[Kharon]

Much to play for, lots to loose.

There’s much to recommend Barnaby Joyce; the speech above leaves one with an impression of a honest, honourable man.  I believe that if industry heavy weights such as the Rev. Forsyth, Lewis, Cannane, Hurst, Russell et al can keep the message simple and provide ‘do-able’ changes they can start the reform ball rolling on Friday, and have BJ give it a bloody big push.

The simple things such as ADSB held off until the manufacturers in the USA come on line with affordable equipment; ruling the ‘new’ fuel policy, part 61 and CAO 48.1 out until common sense prevails; or simply amending the offending, non constitutional parts of the Act.  This would, very quickly, restore confidence and provide irresistible momentum for more, real changes.  Hell they may even bring in Kiwi crew to oversight the implementation of a sensible rule set while we hire some competency. You never know, the real reform process could start with a competent DAS and end with an efficient, swift response CLARC system; or (dare I say it) some medical sanity.

BJ could get this all done with a telephone call and a stroke of the pen; play your cards right boys and he may do just that.  The ‘right stuff’? course he is; a ridgy-didge, true blue Australian, in the finest tradition.  We could offer BJ unlimited access to the Tim-Tam cupboard - can we do that without Stwapon-Wong having a hissy fit?

Toot toot.

[Peetwo]

KC has been busy - AMROBA's latest newsletter a week early:
　
Volume 13 Issue 5 May — 2016  

　
1. Making the CASA Board Responsible for Aviation.

At the Tamworth Aviation Rally on May 6, it was highlighted that the CASA Board does not have full responsibility for aviation safety, progress and harmonisation with global standards so industry can provide many jobs. Until the Board has the power, Ministers will be held responsible for the state of this industry.  

2. Adoption of the USA GA Aviation Regulatory System.

The Rally left no doubt in the minds of DPM Barnaby Joyce, Minister Darren Chester and CASA Chairman Jeff Boyd that the GA community wants the whole GA regulatory system repealed and replaced by the US GA aviation regulatory system. Industry unanimously made it known to the Ministers that CASA cannot provide a sensible regulatory system that encourages growth in GA.

3. Harmonisation with the USA Aviation System for GA.

CASA will argue that you cannot adopt the FARs into the CASRs but that is not what is required. Industry wants the FARs to be promulgated, with minimum change agreed with industry, as Civil Aviation Act Sec. 9(1)© AVIATION SAFETY STANDARDS. Regulations can come later to require the use of those standards. There is no excuse, after 20 years, not to comply with the Act.

4. Simplified Process to Finish Regulatory Reform in 2 years

The Morris Report changed the Civil Aviation Act in 1995, the Act provided a simplified process to deliver a rule of law three tier systems under the Civil Aviation Act. No Manual of Standards are required, they should all be repealed once the FARs are adopted as Aviation Safety Standards.

Number 1. is typical KC with a clear, unadulterated, common-sense message directly aimed at CASA Chairman Jeff Boyd:

1. Making the CASA Board Responsible for Aviation.

At the Tamworth Aviation Rally on May 6, it was highlighted that the CASA Board does not have full responsibility for aviation safety, progress and harmonisation with international standards so industry can provide jobs. Until the Board has the power, Ministers will be held responsible for the state of this industry.

Why would Ministers not empower the CASA Board to be fully responsible? It is so politically sensible that any smart politician will support an Act change to enable CASA’s Board to meet the conditions of the Corporation Act.

A properly constituted Board would take over the responsibilities of the Director of Safety and the DAS would become the CEO with responsibilities determined by the Board.

Therefore, the answer for the politicians is simple, shift the DAS responsibilities to the Board and retitle the DAS as CEO. The responsibilities of CASA’s CEO would then be set by the CASA’s board of directors.

If this is done, the Minister will hold the Board accountable and the Board would hold the CEO accountable. An industry benefit is that this Board is aware what needs to be done. Adoption of the USA GA aviation regulatory system, as Aviation Safety Standards, would be a Board determination, not individuals within CASA, some that have recently departed.

Department of Infrastructure definitions: General aviation commonly refers to that part of the aviation industry that engages in activity other than scheduled commercial airline activity. This may include charter operators, aeromedical operators, agricultural aviation businesses, aviation-based fire-fighting services, training and aerial work such as aerial photography and surveying. It also includes private, business, recreational and sports aviation activity and supporting businesses such as maintenance providers.

US GAMA Definition: General Aviation includes fixed-wing airplanes, helicopters (rotorcraft), balloons, dirigibles, and gliders. GA activities include the manufacture and operation of aircraft equipped with turbine engines (turbojet, turbofan, or turboprop) or piston engines, and of non-powered aircraft. GA includes flights related to business or corporate transportation of people or cargo, personal transportation (e.g., visiting family), air ambulance, flight training, and many purposes such as fire spotting and suppression and pipeline patrol. GA operations are not determined by the ownership of the aircraft; GA aircraft may be wholly-owned, jointly-owned, rented, chartered, or leased. GA operations are not defined by the airman certificate of the pilot operating the aircraft. The pilot of a GA aircraft may hold a student, private, commercial, or air transport pilot certificate, depending on the purpose of the flight and the number of pilots required to operate it by the manufacturer.

In other words, all operations but large air transport operators. US GAMA Quote: "General Aviation is an important element of economic growth in part because it fulfils transportation needs which cannot otherwise be met. Only about 350 U.S. communities have scheduled air service; for the remainder, GA is the only option for the movement of persons or cargo by air. Moreover, GA provides specialized air services, such as air ambulance and traffic patrol, to communities that do have scheduled air service."

Even a current or wannabe MP (well maybe with the exception of Darren Chester) should be able to grasp the simple message in the above text and see the political advantages of supporting amendments to the Act when they are put forward to the Parliament.
"..Why would Ministers not empower the CASA Board to be fully responsible? It is so politically sensible that any smart politician will support an Act change to enable CASA’s Board to meet the conditions of the Corporation Act.."
This would ultimately stop the 'rogue DAS' factor, which unfortunately seems to be continuing under the Skidmore regime. While we have individuals in the DAS position who believe they are law unto themselves the hope for proper cultural & regulatory reform at CASA will continue to be obfuscated till the GA industry is completely destroyed.

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

AMROBA roadmap to GA recovery - KC has came away with an upbeat positivity from the Alphabets meetings with the aviation safety bureaucracy on May 25th:

Breaking News 
Revitalising General Aviation
May 28, 2016May 28, 2016 Ken Cannane

REVITALISING GENERAL AVIATION

BY

CREATING CAREER PATHWAYS

General aviation depends on modernising the current legislative, regulative and specific standards as they have done in the United States. The FAA modernisation program is continuing and is leaving Australia’s general aviation industry struggling to operate efficiently under a system that is archaic, to say the least.

The concept that the EASA engineering system is better than the FAA system in engineering, maintenance, manufacturing and AME licencing is a fallacy. We need the USA BASA so that CASA Type Certificates and STCs can obtain a FAA TC and/or STC. It is the FAA TC/STC that will enable access to the global aviation market more than the CASA TC/STC.  The CASA STC holds little acceptance worldwide.

Let me make a prediction – 2017 will see a lot of engineering, maintenance, manufacturing & licencing issues addressed.

The May 25th Infrastructure/CASA Executive meeting with industry associations was constructive from AMROBA’s perspective. At least we now have people within CASA that will listen and make decisions that support harmonisation – if we base our issues on an ICAO Standard or Recommended Practice (SARP), then we can also convince minor changes to these SARPs to meet Australia’s geographical condition. Minor changes to meet where our businesses are located, etc. to provide career paths in the aviation industry, especially in rural Australia.

The people I am currently dealing within CASA are positively responsive.

To fix all the problems will take time, so we have to look at, and prioritise, the many issues confronting general aviation. Licencing, airworthiness, maintenance, design, manufacturing, inspection standards, etc.

After this meeting, the road back to a thriving industry depends on the changes that we can get out of CASA by the end of this year. AMROBA has spent, and is spending, some time in identifying and prioritising the changes and CASA is not putting up roadblocks.

Regulatory Reform/Development Past Failure to Future Success

In recent months the jobs debate is shifting toward something that could actually help: regulatory reform. The shift in strategy by government is a welcome move considering the incredible regulatory burden faced by our members and others in aviation. Reduce the burden and jobs will be created.

What a different regulatory system we would have had if government was concerned with the creation of jobs and career paths as well as maintaining safety. No amount of regulations will succeed unless people do the right thing – reduce the regulations and rely on individuals with the right attitude and aptitude to create improvements to safety.

How to Create Career Paths

Researching past history to find what worked and what didn’t should be the main aim at this stage of regulatory review. Pilot/LAME career paths that enabled entry into aviation anywhere in Australia opened up a career pathway to employment with major airlines. These career pathways must be created once again.

This means looking back at what worked best under the ANR/ANO era; the change to CAR/CAO era and what worked and what didn’t work. The next stage is to look at the CAR/CAO system to CASR/MoS and see what worked and what didn’t. What worked and now doesn’t work has to be reversed to get the career paths working again.

Australia is not USA, Canada, Europe, Asia or NZ. It is different geographically and lacks many services throughout rural Australia. General aviation was prosperous, efficient and safe prior to regulatory change that came with the creation of CAA.

Since then, GA has been opposing changes that has lost jobs, especially those systems from another country and the move away performance based requirements, to prescriptive requirements. Regulatory systems based on performance based requirements have worked very safely in GA under the previous regulatory system and are now globally being adopted.

1.     Pilot shortage

1. This started about mid 1990s but nobody looked at the regulatory change that created a completely different training environment; an environment that has seen reduced participation because the entry points were reduced. A system that made it harder and more costly for young people to become a pilot. This was the change from ANR/ANO to CAR/CAO change. Change from an individual licence system to organisation approval.
   
2. This change virtually shut down the avenues for young people, mainly rural, from learning to fly. The ANR system had an independent flight instructor licence, just like the FAA independent flight instructors. This independent flight instructor licence attracted many young people into flying.
   
3. Aviation was seen as a career path, especially for rural Australia, because many independent flight instructors were available to start the career path of many country students. A most cost effective system. Removing it from the VH regulated system but allowing it in the non-VH regime reduced the number of applicants/year seeking an aviation career pathway.
   
4. The loss of these independent flight instructor licences also resulted in a reduction of flight training schools because the new entry level was now via a flying school holding an AOC. The number of flying schools reduced post the change from ANR/ANOs to CAR/CAOs. A regulatory change failure.
   
5. Like the USA, these independent flight instructors introduced about 70% of the pilots into aviation as PPLs. By removing this avenue to flying, CASA then devolved this aspect to the non VH industry without a parallel pathway thus removing an ability to provide a cost effective system training in type certificated aircraft.
   
6. This is one of the major reason why private aviation started to decline, it really had nothing to do with “other economic pressures”. This is an excuse by those that won’t admit changes can have unseen negative effects that should be rectified.
   

Findings & recommendations

1. The change from ANR/ANO to CAR/CAO moved all training into aerialwork and the CAA Executive then determined all aerialwork operations required an AOC – big error. Not only did this affect the livelihood of many aerialwork operators, it also meant many jobs associated with aerialwork operating under a “licence” system suddenly had increased costs that closed them down in the early 1990s. Hundreds of jobs were lost.
   
2. Many rural students realised that obtaining flight training from mostly independent flight instructors was the entry to a career in aviation. They would then do further training, usually at an approved flight school, to obtain qualifications to find employment in commercial aviation with many being picked up by airlines whenever they expanded.
   
3. It was commonly stated that 70% of airline pilots came from rural Australia in that period, as did many maintenance engineers who also obtained employment with airlines. Rural Australians had a career path into aviation.
   
4. Recommendation: Reintroduce the independent flight instructor rating based on the FAA system to create aviation career pathways and jobs, especially in rural Australia.
   

2.     LAME Shortage

1. This is an issue that has been made complex because regulatory changes, pre the creation of the CAA, introduced a decline to LAMEs remaining in the industry. CASA no longer has a database that identifies how many LAMEs are still in aviation.
   
2. Currently aviation maintenance is not seen by students, leaving secondary education, as a career pathway. Similarities to the loss of the independent flight instructor, many maintenance careers were lost with the change from ANR/ANO to CAR/CAO.
   
3. Pre the CAA, post the shift of the Authority’s HO to Canberra, the new CASA HO management in Canberra did not understand why CASA promulgated the AME syllabi based on the ICAO AME training manual. It was the national standard.
   
4. Once the ICAO AME syllabi was repealed, different States, different RTOs developed separate AME training standards based on the Education Department’s training packages. Many RTOs training courses became specific for the larger employer. International harmonisation in skills and knowledge declined.
   
5. Many employees from an allied industry trade, simply self-studied, passed “Basic Examinations” and obtained a licence after gaining sufficient experience. This is the same as the EASA system today.
   
6. The Education training packages do not address all of the international training standards for an AME and LAME specific responsibilities.
   
7. Another issue is that RTO training outputs no longer provided an AME with employable skills across the industry. Hundreds have been knowledge trained without obtaining employment in the industry. Many GA employees could not obtain piston engine or rotorcraft training.
   
8. Regulatory changes have not clarified the LAME ICAO privileges and responsibilities; nor did they retain the international responsibility even though many have been trained but are unemployable as they do not have the skills.
   
9. Training in Australia, with employment from remote areas to the major cities, clearly demonstrates that requiring all training to be formal training has impacted negatively on the whole industry.
   
10. The introduction of a perpetual licence also introduced the FAA problem with A&P mechanic certificate holders. EASA, for just this reason, has a 5 year notification system so that they know who is still in the industry.
    

Findings & recommendations

1. Continual changes over many years has slowly declined the skills below the international training standards promulgated by ICAO.
   
2. Continual additional requirements being added to a trade training system without any expansion of the training course has resulted in lower skills.
   
3. All aviation employer associations and operators have identified skill deficiencies that are preventing efficient operations, this was emphasised at the Federal Minister’s Aviation Industry Consultative Council earlier this year.
   
4. JAA/EASA used the ICAO standards to develop new standards for licencing NOT training for AMEs. Australia has a decline in skills caused by moving away from the ICAO international trade training standards.
   
5. FAA/EASA changes to the normal category aircraft certification standard will mean a wider skill set will be required. This will enable CASA to promulgate the international training standards to underpin the 5 licence categories adopted from EASR Part 66. The CASR Part 23 future 19 seat, 5820 Kgs normal category limitation now allows alignment of the AME licencing categories with aircraft certification categories.
   
6. The international “privileges” of a LAME must be clarified in regulations & standards and supported by (hopefully) an on-line diploma course. Additional skills identified in the ICAO training manual should be the basis of a Chief Engineer course for new LAMEs.
   
7. What worked in the past was the Authority’s stated responsibilities of the LAME as follows: “…includes certification of safety for flight of an aircraft; certification of documents for issue or renewal of a Certificate of Airworthiness; approval of subsequent flight test; certification for the issue of a maintenance release; certification of work carried out under regular maintenance schedules; certification after replacement of components; rectification of defects; and maintenance inspections.” In addition “must ensure that he had adequately supervised the work that established airworthiness standards have been maintained and the resulting condition is satisfactory in all aspects “
   
8. ”Aircraft maintenance engineers are authorised by [CASA] to exercise stated privileges and accept responsibilities directly related to airworthiness. These LAMEs act on behalf of the [CASA] in ensuring that established and approved airworthiness standards are continuously maintained during the operation of every aircraft. The exercise of the privileges of a LAME is an individual responsibility of major importance based on proven ability and knowledge by examination.”
   
9. Recommendation: The avionic and mechanical trade training, meeting ICAO international AME trade training standards, must be resurrected.
   
10. Recommendation: The international “privileges” of a LAME must be included in a training package separate from the trade training levels.
    
11. Recommendation: The regulatory system and advisory material must provide the LAME with clear guidance of the international privileges to certify the aircraft as airworthy and coordinate maintenance and issue a maintenance release.
    

Note:   Requirements must separate trade training from LAME responsibilities. CASA and the Education Department responsibilities must be separated.
3.     Design, manufacturing harmonisation

1. This is another area that a proper review of what worked in the past needs to be analysed and the benefits implemented into the current highly prescriptive red tape system.
   
2. Under the ANR/ANO system, Australia had a highly successful design and manufacturing industry that adopted the world’s best total quality system that applied high quality control and assurance systems.
   
3. Manufacturers and design organisations in that era were not much different to the recent FAA regulatory modernisation changes that have been applied. Recent FAA changes further emphasis why our process must speed up reform. Unlike Australia where politician stay away from aviation, the US Senate Commerce Committee, April 4, made the following changes under the Reauthorisation Act.
   

1. 1. FAA Reauthorisation Aircraft Certification Reform
      

Sec. 2221. Aircraft Certification Performance Objectives and Metrics.

This section would direct the FAA, in collaboration with the SOCAC, to establish performance objectives and to apply and track performance metrics for both the FAA and the aviation industry related to aircraft certification. The performance objective for aircraft certification would ensure that progress is being made in eliminating delays, increasing accountability, and achieving full utilization of delegation authority while maintaining leadership of the United States in international aviation.

Sec. 2222. Organization Designation Authorizations.

This section would amend existing law by requiring that, when overseeing an Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) holder, the FAA must require a procedures manual that addresses all procedures and limitations regarding the ODA’s functions and ensure that such functions are delegated fully to the ODA (unless the FAA determines there is a safety or public interest reason not to delegate functions). This section would also establish a centralized ODA policy office within the FAA’s Office of Aviation Safety to oversee and ensure the consistency of audit functions under the ODA program across the FAA.

Sec. 2223. ODA Review.

This section would establish a multidisciplinary expert review panel consisting of members appointed by the FAA to conduct both a survey of ODA holders and applicants and an assessment of the FAA’s processes and procedures to obtain feedback on the FAA’s efforts involving the ODA program and make recommendations to improve the FAA’s ODA-related activities. Within six months of the panel convening, the panel would submit a report to the FAA and relevant congressional committees on the assessment and recommendations.

Sec. 2224. Type Certification Resolution Process.

This section would amend existing law by requiring the FAA to establish a type certification resolution process, in which the certificate applicant and the FAA would establish for each project specific certification milestones and timeframes for those milestones. If the milestones are not met within the specific timeframe, the relevant milestone(s) would be automatically escalated to the appropriate management levels of both the applicant and the FAA and be resolved within a specific period of time.
 
Sec. 2225. Safety Enhancing Technologies for Small General Aviation Airplanes.

This section would require, within 180 days, the FAA to establish and begin implementation of a risk based policy that expedites the installation of safety enhancing technologies for small general aviation aircraft, and establish a more streamlined process so that the safety benefits of such technologies for small general aviation aircraft can be realized.

Sec. 2226. Streamlining Certification of Small General Aviation Airplanes.
This section would require the FAA to issue a final rule required by the Small Airplane Revitalization Act of 2013 by December 31, 2016.

1. The FAA devolution of functions is being pushed politically to “improve safety and cost effectiveness of the industry and to free up FAA technical staff to concentrate on “regulatory oversight”.
   
2. Recommendation: As soon as possible, make regulatory and standards changes to adopt an internationally harmonisation engineering and manufacturing system based primarily on the modernisation of FAR Parts 21 and 183.
   

4.     Inactive Aircraft

In 2013, BITRE identified that 3200 aircraft, for one reason or another flew zero hours during 2013. AMROBA estimates that during 2015/2016 that zero flight time figure would almost be double.

The lack of flying affects the MRO and design industry. The ramification on lower utilisation of the GA fleet has been an issue for a long time.

Nearly 40% of those that reported stated repair/maintenance/restoration – so 60% of those reporting zero hours gave other excuses for not flying. It is these other reasons that are of concern.

Summary: CASA has a challenge. Either harmonise with the most cost effective system for engineering and manufacturing industry by removing any differences to the FAR system or risk the BASA with the US by adopting the EAA system for engineering and manufacture. In addition, the maintenance requirements need urgent changes to remove invoked red tape and regulations that has caused rising criticisms of current requirements.

2017 must see improvement so general aviation can shake the restrictive, prescriptive, red tape shackles

Jobs & growth through bureaucratic red tape reduction and less spin, more action (yesterday) would seem to be KC's main message to the powers to be.

Gold, solid GOLD KC, AMROBA & CO...

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

PBR vs Big "R" regulation (rule with an iron fist)

Former airline LAME and NTSB Board member John Goglia (see Forbes BIO) wrote an article for AIN publication criticising the recent FAA DRAFT AC dealing with LAME/AME duty & rest (FRMS) rules:

Torqued: AC Is Not Good Substitute for Maintenance Fatigue Rule

by John Goglia
 - June 6, 2016, 11:20 AM
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For those of us who have been frustrated by the FAA’s inability to issue a comprehensive duty and rest rule for mechanics, it was disappointing to see the agency’s latest attempt at tackling the issue. Even as the FAA specifically recognizes in [url=https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/media/AFS/AC_120-MFRM_Coord_Copy.pdf]this latest draft Advisory Circular the significant fatigue issues that face maintenance workers: “Of concern to [the FAA] is the finding that maintenance personnel tend to get three hours less sleep per night than is recommended. That is a sleep debt twice the national average. Sleepiness and fatigue associated with sleep debt is cumulative. This means that losing even an hour of sleep every other night over the course of a week will produce conditions that negatively affect performance.” 

Instead of proposing clear maximum duty times and minimum rest requirements, the FAA has instead proposed a draft advisory circular to manage mechanic fatigue risk. Since an AC is not regulatory and therefore not mandatory, its chances of being complied with are limited by the usual factors: time and money. So, no doubt, the best carriers will take this AC to heart and integrate its proposals into their safety management systems. But the rest–of which there are many–will not. And there won’t be anything the FAA can do, of course, because no one needs to comply with an advisory circular. The FAA makes that abundantly clear in the draft itself: “Not Mandatory. This AC is informational and is not mandatory. It does not constitute a regulation.”

Ambiguous Regulation

Currently, the only duty-time rule that applies to mechanics is FAR 121.377, which states, “Within the United States, each certificate holder (or person performing maintenance or preventive maintenance functions for it) shall relieve each person performing maintenance or preventive maintenance from duty for a period of at least 24 consecutive hours during any seven consecutive days, or the equivalent thereof within any one calendar month.”

At first blush it might seem that mechanics under this rule–which applies only to Part 121 air carriers and their maintenance contractors, not air-taxi or corporate or GA mechanics–would get a full 24 hours off every week. But when the FAA tried to interpret it this way in 2010 (in response to a letter from Pratt & Whitney in 2008–yes, interpretations do take their sweet time getting out of the FAA’s legal office) the FAA was met with a hail of opposition from airlines, repair stations and even mechanics’ unions. The issue boiled down to the meaning of the phrase “or the equivalent thereof within any one calendar month.” Did that mean that mechanics could work more than a week straight without a 24-hour break?

In its 2010 interpretation, the FAA took the position that the phrase “or the equivalent thereof within any one calendar month” had its limits: “The equivalent standard, however, does have limits. The tenants [sic] of statutory and regulatory interpretation suggest that the specific standard of one day off every week cannot be rendered completely inoperative by the more general equivalent standard. A previous interpretation allowed that a work schedule that provides for personnel to have a group of four days off followed by up to 24 days of work, or vice versa, would still meet the standard of being ‘equivalent’ to one day off in every seven within a month… That interpretation, however, was issued prior to the findings relating fatigue to maintenance related errors in the air carrier industry… Today, we would not view as compliant a schedule that provides over the course of eight weeks for four days off followed by 48 straight days of duty followed by four more days off. Such a work schedule that generally provides for an average of one day off over several weeks cannot be said to be ‘equivalent’ to the more specific standard requiring one day off out of every seven days.”

The FAA’s opinion here shows that taken to its logical extreme, the “equivalent” standard could allow weeks straight of work without any day off, as long as the required days off were strung together at the end. You don’t have to be a sleep expert to know that working weeks straight without a break is not the same as a day off every week.

Well, in the firestorm that followed, the FAA backtracked on this interpretation. It did go to the trouble of requesting public comments in 2011. I do agree on at least one concern that was raised by opponents: the interpretation would drive even more maintenance work out of the country. And that’s because the rule applies only “within the United States.” Clearly, workers performing maintenance for U.S. airlines should be covered by the same duty and rest rules, regardless of where the work is performed. After all, it’s the safety of the aircraft after maintenance that the FAA is concerned with, not the health of maintenance workers generally. U.S. employers should not be put at a competitive disadvantage by safety rules such as this one that apply only within the U.S.

But back to the subject of an AC instead of a maintenance fatigue rule. Advisory guidelines just won’t work when and where you need them most: when mechanics are being pressured to work fatigued at places that put a premium on pushing airplanes out on schedule more than getting them out maintained correctly. These places tend to be the ones that have the fewest worker protections (yes, that usually means places without unions). So, while the AC has a lot of excellent information and advice that employers should use regardless of where the maintenance work is being performed, it is not a substitute for an actual rule with maximum hours of work and minimum rest.

I understand that getting a rule through will be tough. And it will likely require Congressional direction to push it through. But as our knowledge of the effect of fatigue on human performance grows, it’s not possible to deny that long hours, day after day, without catch-up rest degrade a maintenance performer’s abilities to perform maintenance tasks properly, especially the most safety critical and complex tasks. While improperly performed maintenance could result in a crash in the worst case, improper maintenance also results in costly incidents. So, if the FAA doesn’t come up with a rule, employers should create their own workplace standards, especially since fatigue can drive up worker injuries and Workers Comp claims.

In light of DAS Skidmore's current retrograde approach to embracing (or not) current World's best practice of performance based regulation, I guess it would be heartening to read Goglia's somewhat baffling suggestion that the FAA should be heading back to 'rule by regulation'.

However when you read the paragraphs under 'ambiguous regulation' you then realise that the whole 'AC' softly, softly, approach came about because of strong industry consultation & feedback to the previous ambiguous proposed FAA rule set.

The difference between 'consultation' in the US with completely engaged industry stakeholders to whose opinions the FAA proactively respond, to that in Australia where the regulator will listen with a deaf ear and then ignore the industry input, could not be more stark.

This is further highlighted by a SDA publication response to the Goglia article, where they respectively take JG to task... :

Goglia’s AMT Fatigue needs SMS for solutions


Posted By: Sandy Murdock June 8, 2016

AMT Fatigue SMS

What former NTSB Member Goglia calls out as problems, indeed, needs to be torqued, but the man, who is expert at using tools for maintaining aircraft, may need to update his regulatory toolbox.

He understands the workload and psychological stress of being an AMT with heavy production pressure. His essay well lays out the fatigue issues of his profession. His choice of how to fix them is where he relies on old procedures.

As he notes in the article, the gestation periods of the FAA NPRM process and its Chief Counsel’s opinion are exceedingly slow. Some of the issues, which he highlighted, cannot be universally addressed; a single rule cannot deal with so many variations in the tasks. Fatigue may exist across Airline Maintenance Technicians (AMT) job descriptions, within an airline or even as to airlines with different operational profiles or geographic location or size.

Mr. Goglia also stated that the most effective regulations are specific; precise language makes compliance easier by the certificate holder as well as enforcement by the FAA. The more exact the wording of an FAR, however, makes it more difficult to apply to all potential situations under a single rule. {As guidelines for behavior, probably only the Ten Commandments are simple in statement and universal in application [even then there are many ministers/mullahs/priests/rabbis around to interpret and enforce them.]}

The hypothesis of the NTSB alumnus’ paper is that the FAA should not issue an Advisory Circular, but must issue an improved FAR, i.e. to make the very general 14 CFR§121.377 to be more specific in its mandate. In support of his position, Mr. Goglia’s article cites the following problematic fatigue examples:

• “Of concern to [theFAA] is the finding that maintenance personnel tend to get three hours less sleep per night than is recommended. That is a sleep debt twice the national average. Sleepiness and fatigue associated with sleep debt is cumulative. This means that losing even an hour of sleep every other night over the course of a week will produce conditions that negatively affect performance.”
  

• “…theFAA took the position that the phrase “or the equivalent thereof within any one calendar month” had its limits: “The equivalent standard, however, does have limits. The tenants [sic] of statutory and regulatory interpretation suggest that the specific standard of one day off every week cannot be rendered completely inoperative by the more general equivalent standard. A previous interpretation allowed that a work schedule that provides for personnel to have a group of four days off followed by up to 24 days of work, or vice versa, would still meet the standard of being ‘equivalent’ to one day off in every seven within a month… That interpretation, however, was issued prior to the findings relating fatigue to maintenance related errors in the air carrier industry… Today, we would not view as compliant a schedule that provides over the course of eight weeks for four days off followed by 48 straight days of duty followed by four more days off. Such a work schedule that generally provides for an average of one day off over several weeks cannot be said to be ‘equivalent’ to the more specific standard requiring one day off out of every seven days.”
  

• Clearly, workers performing maintenance forS. airlines should be covered by the same duty and rest rules, regardless of where the work is performed. After all, it’s the safety of the aircraft after maintenance that the FAA is concerned with, not the health of maintenance workers generally. U.S. employers should not be put at a competitive disadvantage by safety rules such as this one that apply only within the U.S.
  

• But as our knowledge of the effect of fatigue on human performance grows, it’s not possible to deny that long hours, day after day, without catch-up rest degrade a maintenance performer’s abilities to perform maintenance tasks properly, especially the most safety critical and complex tasks. While improperly performed maintenance could result in a crash in the worst case, improper maintenance also results in costly incidents. So, if theFAA doesn’t come up with a rule, employers should create their own workplace standards, especially since fatigue can drive up worker injuries and Workers Comp claims.
  

He, then, correctly points out that an AC is not mandatory (as the preamble says “This constitutes one means of compliance”)John concedes that  “the specific advice contained in draft AC 121-MFRM is “excellent information and advice that employers should use regardless of where the maintenance work is being performed.” The Goglia thesis is that the good airlines are already implementing this FAA guidance and the overworked, fatigued AMTs will continue to be at risk.



The new tool box of FAA regulations involves data-based, preventative, 3600 collaborative (i.e. unions sit at the table, among others) and risk-based process called Safety Management System. It was created to make the FAA staff more effective, to avoid the horrendous delays required to issue a new FAA and to move the focus from enforcement to positive, preventative process. All risks, to which an airline is exposed, are the subject matter for this new cooperative approach to safety. Issues are brought to the SMS team and proactive solutions are designed.

As Member Goglia’s paper describes, risks vary in a number of ways.

• Fatigue is more likely for those who work rotating shifts; by being on duty in inconsistent patterns, the need for specific rest remedies may be greater.
  

• Personnel whose jobs are indoors and who work regular hours may have less need to rest rules than the AMTs who work outdoors with adverse weather.
  

• Work involving very exacting or strenuous tasks may need different treatment.
  

 
A single FAR, even a discretionary AC, may not be able to design appropriate solutions which address each of these specific, almost unique risks. SMS can, and the union participates in the deliberation, design proactive strategies for each identifies job fatigue source. Even better than any regulation, SMS provides the flexibility to respond quickly—when the data shows that the SMS is not as effective as it was projected, the continuous improvement principle will bring the issue back for refinement.

Mr. Goglia, when he was an A&P mechanic, always had the best wrench. His assessment of the need to address AMT fatigue is well stated. Today’s tool for fixing such a problem is not the 5 year NPRM process, but a finely tuned mechanism which uses all involved to find repairs for each specific safety risks.
One might suggest that the unions should assure that the statistical analytical tools capture the risk relation between fatigue and degraded MX performance. With that data the SMS team will be able to fashion remedial steps for each job for which there is risk. The science of fatigue management has recently been well researched. The SMS answers will better serve mechanics than a compound, complex 14 CFR§121.377 with multiple dependent clauses. Only lawyers will benefit from that response to this problem.

 
ARTICLE: Torqued: AC Is Not Good Substitute for Maintenance Fatigue Rule

Fancy that industry sector experts, commentators and relevant stakeholders actively getting involved, without fear nor favour, in public debate on the most appropriate way to proactively address an identified but dormant safety risk issue...  


Meanwhile in Oliver's land of retrograde regulations where all industry participants are criminals until proven otherwise, a couple of comments from LAMEs off Sandy's petition that says it all...

Read this comment and sign the petition. I have been in the aviation industry for the past 49 year... https://www.change.org/p/7202495/c/46057...responsive via @ChangeAUS

..The introduction of the part 145 which CASA admitted in a meeting I was at when they dumped the FAR system for the European system. At that meeting CASA said that the system did not work in europe for GA but they were going to make it work in australia. 30 years this September it still has not been put into place. Companies have literly spent millions of dollars getting the 145 tag for no extra safety gains. It has divided GA and forced a lot of companies to close...

 

Read this comment and sign the petition. Although I am skeptical of clicktivism, this is pertinent... https://www.change.org/p/7202495/c/46083...responsive via @ChangeAUS

...Although I am skeptical of clicktivism, this is pertinent to me. I am a LAME and have seen the decline of aviation in Australia, sadly much of that driven by the red tape forced CASA has been mandated to foist upon the industry. The industry needs simple, effective oversight, with effective and accessable rules, and strong enforcement. The aviation industry is seen as a cash cow by many as there seems to be a perception that aircraft = available money, without much thought to the massive overheads and minuscule margins required to operate.

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

PBR vs Big "R" regulation (rule with an iron fist)

Former airline LAME and NTSB Board member John Goglia (see Forbes BIO) wrote an article for AIN publication criticising the recent FAA DRAFT AC dealing with LAME/AME duty & rest (FRMS) rules:

Torqued: AC Is Not Good Substitute for Maintenance Fatigue Rule

by John Goglia
 - June 6, 2016, 11:20 AM
[/url]
For those of us who have been frustrated by the FAA’s inability to issue a comprehensive duty and rest rule for mechanics, it was disappointing to see the agency’s latest attempt at tackling the issue. Even as the FAA specifically recognizes in [url=https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/media/AFS/AC_120-MFRM_Coord_Copy.pdf]this latest draft Advisory Circular the significant fatigue issues that face maintenance workers: “Of concern to [the FAA] is the finding that maintenance personnel tend to get three hours less sleep per night than is recommended. That is a sleep debt twice the national average. Sleepiness and fatigue associated with sleep debt is cumulative. This means that losing even an hour of sleep every other night over the course of a week will produce conditions that negatively affect performance.” 

Instead of proposing clear maximum duty times and minimum rest requirements, the FAA has instead proposed a draft advisory circular to manage mechanic fatigue risk. Since an AC is not regulatory and therefore not mandatory, its chances of being complied with are limited by the usual factors: time and money. So, no doubt, the best carriers will take this AC to heart and integrate its proposals into their safety management systems. But the rest–of which there are many–will not. And there won’t be anything the FAA can do, of course, because no one needs to comply with an advisory circular. The FAA makes that abundantly clear in the draft itself: “Not Mandatory. This AC is informational and is not mandatory. It does not constitute a regulation.”

Ambiguous Regulation

Currently, the only duty-time rule that applies to mechanics is FAR 121.377, which states, “Within the United States, each certificate holder (or person performing maintenance or preventive maintenance functions for it) shall relieve each person performing maintenance or preventive maintenance from duty for a period of at least 24 consecutive hours during any seven consecutive days, or the equivalent thereof within any one calendar month.”

At first blush it might seem that mechanics under this rule–which applies only to Part 121 air carriers and their maintenance contractors, not air-taxi or corporate or GA mechanics–would get a full 24 hours off every week. But when the FAA tried to interpret it this way in 2010 (in response to a letter from Pratt & Whitney in 2008–yes, interpretations do take their sweet time getting out of the FAA’s legal office) the FAA was met with a hail of opposition from airlines, repair stations and even mechanics’ unions. The issue boiled down to the meaning of the phrase “or the equivalent thereof within any one calendar month.” Did that mean that mechanics could work more than a week straight without a 24-hour break?

In its 2010 interpretation, the FAA took the position that the phrase “or the equivalent thereof within any one calendar month” had its limits: “The equivalent standard, however, does have limits. The tenants [sic] of statutory and regulatory interpretation suggest that the specific standard of one day off every week cannot be rendered completely inoperative by the more general equivalent standard. A previous interpretation allowed that a work schedule that provides for personnel to have a group of four days off followed by up to 24 days of work, or vice versa, would still meet the standard of being ‘equivalent’ to one day off in every seven within a month… That interpretation, however, was issued prior to the findings relating fatigue to maintenance related errors in the air carrier industry… Today, we would not view as compliant a schedule that provides over the course of eight weeks for four days off followed by 48 straight days of duty followed by four more days off. Such a work schedule that generally provides for an average of one day off over several weeks cannot be said to be ‘equivalent’ to the more specific standard requiring one day off out of every seven days.”

The FAA’s opinion here shows that taken to its logical extreme, the “equivalent” standard could allow weeks straight of work without any day off, as long as the required days off were strung together at the end. You don’t have to be a sleep expert to know that working weeks straight without a break is not the same as a day off every week.

Well, in the firestorm that followed, the FAA backtracked on this interpretation. It did go to the trouble of requesting public comments in 2011. I do agree on at least one concern that was raised by opponents: the interpretation would drive even more maintenance work out of the country. And that’s because the rule applies only “within the United States.” Clearly, workers performing maintenance for U.S. airlines should be covered by the same duty and rest rules, regardless of where the work is performed. After all, it’s the safety of the aircraft after maintenance that the FAA is concerned with, not the health of maintenance workers generally. U.S. employers should not be put at a competitive disadvantage by safety rules such as this one that apply only within the U.S.

But back to the subject of an AC instead of a maintenance fatigue rule. Advisory guidelines just won’t work when and where you need them most: when mechanics are being pressured to work fatigued at places that put a premium on pushing airplanes out on schedule more than getting them out maintained correctly. These places tend to be the ones that have the fewest worker protections (yes, that usually means places without unions). So, while the AC has a lot of excellent information and advice that employers should use regardless of where the maintenance work is being performed, it is not a substitute for an actual rule with maximum hours of work and minimum rest.

I understand that getting a rule through will be tough. And it will likely require Congressional direction to push it through. But as our knowledge of the effect of fatigue on human performance grows, it’s not possible to deny that long hours, day after day, without catch-up rest degrade a maintenance performer’s abilities to perform maintenance tasks properly, especially the most safety critical and complex tasks. While improperly performed maintenance could result in a crash in the worst case, improper maintenance also results in costly incidents. So, if the FAA doesn’t come up with a rule, employers should create their own workplace standards, especially since fatigue can drive up worker injuries and Workers Comp claims.

In light of DAS Skidmore's current retrograde approach to embracing (or not) current World's best practice of performance based regulation, I guess it would be heartening to read Goglia's somewhat baffling suggestion that the FAA should be heading back to 'rule by regulation'.

However when you read the paragraphs under 'ambiguous regulation' you then realise that the whole 'AC' softly, softly, approach came about because of strong industry consultation & feedback to the previous ambiguous proposed FAA rule set.

The difference between 'consultation' in the US with completely engaged industry stakeholders to whose opinions the FAA proactively respond, to that in Australia where the regulator will listen with a deaf ear and then ignore the industry input, could not be more stark.

This is further highlighted by a SDA publication response to the Goglia article, where they respectively take JG to task... :

Goglia’s AMT Fatigue needs SMS for solutions


Posted By: Sandy Murdock June 8, 2016

AMT Fatigue SMS

What former NTSB Member Goglia calls out as problems, indeed, needs to be torqued, but the man, who is expert at using tools for maintaining aircraft, may need to update his regulatory toolbox.

He understands the workload and psychological stress of being an AMT with heavy production pressure. His essay well lays out the fatigue issues of his profession. His choice of how to fix them is where he relies on old procedures.

As he notes in the article, the gestation periods of the FAA NPRM process and its Chief Counsel’s opinion are exceedingly slow. Some of the issues, which he highlighted, cannot be universally addressed; a single rule cannot deal with so many variations in the tasks. Fatigue may exist across Airline Maintenance Technicians (AMT) job descriptions, within an airline or even as to airlines with different operational profiles or geographic location or size.

Mr. Goglia also stated that the most effective regulations are specific; precise language makes compliance easier by the certificate holder as well as enforcement by the FAA. The more exact the wording of an FAR, however, makes it more difficult to apply to all potential situations under a single rule. {As guidelines for behavior, probably only the Ten Commandments are simple in statement and universal in application [even then there are many ministers/mullahs/priests/rabbis around to interpret and enforce them.]}

The hypothesis of the NTSB alumnus’ paper is that the FAA should not issue an Advisory Circular, but must issue an improved FAR, i.e. to make the very general 14 CFR§121.377 to be more specific in its mandate. In support of his position, Mr. Goglia’s article cites the following problematic fatigue examples:

• “Of concern to [theFAA] is the finding that maintenance personnel tend to get three hours less sleep per night than is recommended. That is a sleep debt twice the national average. Sleepiness and fatigue associated with sleep debt is cumulative. This means that losing even an hour of sleep every other night over the course of a week will produce conditions that negatively affect performance.”
  

• “…theFAA took the position that the phrase “or the equivalent thereof within any one calendar month” had its limits: “The equivalent standard, however, does have limits. The tenants [sic] of statutory and regulatory interpretation suggest that the specific standard of one day off every week cannot be rendered completely inoperative by the more general equivalent standard. A previous interpretation allowed that a work schedule that provides for personnel to have a group of four days off followed by up to 24 days of work, or vice versa, would still meet the standard of being ‘equivalent’ to one day off in every seven within a month… That interpretation, however, was issued prior to the findings relating fatigue to maintenance related errors in the air carrier industry… Today, we would not view as compliant a schedule that provides over the course of eight weeks for four days off followed by 48 straight days of duty followed by four more days off. Such a work schedule that generally provides for an average of one day off over several weeks cannot be said to be ‘equivalent’ to the more specific standard requiring one day off out of every seven days.”
  

• Clearly, workers performing maintenance forS. airlines should be covered by the same duty and rest rules, regardless of where the work is performed. After all, it’s the safety of the aircraft after maintenance that the FAA is concerned with, not the health of maintenance workers generally. U.S. employers should not be put at a competitive disadvantage by safety rules such as this one that apply only within the U.S.
  

• But as our knowledge of the effect of fatigue on human performance grows, it’s not possible to deny that long hours, day after day, without catch-up rest degrade a maintenance performer’s abilities to perform maintenance tasks properly, especially the most safety critical and complex tasks. While improperly performed maintenance could result in a crash in the worst case, improper maintenance also results in costly incidents. So, if theFAA doesn’t come up with a rule, employers should create their own workplace standards, especially since fatigue can drive up worker injuries and Workers Comp claims.
  

He, then, correctly points out that an AC is not mandatory (as the preamble says “This constitutes one means of compliance”)John concedes that  “the specific advice contained in draft AC 121-MFRM is “excellent information and advice that employers should use regardless of where the maintenance work is being performed.” The Goglia thesis is that the good airlines are already implementing this FAA guidance and the overworked, fatigued AMTs will continue to be at risk.



The new tool box of FAA regulations involves data-based, preventative, 3600 collaborative (i.e. unions sit at the table, among others) and risk-based process called Safety Management System. It was created to make the FAA staff more effective, to avoid the horrendous delays required to issue a new FAA and to move the focus from enforcement to positive, preventative process. All risks, to which an airline is exposed, are the subject matter for this new cooperative approach to safety. Issues are brought to the SMS team and proactive solutions are designed.

As Member Goglia’s paper describes, risks vary in a number of ways.

• Fatigue is more likely for those who work rotating shifts; by being on duty in inconsistent patterns, the need for specific rest remedies may be greater.
  

• Personnel whose jobs are indoors and who work regular hours may have less need to rest rules than the AMTs who work outdoors with adverse weather.
  

• Work involving very exacting or strenuous tasks may need different treatment.
  

 
A single FAR, even a discretionary AC, may not be able to design appropriate solutions which address each of these specific, almost unique risks. SMS can, and the union participates in the deliberation, design proactive strategies for each identifies job fatigue source. Even better than any regulation, SMS provides the flexibility to respond quickly—when the data shows that the SMS is not as effective as it was projected, the continuous improvement principle will bring the issue back for refinement.

Mr. Goglia, when he was an A&P mechanic, always had the best wrench. His assessment of the need to address AMT fatigue is well stated. Today’s tool for fixing such a problem is not the 5 year NPRM process, but a finely tuned mechanism which uses all involved to find repairs for each specific safety risks.
One might suggest that the unions should assure that the statistical analytical tools capture the risk relation between fatigue and degraded MX performance. With that data the SMS team will be able to fashion remedial steps for each job for which there is risk. The science of fatigue management has recently been well researched. The SMS answers will better serve mechanics than a compound, complex 14 CFR§121.377 with multiple dependent clauses. Only lawyers will benefit from that response to this problem.

 
ARTICLE: Torqued: AC Is Not Good Substitute for Maintenance Fatigue Rule

Fancy that industry sector experts, commentators and relevant stakeholders actively getting involved, without fear nor favour, in public debate on the most appropriate way to proactively address an identified but dormant safety risk issue...  


Meanwhile in Oliver's land of retrograde regulations where all industry participants are criminals until proven otherwise, a couple of comments from LAMEs off Sandy's petition that says it all...

Read this comment and sign the petition. I have been in the aviation industry for the past 49 year... https://www.change.org/p/7202495/c/46057...responsive via @ChangeAUS

..The introduction of the part 145 which CASA admitted in a meeting I was at when they dumped the FAR system for the European system. At that meeting CASA said that the system did not work in europe for GA but they were going to make it work in australia. 30 years this September it still has not been put into place. Companies have literly spent millions of dollars getting the 145 tag for no extra safety gains. It has divided GA and forced a lot of companies to close...

 

Read this comment and sign the petition. Although I am skeptical of clicktivism, this is pertinent... https://www.change.org/p/7202495/c/46083...responsive via @ChangeAUS

...Although I am skeptical of clicktivism, this is pertinent to me. I am a LAME and have seen the decline of aviation in Australia, sadly much of that driven by the red tape forced CASA has been mandated to foist upon the industry. The industry needs simple, effective oversight, with effective and accessable rules, and strong enforcement. The aviation industry is seen as a cash cow by many as there seems to be a perception that aircraft = available money, without much thought to the massive overheads and minuscule margins required to operate.

KC in reply to the above from off a PAIN email chain:

The big difference in Australia is that “modern awards” negotiated by businesses and unions have addressed this issue a couple of decades back.
ATSB also produced a detailed paper in 2001 highlighting this issue:

https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/33957/sir200102_001.pdf

The recommendations in the ATSB paper were adopted back in 2001.
 
AMROBA uses it when advising its members.
 
Regards...

 To which I replied:

..guess that was a somewhat poor example as I was trying to point out the major difference in 'consultation' when it comes to the FAA v CASA.


However that is an excellent ATSB link Ken. That would have been back when the bureau was somewhat relevant and proactive in addressing identified safety issues. I note that the report had 9 very good safety recommendations, fast forward to today's Dolan led ATSB, they would be lucky to have that many SRs in a year. See my report on the decline of the SR under Dolan: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Popin_2.pdf 
 
As a point of comparison to that ATSB report, refer to yesterday's ATSB VARA ATR interim report  (link at the top of this AP Post: http://auntypru.com/forum/-Overdue-and-Obfuscated?pid=4482#pid4482 ), which IMO should also have generated the need to publish a SR (or two)...

And today another email contributor brings it back to TAWS with the following insightful & historical contribution... :

Folks,
The major points of difference in consultation, FAA v. CASA is:
 
(1)    FAA have a very formal justification criteria for regulation making, that includes risk management and cost/benefit justification ---- the major elements in making sure that every “there should be a rule --------“ doesn’t happen.
(2)    The ARAC groups duties are up to and including drafting the basic “rule” that will eventuate from their activities.
(3)    The ARAC system largely prevents “interested parties” creating “rules” for sectional commercial advantage ----- a major unacknowledged problem here in Australia.
 
As a matter of interest, every time FAA invokes its “emergency authority”, and “proceeds direct to final rule” it turns into to be a shambles, and a very expensive shambles, just like here. The “control cable AD”, which started from the lobbying of one INDUSTRY IDENTITY here, would never get off the ground in the US system.
 
In contrast, here, a genuine risk management approach simply never gets a look in, there is NO genuine and HONEST attempt at cost/benefit analysis, RIS comes after, not before, and we wind up with a huge rule book, where we have LONG SINCE PAST to point of DIMINISHING RETURNS. Ie: Most of CASA’s activities have no beneficial safety benefits, and it can be argued that many have the opposite effect, they actually increase risk.
 
Time and again, CASA’s final rules bear no relationship to what was “consulted” via the Technical Sub-Committees, the “maintenance suite” is the prime example, what we have bears not the slightest relationship to the output of the very expert group put together by Bruce Byron, and bears no relation to the EASA approach, which Byron was looking for.
 
The original draft Part 91 was actually marginally shorter than FAR or NZ CAR 91, the current draft CASR   Part 91 ----- save me.
 
As Assistant Director Bill McIntyre said, many years ago: “ The law requires us to consult, it doesn’t require us to take any notice”.
 
Regards,

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

PBR vs Big "R" regulation

Goglia’s AMT Fatigue needs SMS for solutions


Posted By: Sandy Murdock June 8, 2016

AMT Fatigue SMS

What former NTSB Member Goglia calls out as problems, indeed, needs to be torqued, but the man, who is expert at using tools for maintaining aircraft, may need to update his regulatory toolbox.



 
ARTICLE: Torqued: AC Is Not Good Substitute for Maintenance Fatigue Rule

Fancy that industry sector experts, commentators and relevant stakeholders actively getting involved, without fear nor favour, in public debate on the most appropriate way to proactively address an identified but dormant safety risk issue...  


Meanwhile in Oliver's land of retrograde regulations where all industry participants are criminals until proven otherwise, a couple of comments from LAMEs off Sandy's petition that says it all...

Read this comment and sign the petition. I have been in the aviation industry for the past 49 year... https://www.change.org/p/7202495/c/46057...responsive via @ChangeAUS

..The introduction of the part 145 which CASA admitted in a meeting I was at when they dumped the FAR system for the European system. At that meeting CASA said that the system did not work in europe for GA but they were going to make it work in australia. 30 years this September it still has not been put into place. Companies have literly spent millions of dollars getting the 145 tag for no extra safety gains. It has divided GA and forced a lot of companies to close...

 

Read this comment and sign the petition. Although I am skeptical of clicktivism, this is pertinent... https://www.change.org/p/7202495/c/46083...responsive via @ChangeAUS

...Although I am skeptical of clicktivism, this is pertinent to me. I am a LAME and have seen the decline of aviation in Australia, sadly much of that driven by the red tape forced CASA has been mandated to foist upon the industry. The industry needs simple, effective oversight, with effective and accessable rules, and strong enforcement. The aviation industry is seen as a cash cow by many as there seems to be a perception that aircraft = available money, without much thought to the massive overheads and minuscule margins required to operate.

KC in reply to the above from off a PAIN email chain:

The big difference in Australia is that “modern awards” negotiated by businesses and unions have addressed this issue a couple of decades back.
ATSB also produced a detailed paper in 2001 highlighting this issue:

https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/33957/sir200102_001.pdf

The recommendations in the ATSB paper were adopted back in 2001.
 
AMROBA uses it when advising its members.
 
Regards...

 To which I replied:

..guess that was a somewhat poor example as I was trying to point out the major difference in 'consultation' when it comes to the FAA v CASA.


However that is an excellent ATSB link Ken. That would have been back when the bureau was somewhat relevant and proactive in addressing identified safety issues. I note that the report had 9 very good safety recommendations, fast forward to today's Dolan led ATSB, they would be lucky to have that many SRs in a year. See my report on the decline of the SR under Dolan: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Popin_2.pdf 
 
As a point of comparison to that ATSB report, refer to yesterday's ATSB VARA ATR interim report  (link at the top of this AP Post: http://auntypru.com/forum/-Overdue-and-Obfuscated?pid=4482#pid4482 ), which IMO should also have generated the need to publish a SR (or two)...

And today another email contributor brings it back to TAWS with the following insightful & historical contribution... :

Folks,
The major points of difference in consultation, FAA v. CASA is:
 
(1)    FAA have a very formal justification criteria for regulation making, that includes risk management and cost/benefit justification ---- the major elements in making sure that every “there should be a rule --------“ doesn’t happen.
(2)    The ARAC groups duties are up to and including drafting the basic “rule” that will eventuate from their activities.
(3)    The ARAC system largely prevents “interested parties” creating “rules” for sectional commercial advantage ----- a major unacknowledged problem here in Australia.
 
As a matter of interest, every time FAA invokes its “emergency authority”, and “proceeds direct to final rule” it turns into to be a shambles, and a very expensive shambles, just like here. The “control cable AD”, which started from the lobbying of one INDUSTRY IDENTITY here, would never get off the ground in the US system.
 
In contrast, here, a genuine risk management approach simply never gets a look in, there is NO genuine and HONEST attempt at cost/benefit analysis, RIS comes after, not before, and we wind up with a huge rule book, where we have LONG SINCE PAST to point of DIMINISHING RETURNS. Ie: Most of CASA’s activities have no beneficial safety benefits, and it can be argued that many have the opposite effect, they actually increase risk.
 
Time and again, CASA’s final rules bear no relationship to what was “consulted” via the Technical Sub-Committees, the “maintenance suite” is the prime example, what we have bears not the slightest relationship to the output of the very expert group put together by Bruce Byron, and bears no relation to the EASA approach, which Byron was looking for.
 
The original draft Part 91 was actually marginally shorter than FAR or NZ CAR 91, the current draft CASR   Part 91 ----- save me.
 
As Assistant Director Bill McIntyre said, many years ago: “ The law requires us to consult, it doesn’t require us to take any notice”.
 
Regards,

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

KC & Co win a reprieve on Part 66-

Via the Yaffa's Oz Flying:

An engineer works on a turbine engine at a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) base. (Steve Hitchen)

CASA postpones Part 66 Changes
6 July 2016

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has postponed planned changes to CASR Part 66.

The small aircraft maintenance licensing arrangements were to have come in last Monday 4 July, but maintenance training organisations and associations flagged ongoing issues with the suite of regulations.

"Key stakeholders and CASA recognised there were still outstanding issues to be resolved and some unintended consequences as a result of the proposed new small aircraft maintenance personnel structure," a CASA statement released today said.

"Issues relate to maintenance workforce flexibility, career progression and the workload for maintenance training and registered training organisations.

"In addition, more work needs to be done to ensure the regulatory requirements and the vocational training system can work effectively together."

CASA will now conduct a comprehensive review of Part 66, including working with the national education body to produce a more streamlined training package.

Read more at http://www.australianflying.com.au/lates...OkRZcCM.99

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

KC & Co win a reprieve on Part 66-

Via the Yaffa's Oz Flying:

An engineer works on a turbine engine at a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) base. (Steve Hitchen)

CASA postpones Part 66 Changes
6 July 2016

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has postponed planned changes to CASR Part 66.

The small aircraft maintenance licensing arrangements were to have come in last Monday 4 July, but maintenance training organisations and associations flagged ongoing issues with the suite of regulations.

"Key stakeholders and CASA recognised there were still outstanding issues to be resolved and some unintended consequences as a result of the proposed new small aircraft maintenance personnel structure," a CASA statement released today said.

"Issues relate to maintenance workforce flexibility, career progression and the workload for maintenance training and registered training organisations.

"In addition, more work needs to be done to ensure the regulatory requirements and the vocational training system can work effectively together."

CASA will now conduct a comprehensive review of Part 66, including working with the national education body to produce a more streamlined training package.

Read more at http://www.australianflying.com.au/lates...OkRZcCM.99

Update to Part 66 etc.- To perhaps highlight what's at stake and the importance of getting Part 66 right, here is an article by KC off the latest AMROBA newsletter ( Volume 13 Issue 6 (0616)) ...

 

2. Overcoming concerns with declining skills – 2017 & on.


Ever since the EASR Parts 66/147/Subpart M were partially adopted into CASR Parts 42/66/147, the aviation MRO industry reportedly has seen a decline in skills. AMROBA research has identified that this decline actually started a decade or so before then. Also, this trend is not unique to this industry so proposed fixes need to identify career paths to attract, train and keep important skills within the aviation industry. The foundation of AME training depends on CASA promulgating ICAO international training standards applicable to AMEs and LAMEs as they did in the past.

The EASA LAME system is an examination system the same as CAR31 Basics. Resurrecting a LAME examination system run by CASA or a contractor(s) that has the 75% pass mark will remove the pressure that CASA applied to the AME system.

Undoing the damage that CASA did in the last decade will take time but the current management in CASA has been positive and have agreed to this review.

A return to trade training and a separate licencing examination system correctly implemented can be made to work as long as the following is implemented.

The broad based avionics and mechanical AME employable across the industry sectors is the core to resurrecting a career positive system. With the proper AME skills, a person may gain employment across the industry. AMROBA’s proposal is for a highly skilled AME that can work in avionics/mechanical or a composite of the two streams.

To obtain the licencing knowledge and skills above the trade training, an AME should be able to self-study, or do an on-line course, or a fulltime course. The LAME skills are about supervision, airworthiness requirements, management, and to certify as airworthy, these are all added to the AME trade skills.

The "group" rating system that has been created will work under the proposed licencing system if the different licences are based on aircraft design standards.

The need for the "Elementary" rating should be based on a similar process of to the FAA repairman system where the AMO makes a request for an employee to hold the "elementary" rating based on the AMO assessing the competencies of the employee. This can be limited to an apprentice half way through training or an adult employee from an allied trade.

What has to be carefully handled is the transition of current LAMEs trained under the CASR 66 system to the future system. Some have not attained the practical skills, some have not attained the knowledge so we need to replace that with experience plus employer assessment when they have the knowledge/practical skills to transition.

The last thing we need is the debacle of the introduction of CASR Part 66 and the exclusion fiasco.

The first thing CASA can do is repeal the introduction of the 5700Kg/9 seat and adopt next year’s CASR Part 23 19 seats/5818Kgs limitation. This resurrects "group" ratings up to 19 seats and type ratings above and other transport aeroplanes. The same applies for helicopters, type ratings for CASR Part 29 and "group" ratings for Part 27.

The B2 group and type ratings will basically return to a workable system.

The group rating system was introduced to enable a broadly trained AME to gain experience to obtain a licence. The next system must return to a similar system with CASA promulgating the avionic and mechanical qualifications required to underpin the LAME system. The LAME additional skills can be tested by examination.

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Latest AMROBA newsletter - Volume 13 Issue 7 July 2016

　
1. Progress is being made – now to reduce the time factor.

It has taken some time for CASA to restructure and this has held up progressing regulatory reform in the airworthiness and engineering sectors. The restructuring going on in the Federal Education Department regarding "Skill Councils" has not yet finished – this also affects the proposed AME trade training changes from being implemented quickly. However, two areas that can be progressed almost immediately is harmonising CASR 21 Subpart J and implementing changes to the foundations underpinning airworthiness standards. Performance based – less prescription.  

2. Regulatory Missing Airworthiness Elements.

The basis of any national aviation regulatory system is the responsibility of aircraft registered operators to maintain their aircraft in an "airworthy" condition, especially when a country opts to have an indefinite period of validity for certificates of airworthiness. ICAO Annex 8 clearly states that an indefinite period of validity must be supported by a "periodic inspection" & "on-going inspections" that attests the aircraft continues to meet (conformity) its design standards and is safe for flight. Not in CARs/CASRs.

3. US manufacturers’ trends increasing costs to ROs.

US manufacturers are making changes to their manuals to increase the manufacturers’ commercial profitability not safety. Because the FAA does not approve OEM manuals, they can include requirements to return items to them for maintenance. They can also repackage standard parts with a manufacturer part number under the guise of improved "quality control" and increase the price beyond belief. Also there is a trend for US manufacturers to then increase mandatory replacement items.

4. Part 145 Post Implementation Review next.

With CASA now committed to a Post Implementation Review of CASR Part 66, AME licensing, the next task must be the Post Implementation Review of CASR Part 145 to simplify and harmonise with best practices. Part 145 needs to have the ability to apply applicable standards for various levels and sizes of AMOs. The recently amended FAR Part 145, unlike the EASR Part 145, has addressed this issue. We need to enable management from "directly supervised organisations" to large corporate management structures without getting specific.

Performance based – less prescription.

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Here ye! Here ye! - KC has spoken

Dear Malcolm please take note of the following words of wisdom from KC & the AMROBA Clan : 

Weather and Red Tape

Aviators many moons ago realised that they could not control the weather and they also realised government and public servants were totally in charge of red tape. Both weather and red tape are seen as uncontrollable.

We know that time will see the weather change and we also know that time will see the growth of red tape even though Government Policy and the DAS Directive 01/2015 promises a reduction. Red tape is creating confusion & stopping new entities entering aviation.

Behind all the discontent with the political system is a public service system that seems to be out of touch with the constituents they represent and regulate.

Governments and public servants see their jobs as creating regulations to meet policies of ever changing governments that keep adding to the problem. Public servants also want prescriptive requirements so prosecution can be successful if a person makes even a simple breach of their over prescriptive regulations, standards and quasi-regulations.

Government after government stake their success on the number of new legislation they have created and government departments and agencies stake their success on the number of regulations and quasi-regulations they have created.

Most industrial industries need a political party dedicated to really reducing regulation and red tape so industry can work and adopt innovation in performing that work.

Small business owners just cannot get their head around the multitude of legislation, government standards, quasi regulations, etc. that exists today and all of these requirements add costs to running a business and employment.

Business then needs to compete with other countries that have obtained a free trade agreement with Australia that, in the main, do not have the same over regulated system of Australia nor do they have the same wage structure of Australia.

There is also an on-going trend in government to move to the "strict liability" approach that challenges the "rule of law" principles that we supposedly have. Strict liability shifts the burden of proof from government, the accuser, to the accused. That is not a free society.

Strict liability should be restricted to intentional wrongdoings that are clear criminal elements not the day by day workings of business and society.

The Civil Aviation Act states CASA should promulgate AVIATION SAFETY STANDARDS.

Adopting ICAO STANDARDS as Aviation Safety Standards would be the first step to reducing Red Tape.

It is time that regulations and standards support the safety attitudes of aviation participants and stop drafting requirements that treats them as criminals.

Criminal elements do not enable proper drafting of aviation safety standards that are written in plain English in the interest of safety.

TIME TO SLASH THE RED TAPE AND DRAFT IN PLAIN ENGLISH. 

Strict Liability – is it appropriate?

"The distinguishing feature of crimes of strict liability (SL) is the absence of mens rea, the prosecution is not required to prove the defendant intended the consequences of his actions or even foresaw them. This should only apply if the accuser can prove the person was negligent or deliberately ignored a requirement.

There is a Common Law assumption that a criminal act has to be willed (there is usually a voluntary act) and accompanied by mens rea. The concept of mens rea was developed in England under common law when judges accepted that an act alone could not create a criminal liability unless it was accompanied by a guilty state of mind. In other words the act was intentional.

So regulations using "strict liability" removes the common law approach and shifts responsibility to prove innocence to the accused. Strict liability laws that are currently on the books are inconsistent with principle of culpability-based retributivism."

It is time that government, its departments and agencies stopped disadvantaging their own small business communities and provide them with a level playing field with those countries that they sign free trade agreements with.

That is so confusing for the working man.

THE DRAFTING STYLE OF THE CURRENT AVIATION REGULATORY SYSTEM IS WRITTEN IN SUCH A MANNER THAT A REASONABLE PERSON IS CONFUSED.

WITHOUT CLARITY IN AVIATION REQUIREMENTS, SAFETY IS COMPROMISED.

OTHER REGULATORS, MANUFACTURERS AND ORGANISATIONS HAVE APPLIED HUMAN FACTOR PRINCIPLES TO DATA & DOCUMENTATION TO PREVENT MISUNDERSTANDING DURING OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.

THIS IS AN INDUSTRY DEDICATED TO SAFETY THROUGH CLARITY AND THIS INDUSTRY CANNOT UNDERSTAND THE LACK OF CLEAR AND CONCISE STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS.

EXEMPTIONS IS A RESULT OF COMPLICATED AND CONFUSING REQUIREMENTS.

Aircraft design, manufacture, operation, maintenance, training, etc. safety is built on clear and concise instructions and communications. Why aren’t government standards and regulations clear and concise?

Is there a glimmer of hope that this might happen?

Bravo KC, however the question still remains will the 'powers to be' actually listen???


MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Yet again a strange dichotomy -

The following informative article is somewhat ironically published in CASA's latest flight safety magazine:

Engineering the future
Aug 8, 2016
1777
image: © Airbus SAS 2016 | A400M composite wing flap at Filton site

What happens to aviation safety if there aren’t enough people to service aircraft? In the first of a series of articles, Flight Safety Australia looks at the looming shortage of aviation professionals.

Aviation is facing a quiet crisis. Its signs are subtle and slow and hidden to most. The crisis is the distinct possibility that in ten years there might be too few people left who can maintain aircraft to a safe standard. The problem is local, national and global.

In 2010 the International Civil Aviation Organization, (ICAO) estimated that operating the world’s airlines, charter operators and other aviation businesses would require an additional 350,000 pilots by 2026. Importantly, ICAO estimated that 480,000 more engineers would be needed to deal with the additional 25,000 air transport aircraft expected in service by then.

‘Simply stated, the demand for aviation professionals will exceed supply,’ ICAO said.
Factors contributing to the crisis include:

• wholesale retirements in the current generation of aviation professionals
  
• aviation professions not seen as attractive enough to potential candidates
  
• competition with other industry sectors for skilled employees
  
• training capacity insufficient to meet demand
  
• learning methodologies not responsive to new evolving learning style
  
• accessibility of affordable training
  
• lack of harmonisation of competencies in some aviation disciplines, and
  
• little awareness by the ‘next generation’ of the variety of aviation careers available.
  

The University of NSW Business School published a report on The Future of Aircraft Maintenance in Australia in October 2015.

Based on forecasts made by ICAO in 2010, the report found by 2025 there would be an estimated 30 per cent global workforce shortfall in aircraft maintenance capacity, with Australia and the Asia Pacific region particularly hard hit.

‘Australia has a both a strong need and excellent opportunity to help meet this shortfall in the region,’ the writers said. To meet the opportunity Australia would have to move ‘quickly to rebuild both our aircraft maintenance and maintenance training industries by 2020’.

The report noted a particular irony. As the labour shortage bites, the result may be boom times, in cash flow, at least, for the aircraft maintenance industry members who survive.

‘Shortages of skilled labour in these regions will necessarily affect both their capacity to take in work from countries like Australia, and the prices they will be able to charge in what will progressively become a seller’s market—as well as potentially the quality of that work. In the medium term, this is bound to mean a compression of the cost differential between performing maintenance in Australia and outsourcing it; eventually it could undermine much of the economic case for offshoring Australian work,’ the authors concluded.

image: © Rolls-Royce | BR725 fan assembly at the Rolls-Royce Dahlewitz site

However, ‘it could also force Australian airlines to offshore work to “second tier” maintenance and repair organisations (MRO) suppliers of dubious quality, if Australia lacked its own capacity.’

A lack of aircraft engineering expertise would be ‘a genuine threat to the safety of (Australian) domestic aviation,’ the authors said.

The task of rebuilding national expertise in aircraft maintenance is daunting. The report noted ‘There has been a recent severe decline in training activity and output relative to historical levels’. The number of (maintenance course) commencements over the whole of 2015 was at the lowest level so far this century.

The report’s research officer, Doug Fraser, said wastage rates among aircraft engineering trainees were running close to one in three, due to layoffs, dropouts and other causes.

Fraser said part of the looming problem with aircraft maintenance skills was the situation where ‘the next generation of engineers we train are going to deal with two distinct generations of technology, particularly if we become short on people. It’s going to be hard to specialise if there aren’t enough trained people to meet the overall need.’

‘You can’t assume that a newly qualified person is going to work on old general aviation aircraft for the rest of their career, but neither can you assume that they’ll only be working on composite airframes, highly intelligent avionics and systems monitoring.’

However, industry leaders point to money, or the lack of it, as a root cause of the shortage.

The business development manager of training provider, Aviation Australia, Paul Jones said, ‘from a money perspective it’s not very attractive, not when you can go to TAFE, become a sparkie (electrician) and earn $150, 000 a year.

The mining boom had stripped experienced, enterprising people from the industry, Jones said. ‘There were fully fledged, licensed engineers with multiple types on their licences going to the mines and getting paid an extra $250,000 a year.’

More recently, Jones said, overseas maintenance organisations, in the Middle East and Asia were taking their pick of young engineers, and were unconcerned by having to pay training bonds, as well as offering very lucrative salary packages.

General manager of Queensland Aerospace College, Melinda Murphy, said ‘Internationally, engineers can make more money working on amusement park rides than by being an aircraft engineer.’

Fraser says cost is also an issue in gaining qualifications. ‘It is getting very expensive. People are finding that to go from basic qualifications to licensing they’re facing a very large bill—even if they can find the training college to do it.’

Murphy says aviation as a whole needs to convey a sense of the spirit she has found over her 20 years in the industry.

‘We need to communicate how dynamic and exciting the aviation industry is. As part of that we need to be looking for gaps in the market such as UAV, to get people inspired and get them into training.’

The UNSW report recommended a National Aerospace/Aviation College should be established, with branches in each state and territory.

‘It would draw on the combined resources of the university and TAFE sectors, gain recognition as Part 147 category maintenance training organisation, a registered training organisation and a nationally registered higher education provider,’ the authors said.

image: © Gregor Schläger | Lufthansa Technik AG

Aircraft maintenance at a glance

14,489 Number of aircraft engineers in Australia (military and civilian) from 2011 census
5% Annual attrition rate assumed in ICAO study of engineering requirements
20,000 Estimated number of new qualified engineering personnel required in Australia by 2025
2,347 Number of people in engineering training courses in Australia in March 2011
1,294 Number of people in engineering training courses in Australia in December 2015

MTF...P2  

[Gobbledock]

Aagh yes, CAsA publish 'concerned' articles about a declining industry while being part of the root cause of the industry collapsing. And of course ICAO put out lovely stats, figures and data - and that's pretty much all that those wankers ever do.
Neither organisation does anything to stimulate the industry and make it workable. All piss and wind, both of them.

#makeaviationgreatagain

[thorn bird]

Of course Gobbles no mention that Australia's unique maintenance regulations and the rigid interpretation of them by unqualified incompetent enforcers has lead to a situation where your average LAME now spends more time in front of a computer trying to figure out which rule applies to what torque wrench than actually working on the aircraft.
The cost of building annexes to the hanger to store all the paper work required is a real impediment to investment.

The inability of the regulator to keep up with modern practice and ever changing technology, their firm belief that the manufacturers of aircraft have no idea how they should be maintained because only CAsA knows that, has so reduced the skills base of the very few apprentices that actually finish their tenure that they have to front the computer all the time to google what a torque wrench is.

Of course the rest of the world's regulators fail to recognise that they are completely wrong and refuse to follow CAsA's way of doing things. This is why it costs twice as much to maintain the same aircraft in Australia and our engineers licences are not recognised abroad any more.

[Gobbledock]

Thorny,
Look at the bright side mate - all of our now unemployed aviators will be available to fill in their Census form tonight! It won't take long to fill in the job status, salary, and place of employment section.
Maybe CAsA will data match information with other big brother departments to ensure that the IOS aren't acting illegally or dishonestly. Something that Dr Voodoo will be telling his friends in Can'tberra that we are doing, but just haven't been caught yet.

Is there a section in the Census form where I can write 'go f#ck yourself'?

Gobbles

[Peetwo]

Harmonisation & PBR everywhere but here? -   

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times - Part II

Speaking of weasel words, I wonder if anyone has taken the time to read the latest edition of Murky Mandarin's bollocks SSP (see HERE)? You know the one that was released with little to no fanfare on the day of the Tamworth rally and three days before Malcolm called the  ridiculous two month election campaign.

Contradiction examples from the SSP.

Eg.1 This is Murky's policy statement which supposedly, among other things, is meant to address government aviation policy:

Australia's State Safety Policy Statement

Australia's aviation safety system plays a vital role in ensuring that Australia has a safe, efficient and competitive aviation industry. Australia will continue to seek closer alignment with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices and adopt international best practices in its aviation safety system.

The Australian Government has endorsed the following safety principles that underpin the future aviation safety system:

1. Safety is the primary consideration of Australia's aviation agencies and industry in the performance of their functions;
   
2. The highest safety priority should be afforded to passenger transport operations;
   
3. Australia's regulatory approach and responses are based on a sound assessment of the level of risk associated with particular aviation operations;
   
4. Aviation agencies and industry work closely together to identify aviation safety risks and ensure that the most appropriate methods, practices and technologies are adopted to address and reduce these risks;
   
5. A strong 'just culture' approach underpins information sharing between industry and safety agencies as information sharing assists in preventing future safety events and reflects international best practice;
   
6. Recognition that Australia's safety regulatory system plays an important role in ensuring that Australia has a safe, efficient and competitive aviation industry;
   
7. Australia's aviation regulatory procedures, processes and approach to regulation is fair, transparent and promotes nationally consistent operations;
   
8. Active and ongoing engagement by industry and safety agencies will help inform future regulatory priorities and the development of simpler regulations, standards and orders;
   
9. The safety performance of our aviation safety system will be continuously monitored and measured through the Stat's aggregate safety performance indicators as well as service provider's safety performance indicators; and
   
10. Sufficient financial and human resources for safety management and oversight will be allocated; and staff will be equipped with the proper skills and expertise to discharge their safety oversight and management responsibilities competently.
    

Mike Mrdak
Secretary, Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development
6 May 2016

 
In light of the Mildura Fog duck-up; the ongoing investigation of the broken tail VARA ATR (3 years and counting); and the recent release (after 3 years) of a shambolic investigation into a pushback accident between two RPT jets; I would suggest that the Department and it's responsible agencies are already in direct contravention of No.2 :

"...The highest safety priority should be afforded to passenger transport operations..."    

Eg.2

Quote from SSP Introduction:

The SSP is a key means of demonstrating how each ICAO Contracting State intends to achieve an acceptable level of safety performance in civil aviation in its own State.
The SSP is in essence the safety management system (SMS) for the State.

The detailed requirements for SSPs are set out in Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). Australia's SSP sets out the specific safety activities which we will continue to perform to meet the ICAO State responsibilities concerning the safe and efficient performance of aviation activities in Australia. 

Those paragraphs highlight our obligations as a signatory to ICAO, as outlined under Annex 19, under a State run SMS (SSP). Yet if you refer to my post - The 'despicable' Dazzling Dazza - you can truly get a sense of how much Murky's new SSP is pure unadulterated weasel words and a complete and utter load of bollocks :

Cynically I also wonder if the quiet no frills release of Murky's SSP, has something to do with the fact that M&M does not want to draw attention and be questioned on the 3000+ notified differences & some of my further observations mentioned here:

Of the ICAO SARPs Annex 13 & 19 are integral to the proper implementation and effective administration of a State SSP. However as a further indicator that the Australian aviation safety bureaucracy is merely paying lip-service to the spirit & intent of ICAO, one only needs to review the 'notified differences' for A13 - http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/current/sup/generatedsupplements/Annex_13.pdf -

; & A19 - http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/current/sup/generatedsupplements/Annex_19.pdf .

There is a combined 12 pages and total of 55 NDs for the two Annexes.

However the real cynicism and affront to industry is within the detail. Let me explain, quote from department SSP DRAFT request for industry comment:

On 4 December 2015, the Department released an updated draft SSP for aviation industry and public comments. The comment period has now closed.

 
Note the date. Now refer to AIP SUP H104/15 [url=https://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/current/sup/s15-h104.pdf]  The SUP was issued on the 10 Dec 2015 and notified additional differences to at least 2 of the Annexes instrumental to the administration of a State SSP. So are the relevant notified differences, in particular with Annex 19, preempting the DRAFT SSP being implemented without amendment? How can that be possible when industry stakeholders were yet to comment?

The other option is that the NDs for Annex 19 are based on the current and original SSP.

However the current SSP was published in April 2012, how is it then possible to have additional NDs for a supposedly ICAO compliant document that has been in place for more than 4 years? 

Here is hoping that Murky's mob will eventually publish all industry comments on the 4 Dec 2015 DRAFT SSP..

The other thing that may have prompted M&M to discretely release the SSP two days before the caretaker government period, is that the SSP was referenced in the released TAAAF Policy. 

4. State Safety Program

The State Safety Program (SSP) for aviation is the primary structure for the Government to deliver its obligations under international aviation conventions.

The current approach of Government excludes industry from ongoing involvement in the SSP, other than through very broad consultation or through various piecemeal consultative mechanisms, often through different agencies.

There is a critical need to establish a stronger government-industry partnership through a fresh approach that recognises the role of industry in supporting and informing Government aviation policy. 

The Forum believes that Government should review the structures involved in the State Safety Program and provide mechanisms for improved high-level consultation with industry, including industry representative membership of the key committees.

The Forum is deeply concerned with the ongoing practice of Australia lodging differences to ICAO standards without consultation with industry. This practice must be stopped and a new system of industry consultation implemented through the SSP to ensure any difference lodged has the support of industry and is aligned with Government objectives for the efficient functioning of the Australian aviation regulatory system and international harmonisation.

If this policy (or a version of it) was adopted by the Coalition and they get back into government, it is far easier to say the SSP is done & dusted till next time (3yrs), therefore not requiring adherence to government policy...

Going along the theme of the above quoted post, KC in the latest AMROBA newsletter clearly defines why international regulatory harmonisation is so important for the long term growth and prosperity of the Australian aviation industry... :

3. Harmonised Australasian Aviation Requirements.

If politicians looked at the Pacific Region and ask why Australian aviation businesses do not have more involvement, they would quickly find out that the Pacific Region is harmonised with the NZ aviation requirements. Instead of looking at Europe, North America, government should be concentrating on Pacific Region harmonised aviation regulatory requirements. This is not only cost-effective for government but would provide a broader aviation market to participate in.

Aviation is a global industry and the days of unique requirements are over. The ICAO standards for the non-airline sectors have less red tape than what is applied in Australia. New Zealand has had its focus on the international market in the Pacific region for years and have assisted most Pacific countries to adopt the NZ aviation regulations with minimal changes. These countries copied the NZ requirements – something Australia should be doing ASAP. Basically the Pacific Islands have adopted the Kiwi system.

The Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO) is a regional international organisation overseeing aviation safety and security oversight in the Pacific Islands using guidelines provided by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). PASO was created on 11 June 2005, as a result of the Pacific Islands Civil Aviation Safety and Security Treaty (PICASST) and is managed by a permanent staff based in Port Vila, Vanuatu.

States which are currently Parties to the PICASST are: Cook Islands, Kiribati, Niue, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Countries which are also members of PASO, but not Parties to the PICASST are: Australia, New Zealand and Fiji.

PASO exists to:

 to meet the requirements of the member states in the provision of aviation safety and security regulatory oversight services, in accordance with PICASST

 to undertake the purpose of the organisation in a manner which is cost effective and sustainable in the long term; to utilise coordinated and collaborative business and inspection methods to minimise the costs of safety and security oversight to participating states and the aviation industry

 to support the aviation industry in participating states by the provision of timely advice and guidance in matters of aviation safety and security; and

 to promote an internationally recognised standard of aviation safety and security excellence, based on ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), within the Pacific Islands region.

Australia is part of this region and should be focussed on staying harmonised with NZ so that the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA) could be properly recognised in aviation.

Under the TTMRA, with a few exceptions:

a person registered to practise an occupation in Australia is entitled to practise an equivalent occupation in New Zealand, and vice versa, without the need for further testing or examination.

Pilots, LAMEs, AMEs, etc. should have no restriction working in either country.

This was the aim of government back in 1996, why has CASA been allowed to ignore it?
The government has the ultimate responsibility, has it not?

The ultimate aim of the treaty (Chicago Convention) that Australia signed was to adopt as closely as practical the international standards and recommended practices as it was recognised in 1944 that aviation is a global industry.

The attitude of filing differences with ICAO only highlights to other NAAs the inability of government to meet its obligations under this treaty. We need an Act that commits government and CASA to implement global standards into the aviation system. Most ICAO standards can be written as a PBR. - Absolutely spot on KC.. However the trouble is no-one, including ICAO & several successive Australian governments, seems to give a fig...  

MTF...P2

[thorn bird]

The attitude of filing differences with ICAO only highlights to other NAAs the inability of government to meet its obligations under this treaty. We need an Act that commits government and CASA to implement global standards into the aviation system. Most ICAO standards can be written as a PBR. - Absolutely spot on KC.. However the trouble is no-one, including ICAO & several successive Australian governments, seems to give a fig...

There is another problem P2,

CAsA are won't to crow about compliance with ICAO necessitating some onerous imposition, think the Coober Pedy runway width issue which nearly cost the town its RPT service.
ICAO must set standards that cover the whole world. Runway width requirements must take in such places as far North Europe where ice and snow covered runways are a winter norm, hardly appropriate for a town in the middle of a desert where even rain is a rarity, besides it wasn't exactly 747's operating there. That is where non compliance with ICAO is appropriate, which most countries recognise.

CAsA often uses ICAO compliance as an excuse for a lot of "Issues" with industry.
For example ICAO may call for "A Check" of something, CAsA mandates four, then claims it is only complying with ICAO.

This is why Australia's compliance costs have gone through the roof.

Chatting with a private owner the other day who flies his 172 about a hundred hours a year. He maintains that compliance costs, and all the other charges by various parasitic entities, who feed off the industry, make up over 60% of his operating costs.

If that is indeed true for a private operator what on earth is it for a commercial business?

[Peetwo]

Fresh off the KC keyboard -  

Breaking News 
DAS Gone – The Cycle Continues

August 28, 2016August 28, 2016 Ken Cannane 0 Comment

DAS Gone – Again

[Peetwo]

KC back banging the drum -

Breaking News 
MRO Future – Post 2020
September 3, 2016 Ken Cannane Comments Off on MRO Future – Post 2020
MRO Future 2020

[P7_TOM]

Don’t you just wish that politicians and government agencies took the same care and paid as much attention to their remit as Ken does to his 'members' and industry.  The man is a true legend, cheerful, tireless, always finds a couple of minutes to take a call; or answer some dopey question about ‘what’s-what’ and how to do it.

Reform in action is Ken, shame he’s constantly up against a brick wall made of stupidity, arrogance and unmitigated ignorance.  Pearl before swine, but Ken don’t give a monkey’s; he’s right, he knows he’s right and he ain’t about to quit.  I wish we had a hundred like him; life would be so much better.

Choc frogs only whet his appetite for Tim Tams; so best top up the tin GD.

[Peetwo]

Evidence: CASA holding back industry innovation & investment-

Ref Senate Estimates thread:

Ps Having developed a recent interest in the Joint Parliamentary committee for treaties - see HERE &..

...I was pleased to note that the membership in this parliament of JSCOT also included Senator Sterle.

I also noted with interest certain lapsed inquiries from the 44th Parliament were carried across and reinitiated for inquiry - see top 2 & No. 6 HERE.

Pps Due to the very relevant content the No.6 reinitiated inquiry will be taken as being actively monitored by PAIN and all previous records, submissions, Hansard etc. plus any updates will appear on the AMROBA thread...

This was the ToR & link for the No.6 JSCOT inquiry:

New  Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness - USA
        Status: Current
        Date Referred: 12 September 2016

Track Inquiry                

Now if you go to the submission, you will see (at this stage) there is only one submission from AMROBA:

1 AMROBA (PDF 90 KB) 

 
However prior to end of the last Parliament there was one public hearing that was particularly interesting...

Here is the Hansard where Senator Fawcett once again made the CASA executive trough dwellers, look quite frankly like deer in the headlights, inept & completely out of touch with reality   (P2 - Also note the part in bold from MP Whiteley):

Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

02/05/2016
Treaties tabled on 2 February and 2 March 2016

BALA, Ms Nisha, Section Head, International Relations, Civil Aviation Safety Authority
HUTTON, Ms Carolyn, Branch Manager Government and International Relations, Stakeholder Engagement Group, Civil Aviation Safety Authority
NIKOLIC, Mr Peter, Manager Initial Airworthiness, Standards Division, Civil Aviation Safety Authority
WALKER, Mr Robert, Stakeholder Engagement Group Manager, Civil Aviation Safety Authority
WEEKS, Mr Roger, Acting Executive Manager, Standards Division, Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Committee met at 11:16

Agreement on the Promotion of Aviation Safety between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America

CHAIR ( Mr Hartsuyker ): I now declare open this public hearing. The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties will take evidence on the amendments to the implementation procedures for airworthiness under the Agreement on the Promotion of Aviation Safety between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America.

I welcome representatives from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Although the committee does not require you to give evidence under oath, I should advise you that this hearing is a legal proceeding of the parliament and warrants the same respect as proceedings of the House and the Senate. The giving of false or misleading evidence is a serious matter and may be regarded as a contempt of the parliament. If you nominate to take questions on notice could you please ensure that your written response to questions reaches the committee secretariat within seven working days of your receipt of the transcript of today's proceedings. Do you wish to make some introductory remarks?

Mr Walker : Yes, we would, Chair. Thank you for the opportunity to make some opening remarks around the amendments that are being considered here today. Under article 7 of the Agreement on the Promotion of Aviation Safety between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America, more commonly known as the Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement or BASA, it is proposed to bring into force a number of amendments to the Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness, or the IPA. The BASA is a bilateral technical cooperation agreement that provides the overall framework for cooperation on aviation safety. It also provides for the development of treaty level implementation procedures, or IPs, on specific areas of aviation safety oversight. This agreement was signed in June 2005 and the first and currently only set of IPAs, the Implementation Procedures of Airworthinesss, was signed in May 2006 and entered into force on 28 November 2006.

The agreement and the IPA facilitate mutual acceptance of approvals, evaluations and monitoring associated with civil aviation products, personnel and facilities. These proposed amendments will provide significant benefits to Australia manufacturers of aeronautical parts and appliances by enabling them to export Australian certified aeronautical parts directly into the United States. The benefits will extend to owners and operators of transport category aircraft, normal category helicopters and transport category helicopters as well. The proposed amendments will remove a limitation related to the state of design so that the United States Federal Aviation Administration, the FAA, will accept Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority's supplemental type certificates for those small aeroplanes where the United States is not the state of design. Australian parts and appliances—which include any instrument, mechanism, equipment, part, apparatus, appurtenance or accessory, including communication equipment, that is used or intended to be used in operating or controlling an aircraft in flight, is installed in or attached to the aircraft and is not part of the airframe, the engine or propeller—will no longer have to undergo additional often duplicated manufacturing certification by American authorities when exporting to the United States.

The original IPA established the working processes for recognition of a range of aviation safety certification approvals issued by CASA and the FAA. Following negotiations with the US FAA, amendments to the IPA were signed by representatives of the Australian government and the government of the United States in Washington on 7 May 2010. These amendments extend FAA recognition to CASA's Australian parts-manufacturing approval processes, addressing an imbalance in the IPA where Australian regulation already recognised and accepted US manufactured and FAA aviation parts. The approval of this amendment will provide significant financial benefits to the design and manufacturing sectors of the Australian aviation industry. This will open one of the biggest aviation markets in the world to Australia and will allow for export of Australian designs and products without any additional commitments for Australia. The proposed amendment IPA will replace the current IPA, and no change is required to the BASA. No financial costs to the Australia government are anticipated in the implementation of the proposed amendment IPA and no new legislation is required to give it effect.

I thank the committee for the opportunity to make this opening remarks. We welcome any questions from the committee.

CHAIR: I have two questions. Firstly, what is the size of the market that is likely to be opened up for Australian producers as a result of these changes? Secondly, what are the likely savings in relation to the reduction of the need for validation?

Mr Walker : Obviously the US aviation market is one of the largest in the world. The way the market currently runs is that Australian certification that is done here in Australia has to be revalidated before parts or aircraft can be exported to the US. The real value of these changes is that a lot of the expense that is involved in doing that is going to be taken out of the equation. I will refer to my colleagues for some of the specifics around the actual money saved, but it goes without saying that it is about the range of what is on offer here. These changes will provide opportunities for the larger regular passage of transport operators like Qantas and Virgin when they reach end of lease for aircraft frames et cetera and want to sell those frames back into the US right through to the smaller operators, particularly parts manufacturers here in Australia. There are some great opportunities for some of the smaller aerospace sector operators. In terms of the quantum, it is one of the biggest markets in the world. In terms of the money that can be saved—and I might refer to my colleagues here as well—we are talking about millions of dollars of savings to individual operators.

Mr Weeks : Chair, just to give some sense of differentiation in the size of the two markets, within Australia we have about 15,000 aircraft on our civil register. In the United States there are in excess of 207,000 aircraft. So the potential for our manufacturers to access that market is obviously a significantly greater quantum than what they would have access to here domestically. In relation to the costs it is difficult, because this is a potential opportunity. But we know that, for example, if one of our major carriers was wanting to undertake a refit or refresh of their cabin, at the moment they would have to engage a United States firm to do the certification processes and our own, and it can be in the vicinity of millions of dollars of additional cost to duplicate that certification. That would be removed under this arrangement.

Senator FAWCETT: I want to take you to a couple of points. One is just a question of clarification. My understanding is that CASA STCs for part 25, 27 and 29 aircraft are limited. So where Australia is the designer of the aircraft or where the US is the designer of a small aircraft essentially we can provide STCs for anything, but as soon as we get into the commercial field and the RPT type aircraft my understanding from my notes here is that it is limited. Can you expand on what that means? It appears to limit or put barriers in the way of the most lucrative part of the American market.

Mr Nikolic : Regarding the way this was negotiated, when we approached the FAA for the first time with the wish to expand our scope they requested that we provide them with evidence of our competency—CASA as well as industry. We provided a number of STCs in different categories to demonstrate that competency. They reviewed that and they based their limitation and scope on the basis of what we could demonstrate at the moment as a level of competency, so on those bases they could simply accept those approvals without any further validation. Regarding the way the amendment is structured, we have two tiers of STCs. The first tier will be the one that will be automatically accepted, which means that they will administratively just accept the application and will issue their validated certificate without actually checking anything. The second tier is anything else.

When it comes to anything else, basically that is open to any STC and then it will come to a negotiation between the FAA and CASA as to how deep they need to dig into that more complex STC that they deem outside that initial scope.

What we achieved with that first tier, which is acceptance, is that we managed to cover probably 80 to 90 per cent of the work that is currently being done in Australia, especially when it comes to part 25 and potentially part 29 transport category fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. The acceptance will be related to cabin refurbishments, which is the main thing for airlines. Every 3 to 5 years they refresh the cabin to be more competitive. It will also cover automatic acceptance for emergency medical outfits, which is what is mainly done by our design organisations to equip new helicopters for state emergency services and so on. These are probably the most lucrative areas that currently could be exported to the US and other countries. From the savings point of view, what Qantas and Virgin told us is that each of these STCs when contracted in the US would cost between $2 million and $4 or $5 million. They do probably between three and five projects every year. So there are significant savings there. Also, there is the potential for further development of the manufacturing sector in that particular area. It is potentially undeveloped for the reason that in the past that work was mainly outsourced to the US. That is a big—

Senator FAWCETT: Under the current assessment of this limitation where does that leave, for example, the firm down at Moorabbin that under APMA approvals used to manufacture landing gear struts for Metroliners? They had a very large market in the United States. Where do they stand under this new interpretation of limitations?

Mr Nikolic : If they specifically work on landing gear or for part 25 aircraft they would probably need to go to a slightly higher level of review by the FAA. However, up to this point they did not have any option. They could not enter that market at all with the Australian—

Senator FAWCETT: They have been in the market for five or six years.

Mr Nikolic : Only if they have the FAA approvals. If they have an FAA approval, which means they would need to contract an FAA design organisation, and they have an overarching FAA production approval holder who would take them as a supplier, then they could access that market. With this particular arrangement they would be able to contract an Australian design organisation, get a CASA approved STC and then under their own production approval they would be able to export that. So the option is there. How deep the FAA would seek to go into validation of that STC is a matter of negotiation.

Senator FAWCETT: My next question goes to CASA's capacity to support industry. The feedback that I got extensively a couple of years back when we were doing the Forsyth review was that for people who want to export parts or services into foreign markets time to market was critical. Someone would identify, they would put up a request for tender, people would tender but then they had to deliver within a pretty quick time frame. The feedback that I got consistently was that for anything that was delegated under the old CAR 35 system, where an engineer would sign off on CASA's behalf, that tended to work well but, wherever CASA needed to have its people look at things, capacity constraints—and sometimes it was possibly linked to a shortage of people within CASA with the relative experience—meant that what an independent engineer could sign off within a week was taking up to a year. I think the worst case I came across was nearly two years for CASA to sign off, which meant that it was impossible for them to meet market demands. Where is CASA at at the moment in having the capacity to work with industry and get timely turnarounds so that they can take advantage of this?

Mr Weeks : Senator, that is a difficult question. Because industry is aware that this is likely to occur, we have certainly seen an increase in the number of applications for things like STCs. The branch is working on those applications as we speak. I think it is up around 40 or so. Each STC does take variable time to assess, depending on the complexity of the product that is being applied for. I am confident that with the staff we have we are prioritising the STCs that require the approval. But it is variable, unfortunately.

Senator FAWCETT: That is not quite my question, though. My question is: are you adequately resourced? If the government's agenda is to encourage innovation and agile activity by industry to export and if a regulatory clearance is part of the system that they have to negotiate, then if you are already under-resourced in your ability to respond in a timely manner—which is what I have been hearing from industry—if the demand goes up because of agreements like this it is just going to make the situation worse. My question is: are you currently adequately resourced? Industry is telling me the answer is no, so I am interested in your perspective. And either what would you need to do to be adequately resourced internally or do you have planning in place to look at how you can delegate engineering authority to third parties to whom CASA has said, 'We accept your degree of competence and you can sign on CASA's behalf'?

Mr Weeks : Senator, in broad terms—and I will ask Mr Nikolic to provide some greater detail—it would be fair to say that if we received a significant increase in applications that would place pressure on us. In the current process I think we have a reasonable degree of being able to handle that, but Mr Nikolic will give more detail on that.

Senator FAWCETT: Just before Mr Nikolic starts, the third part of that question was around delegating to third parties. You have done that in the past. That appears to have contracted somewhat. What is CASA's current view? Do you have plans to reimplement some of those delegated options?

Mr Weeks : Yes. Mr Nikolic will provide more detail, but we have moved away from the CAR 35 process into the CASR part 21 approved design organisation process. There are some things for which at the moment CASA only issues the approvals, but there are also a wide range of approvals that are delegated or given to a part 21 design organisation. Mr Nikolic will—

Senator FAWCETT: Again, sorry just before we go to that I want to talk at the strategic level initially. Again the feedback I have had from industry is that there are frequently people with more expertise in industry than CASA has been able to employ and retain, which leads to deep frustration in industry when there are capacity constraints at CASA. Why are you not looking for an opportunity to outsource the maximum extent possible, as opposed to retaining a range of functions within CASA, if industry can demonstrate that they actually have more capacity and demonstrated competence?

Mr Weeks : That is a good point and that is the model of part 21—to the maximum extent possible have the experts and industry undertake those types of design and approval processes. In terms of our obligations as a regulator, there are some things that we will obviously need to continue to be involved in.

Mr WHITELEY: Can you give a percentage break up of those two differentials? What do you retain for whatever reasons you retain? You said you retain some and you are acknowledging that you already do outsource some, so what bits?

Mr Nikolic : The percentage is difficult to give because all these tasks are random. They do not come in a scheduled manner. However, from a strategic perspective I can say that all minor modifications and minor repairs are already delegated 100 per cent to industry and with major modifications and major repairs there are two options. One is that industry would come to CASA and request that they approve, in which case we would be looking at what the actual request is and in many cases delegate that to industry, and in some cases, if it is a very complex task, we would probably do a partial delegation to industry and partially keep it in CASA. This is the setup that has been in place since CAR 35 days, so it has not changed.

We also looked into strategically delegating more to industry and for that purpose a regulation was put in place two years ago, which is known as subpart 21J approved design organisations. That particular regulation allows an approval to industry, to an approved design organisation, that basically will have almost all the options and approval powers as CASA. There are certain areas where industry would literally have everything except the issuing of the final certificate, which is kept for CASA. So that is already in place.

Senator FAWCETT: My concern comes from a recent visit I made of a firm which for many years has been one of Australia's leading aviation providers that modifies aircraft and does things with delegated authority. Now for the things that are not structural, not external to the aircraft, not impacting at all on the safety of the aircraft—and purely for domestic use, not for export—CASA are insisting on sending staff to look at frames and brackets that are being fitted inside the aircraft. So if you are resource constrained already I question why for something this company has done without issue, safety breach or anything for years CASA is now all of a sudden delaying the process considerably by insisting people come out and check step by step the installation of essentially some frames and brackets for equipment to go on the back of an aircraft. It strikes me that there is a mismatch there between what you are telling us and what is actually happening on the ground. I am just trying to understand why. There are always two sides to a story. I went for a visit and asked some questions and this is what I heard. I would like to hear CASA's perspective.

Mr Nikolic : Without getting into the detail of what firm that is—and it is difficult to talk hypothetically without a specific example—I would assume that we are talking about certain conformity inspections that are done by CASA. We are in the process of making arrangements to be able to delegate those as well. That has not been done up till recently.

Senator FAWCETT: Can I say: in the past—

CHAIR: We are running out of time, Senator. Can I just ask that you write to us and provide further information along those lines, and detail where you are at. You get the thrust of where Senator Fawcett is coming from.

Senator FAWCETT: Chair, can I just ask one must question?

CHAIR: Very quickly.

Senator FAWCETT: You can take it on notice if you need to. Does this agreement—and it strikes me that you are doing some restructuring to facilitate this agreement with the FAA—still provide local companies the option to say, 'We don't want to export. This is purely a modification. We would like to do it under an engineering order'—as they have done in the past? Or are they now required to go through this process? It strikes me that, if somebody has no intention to export, and if they are aware of all the limitations of doing it domestically and having to take it back to the FAA baseline, can they still do that? Or is that commercial impost an unintended consequence of this agreement?

Mr Nikolic : They can still do it using the existing systems. We are currently going through a post-implementation review of the Part 21. We are trying to find other solutions for general aviation apart from the approved design of implementation of 21J. We have a significant group of industry advisers in a working group that work with us. We are trying to find a workable, sensible solution so that not necessarily everyone needs to be a 21J-approved design organisation, and not necessarily everyone needs to have an overhead cost of a design organisation. So we are working on that, as well.

CHAIR: Deputy Chair?

Mr KELVIN THOMSON: In the interest of time, Chair, I will let that opportunity pass.

CHAIR: Mr Whiteley?

Mr WHITELEY: No, I will leave it. It was a very good line of questioning, I have to say. There are a number of obvious questions that could be followed up. I think we should wait. There is an obvious theme within the Senator's line of questioning that, I think, should be taken very seriously. The general perception is that the organisation is nowhere near as efficient or as best practice or as industry standard—whatever the words are—as it should be. My only query would be is that, at the moment, with the current level of applications, you are resource okay. But I think I heard you say that, if it goes up, which we believe it will, you probably would not be. My only question would be, and you might want to address it in your letter, is: right now, are you at industry standard? Are you as efficient through the approval process and the certification process as it would be if a third-party independent contractor was used? I would be interested to hear that.

CHAIR: Senator Fawcett, we do have a couple of minutes left if you have a final question.

Senator FAWCETT: You rushed me to a conclusion!

CHAIR: Sorry, but I thought the Deputy Chair had some questions which he wished to ask. I apologise for that. Being almost 11.45 am, we will bring it to a conclusion. Thank you for attending and for giving evidence today. If the committee has any further questions, the committee's secretariat may seek further comment from you at a later date.

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