[Peetwo]

RAOz up on criminal charges??

Via Oz Aviation:

Aviation body to face criminal investigation following fatal crash

written by Naomi Neilson | March 10, 2025



Recreational Aviation Australia has been referred to the Victorian Director of Public Prosecutions for allegedly withholding key documents from a coronial investigation into a fatal light aircraft crash.

Recreational Aviation Australia (RAAus) will be investigated by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the Victorian Director of Public Prosecutions for the alleged behaviour of key personnel during an investigation and inquest into the death of Matthew Farrell.

Neither Farrell or his light sports aircraft, a Jabiru J230-C (similar aircraft pictured), were equipped to fly into cloud, but he made the decision to venture into poor weather conditions to visit his father on 18 September 2022.

Farrell was airborne for 40 minutes before the aircraft crashed into remote and mountainous terrain in Victoria’s north-east.

By the time of the fatal crash, Farrell had 14.7 hours of flight training, but just 3.6 hours was solo. Of that solo training, 3.3 hours was completed on a single day and he was tested on 22 landings.

Among his many concerns, Coroner Paul Lawrie said it “beggars belief” Farrell – as a student pilot – could be “trained effectively to certificate standard in all the above aspects of flying in one day”.

Over one-and-a-half days, RAAus’ head of flight operations, Jillian Bailey gave often “combative” evidence about the validity of Farrell’s recreational pilot’s license and cross-country endorsements.

Bailey claimed she had no concerns regarding the extent of training or experience underlying Farrell’s cross-country endorsement, and did not consider auditing his trainer as a consequence of the crash.

Plus the UP spin off thread, from that update... Raa aviation body to face criminal investigation following fatal crash

KRviator

It isn't that RAAus is being made a scapegoat. No self-respecting fair-weather pilot would do what Farrel did, so RAAus is in the clear there. The extra flight training wouldn't have made a material difference to his actions that day, judging by (accurate) reports on his attitude & risk appetite.

RAAus is in the #### because they lied to the Coroner. Then, from what I can read into the Coroner's report, they lied about lying to the Coroner and the presiding judge is a trifle miffed about that. And rightly so.

Finally on a different subject I note that GlenB is back:

glenb

Why would the Cohort mislead that it was "sold"

WHY WOULD THE CASA COHORT MISLEAD THE OMBUDSMAN INTO FORMING THE VIEW THAT I “SOLD” THE BUSINESS, WHEN TRUTHFULLY CASA CLOSED THE BUSINESS DOWN

The CASA Cohort misled the Ombudsman into believing that I "sold" the business, rather than recognizing that "CASA closed the business." This misrepresentation likely served multiple purposes, all aimed at covering up misconduct or preventing me from obtaining justice.

If CASA closes a business, they have specific procedures that must be followed to ensure procedural fairness, an appeals process, and adherence to administrative law. By misrepresenting that I sold the business, it appears as a commercial transaction, negating the need for an appeals process.

These two scenarios—an owner selling their business versus having it closed by CASA—require very different approaches. I am confident that the CASA Cohort successfully misled the Ombudsman, concealing the fact that CASA did not grant me the procedural fairness I was entitled to, thereby covering up associated misconduct. CASA operated outside its own procedures in cancelling, changing, or varying a previously issued approval.

Each of the involved CASA employees is fully aware of the proper procedures for closing a business and knew that these were not followed in my case. By falsely representing that I sold the business, they concealed the truth. It should be clear that CASA closed my business, yet there remains significant confusion within the Ombudsman’s office after six years.

This confusion, engineered by CASA, can be resolved through witness testimony. Misleading the Ombudsman to believe I sold the business served several purposes. It implied I received compensation, which was not the case, and obscured the reality that CASA closed my business down on June 30th, 2019.

This can be easily proven. I had an interim approval to operate that extended only to June 30th, 2019. If I was able to continue after that date CASA should be able to produce the document that permitted me to continue operations on the morning of July 1st, 2019, if such a document exists.

For clarity I assert that the CASA Cohort misled the Ombudsman into forming the view that the business was sold to conceal that fact that CASA closed down my business, and in misrepresenting it as a Sold business it concealed the fact that CASA had not adhered to their own stipulated procedures in their manuals when they close down a business.

Those procedures are intended to ensure that the affected person is afforded procedural fairness.

The entire five-year Ombudsman investigation made no assessment against CASAs own stipulated procedures in their manuals when they close down a business.

My expectation was that an Ombudsman investigation would have commenced with an assessment of the procedures CASA followed against the stipulated CASA procedures and any anomalies would be identified and addressed.

It appears that no assessment against these procedures was ever made throughout the investigation.
With the documents that I obtained under FOI that clearly indicate that the Ombudsman was misled into believing that I “sold” the business it has become clear that the Ombudsman made no assessment because the Ombudsman mistakenly formed the view that the business was sold., when it most clearly was not “sold” it was closed down by Mr Aleck.

MTF...P2

[Kharon]

“Among his many concerns, Coroner Paul Lawrie said it “beggars belief”

Australian Aviation author Naomi Nieilson has (at last) shone a small, but significant light on an event which could bring some significant changes to the RAAus three ring circus. In the center ring we find the Victoria Coroner and his findings into an event which claimed one life and an aircraft. The 'report' may be found and read -HERE-. I suggest starting at about 'item 127' and going through to about the high mid 200 series. Only my opinion from here – but the Coroner has (I believe) seen, ruled on and eloquently elaborated many of the 'private' concerns many have held since RAAus inception.

While the spotlight is on the centre ring, the Coroner remains without the support part of his troop. The research offered to support his findings is 'narrow'; there exists some 'complexities' which, being fully understood and scrutinised, could have presented the authorising body (CASA) with some fairly curly questions to answer. The probity of the RAAus answers to some questions has been allowed to 'slide' around the details related to the event pilot which, once again could have provided a more 'positive' set of findings and brought in the changes required to prevent a recurrence of what was almost a perfectly preventable event. But this was no 'accident' i.e. ” unexpected event, typically sudden in nature and associated with injury, loss, or harm”.

Given the publicly acknowledged 'nature & demeanor' of this pilot, some form of 'event' was more than likely; there was nothing 'sudden' about the event; the forecast was there, the weather conditions were clearly visible; the act of persisting into unfavorable conditions was deliberate. The 'question' for our Coroner is how was this person authorised to conduct the flight? How, is a bloody good question.

Should Ms. Neilson, CASA or the Coroner be 'interested' in ripping the artful 'band-aid' off this boil, I suggest (humbly) that they begin 'at the beginning', with some basic, difficult questions.. For example:- from Coroners para 31 - on (interesting).

“Mr Farrell had 257.5 hours of paragliding experience.”

TO SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVE THE SAFA PG2 LICENCE, YOU WILL NEED TO ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING:-

Minimum of 6 flying days.
Minimum of 30 flights (launch & landing) from at least 3 different flying sites.
3 soaring flights of at least 15 minutes duration OR 10 flights of at least 5 minutes duration.
1 high flight of above 500ft.

Vic ?@ p 33 =  "Mr Wood applied for Mr Farrell to be issued a Converting Pilot RPC for Group A (3-axis) aircraft on the basis of his paragliding experience and claiming flight training of 11.1 hours dual and 3.6 hours solo flight time in Group A aircraft."

Aye, all well and good until you try to decipher the tangled mess within the RAAus 'accepted' Operations Manual. It is a horrible buggers muddle (and I am qualified to say that); however; always remember that Farrell wanted a 'Class A' RPC for three axis aircraft.

Class A  3 axis aircraft (E.g. Jabiru). 
Class B weight shift.
Class C Combined control.
Class D powered para .

The individual (tailored) 'training' and 'testing' required depended on the basic level and type of experience presented. For example the holder of a CASA Recreational Pilots License (RPL) on VH aircraft can, with very little 'training' be granted a RAAus equivalent, having ticked all the CASA boxes. Farrell only had a background in 'Paragliding'. The 'manual' is difficult to navigate even for experienced RAAus instructors; so, if the following is incorrect I appologise; but, it does seem to me to be the 'right' road toward what Farrell wanted was avoided; or, at best mapped in error. With only 'paragliding' on the record; to qualify for a Recreation Pilot Certificate (RPC) to operate 'Cross Country' - in a three axis aircraft; the following criteria must be satisfied:-

“Minimum 10 hrs dual cross country /-2 solo cross country/examination/  +1 test flight for 3 axis Class A aircraft.”

I may well have that wrong – the manual is confusing; and I can easily imagine how an instructor (any instructor) could confuse the 'qualifications' presented against the 'requirements' of the manual. Again, if wrong I appologise.

The Coroner is IMO righteously miffed; the sin of attempting to varnish over an error is likely to create more anger than the 'sin' itself. IF (big one) the instructor was led astray and if the manual confused him as much as it did me (on one read) then the forgivable 'error' issuing of a certificate for navigation without the required training is much less heinous than trying to baffle the Coroner with Bull-shit and convoluted operating manual 'allowances'.

Mistakes happen; the 'system' utilised should be as bullet proof as possible; as simple as possible and as complete as possible. For example; had the manuals been constructed to 'classify' the presented 'experience' : say a Class D pilot (powered para gliders) then, the training and qualifying course should immediately follow that experience; fill in the 'gaps' and get the job done in one fell swoop. As you qualify as 'Type D' these are your minimum training requirements and the modules to complete them. End of...........

IMO, the performance in the Coroners court will/ can only produce more restrictive practices. RAAus should get ahead of the game; sort out the internal operational mess and show CASA and the Coroner that the 'errors' have been rectified. 'A stitch in time saves nine?

Apologies for Errors and Omissions etc. But. like most events, this was preventable (almost). Sometimes – Shit happens…....

Toot – toot.

[Peetwo]

CASA FOI (non-) Disclosure Log Update?? - 

In recent times CM and I had noticed that CASA FOI disclosure log had not been updated since around about July 2024. We also had the concern that the CASA FDL had changed its published format to no longer include links to the 'publicly' released documents - courtesy CASA FDL:

Removal of CASA FOI Disclosure Log Hyperlinks - 26 August 2024 - All emails and other internal correspondence, meeting minutes or other notes taken, relating to the decision to remove, and the implementation of the decision to remove, from the CASA FOI Disclosure Log, hyperlinks to copies of documents disclosed by CASA pursuant to the FOI Act. Partial Release - s47F

---

Enquiry
I note that the CASA FOI Disclosure log has recently been updated (from 6 March entry onwards) and reformatted.

Unfortunately the new format does not include links for the FOI publicly released documents and has omitted the previously released (prior to 26 February entry) PDF weblinks . In case this is an administrative oversight issue, would it possible for all the new entries to have their released documents PDF web linked?

If this is for some reason not possible, could you at least release the documents for the 6 March 2024 entry: " Reports relevant to CASA's restricting of technical staff since 2010; 2021 CASA APS Employee Census Results; 2023 CASA APS Employee Census Results; Psycho-social safety climate survey conducted by University of South Australia in 2019 for CASA; The Internal Audit Report EAP - Enterprise Aviation Processing; and the most recent interim ICAO report on CASA. Exemption(s) applied: Full release..",

Thank you in advance

P2

Maybe due to some of our protagonist activities, recently the administrators of the CASA FDL started to update and catch up with the CASA FDL back log - see HERE minus the hyperlinks.

Curious about some of the FDL entries I requested copies of what should now be publicly available documents. Finally after a month I got this reply:

OFFICIAL
CASA Ref: F25/1749

Dear P2,

I refer to your email of 10 February 2025, requesting access to the following documents that are published on CASA’s FOI Disclosure Log webpage:

Requesting copies of documents released under disclosure log entries:
1. F25/374 - CASR Part 43 and ICAO Annex 6 5 - February 2025
2. Surveillance and Safety Reports for N619SW (Boeing 737-3H4) -24 December 2024
3. CASA documentation regarding accident that took place on 4 July 2020 in Broome, WA - 2 July 2024
4. CASA advice to the Department of Infrastructure regarding Moorabbin Airport. - 28 June 2024

Please find attached the documents you have requested.

I apologise for the delay in providing you access to these documents.

Kind regards,


Amy George
Freedom of Information Officer
Advisory Section
Legal Services Branch
CASA – Legal, International and Regulatory Affairs

13 17 57
GPO Box 2005 CANBERRA ACT 2601
www.casa.gov.au

Anyway for those interested here are AP links for those released FOI documents:

1. https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...-FINAL.pdf
2. https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...cument.pdf
3. https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...-FINAL.pdf
4. https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...uments.pdf

 Hmm...creating hyperlinks, that took me all of about 2 minutes...  

MTF...P2   

PS: Please bombard Handy Andy and his minions with multiple requests for FDL documents...

[Peetwo]

April CASA BOLLOCKS: WTF? - Su_Spence reinvents SRPs...  

Via casa.gov.au:

Director of Aviation Safety, Pip Spence

Information is the lifeblood of today's world but it is particularly vital to safety-critical industries such as aviation.

Our industry has long mined the rich vein of data provided by aircraft and other systems to improve areas such as predictive maintenance, real-time monitoring, navigation and communication.

We've all read about how the vast amounts of data generated by modern jetliners have improved safety and costs by allowing operators and manufacturers to monitor aircraft health and address potential failures before they occur.

The need to collect and utilise data is also an imperative for modern regulators and we've been working to ensure Australia is ahead of the curve in this important area.

One way we're doing this is through our world-leading Airspace Risk Management System (ARMS), a computer-based quantitative risk modelling tool that is important to our oversight of, and our decision making in relation to, airspace that's attracting international interest.

Operational for about 3 years, ARMS allows us to use data to help inform our decision making rather than relying solely on a more subjective manual process.

Subject matter expertise remains an important part of the mix but by itself does not provide a complete risk picture. By its nature, it will always contain an element of subjectivity whereas a computer-based quantitative model is free from bias and gives us another perspective.

ARMS also replaces manual processing with automation that is quicker and more cost-effective.

Combining both analytics and human experience strongly increases our ability to make well-informed decisions around aviation safety.

ARMS determines risk by analysing the behaviour of air traffic - what aircraft are actually doing within airspace and how close they get to each other.

This means looking at variables such aircraft movements, aircraft types and speeds.

Crunching these numbers not only assists us with major airspace reviews involving bigger strategic pictures, such as the Pilbara and Ballina, but also allows us to tactically monitor specific locations.

If there's an aerodrome we think requires safety investigation, but we’re not sure, we can run an ARMS assessment to determine if further action is required.

We can also use the system to identify locations that may benefit from a safety review but which might not have been considered previously.

Although a big step forward, ARMS is still relatively new and continues to evolve as people use the system and identify additional risk modelling capability and we get access to more data.

Australia’s leading approach in this area has already attracted interest from our overseas counterparts and we have demonstrated ARMS to several national aviation authorities, including those from Canada and New Zealand.

ARMS is one of several areas where we’re building our data analysis capability, as well as improving transparency around our operations.

Over the last 18 months we have been publishing the data we on how long specific applications take to process, which we hope will help you understand what to expect.

The information we collect in our National Oversight Plan will be analysed and used to inform future decisions based on risk.

And as I’ve previously mentioned, we’re now publishing safety sector risk profiles (SSRPs) on our website for various sectors of the aviation community.

SSRPs group operators conducting the same or similar activities and identify current and emerging aviation safety issues, hazards and risks specific to each sector.

Our first SSRP meeting for 2025 took place with the business aviation sector in February and provided a valuable platform for operators and agencies to discuss the issues and risks business aviation is currently facing.

Data has always played a critical role in aviation safety but we believe programs such as ARMS and SSRPs will allow us to further harness the power of trends and statistics to make us all safer and better informed.

All the best,

Pip 

Hmm...SSRPs? Would that be like the SRPs that was originally vogue back in about 2013-2015 and especially when Skidmore was the CEO?

From 06:06 min:

And:

• Sector risk profile for the aerial mustering sector (PDF 416.62 KB)
  
• Sector risk profile for the aerial application sector (PDF 583.67 KB)
  
• Sector risk profile for the aerodrome sector (PDF 1.24 MB)
  
• Sector risk profile for the small aeroplane transport sector (PDF 911.92 KB)
  

 Hmm...but of course the Pup_Spence initiative is more techy and new age inspirational - FFS?? 

Extra hmm...funny how the Kiwis don't refer anywhere in their SRP methodology to the wonderful Ozzie ARMS:

Sector risk profiles

We monitor aviation safety performance and risk in line with international practice.

The risk profile we create for a sector will include:

the knowledge, experience, and perceptions of the sector
evidential data.

Profiles are sector-based because, while something like power lines might be a risk to agricultural operations, they're less of a risk to airlines.

How are sector risk profiles used?

Sector risk profiles help us target our actions and resources, but some risks are beyond our influence.

Their greatest value comes from the sector understanding and minimising the risks it faces.

Learn more about sector risk profiles in the video below:

About SRP projects

The approach

We'll engage the industry through workshops and surveys, identifying hazards and risks relevant to the sector. Further engagement between industry and we will identify risk owners and possible controls and treatments. This work will culminate in a treatment action plan that will assist ongoing continual improvement in safety of the sector.

Wider stakeholder engagement

In addition to Air Operator Certificate (AOC) holders, there are many stakeholders in the industry and the wider community with whom engagement is essential to a successful sector risk profiling exercise. We will work closely with these stakeholders to identify and understand the risks to the sector.

Safety benefits

The safety management system (SMS) rules require organisations to proactively identify hazards and associated risks, and then manage those risks to ensure the safety of their operations. The information gathered for the SRP will further support participants in determining which risks are relevant to their organisation and include them and any treatment in their day to day SMS.

Developing a SRP is also a valuable means of addressing some key safety issues that the Authority considers to be a priority for aviation in New Zealand, such as: loss of control in flight; runway excursions; airborne conflict; and Queenstown operations.

The SRP will support and enhance our risk-based approach to safety oversight. The risks identified through the SRP can be used to inform our future certification and surveillance activities, ensuring efficient and effective focus on areas of higher risk. The risks identified through the SRP may also provide an opportunity to initiate and inform 'theme-based' initiatives to improve sector safety.

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Request For Change - YCTM - RWY 34

Courtesy CM, via AP emails:

Hi Pip and Jonathan

I’m writing to you, directly, in an attempt to bring to an end some unnecessary risks created by CASA at Cootamundra aerodrome (YCTM). All it would take is the deletion of some words from ERSA, but that ostensibly simple outcome has proved difficult to achieve for a protracted period.

Subsequent to correspondence with CASA, the latest of which occurred on 25 March 25 (below), I have found out that the change to right hand circuits during hours of daylight (HJ) on runway (RWY) 34 at YCTM was the result of a thought bubble on the part of a CASA aerodrome inspector, Mr Iain Bailey. Mr Bailey apparently decided that the change was justified because of his perception of the risk of, and his perceptions of the consequences arising from, different pilots coming to different conclusions as to whether it is HJ or HN (hours of night) at the same location at the same point in time.

I bring to your attention the following points about that perceived risk and its perceived consequences, and the reality, all of which should have become obvious if a proper risk assessment had been conducted by competent persons before the change was made at YCTM.

First, the probability of pilots coming to different conclusions as to whether it is HJ or HN at the same location at the same point in time is remote, particularly so in the 21st century. The information is now literally at pilots’ fingertips via an EFB.

That remote probability then has to be multiplied by the probability of those pilots arriving in the same circuit area at the same time, then multiplied by the probability of those pilots being unaware of each other in the vicinity of a certified aerodrome in the vicinity of which carriage and use of serviceable radios are therefore required, all of which results in a very remote risk.

And in the event of that very remote risk becoming reality and even assuming the pilots choose to do a circuit for the same runway rather than a straight-in approach, which straight-in approach they can now do, irrespective of the mandated circuit direction, the outcome at YCTM – prior to the decision resulting from Mr Bailey’s thought bubble – would be that they end up on downwinds on opposite sides of the runway. One would be on a right downwind for RWY 34 (that pilot believing it’s HN) and the other would be on a left hand downwind for RWY 34 (that pilot believing it’s HJ), thus separating them by a substantial distance.

Then that very remote risk must be multiplied by the probability the pilots not seeing each other during their respective downwinds, nor during their base legs when they are ‘head to head’ at slow (flaps extended) speed. At least one of them thinks it’s HN, so at least one aircraft’s landing lights and strobes are on. (Or do we add ‘forgetting to turn on the landing and anticol lights’ and ‘failure of the landing light and anticol lights’, to the list of remote risks?)

All the while, the pilots are apparently oblivious to whether it is, in fact, HN or HJ where they are, in fact. Looking out the window has somehow escaped, or is been avoided by, the pilots.

All of those probabilities multiply to an infinitesimally small risk, which infinitesimally small risk is obvious to most pilots with a modicum of experience, including all of the pilots with whom I’ve discussed this issue. Our combined aeronautical experience adds up to centuries and tens of thousands of hours.

I understand Mr Bailey has around six thousand hours of ‘commercial experience’. However, I also understand that he has not flown as pilot in command at all in the last six or so years. I suggest that Mr Bailey may have either forgotten some of what he learnt during that commercial experience, or that his experience didn’t include many hours operating in and out of non-towered aerodromes around the end of civil daylight. I’m happy to stand corrected, of course.

I am not aware of any recorded accident or incident caused by pilots coming to different conclusions as to whether it is HJ rather than HN or vice versa at the same certified non-towered aerodrome at the same point in time. I would therefore welcome and read with keen interest any report of an investigation of that kind of incident.

Also obvious to experienced pilots are the risks created by CASA’s decision resulting from Mr Bailey’s thought bubble (even setting aside the infringing obstacle issue, to which issue I will return).

The first of those risks is that in circumstances of zero-to-little wind, it is possible - and common - for pilots to choose different runways. If one pilot chooses to use and join downwind for RWY 16 at YCTM and another chooses, at the same time, to use and join downwind for RWY 34, the outcome of Mr Bailey’s thought bubble is a high risk scenario: aircraft joining opposite downwinds ‘head to head’ at high speed, each being a stationary speck in the other’s windscreen. One is joining a right hand downwind for RWY 34 and the other is joining a left downwind for RWY 16. That risk would not arise if the circuit direction for each RWY were the ‘default’ left hand. It is true that there is a remote risk that the aircraft in this scenario would end up landing ‘head to head’, but in that event they end up at low speed on the runway before the potential collision. More time to ‘see and avoid’, and less damage if they don’t.

If the legitimate mitigators for that risk are the use of radio and see and avoid, they are legitimate mitigators for the risk arising from pilots coming to different conclusions as to whether it is HJ or HN at the same location at the same point in time. However, the substantial difference is that the probability of different pilots choosing different runways in circumstances of little-to-no wind is not remote whereas the probability of pilots coming to different conclusions as to whether it is HJ or HN at the same location at the same point in time is remote. The decision resulting from Mr Bailey’s thought bubble has therefore created at least one new risk with greater probabilities than the one perceived as justifying the change.

The circumstances which justified the imposition, decades ago, of the right hand circuit requirement HN on RWY 34 at YCTM have changed substantially. In fact, the circumstances have changed such that there is increased risk in right hand circuits on RWY 34 at YCTM HN (as well as HJ). This should have been identified in a proper and competent risk assessment.

There is no longer a ‘commuter airline’ operating noisy piston twins out of YCTM. They’re decades gone. The number of movements each night at YCTM can now be counted on the fingers of one hand, and usually on one finger of one hand or no fingers at all. Further, the few HN movements almost invariably involve a straight-in approach, because it is no longer mandatory to fly three legs of a circuit. (My first take-off and landing as a pilot at YCTM was 39 years ago. I now live in and operate out of YTCM, and monitor the CTAF and area frequencies. I know of what I speak.)

The absence of night movements is why the current operator of YCTM, the local council, has not expressed any concern about night time air traffic noise in the vicinity as would justify right hand circuits HN on RWY 34 on noise abatement grounds.

Further, and more importantly, the tallest and closest of the infringing obstacles in the vicinity of YCTM – the telecom tower – was erected after the imposition of the right hand circuit requirement on RWY 34 HN. It is on a bearing of 137 degrees magnetic at a distance of 2,411 metres from the ARP, and infringes the HZS by 185 feet. Only a little further away and not too much shorter is a radio tower on a bearing of 138 degrees magnetic at a distance of 2,457 metres from ARP, which tower infringes the HZS by 146 feet. Both of those obstacles are under or close to the right base leg for RWY 34. There are no infringing obstacles under or close to the left base leg for RWY 34. (At least my original REPCON on this issue apparently precipitated an overdue survey of the terrain and obstacles in the vicinity of YCTM.)

Those infringing obstacles pose little material risk HN, first because of the lack of traffic noted above, secondly because of the use of straight-in approaches by what little traffic there is, again as noted above and, thirdly, because the obstacles are illuminated and, therefore, very easy to see at night. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the removal of the requirement for right hand circuits HN on RWY 34 would move the tiny amount of traffic that might fly a circuit HN away from the only infringing obstacles in the vicinity of its base leg to an area where there are no infringing obstacles.

Mr Bailey apparently takes a different to view than I do, and a different view to every other experienced pilot with whom I’ve discussed the issue, as to the difficulty of spotting obstacles on the ground from the cockpit in the air HJ. It is true that the tallest and closest of the infringing obstacles in the vicinity of YCTM is really easy to spot from the ground during the day. The next closest obstacle is a little more difficult to see from the ground, but still obvious if one knows where to look. And the lights on their tops make them really easy to spot at night.

However, unless one knows that the obstacles are there, they can be difficult to spot during the day, depending on where the sun is, what the cloud conditions are and the way in and direction from which aircraft join the circuit. Further, it is impossible to see anything through an engine cowling or wing. (I’ll stand corrected on the last point if you inform me that Mr Bailey has x-ray vision.)

Further still, lots of pilots will assume – reasonably I suggest – that no competent safety regulator would deliberately make or allow circuit arrangements so as to concentrate descending traffic near the only infringing obstacles in the vicinity of an aerodrome, when an available alternative is the ‘default’ left hand circuits that would result in descending traffic

nowhere near any of the obstacles. (Though I do note that if any right hand circuit is justifiable on any valid grounds at YCTM, it would be on RWY 28. That would not only take its descending base away from the only infringing obstacles, it would also move the only runway downwind leg that is currently above the Cootamundra township to above farm paddocks instead.)

The pilot of a ‘low-performance aircraft’ doing a 500’ circuit, in accordance with CASA’s published guidance, in an aircraft fitted with an altimeter with VFR tolerances, would, I suspect, be surprised and perturbed to learn that someone in CASA decided it is okay to put the pilot on a potential collision course with infringing obstacles on a descending right base for a RWY, when there would be no potential for a collision with any infringing obstacles during a left base for that RWY. YCTM has an elevation of 1,110’. The top of the closest and tallest obstacle is under or near the right base leg of RWY 34. The radio tower nearby that obstacle is more difficult to see and only 41’ shorter. A ‘perfect’ 500’ above YCTM is 1,610’. That’s less than 200’ clearance above the top of tallest obstacle at 1,435’. And the aircraft’s altimeter could be up to 100’ wrong. That’s less than 100’ clearance above the tallest obstacle. And the aircraft could be descending.

Assuming I’m wrong about the difficulty in spotting the obstacles from the air HJ, and the obstacles are, in fact, obvious to all pilots in all circumstances, it does not follow that the obstacles do not pose any risk in any circumstances. Further and in any event, there is no logical or safety-based reason for concentrating traffic anywhere near those obstacles when there is a safer, available alternative in the form of left hand circuits.

What’s happened at YCTM is like prescribing a mandatory navigation route, for ships, across the shallowest water in a harbour, when the route could just as easily be across deeper water. It’s patently – I’m struggling for an adjective usable in polite correspondence, so I’ll opt for – silly.

There is a safety-based reason for the ‘default’ circuit direction being left hand, the corollary of which is that requiring right hand circuits entails, in and of itself, increased risk compared with left hand circuits. Many fixed wing aircraft have two seats in the front, and in most cases the pilot in command of those aircraft sits in the left hand seat. Left hand circuits give the pilots a better view of the manoeuvring area compared with right hand circuits. That is why Part 139 MOS says PAPI should be on the left side of a runway. That is why Part 139 MOS says a threshold wind indicator should be on the left side of a runway.

And those circumstances, among others, are why there should be a safety case supported by a risk assessment carried out by competent people, demonstrating that the reduction in safety inherent in a change to right circuits is outweighed by other considerations, before any decision to change to right circuits is made. My FOI request for access to documents relating to the change at YCTM did not result in the disclosure of any credible safety case or risk assessment in support of the change.

I note that there are many aerodromes at which the circuit direction HN is different to the circuit direction HJ. That fact is expressly acknowledged in CASA’s own advisory material. AC 91-10 v1.3 dated January 2025 notes at page 26:

“At many aerodromes, the circuit direction at night is different to the direction during the day. This is generally because of terrain, obstructions or noise abatement.”

If the potential for different pilots to make different decisions about when it’s HJ or HN at YCTM created risks so great that it justified the new risk of head-to-head downwinds HJ as well as concentrating descending traffic over the only infringing obstacles in the vicinity at YCTM, it would surely follow that the potential creates an unacceptable risk at all other non-towered aerodromes where the circuit direction HN is different to the direction HJ. Yet CASA has approved and is continuing to allow those circumstances to continue at many aerodromes. I am confident that those circumstances have been approved and continue because, among other reasons, the risk perceived by Mr Bailey is infinitesimally remote.

The outcome of CASA’s decision to require right hand circuits HJ on RWY 34 at YCTM is to create unnecessary risks, all of which could easily be avoided by a return to the simple, default rule which has a substantial safety basis. But I now learn that CASA expects to be provided with a risk assessment and justification before CASA will undo its decision. When the operator of the aerodrome issued a NOTAM in an attempt to undo the risks created by CASA, CASA quashed the NOTAM. This is Alice In Wonderland stuff. But pilots like me are put at risk in the real world.

CASA, alone, created unnecessary and avoidable risks at YCTM. And CASA, alone, is now prolonging the existence of those unnecessary and avoidable risks. You are now on actual notice of the circumstances.

Please just get some competent CASA officer/s to arrange for the deletion of a few words from the ERSA entry for YTCM, so as to clean up a mess created by CASA. Please.

I will be submitting another REPCON to ATSB on this issue because it is all a product of CASA’s corporate incompetence.

Regards

Clinton

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Popinjay slaps CASA with a wet lettuce?? -

Via the Oz:

CASA failed to investigate complaints of poor practices at charter operator before crash

The aviation safety regulator failed to properly investigate claims a West Australian charter operator was making its pilots fly unsafe aircraft, even after a serious crash.

The damning finding against the Civil Aviation Safety Authority is among several concerns identified by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau in its report on a Broome Aviation crash at Derby in 2023.

A young pilot was badly hurt when the Cessna 310R he was flying ran out of fuel 5km short of Derby Airport, and then crashed into bushland as he tried to land on a highway. His passenger escaped serious injury.

The final ATSB report found the pilot was not familiar with the aircraft’s relatively complex fuel system after transitioning from a Cessna 210 and getting little supervision or support from employer Broome Aviation.

Further findings were made that current and former pilots of the company had raised concerns about pressure not to report aircraft defects and to continue flying planes they considered unsafe.

A complaint of this nature was made to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority prior to the 2023 crash, but the ATSB found it was not properly investigated because no pilots were interviewed.

“On this occasion, it appears an important opportunity was missed,” said the ATSB report.



Two more complaints to CASA after the crash were similarly poorly handled, the report found.

“There were multiple pilots within the organisation who could have provided valuable insights given their extended time and familiarity with the operator,” the report said.

“Engaging with these individuals would have allowed CASA to gather a broader perspective and determine whether the reported organisational issues were systemic or simply reflective of dissatisfaction from potentially disgruntled former employees. As demonstrated during this investigation, there were widespread concerns about these matters within the pilot group.”

ATSB chief commissioner Angus Mitchell said findings against the regulator were not made lightly.

“It’s all very well to make findings in hindsight, and we look at how our findings are likely to lead to a safer system in the future, as opposed to just hammering a regulator because we found evidence to be critical,” said Mr Mitchell.

“We look for evidence that will lead to making recommendations that are going to have a safer system moving forward.”

The report also found CASA approved an interim head of flying operations at Broome Aviation six months before the crash, via an abbreviated assessment.

When the HOFO continued on in the role while doing the same job for another operator as well as working as a pilot, CASA did not conduct a full assessment.

“Those positions have some very distinct responsibilities around safety,” said Mr Mitchell.

“If you’re starting to split someone’s focus between flying and other duties and between organisations, then you start to compromise the integrity of what the HOFO is meant to be.”



Since the ATSB investigation, Broome Aviation had addressed the concerns around fuel management systems, training and supervision, and installed a permanent head of flying operations.

“CASA has also advised it will consider the issues of organisational pressure when it conducts its next surveillance event on the operator,” said the ATSB.

Mr Mitchell declined to comment on whether the ATSB’s findings suggested other charter flight businesses could be operating unsafely, with inadequate oversight by CASA.

“One of my roles is to instil confidence in the travelling public in that when things like this do raise their head, they are transparently investigated and reported on,” he said.

“That’s exactly what’s happened in this investigation, as difficult as that sometimes is when you’re investigating the actions of another government body.”

A CASA spokesman said the regulator was “reviewing the ATSB report in detail with a view to applying any relevant safety lessons”.

PJ media link: Operator, regulator oversight lacking prior to fuel mismanagement accident

Hmm...anyone else notice the common themes here?? 

References:  Su_Spence timeline of negligence and duplicity on Top End Robbo and Tourism Ops!! & Miniscule Dicky King weighs in on CASA ineptitude on Broome R44 fatal?? & Hubris and a blind eye. & AP Forum Weekly Wrap: 26/11/23

MTF...P2

[Sandy Reith]

Another change of the regulations which will include a number of new procedures that will be documented and incorporated into CASA approved operator manuals following some years of careful study should suffice. It will of course cost the operator considerable time to negotiate the appropriate wording and CASA’s fees for service will not be inconsiderable.

[Kharon]

The Broome Cup (a race to the bottom).

Oh, my giddy Aunt! - the article published by 'The Australian' – HERE – should be an embarrassment to the editors and publishers. Delicately bland, carefully avoiding any semblance of outrage or even condemnation. There is a mega story within which demands (insists even) a serious deep look at the background to what is, potentially a horror story. I shall, in my muddled way attempt to elaborate that, in the hope of the traveling, fare paying, tax paying, voting public  realise just how they are at risk and being not only deceived but ripped off.

Let us start with the ATSB and their 'report'.  Read it through if you must, but find the 'Findings' section and join the dots. Those 'findings' should provoke a shout of outrage. Why? Let me explain.

ATSB - “A CASA spokesman said the regulator was “reviewing the ATSB report in detail with a view to applying any relevant safety lessons”.

A classic 'taking the piss' response from CASA. Anyone who has paid attention has sat through multiple 'inquiries' investigations and Senate Estimates sessions will instantly translate that response to a great shout of BOLLOCKS!. Did even a multi million dollar 'inquiry' into the Pel Air ditching off Norfolk Island with almost 70 serious 'recommendations' change anything? - NO - not one Iota. So what chance do you reckon on the ATSB entry 'Lettuce Leaf' in the Broome Cup? I'll give you 100:: 1 and take your money.  But wait; there's more..

Sandy “Another change of the regulations which will include a number of new procedures that will be documented and incorporated into the CASA approved operator manuals following some years of careful study should suffice.”

If only that were true; alas. CASA 'accept' an Ops Manual; but not 'approve'. Provided the 'format' and legal liability (blame) boxes are ticked; CASA is off the hook. BUT – a big one: they do approve the HOFO (and other key crew). Provided the 'training and checking' parts of the manual tick the boxes all is well and CASA escapes the 'responsibility' hook again, with the bonus of 'Easy Prosecution' priced at 50::1 in the Broome Cup. That there is no investigation of the company 'practices' and no prosecution of the Operator or HOFO raises some doubts that 'Easy Prosecution' will enter the Broome Cup. The course side  speculation is that 'Liability Backfire' may enter the race could be causing some concern to the 'Easy Prosecution' connections. A caution here punters; both entries may be withdrawn; keep your slips.

By now, the reader is probably wondering where my marbles are; they're safe enough. Indulge me, I shall explain. The ATSB investigation remarks in the 'Finding' section individually indicate 'something' being out of square. That two CASA investigations 'ignored' the core issues and despite that, the whole circus was allowed, by CASA, to keep functioning begs but one question – WHY?

The 'background' of the junior pilots involved don't signify; some may hold a multi engine rating' others may not. It matters not; they are 'line pilots' licensed and qualified to fly the public for hire and reward. It is almost certain that they have little 'operational' experience in a commercial operation. That takes not only time, but guidance, patience and someone to talk to about the days work. Their mates need not apply; it has to be a 'senior' or better. This is 'important' as early mistakes can become normalised 'in silence'. In short, they need a 'confessor' and guidance. Now, the transition from a single engine aircraft the a multi engine aircraft is not difficult; BUT it must be 'managed' correctly particularly for the neophyte warrior. Habits of a lifetime can be formed during this phase – good and bad – and this is where 'proper' training and supervision enters the race. No one would put a loaded shot gun in the hands of a child; so why would you turn an  'aeronautical child' loose with a 2o86 kg aircraft, with up to five passengers and 133 + gallons (500 liters) of high octane fuel on board?  Of course not...

So what would be a 'sensible' training and checking regime for the 'new' to type junior. Bear in mind this takes two pilots out of the system, it is a direct cost to the operator and could mean a charter flight lost – so potentially expensive and 'annoying'. Not our problem is it. But lets sketch out a minimalist, practical approach, a compromise to spare the operator unnecessary expense.

Day `1 – Provide candidate pilot a set of 'Pilot Operating Notes' (POH) and a copy of a typical 'Flight Manual' (FM) and a copy of the Company Operating Manual; send him away to do the homework. Allow a week or even 10 days for a 'working' pilot; or, roster the pilot to charters with 'long' waiting times between departure and return. 

Briefing 1 – Company requirements and obligations. (two coffees)
Briefing 2 – Training program detail and expectations on completion. (One beer).
Briefing 3 – Systems operation; performance data extraction and calculations; flight and fuel planning. (Long day + two beers).
Briefing 4 – Company examination and debrief – paperwork complete.
Briefing 5 – Daily inspection, fuel uplift; flight details; check lists and finally; flying; soup to nuts. Satisfactory =sign off. Or, remedial training as required. ICUS time would be the perfect topping; couple of runs at least. (Not really optional).

Or, whatever the 'company' check training manual/ approvals decide is 'enough' training along with company type operating policy (fuel/oil/ temps. Etc) should be 'set in stone' – in the manual; and that is 'approved' by CASA as part of the C&T delegation. Pilots who ignore the Company mandates (SOP) then do so at their own peril; right along side of the company.

Poor company ethos; poor maintenance; poor training; poor SOP and poor directions on the management of a fuel system, one which demands careful management all led to the C 310 event. BUT the road which nearly ended in fire and coffins was clearly defined; early in the piece.

Ain't it great that CASA has deigned to accept a 'new' manual; that'll fix it all up; for certain sure.  (Certain Sure @ 120:1 on my tote board). Wonder what the response would have been; had the DAS decided on another jolly in the C310?

“Broome Aviation updated its operations manual to the new format exposition in response to Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) findings during a level 1 surveillance audit. It now outlines an in‑flight fuel management procedure.:” ATSB.

Stellar; fantastically proactive; bloody marvelous - and the Angels wept (5::1 odds on).

Toot – weary -toot...

[Peetwo]

The Su_Spence SAGA continues...

Courtesy CM, via the UP...

When our “system of aviation safety” produces and perpetuates the least safe option

---

When I learnt to fly in the mid-80s, there were some fundamental rules and priorities reinforced throughout the training. Those rules and priorities have their foundations in lessons learned from accidents and lives lost. They should be ‘taken as read’. They don’t need to be meddled with or obscured. That’s because, as with so many things in life, survival in aviation depends on being able to comprehend, focus on and mitigate the inbound 155mm howitzer round sized risks and not being distracted too much by the myriad marshmallow sized risks. (I don’t remember any ‘pledge’ during my training, though. It was more: If you don’t want to die, best to concentrate on … . But as part of my ‘learning journey’ I’ve resolved to take the ‘aviation safety pledge’ on the day that the first drone taxi with a passenger takes off from the first Vertiport in Australia.)

My apologies for the long post, but its length is a manifestation of Brandolini’s Law, otherwise known as the bull##### asymmetry: The time and resources it takes to undo bull##### is an order of magnitude greater than it took to create it.

The ‘default’ left hand circuit rule

One of the fundamentals reinforced throughout my training was the ‘default’ left hand circuit rule at what are now called ‘non-towered’ aerodromes. That rule is currently ‘enshrined’ in CASR 91.385. It’s now a bit different from when I learnt to fly, because the ‘default’ left hand rule now only applies after joining the circuit for a landing or while flying in the circuit after take off, whereas it used to apply even to turns joining the circuit. And now it’s not mandatory to fly at least 3 legs before landing.

As well as the safety benefits arising from consistency, of itself, there is a physical reason for the ‘default’ left rather than it being the result of a coin toss between right and left: Many fixed wing aircraft have two seats in the front and, in most of those aircraft, the PIC sits in the left seat. Left hand circuits give those PICs a better view of the manoeuvring area of the aerodrome. (For anyone who doesn’t understand the point: Think about what would happen if the side of the road on which we drive in Australia was changed to the right, but all our cars remained right hand drive.)

Therefore, there have to be substantial grounds – or at least there should be substantial grounds – like a safety case supported by the outcomes of a risk assessment on which to require right hand circuits, sufficient to outweigh and justify the corresponding inherent reduction in safety. Although requiring a right hand circuit on a runway will achieve consistency (assuming pilots are aware of and comply with the requirement if they’re turning in the circuit), it sacrifices the better visibility for many PICs and could entail further, new risks, depending on the specific circumstances.

That is why the decision has to be made – or at least should be made - by a person with the power to make, and therefore bearing responsibility for making, the decision to impose a requirement for right turns in a circuit.

Responsibility focusses one’s attention. And there has to be – or at least there should be – a clear record of that person’s decision and the basis of that person’s power to make it. ‘Back in my day’, there was a piece of squashed tree, signed by a human being, specifying the person’s name, citing the source of the person’s power to make the decision and stating, in black and white, what decision the person had made.

As a consequence of a protracted and ongoing tragi-comedy at Cootamundra (YCTM) – and other disconcerting circumstances that increasingly prevail in aviation - it appears to me that our “system of aviation safety” has deteriorated to the point at which decisions like turn directions in circuits are increasingly being made in a Monty Python-esque anarcho syndicalist commune where it’s not clear who actually makes the decision, when or why.

A bolt from the blue in our sleepy hollow

Welcome to YCTM, one of the many Australian aerodromes steeped in rich aviation history. Part of that was a locally-based ‘commuter’ airline running noisy piston twins.

Right hand circuits were directed for YCTM’s RWY 34 at night (HN). There’s rising terrain to both the east and west, and back then the township was concentrated almost entirely to the southwest of the aerodrome. Right hand circuits HN on RWY 34 kept the noisy twins away from above the centre of the township and the rising terrain to the west and southwest of the town at night. And everyone was happy.

Right hand circuits HN on RWY 34 YCTM was a typical example of the kind of circumstances referred to in the note on page 26 of AC 91-10 v 1.3 – the current version published by CASA as at the date of this post: “At many aerodromes, the circuit direction at night is different to the direction during the day. This is generally because of terrain, obstructions or noise abatement.” None of that is rocket surgery.

Decades after the imposition of the requirement for right hand circuits HN on RWY 34, YCTM has – like many country aerodromes – become very quiet. The ‘commuter’ airline is long gone. The amount of HN traffic can usually be counted on the fingers of one finger or no fingers at all. And now that straight-ins are legal, what little HN traffic there is rarely does a circuit. The requirement for right hand turns in the RWY 34 circuit HN is therefore of almost no practical contemporary consequence, either safety-wise or noise abatement-wise. (I should note here that my first touch and go at YCTM was in the mid-80s and I now live here and monitor the CTAF and area frequencies to the east and west.)

Then a ‘bolt out of the blue’ around a year ago: The ERSA entry for YCTM was amended to require right hand circuits on RWY 34 during daylight hours (HJ) as well as HN. All of us locals had a whisky tango foxtrot moment. Who came up with that idea, and why?

Who’s responsible?

My attempts at getting a clear answer to the questions “who” and “why” quickly bogged down. I asked those questions of CASA, who effectively pointed at the aerodrome operator, but the aerodrome operator pointed at CASA.
I made an FOI request for the instrument – surely there’d be a piece of paper – signed by a delegate of CASA’s power – surely it’s CASA’s power – recording that individual’s exercise of that power so as to require right turns in the RWY 34 circuit HJ. But that request appeared not to make sense to CASA’s FOI officer. (I’m not criticising CASA’s FOI officers. They have always been very efficient and professional in response to my FOI requests.)

I changed the request to any documents with any relevance to right hand circuits in the last couple of years. The returned documents left me none-the-wiser as to what individual made the decision or that person’s reasons for it. But the documents did reveal one astonishing circumstance: The aerodrome operator had, as a consequence of us locals pointing out the risks that had been created by the change and a REPCON I submitted to ATSB, put out a NOTAM in an attempt to effectively reverse the decision, but CASA quashed the NOTAM!

Cue the Monty Python Flying Circus theme music

For a while, us locals speculated that the change may have been purportedly justified on noise abatement grounds, but subsequent events and intel I’ve gathered reveal this Python-esque course of events that explains how stuff makes it into AIP these days:

Someone who’s apparently a CASA Aerodrome Inspector – a Mr Iain Bailey - had what I can only describe as a thought bubble. His thought bubble was that there is a material risk of pilots coming to different conclusions as to whether it is HJ or HN at the same time at the same location, and that risk – according to Mr Bailey - created a safety risk at YCTM because RWY 34 was right hand only HN. Mr Bailey had a further thought bubble as to how to mitigate the safety risk he perceived: Require right hand turns in the circuit HJ as well as HN on RWY 34.

Mr Bailey apparently put those risks and the mitigation to the aerodrome operator, whose personnel have no aeronautical experience and who therefore assumed – reasonably – that Mr Bailey’s thought bubbles were the product of competent analyses of the objective facts and operational risks, and the aerodrome operator ‘requested’ a change that was, in fact, Mr Bailey’s proposed solution to a problem perceived by Mr Bailey.

Let’s assume, for a moment, that the safety risk perceived by Mr Bailey is a material one.

The immediate questions that would have jumped to my mind would have been: First, why was that risk created and allowed to exist for decades at YCTM and the “many” other aerodromes, referred to in AC 91-10, at which “the circuit direction at night is different to the direction during the day”? Was there some recent change such as to render pilots, in the vicinity of YCTM, more likely to come to different conclusions about when daylight ends and begins and more likely not to hear or see each other while one of them has mistaken daylight for darkness or vice versa? The objective answer to the latter question is: No.

I’d therefore have to consider the possibility that all those aerodromes referred to in the note I quoted from AC 91-10 are a safety timebomb waiting to explode around the beginning or end of daylight, and that perhaps YCTM has been lucky enough to have been saved.

Therefore the next question that would have jumped to my mind would have been: What would the worst possible outcome be in the event that two pilots do, in fact, come to different conclusions as to whether it is HJ or HN at the same time and place where their chosen RWY has left hand circuits HJ and right hand circuits HN? Assuming they decide to fly a circuit rather than doing a straight-in (the latter option being available irrespective of the circuit direction and whether it’s HJ or HN), I would have thought they end up on downwind on opposite sides of the RWY. One is on a right hand downwind, believing it’s HN and the other is on a left hand downwind, believing it’s HJ. That does not strike me as being a particularly dangerous situation.

Then they turn head-head-on base, but that’s at ‘low’ speed with flaps out and at least one of them is lit up like a Christmas tree because the pilot of one of the aircraft believes it’s HN. Or they join the circuit on head-to-head base legs, but still at ‘low’ speed with flaps out and at least one of them is lit up like a Christmas tree. Yet neither pilot hears or sees the other aircraft during any of this? (At this point I’m thinking of the Ministry for Silly Walks sketch.)

The next question that would have jumped to my mind would have been: Would requiring right hand turns on RWY 34 HJ create any new risks? The objective answer to that question is: Yes. First, there’s the increased risk inherent in the change (the fundamental basis of the ‘default’ left turn rule). Secondly and more importantly, it creates the new risk of the most dangerous of scenarios: pilots choosing opposite direction runways in nil-to-little wind situations, ending up head-to-head at high speed on opposite downwinds HJ – one right hand for 34 and the other left hand for 16 - with each being a stationary speck in the other’s windscreen. (That scenario highlights another safety benefit of the default rule: If different pilots choose opposite direction runways in nil-to-little wind conditions but choose to fly a circuit and comply with the default rule, they won’t end up head-to-head at high speed on opposite direction downwinds or crosswinds.)

The final question that would have jumped to my mind would have been: What new risks would arise if the requirement for right hand turns in the circuit on RWY 34 HN was revoked and the default rule prevailed 24/7? If the answer to that question were no new risks, the mitigation of the risk of and arising from pilots coming to different conclusions as to whether it is HJ or HN becomes pretty obvious: revert to the default rule HN and HJ.

Isn’t the existence and location of any infringing obstacles relevant to the decision as to the required circuit direction?

Perhaps it was pure coincidence but, after I submitted my REPCON about the increased risks created by the change to right hand circuits HJ on RWY 34, a NOTAM was promulgated which identified and detailed all of the infringing obstacles in the vicinity of YCTM. And the closest and tallest of the identified obstacles are under or close to a right base leg for RWY 34. In contrast, no infringing obstacles were identified under or near a left base leg for RWY 34.

None of the identified infringing obstacles is marked on any aeronautical chart. And they’re not mere bushes infringing by a mere 4’, per the infamous YSSY NOTAM. The two closest obstacles infringe by 185’ and 146’ respectively and are within the circuit area.

The closest, tallest and most infringing of the obstacles is a cell tower/digital TV tower erected on a hill in the circuit area long after the ‘commuter’ airline operating out of YCTM went defunct. That tower presents only a remote risk to the rare HN traffic at YCTM, given that it and the nearby infringing radio tower are illuminated and very easy to spot at night from the air. It’s not so easy to spot them from the air during the day in some circumstances, and impossible to see if there’s an engine cowl or wing in the way. But that wasn’t much of a problem when 34 was left hand HJ.

That’s why us locals had the whiskey tango foxtrot moment when the change to right hand circuits on 34 HJ came out of the blue. But we’re not most ‘at risk’, precisely because we know about all the obstacles. The most ‘at risk’ are ‘outsiders’ who, when flying in, make the reasonable assumption that no “system of aviation safety” would deliberately concentrate circuit traffic over the only infringing obstacles in the circuit area when there were available and safer alternatives and, in any event, infringing obstacles like comms towers in the circuit area would be marked on aeronautical charts.

Are objective facts and risks affected by a popularity contest?

Another result of the REPCON was that the aerodrome operator then consulted local operators about the change. Although I’m not criticising the aerodrome operator’s personnel, as they were merely being pulled from pillar to post, the concept of consulting about these kinds of changes is surreally silly. The objective facts and risks are what they are, unaffected by a popular vote or personal opinions.

Infringing obstacles are where they are and are the height they are, and are as easy or difficult to spot as they are in different circumstances, despite any consensus or disagreement otherwise. Risks inherent in right hand circuits rather than left hand circuits are what they are. The risk of pilots coming to different conclusions as to whether it is HJ or HN at the same time at YCTM are what they are. The risks of pilots choosing opposite direction runways in nil-to-little wind situations, ending up head-to-head at high speed on opposite direction downwinds HJ are what they are. Noise is either a problem or it isn’t and, if it is, it’s either solvable by a change in circuit direction or it isn’t. (As it turned out, and unsurprisingly to me, the consensus of those consulted by the aerodrome operator– with combined aeronautical experience of centuries and tens of thousands of hours - was contrary to the thought bubbles. That’s what led to the aerodrome operator issuing the NOTAM trying to address the risks, which NOTAM was quashed by CASA.)

ERSA was then subject to the usual amendment cycle. The obstacle data from the NOTAM was incorporated into the ERSA entry for YCTM but the requirement for right hand circuits on RWY 34 HJ and HN remained. When I asked CASA what was going on, I was told CASA was waiting for “a data item” from the aerodrome operator.

Please provide a risk assessment to undo a change that was not supported by a risk assessment

The aerodrome operator then revealed to local users that CASA had asked the aerodrome operator for a risk assessment to remove the right hand circuit requirement! That was, apparently, the ‘data item’ for which CASA was waiting before it would change the circuit direction text in the YCTM ERSA. The aerodrome operator asked local users how to do the risk assessment because the aerodrome operator does not have the operational expertise to do that assessment. (And for that request the aerodrome operator is to be commended. But I note that the circumstances are a demonstration of the fact that the Part 139 and Part 175 provisions about the qualifications and competence of aerodrome operator personnel and aeronautical information originators are practically meaningless.)

Then a meeting occurred between Mr Bailey, aerodrome operator representatives and user representatives, at which the aerodrome operator made clear that right hand circuits on RWY 34 were not its idea and weren’t required for noise abatement reasons and the local user representatives made clear their safety concerns about the prevailing, new arrangements. But Mr Bailey defended those arrangements and invited a written submission to him as to why they should be changed.

Pause here to ponder the surreal silliness of the course of events.

The new requirement for right hand circuits on RWY 34 HJ was pressed on the aerodrome operator by CASA, without any risk assessment having been done and documented by CASA or the aerodrome operator. CASA then attributed the change to the aerodrome operator because the aerodrome operator had requested it, but the aerodrome operator had actually been pressed by CASA to make the request. When the risks arising from the change became evident to the aerodrome operator and the aerodrome operator tried to do something about it, CASA thwarted those attempts and is now perpetuating the new requirement on the basis that the aerodrome operator has not done and submitted a risk assessment to CASA, which risk assessment the aerodrome operator is not competent to conduct. During this ‘process’ a popularity contest was run and the new arrangements lost, but that outcome is objectively and practically irrelevant.

And Mr Bailey continues to defend the change as a good idea.

You could not make this stuff up.

My thoughts on what a competent risk assessment would have identified

I reckon that had a competent risk assessment been done, it would have identified that:

- Left hand circuits for fixed wing aircraft are generally inherently safer than right hand. (Hence the default rule and why there should be a safety case supported by a competent risk assessment to justify any departures from that rule.)
- Not only did the justification for the original HN right hand circuit requirement on RWY 34 YCTM no longer exist, infringing obstacles had subsequently been erected under or close to the right base leg for RWY 34. Changing to the default left hand circuits HN (and leaving it the default left hand HJ) would move the tiny amount of HN RWY 34 circuit traffic away from those obstacles.
- The infringing obstacles in the YCTM circuit area are not marked on any aeronautical chart.
- An aircraft maintaining a perfect 500’ above YCTM aerodrome – the circuit height expressly recommended in CASA advisory material for ‘low performance’ aircraft - would be less than 200’ above the top of the closest and tallest of the infringing obstacles. Changing to the default left hand circuits HN on RWY 34 and leaving it left hand HJ would not only move the tiny amount of HN circuit traffic away from those obstacles, it would keep HJ aircraft with ‘less than perfect’ altitude management and altimeters away from those obstacles while descending on base for 34.
- Right hand circuits on 34 HJ and left hand circuits on 16 HJ would create the new risk of the most dangerous of scenarios: pilots choosing opposite direction runways in nil-to-little wind situations, ending up head-to-head at high speed on opposite downwinds HJ, with each being a stationary speck in the other’s windscreen. Leaving RWY 34 left hand HJ would avoid creating that new risk.
- Obstacles on the ground can be difficult to spot from the air HJ, because they are sometimes obscured by ground clutter and, in any event, are impossible to see through an engine cowling or wing. Changing to the default left hand circuits HN on RWY 34 and leaving it left hand HJ would move or keep traffic descending on base for RWY 34 away from those obstacles, thus mitigating the risk of the obstacles being difficult to spot or impossible to see from the air.
- There are no infringing obstacles under or near a left base leg for RWY 34. Thus, changing to the default left hand circuits HN and leaving it left hand HJ on RWY 34 would not put aircraft descending on base nearer to any infringing obstacles.
- The probabilities of pilots coming to different conclusions as to whether it’s HJ or HN at the same time at the same aerodrome, multiplied by the probabilities of neither hearing nor seeing the other at all, results in extraordinarily remote probabilities. How many reported accidents or incidents have been caused by those differing conclusions? Unable to find one. [Every experienced pilot with whom I’ve discussed the HJ/HN different conclusions thought bubble risk considers it to be – expletives deleted - laughable. It’s a marshmallow sized risk.]
- Assuming instead that Mr Bailey is correct and the risk of and arising from pilots coming to different conclusions as to whether it’s HJ or HN at the same time at the same aerodrome is material, changing to the default left hand circuit HN and leaving it left hand HJ on RWY 34 at YCTM would mitigate that risk without creating any new ones. If the default rule applied day and night, different conclusions from different pilots about whether it is night or day at the same time at the same place would make no difference to the required turn direction in the circuit. It would either be left or … left.

(I think that a competent risk assessment would also conclude that the only YCTM runway for which a departure from the default rule may be justified is RWY 28. Requiring right hand turns in the RWY 28 circuit would move its base leg away from the infringing obstacles and move its downwind leg away from above the township over to the farm paddocks on the northern side of the aerodrome. But maybe the ‘head-to-head’ downwind risk RWY 10/28 would outweigh the benefits. Someone with expertise should turn their mind to these matters.)

I’d welcome any feedback as to any mistakes I’ve made as to facts and logic. Maybe I’ve overlooked some glaringly obvious factor that makes sensible an outcome that seems patently absurd to me. Or maybe the purported justification for the change is just a smokescreen for some other agenda but, as they say, if you have to make a choice between a conspiracy and incompetence, pick incompetence.

Where we are at: The least safe option

CASA has implemented the least safe option and CASA is the reason it remains in place. The wrong mitigation has been applied to a marshmallow sized risk, thereby unnecessarily creating a new, bigger risk.

The safer and simplest option is the default rule.

As I said in my most recent email to CASA on this subject, it’s like the maritime safety regulator knowingly mandating a shipping lane that concentrates traffic over the shallowest water in a harbour instead of an available deeper route with no disadvantages. What competent maritime safety regulator would do that? And maybe it would be a good idea to get the submerged rocks marked on the nautical charts?

Post script – maybe none of this matters?

These days I’m frequently forced to confront the possibility that none of this really matters. After the change at YCTM, plenty of traffic continued to do left hand circuits on RWY 34 HJ, the pilots evidently blissfully unaware of the change. And an increasing number of pilots take the view that they are allowed to do a turn in the circuit contrary to whatever requirement applies, simply by announcing what they’ve decided to do.

The latter phenomenon particularly fascinates me. It seems to me to be something that is deliberately trained these days and must, therefore, be contained in training documentation given the smiley face of approval by CASA or observed by CASA in its surveillance activities. But I’m yet to find the regulatory provision that authorises the practice, unless it’s in circumstances of extreme weather or other unavoidable cause. In the case of turns in the circuit, there are some exceptions ‘built into’ CASR 91.385, but I can’t find the one covering all turns that a pilot happens to announce. (I might give this a go some time: I’ll announce on the Cootamundra Matters Facebook page that I’m doing a ‘non-standard’ approach to the Woolies carpark by driving down the right hand side of main street and entering the carpark though the exit. I guess the police will be fine with that if there happens to be nobody coming the other way during my approach.)

I used to think that avoiding approach points on departure from a GAAP – sorry, ‘Metropolitan Class D’ – was a fundamental rule, but apparently departures via The Oaks were (remain?) SOP at YSCN.

When I asked CASA whether the ERSA entry for YOAS: “All CCT to W of AD”, was an instruction requiring and therefore authorising right hand turns in the RWY 18 YOAS circuit, I did not understand the answer I was given. Silence remains the stern reply to my supplementary question to CASA: “Is that a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’?” Ditto my supplementary question as to where an aerodrome operator derives any power to decide what the rules are in the air above and in the vicinity of the aerodrome. I always thought that that was CASA’s power and therefore responsibility.

Every time I pop into YCWR these days I just shrug and laugh at this chronic nonsense in ERSA: “RWS not AVBL for TKOF or LDG”. That’s the product of the incompetent leading the unqualified, but most pilots evidently don’t realise that those words technically mean that you’re not allowed to land or take off anywhere inside the 90 metre wide RWS which, by definition, includes the RWY. I therefore suppose the words don’t really matter and it’s OK to load up ERSA with whoever’s thought bubbles inflate from time to time.

VFR “departure calls” on CTAF? If this is a manifestation of being “professional” – per The Pledge – then please be really “professional” and give your departure call on the Area frequency where Centre will hear you. If it’s about safety, Centre should be able to hear your departure call, shouldn’t they, because Centre’s knowledge of your existence and intentions will add safety to your flight, won’t it?

Perhaps the relatively-recent spate of mid-airs is just the result of random chance rather than any loss of focus on fundamental rules and priorities during training and subsequent reviews. And maybe there’s been no loss of corporate competence in CASA. ATSB evidently thinks so, given the frequency with which it chooses not to investigate ‘light aircraft’ accidents. But then I can’t help asking myself: Given that the ATSB, like CASA, is part of the system of aviation safety, who has the competence and responsibility for reviewing whether ATSB’s decisions are objectively justified?

Yours in aviation safety.

You can visit the UP thread - HERE - to see the commentary/posts that followed...

MTF...P2

[Kharon]

Choc Frog Post.

Bravo Clinton; nicely done. Could this epistle possibly be the 'thin end of the wedge' – it certainly should be. It is said that Nero played a lyre while Rome burned; it ain't historically true. However. It will become factually quoted as it was Spence who sat fiddling while Aviation burned; fiddling and tweaking stupid notions like the 'pledge' etc (long list available).

CM - “And an increasing number of pilots take the view that they are allowed to do a turn in the circuit contrary to whatever requirement applies, simply by announcing what they’ve decided to do.”

CM The latter phenomenon particularly fascinates me.

Yeah, me too, like being fascinated by a brown snake in my boot; the same shiver of fear result in both cases.

CM I’ll announce on the Cootamundra Matters Facebook page that I’m doing a ‘non-standard’ approach to the Woolies car-park by driving down the right hand side of main street and entering the car-park though the exit. (I guess the police will be fine with that if there happens to be nobody coming the other way during my approach.)

Without referring to the log books; I can remember (clearly) some 'Brown snake' moments directly related to this phenomenon, usually IMO by folk with zero 'situational awareness'. The episode which immediately comes to mind is a classic and thankfully, a once in a career event, but it is pertinent. An hour after sunrise, on descent from flight levels. heading directly into the sun, 5/8 Sc to roll through- no problem. Then the radio crackles into life. There are nine (9) aircraft planning a group take off announced the lead aircraft: then each aircraft announced their 'tracking' airborne; some left - some right -So far so good I thought as I indicated my intentions, gave them plenty of wiggle room. No acknowledgement transmitted. They 'rolled' and staggered off, then : 'Old Mates' wheels failed to retract; by this time, I'm descending in cloud, (1500 fpm @ 220 KIAS)  blinded by the sunlight and these Bozo's scattered - left and right - to find Old Mate and 'assist' in escorting him back to the field. Radio chaos - completed the script. To this day I've no idea how close I came to any of 'em. Broke cloud and 'parked up' out of the way until they were all back on the deck, turned in and landed.

The point I'm struggling to make is that if you go 'non standard' sooner or later another Mutt exercising a self allocated 'right to freedom' may be doing the opposite. For many, many years, standard calls have worked just fine; as has departing straight ahead or by a leg of the circuit; those on approach can then arrange descent and tracking to avoid conflict. Why complicate a sensible, time proven system. ATC need to know early to pass on traffic to inbound; outbound need to know where the opposition is and their intentions. Only CASA could make such a Balls up possible. Situational awareness is good; forewarned situational awareness is much, much better. For a scary situation can develop so very easily and so quickly when 'non standard' stuff rears it's head. Not a great fan of 'tall' things on the approach path either. when a sane situation is available. There are two Jokers in every pack of cards; mostly removed for sake of peace and harmony. Perhaps CASA could consider their pack, before the game is dealt? Just saying.

Toot - toot.