[Sandy Reith]

With the deepest respect it’s obvious that people don’t have understanding that these are complex issues that have to rescoped in time frames that give consideration to a number of industry inputs about the consultative process and the combination of competing priorities.

Or straight from the over staffed CASA Obfuscation and Clever Drivel Section, earlier this year:-

“ This project is being rescoped due to a range of dependencies identified through the preparation of the Part 103 MOS which need to be resolved before this issue can be addressed," CASA has stated. "Benefit date is contingent on the finalising of the Part 103 MOS, expected to be February 2023."

Policy concerns have delayed new pathways for task-specialist pilot endorsements, less onerous maintenance licensing for light aircraft and CASR Part 43 maintenance regulations.

Reforms to CASR Part 103 recreational and sport aviation have been delayed by "competing priorities and availability of staff and industry representative."

Range of dependencies! Task specialists and availability of ..industry representative.

Put one’s eyeballs back in and start breathing again, relax, I’ll interpret for anyone new to the longest and sadest game in Can’tberra.

“We are not going to make a decision.”

[Peetwo]

CASA FUBAR: Regulatory oversight of our National Aerial Firefighting capability?? -     

To begin our tale of intrigue and passing strange coincidences, let us first set the scene to the beginning of 2020 just after the worst of the 2019-20 bushfires and in the lead up to the 'Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements' - via the other Aunty's YouTube channel: 

74,435 views  Jan 17, 2020

Despite early warnings of a catastrophic fire season, authorities are still scrambling to get extra water bombing aircraft to Australia. Four jet water bombers called up by the Prime Minister are stuck overseas, unable to fly because of tornadoes and volcanic ash.

Smaller water-scooping planes are grounded in Canada, iced in for the winter.

Some firefighters argue that extra aerial support could have made a big difference earlier in this bushfire disaster, and that Australia should buy its own water bombing fleet rather than leasing aircraft from overseas.

Statement from a Government spokesperson: https://www.documentcloud.org/documen...

Ok...so let's kick the timeline off as we know it so far...

At the beginning of 2020 ( IE during the Black Summer bushfires) the Morrison Government was under extreme pressure  to address the highlighted shortfalls (ABC article above) in our National Aerial Firefighting capability.

Some of the timeline of political and bureaucratic pressure this created within Aviation House was reported on within the regulator's 2019-20 Annual Report:

     Urgent approvals for firefighting aircraft

On 4 January 2020, as Australia grappled with a devastating bushfire season, the Prime Minister announced that the Government was preparing to lease additional waterbombing aircraft for the states and territories to deploy in firefighting efforts.

The additional units would comprise two long-range fixed-wing aircraft (DC-10s) with 36,000 litres capacity, and two medium-range fixed-wing large air tankers with 11,000 litres capacity.

From 5 January, under the coordination of the Southern Region office, CASA teams across the country worked together to provide urgent approvals for the firefighting aircraft.

Once the operators of the aircraft had been confirmed, CASA commenced preparations for the entry control process. This involved providing an air operator certificate variation for AGAIR Pty Ltd, to add two DC-10s, and an air operator certificate renewal for Erickson Aero Tankers Australia LLC, to include up to five DC-9-87 aircraft. CASA concurrently processed applications for the addition of a C525 Citation and a B200 King Air aircraft to be flown by specialist pilots from the United States.

Civil Aviation Act 1988 section 28A agreements with the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) were completed within 48 hours. These agreements are formalised jurisdictional arrangements for maintenance and flying operations.

Other authorisations issued or continued included air operator certificates for two operators, Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) Part 137 exemptions for the use of transport category aircraft in aerial application operations, exemptions from licensing requirements of CASR Part 61 for FAA pilots, chief pilot approvals, and flight check system approvals for the DC-9 and DC-10 aircraft.

CASA also processed training and checking approvals, for three type specialists for the DC-10 to support the AGAIR chief pilot responsibilities, and certificates of validation for FAA-licensed pilots to operate the Australian (lead plane) aircraft.

The last permissions were issued as the aircraft began their transit from the United States on 16 January.

CASA had handled a similar high-priority task in November 2019, when the first DC-10 air tanker was requested by the New South Wales Rural Fire Service. The aircraft authorisations, including the FAA agreement, were in place within five working days.

CASA actively supported aerial firefighting efforts across the country in the summer of 2019–20. It assessed and approved 19 operators to use 58 foreign aircraft in Australia including two DC-9s and two DC-10s, two B737 air tankers, a Black Hawk and a Russian Kazan MIL-8 helicopter.

The ability to work directly across the various divisions within CASA resulted in huge efficiencies in communication and workflow, despite the active workload demands each day.

     
With that in mind, next significant event on our timeline was the tragic crash of the Coulson C130 near Peak View, New South Wales, on 23 January 2020:

Despite the serious safety issues and deficiencies discovered in the course of the ATSB accident investigation - see HERE - the CASA Executive Management (which included at the time Graeme Crawford, former Group Executive Manager Aviation and former Regulatory Oversight Executive Manager, Craig Martin) swayed to political pressure to award a complex Australian AOC to Coulson Aviation in world record time for our regulator - here is the current version of the CAA AAOC:



Still trying to discover the exact date the AAOC was issued but from the following links/references it would have to have been in the tail end of 2020- via Airmed & Rescue: https://www.airmedandrescue.com/sites/de...k=TmJ2MvFf

Coulson Aviation has officially welcomed two new pilots to its team

Nathan Soster from Mittagong, NSW is the company’s new Chief Rotary Wing Pilot and Martyn Heyne from Sunbury, Victoria is the new Chief Fixed-Wing Pilot.

Nathan joins Coulson Aviation with an extensive 20-year career in aviation as a pilot mostly in the utility and airwork sector with widespread knowledge in aviation land management tasks such as prescribed and wildland firefighting, longline experience, and even in the past, time as a mechanical engineer. Martyn joins the company with over 30 years of experience in aviation, from flight instructor to training captain, fleet manager, auditing air operators and an extensive career as first officer and captain with several commercial airlines.

Interesting fact is that Heyne only lasted 7 months at CAA - extract from Linkedin:

Chief Pilot / Head of Training and Checking
RFS - NSW · Full-time
May 2020 - Nov 2020 · 7 mos
Richmond, NSW

Project management for AOC introduction for B737 and C560 aircraft. Completed Check and Training Manual as well as developed training programs and standards and benchmark development

Note: It is bizarre that MH does not even acknowledge that he was employed by Coulson...

In the context of the regulator issuing the CAA AOC in world record time, it should also be remembered that in the course of 2020 CASA put forward their draft CASR Part 138 MOS for consultation. This was the former 4As CEO Phil Hurst's take on that proposed legislation: https://aaaa.org.au/?mdocs-file=1233

AAAA Overall Response to the Part 138 MOS

AAAA completely rejects the Part 138 MOS and the existing regulations as unfit for
purpose.

The proposed MOS is particularly rejected as unworkable, costly, and a severe
regulatory overreach that is clearly additional significant regulation by stealth. It is
overly complex and seeks to micro-manage businesses and risk management
processes while ignoring existing risk controls and obviously simpler approaches.

The MOS and the regulations maintain a cool detachment from safety and instead
focus on byzantine approaches to limiting the ability of aviation companies to
manage themselves, their staff and their risks.

It is not clear what ‘problems’ CASA seeks to remedy with this detailed, complex and
highly prescriptive approach that creates a number of new requirements that are not
directly relevant to the safe operation of the aircraft or the conduct of the operation.

The current relatively simple system has not resulted in any upswing of accidents
that would warrant such a draconian regulatory response.

This is a clear case of regulatory overreach, prescription versus outcome and a lack
of understanding of the operation and the context.

As we all now know, despite the protestations of Alphabet associations like the 4As, the CASR Part 138 MOS was officially promulgated on the 29 October 2020 with little to no change...

In somewhat of a coincidence the day before the part 138 MOS was tabled the Bush Fire RC Commissioner Chair (soon to be CASA Board Chair) presented the RC report to the GG:

The Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements Report

The Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements has concluded.

Commission Chair, Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin AC (Retd) presented the Royal Commission’s report to the Governor‑General on Wednesday, 28 October 2020.

The report was tabled in Parliament on Friday, 30 October, 2020.

The Royal Commission was formally established on 20 February 2020 when the Governor-General, His Excellency General the Honourable David Hurley AC DSC (Retd) issued Letters Patent formally appointing the Royal Commission and outlining the terms of reference for its inquiry.

     
In particular I refer to this recommendation:

Recommendation 8.1 A sovereign aerial firefighting capability 223

Australian, state and territory governments should develop an Australian-based and registered national aerial firefighting capability, to be tasked according to greatest national need. This capability should include:
(1) a modest, very large air tanker/large air tanker, and Type-1 helicopter capability, including supporting infrastructure, aircrew and aviation support personnel, and
(2) any other aerial firefighting capabilities (eg Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), line-scanning, transport, and logistics) that would benefit from a nationally coordinated approach.

This led to Senator Sic-em-Rex Patrick making several media appearances and this presentation to the Senate on this issue:

Now ffwd to the middle of 2021 when CAA employed a Quality Manager and Lead auditor to support the CASA issued AOC: https://coulsonaviation.com.au/profile-quality-manager/ 

Sam is there to provide guidance to Coulson Aviation Australia team members in CAMO and AMO on compliance issues, regulatory clarification and regulatory variations and it’s an important role.

Importantly, he also provides the CEO as the Accountable Manager with assurance of compliant operations within in CASA regulatory framework, regulations and company requirements of the Air Operators Certificate (AOC) by delivering risk and evidence-based recommendations and observations to inform improvement actions.

“It gives me great pleasure working along with the team when I can help guide them to comply with CASA, and meet regulatory and legislative requirements.” 

  
In the meantime CAA appointed another fixed wing CP: https://coulsonaviation.com.au/new-fixed...ief-pilot/

Coulson Aviation Australia is pleased to announce Stuart as the organisation’s new Chief Pilot Fixed Wing.

Stuart is an experienced senior flight operations manager and B737 Flight Examiner/Instructor. Safety focused with an extensive regulatory experience and team building history, Stuart has almost two decades of experience in B737 domestic and international line operations including training and assessment of Captains and First Officers for Virgin Australia Airlines.

Stuart joins Chief Pilot Rotary Wing Nathan, who has been involved with Coulson Aviation Australia since mid 2020.

Nathan has a 20-year career in aviation behind him, including as a charter, remote area and line pilot with a background in fire operations and land management. His experience covers mechanical engineering and the introduction of technology improvements, as well as Head of Airworthiness with NSW National parks and Wildlife and most recently, as Rotary Wing Fleet Manager with Careflight.

Coulson Aviation Australia supports the New South Wales Rural Fire Service in operating the 737 FIRELINER, two Bell 412 helicopters and Cessna Citations on its behalf. Coulson Aviation Australia also supports Australian States as a subsidiary of Coulson Aviation in the provision of large aircraft and experienced team members seasonally.

Coulson Aviation Australia CEO Chris Smallhorn said the senior positions of Chief Pilot had attracted intense interest in the industry, and Stuart was a welcome addition to the organisation’s experienced team.

Chris said Coulson Aviation Australia had established approximately 35 roles in the past eight months. With the rest of the team members already in place, the positions of Chief Pilot will play an integral role in further establishing and growing the Australian-based organisation.

“Our key partner is the NSW RFS, as well as supporting the equivalent organisations in States including Victoria, Western Australia and New South Wales with the larger capacity aircraft,” Chris said.

“We’re very focussed on supporting and helping to build the Australian aviation industry and we’re proud of being able to create Australian jobs towards that aim.”

 
Still can't work out whether 'Stewie' is still there but my gut feeling is maybe not??

Item next was occurring at Fort Fumble where Crawford and Martin had fallen under a cloud of internal ructions which ultimately led to them both being let loose from the (now maternal) Big-Regulator Oz Aviation world.

In the interim period apparently this dude was (from at least July 2021) the 'Acting' Reg Oversight Ex Manager - MTF on this dude...

Consequently Pup_Spence appointed (NFI) former Stakeholder Ex Manager Rob Walker to the Regulatory Oversight Ex manager role...UDB! 

Less than 3 weeks into his new role Walker ticked and flicked a fairly significant legislative exemption to CAA - WTD??



P2 OBS: Coincidentally, three days after Walker issued that exemption to CAA, Pup_Spence (with equally NFI) issued a copied and pasted version of that exemption to another foreign aerial fire fighting operator Neptune Aviation Services: https://www.casa.gov.au/fixed-wing-firef...e-aviation

Which brings me to 2022...

From the CAA media release files: https://coulsonaviation.com.au/new-chief...australia/

“A key focus for Craig will be supporting the needs of NSW Rural Fire Service, and ensuring the expansion of our organisation continues to meet the regulatory and safety outcomes required of operators authorised by CASA to develop national aerial firefighting capability.

“This will be a major turning point for sovereign aerial firefighting capability, and will provide a strong foundation on which to build an expanding fleet of Australian owned and operated rotary and fixed-wing aerial firefighting assets.”

Craig said he was pleased to be joining Coulson Aviation Australia given the history of significant support provided by Coulson Aviation to Australia over the last 20 years.
“The commitment of Coulson Aviation to a long-term strategy to build Australia’s sovereign aerial firefighting capability was a great motivator for me in deciding to join the Coulson team,” he said.

And then not long after this dude (refer above) was appointed to the position of Ex Manager FLT OPS: https://coulsonaviation.com.au/new-execu...australia/\

Since that time we have had the 737 LAT crash in WA - see HERE for ATSB prelim - and the consequential subsequent CAA demotion of CM - see HERE - with rumours indicating he is currently looking for future employment...  

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

CASA FUBAR: Regulatory oversight of our National Aerial Firefighting capability? - MKII

Courtesy the BRB and associated SMEs...

Via the AP emails, KC of AMROBA fame:

https://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/...ions-1.pdf

Dear P2,

Been through this with another fire-fighting operator in WA.
No crash but regarding connection of equipment.
Their legal firm used the above to protect the operator.
 
Coulson is another issue
 
The problem with fire-fighting is CASA’s drafting of Part 137.
Part 137 does not refer to aircraft with STCs, it only refers to TC’d aircraft.
Exemptions are therefore necessary.
Nearly all aircraft that do fire-fighting are changed TC aircraft holding an STC.
 
CASA has copied FAA conditions for instruments for these type of aircraft operations.
 
I know they conferred with the FAA before issuing conditions for Coulson.
 
I wonder about the expertise within CASA that drafted the Instrument for the delegate to sign.

And then from another regulatory and aviation safety investigative subject matter expert...  

P2,

Thanks. Ken’s pick up on the STCs adds a whole different dimension to it. That’s fact, not opinion.
On the 137 aspect, I still think the government contracts have a lot to do with it. Why issue an Australian AOC to Coulson (and Neptune) when they are relying on foreign control? CASA have always had an issue with remote Chief Pilots (in a differing physical location in Australia than the HQ), so what’s the difference with remote crew or local crews complying with foreign regulations?
Why not just use a FAOC? It makes sense in a seasonal industry, that is high risk. The yanks are the veterans in the field, so let the FAA, who have the knowledge and skill set, manage the risk.
Probably a move to look like Australian has a full-time resource for the need, but the regulator and reality of the business was an afterthought. The fix was sorted through exemptions. No wonder the FAA are interested. It’ll be interesting to watch for FAA changes as a result of these accidents.
 
Regards...??? 

 
My take on this (so far) is that Coulson were not in fact the ones keen on pushing for the adoption of an Oz AOC, they had after all been successfully operating under a foreign AOC in Australia since 2010. Rather this was instigated by the CASA Iron Ring and then put to the Government as key to reassuring Australia has a Federally funded (IE tax payer funded) sovereign aerial firefighting capability (IE recommendation 8.1 of the RC):

Recommendation 8.1 A sovereign aerial firefighting capability 223

Australian, state and territory governments should develop an Australian-based and registered national aerial firefighting capability, to be tasked according to greatest national need. This capability should include:

(1) a modest, very large air tanker/large air tanker, and Type-1 helicopter capability, including supporting infrastructure, aircrew and aviation support personnel, and
(2) any other aerial firefighting capabilities (eg Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), line-scanning, transport, and logistics) that would benefit from a nationally coordinated approach.

Coulson just happened to be one of the anointed entities that the State and Federal Governments (aided and abetted by CASA) decided would supply this sovereign capability to Australia. 

To get a feel for how this timeline of political expedience and regulatory hypocrisy was instigated , go no further than the CAA media release timeline (make sure you backtrack the older enties - ): https://coulsonaviation.com.au/news-media/

Some example extracts: 

COULSON AVIATION AND NEW SOUTH WALES GOVERNMENT SECURE DEAL TO PURCHASE COULSON FIRELINER WITH 10 YEAR OPERATIONAL CONTRACT

May 14, 2019

Coulson Aviation and New South Wales Government Secure Deal to Purchase Coulson Fireliner with 10 Year Operational Contract

Coulson Aviation and New South Wales Government Secure Deal to Purchase Coulson Fireliner with 10 Year Operational Contract

May 14th, 2019 (Vancouver, BC) - Coulson Aviation USA, a member of the Coulson Group, and New South Wales Rural Fire Service (NSW), have secured a deal in which NSW will purchase one Boeing 737 Fireliner and two Citation V Lead / Intelligence Aircraft. The purchases are accompanied by a ten-year operational contract where Coulson will provide all flight and maintenance personal.

The B737 Fireliner is the first large air tanker ever purchased by a country, and its multi-role capability will be highlighted in this unique new operation. “When we started the B737 Fireliner program we set out to create a new generation of airtanker.” said Britton Coulson, Vice President of Aviation. “The goal was to utilize the latest SMART technology in our tanking system and create a multi-use firefighting aircraft that would create the best value for our customers.”

In 2018 the B737 Fireliner was FAA Certified as an air tanker and passenger transport. The Fireliner packs 15,150 litres of fluid with unmatched performance in distance, speed and altitude while retaining the capability to transport up to 72 passengers.

“We are honoured to have our Boeing 737 Fireliner and Citation V’s chosen by RFS to protect the beautiful state of New South Wales. Our C-130 Hercules fleet has supported RFS for several years along with our first B737 Fireliner during the 2018/2019 fire season. We see the NSW government leading the industry with new creative solutions in protecting life and property. “said Wayne Coulson, President and CEO of the Coulson Group.

Coulson has been operating under contract with the Australian National Aerial Firefighting Centre (NAFC) in Australia since 2000 and the 2018/2019 fire season marked the first year Coulson was the largest in country operator of Type 1 Rotary and Fixed Wing Aircraft.

NSW RFS Acting Commissioner Rob Rogers said that the RFS had evaluated several different large and very large air tankers over recent fire seasons and had settled on the B737 Fireliner as the preferred option, operated by Canadian based Coulson Aviation.

“This type of aircraft provides us with a fast, effective and flexible option for fighting fires year-round, and supporting firefighters on the ground,” Acting Commissioner Rogers said.

Foster Coulson, Vice President Sales & Marketing, added “With this contract now in place, Coulson Aviation PTY will establish a year-round operation in NSW to support its contracts at the RAAF base in Richmond where the B737 Fireliner will be pre-positioned to support the RFS this coming July.”

And:

Coulson Aviation Australia Partnerships in Australia
by Coulson Team | Apr 23, 2020 | Press Releases | 0 comments

Coulson Aviation (Australia) Pty Ltd. (the Australian division of Coulson Aviation) is expanding its partnerships in Australia as the business looks to cement its commitment to supporting Australian emergency services in firefighting. This will allow Coulson Aviation Australia to maintain and continue its strong operational presence.

Coulson Aviation Australia has operated in Australia for more than 19 years and is in the process of relocating its headquarters from Melbourne to Sydney, securing a hangar and offices at Bankstown Airport in partnership with Sydney Metro Airports.

Coulson Group CEO, Wayne Coulson said the family company was looking to expand with the new home base, employing locally and partnering with local and Australian-based companies across a range of requirements.

By September 2020, Coulson plans to have over 40 full-time employees based in Bankstown to look after the Australian-based division of the company.

Accommodation suppliers Crowne Plaza Hawkesbury Valley, Hawksbury Race Club Motel and Travelodge Hotel Bankstown will look after the crews and pilots who come in each year to support at risk communities with the New South Wales Rural Fire Service.

Coulson Aviation transports teams across the country and across countries to get them positioned for their roles supporting firefighting efforts, we are excited to announce a partnership with QANTAS as our preferred international and domestic airline carrier.

Coulson said the partnerships are important to Coulson Aviation Australia as it settles into Sydney and continues to grow.

“Our aim is to use local suppliers where we can.  We’ve operated in Australia for almost 20 years of our 26 years in aerial fire suppression, and supporting Australia and Australian businesses where we can, is an important commitment for us,” Wayne Coulson said.

Coulson Aviation Pty Ltd. will shortly start recruitment for administration team members, local fixed wing and rotary wing pilots, engineers, and maintenance crews.

About Coulson Aviation Pty Ltd.: Coulson Aviation is a family owned business with global operations in Australia, North America and South America and a diverse fleet of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Coulson Aviation Pty Ltd is a division of Coulson Aviation and was launched in 2001 to support Australian firefighting. In addition to its aerial firefighting, emergency personnel transport, and heavy lift operations, Coulson is also a world leader in technology and engineering focusing primarily on special mission modifications. Coulson’s latest design, the RADS-L for the Boeing CH-47D helitanker is the largest capacity, lightest weight, highest flow rate helicopter tank in the world.

Much...MTF - P2 

[Peetwo]

BRB SMEs view/QON on the CAA Oz AOC timeline of discrepancy??

Courtesy of the BRB communication channels...

SME 1: "Coulson's had no option but to operate under an Australian AOC or short term approvals under s 27A of the Civil Aviation Act.   There are no other alternatives.   All foreign commercial operators who operate into, in, and out of Australian airspace have an Australian AOC issued by CASA (or a short term 27A approval).   CASA describes them as "foreign" AOCs but that is misleading.  They are Australian AOCs that happen to authorise the operation of a foreign aircraft in Australian airspace.   The operators may well also have - and usually do also have - an AOC issued by their 'flag' state."

SME 2:  "Interesting comment from SME 1. There are significant differences in the issuance of AOC and FAOCs. A FAOC is based on an existing AOC from a foreign state, in this case the US. Depending on who the State is, it may aid in the approval process, hence the importance of ICAO USOP. It certainly was relevant in several other contextual and possibly politically controversial FAOC applications. The assessment process of an Australian AOC is detailed and contains aspects, proving flights, post-holder interviews etc, etc, that aren't included for a FAOC. ICAO have always recognised the State of the operator and State of Registry (NAA) have the primary responsibility for surveillance. These FOAC approvals should only be short term. That's a case by case decision currently...

...Looking at the CASA FOAC definition, they should have has an Australian AOC as the operation likely involves more than 8 movements in 12 months. However, being seasonal and reliant on fires means they probably won't comply with 137 proficiency requirements, therefore, the exemption. Yet, do they comply with the FAA requirements? Also, how are the FAA supposed to oversight a AOC outside the US? There's a hole in the system. That's part of the reason the FAA hold bi-lateral State (NAA) partner meetings. To keep an eye this kind of activity. "N" registered aircraft domiciled in foreign States is part of this complexity.

Murky waters indeed and something ICAO need to consider. This isn't a unique issue here.

Regardless of the home of the AOC, these prangs indicate a loose operation, poor decision making and deviation from SOPs. It's an Australian AOC, so it's difficult to understand the speed in which it was issued. My experience with a new AOC is a invasive and thorough process that can't be done in the time frame you highlighted P2..."

Very much related, I note that the Coulson regulatory facilitator (IE the previous Executive Manager of Reg Oversight Craig Martin) was apparently demoted in February from the CAA COO to a 'Strategic Advisor' and in recent weeks has taken up a position as a Director of 'Environ Global Consulting' - err WTD??

Meanwhile the CAA rotary wing CP was promoted (also in February??) to the CASA approved statutory position of Director Flight Ops?? - Hmm...love to see the paper trail on that one?? 

MTF...P2 

PS: This 2021 media release from CAA IMO adds to the intrigue and associated disconnections.. : https://coulsonaviation.com.au/coulson-a...xperience/ & https://coulsonaviation.com.au/usa-presi...australia/

[Peetwo]

LMH etc..catching up! - 

Reference Senate Estimates:

Senator McDonald Adjournment Speech - 13/06/23: Air Safety Torres Strait

Last night in the Senate...

Air Safety: Torres Strait



Senator McDONALD (Queensland) (19:32): Tonight I rise with a heavy heart, because three weeks ago I raised with CASA the very serious situation of no passenger air services to Darnley and M... (I believe that is meant to read: Mabuiag)  islands as a result of CASA regulation. Despite there being no incidents reported on the airstrips on those islands, CASA closed the strips to commercial flights and withdrew the ability for these community members to affordably travel by air between islands.

Instead, residents were forced into dinghies—dinghies!—on notoriously dangerous waters inhabited by crocodiles and sharks. On 19 April the Torres Strait Islander Regional Council met with CASA and asked them to allow an exemption for the airline to land of these strips—island strips that this company had been landing on for the past 20 years without incident. As usual, CASA gave a bureaucratic response that did not identify what the problem actually was that it was solving. Nor did they offer a solution for the remote community to continue accessing commercial air travel, leaving people to traverse these treacherous waters in boats. No pathway was undertaken for the airline to receive an approval. Instead, they are undertaking landing trials with weights, which CASA may or may not consider.

Underscoring the confusion of CASA's conduct is the fact that the same planes being banned from commercial operations on the islands could still use the strips in a private capacity. Just take a moment to comprehend that. Commercial rules are understandably stricter than private rules, but you can see how industry participants and passengers get frustrated: the same planes and the same airstrips, but different rules.

Three weeks ago, I asked the representing minister, Assistant Minister Anthony Chisholm: do you think that, for the two islands that have no passenger service going into them, this is a good outcome? His response was that the islands could apply for some funding for the airstrips to be upgraded. I asked the CEO of CASA to make sure the minister was briefed on the issue of there being no passenger service for these two islands. I wonder if that has happened, because the very worst news has been advised. Yesterday, after a four-day search for Wendy Richardson, the search was called off. I knew Wendy. The last time we met, we discussed her father, Sir Robert Norman, the acclaimed pioneer of regional aviation in the cape. Sir Robert saw the importance of providing an aerial service in the north for isolated communities at a time when aviation was overseen by the Civil Aviation Authority.

Wendy's loss is the exclamation point on years of conduct by CASA which has my phone running hot with complaints every single week. I grew up in a time when aviation was easily accessible and was a reliable way to conquer the tyranny of distance we experience in this country, especially in northern Australia. I remember local shows and events having not just automobiles in the car park but dozens of light planes. It seemed that everyone in North Queensland flew or knew someone who flew. Now flying is reserved for people who have a lot of money or who have the patience and fortitude to navigate the mountains of regulation imposed on them by CASA—regulations which many participants point out make no improvements to safety but discourage flying and cruelly punish minor indiscretions and which the big players can afford to implement but which force smaller carriers to pay to retrain staff, replace equipment that is functioning perfectly and change work operations they've used for years without incident.

No-one is blaming CASA for Wendy Richardson's death, but I want assurances that air travel will be restored to these islands immediately. In the meantime, flight companies should be provided with exemptions that will allow them to continue operations until more permanent fixtures are in place. I say that because no-one—and I mean no-one—in Australia should be forced to cross open sea in a dinghy because our air safety regulations force them out of the sky and into an open boat.

Via the LMH.. :

CASA under Fire over Torres Strait Airports

14 June 2023





Queensland Nationals Senator Susan McDonald has fired a broadside at CASA over what she says are unnecessary restrictions on RPT operations into some airports in the Torres Strait islands.

CASA has determined that some Cessna C208B operations into short strips have been ignoring runway safety factors required for RPT flights, which effectively removed services from some islands because the operators can't comply when the aircraft are flown at certain weights.

The issue was highlighted last week with the disappearance of speech pathologist Wendy Richardson, who was lost when the boat she was in capsized near Mabuiag Island, one of the islands that has lost its RPT service.

Addressing the senate on Tuesday night, Senator McDonald took aim at CASA and demanded an immediate resumption of the suspended services.

"Tonight I rise with a heavy heart, because three weeks ago I raised with CASA the very serious situation of no passenger air services to Darnley and Mabuiag islands as a result of CASA regulation," McDonald told the senators.

"Despite there being no incidents reported on the airstrips on those islands, CASA closed the strips to commercial flights and withdrew the ability for these community members to affordably travel by air between islands.

"Instead, residents were forced into dinghies—dinghies!—on notoriously dangerous waters inhabited by crocodiles and sharks."

McDonald also pointed out that private operations were still permitted into the impacted runways using the same aircraft that RPT operators have been prevented from using.

"Just take a moment to comprehend that," she said. "Commercial rules are understandably stricter than private rules, but you can see how industry participants and passengers get frustrated: the same planes and the same airstrips, but different rules."

According to the CASA website, the rules surrounding runway safety factors have not changed.

"Runway safety buffers provides a margin of error to account for issues like unexpected weather conditions, poor runway surfaces, aircraft performance or pilot skill," CASA states.

"Safety buffers are determined by adjusting the actual runway distance by using a ‘factoring’ multiplier. This factoring increases the minimum runway length required based on the type of operation and the aircraft.

"There has been no change to the rules for factoring and runways which increases the runway length required."

A CASA spokesperson told Australian Flying that the regulator was working to resolve the issue with RPT operator Skytrans.

"Torres Strait aerodromes and runways remain open for all aircraft that can land on short runways," the spokesperson said. "Every CASA decision is made with the safety of passengers in mind.

"Over the last six months, we have been working with Skytrans and providing progressive approvals to enable them to continue operating safely.

"We will continue to work with Skytrans to support the return of services where safe."

Sources close to the issue have said that the crux of the problems is that if runway safety buffers are applied, operators of Cessna Caravans can't comply unless they fly at weights that make the aircraft economically unviable.

Other aircraft such as the Britten-Norman Islander are believed to have no issue on those runways, but don't have the capacity of the Caravans.

Senator McDonald on Wednesday called on Minister for Transport and Infrastructure Catherine King to fast-track planned upgrades for Torres Strait airstrips.

“CASA made a questionable decision to close these strips and offered no alternatives for people needing to travel and they are forced to use boats,” she said. 

“CASA must provide an exemption to allow air travel to restart to and from these islands before there is another tragedy.
“I am distressed that we are seeing CASA make decisions without sufficient evidence that, instead of offering tangible safety benefits, in fact put people in high-risk situations.

“Minister King must review the closures, order the fast-tracking of airstrip upgrades and ensure the Civil Aviation Safety Authority is addressing issues in a timely, logical and effective manner before another life is lost.”

Runway safety factors allows for things like aborted take-offs, poor weather, slower braking and human error.
Operators can fly into runways that don’t meet the requirements, but only with permission from CASA.

Plus via the UP: Hansard Today……

megle2

This casa madness just goes on and on, I wonder what the actual airstrip deficiencies are

---

SOPS

An empty sky is a safe sky.

---

megan

No-one is blaming CASA for Wendy Richardson's death

I would, decisions you make have consequences, however tenuous they may be, the good old Swiss cheese model.

CASA gave a bureaucratic response that did not identify what the problem actually was that it was solving. Nor did they offer a solution for the remote community to continue accessing commercial air travel

I'm from the Government and I'm here to help you.

---

PiperCameron

Three weeks ago, I asked the representing minister, Assistant Minister Anthony Chisholm: do you think that, for the two islands that have no passenger service going into them, this is a good outcome? His response was that the islands could apply for some funding for the airstrips to be upgraded. I asked the CEO of CASA to make sure the minister was briefed on the issue of there being no passenger service for these two islands. I wonder if that has happened..

Crikey! So.. if the government doesn't control CASA, who does?!?

---

Clinton McKenzie

The government doesn't control CASA. That's an intended outcome.

The Parliament controls CASA in principle - through the legislation it makes or does not disallow - but in general leaves CASA to do what it will as a matter of practicality.

In any event, it's not CASA job to brief anyone on what places do and do not have a passenger service.

---

Mach E Avelli

Bring back something along the lines of the old PNG Developmental Air Services regulations. For years, under Aussie regulation we put DC 3s onto marginal strips, with decent loads, and yet had a good safety record.

CASA being CASA would want to cook up extra pilot training, just to ‘manage’ the risk. No harm in that if it’s relevant to the task.

Via Su_Spence HQ yesterday...

Aviation safety in the Torres Strait

TypeStating the facts
Date 15 June 2023

We understand how frustrating it is for communities in the Torres Strait that don't currently have regular air services.



But we don't cut corners when it comes to passenger safety.

Mabuiag and Darnley Islands have short runways that don't meet safety standards for commercial passenger flights in the types of aircraft Skytrans operate.

The aircraft meet the minimums required by the manufacturer, but Australia's safety rules for commercial air transport require longer runways to account for unexpected conditions or pilot skills.

We acknowledge that Skytrans have had a strong safety record over many years. But they have been operating to manufacturer minimums, and not to Australia's airline safety standards.

We are working with Skytrans to see if flights can resume by ensuring safety requirements are met in a different way.

We are determined to find a practical solution, but we need to be sure that we aren't putting passengers at risk.

We have been working with Skytrans over the past 8 months and providing progressive approvals to enable them to continue operating safely to some islands and in some conditions.

This has included Skytrans putting in place additional safety controls like special pilot training and runway markings.

Today they provided us with preliminary data from demonstration flights conducted at Mabuiag. We expect them to conclude test flights and provide their final data in the coming week.

This will give us detailed information on whether they can reliability operate safely on these runways with these new controls in place.

We'll work with them on the safety analysis, comparing real-life data with manufacturer data and safety standards, and we will do the same when data for other islands is available.

If we can be satisfied that the operations are safe, we will approve a departure from the normal rules.

But if we can't be sure it's safe, we may require that different aircraft are used in the absence of access to a longer runway.

What we won't do is compromise passenger safety.

Hmm...Su_Spence trying to reinvent the wheel - 

A blast from the past from the Uzu timeline of embuggerance... : (reference Phearless Phelan article: http://proaviation.com.au/2013/04/28/a-s...d-stuffup/)

Jan 16 99:            Uzu Air’s Britten Norman Islander was involved in a fatal accident at Coconut Island.

Jan 17 99:            An “Immediate safety report” signed by CASA Assistant Director Laurie Foley on the advice of a Cairns FOI who had not visited the site or communicated with the operator, outlined the few known circumstances of the accident, and stated under recommended action: “DFOM (District Flying Operations Manager) to now recommend 28 day suspension of AOC.” The report, faxed to Canberra at 10.55 am, on that day (a Sunday), did not state any reason for the recommendation.

Jan 19 99:            BASI, insurer and operator representatives flew to the accident site. In a faxed message, CASA suspended Uzu Air’s AOC for 28 days, with effect from 2359 that night.

Jan 20 99:            Uzu filed a notice of application for review of the CASA decision to suspend its AOC, claiming that the Authority had acted ultra vires (outside its legislated authority); breached rules of procedural fairness and natural justice; failed to provide adequate reasons for the decision; misapplied administrative principles, and “failed to correctly interpret and apply the law.”

Jan 21 99:            Uzu lodged a detailed 127-page response to CASA’s notice to show cause. The response was never acknowledged. At the same time, the operator attended the first hearing on the matter in the AAT seeking a stay of its AOC suspension. CASA succeeded in having the stay denied. CASA’s use in such stay proceedings of Section 9 of the Civil Aviation Act, appeared to question the ability of any operator to gain a stay. The operator believed the AAT’s effectiveness in reviewing administrative processes may be neutered by this tactic. Uzu would have to wait for the 28 day suspension to expire, before being able to proceed to a substantive hearing. Uzu sought an order for the release of CASA documents related to its decision. CASA said it would take up to 30 days to produce the documents. AAT directed CASA to provide Uzu with all relevant documentation within seven days. (The documents were made available about 10 days later. The 13 letters seeking clarification of RPT/charter status were not included in the documents.)

Jan 22 99:            BASI investigators recovered the engines from the Islander and returned to Cairns. BASI held a meeting at CASA Cairns with CASA AWI. BASI advised CASA the left engine did not appear to be developing power at impact and the fuel mixture control rod was found to be broken at the accident site, but advised the component would require metallurgical examination to determine cause and time of breakage.

Jan 26 99:            Uzu Air lodged a 40-page response to CASA’s proposed AOC suspension.

Jan 27 99:            BASI advised Uzu and CASA that laboratory analysis verified the fuel mixture control rod failed “…due to overload as a result on impact forces.”

Feb 2 99:              BASI stripped down the left engine at Archerfield. On the following day, BASI advised all interested parties of the outcome of the engine strip down.

Feb 4 99:              CASA served a Notice to Show Cause on Uzu Air’s associated company, Tamco Engineering, asserting that BASI investigations “resulted in a finding of a disconnected mixture control rod on the left engine, which was not delivering power prior to time of aircraft impact, and was considered by these BASI Investigators to be a contributing factor to the loss of control of the aircraft prior to that impact. The subject mixture control was found to have suffered failure which exhibited severe corrosion of the mixture control ball end connection.”

The BASI Investigator verbally denied the assertions were ever made and advised Uzu that BASI was lodging a protest with CASA regarding the allegations.

Feb 8 99:              Uzu Air held an informal conference in Cairns with the CASA regional manager, the acting DFOM, and the assigned FOI. Uzu made a proposal that it implement check and training and Class A aircraft maintenance, immediately upon reinstatement of the AOC. The company believed this met with CASA approval.

Feb 12 99:            BASI Deputy Director Alan Stray faxed BASI’s Preliminary Report to Uzu Air. The preliminary report was also faxed to General Manager, Aviation Safety Branch, CASA, Canberra; and CASA Canberra was telephoned to confirm CASA’s receipt of the report. The report stated inter alia: “Examination of the left engine, while still in the wreckage at the accident site, revealed the linkage between the mixture control cable on the carburettor had failed. Subsequent metallurgical examination of these components confirmed that failure was due to overload as a result of impact forces, and that it had not contributed to the accident.” (our emphasis)

Feb 15 99:            CASA suspended Uzu Air’s AOC for a further 28 days and asserted inter alia: “The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) has been investigating the crash but has not published a preliminary or final report on its causes.”

Feb 17 99:            The Cairns Post newspaper published an article headed “Crash report rocks CASA,” (by this writer) detailing the contrasts between CASA’s allegations and those of the preliminary BASI report. A faxed letter was received on the same morning from Laurie Foley, saying: “I have now been made aware of the content of a preliminary report of the accident by BASI. Please note that neither the crash itself, nor the possible causes of the crash, were a decisive consideration in my decision to suspend your AOC. I would have suspended your AOC even if I had been aware of the content of the BASI preliminary report.” Assistant Director Foley did not reveal his reasons for this damning assertion.

Feb 18 99:            An AAT-directed teleconference was scheduled for 1700, between Uzu counsel, the AAT registrar, and CASA’s office of legal counsel, to determine the process of an AAT hearing on the second suspension, and to enable Uzu’s counsel to advise CASA of the witnesses Uzu required to examine. Uzu counsel and the AAT were connected. CASA’s phone rang out without answering.

Feb 19 99:            Uzu counsel telephoned CASA Office of Legal Counsel, who advised they had forgotten the teleconference set for the previous day. CASA advised the further “T” documents (documents which CASA relied on to make its decision to suspend the AOC further and which Uzu required under the AAT court order) would now be made available to Uzu. Uzu’s counsel advised that he had the AAT booked in Sydney for Wednesday Feb 24. CASA advised they would be unavailable on that day but Thursday Feb 25 would be acceptable.

On the same day Uzu Air provided CASA with a detailed 50-page response to the proposed further 28 day suspension of its AOC, detailing the foregoing events and again raising the question of RPT versus charter.

Feb 23 99        Uzu’s lawyers requested the AAT issue three subpoenas to involved CASA staff members:

Assistant Director of Aviation Safety Compliance Laurie Foley; District Flying Operations Manager Robert Collins, and;
The case FOI Neale Crawford to be present at the hearing. AAT declined due to inadequate time. “We later learned that CASA did not want them questioned under oath,” said Bob Fulton. The Deputy Commissioner of the AAT gave CASA until 5.30 pm to agree to return the AOC or she would list a substantive hearing on the following Monday and issue writs for the witnesses.

“CASA agreed to return the AOC but included a string of ludicrous conditions including that our Cessna 206 be maintained under an approved Class A system of maintenance, which was absurd and in fact, illegal.”

Feb 25 99            At a cost of about $6,000, Uzu attends AAT Sydney at 0915. At 0930, AAT Vice President’s associates advised that CASA would not be attending due to commitments in Brisbane, but CASA would not object to a telephone hearing. However CASA objected to any evidence being tendered or any witnesses being called, as it is ‘not practical to cross examine by telephone.’ Uzu, which had now not earned any revenue for 36 days, was therefore again denied an opportunity to confront its accusers, some of whom were on “stress leave,” a luxury unavailable to Uzu General Manager Bob Fulton or his staff, some of whom had been stood down. CASA however successfully objected to the lifting of the suspension on the grounds of “Air Safety,” relying on Section 9 of the Civil Aviation Act.

Mar 2 99:              A meeting in Canberra was attended by Uzu’s chief pilot, an Uzu consultant, a CASA lawyer, and CASA’s public affairs manager. Uzu was told that CASA wouldn’t extend the suspension, but would either lift it, or let it run its course until March 16. The company was also told that CASA would not renew the suspension or cancel the AOC. No explanation was offered as to why, having made that decision, CASA would not lift the suspension immediately.

It was agreed that draft checking and training and maintenance procedures were required and had been submitted, and that checking and training and progressive maintenance would be progressively incorporated.

Mar 5 99:              An AAT teleconference between CASA office of legal counsel and Uzu confirmed all required documents had been submitted and that the AOC would not be cancelled, no further suspension would be imposed, and the suspension would be lifted between March 10 and 12.

Mar 8 99:              CASA acting DFOM Cairns advised he was satisfied with the draft manuals and would be making “unspecified recommendations” to CASA Canberra. Uzu’s optimism was heightened.

Mar 9 99:              CASA published an amended CAO 82.3 and three blanket exemptions, authorising air charter operators in the Torres Straits to operate RPT until June 9 without meeting the aerodrome, maintenance, or training and checking requirements for RPT.

The principal expertise of the three CASA officers preparing the new rules lay in the respective areas of airworthiness, legal and navigation. Uzu was again told its AOC would be restored by the end of that week.

Mar 10 99:            AM – CASA shifted the goalposts again. While its competitors, who had been operating for the two months Uzu has been grounded, were still in the air and had 90 days to comply with RPT rules, Uzu was told it must comply BEFORE its AOC was restored.

PM -Uzu’s solicitor contacted CASA office of legal counsel and was told the manuals the company had submitted were only DRAFT and that Uzu had not nominated a maintenance controller or check and training captain.

This writer faxed a draft of this chronology to CASA with an invitation to review it for accuracy.

Mar 11 99:            CASA phoned and indicated that a response, detailing some “errors and omissions” would be faxed “tomorrow.” I admitted that because of space limitations I had omitted considerable material, much of it damaging to CASA. (Information provided in CASA’s response is incorporated in this narrative.)

Mar 12 99:            The CASA response did not arrive. Or maybe, obliquely, it did. A faxed message from CASA to Uzu suspended the AOC for a third period, “pending an investigation by CASA into your company’s operations, and the risk to the safety of air navigation in allowing the AOC to continue in force……… The reasons for this decision and the facts and circumstances on which I rely are set out below.” The letter detailed thirty-eight points as “facts and circumstances,”

Mar 15 99:            A fax to the Hon. Warren Entsch, Member for Leichhardt, in response to a phone call to CASA from Mr. Entsch, said that for Uzu to have its AOC reinstated, it must comply with three requirements – training and checking, Class A maintenance, and an approved maintenance controller, which Uzu had already addressed.

Then this...

..In recognition of the need for scheduled air services in remote areas of Australia, CASA implemented a low capacity AOC to regulate scheduled air services into air strips which did not meet the regulatory requirements for normal scheduled air services. CASA stationed FOI Rod Bencke on Horn Island, who recognised the need for these essential services. Working with Rod, Uzu Air rapidly qualified for the issue of a low capacity RPT AOC enabling conduct of scheduled air services to the islands of the Torres Strait...

 

UDB?? 24 years and yet here we are doing the 'Timewarp Again" - 

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

ARFFS to be separately regulated? - Another Part 139 clusterduck...    

Via Oz Flying:

CASA to create Stand-alone ARFFS Regulations

14 July 2023



CASA yesterday launched community consultation on aerodrome rescue and firefighting services (ARFFS), proposing to make 24 changes to current rules and creating a separate regulation.

Following policy considerations from a technical working group (TWG), CASA says that it intends to create CASR Part 176, breaking out the ARFFS ruleset from CASR Part 139.

According to CASA, new regulations will cover establishing, functions and modernisation of ARFFS whilst removing some prescriptive standards.

CASA has stated that the intent of the changes is to align Australian practices with ICAO standards and practices (SARPS) and better define the roles, functions, responsibilities, requirements and locations of ARFFS in Australia.

"The proposed new ARFFS ruleset will be comprised of the CASR Part 176 regulation and Part 176 Manual of Standards (MOS)," CASA states, "and will apply to:

• existing and prospective ARFFS providers
  
• accredited ARFFS training providers
  
• aerodrome operators.
  

"The proposed changes also have relevance to State and Territory fire authorities due to clarification of ARFFS functions, providing greater clarity about the delineation of the ARFFS provider and State and Territory fire authorities’ roles."

CASR Part 139 Subpart H currently requires ARFFS to be established at any airport that has had passenger movements of 350,000 in a preceding year, or any airport that has an international passenger service regardless of movements.

Airservices Australia currently provides ARFFS at 27 airports, operating a fleet of 100 fire and rescue vehicles.

The proposed changes and consultation papers are on the CASA consultation hub website.

Via Su_Spence HQ:

Overview

CASA is seeking feedback on our proposal for the creation and implementation of CASR Part 176 - regulation of aerodrome rescue and firefighting services (ARFFS).

The policy proposal includes the transition of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR) Subpart 139.H ruleset to Part 176 of CASR as a standalone ARFFS regulation suite.

CASA's review of the Subpart 139.H ruleset considered the recommendations of reviews by:

• Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications (the Department) (2015-2016)
  
• Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee (2018-2019).
  

The proposal aims to modernise the ARFFS ruleset with an increased focus on performance-based approaches.

The areas of policy change are:

• functions of ARFFS
  
• ARFFS establishment criteria
  
• ARFFS establishment requirements
  
• graduated ARFFS
  
• removal of prescriptive regulatory requirements
  
• modernisation of ARFFS standards.
  

The proposed changes intend to provide:

• better alignment of safety regulations governing ARFFS with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended practices (SARPS) and guidance material
  
• a clearer definition of the role and functions of ARFFS, to ensure ARFFS providers can perform their core functions and prioritise non-aviation requests
  
• defined aerodrome responsibilities in the establishment and provision of ARFFS
  
• clearer ARFFS establishment/disestablishment requirements and timeframes
  
• location specific ARFFS resource (staffing and equipment) and training requirements, based on aircraft operations and aerodrome factors, providing a stronger safety focus.
  

CASA is proposing 24 changes in total including amendments and additions to the current ARFFS ruleset.

The proposal also considers contemporary ICAO SARPS and guidance material to proposed regulatory amendments which ensure ARFFS can adopt to modern, performance-based approaches in the performance of their functions.

A Technical Working Group appointed by the Aviation Safety Advisory Panel has considered policy options and provided relevant technical expertise and industry sector insight for this proposal.

Hmm...any bets on how long Dr A will string out writing that ruleset?? 

MTF...P2 

[Wombat]

Any bets on whether any Australian Airport will be safer as a result?

This looks to me to be the excavation of the regulatory foundations for a major fire fighting cost cutting exercise planned for about three years from now.

I mean since when did CASA ever have more than a casual interest in aviation safety?

[Peetwo]

Su_Spence on industry tote boards and the Jetsons?? - 

Via Fort Fumble:

Director of Aviation Safety, Pip Spence

Australian aviation quietly reached several milestones in recent weeks that demonstrate its ongoing potential as a dynamic and evolving industry.

We're all aware that drones are an integral and growing part of our aviation landscape and that innovators are finding a widening range of uses for them.

Such is the growth in this sector that the number of people holding a Remote Pilot Licence (RePL) recently topped 30,000 for the first time and closed the gap on the number of aeroplane and helicopter licence holders.

Like a good Melbourne Cup, the two categories have been jockeying for position and a post-COVID surge kept transport, commercial, private and recreational pilots with a current medical ahead by a length.

But the staying power of the RePL category means the race is not yet run and last week the 30,870 RePL holders were closing the gap with the 32,871 pilots with valid medicals.

This came after the number of remote pilot licences jumped more than 20% in the 2022-23 fiscal year and the number of registered drones rose 11%.

Anybody who's seen the amazing Mission Impossible footage of Tom Cruise riding a motorbike off a cliff as he's shadowed by drones filming the stunt can see how versatile these aircraft have become.

Already drones are proving their worth in fields ranging from mining to photography and the delivery of time-sensitive payloads such as medicines and pathology samples.

Bigger drones also make cargo operations an option and we have already been involved in trials of commercial deliveries with companies such as Wing and Swoop Aero.

We are seeing keen interest from the agriculture sector in applications operating beyond the visual line-of-sight outside of controlled airspace (BVLOS OCTA).

To support the evolution of this technology, CASA has been progressing a number of initiatives set out in the Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) and Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) Strategic Regulatory Roadmap we launched a year ago.

These include introducing a new BVLOS OCTA exam for the RPAS industry, releasing guidance material for vertiports (which I’ll come back to shortly) and by cutting red tape in other areas.

We also provide operators with a list of CASA-verified drone safety apps that tell them where they can and can’t fly drones according to aviation legislation and we’re working on initiatives with manufacturers as well as federal and state departments and agencies.

A second milestone was the first application to certify an Australian-made AAM aircraft.

The Vertiia electric Vertical Take Off and Landing (eVTOL) aircraft has been under development for several years by NSW company AMSL Aero, co-founded by aeronautical engineer Andrew Moore and former Google executive Siobhan Lyndon.

The Vertiia will be able to accommodate five people with a range of 1000km using a hydrogen fuel cell to power its electric engines and a cruise speed of 300kmh. Importantly, AMSL is targeting safety by building triple redundancy into its systems.

The aircraft has been pitched initially at the medical transport market — particularly in rural, regional and remote Australia — but there are also air taxi, cargo and other emergency service possibilities.

It is part of a new breed of aircraft aiming for zero operational carbon emissions and a smaller noise footprint compared with conventional aircraft.

This will be a multi-year certification project for CASA that will break new ground, deal with unfamiliar technologies and be at the forefront of global aircraft type certification.

We want to make sure we learn from international experience, which is why it is so helpful we are collaborating with the US Federal Aviation Administration and Swoop Aero on the joint type and production certification of Swoop Aero’s Kite drone.

As mentioned above, we issued our advisory circular on vertiport design last month.

This is a long-term project and involves complex issues that sometimes go beyond CASA to areas controlled by other government agencies and departments.

We expect early AAM aircraft to use existing aerodrome and helicopter landing site infrastructure.

But we believe AAM growth and the need to ensure helicopter operations are not adversely affected will ultimately require this new type of separate facility.

The vertiport consultation and a strong response to a series of associated webinars demonstrated a keen interest in Australia’s aviation future.

The developments outlined here offer a glimpse of that future and it’s one in which CASA intends to play a key role.

All the best

Pip

Plus: https://updates.communication.casa.gov.a...-july-2023

I continue to despair for our once proud and burgeoning GA industry...

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Clarke v CASA - AAT back CASA decision?? 

AAT decision reference: Clarke and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2023] AATA 2628 (18 August 2023)

Here's one for possible BRB debate...

Via the Oz:

Meet the top gun CASA says is too good to train new pilots

A former Australian Defence Force top gun has been refused a flight instructor rating by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority on the basis he had the experience but not the qualifications.

Former Royal Australian Air Force squadron leader Adam Clarke challenged the decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, but was unsuccessful.

In his judgment, AAT deputy president Stephen Boyle said there was much evidence to attest to Mr Clarke’s expertise as a highly skilled and trained ADF pilot.

“It may also be that because of Mr Clarke’s vast experience and training he would be able to discharge the functions associated with the authorisations he seeks,” Mr Boyle wrote.

“However that is not the enquiry directed by CASA’s regulation. That enquiry is as to the equivalence of the qualification granted by the ADF.”

In his 26 years in the RAAF, Mr Clarke flew F/A-18 hornets and instructed other pilots on the aircraft. He also worked in the 2 Flying Training School (2FTS) as a Pilatus PC-9/A instructor, and provided remedial instruction for students that required additional help.

More recently Mr Clarke worked in Saudi Arabia as an instructor on F-15SA fighter jets, and throughout his career amassed close to 5000 hours of flying time.



The tribunal heard Mr Clarke’s flight training experience was “at least equivalent to the civil standard because the platforms on which he instructed were more complex with higher performance”.

“In-flight instruction is extremely important, but it is improved and focused by pre-flight tutorials, mass briefs, before flight briefs, and most importantly debriefs,” submissions for Mr Clarke said.

“These disciplines are a real strength of RAAF flying and particularly fighter flying. This allows significant student improvement and progression in a healthy learning environment.”

But CASA reasoned that as an ADF instructor, Mr Clarke trained pilots in more complex aircraft than the light recreational aircraft used by flight training schools.

“It does not matter how experienced the applicant is,” CASA’s submissions to the tribunal said.

“If he has not received an equivalent flight crew qualification to the endorsements that he is now seeking then he is not entitled to the endorsement (under CASA regulations)”.



Mr Boyle concluded that to grant Mr Clarke, of Perth, the civilian endorsements he sought would be akin to allowing “a professor of mathematics to teach arithmetic to primary school children”.

“The professor would certainly have the technical knowledge of the subject matter, mathematics, but may be lacking the training or experience in teaching those with effectively no knowledge of mathematics,” Mr Boyle wrote.

“While (Mr Clarke) has instructed at 2FTS, those he was instructing already had flight training.”

He upheld CASA’s original decision in the matter, finding the ADF qualification was not equivalent to that required by the regulator.

Mr Clarke’s solicitor Joseph Wheeler, from the International Aerospace Law and Policy Group, said his client was considering his appeal options.

“Australia is privileged to have a significant cadre of highly qualified, talented and decorated ex-defence force pilots, who after concluding their military careers set their sights upon civilian aviation,” Mr Wheeler said.

“Their qualifications and experience are globally held in very high regard. Australian flying students could only benefit from lower barriers for ex-defence pilots in this regard as diversity of aviation experience is a proverbial pearl of aviation wisdom they could benefit from.”

A CASA spokesman said they met regularly with Defence “to identify opportunities to align our regulatory arrangements where appropriate”.

Also creating a bit of debate over on the UP... : TOO GOOD FOR GA?

MTF...P2 

[Cap'n Wannabe]

You know, I actually agree with CASA on this one.  Instructing highly motivated cream-of-the-crop type students in complex aircraft is one thing, instructing average Joe with more money than brains is quite another.  In my opinion, he should be required to demonstrate competence in all the authorisations he applied for rather than simply having them handed to him.

The AAT's ruling is here.  Makes for an interesting read..

[Peetwo]

Su_Spence's conflicted 'stating the bollocks' on Top-End Madness?? - 

The dots-n-dashes trail so far: 

Of Senators and garden paths.

This is to be quite a complicated piece if knitting, a tricky pattern; I shall probably make a fearful hash of it, but IMO it is worth the effort. So, with your indulgence I'll crack on.

From the reading material – HERE – buried within the story we find the following :-

“The CASA documents detail that the helicopters involved in these events were part of a “small satellite operation” – operating under several Air Operator’s Certificates – which took tourists on joy flights in connection with a fixed-wing operation at Horizontal Falls, about 270 km northeast of Broome.”

“The complaints sparked a noncompliance investigation into Helibrook, the aviation business of Outback Wrangler star Matt Wright, because Mr Thomas’s choppers were operating under his air operator’s certificate.”

“Aircraft registration records show that helicopters involved belonged to Thomas’s company Avanova, which operated five helicopters for private, business and commercial purposes for his tourism ventures.”

Now, before we get too sidetracked by the performers centre stage; take quick look at the Glen Buckley character patiently waiting stage left; then read through the paragraphs above again and see if you can define the diverging lines of argument; strict compliance application;and, the remarkable 'double standards' – those almost, but not quite visible, hovering in the wings. They are there, just neatly tucked behind a thin curtain; waiting their moment, centre stage. 

Aye, Senators bamboozled (again) by the 'human interest' and the misleading sleight of the Spence hand (legerdemain and opportunity). - Journalists too, all,  it seems, have missed this very important element....Lost in the maze, hampered by smoke and blinded by the mirrors. Then, we must add in a small dollop of 'ministerial defence' – once Smith tried to get to the business end of his 'inquiry'.

Sterle -”I am keen if you want to keep going, although it has nothing to do with the budget. I know how flexible we have been in this committee. “

Which is a bit rich coming from Sterle who seems to have obligingly rolled over in favour of 'the party' ignoring the fact that this is a WA matter - and his previous fierce, time consuming forays against the entire aviation management conglomerate when in opposition. But I digress. “To the point fool” howls the mob. Well M'lud, in short, I would be questioning the great variance clearly apparent in the way CASA sanction some operations and others are crucified; the 'legality' of the operation which claimed a young life and the history of how that operation came into being, and how, given the track record, it was allowed to continue. Buckley driven into the dirt like a tent peg – this operation allowed to progress to a fatality? Sen. Smith could do with some real ammunition for his next encounter. Properly briefed, he could have shot the boots off the ever elusive, evasive, untouchable CASA monolith. Why take a pocket knife to a gunfight? End of ramble...

“The archer is the true weapon; the bow is just a long piece of wood.

Plus from the bottom of.. Pup_Spence dodges a legal hand grenade with Firefighter widow court case??

Also: Pup_Spence and the CASA Board signal duplicity and favoritism is alive and well inside the halls of Fort Fumble in the case of the Croc Wrangler...

CASA gave Matt Wright exemption before Chris Wilson’s fatal chopper crash



The Civil Aviation Safety Authority granted Netflix star Matt Wright and two of his mates ­exemptions that allowed them to collect crocodile eggs with someone hanging from their helicopters – after its chief executive and board members received a private demonstration – just months before the fatal chopper crash that killed Chris Wilson.

New flight operations rules, ­effective from December 2021, stipulated that only turbine-­engine-powered helicopters were permitted to carry a person externally for sling operations.

Despite this, in September 2021, CASA granted Wright and pilot Michael Burbidge an exemption allowing them to continue carrying crocodile-egg collectors beneath their piston-engine-powered Robinson R44 aircraft for ­another three years.

In February last year Wilson – who starred on Outback Wrangler and Wild Croc Territory – was killed when the Robinson R44 Raven II he was slung beneath crashed in a remote part of West Arnhem Land during an egg-collecting mission. Pilot Sebastian Robinson was critically injured.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s preliminary ­report revealed the chopper’s ­engine had stopped before the helicopter hit the ground.

The destroyed chopper was owned and operated by Wright’s company Helibrook and contracted to Mick Burns’ company Wildlife Harvesting NT.

Shortly before the exemptions were granted, Mr Burns and Wright met CASA chief executive Pip Spence and board members Tony Matthews, Michael Bridge and Elizabeth Hallett in Darwin.

The CASA executives had travelled to the Territory in June 2021 for a safety forum, regular board meeting and industry ­engagement events. CASA said it fully-funded its employees’ travel.

While in Darwin, Ms Spence, also director of aviation safety, and her three board members visited Mr Burns’ business Crocodile Farms NT where they were briefed on its operations and how the looming new flight rules would affect its ability to collect crocodile eggs.



Celebrity croc-wrangler Wright then took the CASA CEO and Board members for a flight on one of his Bell choppers to see the scale of the company’s operations and the remote environment in which egg collection is undertaken.

The following month, CASA granted another of Burns’ companies, Porosus, a Supplemental Type Certificate allowing it to use dual cargo hooks for human external cargo operations on Robinson R44 and R44 Raven II helicopters for the purpose of crocodile-egg collecting.

A couple of months after that, CASA granted Helibrook and Mr Burbidge’s company, Northshore Holdings NT, an exemption ­allowing them to collect crocodile eggs via a sling person.

The authorisation was subject to many conditions, which included fitment of dual external cargo hooks under the certificate issued to Burns.

Among its 33 conditions, the sling person must carry a “readily ­accessible harness knife capable of cutting the lifting strop or harness in an emergency”. Also that the sling person “must be made aware, in writing, that the hook system is not certified for human use”.

CASA this week confirmed that Robinson R44 aircraft “can no longer be used for this kind of operation” under Civil Aviation Safety Regulations.

“Transitional arrangements vary between operators based on when an approval was granted but the longest an approval could be used is up to two years after it was made,” a spokesperson said.

While the exemptions granted to Wright and Burbidge in September 2021 state they will not be ­repealed until September 2024, CASA told The Australian their exemptions will cease after two years.

Since Wilson’s death, NT WorkSafe has prohibted the practice of collecting crocodile eggs from the wild by transporting workers suspended from a helicopter via a sling.

CASA board member Mr Bridge also sits on the Northern Territory Tourism board of commissioners alongside Mr Burns.

Tourism NT said it had no knowledge of, or involvement in, CASA’s visit. Wright declined to comment and Mr Burns, who is a­ ­director of Crocosaurus Cove and owns the Darwin Crocodile Farm that houses about 70,000 salt­water crocodiles, did not respond to requests for comment.

And from the CASA FOI disclosure log: 

23 May 2023 - All documents and correspondence related to the 23 June 2021 Crocodile Farms NT gift of a briefing and helicopter flight.

• Freedom of Information (FOI) - 23 June 2021 Helicopter Flight
  

Shades of the Hooded Canary here but it would seem that Pup_Spence has got her knickers in a knot with both the Croc Wrangler and Broome R44 fatal, with multiple entries to her introduced stating/correcting the bollocks pages...    

Read here:

Our response to media claims

• Allegations published by The Australian which suggest CASA does not take action against instances of unsafe flying are completely false.
  
• CASA has zero tolerance for serious, wilful or repeated disregard of the aviation rules and takes all reports of illegal aviation behaviour seriously.
  
• CASA does not normally investigate the owners of aircraft involved in incidents – many are owned under complex financial and shareholding arrangements.
  

Troy Robert Thomas was a private pilot that had business interests in some aviation tourism companies. He had ownership interest in companies that owned aircraft that were being operated under another Air Operators’ Certificate.

Mr Thomas has never held any regulatory approvals other than a private pilot licence and was never authorised to make any safety decisions or fly on behalf of Horizontal Falls Seaplane Adventures or any other company.

CASA refutes the allegations published today in The Australian. Each of the 2018 incidents was investigated and acted on by CASA, and not one of them involved Mr Thomas.

CASA does not normally investigate the owners of aircraft involved in accidents or incidents – as many are owned under complex financial and shareholding arrangements.

CASA was aware of only one previous incident that Mr Thomas was involved in prior to his fatal accident. That incident resulted in enforcement action being taken against Mr Thomas.

In the 2022-23 financial year, CASA cancelled 6 civil aviation authorisations and suspended 4, and issued 106 infringement notices and 68 other notices. Many more incidents were also investigated under our coordinated enforcement process. We include these figures in our annual reports each year.

Response to The Australian enquiry – Darwin industry engagement

The following statement was provided to The Australian newspaper on 30 May 2023 in relation to questions about our Board’s engagement with industry in Darwin in 2021.

CASA has robust conflict of interest processes in place for staff and Board members which ensure that any perceived or actual conflict is appropriately managed.

The applications allowing collection of crocodile eggs were not exemptions but renewals of long-standing approvals held by a number of operators. They were handled as a routine matter by a CASA staff member.

CASA issues more than 200 approvals and authorisations each year to operators. We also issue around 100 exemptions to operators.

CASA’s Conflict of Interest (COI) Policy applies to all Board members and our staff. It outlines what is required to ensure actual or perceived conflict of interest are managed appropriately. The policy is published on our website.

Conflicts of interest by staff are regularly reviewed and where something is declared, this is reviewed by the manager as well as CASA’s legal team to see whether the conflict can be appropriately managed. This includes requirements for staff to declare COIs at the time of employment as well as other key touchpoints.

Board members are required to declare specific conflicts of interest at each Board meeting with respect to any matters that the Board will consider or make decisions on.

Board members have no role in CASA’s decision-making processes relating to applications or approvals.

The gifts and benefits register which CASA publishes includes detail about gifts or benefits received where the estimated value is greater than $100.

The CASA CEO and Board member who flew to Bathurst Island on a scheduled airline service on 21 June 2021 to better understand the types of aircraft used for remote air services did not leave the airport before they flew back to Darwin. These flights were paid for by CASA.

Correcting the record

The article in The Australian newspaper (CASA gave Matt Wright exemption before Chris Wilson’s fatal chopper crash, 6 May 2023) makes several statements that are incorrect and potentially misleading.

CASA routinely assesses applications for activities which are unusual or not specifically addressed in the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations. Collecting crocodile eggs in remote areas is a good example and this type of activity has been approved, with safety conditions, for more than 10 years.

CASA’s Board regularly meets in different locations around Australia as part of an ongoing program to engage with communities, local operators and CASA staff. Visiting aviation businesses to gain a deeper understanding of aviation operations is often arranged around Board meetings.

The CASA CEO and Board were not flown to the Tiwi Islands on a helicopter. As part of a familiarisation of remote air services, two members flew to Bathurst Island and return on the same afternoon on scheduled airline flights from Darwin. The tickets were purchased by CASA.

Oversight of tourism operators and private flights

Aviation tourism flights can only be offered by a commercial pilot flying under an Air Operators Certificate (AOC) from CASA.



Commercial aviation operations are strictly monitored by CASA including through ongoing oversight, surveillance and audits.

This week the Australian Transport Safety Bureau released its final investigation report on a Broome R44 helicopter accident that occurred in 2020.

The accident flight was not a commercial tourist operation, but a private flight organised for family and friends.

The pilot never held a commercial pilot licence and had never been licensed to fly passengers as part of a tourist operation.

Private pilots, such as the pilot involved in this tragedy, are not authorised to provide aviation tourism experiences.

Private pilots conducting private operations for family or friends must still follow the aviation safety rules, including the requirement to hold a valid and current licence.

We extend our condolences to the families and friends of those involved.

 
Hmm...anyone else thinking that Pup_Spence is getting a tad bit defensive on 'conflict of interest' matters North of the Can'tberra bubble?? - 

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Dots-n-dashes on Su_Spence stating the bollocks media pages?? - 

Remember this from the Hooded Canary's days as the Chief Commissioner of the ATSB??

MH370 reporting by The Australian

Letter to the Editor of The Australian

I am writing to express my concern regarding the manner in which The Australian journalist Ean Higgins continues to inaccurately report on the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 – in particular I am concerned at the negative impact this inaccurate reporting is having on the knowledge of the search by the families of those on board the aircraft.

To reiterate, under the International Civil Aviation (ICAO) Annex 13 provisions, the government of Malaysia is responsible for investigating, determining and reporting the causal factors behind the loss of MH370. It is my understanding that their investigation team is well progressed in the development of a draft report. The role of the ATSB, at the request of the government of Malaysia, is to coordinate the conduct of the underwater search.

Many of Mr Higgins’ recent articles have been centred on the ATSB’s decision not to provide him with a series of emails between members of the group of experts advising the ATSB on the search strategy in 2016. The emails pertain to an analysis of the final series of satellite communications between the aircraft and the ground earth station which indicate that the aircraft was, at that time, in a high and increasing rate of decent. The analysis was performed by one of Australia’s leading scientists in the field, is based on solid evidence and it has been extensively peer reviewed and published in a scientific journal.

The implication of this analysis for the search is that the aircraft probably impacted the surface of the ocean reasonably close to where the transmissions were made (what is known as the 7th arc). This is contrary to the views expressed by Mr Higgins and Mr Byron Bailey from The Australian, who have been vocal critics of the search and have long contended that the aircraft was being actively controlled at the end of flight and was glided to a location well away from the area which has been searched. The analysis of the transmission data, when complemented by the recently published CSIRO drift-modelling analysis, provides the best possible definition of an area in which the aircraft is likely to be located.

Mr Higgins’ articles have also consistently attempted to create the appearance of contention between the search strategy experts and members of the ATSB’s search team where none exists. He has suggested in his articles that some ATSB officers have had second thoughts about the ATSB’s position in relation to the end of flight scenario and further;

“(the) Australian Transport Safety Bureau has invoked draconian legislation in refusing to release material about its search for missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370, warning that any bureau employee who provides such information to the public or a court could face two years in jail.”       

I find the use of this journalistic tactic particularly objectionable. No such warning has ever been issued, every member of the search strategy group and the ATSB’s search team understands, and is in agreement with, the science associated with the search and the implications on the search area of the analysis of the satellite communication data. Members of the ATSB’s search team are operating under the standard legislation that ATSB employees normally operate under, governing the disclosure and use of information.

Similarly Mr Higgins suggests in his most recent article that the work currently being performed by the ATSB was prompted by negative public opinion about the search. To quote;

“But he (Mr Hood) and his ATSB colleagues are no doubt thinking the best way out of this continuing world of pain is to find MH370, and behind the scenes that’s exactly what they are trying to help make happen.”

This is also incorrect – the CSIRO drift study work we have recently published was commenced in April 2016. It is the most comprehensive and accurate study of the point of origin of MH370 debris performed to date. It forms a part of the ATSB’s ongoing work to bring the best possible science to bear to find the aircraft.

It is particularly regrettable that Mr Higgin’s articles have now led to some of the MH370 next of kin expressing doubts about the ATSB’s conduct of the search, and by implication, our commitment to finding the aircraft. The ATSB’s search team, and the experts from many organisations both in Australia and overseas supporting the search, have worked with absolute commitment, dedication and a single minded focus on finding the aircraft to provide the answers for the families of those on board and to improve transport safety. It is extraordinarily difficult and challenging work.

Leaving aside his harassing and intimidating approach in dealing with my staff when requesting information, you can perhaps now understand why I find Mr Higgins’ approach to attacking the credibility of the search unwarranted. The ATSB reserves its rights not to interact with Mr Higgins.

Greg Hood Chief Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer Australian Transport Safety Bureau


_____________- Web page updated 1 May 2017 to correct text.

Correction Date
Fri, 2017-04-28 00:00

P2 - At least HVH had the balls to actually put his name to that load of bollocks... 

Plus:

Ongoing false media reporting on search for MH370

&..

Inaccurate media reporting on search for MH370

&..

Misleading media reporting on the First Principles Review into the search for MH370
 
Eventually this precious, subversive, defensive approach adopted by HVH was thankfully ended, presumably from someone within the Mandarin ranks that could see how inappropriate it was for a independent statutory government agency being politically combative with the 5th Estate - well done for some sense of sanity from the political/bureaucratic elite ranks...  

However it would seem that HVH has been whispering in the Pup_Spence ear and she has subsequently whole-heartedly embraced this self-serving, self-righteous concept to tackle media/industry critiquing the performance of the Board, Spence and her executive team.

Where did this 'stating the bollocks' begin?

Intrigued with where this all began and perhaps discover what may have triggered this sneaky, defensive concept, I visited the CASA 'News media releases and speeches' pages - see 'stating the facts' bylines here: https://www.casa.gov.au/search-centre/ne...d-speeches  

So tracing the byline back I got to page 4, for this 1st entry on 9 November 2022:

Safety regulations require that the minimum take-off and landing distances calculated by an aircraft manufacturer have a safety buffer added.


Torres Strait island

These rules have been in place for decades and apply internationally.

Runway safety buffers provides a margin of error to account for issues like unexpected weather conditions, poor runway surfaces, aircraft performance or pilot skill.

Safety buffers are determined by adjusting the actual runway distance by using a ‘factoring’ multiplier. This factoring increases the minimum runway length required based on the type of operation and the aircraft.

There has been no change to the rules for factoring and runways which increases the runway length required.

Regulatory detail

Part 135 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations was introduced on 2 December 2021. It sets out the rules for air transport operations in small aeroplanes and incorporates the rules that were previously known as Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 20.7.4, including those factoring requirements.

A small change was made as part of the rule transition which allows slightly shorter runways to be used for take-off in some circumstances.

The new rules also allow an operator to make an application to use reduced factoring (and shorter runways) if additional safety measures are put into place – for example additional pilot training, or limitations on weather conditions.

An operator can apply for an exemption or approval on its Air Operators Certificate provided it can satisfy CASA that operations to affected aerodromes still meet acceptable safety requirements.

This bit: "The new rules also allow an operator to make an application to use reduced factoring (and shorter runways) if additional safety measures are put into place – for example additional pilot training, or limitations on weather conditions..."

For a presser that believes it is stating the facts, this bit neglects to recognise that these safety risk mitigation concepts were brought in nearly a quarter of a century before by CASA with the issuing of a special exemption form of Low Capacity RPT AOCs, that included additional safety measures like those mentioned...

Ref: http://proaviation.com.au/2013/04/28/a-s...d-stuffup/

..In recognition of the need for scheduled air services in remote areas of Australia, CASA implemented a low capacity AOC to regulate scheduled air services into air strips which did not meet the regulatory requirements for normal scheduled air services. CASA stationed FOI Rod Bencke on Horn Island, who recognised the need for these essential services. Working with Rod, Uzu Air rapidly qualified for the issue of a low capacity RPT AOC enabling conduct of scheduled air services to the islands of the Torres Strait...

So the 'stating the bollocks' media releases were brought in after the change in government??

Theory 1: Hmm..so perhaps Pup_Spence got a bit defensive from about here??

Of interest with these bollocks entries so far was this one:

Enforcement of safety rules

Type Stating the facts
Date 21 July 2023

Everything we do is driven by safety and we understand most people in the aviation industry do the right thing and act in good faith in accordance with the rules.



The professionalism and integrity of the majority of aviation industry participants underpins Australia’s strong safety record but we understand people sometimes make mistakes.

When that happens, we work with them using just culture principles to help them understand how they may have inadvertently erred and what they need to do to avoid making the same mistake again.

We may decide to provide education or formal counselling to ensure that in future they have adequate knowledge and will operate safely and in compliance with the rules.

It is a way of achieving a good safety outcome without the need to limit a person’s aviation privileges unless necessary in the interests of aviation safety.

Where we have zero tolerance is for serious, wilful or repeated disregard of the aviation rules.

We take all reports of illegal aviation behaviour seriously and we employ a range of responses determined by the available evidence.

Information about potential breaches can come from a variety of sources, including the public, other members of the aviation industry, CASA surveillance or oversight operations and anonymous or self-reporting.

All reports are important and even if a single report does not result in regulatory action, it may be used to build a case in the longer term.

We carefully consider all information and concerns raised with us, assessing how we should respond and the sort of action we should take.

We use proportionality and discretion in regulatory decision making and we always act according to the law. 

This means exercising our powers in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness and natural justice, which require us to rely on evidence rather than hunches, rumour or speculation.

Our decisions need to be lawful and defensible and they are governed by our documented procedures, including those set out in the Enforcement Manual.

Different pathways that are available, depending on the issue, include:

• assisting people with education and guidance material
  
• encouraging people through audit safety findings and counselling notices
  
• taking administrative action such as varying suspending, suspending or cancelling an authorisation
  
• issuing an aviation infringement notice (AIN)
  
• referring the matter for criminal prosecution.
  

We use enforcement action where necessary to compel a person to comply with legislative requirements or limit, constrain or prevent someone who is demonstrably unable or unwilling to follow the rules from exercising their aviation privileges.

Administrative action can include entering an enforceable voluntary undertaking, issuing directions or delivering a 'show cause' notice to vary, suspend or cancel and authorisation. An aviation infringement notice can involve fines of up to $1565 but the penalty a court can impose for the same offence can be up to $15,650. Demerit points may also be incurred and lead to the automatic suspension or cancellation of a licence.

A 'show cause notice' tells the holder of a civil aviation authorisation – such as a flight crew, remote pilot, aircraft engineer or air operator – why we believe there are reasons to vary, suspend or cancel their authorisation and invites them to tell CASA why they believe we should not do so.

If we consider there is an imminent and serious risk to safety, we can move to immediately suspend an authorisation while we complete an investigation into the facts and circumstances giving rise to our concerns. Such action requires CASA to make an application to the Federal Court, which must agree to maintain the suspension pending the completion of CASA’s investigation.

We also refer serious cases to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP), who determines whether to start a prosecution.

Matters are usually referred to the CDPP when breaches are deliberate, show a reckless disregard for the rules or a pattern of disregarding rules, and/or cause a significant safety risk that can include putting other people in danger.

Whichever way we proceed, the chain of events begins with the accumulation of sound evidence supporting the belief that the safety rules have been breached.

We can’t be everywhere and see everything but credible reports from the public and industry can alert us to people doing the wrong thing, help preserve aviation’s well-deserved reputation and improve safety.

This is why we encourage people to report any safety concerns to us through our safety reporting mechanism. They should provide us with as much information as they can to support the concerns they have raised.

Hmm...wonder what precipitated the issuing of that sinister presser? It's got Dr A's pugmarks all over it...

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Su_Spence Class 5 medical consultation?? -   

Via latest CASA (Bollocks) Briefing:

Director of Aviation Safety, Pip Spence

We'll open consultation later this month on an eagerly awaited proposal that will give most of Australia's private pilots unprecedented flexibility when it comes to renewing their medical certificates.

We reviewed your responses to last year's medical policy review and other feedback from the aviation community to design a streamlined medical certification process for general and recreational pilots.

As a result, we will shortly ask for your views on a proposed Class 5 medical self-declaration.

The new Class 5 medical self-declaration, which was flagged in our General Aviation Workplan, will allow private pilots who meet fitness requirements to self-assess and self-declare without the need to see a doctor.

Those who meet the eligibility criteria and satisfy the requirements will have a Class 5 self-declared medical automatically issued.

The self-assessment would see applicants answer a simple set of questions using CASA's current online systems.

Access to training modules and comprehensive guidance material will help you  make a well-informed and appropriate decision.

Adoption of the proposal will mean that most people who fly the majority of hours in private operations will be able to apply for a Class 5 medical self-declaration, noting the medical exclusions and operational limitations.

We estimate the new system will cover about 70% of the Australian aircraft fleet.

There will, of course, be exceptions and some people will still need to see a doctor.

The proposal also does not cover riskier activities such as aerobatics, formation flying and night Visual Flight Rules operations.

We believe the Class 5 medical is a world first in terms of trusting pilots to decide on their own fitness and we worked diligently with the aviation medicine technical working group to arrive at a proposal that ensures regulation is proportionate to risk and is managed appropriately.

We're already working on the systems that will support the new self-declaration process and we aim to go live as soon as practicable, following the outcomes of the public consultation.

I'd like to acknowledge the contribution of our technical working group on this important initiative and other ongoing considerations for aviation medicine reform.

Consultation on a second key initiative from our General Aviation Workplan, this time aimed at addressing the shortage of Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineers (LAMEs), opened last month and runs until Thursday 12 October.

A product of extensive industry consultation through the Part 66 technical working group, this proposes changes to the Part 66 Manual of Standards that would allow us to introduce ‘modular’ licensing for aircraft engineers.

It aims to address the considerable time associated with an engineering apprenticeship and the difficulties associated with retraining maintenance engineers who have spent a long time out of the industry.

It will also assist foreign licence holders seeking a qualification to work in Australia.

We plan to introduce the modular system in two phases.

In stage 1, we plan to amend the Part 66 MOS by the end of this year to enable Category B1 and B2 licences to be issued with exclusions.

A person who has only completed the general training and modules for piston engines, for example, could be granted a modular licence to work in that area.

But the exclusions would mean they couldn't work on airframes or other systems without completing the relevant training modules and experience.

In short, it will allow everybody who wants to become an engineer to get a licence to do certain things sooner than they would be able to do if they had to complete the full licence.

Most people will be able to expand their licences in Stage 1, should they choose to, through an approved maintenance training organisation.

Stage 2, which we aim to introduce next year, will expand the pathways to remove exclusions through a self-study pathway which is used by a small but important cohort.

This will help people in regional areas who have trouble accessing maintenance training organisations.

These two important GA Workplan initiatives have been complex issues for us to work through, but we’re confident they’re positive developments and deliver some of the benefits being sought by industry while maintaining an appropriate level of safety.

All the best,

Pip

---

Comments in reply, via FB:

Ralph Holland


These are observations and opinions;

Can you really believe that the CASA medical authoritarian public servants, delegates and consultants will divest their power and authority to the likes of pilots like you and me to self/assess their medical status?

What data analysis did they use to derive 70 percent of the fleet when we are actually talking about pilots and not aeroplanes? Does that seem mixed up to you like it does to me?
Can you believe that they won’t have notes in their licensing software and on your pilot certificate stating medical review required , and that will be removed?

So you believe their statement World first is correct when other ICAO states have obviously been there first?

Obviously they employ good technical and media release writers, it reads well, but we care about semantic content and action.

Yet another survey when they should already be informed over all these years.

The lack of progress, the push back installation of exceptions and restrictions is one way to ensure this never happens just like the last medical announcement that turned out to be at commercial truck driver standard, meanwhile the delegated RAUS self-management company continue to operate and grow promoting the demise of General Aviation numbers.

I looks like the typical delaying tactics employed of inaction when they don’t want to support or listen to industry.

They send out surveys, they get the responses they don’t like to hear or agree with, so they send out another survey. They have already been asked to adopt a consistent practice as other ICAO States have adopted. The same goes for all their legislation they have to write their own with CASA flavoured nuances so it appears they can justify budget to keep the factory operating.

Safe Skies are Empty Skies!

---

Michael Webb

Will be interesting to see the list of limitations CASA will impose. You can bet it will mean very little to those people who are being discriminated against yet perfectly capable of flying safely.

---

Tony Callaghan

Yeah and when you get knocked back on a class 2 medical and then you self assess only to find that they refer back to your class 2 application and your self assessment then also gets declined.

---

Jimmy White

The Lunatics are obviously still running the asylum

Hmmm...???



   

MTF...P2 

[Sandy Reith]

An ode to the aviation medically vanquished pilots, with nod to Ralph Holland, Michael Webb, Tony Callaghan and Jimmy White.
PS Ralph, the current Basic C2 has to be com. heavy truck ‘unconditional’ meaning that I could drive a truck load of avgas through a city on a (quite common) conditional licence but not fly a VH reg. light aircraft.

The Real and Truthful Version of the Media Release of Ms. Pip Spence’s supposed reform of medical certification for Private Pilots.

We'll open yet another consultation later this month on a proposal that will give Australia's private pilots, mostly for those that don’t need flexibility when it comes to renewing their medical certificates.

We went through the motions of reviewing your responses to last year's medical policy review and other feedback from what’s left of the aviation community to design another clunker medical certification process for general and recreational pilots that will do nothing but frustrate the GA community once again.

Unbelievably, for the umpteen time, we will again, soonish, ask for your views on a proposed Class 5 medical self-declaration knowing that few will bother to comment in the sure knowledge of CASA’s time wasting pretences.

The new Class 5 medical self-declaration, which was flogged half to death in our General Aviation Workplan, will allow a few private pilots who meet our idea of fitness requirements to self-assess and self-declare without the need to see a doctor.

Those who meet the eligibility criteria, like only flying aircraft of restricted weight, no IFR, and satisfy other (totally without rational or statistical basis) requirements will have a Class 5 self-declared medical automatically issued.

The self-assessment would see applicants answer a simple set of questions using CASA's current online systems, much like the current MRS with hundred of questions. Questions including what’s your drug taking habit, your mental stability, your complete medical history, medicines, family medical history etc. and as is the case for all our regs., any found discrepancies shall be treated as criminal offences with strict liability applied.

Access to training modules and comprehensive guidance material will help you make a well-informed and appropriate decision, allow a couple of weeks study, and answer 100% correctly a proposed set of questions to demonstrate your self assessing abilities. Re-sit failed exams after 6 months re-education in a special facility in the dungeons of Aviation Hearse, oops typo ‘House.’

Adoption of the proposal will mean that most people who fly the majority of hours in private operations will be able to apply for a Class 5 medical self-declaration, noting the medical exclusions and operational limitations (actually already decided) that will exclude numerous operations and discourage various elements of GA yet again leading to less employment and higher costs throughout.

We estimate the new system will cover about 70% of the Australian VH reg GA aircraft fleet, noting that the many thousands of RAAUS and gliding aircraft and pilots are not in contention (and don’t do any aviation medicals). This leaves nearly all of the capable and safe flying twin and heavier aircraft GA pilots still to battle with the monstrous, costly and time consuming current system.

There will, of course, be lots of exceptions and thousands of pilots will still need to see a doctor and be assessed by our so called experts whose employment in AVMED might otherwise be compromised due to lack of work.

The proposal also does not cover riskier activities such as aerobatics, formation flying and night Visual Flight Rules operations, or risky IFR, ag ops, flying in windy conditions or takeoff and landing at other than registered airports.

We believe the Class 5 medical is a world first in terms of trusting pilots because we completely ignore 70 years of successful Australian gliding ops and 40 years of RAAUS same, no aviation medicals. We also pretend that we know nothing of our current failed Basic C2 or the self declared USA BasicMed, UK or NZ models that have been in effect for years. Working on allowing pilots to decide on their own fitness is incredibly involved and we worked diligently and wasting as much time as possible with the aviation medicine technical working group to arrive at a proposal that ensures regulation to a risk profile that has not one fact or statistic to lend a scintilla of evidence to our proposal and is managed inappropriately for the sole benefit of CASA’s employment, power play and salary priorities.

We're already working on the systems that will support the new self-declaration process and we aim to go live as soon as practicable, following the outcomes of the public consultation. In other words our self serving system is already decided and we stretch out the farce as long as possible.

I'd like to acknowledge the contribution of our technical working group on this important initiative and other ongoing considerations for aviation medicine reform because they’ve made us look like we are being busy and serious.

[Peetwo]

CASA Estimates: 23/10/23

Via APH:  Hansard out, see - HERE - or PDF Version - HERE:

CHAIR: Welcome back, everyone! I welcome officers from CASA. I won't ask for opening statements; if you have one you can table it. Senator Fawcett, who is 60 today, has the call. Happy birthday—there's no better way to spend it than at Senate estimates!

Senator FAWCETT: We won't be asking for your age, either, Ms Spence, you'll be glad to hear!

Ms Spence : Happy birthday, Senator!

Senator FAWCETT: Thank you. In fact, this does actually take me back a little bit. I'm assuming that in preparation for your role you read through the Hansard transcripts of many years and that you're aware that between 2014 and 2017 your predecessors and I had many discussions about colour-vision-deficient pilots?

Ms Spence : Yes.

CHAIR: I'm aware of it!

Senator FAWCETT: Eventually, as you'd be aware, in February 2020 your predecessor, Mr Carmody, announced something to the world, which I will read from the statement that he sent out:

Research in recent years has shown relying on diagnostic tests alone may be unnecessarily limiting when considering the impact of colour vision deficiency on aviation safety. Advances in technology, operating techniques and human factors training can now mitigate many of the safety risks of colour vision deficiency. Technology to assist pilots has developed significantly and the impact of colour vision deficiency on aviation safety should take these changes into account.

At the end of his statement he said:

CASA has carefully examined all relevant safety issues and believes this new approach—

Which is the same as in New Zealand and for the FAA—

offers a practical alternative assessment for colour vision deficient pilots. We have listened to the views of pilots and made judgements based on research and evidence.

That is a fantastic outcome. They changed the lot of pilots, which had been thrown into confusion by a new senior medical officer within CASA who didn't like Australia's position, which was to allow pilots to do an operational test. Despite losing AAT cases et cetera and despite reviews of evidence that finally proved we should do this operational test, like the New Zealanders and the FAA, it's all happening again. Could you explain why CASA is spending half a million dollars on a review? What is the evidence base to justify this change of position? What incidents have occurred? What evidence has led to the decision to spend half a million dollars of taxpayers' money and overturn what has been in the CASRs for some years now, to the detriment of a group of individuals in our aviation community?

Ms Spence : I wouldn't describe it in the same way that you have, in terms of someone coming in and not supporting the previous position. I will ask our principal medical officer if she wouldn't mind joining us at the table, but I think the first thing really is that it's a question about what's consistent with the standards versus what's okay from an operational perspective. I don't think we've changed our position that there aren't ways of overcoming the issue of colour blindness from an operational perspective. I think there is a different question about whether that is consistent with the standards, and that's a harder question to answer, so I might pass to Dr Manderson to provide a bit more detail.

Senator FAWCETT: Dr Manderson, welcome.

Dr Manderson : Thank you very much. Regarding the colour vision assessment, what we found a couple years ago, and going back a bit before that, was that there was a lot of difficulty and confusion in how that colour vision assessment was being applied by the flight instructors who were assessing the pilots with colour vision deficiencies and in how the pilots themselves knew what they would be expected to demonstrate in their flights. We had some difficulties where the forms and the flights were not being conducted to a consistent standard across the board. Someone might have one kind of flight or assessment with one assessor and a completely different one with somebody else. With that degree of confusion and lack of clarity, we realised that, having established that an operational flight based assessment was really important, how we did that was where there was a big gap in what we were doing and why we were doing it, and it was that gap that led to all of that confusion and some difficulties in what standard was being met by whom and when. That's why we saw that gap in the how that hadn't been filled by any of those other organisations or jurisdictions.

We've consulted really quite extensively. Even last Friday we had an international meeting here in Canberra with our colleagues from FAA, New Zealand and ICAO. The United States military have come across as well to share their experiences with us and how we do it now. There really is a global consensus that the approach we've taken is world leading and will make a big difference to the consistent application of a good standard that our instructors and pilots can rely on to make a safe decision.

Senator FAWCETT: Sure. I don't have a problem with standardisation. I think that's excellent. I do note my understanding is that New Zealand did have a course to standardise their examiners, which we didn't adopt, even though we adopted their operational test. Am I correct in my understanding of that?

Dr Manderson : I'm not familiar with the detail of the way the New Zealand team initially applied theirs, but they're certainly very excited about looking at what we're doing and learning from what we're doing. That's because we have gone to the next level. There's much more depth and it's much more comprehensive. The CAA New Zealand chief medical officer is very interested in learning from what we've done.

Senator FAWCETT: My understanding is that, because we didn't have any standardisation initially, the initial batch of flight examiners went to New Zealand to get their training there. In fact, we encouraged or enabled it, saying that, if pilots wished to bear the cost to go to New Zealand to be tested by the New Zealanders, we would accept that as a valid system that did have standardisation and did the test. I don't have a problem with standardisation. What I have a problem with is this. When I look at your website, we have gone back to the days of saying: if you pass the operational test, we are still going to limit you in terms of what you can do as a pilot; for example, fly as or with a copilot. Given everything Mr Carmody said, everything the AAT found and cases back in ancient history—30 years ago now—when Australia became a world leader, what evidence justifies that imposition of a restriction on someone who passes the operational test?

Dr Manderson: The evidence is based around the demonstration of being able to do the elements of the flying task that have been assessed by this international group of expert pilots and flying instructors as being the time-critical, safety-critical colour-vision-dependent tasks of the flying task. That was a gap that was there in the work that was done leading up to the New Zealand assessment that we've now been able to produce. It is not about the medical diagnosis; it is what it is with the diagnosis of colour vision deficiency. The evidence is now about being able to know exactly how that medical status affects a person's fitness to fly and fly safely. That's exactly the same as we do with people with kidney disease, hearing deficiency or heart disease. They don't meet the standard, but now we can—in very great detail and very safely—effectively and consistently assess whether or not the way they meet the standard presents a hazard to safe air navigation. That's the way we do all of our medical assessments.

Senator FAWCETT: In theory that is fine. What you're describing is that your test is now focusing on some discrete task elements that you believe are important. But what your website says is that even if someone passes that test—they've now jumped through these additional hoops of specific tasks—you're still going to put limitations on what they can exercise as captain in command of an aircraft. What is the evidence to justify those limitations? That is my question.

Mr Marcelja : Could I jump in? The website and some of that information sits in my area. I think what you're describing, if that is correct, is not our policy. Our policy is that there are various conditions that we can put on medical certificates, depending on how you go in the test, but if you pass the test and can demonstrate that you're operationally safe there is no condition of a copilot. What Dr Manderson is saying, though, is that, because you have not met a medical standard that's internationally accepted but have proven you are safe, we will grant you a medical certificate. We can't say that you've met a standard but we can say you're safe to fly, and those conditions will be applied depending on the way you've gone. If that's on our website, I'll take that up, because that's not the policy.

Senator FAWCETT: I have two points. I think it was amply proven almost a decade ago, and two decades before that, as we dug into the history, that those standards emerged from maritime standards that were applied in the United Kingdom in the days of Sopwith Camels and things in World War 1, and the reason we no longer require them is that we have secondary means of communication. We've demonstrated through a whole range of flight profiles and cockpit modifications, particularly with the advent of EFIS screens et cetera, that many of the old colour hierarchies around warnings et cetera are no longer relevant. They're not required to do the task. Even the red and green lights are not required. Pilots wear Bluetooth headsets.

I come back to the fact that your website—at this stage, this is what industry is seeing—states that a pilot who passes the test will have these restrictions until they have 100 hours of flight at night, the ATPL standard, or 75 hours of instrument time. I've done just a very quick bit of research on the current costing of something like a Cessna 172RG, which is the kind of aircraft for night VFR or instrument flying, the costs between Moorabbin, Dubbo, Adelaide and Sunshine Coast vary from about $250 to $355, excluding GST. We're putting a burden on pilots who want to enter the industry of $30,000 to $40,000, and I'm not aware of any evidence that would justify those restrictions if they have passed the operational test.

Ms Spence : I think what we're saying is that we think our website's wrong. We will go back to review it, because that doesn't sound like our policy. As Dr Manderson said, we're working—and we're working internationally—looking at how we manage this issue. But the whole point, in the simplest terms, was that if you pass the test then you've got a permission to fly. Those sorts of conditions you've just described should not be applying. If you can bear with us, we'll review the website, because what you've read out just doesn't sound right.

Senator FAWCETT: I'll have a look tomorrow afternoon. I'll be very pleased to see that gone. This is my last question. My understanding is that, in accordance with the regulation—which I could look up; I've got it written here somewhere, but I'm sure you know what it is—CASA was still advising pilots to do the operational test, which they did at some cost, and then AvMed were denying them an aircrew medical because CASA had changed its mind, even though the regulation still said it was possible and even though pilots have been directed to that. Some pilots now, over periods in excess of 12 months, have forked out thousands of dollars to take a flight test and have had their application refused. What is the situation for people who have previously done it, before this change in approach? What is the situation for those who did it in the intervening period, when the regulation said they would be approved? They committed to a flight test on that basis and have now been told they're not able to fly. What is CASA going to do to enable those people to move ahead with their lives, and can you guarantee there's going to be no retrospective action against the many pilots who did the original operational flight test as announced in 2020 and have been flying—single-pilot, in RFDS type operations, and multi-pilot, in RPT operations, both domestically and overseas—without incident since they got their medicals? Can you guarantee that they will be able to continue to exercise the qualifications that they have earned in accordance with the regulation, or will there be any retrospective action that CASA is looking to impose upon them?

Ms Spence : Can I just jump in first: if you've got people who've come to you saying that they haven't been approved, I would really encourage you to refer them to me, Mr Marcelja or Dr Manderson, because that doesn't sound like that's consistent with our policy. I would have thought, with medicals, that they're things that come up every two years or whatever, depending on where you are, and so there would be no retrospective requirements. If matters change over time then get your medical renewed, but there's certainly not an intention to have a retrospective element to all of this. Again, for anyone who's spoken to you and said that they've been refused on the grounds that you've described, please encourage them to talk to us, because that just doesn't sound right.

Senator FAWCETT: This is my last question, Chair, before you wind me up. Industry had been told that the new test and all of its conditions would be released in September this year. We're now approaching the end of October. Where are we at, and when will these people have some certainty about their future or current careers?

Mr Marcelja : We have slowed that down just a little bit because we're working through some of those implementation issues that you just mentioned. As Ms Spence said, we don't expect people to automatically have to prove things themselves, but, where we've discovered that a test maybe has some uncertainty around it, we might ask somebody to do that test again. In that circumstance, we would fund that. These are the policies that we haven't yet settled, which is why you haven't seen a policy come out. They haven't been finalised, but they're very close. As Ms Spence said, we'd very happily follow up any individual case where someone's been disadvantaged, because our understanding was that the existing scheme was in place while we were settling the new one.

Ms Spence : As far as my understanding goes, no-one has been refused—

Dr Manderson : There have been no refusals or cancellations for colour vision deficiency.

Senator FA WCETT: Okay. I'll go back to the email trail that I have been given and see if I can see whether there's substance to what was reflected in that email. If that's the case, I will come to you, Ms Spence, as the best person to—

Ms Spence : That'd be great. Thanks, Senator.

---

Torres Strait & remote airstrips.

Senator McDONAL D: I get a lot of feedback about not having staff where you operate, where the aircraft operate. At the May estimates, we discussed the airstrips in the Torres Strait and the Civil Aviation Authority applicable to the three strips there. Tragically, a life was lost only a couple of weeks after that estimates hearing because air services were not able to be provided. Has a solution been developed to allow services to be restored to these islands?

Ms Spence : Yes.

Senator McDONALD: To all three?

Ms Spence : Yes, to all three, and we've also got two airlines operating there—both Hinterland and Skytrans.

Senator McDONALD: What was the solution that was provided in the end?

Ms Spence : It was extensive testing of the operations that Skytrans have in place with a particular aircraft that they're using, but I might ask my colleague Mr Monahan to provide a bit more detail.

Mr Monahan : As Ms Spence pointed out, it was a more robust safety case that aligned how they were going to operate and identified the controls that they suggested, that we agreed to, that now make them safe—because one end of the runway on one of them was different; it required a slight modification. Once we settled that, they were then able to operate into there.

Senator McDONALD: Who paid for the modification of that end of the strip?

Mr Monahan : They didn't modify the end of the strip. The way they fly the approach and the way they manage the arrivals was different, in that they were cognisant of what was different about that end of the runway versus the other one. They did an individual assessment of each runway in the end, and then we found what they had was suitable. That enabled us to reduce the factoring for them, to allow them to get in there.

Senator McDONALD: You know my opinion on this. There were no incidents reported; there was no safety case raised. You implemented a system that meant that those islands didn't have a service, and then the final solution was that the pilots assessed how they landed there, to land in a safe way.

Mr Monahan : No, they do it differently to how they did it before. They do it with additional controls in place that make them safe and appropriately safe for the type of operation they want—

Senator McDONALD: Did they introduce them to satisfy CASA or because they were safer?

Ms Spence : It's definitely safer, and I think you would appreciate as much as anyone that regulations are always a balance between—

Senator McDONALD: Let's not talk about this anymore because I will get too distressed about the outcome and no interim—you mentioned in the May estimates that there were other aerodromes that would have similar issues. I believe you were referring to airstrips that were built before such sophisticated aircraft were using them. What other airstrips would these be?

Ms Spence : I don't have a list of the airstrips. I think the only operator that we've currently got any issues that we're working through with is the Queensland RFDS. We've got arrangements in place that allow them to continue to operate to some of those smaller strips which don't meet the same arrangements, but because of the nature of those operations—they're not a commercial air transport service—that's allowed us to have a slightly different approach with the Queensland RFDS. I think that's the only one.

Mr Monahan : That's correct.

Senator McDONALD: Are there any strips that you have prevented the RFDS from landing on?

Ms Spence : There are some strips that we're monitoring closely and have given them approval to operate while they work through what they might need to do to their aircraft to be able to operate to those strips in a way that meets our requirements around factoring that we've discussed.

Senator McDONALD: Are these in Queensland, the Northern Territory or Western Australia?

Ms Spence : These are in Queensland.

Senator McDONALD: Is that because they're using twin-engine aircraft and not the Pilatus that they use in other states?

Mr Monahan : It would depend on the type of aircraft and its performance capability on what runway combination.

Senator McDONALD: Could you provide me on notice that list of airstrips and the reasons why there are some restrictions on them?

Mr Marcelja : Absolutely, Senator. I wanted to say that we're not impacting any operations at the moment, so we're working through that. No-one's operations are being impacted, to our knowledge, in terms of restrictions. We'll absolutely get you a list of where we're working through it. We're also working with the department on whether we can identify any strips. Our intention is to try and get ahead of it so that we're not in a situation where someone's stopping.

Senator McDONALD: I would certainly hope not, because the problem with RFDS is that they don't land at a lot of places. I know people who have landed in remote places because the RFDS can't land to pick them up, because they can't land on roads and in other places that they were designed to be used for. But it's northern Australia; nobody gives a bugger, so let's not talk about it. Who's going to pay for the upgrades of these airfields?

Ms Spence : At this stage, we're working with the operators to see whether there are things that we can do, like with the Torres Strait and how they can demonstrate that they can operate safely. It's more likely to be modifications to aircraft at this stage, but that's something we're still working through.

Senator McDONALD: The other assistant minister suggested that the councils could apply for money from the remote airfields.

Ms Spence : That's correct.

Senator McDONALD: Have you put together any suggestions or assistance for those remote councils to apply for those monies?

Ms Spence : We haven't identified any. We know that the only solution is physical investment in the infrastructure. So we haven't as yet, but we talk regularly with the department and understand how their programs operate.

Senator McDONALD: On notice, will you provide me the list of the six other airstrips for the Torres Strait, if I haven't asked you that already?

Ms Spence : Six?

Senator McDONALD: At the last estimates, you told me there were six other strips.

Mr Marcelja : I don't remember the number, but we'll certainly provide the strips.

Senator McDONALD: You mentioned that you met with the council in Cairns a few weeks before the last May estimates. I assume that that was the Torres Strait Council.

Ms Spence : That's correct.

Senator McDONALD: Did they travel 800 kilometres to Cairns to meet you or did you travel to Torres Strait to meet them?

Ms Spence : We met in Cairns at their suggestion.

Mr Marcelja : My understanding was that they were in Cairns for other business, so they didn't travel just to meet us.

---

CASA approvals for EMS/Firebombing aircraft.

CHAIR: Any further questions of CASA?

Senator McKENZIE: Yes, there is one—whatever one it was.

Senator CANAVAN: I will try to do it as quickly as I can. What regulation does CASA use to authorise the conduct of emergency service response aviation activities within Australia?

Ms Spence : Can you provide a little bit more context to that question?

Senator CANAVAN: With respect to emergency services, when you do need a response, what activities or services do you provide in an emergency?

Senator McKENZIE: When we have massive planes dumping water or fire retardant.

Mr Monahan : For emergencies, that would be part 138.

Ms Spence : Which is regulating aerial work.

Mr Monahan : That's aerial work. I apologise.

Senator CANAVAN: Does the regulation authorise the use of modified transport category aircraft and ex-military aircraft in those situations?

Ms Spence : There would be multiple points to that question, and there are processes that need to be worked through before modified aircraft can be operated in Australia, usually through restricted type certification.

Mr Monahan : Ms Spence is right. There is accommodation for some of them but not in every aspect of the aerial work portfolio. It depends on what they want to do, but it's more limited.

Senator CANAVAN: So part 138 does authorise ex-military aircraft?

Mr Monahan : It does, but it doesn't necessarily allow them to do everything.

Ms Spence : There are quite detailed processes that need to be worked through to approve those types of aircraft operating in Australia, even for part 138 operations.

Mr Monahan : That's where they would start. It just depends on what they want to do and the type of aircraft.

Senator CANAVAN: I'm rushing through this, but my understanding, or what I'm informed, is that ex-military aircraft in the US are an important part of the firefighting capability and that, in the US, specialist support and direct firefighting personnel can be carried on ex-military aircraft. But apparently that's not permitted here. Is that correct?

Mr Mona han : It's correct, because the US model is different to the Australian model. I think the case you are speaking of is working under the public use model, which is a very different construct that actually is not governed by an FAA regulation. It's governed by risk acceptance by the state, and it doesn't have the same oversight.

Senator CANAVAN: Have we looked at that before?

Mr Monahan : Absolutely.

Senator CANAVAN: Why don't we allow that while the US does?

Ms Spence : We actually have some work underway, but one point of clarification—you can let me know if I'm wrong—is that I didn't think they could actually carry firefighters on those aircraft in the US. It's more agricultural. I didn't think they were actually able to carry passengers.

Senator CANAVAN: Maybe you could come back. We'll put some questions on notice on that.

Mr Monahan : Sure.

Senator CANAVAN: And we can get some more information, but, given the time, we'll move on.

Senator McDONALD: Can I just suggest that we went through this at length with Senator Patrick a couple of years ago, and it would be good to dust off those answers, because it wasn't very satisfactory at the time. There was some talk about exactly this issue of who was being carried on the aircraft. Could you make sure that your answers align with that.

Senator McKENZIE: And 'They're undertaking some work' has been the answer for a couple of estimates. Eventually we'd like to understand what that looks like.

Ms Spence : I can confirm that we are actively engaging with the various RFSs across the country to try and understand exactly what they need. I think there has been a step forward from where we were two years ago.

CHAIR: CASA, thank you very much.

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Latest Spence bollocks briefing: Monahan & Walker gone -

 
DIrector of Aviation Safety, Pip Spence

The General Aviation Workplan continues to forge ahead with progress on proposals aimed at simplifying access to medicals, maintenance and airspace.

Last week, we opened the promised consultation on proposed Class 5 medical self-declarations as well as an initiative to increase access to Class C and D controlled airspace for sport and recreational aircraft.

The Class 5 proposal was outlined in the last edition of CASA Briefing but will essentially allow private pilots to self-assess and self-declare if they meet certain fitness requirements and operate within specified bounds.

We believe this will give most of Australia's pilots unprecedented flexibility when it comes to renewing their medical certificates, including those in remote and regional areas.

Increased access to Class C and D controlled airspace is something long sought by sport and recreational pilots and we want your comments on requirements that will allow you to safely do this.

Currently, this includes pilot and radio competency standards as well as medical fitness and aircraft equipment requirements.

Details of how to participate in both these consultations are available in this newsletter.

We're also putting the finishing touches on the proposed ruleset, implementation guidelines, and supporting material for another GA Workplan initiative offering simpler maintenance rules for private and aerial work aircraft.

The basic aim of the proposed Part 43 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations is to maintain appropriate levels of safety while minimising the regulatory burden on general aviation and keeping compliance costs low.

It will allow independent licensed aircraft maintenance engineers (LAMEs) to provide most maintenance services on private and aerial work aircraft without the additional expense of setting up an approved maintenance organisation.

We have extensively consulted on this proposed policy, making sure to take our time to consider the concerns raised by stakeholders.

In developing the proposed Part 43 we took on board feedback from industry, including through the technical working group and Aviation Safety Advisory Panel.

We’re in the process of consulting on 9 new fees to support the proposed new regime, in accordance with the Australian government’s cost recovery policy.

These include fees for granting inspection authorisations to category B1 and B2 maintenance licence holders, as well as for aircraft maintenance technician certificates for specialised maintenance functions.

Once the fees are settled, we’ll be seeking final endorsement for the new rules with the expectation of completing the legislative package in the first half of 2024.

One of our next focus areas will be working on the post-implementation review of Part 145 requirements, including where operations still under Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 30 should sit.

Still on maintenance, we received 34 submissions from a variety of stakeholders on our proposed modular licensing structure and we will use this to make changes to the Part 66 Manual of Standards.

A summary of the consultation will go to the Part 66 Technical Working Group and will be published on our consultation hub.

We will continue to work with the Technical Working Group to ensure any issues arising from the consultation are appropriately addressed.

We have completed 11 of the GA Workplan initiatives and hope to deliver 3 more in the next few months, including the first stage of modular licensing and the Part 131 Manual of Standards impacting balloons and hot air airships.

This coincides with a decision by the Australian Ballooning Federation to hand back administration of recreational (private) ballooning activities to CASA, although this is not related to the workplan.

We are also looking at a refresh of the GA Workplan and we will be working with industry to prioritise existing projects and to identify any new initiatives. As always, we will keep you informed.

Finally, I’d like to acknowledge the contribution of 2 members of our senior leadership team who are leaving CASA to pursue other opportunities, Chris Monahan and Rob Walker.

Chris has done a stellar job of leading the National Operations and Standards Division since March 2018, including landing the long-awaited flight operations regulations, driving the last elements of the regulatory reform agenda and helping us prepare for new and emerging technology.

After more than 7 years, Rob leaves CASA in a stronger position than when he started as a result of his work both in building up the Stakeholder Engagement Division and more recently in leading the Regulatory Oversight Division.

I wish them both well.

All the best,

Pip

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

Miniscule Dicky King weighs in on CASA ineptitude on Broome R44 fatal?? - 

Via LinkedIn... :

Australian Aviation
53,678 followers
2h •

Transport Minister Catherine King has defended CASA’s handling of the company responsible for 2020’s fatal crash of a Robinson R44 helicopter which killed a young girl.

The minister told ABC Radio in Perth this week that CASA “can’t be everywhere” in response to questions from host Nadia Mitsopoulos over whether the crash, which took the life of 12-year-old Amber Jess Millar (pictured), could have been prevented had CASA been more proactive.

https://ow.ly/xgqe50Q5Mti

---

The minister told ABC Radio in Perth this week that CASA “can’t be everywhere” in response to questions from host Nadia Mitsopoulos over whether the crash, which took the life of 12-year-old Amber Jess Millar (pictured), could have been prevented had CASA been more proactive.

“We can’t have investigators everywhere, but what we can have is eyes on the industry everywhere, and that is incumbent on all of us, if we see something, report it, if we see that there’s unsafe action, or you think there is unsafe action in the industry,” she said.

“General aviation is a big sector, it is everywhere, in small airports, small properties, all the way across the country, it is really important that people report incidents if they think something is happening and report that to CASA so they can investigate, cause they just can’t be everywhere.”

The Australian in August obtained documents under FOI suggesting CASA had known of previous reckless conduct by pilot Troy Thomas’s company, Horizontal Falls Seaplane Adventures, in 2018.

Amber’s mother and stepfather, Fiona and Clint Benbow, have previously said CASA has “blood on its hands” over the incident, an accusation the agency refutes.

“It is soul destroying to know that CASA did nothing with the evidence it had received about Troy Thomas and others except to turn a blind eye,” said Mrs Benbow.

“We aren’t talking about ignoring hearsay or gossip. They had hard photographic and videographic evidence.

“If CASA is not going to act on information it receives about ­pilots and companies, why bother to have a regulator?”

Minister King said she has asked CASA to look at the incident and determine if there is anything further the authority needs to do.

“CASA has said publicly, obviously had the pilot survived the accident, they would have taken action against the pilot, but that unfortunately they’re not able to do, he lost his life in that incident as well. They’ve said that really clearly that’s what would have happened,” she said.

“ATSB have finished its investigation and didn’t find any direct findings against CASA, and really what ATSB will do, and they’re the investigators, will look at whether there’s any systemic failures that need further work.”

According to the ATSB’s report, the crash was caused by an overstress fracture in the tail rotor gearbox’s input cartridge that may have been picked up had more been done about reports of unusual vibrations in the rotor pedals.

The crash investigator also noted Thomas’ “high-risk appetite” and lack of a current aviation medical certificate or R44 helicopter flight review at the time of the accident.

“Additionally, during a review of the past usage of VH-NBY to identify any previous events that may have damaged the tail rotor, numerous instances of high risk operation by the accident pilot were identified (together with several reportable matters that had not been conveyed to the ATSB),” the ATSB wrote.

“These included the conduct of low flying and external load operations without the required training or qualifications and, more significantly, the carriage of passengers in an unsafe manner on multiple occasions.”

UDB! - 

MTF...P2 

[Earl Lank]

C’mon, the solution was identified by CASA at the time:

“We encourage people to always check pilots are appropriately licensed and qualified to fly and to report any safety concerns they may have to CASA or the Australian Transport Safety Bureau."

Amber and her parents are to blame for not checking that the pilot was appropriately licensed and qualified. Shame on them.

[Peetwo]

Su_Spence timeline of negligence and duplicity on Top End Robbo and Tourism Ops!! - 

To begin I start with the following extract from this week's #SBG:  Ineptitude, Insouciance and perhaps...

DK: “But again, it’s whether there was any further action in terms of the maintenance of this craft, whether there’s more, broader systemic things that they think they need to do. So they’re continuing to look at that, but ATSB have finished its investigation and didn’t find any direct findings against CASA, and really what ATSB will do, and they’re the investigators, will look at whether there’s any systemic failures that need further work.”

BRB - But How??? This was defined (modulated) to a “defined” investigation; not a 'systemic' investigation. Whole world of difference. ATSB being obliging and Popinjay (he, a graduate of the NFI idea club) just hopes it all slides by. BOLLOCKS....

Working backwards on the TONAD and very much related, to perhaps 'broader systemic things', I note the following Oz articles published in recent days... (TY CW.. )

Broome Council never authorised industrial site to be used as helicopter landing strip before fatal crash



Award-winning West Australian tourism operator Troy Thomas used a crowded industrial property in the Kimberley as a helicopter landing site – without council permission or anyone noticing – for at least four years before it became the scene of a fatal crash that killed him and a 12-year-old girl.

On July 4, 2020, Thomas and Perth schoolgirl Amber Millar were killed when his chopper – registered VH-NBY – crashed within 2.7 seconds of take-off from the Bilingurr industrial site, 3km north of Broome Airport.

The Australian can now reveal that immediately after the double-fatality WA Police exercised their coronial investigation powers to find out if the high-profile tourism operator was authorised to take-off from and land aircraft at the crowded Antheous Way property, just a few minutes’ drive from a regional airport.

Documents obtained from Broome Shire Council under Freedom of Information laws reveal that three days after the crash detectives were already asking whether Thomas had approval to use his private warehouse and residential premises as a helicopter landing site.

On July 7, 2020, a Broome detective – whose name was redacted – asked the council for copies of building plans, zoning, complaints and planning approvals related to the industrial site.



Planning and Building Services manager Kirsten Wood told police the property was zoned ‘Light and Service Industry’ under Local Planning Scheme No 6.

“The Shire did not receive any request for approval to land and take off helicopters from the site,” she emailed the investigator.

“To use the land as a helicopter landing pad, the land use definition under LPS6 would be ‘landing strip’... A ‘landing strip’ is an ‘X’ use (not permitted) in the Light and Service Industry area, which the subject site is zoned.

“The Shire has not issued any specific approval for the property to be used as a landing strip.”

Ms Wood said that the site was only approved as a warehouse, which is the “storing of goods”, and a development application would have needed to have been submitted and approved to use the site as a landing strip.

“Through the application process it would have to be demonstrated how the land use is incidental to an approved use on site,” she said.

“It would also need to be demonstrated that CASA safety standards would be met and noise regulations could be satisfied.”

The correspondence between council officers and WA Police suggested that Broome Shire was unaware of Thomas taking off from and landing helicopters at the Bilingurr industrial site because it never received any reports or noise complaints about aircraft activity at that location.

The fenced 2000-square metre property – which Thomas and his widow Sophie purchased in 2007 – contained large sheds and private residences where the Thomas family lived. It was also used to store equipment and assets for their tourism operations.



The Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s final report into the fatal crash said that due to COVID-19, more equipment than usual was stored at the industrial site at the time of the fatal crash.

“As a result, the site was more confined than usual, presenting an increased risk for helicopter operations,” its final report said.

“The site at Bilingurr was used as the home base for the helicopter and partly intended for use for the arrival or departure of helicopters.

“The operator stated that the site was operated as a basic helicopter landing site (HLS). However, helicopters had been used at the site for at least 4 years.”

A civil aviation advisory circular in force at the time of the crash defined “basic” HLS as “a place that may be used as an aerodrome for infrequent, opportunity and short-term operations … by day under helicopter Visual Meteorological Conditions.”

In the weeks preceding the fatal crash, both Thomas and pilot Bryce McGlashan had observed an unusual vibration through the tail rotor pedals of VH-NBY.

The day before the fatal crash, on July 3, a team of engineers from an approved maintenance organisation attended the industrial site to inspect the chopper but refused to perform the required check flight at that location for safety reasons.

“The LAME (licensed aircraft maintenance engineer) reported wanting someone to fly the helicopter as they wanted to determine if the reported vibration in the pedals was detectable in flight,” the ATSB report said.

“The AMO pilot elected not to hover or fly the helicopter in the industrial site as they felt that it was too confined and were concerned about foreign object damage if they hovered the helicopter.”



The owner of the AMO told the ATSB that he advised both Thomas and Mr McGlashan of the requirement for a check flight to be carried out. This was also annotated in their maintenance documentation.

“However, the pilot that first detected the vibration and the accident pilot were reportedly unaware that a check flight was required,” the ATSB wrote.

The next day Thomas, a private pilot who was unlicensed at the time, performed a high-powered vertical take-off from the industrial site in VH-NBY with three passengers on board.

“The confined area associated with the industrial property required the pilot of VH-NBY to conduct a near-vertical departure, within the avoid area of the height / velocity diagram, limiting the energy available in the helicopter to use in an emergency response,” the ATSB found.

“That departure also demanded higher power than the recommended take-off profile over open ground.”

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has previously declined to answer questions about whether Thomas had permission to take off from or land at the industrial site; however emails between Thomas and CASA obtained under FOI make no mention of it.

Civil Aviation Regulations state that an aircraft shall not land at, or take-off from, any place unless the place “is suitable for use as an aerodrome for the purposes of the landing and taking-off of aircraft; and, having regard to all the circumstances of the proposed landing or take-off (including the prevailing weather conditions), the aircraft can land at, or take-off from, the place in safety”.

Helicopter take-offs from the industrial site required clearance from Broome’s Air Traffic Control tower because the site is within Class Delta airspace.

The Australian is aware of Thomas taking off from and landing at the property on multiple occasions, including with paying passengers after performing an unauthorised medical evacuation from a vessel in August 2019.

This comes after a WA coroner last month refused repeated pleas from Amber’s parents to hold an inquest into their only child’s preventable death.

Pilot Troy Thomas performed unauthorised helicopter medical evacuations before fatal Broome crash



A high-profile tourism operator, whose private pilot license had expired, was performing commercial medical evacuations off the coast of Western Australia before the fatal Kimberley chopper crash that killed him and a 12-year-old girl.

In July 2020, pilot Troy Thomas and Perth schoolgirl Amber Millar were killed when his helicopter – registered VH-NBY – crashed immediately after take-off from an industrial site in Broome.

The Australian can now reveal that prior to the fatal crash, Thomas was performing medical evacuations in his choppers for which he charged passengers thousands of dollars.

In July 2019, Thomas airlifted a passenger from luxury catamaran MV Diversity II, off the WA coast, in his Robinson R44 registered VH-ZGY. That helicopter was destroyed the next day when he crashed it off the top of his boat.

Weeks later on August 2, Thomas airlifted Elly Hayes and her husband David from expedition vessel Odyssey in a different helicopter and charged them almost $2000 for the service.

Ms Hayes, 76, said that Thomas performed the paid medical evacuation after she became unwell on the first afternoon of a nine-day cruise.

The Australian understands that the vessel’s skipper called the Royal Flying Doctors Service, who conducted a telehealth consultation.

The vessel’s owner then contacted Thomas about performing a medical evacuation for Ms Hayes and her husband.

“It was kind of dusk when we got picked up,” Ms Hayes said.

“It was a pretty windy and scary ride, I must admit.

“It was one of those tiny little helicopters and the wind was buffeting like crazy.”



Thomas flew the couple to his property at an industrial site, north of Broome.

“He dropped me back to his yard at the industrial site where he has his own home,” Ms Hayes said.

“We sat in his home waiting for the ambulance.”

St John Ambulance confirmed a crew collected Ms Hayes from the Bilingurr property at 5.48pm and transported her to Broome Hospital.

A few days later, Ms Hayes received a $1936 invoice from Ultimate Outback Experiences for the “supply of helicopter for Medi-vac from the vessel Odyssey back to Broome for medical treatment” which the invoice says took 1.6 hours.

Australian Securities and Investments Commission records show Ultimate Outback Experiences was registered in June 2019 and traded as Horizontal Falls Seaplane Adventures which Thomas founded in 2008. The holder of the company, which is based at the Bilingurr industrial site, is The Trustee for the Thomas Family Trust.

Ultimate Outback Experiences did not hold an Air Operators’ Certificate. Nor did Avanova Pty Ltd, which owned and operated the helicopter.

“We were airlifted by a pilot who we now understand wasn‘t compliant and didn’t have a license and I mean; we could have been killed,” Ms Hayes said.

“We were put in a situation which nobody should be put in.

“The north-west might be a cowboy town but it‘s still Australia and you still have to abide by the laws.

“It‘s mind boggling to think that he’s got away with this in Australia.”

Ms Hayes said her travel insurance, Fast Cover, paid the invoice.

“We‘ve got off scot-free,” she said.

“We were very lucky.

“But how did he get a contract to fly for the RFDS?”



The RFDS last week said that neither Thomas or his companies were contracted to its organisation.

“As far RFDS Western Operations is aware, the organisation has never tasked Troy Thomas or his company Ultimate Outback Experiences, which was trading as Horizontal Falls Seaplane Adventures, to carry out aeromedical retrievals,” a spokesperson said.

“RFDS Western Operations provided a telehealth consult for each of these patients (on vessels Diversity and Odyssey) however RFDS Western Operations did not have any involvement in coordinating or facilitating either medical evacuation.”

Under the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s regulatory framework “air ambulance flights” are considered commercial air transport flights and pilots conducting flights for the RFDS are required to hold a Commercial Pilots Licence.

“Mr Thomas has never held any regulatory approvals other than a private pilot licence and was never authorised to make any safety decisions or fly on behalf of Horizontal Falls Seaplane Adventures or any other company,” CASA said.

Odyssey’s owner at the time told The Australian he did not know – until after Thomas’s death – that the 40-year-old was unlicensed at the time and unauthorised to perform medical evacuations.

Diversity’s long-time owner last week said she “does not know anything about” the medical evacuation from her 12-passenger charter boat in July 2019 and that her son, who was the skipper at the time, was too busy to speak to The Australian about it.

This comes after a West Australian coroner refused to hold an inquest into Amber’s death, despite repeated pleas from her parents, because he did not believe it would “generate any additional evidence”.

Of course, around about the same time we had Dicky King's trainwreck interview - ref:  Miniscule Dicky King trainwreck interview: Skerritt the panacea for Transport Safety agencies?? - and a week before Nadia Misopoulos:

Looking through previous episodes of the Nadia Mitsopoulos morning radio program, I note that last week she focused on the Broome R44 crash that killed 12 year old Ambar Miller: https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/p.../103036226 (from 05:15 minutes)

  
Nadia also interviewed the parents back in April: Family of girl killed in Broome chopper crash calls for aviation crackdown as ATSB finds safety failures

A couple of days later there was this ABC article: West Australian government scathing of CASA over Broome helicopter crash that killed Amber Millar and Troy Thomas

CASA advice on pilots questioned

In statements to the ABC earlier this week, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) said all aviation tourism operators must hold an air operator's certificate — something it is understood Mr Thomas did not.



"Commercial aviation operations are strictly monitored by CASA including through ongoing oversight, surveillance and audits," a spokesperson said.

"We encourage people to always check pilots are appropriately licensed and qualified to fly and to report any safety concerns they may have to CASA or the Australian Transport Safety Bureau."

Some days later, in a AOPA Live YouTube video, Clinton McKenzie commented on the above (in bold) statement  (from about 01:09 min):

(Earlier in the segment {about 56 minutes in} Clinton also mentioned the subject of the SOE/ATSB special requests for extra funding and the fact he made a FOI submission to the ATSB in regards to when and if this may have occurred:

All internal and external correspondence and records of any meetings or discussions created within the period 18 April 2020 to 17 April 2023, comprising or relating to advice given by ATSB or the ATSB’s Chief Commissioner, or advice considered to be given by ATSB or the ATSB’s Chief Commissioner even if the advice was not given, to either or both of: (1) a Minister with portfolio responsibility for the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 or any of that Minister’s staff; and (2) any official in the Department with portfolio responsibility for the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 when the costs of investigation activities by the ATSB were assessed by ATSB as likely to exceed established ATSB budget levels.

For those interested here is a link for the FOI documents released under Clinton's FOI request: https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/fi...uments.pdf )

Speaking of FOI requests I note the following entry from the CASA FOI disclosure log: 

1 June 2023
Aircraft maintenance for VH-NBY

• Freedom of Information (FOI) 1 June 2023 – Aircraft maintenance for VH-NBY (PDF, 33.86 MB)
  

Plus, IMO definitely related, these FOI released documents: Ref - Su_Spence's conflicted 'stating the bollocks' on Top-End Madness??  

23 May 2023
All documents and correspondence related to the 23 June 2021 Crocodile Farms NT gift of a briefing and helicopter flight.

• Freedom of Information (FOI) - 23 June 2021 Helicopter Flight
  

Much, much MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

WTD? - Su_Spence lets loose Dr A (LSD) in the risk analysis and SSRP broom cupboard!!

Have some suspicions about what may have kicked this off? However bizarrely last Friday, without any media lead up or fanfare, the following was posted on the CASA LinkedIn page:

Civil Aviation Safety Authority
47,355 followers
3d •

If you’re a small aviation operator, developing a scalable safety management system can be daunting task.

To assist, we’ve published a range of risk analysis bowties for small and large aeroplane and rotorcraft operators. Bowties are useful for understanding the link between threats and hazards, how they produce consequences, and the controls or barriers used to mitigate risk. 

Check them out today:                 
https://lnkd.in/gBeqcS9z

https://media.licdn.com/dms/image/D5622A...E3kxRaHdvU

  Hmm...passing strange but up until this morning LinkedIn remained the only form of social and mainstream media that CASA utilised to announce these apparently useful aids for helping identify and analyse safety risk in individual aviation industry sectors??

If they were hoping for some professional positive appraisal, then unfortunately the comments run at about 50:50 (positive/negative) and most of the more insightful SME comments are very much in the negative:

Mike Allocco, Emeritus Fellow ISSS
• 2nd
System Safety Engineering and Management of Complex Systems; Risk Management Advisor...Complex System Risks
2d
It is so sad that safety people don't recognize rebranding of safety terms... As if the new buzzwords create some magical thoughts... There is nothing new or magical with Safety I, II, III, Hoping, Agile, Lean, Differently, Zero, Black Swans, Gray Rhino’s, Quantum Risk, Design Confusion… Just read any book on safety from the 1960's on out...

What is going on these days with safety sound bites? Nothing is a substitution for research skills... Don't be distracted from doing the work of the identification, elimination, or the control of risks to acceptable levels…

---

Matthew Wuillemin
• 2nd
Training Captain - Bonza Airlines 737MAX
2d

All good stuff , but it’s usually the unforeseen hazard / risk that pops up ( Black Swan ) .. assessing all of these realistically is at the core , and often humans are poor at credible risk evaluation. Until there’s a high level event then 20/20 hindsight kicks in and the phrase ‘ we will change things so this never happens again “ .. till it does.

Which brings me to the link itself:

Using our bowtie risk analysis

Bowtie analysis is a risk analysis methodology allowing stakeholders and risk owners to better understand:

• risks
  
• associated threats (causal factors)
  
• consequences (outcomes)
  
• preventative and recovery controls (barriers).
  

A key benefit of the bowtie methodology is it creates a visual representation between threats and hazards. It also shows how threats and hazards interact to produce consequences and the barriers or controls that could prevent an event or reduce its impact.

This is a valuable tool to help you better understand how effective your current controls are and identify new or enhanced controls.

We have developed a series of bowties across various sectors for the following risk categories, including:

• loss of control inflight
  
• controlled flight into terrain
  
• mid-air collision
  
• runway incursion
  
• runway excursion
  
• human performance
  
• technical
  
• organisational.
  

The human performance, technical and organisational bowties complement the operational bowties where human performance, technical or organisational issues may be a factor for a control not being effective.

These are often identified as escalating factors. We have developed separate bowties for these to address the relevant threats these could introduce.

Reading a bowtie analysis

The following bowties identify the relevant regulatory controls (preventative and recovery) for the specific threat and consequence for each of the risks. These include:

• the hazard: something with the potential to cause risk
  
• the top event: in the middle of the diagram is the moment control is lost over the hazard
  
• the threats: are what could cause the top event on the left-hand side of the diagram
  
• the preventative controls: these are the barriers that sit between the threats and the top event to prevent the event from happening
  
• the consequences: are the possible outcomes resulting from the top event being realised. You can find these on the right-hand side of the diagram
  
• the recovery controls: are the barriers on the right side of the top event that prevent the top event resulting in unwanted consequences
  
• escalating factors: a condition that leads to increased risk by defeating or reducing the effectiveness of a control. Escalating factors can also have controls assigned to reduce the likelihood of that factor happening...
  

     
Hmm...so the bowties that CASA have produced, as an aid to industry, singularly focusses on regulatory controls? I've got a feeling I know where this is heading but to be sure let's pick an example - how about: ATO-SA Controlled Flight into Terrain

Here is the PDF link: https://www.casa.gov.au/sites/default/fi...errain.pdf

 
Hmm...clear as mud?? - 

While on the 'Using our bowtie risk analysis' webpage you'll notice this link: Please use our SSRP contact form for any of the following requests:

The SSRP reference piqued my interest because of the history of Sector Risk Profiles that were being proactively developed and promoted by former CEO of the 4As Phil Hurst, during the tail end of the McCormick regime and into the short-lived Skidmore era:



Page 4 AAAA response to ASRR report: https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/...ia_Ltd.pdf

&.. (from 05:58)

Senator Fawcett, David asked:

Senator FAWCETT: I am happy to put my questions on notice, given the time constraints. Mr Skidmore, the
industry has been very positive about sector risk profiles. I would like an update on where CASA's view is with
that process, who you have got working on it and what resources you are investing in it. It appears to be a good
way of collaborating with industry.

Mr Skidmore: I will take that on notice, and thank you very much for those comments.

Answer:

CASA considers that Sector Risk Profiling (SRP) is an effective risk management tool to assist the aviation
industry in developing an understanding of the effects of risks in order to maximise their aviation safety
performance. SRPs that have already been developed are in the areas of aerial application and aerial mustering.
In 2016 CASA expects to publish SRPs in aerodromes, small aeroplanes, large aeroplanes and offshore
helicopter transport. The SRPs in helicopter emergency medical services and aerial ambulance sectors are
expected to be published in 2016-17.

The profiles are developed by a team of subject matter experts drawn from CASA’s operational areas that
collect and analyse relevant data. The data and other additional information are reviewed collectively by CASA
and representatives from the relevant sector prior to finalising the SRP.

History will show that only about 4 of the proposed dozen SRPs were completed before being kyboshed by the St Commode. It would now appear that even those 4 published SRPs are no longer easily accessible off the Fort Fumble website. However I was able to track down one of the 4 SRPs: https://www.casa.gov.au/sites/default/fi...sector.pdf

Using the sector risk profile

The purpose of the aerial mustering sector risk profile is
to present a picture of the key risks and effects arising from
the operations of the sector’s fleet of aircraft at a given point
in time.

CASA and selected industry sector participants developed
the sector risk profile through a process in which risks were
jointly identified, assessed and evaluated for treatment. When
fully implemented these risk treatments should reduce the risk
profile of the sector. The responsibility for implementation of
the treatment measures for which industry has accountability
rests with authorisation holders, operators and pilots.

The sector risk profile is dynamic and will change over time
to reflect changes in the sector and the environment. The risk
treatments are subject to a monitoring plan that measures
change in safety performance following implementation of
the risk reduction measures. An evaluation plan evaluates the
effectiveness of the risk reduction measures.

Hmm...like Chalk & Cheese, you know where Dr A can stick his regulatory mumbo, jumbo BOWTIEs?? -

MTF...P2