 1 or 2 runways.

Ref: Pg 10 NDs to Annex 14 Vol 1: http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/..._Vol_1.pdf

As pointed out in earlier posts this ND is in stark contrast to the USA and other 1st world countries where if an airport can't comply they will have a compliant arresting system. Or in the case of ICAO States with limited resources like Micronesia they will notify a difference and/or NOTAM/AIP the reduction in ICAO safety standards for the particular airport.   

Further to this excellent PNG AIC investigated and identified holes in the Swiss cheese I cannot help but be reminded of the Senator Fawcett questioning of the Dept of Infrastructure (in relation to PelAir ditching) in the JSCOT inquiry - see here: https://auntypru.com/forum/showthread.ph...44#pid5144 and here: https://auntypru.com/forum/showthread.ph...29#pid8829 and the findings that followed.

Deviation from the International Civil Aviation Organisation standards

2.27 Article 38 of the Chicago Convention requires a Party to notify the ICAO when it finds it impractical to comply in all respects with international standards and practices, and when it is unable to change its standards and practices to comply with standards and practices revised by the ICAO.36

2.28 Both Serbia and Vanuatu have formally notified the ICAO of differences with the ICAO standards. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development advised that Serbia has lodged 183 substantive differences and Vanuatu has lodged 82 substantive differences with the ICAO.37

2.29 According to the Department, substantive differences can involve a State being deficient in an ICAO Standard, meeting an ICAO Standard using a method different to that stated in the Standard, or exceeding an ICAO
Standard.38

2.30 The Department analysed the substantive differences notified by Serbia
and Vanuatu and advised the Committee that, in the case of Serbia, 84 of
the substantive differences involved exceeding the ICAO Standards,
58 involved meeting the relevant Standard by another means, and
41 involved being deficient in relation to the relevant Standard.39

2.31 Vanuatu exceeded two of the ICAO Standards, complied with
71 Standards by a different method, and was deficient in relation to nine
of the Standards.40

2.32 The Department noted:

The majority of differences notified by most countries are those
where the ICAO standards and recommended practice is not
applicable. An example for both Australia and Vanuatu would be
those standards relating to snow-clearing activities at airports.41

2.33 In a later submission, the Department noted that differences to ICAO
Standards were not considered when Air Services Agreements were being
negotiated. The Department advised that:

Air services arrangements provide an economic framework in
which airlines can consider serving a market. Differences lodged
by States, among other more pertinent kinds of safety-related
information, may be taken into account by the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority in the assessment of applications for the
operation of foreign aircraft into and out of Australia.42

2.34 The Committee considers that, while the Agreements are principally about
opening markets, the preamble to each Agreement includes the following
statement:

… Desiring to ensure the highest degree of safety and security in
international air transport and reaffirming their grave concern
about acts or threats against the security of aircraft, which
jeopardise the safety of persons or property, adversely affect the
operation of air transport, and undermine public confidence in the
safety of civil aviation; …43

2.35 The Committee also notes that the Agreements themselves contain a significant number of Articles that either directly or indirectly relate to safety.

2.36 The Committee considers that it would be imprudent if the Department’s negotiators did not at least make themselves aware of the differences notified to the ICAO by States with which they are negotiating. The Committee suggests that, as part of the negotiation process of future Air Services Agreements, the Department’s negotiators consult with CASA in order to determine if any of the differences notified by the State with which they are negotiating may pose a safety risk for Australian travellers.

---

Plus: 

2.45 The Committee is of the view that the establishment or renewal of Air Service agreements should be a trigger for CASA to undertake a due-diligence review of the status of compliance (including filing of differences with ICAO) with new or revised safety-critical regulations such as those outlined in para 2.42. This review should be completed as part of CASA's input to the evaluation of new or renewed Air Services Agreements and the documented outcomes included in the Department's evidence to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties.

https://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Committee....pdf?la=en

This got me thinking about the ASA that we have with PASO (Pacific islands) called PIASA. Now if the Dept was doing due diligence and following up on those JSCOT findings/recommendations one would have thought the PIASA may have been possibly updated and upgraded to encompass those extra safety provisions? However I can only find the 2004 version of the PIASA (see here: https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/....17tt1.pdf ) which does not appear to have been updated. But I do note that there is still scope under Article 16 of that agreement to recognise the now identified PNG AIC safety deficiencies with the noncompliance of Micronesia with certain Annex 14 Vol 1 SARPs:

ARTICLE 16 – Safety
1. Each Party shall recognise as valid, for the purpose of operating international
air transport governed by this Agreement, certificates of airworthiness, certificates of
competency, and licences issued or validated by another Party and still in force,
provided that the requirements for such certificates or licences meet the minimum
standards established pursuant to the Convention. Each Party may, however, refuse to
recognise as valid for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of
competency and licences granted or validated for its own nationals by another Party.
2. Any Party may request consultations concerning the safety standards
maintained by another Party relating to aeronautical facilities, aircrews, aircraft, and
operation of the designated airlines. Other Parties may participate in the consultations
in accordance with Article 18 (2) and (3).
3. If, following such consultations, any Party participating in the consultations
finds that the other Party does not effectively maintain and administer safety standards
and requirements in these areas that meet the minimum standards established pursuant
to the Convention, that other Party shall be notified of such findings and the steps
considered necessary to conform with these minimum standards, and that other Party
shall take appropriate corrective action.
4. Each Party shall have the right to withhold, revoke or limit the operating
authorisation or technical permission of an airline or airlines designated by another
Party where that Party does not take the appropriate corrective action within a
reasonable time or where urgent action is necessary to ensure the safety of an airline
operation.

In my mind this doesn't dispel the potential culpability for the Australian aviation safety bureaucracy not to have reviewed the PIASA (and other airservices agreements) after the findings of both the Senate PelAir cover-up inquiry and the JSCOT inquiry. 

It is also disturbing that despite there being a 2nd inquiry and report by the ATSB into the PelAir VH-NGA ditching that there was no observations/findings in regards to Pacitic Island airservices agreements etc. like the PNG AIC has been able to do, without fear nor favour, inside of 10 months to an excellent full report...   

MTF...P2