[Peetwo]

Without fear nor favour the UK AAIB (point of comparison)?? -   

The following is a no fuss (no bollocks and definitely no attribution; or Director of Transport Safety quotes) AAIB media statement, for a fatal GA VFR into IMC loss of control accident investigation final report, released yesterday...  

AAIB investigation to Mudry Cap 10B, G-BXBU

Loss of control during diversion in poor weather, Lower Colley Farm, Buckland St Mary, Somerset, 12 August 2021.

From:Air Accidents Investigation Branch Published 27 April 2023


Category: General aviation - fixed wing
Report type: Bulletin - Field investigation
Date of occurrence: 12 August 2021
Aircraft type: Mudry Cap 10B
Location: Lower Colley Farm, Buckland St Mary, Somerset
Registration: G-BXBU

Summary:

The pilot found himself stuck above cloud during a cross-country flight under Visual Flight Rules. After contacting the Distress & Diversion Cell for assistance he was transferred to the radar frequency of a nearby airport, at which the cloud base was below the minimum required for the approach offered. The pilot, who was not qualified to fly in cloud, lost control of the aircraft during the subsequent descent and the aircraft was destroyed when it hit a tree. Both occupants were fatally injured.

The investigation found that air traffic service providers did not obtain or exchange sufficient information about the aircraft and its pilot to enable adequate assistance to be provided. There was an absence of active decision making by those providers, and uncertainty between units about their respective roles and responsibilities.

Seven Safety Recommendations are made to address shortcomings identified in the provision of air traffic services in an emergency.

Download report:

Mudry Cap 10B, G-BXBU 06-23

Download glossary of abbreviations:

Glossary of abbreviations

Published 27 April 2023[/font][/color]

The safety recommendations:  

Safety Recommendation 2023-011

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority publish guidance for general
aviation pilots on responding to unexpected weather deterioration, highlighting
the factors affecting their performance and the benefits of planning before the
flight how they will respond.

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Safety Recommendation 2023-012

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority require air traffic controllers
to receive training regarding the human performance characteristics and
limitations associated with stress. This should include the verbal cues that may
indicate that a pilot is operating under high stress, and mitigation strategies to
help controllers deal with such events.

---

Safety Recommendation 2023-013

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority specify the types of information
that air traffic controllers will obtain and record when responding to aircraft in
an emergency to ensure that pilots’ needs are met and reported correctly if
communicated to other air traffic control units.

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Safety Recommendation 2023-014

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority encourage the use of
checklists in air traffic management operations when dealing with abnormal and
emergency situations.

---

Safety Recommendation 2023-015

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority determine the effect the
D&D Cell’s executive control has on civil ATCOs and inform civil ATCOs of any
differences in their responsibilities whilst executive control is exercised.

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Safety Recommendation 2023-016

It is recommended that the Department for Transport review the current provision
of emergency communications in the UK to determine if the involvement of a
dedicated emergency air traffic service unit is the most effective way to assist
civil aircraft in an emergency, and publish its findings

---

Safety Recommendation 2023-017

It is recommended that the Department for Transport specify and publish details
of the emergency air traffic service it requires the D&D Cell to provide.

The AAIB was established in 1915 and since 1983 has been under the Department of Transport control (see HERE). This is how it is constituted today:

The AAIB has 64 employees.[10]

These are:

• Chief Inspector of Air Accidents
  
• Deputy Chief Inspector of Air Accidents
  
• Six teams of inspectors from all disciplines each led by a principal inspector
  

AAIB Inspectors fall into one of three categories:

• Operations inspector – must hold a current Airline Transport Pilot Licence with a valid Class I medical certificate. Able to offer appropriate command experience on fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters. Broad-based knowledge of aviation.
  
• Engineering inspector – must hold an engineering degree and/or be a Chartered Engineer with a minimum of five years' post qualifications experience. Knowledge and experience of modern aircraft control systems.
  
• Flight recorder inspector – degree level in electronics/electrical engineering or an aeronautical engineering related subject and/or is a chartered member of a relevant engineering institute with eight years' experience since qualifying. Knowledge and experience of modern avionics.
  

There is also a Head of Administration who is supported by two teams, the Inspector Support Unit (ISU) who provide administrative support to the principal inspectors and their teams and the Information Unit (IU), who are the first port of call for accidents being reported.

AAIB administrative staff are part of the Department for Transport (DfT) and are recruited according to civil service guidelines.

 
So kind of like our BASI was originally constituted, this small but effective team has the proven and historical runs (108 years) on the board. I say - BRING BACK BASI! 

MTF...P2