[Kharon]

Ops Manual dexterity.

The two events featured above, IMO – highlight a notable trend in the ATSB's background 'reporting' after the investigation. The 'need' for changes and amendments to the 'Operations Manual'.

This has featured in nearly all of the latest rounds of investigations to become almost a trend', alongside of some fairly 'basic' handling errors.

“A superior pilot uses his superior judgment to avoid situations which require the use of his superior skill.” (Borman).

A fair enough comment on the properly trained and disciplined pilot, but the 'training and discipline' element seems to be missing in some reported events. If the 'superior judgement' was not gained through superior training (include 'on-line) ; events like the G8 one above are almost inevitable. The part about 'avoiding' situations has very real implications; yet there is stark evidence that the ability to 'define and correct' is often 'lacking'. The G8 event a classic example; multiple opportunities to correct the approach path not taken; why? ATSB probably lack the time , resources and interest to take a long rearward look at the lead up to this event. That however is not the fault of the investigators. The 'radical' cause of this event can probably be backtracked to pre first solo, through to 'checked to line' with the public in the back.

We've probably all done it at one time or another – hot and high – albeit sometimes unavoidable; BUT, the first time, back in the beginning of training should begin to be the last time in routine operations. A briefing on where the 'mistake' began should be detailed, on the white board. Beginning with the selected 'top-of-descent' point, ending with the 'ways and means' available to correct the approach, circuit and landing. The 'ability' to modify the final stages of a flight (hot/high – low/slow etc.) is an essential part of the pilot's tool kit. So much for the 'formative years'.

Once junior has outgrown short pants and is signed on to do a 'grown-ups' job; there is a further 'training' regimen to close off. This begins with the 'Ops Manual' a.k.a. 'the Bible'. The modern version is full of stuff which will not affect the pilot as much as the operator. (I digress again). Part of 'the manual' is the Pilot Operating Manual' (POH) AND the company operating policy and techniques. These are 'important' elements, operationally and legally binding; should 'push come to shove': as it occasionally does. In short this 'stuff' must be beaten into the wooden head of the bright eyed junior warrior; (should they wish to become older warriors).

They say one cannot put an old head on young shoulders; one can (with persistence) teach 'em how to 'see' the impending stuff up; and,what to do if you have stuffed it all up. A junior commercial pilot, on a fine day, in a serviceable aircraft, in the country,  getting 'out of shape' should never have had any reason to 'do' other than put a bit of power on, extend to circuit and return in good order to a routine approach and landing. This did not happen; ATSB reports the what, but to me, I'd want to know why. That could have gone horribly wrong; Murphy taking a day off is little excuse.

Whilst laudable amending 'the manuals', should not be necessary; if there were 'flaws' within then those should have been flagged early; the check to line should have identified any shortcoming in operating technique and corrected long before turning the pilot loose on the public. None of this is rocket science; been that way since Pontius went solo. The notion of 'blame' is redundant here; the name of the game is stopping those holes in those famous cheese slices to align. Ops Manual dexterity allowing.............

Right, I'll go back to my knitting now and sit quietly in a corner.

Toot – toot....

[Kharon]

FWIW -

The ATSB report on the "Kabulture" or "Caboolture" mid-air event is out:-
Short version below.



Toot - toot..

[Kharon]

No matter how much you shake and dance.

“Mr Wright has indicated he will plead not guilty and has strenuously denied any wrongdoing.”[url=https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/crime/celebrity-croc-wrangler-matt-wrights-lawyers-seeking-mother-of-pilots-phone-records-from-after-helicopter-crash/news-story/bb9309b8aa8c3e92757babcb52397b0f][/url]

“Justice Blow set a tentative date of July 28 for a trial that is expected to run for up to five weeks.”

“Nothing is ever settled until it is settled right.” We can point our finger and make up excuses, we can invent arguments and do anything else we want, but the key to the skeleton jingles in our pocket until we settle matters right.” (JRK)..

Pleas note the R44 chopper.  The video below is worth watching: ignore the 'drama' and yes, it is a risky way to earn some much needed dollars. The math is simple enough; $300 an hour to run the chopper:: $20 per egg :: harvest 250 eggs = $5000 - $1000 expenses; that's about a $4000 payday. Insurance, maintenance etc will need to come out of that pot. But, take a look at the chopper; it is almost immaculate, fully serviceable and obviously well maintained. Money well spent. Despite the typical NT 'just bush boys' larrikin antics; this was supremely 'professional' and as safe as possible; sensible risk 'analysis: not too shabby, all things considered.

Now, Justice Blow has set five weeks aside to hear the 'Wright' case; there will be expert counsel on the pitch, both sides with an argument to sell on. But in the background carefully coiffed and manicured will be the 'unseen' never questioned CASA operatives who failed, dismally, to properly oversight the operations of this cowboy outfit. On paper, the operation 'stacked up' so a certificate to operate was granted; lovely manuals and boxes ticked. Signed, sealed and duly forgotten. The event which led to the tragedy could have been prevented, the warning signs were all there, clear and unequivocal. The 'doings' in Broome and the 'connections' should have at least raised some doubts, enough to warrant at least an operational audit; maintenance, serviceability, fuel loads, flight and duty etc. The only thing that occurred was the CASA Board arriving for lunch and a joy flight. The two Muppets charged with oversight and 'surveillance' never deigned to leave their air conditioned luxury to pay the operation any mind. Talk about mind over what matters.

The ATSB report speaks to some unsettling practices and a cavalier approach to 'operational' standards and 'good' practice. We shall watch this case with some interest; as the prophet says; - the last few drops fall down your pants.

Toot – toot...

[P7_TOM]

ATSB - Chopper break up - final report released.

[Peetwo]

ATSB pays compliment to GA pilot?? -

Via Popinjay media minions...

Effective decision-making contributed to successful forced landing on highway after engine failure and fire



The pilot of a Cirrus SR22 conducted a forced landing on the Mitchell Highway in central NSW after the light aircraft experienced an engine failure and in-flight fire, an ATSB investigation report details.

On 24 January 2025, a pilot and a passenger were flying from the Gold Coast to Mildura.

About three hours into the flight, while approximately 150 km north-west of Dubbo and cruising at about 8,000 ft, the aircraft’s engine oil pressure decreased below normal operating limits.

In response the pilot began to divert for a landing at Nyngan. But as they were making a PAN PAN radio call announcing their intentions, they heard the engine begin to ‘rev up’, followed by a ‘bang’.

The pilot then made a MAYDAY broadcast to ATC, advising that the engine had experienced a mechanical failure and they would be making an emergency landing on the Mitchell Highway, east of Nyngan.

As ATC acknowledged the broadcast, the pilot observed flames ‘pouring’ from the top of the cowl.

The report notes the pilot elected not to deploy the aircraft’s ballistic recovery parachute due to concerns that the fire was fuel related, and that a parachute-assisted landing may result in injuries to the passenger, who was pregnant.
Instead, the pilot began an emergency descent, putting the aircraft into a ‘dive’ in an attempt to put out the fire. The fire self-extinguished, but smoke began to enter the cockpit.

Despite the subsequent reduced visibility, the pilot proceeded to navigate the aircraft to land on the highway, while avoiding road traffic, for a successful forced landing with no injuries.

“The pilot’s timely and effective decision-making, likely supported by their experience on the aircraft type and knowledge of its performance capabilities, mitigated the risk of injury and further damage to the aircraft,” ATSB Director Transport Safety Dr Stuart Godley said.

Dr Godley noted in-flight engine failures in single-engine aircraft often result in the pilot experiencing high workload and time pressure, making preparedness critical.

“This incident demonstrates how the ‘aviate, navigate, communicate’ framework establishes a clear hierarchy of priorities, particularly during emergencies,” he continued.

“Acting in the appropriate order of priority improves situational awareness and supports coordinated responses in a dynamic environment.”

After the landing, the pilot inspected the engine and found the crankcase had ruptured adjacent to cylinder 6, below the induction duct assembly. A connecting rod had separated from the crankshaft and the air filter was visibly damaged by fire.

A disassembly and inspection of the engine had yet to be conducted at the time of publication of the ATSB’s investigation report. As a result, the ATSB was unable to determine the root cause for the loss of oil pressure or the mechanical failure of the engine.

“Although engine failures are relatively rare, they do happen,” Dr Godley concluded. “Given the potential severity of the consequences of an engine failure or power loss in a single‑engine aircraft, such occurrences therefore need to be planned for and managed appropriately.”

Read the final report: Engine failure involving Cirrus SR22, VH-DCB, 28 km east of Nyngan, New South Wales, on 24 January 2025

Publication Date
15/08/2025

MTF...P2