Z's computer.
A "Mission Planner's Perspective".
The significance of the two SIO coordinates on Z's computer, close together, (near 45 South 104 East), one at FL380 and the other at 4,000 feet, is quite obvious to any Navigator.
![[Image: attachment.php?aid=210]](http://auntypru.com/forum/attachment.php?aid=210)
Z was testing arriving at 45 South 104 East, just before the first light of dawn at cruise altitude, but with the sea below still in total darkness, then conducting a circling descent, to search for the lights of any ships if present, on the shortest day of the year, in the southern hemisphere, ie, the winter solstice, June 23.
The relevant Astronomical Data is as follows.
At 45S-104E, at cruising altitude of 10km (FL330) on 2014-06-23 at 00:00:00 UTC, we have:-
It is pre-dawn, in the beginning of Twilight.
The Sun is still below the horizon to the east-north - east (Az/Alt: +64°08'58"/-7°28'16")
Canopus is still fully visible to the south east (Az/Alt: +129°36'57"/+39°02'24")
Ten minutes later:-
At 45S-104E, at cruising altitude of 10km (FL330) on 2014-06-23 at 00:10:00 UTC, we have:-
It is still pre-dawn, but Twilight is rapidly lightening to the east.
The Sun is still below the horizon (Az/Alt: +62°28'29"/-5°53'31")
The sky is rapidly lightening to the east.
Canopus is still just visible to the south east (Az/Alt: +128°46'24"/+40°24'01")
Ten minutes later:-
At 45S-104E, at cruising altitude of 10km (FL330) on 2014-06-23 at 00:20:00 UTC, we have:-
It is still pre-dawn, but in the end of Twilight.
The Sun is now only just below the horizon (Az/Alt: +60°46'56"/-4°20'12")
But the sky is rapidly lightening to the east.
Canopus is still to the south east (Az/Alt: +127°57'37"/+41°47'24") but is no longer visible.
Ten minutes later:-
At 45S-104E, at cruising altitude of 10km (FL330) on 2014-06-23 at 00:30:00 UTC, we have:-
It is still pre-dawn, but in the end of Twilight.
The Sun is now only just below the horizon (Az/Alt: +59°04'12"/-2°48'26")
But the sky is rapidly lightening to the east.
Canopus is still only just visible to the south east (Az/Alt: +127°10'40"/+43°11'42")
Ten minutes later:-
At 45S-104E, at cruising altitude of 10km (FL330) on 2014-06-23 at 00:40:00 UTC, we have:-
It is now effectively dawn.
The Sun is effectively on the horizon (Az/Alt: +57°20'09"/-1°18'17")
Canopus (the last star visible) has now disappeared to the south east (Az/Alt: +127°10'40"/+43°11'42")
From a "Mission Planning Perspective", the significance of all this is as follows.
FIRST:
The "shortest day of the year" is also the "longest night" of the year. The "longest night" give the maximum amount of time to fly south - in the dark. It also puts sunrise at the surface (the surface TERMINATOR) the furthest east of any day of the year (for any given southern latitude). For planning purposes, 00:00 UTC is the obvious choice.
SECOND:
The position itself (45S 104E) is a significant choice, in that it satisfies all the requirements of a "vanishing", for EITHER a "crash" (with lots of floating debris), or a "ditch" (with little if any floating debris).
(a) Stealth:-
This position is remote, and well outside all normal shipping routes. The possibility of "discovery" by "fishing fleets" exists, but is unlikely. The possibly of discovery by Naval shipping is even more unlikely, and any other shipping, whether Research vessels or yachts, is so minute as to be safely ignored.
(B) Debris:-
At this latitude, any debris would pass well south of Australia, in the Circumpolar Current, and would be unlikely to wash up on any inhabited shore anywhere in the southern hemisphere, for a very long time, probably years.
THIRD:
To reach this position, in no wind conditions, from a "start point" (the FMT) north-west of Ache , (let's assume at ANOKO), and thence to track around Indonesian Radar to BEDAX, and then to set off for "top of descent" at 45S 104E, travelling at 480 Knots Ground Speed, it would take 6 hours and 33 minutes (for a total distance of 3,174 nautical miles from ANOKO).
If the intended time of "top of descent" was "just prior to dawn at altitude" (to allow time for descent for a "ditch at dawn"), you would want to reach "top of descent" no later than 00:30 UTC. Thus, the FMT at ANOKO would need to be no later than 18:00 UTC. To reach ANOKO from KLIA (on a "planning flight" to Europe) would take an additional 1 hour 10 minutes, so "departure time" of that flight would have to be no later than 16:50 UTC, preferably a little earlier (to allow for "delays"), thus, a flight with a "scheduled departure" around 16:30 UTC would be ideal, from a "planning perspective".
MH-370 met the "departure criteria".
<Begin SIDEBAR NOTES 1>
At this point in the discussion, I will add one "significant observation", and it is this.
(a) In "the plan", you will note that when flying south from BEDAX, the path crosses AIRWAY L774. The crossing point is at way point UPROB, 268 nautical miles south of BEDAX (time interval at 480 knots ground speed is 34 minutes) .
(b) At 480 knots ground speed, The time interval from ANOKO to UPROB is 48 minutes, so the "planned time" at UPROB is 18:48UTC. Remember this place and time, because it is PIVOTAL to "finding" MH-370. You heard it here FIRST.
© The actual "cruise time and distance" onward from UPROB to "top of descent" at 45S 104E at 00:30 UTC is 5 hours 46 minutes (00:34 UTC actually - only 4 minutes difference) and 2,794 nautical miles (which, incidentally, also puts the abandoned "EMU FIELD" (YEMJ), the 5'500 foot dry lake strip, at the old Nuclear Test Site, in North West South Australia, just within range).
(d) From a "planning perspective" therefore, UPROB is the "Rally Point", the "Initial Point", the "Pivot Point", for ANY flight into the SIO, for ANY day of the year, to reach "sunrise at Top Of Descent" for a "ditch at dawn".
(e) Consequently, the "radius" of 2,794 nautical miles from UPROB give the locus of "reachable tops of descent" at 00:30 UTC (which, incidentely, crosses the 7th Arc at 42 deg 37.67 minutes South 75 degrees 57.167 minutes East) assuming that this "any other flight" has the same (or more) fuel.
(f) Note also, that this position and time is still "in the dark" on the morning of the 8th March 2014.
(g) We know that MH-370 did not have as much fuel as the "European Planning Flight". We know that it's fuel was "effectively" exhausted around 00:10 UTC (approximately), giving an actual "cruise endurance" past UPROB of (18:48 to 00:20) of about 5 hours 32 minutes. At 480 knots ground speed this gives a "radius of action" for MH370 of 2,656 nautical miles from UPROB. This gives a maximum possible intercept of the 7th Arc at 41 degrees 21.94 minutes south 80 degrees 12.83 minutes East, which is about 370 Nautical Miles south west of the current search focus.
(h) Again, it is significant to note, that this position and time is still "in the dark" on the morning of the 8th March 2014, at 00:10 UTC.
(i) It is also significant to note, that CANOPUS is still above the horizon at this time and location
<End Sidebar Notes 1>
So, what is the significance of "UPROB" - you ask ?
The answer is simple, and has stunning implications.
<Begin SIDEBAR NOTES 2>
Every "Mission Planner" has a "Plan B".
Z planned his vanishing well, and he did have a "Plan B".
Plan A - was the "vanishing" off the "North Western European Flight" with the "Northern FMT" at ANOKO.
Plan B - was the "vanishing" off the "North Eastern Beijing Flight" with the "Southern FMT" at UPROB.
As stated above, UPROB is the "key".
In the case of the "North Eastern Beijing Flight", ie, MH-370, the critical requirement is to be able to reach UPROB by 18:48 UTC.
The only way MH-370 can reach UPROB by 18:48 UTC, is for it to track virtually direct from IGARI to UPROB.
Departing KLIA at 16:42, turning IGARI at 17:20, passing abeam Penang at 17:52, and thence picking up Airway G468 at GUNIP, then GOTLA then overflying MEDAN onto Airway L774 to MERIM and thence to UPROB.
The arrival time at UPROB would have been 18:48 UTC approximately, "AS PLANNED - in Plan A".
But, the ISAT data tells us that the FMT was at 18:38 UTC.
Z wanted "a little insurance". He knew that his fuel was "mission critical" in terms of both endurance and range. So he decided to "turn early", ten minutes early, with a view to "saving" some track miles to his TOP of Descent Point, but more significantly, he had to consider, that if he encountered unexpectedly strong westerly winds, he would burn more fuel getting south, and thus would fall a bit short on his final latitude, and if his ground speed was reduced by ten knots or more, over 5 hours, he would slightly north and east of his "planned TOD. Turning ten minutes early moves the longitude of sunrise east by 2.5 degrees of longitude (Earth's rotation is 15 degrees per hour - thus 10 minutes = 2.5 degrees). Thus, he builds in an additional "safety margin", for "remaining in the dark" all the way. Depending on the winds encountered, he can adjust his track in the final hour or so of cruise, to refine his TOD position more accurately.
So he turned SW at 18:38 UTC, 80 miles short of UPROB, very near to position 01:40.04N 095:42.43E.
Thus, the north-west flight up the Malacca Straight is an "INVENTION". It never happened. QED.
This means that the "Southern FMT" is the "TRUE FMT", and thus, the final resting place of MH-370 is a long way south west on the 7th Arc than the DSTG's (and others) analysis from the "Northern FMT" suggests.
It is of interest to note, that the Malaysians have, from the earliest days of ISAT data analysis, done everything seemingly (and unseemingly) possible, to "drive the search north east", AWAY from the INITIAL US NTSB TWIN TRACKS (which do put the terminal point well to the south west on the 7th Arc from the DSTG's (and others) analysis from the "Northern FMT").
Indeed, if the examination of Z's computer by the Malaysians in the first few days, revealed the data in the table at the head of this post, at that time, it is more than probable, that the very "creation" of the Malacca Strait flight path (the famous Lido slide) was done deliberately with a view, to be able to "subsequently" convince the world, that that is what actually happened, when it clearly did not. That "subsequently", was the leaking of the table, more than two years later. Such action speaks of deliberate "management" of the search criteria, with only one possible reason, to ensure that the aircraft is never found.
<End Sidebar Notes 2>
I will therefore ignore the ATSB/DSTG position, since they are based on the Northern FMT, and they are politically welded to it.
I will however ask the IG, their technical associates, and any other "interested others", to restart their analysis, with a "clean sheet of paper", ( clean spreadsheets ! ) from my "Southern FMT" (01:40.04N 095:42.43E) and see what they come up with.
All for now.
