[Gobbledock]

The Sexless Pistols - 'Beaker, never mind the Bollocks', coming to a risk management workshop soon near you!!!

Just re-read this complete and utter drivel stammered out of the wobbling head and quivering lips from behind the facial fungus of Beaker the bureaucratic whore (Warning: big-ass bucket required)

Monsignor Beaker mi mi mi-ed;

"If you are looking for the philosophical underpinnings of how we deal with evidence and a range of other things, there is a document, Analysis, causality and proof in safety investigations, which was a publication of Dr Walker and Mr Bills in 2008. That shows the philosophical underpinnings of how we deal with facts, evidence, analysis and so on. It is reflected in our policies and procedures in the organisation. The risk assessments largely draw on or are compressed versions of international safety organisation risk management standards. We are trying to bring all that to bear on a diverse range of operations, while bearing in mind the guidance from the government that our attention should primarily be on the safety of the travelling public..."

= 'Vomitus excretus'. A horrid unloading of utter bullshit wrapped in a PHD ribbon. It's criminal that the relatively simple but oh so logical James Reason methodology, yes THE tried, proven and tested methodology universally accepted by THE best in the investigative business could be thrown on the pony pooh scrap heap by this Comcare CEO, career sheltered government workshop worker and all round dipshit....Beaker.

What in the wide world of sports went wrong in this Country? FFS. Have we finally reached the end of the human evolution chain, here in Canberra, this decade? And now we have Hoody with his 'we must defend ourselves webpage', another embarrassing non-independent piece of philosophical underpinning horseshit that flies in the face of what our once independent succinct bureau once stood for, where it used to use it's unfettered authority to do good, which included kicking CAsA's ass when justified. Before the spin doctors, charlatans, witch doctors and assorted PHD holders ass-fu#ked the system.

Seaview, Lockhart, Pelair, Canley Vale, A380????? TICK TOCK

[Kharon]

The prosecution rests M’lud.

The evidence is before you; I say the bundle provided by P2 takes the matter beyond reasonable doubt.  The Australian people are being ripped off, ICAO is being conned and the aviation industry not only foots the bill for this aberration, but must suffer the consequences of a failed safety system. To explain, why - in simple terms, we look to a 12th century rhyme, for clarity. It is old, the reason it has survived the test of time is that it is so fundamentally correct.  So far as it goes

Wiki - a proverb, having numerous variations over several centuries, reminding that seemingly unimportant acts or omissions can have grave and unforeseen consequences.

For want of a nail the shoe was lost.

For want of a shoe the horse was lost.

For want of a horse the rider was lost.

For want of a rider the message was lost.

For want of a message the battle was lost.

For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.

And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.

The ‘proverb’ quintessentially defines accident investigation and the radical cause of the accident.  One can quite easily see where the causal chain began and the end result. There is however a flaw in the proverb.  Like the ATSB reports, the poem needs the second verse, to clarify. In an aviation sense we need to know why the ‘nail’ was lost; how was it lost; why did no one notice; who was/ is responsible for checking that the shoe was secure; was the correct nail used; was it ignorance or laziness? Was it an organizational or systemic failure?  Clearly the reason for the loss of a horse was a result of a systematic failure; but the loss of the kingdom was purely an organizational failure.

You can see where this is going – we know the kingdom was lost; we know where the chain of events began; what we don’t know is how the loss came into being – or; what has been done to prevent the same thing happening again.

We need to know why the shoe wanted a nail.

This is the question Fawcett asks – the question Beaker dare not answer.  He’s buggered, whichever way he goes, but; if the problem was only skin deep allowing the truth of a flawed report to be seen, then perhaps all was not lost. Alas, he is confounded by the ‘Hobson’s choice options, non of which bode well.  If it was ICAO asking the questions David Fawcett was, ATSB could point at their artificial, desk-top generated record and slither off the hook.  But it ain’t.  Fawcett knows as well as we do exactly what is going on, where the skeletons are buried, how many there are and who put ‘em there.  Whether it was though grace or political expediency to save embarrassment, ATSB and CASA were allowed a second chance to get their ducks in a row.  Did they take the action required?

Not bloody likely; they mistook kindness for weakness, grace for forgiveness and then set about ensuring they would never get caught out again. Apart from some tawdry window dressing nothing has changed; not in essentials. M’lud, I say the proof is contained in the reports ATSB produce and pass off to the world as adequate to task, under a system which has gone far beyond all sensible Reason.

When I was young, the stories of palaces, kings, hero’s and evil grand viziers were a favourite, because in the end, the wicked vizier and his twisted magicians always got there comeuppance.  In faery tales, good always triumphs, the good guy survives, puts a band aid on the wounds, grabs the money, gets the damsel and buggers off into the sunset. Now, with experience, I can see where I was led astray; it is not so easy to shift the evil viziers; they are entrenched, have stolen the power and the kings ear.  Once, I asked my Papa “Why are the movies not more like life?”  He smiled, then said  “wrong question son; better to ask why is life not more like the movies?”  Never did quite figure that one out.

Aye; P2 was bang on the money, non of the accident/incident reports eventually presented withstand a close examination. Which leaves us still wondering how the ATSB can attain such a high ICAO score after the Canley Vale and Norfolk debacles, and Mildura, and the ATR and a whole list of ‘other’ matters which have been delayed, deferred or degraded to ‘minor’ or insignificant. Manipulated, to tick an ICAO box; and, ensure ministerial comfort of course.

Right then; boots, dogs, smokes – check – Out of here; need some fresh air, solitude, peace and perhaps a coffee, far away from the library files.

Toot toot.

[Peetwo]

Part II: Operations - Airline/Operator AOC Flight Operations & NAA oversight.

Kharon - Aye, P2 was bang on the money, non of the accident/incident reports eventually presented withstand a close examination. Which leaves us still wondering how the ATSB can attain such a high ICAO score after the Canley Vale and Norfolk debacles, and Mildura, and the ATR and a whole list of ‘other’ matters which have been delayed, deferred or degraded to ‘minor’ or insignificant. Manipulated to tick an ICAO box and ensure ministerial comfort.

Yes a reminder that Murky and his minions manipulated a near perfect (3.03% off 100% compliance implementation) for the ICAO audit AI critical element - one word BOLLOCKS!

However "K" that does not mean it is time to knock off, we still have 7 more critical elements to appraise and I think we should now go to your pet subject - 'Operations.'

Now although 'operations' is above the global average (Aus 71.07% vs 67.01 ICAO GA), I find it passing strange that of all the critical elements this would be the one CE that you would want to manipulate/doctor to appear much better than the global average. The reason being that 'operations' is the one real showstopper that can draw an ICAO red flag and, when  combined with other negative findings can ultimately lead to a subsequent downgrade to ICAO category two.

Example: This is what Nepal is currently dealing with, reference Nepal v Aus v ICAO GA:


So "K" when you get back from your Wednesday ramble let us begin to examine the area of 'operations'. Maybe we could start by examining some of the more happy, crappy ATSB 'topcover' incident/accident reports and current investigations that seemingly ignore or sideline obvious operational 'safety issues' in their rush to ping the flight crew and/or smaller operators.

Now I know we have a plethora of obfuscated high profile occurrences to choose from that fit the bill (Mildura Fog duck-up, Norfolk Island ditching, ATR bird strike accident, Rex & Coal loaders, B717 and marginal fuel etc..etc.) but for recency and topical relevance, I thought this just released ATSB 'short investigation bulletin' report could be extremely topical...

kharon Wrote: ATSB on the 717 incident - HERE.
From the ASIB report:

Safety message

Inaccurate take-off reference data has potentially serious consequences. ATSB Aviation Research and Analysis Report AR-2009-052 (Take-off performance calculation and entry errors: A global perspective) documents a number of accidents and incidents where take-off performance data was inaccurate. The report analyses those accidents and incidents, and concludes:

… it is imperative that the aviation industry continues to explore solutions to firstly minimise the opportunities for take-off performance parameter errors from occurring and secondly, maximise the chance that any errors that do occur are detected and/or do not lead to negative consequences.

The ATSB SafetyWatch highlights the broad safety concerns that come out of our investigation findings and from the occurrence data reported to us by industry. One of the safety concerns relates to data input errors.

 
Reference ATSB desktop ASIB report - Issue 52

Update: Binger in the Oz today...

QantasLink flight ‘used incorrect weight and temperature data’

• Mitchell Bingemann
  
• The Australian
  
• 12:00AM October 4, 2016
  

Reporter
Sydney
@Mitch_Hell

A QantasLink plane avoided a potentially serious incident after it completed a trip from Canberra to Sydney using incorrect data about the plane’s weight and temperature.

An investigation by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau into the June 20 incident has found that a tired crew and last-minute changes to the aeroplane’s passenger numbers meant the wrong takeoff data was used for the flight.

The incident involved a Cob­ham-operated Boeing 717-200 that was flying to Sydney with 91 passengers and five crew on board. The captain had prepared for a “flex” takeoff based on an assumed outside temperature of 39C. Flex allows pilots to use reduced thrust to take off, which reduces the wear and tear on plane engines.

However, that flex temperature was revised down to 34C when 22 additional passengers were loaded on to the plane after the cockpit checklist had been completed. While the captain recorded the new temperature, it was scribbled over the initial 39C figure, which was then used to calculate the engine’s required thrust.

Despite the error, the flight continued to Sydney and landed without incident.

In its investigation into the incident, the ATSB found that both members of the flight crew assessed that tiredness because of their early morning start may have contributed to the flex temperature error, but that they were fit to continue to operate for the rest of the day’s duty.

“The flight crew commented that a combination of distraction by cabin crew and ground personnel while re-entering data, a reduced state of arousal following a high workload instrument ­approach, and possibly tiredness from an early start may have contributed to their omitting to enter the correct flex temperature,” the ATSB said. In its official report into the incident, the bureau said the use of inaccurate takeoff reference data could have potentially serious consequences.

In a 2011 report, the ATSB highlighted the consequences of failing to use correct data for flight calculations, saying that tail strikes, runway overruns and degraded handling qualities could all occur.

“It is imperative that the aviation industry continues to explore solutions to, firstly, minimise the opportunities for takeoff performance parameter errors from occurring and, secondly, maximise the chance that any errors that do occur are ­detected and/or do not lead to negative consequences,” it said.

Cobham Aviation Services, which hires the crew, said they would ensure their pilots used a new takeoff and landing data collection card if new information needed to be added or updated.

Back to you Dear Ferryman, Dear Ferryman..
MTF...P2

[Kharon]

Forbidden fruit, the Operations pineapple.

P2 – “The reason being that 'operations' is the one real showstoppers, that can draw an ICAO red flag; and, when combined with other negative findings can ultimately lead to a subsequent downgrade to ICAO category two.”

Prickly bloody things; pineapples, tough to peel and one needs to take care if the fruit is to be enjoyed.  The ICAO ‘Operations’ analysis and IOSA audit parameters are pretty specific and not overly esoteric – for operators.  For our ‘watch-dogs’ they present a different challenge.  In the main, it is a licence to print money under the ‘mystique’ shelter. “Operations is a ‘specialised’ highly technical area minister, we have a low score and must act swiftly before we loose our rating – just sign here – Safety is our prime concern”.  The minister understands (as briefed) the horrendous consequences of a downgrade – very well – insomuch as if it happens on his watch – his political career is over.  So, whilst a lower score may not, of itself, be a bad, threatening, thing, but it is enough to bamboozle and a handy tool for extracting more dollars.  The dollars mostly poured down the bottomless pit of ‘regulatory reform’, hiring useless DAS and supporting the never ending window dressers party.  The cynic would suggest the low score is a manipulated result; the pragmatist could appreciate the subtle management but deplore the methods; but in truth – it is an ‘internal game’ the public oblivious to the vast sums spent on the ICAO merry-go-round.  I ramble.

The really ferocious end of the pineapple belongs to ‘the operators’ and here we must tread carefully. With little provocation the operators will come out swinging and defend ‘their’ operating practices; and rightly so, for the ‘practices’ are hard won.  I’m glad P2 selected a relatively ‘simple’ case for a look-see.  The business of TOLD cards has been pushed out and the ‘operational’ corrections i.e. the ‘safety fix’ has been promulgated on this very slim reed.

I grew up with and value the humble Take off and Landing Data (TOLD) a good one provides the backbone of the take off briefing; it provides the data on which ‘performance’ predicted. With the indulgence of professionals who know this, I’ll digress to explain the TOLD card a little.  In simple terms an aircraft is like a Scotch and soda; you can have a lot of whisky and a little soda; or vice versa. What you cannot have is both; there is a limited capacity.  Same -same aircraft; you can fill it with passengers, baggage and freight and a little fuel; or lots of fuel and fewer passengers; no matter, once you reach the ‘maximum’ that’s your lot; on a good day. Things get tricky when the weather is bad; or the temperature is high; or the runway is short; or there are big hills close to the aerodrome; all of these factors affect the maximum weight for the take off. So it become a juggling match; fuel (a must) passengers (a necessity). So, the humble TOLD card is generated; at this temperature, off this runway we can take off at X tons (metric or imperial). This weight covers all the bets – legal and operational and commercial. ‘Operational safety’ achieved.

Now in the subject case, we have a huge runway, a reasonable temperature, not too much in the way of obstacles and not very far to go – so the aircraft is well below any limiting weight. The crew know this and have generated the ‘numbers’ which allow for a ‘reduced’ power take off; now this is a good thing. The figures derived provide a more than adequate margin of power to meet all legal and operational demands so there is no point in hammering the engines to provide more power than needed; sound operational practice. The ‘power’ setting is obtained by creating an artificial temperature based against the predicted Take Off Weight (TOW).  It has taken some little time to determine; a plugged in crew can, fairly quickly, nut out a TOLD card; brief and park the card on the glare shield for future reference; routine stuff.

So how come there was a cock-up?

There were a few potential gremlins floating about, each capable of spoiling the day – if they got a chance.  But here’s where it gets sticky; how deeply do we look into an operational hiccup.  The wider net could be trawled through the deeper waters and come up with some real uglies; the question is how deep were ATSB prepared to fish. Take On Time Performance (OTP) as an example: this is a PR thing, NOT a safety issue; and has sweet sod all to do with flight crew – nothing – zip – nada: and yet, it creates a subtle, I believe ignominious, subconscious pressure. It should be removed – totally.  Flight crew are aware of schedule; they know when there is a delay there is little they can do about it – provided they were ‘on time’ at sign on whatever else happens during the tour of duty with regard to ‘OTP’ is absolutely beyond their control.  Best airline I ever operated for had ‘brilliant’ schedulers – on time every time; why? Well the turn around times were tailor made to each port; so a delayed departure from A could be absorbed at B, so at C everything was back ‘on schedule’.  So a late change was not a rushed job; time was available to rejig the numbers, cross check those numbers, take a leak and toddle off – on time.  Mind you, the skippers there were ‘seasoned’ and took no crap from HR/PR or whoever decided that ‘late’ was a punishable event. Provided the crew had not been away for a ‘long lunch’ when they were supposed to be operating – all was well.

So to the 717 crew and their wee problems; how deep do we dig?  Is the fix presented adequate to task? Has the ATSB done enough to cure the problem?  Can this be classed as an ‘operational’ matter?   The rational way to answer is to examine one factor only – can this happen again?  The answer to that is a resounding absolutely. The loop remains open. The event could have been avoided by the skipper – late change – Ok give us ten minutes and we’ll be ready – new TOLD card, re-brief, cross check then bitch and moan about the delay generated land side. Or; the ATSB could cite ‘on-time-itus’ as a contributory factor and put the hard word on the operator about ‘scheduling’ for reality not PR faery tales.  Many things could have been done; but a new paragraph in the manual, insisting that the crew generate a new TOLD card is a fairly thin band aid, plastered over a deeper problem. Have the ATSB the balls to address it? Take it the deep levels of the garbage in the Company operations manual generated to meet some CASA fantasy. You know they won’t.

Aye well, that’s the best I can do – my own OTP is threatened. This incident is worth deep examination for it invokes some of the very real issues which can and do affect operations. Like stress induced fatigue due to subliminal OTP demands.  No doubt the airline team will make the right adjustments; but on their own recognisance, without ATSB back up or advice; and, without upsetting the delicate balance of CASA ‘approval’. 

I do know this; tear arsing and gut busting have caused more problems than a lateish departure ever did; and Murphy is everyman’s co-pilot, on every flight.

MTF – probably; dunno.

Toot toot.

[Peetwo]

Safety loops, trends & disconnections?

Kharon: "..So to the 717 crew and their wee problems; how deep do we dig?  Is the fix presented adequate to task? Has the ATSB done enough to cure the problem?  Can this be classed as an ‘operational’ matter?   The rational way to answer is to examine one factor only – can this happen again?  The answer to that is a resounding absolutely. The loop remains open.."

Nail on head "K" but this is not an isolated occurrence aberration, these are well documented repetitive operational safety issues. Yet the ATSB don't seem capable of even joining their own dots, which perhaps is best reflected in the fact that this occurrence was 'desktop' investigated and discretely hidden away in the latest ATSB SIB - WTD..

IMO if the ATSB had of join some of their own dots, they would have spotted a growing trend of similar incidents/accidents that potentially point to similar/identical contributory factors.

Let me explain...

If you go to the ATSB 'Safety Watch' (or safety issue trend page) webpage, you will see there is one safety concern photo labelled 'Data Input errors':

[/url][url=http://www.atsb.gov.au/safetywatch/safety-around-aeros/]Data input errors
Safety concern
There have been numerous accidents worldwide that were the result of simple human errors in data calculation or entry.

Data errors—such as the wrong figure being used as well as data being entered incorrectly, not being updated, or being excluded—happen for many different reasons.

The consequences of these sorts of errors can range from aborted take-offs through to collisions with the ground. Errors can occur irrespective of pilot experience, operator, aircraft type, location and take-off performance calculation method.
 

 
What the ATSB is doing
As part of its investigation into an Airbus A340 tailstrike and runway overrun at Melbourne Airport in March 2009, the ATSB acknowledged the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) action in assisting setting up a working group with the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) to study the feasibility of take-off performance monitoring systems and developing an equipment standard. The ATSB also made a recommendation to the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to address the existing standard that did not provide flight crews with a means to detect degraded take-off acceleration. The FAA has subsequently joined EASA as a member of the working group and, given this safety action, the ATSB has closed that recommendation.

In recognition of the hazards posed by data entry errors, the ATSB will continue to monitor output from the EUROCAE take-off performance monitoring working group and any associated developments that may assist in mitigating this risk.

What can you do?
While no one is immune from data input errors, risk can be significantly reduced through effective management and systems. Good communication and independent cross-checks between pilots, effective operating procedures, improved aircraft automation systems and software design, and clear and complete flight documentation will all help prevent or uncover data entry errors.

The ATSB advises operators to consider all the possible errors that could be introduced and then determine if the procedures in place will prevent these errors from occurring, or will provide an opportunity to detect them.

More information
An ATSB safety research report, Take-off performance calculation and entry errors: A global perspective, examines Australian and international occurrences between 1 January 1989 and 30 June 2009 that involved the calculation and entry of erroneous take-off data.
The following investigation reports also provide useful lessons on the potential dangers of data input errors:

• An Airbus A340-541 tailstrike and runway overrun that occurred at Melbourne Airport on 20 March 2009
  
• An operational event involving an Airbus A380 that occurred at Los Angeles International Airport on 8 October 2011
  

Useful international reports include:

• A study by the US Navy/NASA Ames Research Center: Cockpit interruptions and distractions: A line observation study
  
• A NASA research publication, Performance Data Errors in Air Carrier Operations: Causes and Countermeasures
  

Related: SafetyWatch
 

     
 Because this safety concern is still highlighted on the bureau 'Safety Watch' page, would suggest that this is still a very real ongoing safety concern that is yet to be properly risk mitigated.

The focal occurrence that lead to this ATSB 'safety watch' initiative was of course the Emirates A340 T/O occurrence out of YMML - Airbus A340 tailstrike and runway overrun at Melbourne Airport in March 2009. If you go down through the various links in the safety watch initiative you have to commend the ATSB for their efforts to address this safety concern. These proactive actions included a rare 'safety recommendation' addressed to the FAA, who responded respectively, appropriately and timely:

Date received: 19 December 2011

Response from: United States Federal Aviation Administration

Response text:

During the investigation, the ATSB sought an understanding from the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of whether the FAA was contemplating work similar to that by EASA to develop a standard to guide the development in the US of take-off performance monitoring systems. On 6 December 2011 the FAA advised that:

…the FAA has entertained this idea before, notably, in the aftermath of the Air Florida accident here in Washington, DC, and has found the idea of these systems, with all of their inherent complexity to be more problematical than reliance on adequate airmanship. That has been the FAA position in the past. I'm sure the FAA would be happy to entertain any recommendation to re-visit the issue in the light of new information or ideas.

---

...Previous unexpectedly poor takeoff acceleration events led to the 1987 SAE Aeronautical Standard for takeoff performance monitoring (TOPM) systems. Because adequate technology and equipment were not available at that time, no systems were completed, and the standard was never invoked.  

With advances in technology and equipment, the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) convened a working group to study the feasibility of developing standards for TOPM systems. The group is expected to deliver its first report in March 2013.  We intend to work with the government and industry team to define modern standards for designing and using TOPM systems.

The ATSB report noted that the first contributor to the subject accident was a human data entry error in the first digit of the airplane’s takeoff weight which caused gross discrepancies in takeoff calculations and expected performance. To address this hazard, we issued policy covering weight entry methods in flight management systems that are intended to reduce exposure to the particular error that initiated the Emirates accident sequence. Future systems will include features to assist pilots during flight planning that would reduce the likelihood of hazardous preflight errors. The features will perform automatic checks on each weight component and calculation, and will alert the crew to errors. TOPM systems, if available, would provide another layer of safety and error detection...

---

ATSB response:

The ATSB acknowledges that the FAA is collaboratively working towards addressing this safety issue and will continue to monitor the progress of the safety actions.

Okay so all good responsible 'adult' stuff and a perfect example on how the system is supposed to work..

The other proactive ATSB action to come from the Emirates occurrence was the completion of the research paper titled - Take-off performance calculation and entry errors: A global perspective 

Which highlighted that this was a multi-faceted safety issue that even the former CC, & MH370 super sleuth, Beaker had to admit would not be easily addressed: No single fix for aircraft take-off errors: ATSB report

Spot the disconnect...

However what I found most interesting, in the preamble to that report, was the breakdown of figures for the ATSB identified contributory factors that included some of Kharon's more considered causal issues to the B717 YSCB incident:

A review of the international and Australian occurrences showed that these types of errors have many different origins; with crew actions involving the wrong figure being used, data entered incorrectly, data not being updated, and data being excluded. Furthermore, a range of systems and devices have been involved in these errors, including performance documentation, laptop computers, the flight management computer, and the aircraft communications addressing and reporting systems. The consequences of these errors also ranged from a noticeable reduction in the aircraft's performance during the takeoff, to the aircraft being destroyed and loss of life.

The most common contributing safety factor identified related to crew actions (39 per cent), including monitoring and checking, assessing and planning, and the use of aircraft equipment. This was followed by absent or inadequate risk controls (31 per cent), mostly centred on poor procedures, non-optimally designed aircraft automation systems, inappropriately designed or unavailable reference materials, and inadequate crew management practices and training. Common local conditions (27 per cent) involved inadequate task experience or recency, time pressures, distractions and incorrect task information.

A 27% 'hole in the cheese' I would have thought, should be considered worthy of further investigative exploration??

However that was in January 2011 and since that time there would appear to have been a stalling of any further proactive actions to address the other IMO significant safety factors...

Meanwhile these latent safety issues are possibly reoccurring in similar domestic incidents but due to the strange prioritisation of resources (& a continued desire to be PC by the ATSB), these serious, trend identified occurrences are yet to be completed...

Example (with reference to 'Closing the safety loop' thread post - TICK TOCK goes the Miniscule clock??) note the last update to AO-2015-139 :

Updated: 23 August 2016

Completion of the draft investigation report has been delayed due to competing team member priorities and workload, and to allow additional investigative work to be finalised.

This additional work includes:

• obtaining and consolidating additional evidence
  
• analysis of evidence held and the development and test of investigation findings.
  

When complete, the draft report will be released to directly involved parties (DIP) for comment and on the factual accuracy of the draft report. Feedback from those parties over the 28-day DIP period will be considered for inclusion in the final investigation report.

Hmm..no further comment required - over to you Ferryman...
MTF...P2

[Kharon]

Digital dysfunction; not a new concept.

Before going anywhere near the flight deck end of this tale, and seeing as it is an ATSB thread we need to start in the ‘experts’ corner.

P2 – “These proactive actions included a rare 'safety recommendation' addressed to the FAA, who responded respectively, appropriately and timely:”

Why just the FAA? Why not CASA? Clearly there has been some good work done and a genuine attempt to resolve the matter, the report certainly good enough for the FAA to take seriously and acknowledge.  

P2 – “However that was in January 2011 and since that time there would appear to have been a stalling of any further proactive actions to address the other IMO significant safety factors...”

I suspect there are three reasons for ATSB to go running to the grown ups.

1) Kudos – the FAA will think well of ATSB. A credible report and a SR enhances the notion that ATSB are a good unit, on the ball and ‘doing’ good things. This all helps come audit time, it also helps fuel the notion that Pel-Air was, indeed, an aberration; not the norm. I doubt it would occur to the FAA to take a peep at the ATSB follow up: they would simply assume that CASA was ‘in the loop’ and proactive change was afoot. They would be startled to discover that ATSB simply accepted the operators ‘fix’ and put the whole thing back on the shelf. They would also be interested in why CASA was not formally included and the cosy little arrangements in place which allow a matter like this to be quietly left gathering dust.

2) The ‘white hats’ in ATSB know, full well, they are flogging a dead horse trying to get action on a SR from CASA; even if they were allowed to issue one. However, by roping in the FAA ‘weight’ is added to the argument and the lack of CASA action is bracketed. This serves two obvious purposes; when the time comes and awkward questions are being asked. The ATSB arse is covered.

3) By keeping the matter buried, but alive ATSB can watch and wait, then with no expense or effort, the big guns will come up with a ‘working’ solution; when that happens, ATSB will unearth their buried treasure and come up clean, smelling of roses with a golden treasure. Everyone happy – except the poor sap, who’s engines ingested a bus on the highway which was not part of the runway.  Guess who cops the blame and shame then; no prizes for a no brainer.

Operationally; this is a biggy. I reckon we could sit about the camp fire for week and still not reach a consensus on ‘how to’ prevent flight all deck data errors. The question of ‘Why’ incorrect data is used has been around since the garden of Eden; ever see an eagle try to take off carrying three or four times it’s body weight; how many times have you dialled the wrong number; how often have you buggered up ‘data entry’ on the PC? It happens and it is a ‘problem’; but how to prevent it?

If you sketch up one of little bollocks things Walker is so enamoured of, with the flight deck in the centre, surrounded by the incoming ‘data’ points you will see that the cockpit is surrounded by ‘incoming’ data bombs. Expand backwards to a simple, single point, say for a parcel consigned as freight. Then look and see the number of potential ‘error’ points; when you add them all up; the percentile chances of ‘something’ going awry are immense. But so are the defences; the chances of a pallet being grossly overweight are very slim, it happens – but very rarely. But if it did, the crew can’t possibly know. So we can safely eliminate the chances of an external factor; within reasonable, acceptable tolerances; I think so. There is check after check after check – land side; all designed to prevent, if not eliminate the small chance.

Which leaves the last link in the chain firmly in the cockpit; there are no external checks to prevent an error. There are SOP and there are ‘cross checks’ which the crew will do as routine. But 27% is a big number. You can look at scheduling and 100 other things which may be sheeted home to ‘common local conditions’. It is a nightmare for operators who must juggle crew duty schedules, slot times, fuel loads, weather, traffic etc. make a dollar and keep the travelling public ‘happy’.  In the end, it all comes down to rest on the two wee heads parked in the very front row.    

Here we walk into another hall of puzzles; the human one.  A student of human factors would do well to search out some of the old fashioned ‘tech-logs’ (trip sheets, post flight reports etc.). Try to find one, without error; more may learned about a fellow aviator from studying the ‘trip sheet’ than you’ll ever discover playing poker or strapping ‘em to a trickcyclists Ouija board.  I’ve operated with some beauties; guys who can pick out the smallest error in my own scruffy paperwork; pilots who simply cannot add up; pilots who get pounds and Kg confused; some of the manually extracted performance data should be framed for posterity. And yet we muddle through. It is a huge topic to cover, well beyond the scope of my half baked twiddle.  But for myself, I have found a solution which works; it may delay me a minute or even two, but done properly it rarely does. I simply cross check – I read out the data – Chummy enters that data; then Chummy reads back that data and I look at the box and make sure the numbers called are entered; same-same TOLD card. Often it is the very last thing done.  “Tell the bloody tug to wait; now then, call those numbers”.  "Late off blox – here, use my phone, call someone who gives a toss".

Can’t see the Witless Walker sorting this lot out with a bollocks, no organisational issues diagram; best wait a while for the coronial inquiry. Then for the Senate inquiry, then for the Royal Commission; maybe, in another ten years or so the answer will be obfuscated sufficiently. Meanwhile; do I press enter twice?

Toot - head scratch - toot.

[Gobbledock]

Dr Hoodoo Voodoo's world safety tour continues.......IATA Safety Management Conference October25-27 Abu Dhabi, Ritz Carlton.

Back fresh from his Montreal snowfields tour/ICAO word wankery conference and ready and primed to deliver some robust intellectual drivel is Dr. Jonathan Aleck, General Manager, Legal Affairs, Regulatory Policy and International Strategy, CASA, Australia will be presenting at the above conference later this month.

http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2...04-01.aspx

and Dr Voodoo and the full schedule;

http://www.iata.org/events/Documents/Saf...Agenda.pdf

I'm sure it will be a real hoot as there are lots of 'Doctors' and a few Professors down as speakers. Always fun listening to soft handed intellects who have years of study under their belt but never gotten their hands dirty in the real world pissing on about their personal interpretation, theories and beliefs in what constitutes a safety culture and/or a safe environment. The most dangerous thing these arseclowns would do on a weekly basis is analyse whether the cup of coffee is too hot or do a risk analysis on whether to wear a high vis vest while sharpening pencils at their office desk. WANKERS!

OINK OINK

[Peetwo]

Murky & his minions - A bureaucratic dictatorship?

Oh Gobbles you sure know how to raise the blood pressure of this fellow IOS comrade in arms -

Hmm...think I summed up quite well my sentiments on Dr Hoodoo Voodoo :   


Which, as you will see, kind of gives me a good lead in to the next ICAO USOAP audit critical element - 'Airworthiness'.

Now being a simple knuckle-dragger, whose aeronautical engineering knowledge I could probably write on the back of a postage stamp, I am well out of my league on LAME/AME, MRO and aerospace design/manufacturing. However I do know someone who is full bottle on such issues and that is KC and his AMROBA clan -  

Okay a bit of an intro because this area is kind of taking us full circle on the Mount NCN thread:

Treaty

A treaty is an agreement under international law entered into by actors in international law, namely sovereign states and international organizations. Wikipedia

You will recall that certain business from the 44th Parliamentary Treaties committee was carried through to this Parliament for further inquiry and review. In particular there was the  Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness - USA treaty:

Treaty under consideration
The following treaties were tabled on 12 September 2016:

Amendment 1 to Revision 1 of the Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness covering Design Approval, Production Activities, Export Airworthiness Approval, Post Design Approval Activities, and Technical Assistance between Authorities under the Agreement on the Promotion of Aviation Safety and Addendum to the Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America

• Treaty text (PDF 161KB)
  
• Related documents:
  

NIA (PDF 190KB)
Cover Page (PDF 30KB)
Regulation Impact Statement: not applicable
Letters: not applicable

            
As it sometime happens ( ), yesterday KC & his AMROBA clan put out a 'breaking news' bulletin that is extremely topical to international 'Airworthiness' deals and the above treaty inquiry...

Breaking News 
Government Restricting Trade
October 8, 2016 Ken Cannane
government-trade-restrictions

Reference page 3:    

Dear Malcolm, Barnbaby & Dazzling Dazza please take heed: Stop listening to the weasel words of self-professed aviation safety gurus & academics - like Dr Aleck (see pic above) & Dr Walker. There is much empirical and circumstantial evidence (e.g. 3000+ notified differences to ICAO/ 300+ million dollars on CASR RRP/ PelAir & beyond all reason) that relying on such individuals to set aviation safety policy is doing irreparable damage to our reputation internationally and to our industry prosperity domestically.  
Start listening to the words of wisdom from industry advocates like KC:

As you can see the problems are complex but the solutions could be comparatively simple. However while we continue to have a minister and government that allows the bureaucrats to run the show unimpeded by proper governance and lording over industry with its 'mystique of aviation safety' and its aviation isolationist policy, industry businesses will continue to fail; or to survive businesses will have no choice but to export their business and expertise overseas...

MTF...P2

[Kharon]

Hats off.

KC and his AMROBA crew reflect the detailed, intricate knowledge our world renown ‘Engineers’ have, a well deserved reputation for ‘getting it right’. Its in the genes; airframe drivers bring an aircraft home – “what’s wrong” asks the ‘Ginger-beer’  - “Dunno” says the driver; “broken whudjamcallit”. Patiently, the GB walks the driver through what happened and what did not, when, why and what the driver did. Then the work begins.  The GB is not looking for a Band-Aid fix so he can knock off at 1600, he is looking for a permanent solution or a ‘good’ fix which keep things rolling.  Books out, test, rethink, until finally the ‘right’ answer is found, then the repair. They are bloody good at it, they look for the root cause, the real one, they have to.  Then they design and execute the ‘fix’; this also has to be correct, it must be. It is not the ‘high drama’ of lives at risk; but the more mundane ‘on schedule, earning money’ and looking after the company good name for which industry relies on engineering expertise.

So, when a crowd like AMROBA design a ‘Fix’ you can bet your socks they have it right. They have skin in the game, lots of; their future well being depends on solving and fixing ‘problems’. The ‘departments’ and their experts simply work for a living; they have nothing to loose when they stuff it up; there are no aircraft flying with their name and badge number guaranteeing the safety or reliability of an aircraft. The same with policy – the clueless buggers can whip up a pipe dream; flog it to a minister; step back to the lunch table and count their Super.

When people like KC (bless) and AMROBA and Purvinas  of the ALAEA speak out and provide first rate solutions to government; that government has two choices. Go with the ‘departmental’ seat warmers and wind up with another mess in five years; or, take heed of true experts, get the thing right, then reap the benefits and credit for doing so.

Toot – toot.

[Peetwo]

Noddy & Big Ears take charge - KEI (Key Embuggerance Indicators)

A couple of disturbing recent reference posts:

miniscule Dazzling Dazza: "Nothing to see here, move along!" - FDS  

Well Gobbles it would seem that once again you hit the nail fair smack on its head and the miniscule can now trot out some more bullshit lines and everyone from the ICAO wank-fest confirms that Murky, Dr Hoodoo & Dr W##er are doing a stellar job obfuscating our aviation safety deficiencies DownUnda : 

UN aviation Assembly a success for Australia
Media Release
DC140/2016
11 October 2016

I am pleased to announce Australia has had its Category One status on the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) governing Council reaffirmed following an election process involving more than 190 member states.

This continues our tradition of serving as a ‘State of chief importance in civil aviation’ on the Council. As a founding member of the body, I am delighted Australia has retained this status following the election at ICAO's 39th Assembly in Montreal, Canada.

ICAO is the specialised United Nations agency for international cooperation in civil aviation and works to enhance aviation safety, security, efficiency, and sustainability.

Australia's participation at the Assembly has once again demonstrated our global aviation leadership and enabled Australia to influence key international aviation safety, security and environmental standards and recommended practices.

Another significant achievement for Australia at this year's Assembly was the awarding of the most prestigious award in international aviation, the Edward Warner Award, which was awarded to the late Dr David Warren AO, an Australian citizen renowned for inventing the ‘black box’ flight and data recorder.

An historic agreement was also reached to introduce a global carbon offsetting and reduction scheme for international aviation to control carbon dioxide emissions.

The agreement is the culmination of more than six years of negotiations and is the first time an industry sector has committed to reducing its carbon footprint on a global scale.

 GD - Total of around 11 attendees (trough swillers) from Australia;

- Airfares are business class at around $11k each, = $110k
- 7 days accommodation at around $4k pp = $28k
- Meals, entertainment, vehicles and fiddles are approx $2k pp = $14k
- Salaries. Each attendee earns between $200k - $800k p/a. If you take a medium of $350k, divide that by 52 weeks they average around $6,730 per week. Times that by 11 = $74k


Total = $226,000 AUD for this farce.

Money well spent according to the miniscule - OFDS!

The twerp-tweep which puzzles.

ATSB - “Although there has been a slight growth in the number of accidents over the past three years, there were considerably fewer accidents each year in the past decade than in the previous 25 years.”

Just trying to puzzle out why ‘that’ CASA tweet turned up, when it did. I wonder if this is the beginning of a ‘hardening’ of attitude; Chester is bragging and posturing about our ‘great success’ at the latest ICAO gabfest.  There are other small indications that the iron fist, hidden within the artificial velvet Skidmore glove is about to reappear. As the man once said “when you have ‘em by the balls; hearts and minds will follow”.

There’s the rub; operators, particularly in the small to middle range know that CASA have their nuts in a vise.  The ever present threat of a ‘special’ audit; the delay on an approval; faux ‘difficulties’ or disliked drafting in an operations manual etc.; lots and lots of options for CASA to use, as crowd control. One veiled threat and the mouse that roared will scuttle back to its hole and tremble, wishing it had never popped out. You can’t really blame the operators for pulling their collective heads in – out of harms way.

That ‘tweep’ may well have been misconstrued – stand alone it seems innocuous, a little pointless even; or as the unlamented Wodger would say “unfortunate”. Now, had it been followed by another which ‘bragged’ that CASA and ATSB working with AAAA had been able to make improvements; then we could see real reform, happening in real time; and, cheer; loud and long.

So the choices; unfortunate; a call to arms; a failed ‘feel good’; a sinister veiled threat; or just another example of the CASA detachment from reality.

Don’t know and I ain’t certain I care a button. There was only ever the smallest hope that reform of CASA, as it stands, could actually happen without a reform DAS; one who actually can do the job.  Carmody will keep the ship afloat and pointed away from dangerous waters; but he will not, indeed he cannot control the rats down in the bilges. Is this ‘twerp-tweep’ the opening stanza of the Retribution sonata, played while the cats away? Pest control for safe skies – anyone.  

Toot – contemplative toot.

Which leads me to the following courtesy of Oz Aviation magazine...

Shane Carmody starts as acting CASA chief executive
October 12, 2016 by australianaviation.com.au
Minister for Infrastructure and Transport Darren Chester (left) and CASA acting chief executive Shane Carmody. (Minister Chester’s office)

Senior public servant Shane Carmody has taken his seat as acting chief executive of Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).

Minister for Infrastructure and Transport Darren Chester said Carmody, whose most recent position was as Deputy Secretary at the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, would be in the role for up to 12 months or until a new chief executive was appointed by the CASA board.

Carmody takes over from Mark Skidmore, who announced his resignation as CASA chief executive and director of aviation safety in August, less than two and a half years into his five-year term.

Chester said Carmody would continue to progress the implementation of CASA’s response to the Aviation Safety Regulatory Review (ASRR).

“Mr Carmody’s appointment will ensure the aviation safety regulator retains strong leadership as the reforms are finalised,” Minister Chester said in a statement on Wednesday.

“A domestic and international search for a new CEO is currently underway.”

In his various roles at the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, Carmody had responsibility for aviation and airports, the Office of Transport Security, the Western Sydney Unit and local government and territories.

Also, Carmody worked at CASA for about three years between 2006 and 2009 as deputy chief executive for strategy and support. He also worked at the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Defence.

His appointment as acting CASA chief executive was first announced on September 1.

“Implementation of the important reforms will require CASA to work closely with all sectors of the aviation industry, a role where Mr Carmody’s previous experience should prove invaluable,” Chester said.

In his final CASA Briefing column, Skidmore acknowledged there would always be “points of tension between the regulator and the regulated”.

However, the retired RAAF Air Vice-Marshal said this was normal and the sign of a healthy relationship.

“As the safety relationship matures we all need to recognise these points of tension and work to address our differences in a positive way,” Skidmore said.

“Genuinely listening to each other is critical and sometimes both sides will have to accept there is no magical middle solution that satisfies everyone.

“What CASA and the aviation community must strive for are the right safety outcomes, reached through proper processes, real consultation and transparent decision making.

Read my (immaculately crafted) felt lips : In case you missed it, Murky Mandarin's ventriloquist dummy, the immaculate miniscule Dazzling Dazza said: ...Carmody...would be in the role for up to 12 months or until a new chief executive was appointed by the CASA board...

I would suggest that if Big Ears is in the job for up to 12 months then the industry will be gutted beyond repair...


MTF...P2   

Ps IOS/SOI plea - A bit of divine intervention needed - SOI (Save Our Industry)

Pps: The Can'tberra disease (aka AIOS) reaches plague proportions, reference the Mandarin thread:

Fat cat bureaucrats plundering the trough -

A couple of references:

Enough of the Hollowmen & AIOS - FDS!

In the latest Ferryman Sunday ramble sums up the aviation safety bureaucracy 'paradox': 

Kharon - Irresistible force paradox.

"Wiki – “The paradox arises because it rests on two incompatible premises: that there can exist simultaneously such things as irresistible forces and immovable objects. The "paradox" is flawed because if there exists an irresistible force, it follows logically that there cannot be any such thing as an immovable object and vice versa”.

Despite the paradox – we need to move an immovable object. Difficult task; but, move it we must.

Personally I think this could be applied across a much wider spectrum of the Federal bureaucracy and is systematic of more than a decade of successive poor governance and direction at an executive government level,  Sandy dubs it the 'Canberra disease' and Ventus reckons it is a syndrome i.e. "acquired institutionalised ostrichitis syndrome" (AIOS).




 

+

Alexander 1 hour ago

By their silence Qantas, Virgin, Jetstar and Tiger have maintained their three wise monkeys stance (hear no, see no, speak no evil) so as not to offend their master CASA. Much easier to jack up the airfares to pay for the irrational, erratic and costly procedures of an all powerful but dysfunctional bureaucracy than to take a principled stand. Small aviation businesses have been taxed and ground down with unworkable rules so much so that foreign pilots are now hired on the 457 working visa list. John C points to one of the symptoms of bureaucracy, the aversion to egg on face. Very good reasons for this aversion, huge salaries and amazing working conditions. Not to mention that in the scramble by Ministers to distance themselves from responsibility governments of both stripes have created numerous independent statutory bodies like CASA.

What we've been slow to perceive is that they are not public servants at all (not subject to the Public Governance and Service Act), but a new breed of self serving bodies whose main preoccupation is to cover their failings and protect their Minister while indulging on the public purse. Alex in the Rises.

[Gobbledock]

P2;

"Read my (immaculately crafted) felt lips  : In case you missed it, Murky Mandarin's ventriloquist dummy, the immaculate miniscule Dazzling Dazza said: ...Carmody...would be in the role for up to 12 months or until a new chief executive was appointed by the CASA board"

Couldn't agree more P2. 1 year? Perhaps October next year? Oh my Lordy!! It must be such a special position!
1 year to hire a Government footstool? Get your hand off it Dazza. Go get a work experience kid or perhaps some unemployed Cabramattta Wino to do the job, they would do it better!

- 1 year until another RAAF subservient 40 year loyal puppet retires from some department and becomes available for the role?

- 1 year until some politicians 'mate of a mate' becomes available to fill the position?

- 1 year until all airports have been converted into shopping malls and the final nail in GA's coffin has been banged in, then the new DAS will be hired?

- 1 year until all the IOS are all rounded up, had pineapples inserted into their anuses and been thrown into an aviation Gulag?

BOLLOCKS ABSOLUTE BOLLOCKS

D. Chester: Ring ring
M.Smith: Hello?
D.Chester: Mike, it's the beautiful one here, Darren. We've decided to 'make aviation great again',when can you start?
M.Smith: That depends. Can I hand pick my own executive team, restructure the place, comply with ICAO, smash the remaining iron ring, and introduce accountability?
D. Chester: Ummm, oh dear, ummmm. Let me check with Pumpkin Head and Wingnut, I will get back to you. Click........(combs his hair, takes a selfie and posts it to Farcebook, sends out a bollocks tweep on Twatter, joins Barn'boy at the urinal.

"Safe calendar dates for all"

[Kharon]

Holy Smoke.

And mirrors.  What a cunning plan, the ultimate in defer, delay and distract; a classic.

Carmody has been posted to what is essentially a caretaker position.  No remit, no brief, no need to do anything but sign the pay-checks and collect his own, pop in once or twice a week make sure the dirt under the carpets is not too deep.  The pressure for reform and institution of the Forsyth review firmly on the back burner; Senate recommendations consigned to shelf ware and the whole reform charade, cast, crew and costumes, resting between seasons. It is a good plan, its despicable, disgusting, dishonest and dastardly; but its good. Hiatus – for all.  

Caretaker Carmody wont be swinging a big axe, cleaning out the deadwood. Caretaker Carmody will not be wielding the broom to sweep up the filth left behind from the Skidmore party; Caretaker Carmody will not be breaking out the tool kit and doing the repairs; nope. Peace reigns.

The Board can relax while they plod their way through the process of hiring a new DAS. First there needs to series of meetings  to set down their ‘vision’ of what the new boy must be. Then a series of meetings to decide which agency should run the process. This followed by more meetings to decide if their selection criteria meets everyone’s expectations; then there is the minister to deal with; more meetings.  Then the final series where the minister finally, after much consultation with the Murky Machiavellian and hypnotherapy session with the ICAO manipulation team, actually decides to let the carefully orchestrated process begin.

Eventually – ‘their’ carefully selected handmaiden will be appointed, with much fanfare and meaningless promises of reform. The mandatory honey-moon period will be seasoned with lots of flesh pressing and pleas for industry cooperation; more meetings; more glossy, feel-good literature and a whole raft of carefully worded promises will, eventually be produced – for industry consultation. More meetings? Absolutely.

This is all first rate stuff – unless you own an aviation business or are employed by one. Industry will be left in the blasted wasteland; deserted by the minister, crippled by a useless department, hidebound by complex rules, forced, yet again, to survive on bread and water. But that’s all good; the dancing, dazzling, do-nothing minister will be off the hook with a hand crafted, gold plated excuse.

I say if Carmody is to keep the seat warm then he must be issued a ministerial directive to keep the reform process; pitiful as it is rolling.  I say the industry must not be side tracked or distracted from having their demands, for they are no longer requests, met for the reformation of CASA and of the laws which cripple industry progress.  

Carmody either is or he ain’t DAS; either way, until Mike Smith is on a jet, with a mandate keep the pressure on; rope in the Senators. Begs, plead, demand – whatever it takes; just don’t, for pities sake, take the boot of the gas pedal and allow CASA or its board a twelvemonth to cover their sorry, collective arses.

I believe we can add another ‘D’ to miniscules list – Disgusting.  I also think its about time the ‘Board’ actually weighed in, stopped this pantomime, exercised their powers and do the bloody job they were hired to do – or bugger off and let someone else have a crack at it. The board track record has not, to date been remarkable, mundane perhaps, ineffective certainly, bordering on being about as much use as a chocolate fire wall.

No matter; but I do wonder, had Boyd been still running his wee ‘airline’ how he would view the latest insult. For it is an insult; told to wait patiently for another twelve to eighteen months to get the risible, pathetic comedy of ‘reform’ road show back on track, without momentum.  We all know, once that momentum is lost, industry is doomed to another three decades of purification.

Aye well; seems we have lost the blunt knife we were using at the gunfight. "Lasciate ogne speranza, voi ch'intrate", seems appropriate.

[Peetwo]

Yet another ATSB/CASA top-cover non-investigation -  

Here we go again with yet another AirAsia X occurrence... But first here is some background AP & media reference:

A timeline of SSP & ICAO obfuscation? -

However like the vast majority of well considered Senate & Government non-partisan review findings, these potential risk mitigation recommendations were completely ignored by CASA, ATSB, Airservices Australia & Murky's department.

Therefore rather than being at the forefront in aviation safety, Australia is now severely lagging behind the rest of the world and in some cases our aviation safety agencies are consistently becoming part of the causal (Reason model) chain...

On data input errors and to a degree 'automation dependency', the recently released final report into a March 2015 Air Asia X A330 incident on departure Sydney is a classic example:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inve...-2015-029/

Photograph of A330-343 9M-XXM

Source: Airliners.net

 
Our authorities also seem to have this aversion to thoroughly scrutinising certain international operators (like AirAsia & AirAsia X). This is despite numerous incidents/accidents pointing towards serious systemic safety issue deficiencies within these airlines.

Other countries have considered these safety deficiencies serious enough to issue a blanket ban on these airlines and in some cases their affiliates.

However here in Australia we consider 'our' system of oversight of international carriers robust enough to capture any miscreant airlines entering our borders and endangering citizens. Remember this captured on AP from Skidmore's first foray into Senate Estimates?

P7- ...When you read Hansard the intent and the purpose of the question was – how come operators which are blacklisted in Europe can operate into Australia?.  What was needed, by way of answer was an explanation of the differences between Australia and Europe: given that ICAO compliance in the real world is the norm, rather than the 1600 (Edit correction) 4000 odd differences package which keeps Australia off the real compliance radar, using stealth and technical lip service.

I wonder how long ICAO will sit still, when the world is blatantly taking the Mickey out of Annexe 13.  Perhaps they will start to hunt down a fat, juicy high roller for to make an example of?

Well, poor old Skidmore was lured into a velvet lined trap, foiled by smoke, dazzled by mirrors and succumbing to the oldest trap in the world – the whispered "trust me".

You know the old gag – "I'll only pop it in a little way, if you don't like it, I'll take it out; trust me"..... ......

Tower Chair are we clear to backtrack?

Although personally I was much more interested in other passages of play at the time, I did find that Air Asia ......? (fill out on the dotted line.. ) & EU blacklist thing intriguing and now with Skates 1st Estimates retraction, even more so???

Anyway for those interested here is the "exchange" in pictures - fascinating how Hoodoo Voodoo seems to know in almost intimate detail the previous (prior to December 2014) EU blacklist??

 

Dr Aleck : Can I just add quickly that, in 2009, we amended our legislation specifically to enable us to look at these issues more closely. We exercised those powers in connection with any operator who draws our attention to their activities, and an accident would be a flag.

CHAIR: It is a long time since I learned to fly. You may be captured by an area that has been black listed, but generally what goes wrong when an airline gets black listed in Europe?

Mr Mrdak : Generally, it starts with a concern about the safety regulator in that country in which the airline is based.

CHAIR: The skill of the pilot, the servicing of the plane?

Mr Mrdak : Generally, it starts with concerns about the quality of the safety assurance process in the country in which the airline is based, and the safety regulatory record of the jurisdiction before it gets to the individual aircraft operator. It is much more complex than simply the operator itself.

Update to the AirAsia X incident & the indefatigable CASA...

Via the New Daily & the West Oz:

AirAsia in aviation crackdown after incidents



Related Coverage

Pilot error blamed for Sydney flight failure

[/url]
‘These airlines should be banned in Australia’

To yesterday's story via news.com.au:

[url=http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/incidents/airasia-x-facing-multiple-safety-investigations-in-australia/news-story/1ae907cc123b72d8d53e65d11a69e402]AirAsia X facing multiple safety investigations in Australia
October 14, 2016 3:48pm

Aussie flavour. AirAsia X has started hiring Australian cabin crew. Picture: AirAsia Berhad
Robyn IronsideNews Corp Australia Network

AIRASIA X is facing its sixth investigation by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau in 18-months, after another incident in southeast Queensland.

Last Saturday, October 8, an AirAsia X A330 was diverted from the Gold Coast to Brisbane when its wing flaps failed to fully deploy.

As wing flaps work to slow down an aircraft on landing, it was feared the aircraft would overshoot the runway at Coolangatta and plough into traffic.

Instead flight D7-200 was diverted to Brisbane where fire trucks were placed on standby and other aircraft cleared from the runway ahead of the landing.

AirAsia X confirmed the diversion “due to a minor technical issue”.

Troubled. AirAsia X flight D7200 diverted to Brisbane from the Gold Coast when its wing flaps became stuck halfway down. Picture: Flightradar24.orgSource:

The ATSB was yesterday awaiting further information from the airline and Airservices Australia before deciding whether to investigate.

The Malaysian based budget carrier is already the subject of four other active investigations and was forced to overhaul training procedures at the completion of another investigation into an incident in Sydney last year.

On March 10, 2015, an AirAsia X plane turned the wrong way on departure from Sydney Airport after incorrect coordinates were entered into the flight computer.

Flight crew were unable to correct the error and the A330 had to divert to Melbourne for landing with the assistance of Air Traffic Control.




Flight of failures. The AirAsia X plane that turned left instead of right on takeoff. Picture: ATSBSource:

Other incidents under investigation include:

* a “loss of separation” involving and AirAsia X A330 and a Jetstar plane over the Gold Coast in July;

* an engine shutdown en route from Sydney to Kuala Lumpur, resulting in a diversion to Melbourne on August 16;

* a taxiing incident in Melbourne last month, in which an AirAsia X aircraft began taxiing before the pushback tug and engine moved clear;

* a descent below minimum safe altitude at Gold Coast Airport on September 11.

Aviation expert, Neil Hansford said the problems were “a direct reflection of the quality of training, the quality of supervision and the quality of the checks being done”.

“All of those incidents are inexcusable. If it was one of the smaller Australian carriers, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority would ground them,” Mr Hansford said.


Safety first. AirAsia X is enjoying strong growth in passenger numbers. Picture: SuppliedSource:

A CASA spokesman declined to discuss AirAsia X but indicated there was no extra attention being given to the budget airline.

Mr Hansford asked if they were waiting for a plane crash.

“CASA needs to say (to AirAsia X) “you lose your flight approval to come to Australia, until you raise standards”,” he said.

Despite its recent history, AirAsia X continues to grow in popularity with Australian travellers.

Figures from the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics’ International Airline Activity report, show AirAsia X recorded 46 per cent growth in the year to July, to claim a 4.1 per cent share of all overseas travellers in and out of Australia.

An AirAsia Berhad spokesman said the airline would celebrate its tenth birthday next year, and was proud that its first route in 2007 was to the Gold Coast.

“The safety of all guests and our crew is our utmost priority at all times,” he said.

“AirAsia remains committed to ensuring its compliance to all safety and security regulations.”

Chocfrog & QOTM nomination for Neil Hansford for these two reported statements...
1) ..“All of those incidents are inexcusable. If it was one of the smaller Australian carriers, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority would ground them,” Mr Hansford said...
2) ...A CASA spokesman declined to discuss AirAsia X but indicated there was no extra attention being given to the budget airline.
Mr Hansford asked if they were waiting for a plane crash...


MTF...P2  

[Gobbledock]

Air Asia X is a chickenshit outfit. It's only a matter of time before some serious shit goes down with this mob, on Australian soil.
As for banning international airlines, Australia has never had the balls. Air Asia X and/or Air Asia have nothing to worry about. Just like chickenshit Garuda circa 2007, even when the FAA and EU are banning these shonky chickenshit airlines good ol 'missing testicles' Australia is too soft to take a hard stand.

But heaven forbid an Aussie AOC or COA holder if they are guilty of a minor misdemeanour!

[Peetwo]

Murky & his minions - A bureaucratic dictatorship?



  Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness - USA treaty:

Treaty under consideration
The following treaties were tabled on 12 September 2016:

Amendment 1 to Revision 1 of the Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness covering Design Approval, Production Activities, Export Airworthiness Approval, Post Design Approval Activities, and Technical Assistance between Authorities under the Agreement on the Promotion of Aviation Safety and Addendum to the Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America

• Treaty text (PDF 161KB)
  
• Related documents:
  

NIA (PDF 190KB)
Cover Page (PDF 30KB)
Regulation Impact Statement: not applicable
Letters: not applicable

            

Breaking News 
Government Restricting Trade
October 8, 2016 Ken Cannane
government-trade-restrictions

Update: Submissions to the Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness - USA 

1 Mr David Forsyth AM (PDF 319 KB) 

..At the high level, in my personal opinion, this Amendment is good for the Australian aviation industry, and is something which has been pursued by industry for many years. It is unfortunate that the industry segment involved has contracted significantly over the more than ten years this has been negotiated. Nonetheless, it opens the pathway for benefits in the future...

---

..SUMMARY


In my opinion, this Treaty Amendment has the potential to significantly improve opportunities for Australian aviation manufacture and design.


As noted in the questioning at the Committee hearing, in particular by Senator Fawcett, and by the nature of the follow up questions to CASA, realising the potential benefits depends on CASA’s ability to provide approvals in a timely manner. CASA does not have a good track record in this area as evidenced by industry submissions to the ASRR, and more recently by submissions to the CASA Industry Stakeholder survey.


To fully realise the potential benefits of the Amendment, CASA will need to significantly increase the use of industry delegations, improve its relationship with industry to increase trust and thus information exchange, and automatically approve STCs, modifications, licences, and other approvals from the FAA and EASA...

2 Mr Ken Cannane, AMROBA (PDF 465 KB) 

..Summary and Recommendation:


Expectations of our members was that this amendment to the IP would, and should
have been approved 12 months ago. It is needed to encourage innovators to invest in
new technologies and especially modernisation of older aircraft.

CASA, and our members, have been positively discussing the adoption of the
FAR/EASA devolvement of these functions currently performed by CASA. The
experience of industry, especially those that exercised some of these functions prior to CASR Part 21, will see safer practices, clearer responsibilities and higher productivity.

Regulatory support, though requiring minor amendment, is available under CASR
Part 21, Subpart J.

Approval of this amendment and the minor changes to Subpart 21J will enable a more
productive system commencing early in 2017.

We see this amendment as the first stage in the modernisation and streamlining of the CASA/Industry product certification process.

We look forward to the committee’s support for this IP amendment...

3 Civil Aviation Safety Authority (PDF 243 KB) 

13. Has the post implementation review of CASR Part 21 been completed? If not, when will it be completed? In either case, will CASA provide a copy of the review to the Committee for its consideration?

The post implementation review of CASR Part 21 is still ongoing. CASA and industry are expected to continue their work on the review throughout 2016 and potentially into part of 2017.

Once the review process is finalised, CASA will provide the outcome of the process in the form of a Discussion Paper or similar document intended for public consultation.

---

17. What consideration has CASA given to streamlining certification process and harmonisation of operational validation requirements with other civil aviation regulators, for example EASA or the FAA?

In early 2015, the Validation Principles Working Group was established by the FAA/Asia Pacific Bilateral Partners Dialogue members to review the current processes for foreign aircraft type certificate validation and develop standardised risk-based validation principles. This working group completed its work in August 2016. The group has developed a risk-based validation approach that aims to increase efficiency by reducing any unnecessary duplication of efforts, while maintaining an acceptable level of safety through encouraging a common approach to validation. Australia was a co-leader of that group. The group has completed its work. The final product is currently being presented to ICAO for its consideration.

Pretty easy to work out who invited the Reverend Forsyth to comment....


MTF...P2

[Kharon]

The Rev rides again. Bravo!

Once again we find the quiet, modest words of the good Rev. Forsyth to be concise and eminently sensible. The case made not only practical but profitable and it drags Australia screaming into the modern world of real aviation. He tried to achieve this with the ASRR – which was treated very shabbily, denigrated to ‘an opinion’ and dismissed with lip service. Lets hope the latest ‘opinion’ is treated with less contempt.

Rev. Forsyth – “The problem is exacerbated by the lack of trust between CASA and industry as noted in the ASRR, which denies CASA assistance from industry to acquire at least some of the required knowledge.”

I can’t take umbrage with the good Rev’s statements, for they are, in main, true. But it gets my back up when CASA ‘experts’ must rely on industry to learn how to best do their work.  FCOL, we pay ‘expert’ wages to these people; they are hired because of their ‘expertise’, we are constantly judged and assessed by these ‘experts’; we must obey and endure their often whimsical notions of what is considered legal and correct. But now, we must also, without recompense, train the dozy buggers. Sod that; either pay ‘em apprentice wages; or, hire the real deal: end of.

Nice to see AMROBA and the inestimable Ken Cannane in there with another excellent submission. I’m always impressed by the sheer volume of work Ken and his crew get through; the unstinting provision of the first class expert assistance, to CASA, industry is expected to provide.  I’m amazed he still bothers to try and educate CASA, but he does, despite the students being as thick as pig pooh, deaf as posts and as blind as church bell.

I do wonder why some of the big ‘union’ players did not or have not as yet taken a swing at this ball? Seems to me it would be in their general interest to support the move – but then I don’t really understand the world of maintenance. Hey, maybe I could get a gig with Airworthiness and get paid a fortune to learn all about it from Ken and the Rev. Aye, nice work if you can get it.

Toot toot.

[Gobbledock]

Will the real experts please step forward

Well noted by Kharon;

"I’m always impressed by the sheer volume of work Ken and his crew get through; the unstinting provision of the first class expert assistance, to CASA, industry is expected to provide.  I’m amazed he still bothers to try and educate CASA, but he does, despite the students being as thick as pig pooh, deaf as posts and as blind as church bell".

Ken and his crew, Nathan Safe, Ag Phil, Ben Morgan, just a small group of names as an example of industry experts. All willing to stand up for their technical discipline, all passionate about SAFETY, all brave men knowing that the deep state enemy CAsA don't appreciate outspoken people. All who can run rings around the so-called Fort Fumble experts. Take the names above and now park them next to Campbell, Aleck, Anustasi. See any robust comparison? See any logical connection on a safety, operational, technical, and 'real world' skill front? Chalk and cheese ya reckon? It's like comparing Miranda Kerr's ass to Shillary Clintons ass!

And then the nerve of the CAsAmites on $400, $500k upwards to ask for our 'assistance' and then piss on your back after you give it, or they ignore it, or they then bully you because you've shown up their lack of ability!

    ***Suggestion to Wingnut***

You guys really want to know how or where to start so as to fix the Australian 30 year an $300m clusterf#ck (and let's be honest, you know it is a clusterf#ck).

Step 1: Scrap the past 30 years and $300m. Its finished. It was a waste. It didn't work and will never work. Clean sheet and a new day dawns.

Step 2: A business class ticket for Mike Smith. Give him a start day of Feb 1 2017. Plenty of time for him to mow the lawns at the rental, scrub the floor and pack 2 suitcases. Consider it done.

Step 3: Carmody as Commander in Chief makes the above announcements. Then goes on to commit the Guv'mint to implementing Rev Forsythes recommendations.

Step 4: ICC restructured. By the time Smith starts his tenure the ICC will be restructured with a new Commissioner equal in integrity to Mr Hart.  

Step 5: Another announcement by Wingnut, this time announcing that strict liability will be gutted, changes afoot, and even the Act will be amended.

Step 6: Wingnut announces the NZ regs will be adopted. Straight away we will be able to introduce something 95% effective straight out of the packet. We will work through the remaining 5%. Better option than the current unworkable shite. It will take 3 years and around $50m. (All depending on whether Smith is given the keys to the gold vault and has unfettered access including a gutting of CAsA and the permission to crew the new ship his way).

Steps 7 onward: A host of further big ticket changes to come including the final removal of roadblocks such as Dr Voodoo and his merry men and any other cancerous lesion.

Get to it Wingnut. Tee minus 51 weeks and counting!

[Peetwo]

AirAsiaX boss gives green light for ATSB/CASA to investigate -  

Yet another ATSB/CASA top-cover non-investigation -  

Here we go again with yet another AirAsia X occurrence...

Update to the AirAsia X incident & the indefatigable CASA...

Via the New Daily & the West Oz:

AirAsia in aviation crackdown after incidents



Related Coverage

Pilot error blamed for Sydney flight failure

[/url]
‘These airlines should be banned in Australia’

To yesterday's story via news.com.au:

[url=http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/incidents/airasia-x-facing-multiple-safety-investigations-in-australia/news-story/1ae907cc123b72d8d53e65d11a69e402]AirAsia X facing multiple safety investigations in Australia
October 14, 2016 3:48pm

Via Binger in the Oz today... :

AirAsia X has ‘nothing to hide’
9:15pmMITCHELL BINGEMANN
The boss of low-cost carrier AirAsia X has dismissed calls for the airline to be banned over safety fears.

The head of low-cost, long-haul carrier AirAsia X has dismissed calls for the airline to be banned from Australian skies because of safety fears, claiming that a string of incidents being investigated by the nation’s transport safety ­bureau were being misreported.

Four separate incidents involving the Malaysia-based carrier are under investigation by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, prompting calls for the airline to be grounded.

The incidents include a loss of separation between an AirAsia X A330 and a Jetstar A320 over Gold Coast Airport, an engine shutdown on a flight to Kuala Lumpur and a near collision in Melbourne when an AirAsia X A330 began taxiing before a pushback tug had moved clear.

But AirAsia X group chief executive Datuk Kamarudin ­Meranun said the incidents were not as serious as had been reported and that the airline stood by its safety record.

“It is what it is. I know there is a lot of misreporting as well. If you look at cases, the negative reporting that came out, I don’t think it is fair,” Mr Kamarudin said.

“I don’t think the conclusions and assumptions that have been put out are correct. If you go to the ATSB website you can see lots of other airlines that are worse off. But that’s the price you pay when you are busy. We are paying the price for being very visible.

“As far as I’m concerned, we are very proud of our safety ­record.”

Mr Kamarudin pointed to the airline’s insurance premiums — which he said had not moved up since the investigations opened — as proof that AirAsia X was not a safety risk.

“We are equally proud to say our insurance coverage is one of the lowest. To me that is testament of the safety and security of the company because they are the paymaster,” he said.

“If the insurance investigator and insurance adjuster and ­insurance evaluator look at you and still offer you the kind of premium which is low enough compared to others, it gives you confidence and credibility because these are the people who ­actually look at the company and evaluate the risk of the company.

“So we are not concerned ­because we have nothing to hide.”

Mr Kamarudin’s defence of the airline’s safety record comes as it this week recruited Australian singer and X Factor judge Guy ­Sebastian as its ambassador.

“He has all the right fittings for us. He has the right profile. We are already getting traction in terms of response from Australians. Australia is a very important market for us,” Mr Kamarudin said.

The appointment of Sebastian comes in advance of AirAsia X’s plans to offer Australians a new way to fly to London from 2018 when the carrier takes delivery of its new Airbus A330neos.

Flights from KL to London will be a return to Britain for AirAsia X which axed the route in 2012 ­because of the high cost of filling up its fuel-guzzling A340s.

But with AirAsia X not taking delivery of any other aircraft until the A330neos are in action, ­capacity into Australia will remain flat until 2018 Mr Kamarudin said.

“But if the opportunity does arise and it’s one we can’t miss, then there are always lots of planes out there we can lease,” he said.

The airline recently added ­capacity to flights into Sydney, Melbourne and the Gold Coast that will help lift revenue through the second half of this year after finalising a restructure and $100m capital raising last year to repair its balance sheet.

Those capacity upgrades have seen flights to the Gold Coast ­increase from seven to 11 services, and both Sydney and Melbourne to fly to Kuala Lumpur twice daily or 14 times a week each.

“Sales have been good and surprising. But I think we can do a little bit better on the fares,” Mr Kamarudin said

“Some are profitable but some are challenging but given time we will make it work. I think we can do a lot more. China and Australia are big markets for us.”

Mr Kamarudin also shrugged off competition from other low- cost carriers such as Jetstar, saying: “It is what it is.”

“It’s always been there. When we set up this business we said we had to be self-sustaining so we don’t look at other carriers as competitors,” he said.

“As long as you can manage your business well and you can sustain whatever shocks come across then you should be all right. Margins might be squeezed but you should be all right.

“We’ve been through hell in the past fifteen years. Financial crises, tsunamis, SARS, you name it, but we came back. So we have a model that remains the same from day one. “

No wonder old mate Kamarudin appears totally relaxed because a quick peruse of the ATSB & CASA websites would lead one to the conclusion that both agencies have gone MIA on this issue. The bureau site doesn't even register that they are aware of this latest AAX (8 Oct) indiscretion, let alone whether they are investigating or not - WTF??
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/safe...elect=true
MTF...P2

[Gobbledock]

So Mr Meranun bases the fact that his airlines insurance costs aren't rising as being evidence that his airline is totally safe? WTF? Insurers and insurance is an interesting area for discussion, could probably do with a thread all of its own. However Insurance companies, as with any 'big business' can and have been 'paid off' by large organisations over the years.

Some Governments own or partially own insurance companies that have then insured the Governments own assets, then written glowing reports, blah blah blah, even though the Government asset is shonky.
I'm not saying this is occurring in the case of Air Asia X but by Christ I have seen some of the dodgiest shit go down with insurance companies, so sorry Mr Meranun but you could have a signed written endorsement by Lloyds of London and I would still wipe my arse with it. It means nothing.

Tick 'crash' Tock Air Asia Xcrement

[Peetwo]

Joining dots, making dashes on Aussie SSP??? -   

Ferryman: "..The Senate XI have not, as yet, used the powerful SSP as a means of winning the championship; not too much opposition so far to test it against - but despite it's 'wet lettuce' appearance; it is a handy tool - if needed (hint)..."

PAIN/IOS audit of Australia's SSP (ICAO Annex 19) 

Before we get started note that of the original ICAO eight critical elements of a USOAP Safety Audit, 'Accident Investigation' has I believe taken over the previously listed 'resolution of safety concerns' critical element. The reason ICAO have changed the element reflects the introduction (2012) of Annex 19 and the importance ICAO places on the State AAI, according to Annex 13, to the integrity and compliance of an effective State Safety Program (SSP). 

vs

Over on the Estimates thread "K" has finished commentating (for now) on the SSP Cup - The State Safety Program cup – Round one. This commentary has brought about a fascinating situation where Harfwit has unwittingly (no surprises there ) provided a perfect test case to review the effectiveness and veracity of Murky's newly minted, ICAO Annex 19 defined, State Safety Program.  

To begin, Chapter 3, section 3.2 of Murky's SSP sets out the guidelines and risk mitigation strategies intended to be put in place to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of the SSP:

..Safety performance measurement and monitoring are the means by which the safety performance of the aviation system is described and evaluated. Through analysis of safety data and information, areas of emerging risk can be highlighted and this information used to inform decisions regarding making appropriate safety interventions and the subsequent assessment of effectiveness of those interventions.

A number of high-level safety performance (Tier1) indicators have been identified as markers for monitoring the State's aviation safety performance. These indicators consist of measures of adverse safety outcomes (accidents and fatal accidents) according to operational sector and relative to the level of activity within that sector (exposure)...

All basic meat & potatoes for checks & balances of an SMS. However that is where it suddenly diverges from the 'tried & true' to the bizarre world of bureaucratic academia and legal weasels:

..Recognising the limited ability of these indicators to aid in the proactive identification of emerging risks, CASA has expanded on this set of indicators.


CASA has adopted a tiered approach to the development of indicators to describe safety at three different levels within the aviation system (refer Figure 2).

This approach allows CASA to capture the role of, and relationship between, the activities of the authorisation holder and the regulator in contributing to adverse safety outcomes. It also provides greater insight into the nature of those conditions that underlie potential adverse safety outcomes.

Safety Performance Indicators (Tier1, 2 and 3) are being developed to align with the key risk areas for CASA and the different sectors of the aviation industry...

 
Saving the best to last (as referred to above), Figure 2 is a true work of art in spin and bureaucratic obfuscation:

 (P2 - Somewhat strangely, there are some remarkable similarities to the Dr 'Ghost-Who-Walks' beyond Reason thought bubble diagram, for why the Lockhart River tragedy occurred)
WTD??   

 Fortunately, after that load of bollocks, Murky does bring us back to ICAO Annex 19 ToRs, although the part in bold red is very questionable at this point in time:

Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP)


An ALoSP requires the State to consider the effectiveness of the following four components:

• the State's implementation of the SSP;
  
• service providers’ implementation of SMS;
  
• the management of aviation safety risk and associated Safety Performance Indicators; and
  
• implementation of ICAO SARPs by the State.
  

Australia examines each of these elements through its aviation safety system.

Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous monitoring approach


Australia undertakes a systematic, coordinated national approach to managing aviation safety.

The results of the last ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) review of Australia's safety system, in 2008 support this. Since the 2008 audit, the USOAP has evolved to a Continuous Monitoring Approach programme.

Australia's full USOAP report, including updates on Australia's corrective action plan, is available from ICAO's public website.

  
Personally I can think of much documented evidence that would refute that Australia, as a signatory State to ICAO, is anywhere near an acceptable standard of effectiveness in regards to the ALoSP four components.(E.g. Bullet point four - implementation of ICAO SARPs by the State. - I would say that 3000+ notified differences to the SARPs are a good indicator that our aviation safety bureaucracy is totally ineffective with this component.)

However the one effectiveness indicating component we're interested examining in finer detail is bullet point two: service providers’ implementation of SMS;

Which brings me back to some references I provided for "K" in his Senate Estimates SSP cup posts:

2.2 Safety management system obligations

Australia has introduced the requirement for the implementation of SMS in certain sectors of the aviation industry. CASA has introduced the requirement for the following civil aviation service providers to implement SMS:

• ...Air Operators—Civil Aviation Orders (CAO) 82.3 and CAO 82.5 require both high capacity and low capacity RPT operators to establish and maintain appropriate operations with a sound and effective management structure that uses an SMS approved by CASA....
  

• ...Air Traffic Service Providers—CASR Part 172 provides that an air traffic service provider must have, and put into effect, an SMS that includes the policies, procedures, and practices necessary to provide the air traffic services covered by its approval safely...
  

• ...Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (ARFFS)—CASR Subpart 139.H provides that the ARFFS provider must have an SMS consistent with the requirements in the Manual of Standards, including the policies, procedures and practices necessary to provide the service safely...
  

• ...Aeronautical telecommunication and radionavigation service providers – CASR Subpart 171.C requires service providers to have SMS processes in place to assess...
  

These requirements recognise the relevant ICAO SARPs outlined in ICAO Annex 19, Safety Management, and the safety benefits to be gained by the effective establishment by industry of an SMS. Where appropriate this requirement will be extended to additional sections of the industry.

CASA provides a range of support for the implementation of a SMS and continues to develop and review the guidance material to assist industry with their SMS.

More information on Australia's adoption of SMS can be found on CASA's website.

Links to more information about requirements for civil aviation service providers SMS implementation is at Appendix F. 
Also included in SSP para 2.2 is a short paragraph outlining CASA's oversight obligations of a State service provider's SMS:

Service providers’ safety performance

An important element of a mature system of safety management oversight is agreement between the safety regulator and service providers on the key performance indicators and expected level of performance to be achieved. In the Australian safety regulatory system this level of performance is in part judged by how the service provider delivers against its SMS, therefore oversight of a SMS is included in CASA's audit programme for the operators who are mandated to have a SMS.

(P2 - It would/should be safe to assume that there would also be significant organisational developments within a service provider, such as 900 odd redundancies, which 'should' automatically red flag a need for CASA to facilitate a special audit process.) 

All of which provides another opportunity to argue the case for the Rev Forsyth to review the implementation progress of the ASRR:  

Time for the Rev Forsyth to review the review

In particular:

Ps Very soon PAIN & associates will be continuing with the SSP (ICAO Annex 19) review and how it relates to the so called Department action on ASRR recommendations 1 & 2: References -

PAIN/IOS audit of Australia's SSP (ICAO Annex 19) 

Report of the Aviation Safety Regulation Review PDF: 1598 KB

Just saying and standing by for incoming -

MTF...P2