Just my opinion, on the search for probity:-stray thoughts -FWIW..........
Reality v ignorance: official ass cover and insurance placebo.
Quickly and easily any one of dozens of videos may be sourced on 'the net' related to underwater escape from an aircraft, particularly from helicopters. People who travel by and operate choppers to ocean oil rigs, ships etc (etc.) take this all very, very seriously and adapt procedure to meet 'conceived' risks. If you must ask why, stop reading.
In the video, it all seems calm, orderly and well managed and so it is in the 'tank'. However, the underpinning message of the training is vital, valid; understanding, practice, habit familiarity with the 'how/what and when/ why' is quintessential. One could spend a lifetime flying between 'home' and rig and back again, without even spilling your coffee, less risk than the bus ride to the airport. Then again:-
There are factors involved here of which the average mug punter will have no idea, nor the tools and training to deal with. Military and 'off-shore' crew do; even so, the shock of and disbelief in the fact that the aircraft is actually 'in trouble' must be quickly overcome and training must take over; best use of time available an essential . Even then - with fully trained, disciplined, fully aware personnel:-
02 Aug. 2023. Taipan – 4 dead. - 27 Aug. 2023..Bell Boeing V-22 – 3 dead.
The impact forces are scary, the chance of injury very real and the ability to function effectively under water, under threat, in pain/shock, possibly, upside down in the dark demand much: a much not readily available to the average joy flight thrill seeker.. When you get down to it, for most it will a first ride in a 'chopper' or 'light aircraft'; and, they have absolutely no idea how quickly it can all turn to worms......or even remotely have any real expectations of. Nor should they, in the normal run of the mill outing.
Operators should (and mostly do) know better. Aircraft are excellently maintained; the crew trained and checked; the procedures to ensure safety are enforced, scrutinised and made into law, often with serious penalty attached. Meticulously followed, even if grumbled about – safe as houses 99.999% - the safety record speaks volumes.
P2 - ” Interesting scenario??
P2 - “Hmm...wonder why a 'critical' or 'significant' safety issue notice, accompanied by a safety recommendation, was not addressed directly to the Australian aviation regulator? Shirley this falls directly into the area of CASA's oversight and surveillance of EP's covered under CAO 20.117.?”
P2 - “Under CAO 20.11 the fitment of the life jackets on the pax is not, from my interpretation, actually required for helicopter scenic flight ops, so is this is placebo measure only, one that has probably been encouraged by CASA without realising that they have inadvertently created a safety risk issue in the process. ('K' edit).
Interesting question – 'to have or not to have' - that is the question. But this a scenario which raises more questions than answers and a 'blanket' answer presents some flaws in the 'survivability' equation. Survival of all is the target; there we have half a dozen passengers; call it a broad selection of the public. The life 'jacket' is strapped to the waist. So, the aircraft is going down - Water landing imminent. - What to do? Unfasten the seat belt, open the 'packet' don the packaged life preserver, fit it correctly, not pull 'the tag' and then strap back in again, await for the Brace call then' evacuate' cleanly? How many 'off the street' folk could even respond, let alone do that within the few seconds allotted between one chopper hitting another and landing 'in the drink'? Not too bloody many.
Yes, it is a 'one-off' - rare (ultra) event; off the charts really. You see, in a routine situation; say engine failure – the crew can (for this discussion) usually manage to get the thing back on the deck without too much 'serious' risk if some 'control' is available– even on water, with self deploying floats. It is a 'nasty' situation but the percentages of survival have been (arguably) demonstrated many times..... But.
There are two things which really beat me; and, a third which leaves me wondering about the 'quality' of safety thinking from the domestic 'authorities' across the spectrum.
In primus, though I hesitate to use the word 'deception' , it sort of fits. Perhaps artificial, or even superficial may suit my purpose best; to explain why the safety measures in place failed and lives were lost – innocent lives, lives of those who 'trusted' the system. Nothing is absolutely 'safe'. But to place the ultimate, last chance of survival, after a short notice of a 'crash' into water, effectively using the allocated 'preserver' of life? Bets on any real safety benefit are at short odds.
The almost worst, unthinkable happened on the Gold Coast. Luck (or as fate would have it) spared the life of one pilot. The other aircraft was out of control, at low level. What chance did the survivors have to undo seat belts, open their 'fanny pack' don their life jackets, re-buckle their belts and 'Brace' for the uncontrolled ditching. (Movie script FCOL). What was the point in providing these things for a five minute flight over inland water; close to a heavy populated, busy, boat crowded shore? Surely a properly adjusted seat belt, sans the 'pack' would have been more beneficial at impact, considering the altitude, time available, lack of notice. Perhaps – probability; and, even 'bullet proof' separation procedures and more time allocated could have been financially justified and officially considered? – Just to be sure; to be sure?
In secundus; why were the scripted operational requirement for the use of these 'life -jackets' approved by CASA for this specific operation? The reality of time required to unpack and 'don' the jacket, the altitude of the flights, the length of the over water segment exposure, the assistance available and the inability of a passenger to complete the required tasks, prior to alighting on water make a complete nonsense of any 'operational oversight'. Has the operator simply gone along with 'the requirements' as stated to gain operational approval; tick, flick and do. Thumb in bum; mind in neutral from then, and passive acceptance of any dictates imposed.
To crown this glowing, real life glowing achievement; long after the fact, we have the ATSB band wagon 'suddenly' taking a voice, with 'Popinjay' in the media, mouthing a senseless take on an item which should have been considered years ago. The self promotion of this man beggars belief; the 'safety' considerations should (and probably were) documented long ago, by someone with a handle on what 'real life' safety system management should be. Take a quick tour of how a 'real' (cash and no horse-pooh) safety operation works. The Canadians (once again) – professional, on time, on the money, on budget, get the right job done, no fanfare – just a great 'lesson' for thoughtful, safety conscious folks to contemplate and adopt.
Before anyone starts allocating 'blame' or 'piggy-backing' on tragedy; perhaps it is time to do an 'in depth' on just how hidebound thinking and box ticking convenience is being foisted on the travelling public by our self appointed 'experts'. Re-boot and reality fix required methinks.
Toot (in my opinion) – toot............
Reality v ignorance: official ass cover and insurance placebo.
Quickly and easily any one of dozens of videos may be sourced on 'the net' related to underwater escape from an aircraft, particularly from helicopters. People who travel by and operate choppers to ocean oil rigs, ships etc (etc.) take this all very, very seriously and adapt procedure to meet 'conceived' risks. If you must ask why, stop reading.
In the video, it all seems calm, orderly and well managed and so it is in the 'tank'. However, the underpinning message of the training is vital, valid; understanding, practice, habit familiarity with the 'how/what and when/ why' is quintessential. One could spend a lifetime flying between 'home' and rig and back again, without even spilling your coffee, less risk than the bus ride to the airport. Then again:-
There are factors involved here of which the average mug punter will have no idea, nor the tools and training to deal with. Military and 'off-shore' crew do; even so, the shock of and disbelief in the fact that the aircraft is actually 'in trouble' must be quickly overcome and training must take over; best use of time available an essential . Even then - with fully trained, disciplined, fully aware personnel:-
02 Aug. 2023. Taipan – 4 dead. - 27 Aug. 2023..Bell Boeing V-22 – 3 dead.
The impact forces are scary, the chance of injury very real and the ability to function effectively under water, under threat, in pain/shock, possibly, upside down in the dark demand much: a much not readily available to the average joy flight thrill seeker.. When you get down to it, for most it will a first ride in a 'chopper' or 'light aircraft'; and, they have absolutely no idea how quickly it can all turn to worms......or even remotely have any real expectations of. Nor should they, in the normal run of the mill outing.
Operators should (and mostly do) know better. Aircraft are excellently maintained; the crew trained and checked; the procedures to ensure safety are enforced, scrutinised and made into law, often with serious penalty attached. Meticulously followed, even if grumbled about – safe as houses 99.999% - the safety record speaks volumes.
P2 - ” Interesting scenario??
P2 - “Hmm...wonder why a 'critical' or 'significant' safety issue notice, accompanied by a safety recommendation, was not addressed directly to the Australian aviation regulator? Shirley this falls directly into the area of CASA's oversight and surveillance of EP's covered under CAO 20.117.?”
P2 - “Under CAO 20.11 the fitment of the life jackets on the pax is not, from my interpretation, actually required for helicopter scenic flight ops, so is this is placebo measure only, one that has probably been encouraged by CASA without realising that they have inadvertently created a safety risk issue in the process. ('K' edit).
Interesting question – 'to have or not to have' - that is the question. But this a scenario which raises more questions than answers and a 'blanket' answer presents some flaws in the 'survivability' equation. Survival of all is the target; there we have half a dozen passengers; call it a broad selection of the public. The life 'jacket' is strapped to the waist. So, the aircraft is going down - Water landing imminent. - What to do? Unfasten the seat belt, open the 'packet' don the packaged life preserver, fit it correctly, not pull 'the tag' and then strap back in again, await for the Brace call then' evacuate' cleanly? How many 'off the street' folk could even respond, let alone do that within the few seconds allotted between one chopper hitting another and landing 'in the drink'? Not too bloody many.
Yes, it is a 'one-off' - rare (ultra) event; off the charts really. You see, in a routine situation; say engine failure – the crew can (for this discussion) usually manage to get the thing back on the deck without too much 'serious' risk if some 'control' is available– even on water, with self deploying floats. It is a 'nasty' situation but the percentages of survival have been (arguably) demonstrated many times..... But.
There are two things which really beat me; and, a third which leaves me wondering about the 'quality' of safety thinking from the domestic 'authorities' across the spectrum.
In primus, though I hesitate to use the word 'deception' , it sort of fits. Perhaps artificial, or even superficial may suit my purpose best; to explain why the safety measures in place failed and lives were lost – innocent lives, lives of those who 'trusted' the system. Nothing is absolutely 'safe'. But to place the ultimate, last chance of survival, after a short notice of a 'crash' into water, effectively using the allocated 'preserver' of life? Bets on any real safety benefit are at short odds.
The almost worst, unthinkable happened on the Gold Coast. Luck (or as fate would have it) spared the life of one pilot. The other aircraft was out of control, at low level. What chance did the survivors have to undo seat belts, open their 'fanny pack' don their life jackets, re-buckle their belts and 'Brace' for the uncontrolled ditching. (Movie script FCOL). What was the point in providing these things for a five minute flight over inland water; close to a heavy populated, busy, boat crowded shore? Surely a properly adjusted seat belt, sans the 'pack' would have been more beneficial at impact, considering the altitude, time available, lack of notice. Perhaps – probability; and, even 'bullet proof' separation procedures and more time allocated could have been financially justified and officially considered? – Just to be sure; to be sure?
In secundus; why were the scripted operational requirement for the use of these 'life -jackets' approved by CASA for this specific operation? The reality of time required to unpack and 'don' the jacket, the altitude of the flights, the length of the over water segment exposure, the assistance available and the inability of a passenger to complete the required tasks, prior to alighting on water make a complete nonsense of any 'operational oversight'. Has the operator simply gone along with 'the requirements' as stated to gain operational approval; tick, flick and do. Thumb in bum; mind in neutral from then, and passive acceptance of any dictates imposed.
To crown this glowing, real life glowing achievement; long after the fact, we have the ATSB band wagon 'suddenly' taking a voice, with 'Popinjay' in the media, mouthing a senseless take on an item which should have been considered years ago. The self promotion of this man beggars belief; the 'safety' considerations should (and probably were) documented long ago, by someone with a handle on what 'real life' safety system management should be. Take a quick tour of how a 'real' (cash and no horse-pooh) safety operation works. The Canadians (once again) – professional, on time, on the money, on budget, get the right job done, no fanfare – just a great 'lesson' for thoughtful, safety conscious folks to contemplate and adopt.
Before anyone starts allocating 'blame' or 'piggy-backing' on tragedy; perhaps it is time to do an 'in depth' on just how hidebound thinking and box ticking convenience is being foisted on the travelling public by our self appointed 'experts'. Re-boot and reality fix required methinks.
Toot (in my opinion) – toot............