“I don't know. It's a mystery”
Thinking aloud here, rather than speculation. I keep being drawn back to P23 – Fig. 13. of the ATSB report. Can't put a finger on it, but every time I look at it, a half dozen questions pop up to which a definitive answer eludes me.
One item is a constant irritation, best get that off my chest before I venture into the realms of mystery. – This use of 400' AGL as some sort of a magic number – it ain't. The height you need is Obstacle Clearance Height – OCH. Here's a couple of check flight question; if an engine fails just after take off, in today's conditions, what rate of climb and climb gradient can you expect? How far from the runway end must you travel to reach an OCH of 700'? The answers nearly always surprise the victim. Setting an arbitrary 'safe height' of 400' AGL is a nonsense, a myth perpetrated by CASA into some form of a safe zone. It ain't, not by a country mile. Rant over; but it annoys me. Back to business.
P 19 – ATSB - Part A detailed that engine failure simulation for training purposes was to occur above 3,000 ft above ground level unless specifically required during the approach and landing phase. Part C permitted the simulation of engine failure ‘After attaining the higher of 400’ or acceleration altitude’. The reference to ‘acceleration altitude’ was not applicable to the Cessna 441. BOLLOCKS.
P27 – 30.- ATSB. “While the manual of standards does not specify a height at which these activities should be conducted, CAAP guidance stated that they should not be conducted below 400 ft above ground level. The requirement of managing an engine failure during an instrument departure or after take-off, could be interpreted as meaning that these activities should to be conducted at low altitude. However, there was no direct comment in any CASA guidance that this is required.
Look at Fig. 13 again. At 20 seconds, the speed was 130KIAS, then reduced to 120 KIAS (SEBROC) at the 30 second mark. By the 35 second mark the speed is below 120 KIAS and reducing. Yet the altitude remains constant during the speed decay - why? One of two things should have happened..i.. an acceleration segment to regain the lost speed and trim the aircraft or: ..ii.. the check pilot should have returned power to both engines. Neither of these things happened; nor was whatever caused the loss of performance identified. I'm curious as to why, two experienced men would sit and watch the speed wash off while trying to maintain an altitude; they had two serviceable engines, daylight, height to spare and a lightly loaded, clean configuration aircraft.
ATSB - P20 – Fig. 12. “N.B. Normal power on the failed engine is to be restored should the Flight Crew member flying experience difficulty in maintaining control of the aircraft”
P 62. - ATSB - A review of the ATSB occurrence database identified that there were three accidents during asymmetric training/checking flights in the last 10 years, with this accident being the only one with a fatal outcome.
Yes, but why? Hundreds of pilots qualified on the aircraft; gods alone know how many 'simulated' engine failure scenario's have been safely and competently executed, the aircraft is a tried and tested performer with a long safety record behind it. There were two experienced men at the controls. So what went so horribly wrong. After (almost) three years of 'investigation' ATSB should be able to come up with something more real than a subliminal hint that it was pilot error. I say it would take a nanosecond for either pilot to grab a fistful of power levers and get the Garret's singing their familiar song, at cobbed throttle. That never happened. Why?
End of ramble, but there are questions begging answers, lots of. Perhaps the answers lay within the mysteries of CASA 'approval' of C&T systems and the convoluted rubbish Part 61 demands. We shall see; meanwhile I remain slightly bemused by the ATSB report which, once again,essentially fails to identify the radical, while hinting at the surreal. Aye well; more puzzling to follow.
Toot – toot.
Thinking aloud here, rather than speculation. I keep being drawn back to P23 – Fig. 13. of the ATSB report. Can't put a finger on it, but every time I look at it, a half dozen questions pop up to which a definitive answer eludes me.
One item is a constant irritation, best get that off my chest before I venture into the realms of mystery. – This use of 400' AGL as some sort of a magic number – it ain't. The height you need is Obstacle Clearance Height – OCH. Here's a couple of check flight question; if an engine fails just after take off, in today's conditions, what rate of climb and climb gradient can you expect? How far from the runway end must you travel to reach an OCH of 700'? The answers nearly always surprise the victim. Setting an arbitrary 'safe height' of 400' AGL is a nonsense, a myth perpetrated by CASA into some form of a safe zone. It ain't, not by a country mile. Rant over; but it annoys me. Back to business.
P 19 – ATSB - Part A detailed that engine failure simulation for training purposes was to occur above 3,000 ft above ground level unless specifically required during the approach and landing phase. Part C permitted the simulation of engine failure ‘After attaining the higher of 400’ or acceleration altitude’. The reference to ‘acceleration altitude’ was not applicable to the Cessna 441. BOLLOCKS.
P27 – 30.- ATSB. “While the manual of standards does not specify a height at which these activities should be conducted, CAAP guidance stated that they should not be conducted below 400 ft above ground level. The requirement of managing an engine failure during an instrument departure or after take-off, could be interpreted as meaning that these activities should to be conducted at low altitude. However, there was no direct comment in any CASA guidance that this is required.
Look at Fig. 13 again. At 20 seconds, the speed was 130KIAS, then reduced to 120 KIAS (SEBROC) at the 30 second mark. By the 35 second mark the speed is below 120 KIAS and reducing. Yet the altitude remains constant during the speed decay - why? One of two things should have happened..i.. an acceleration segment to regain the lost speed and trim the aircraft or: ..ii.. the check pilot should have returned power to both engines. Neither of these things happened; nor was whatever caused the loss of performance identified. I'm curious as to why, two experienced men would sit and watch the speed wash off while trying to maintain an altitude; they had two serviceable engines, daylight, height to spare and a lightly loaded, clean configuration aircraft.
ATSB - P20 – Fig. 12. “N.B. Normal power on the failed engine is to be restored should the Flight Crew member flying experience difficulty in maintaining control of the aircraft”
P 62. - ATSB - A review of the ATSB occurrence database identified that there were three accidents during asymmetric training/checking flights in the last 10 years, with this accident being the only one with a fatal outcome.
Yes, but why? Hundreds of pilots qualified on the aircraft; gods alone know how many 'simulated' engine failure scenario's have been safely and competently executed, the aircraft is a tried and tested performer with a long safety record behind it. There were two experienced men at the controls. So what went so horribly wrong. After (almost) three years of 'investigation' ATSB should be able to come up with something more real than a subliminal hint that it was pilot error. I say it would take a nanosecond for either pilot to grab a fistful of power levers and get the Garret's singing their familiar song, at cobbed throttle. That never happened. Why?
End of ramble, but there are questions begging answers, lots of. Perhaps the answers lay within the mysteries of CASA 'approval' of C&T systems and the convoluted rubbish Part 61 demands. We shall see; meanwhile I remain slightly bemused by the ATSB report which, once again,essentially fails to identify the radical, while hinting at the surreal. Aye well; more puzzling to follow.
Toot – toot.