[Peetwo]

AOPA on bollocks ASIC card; & Airport screening at Estimates -   

Courtesy AOPA Oz, via Facebook:

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Australia was live.
  ·
ASIC SINGLE ISSUING BODY, GOVT PUSHING ON TO CREATE NEW $30MIL SECURITY BUREAUCRACY
AOPA Australia will be attending a virtual town hall meeting hosted by the Department of Home Affairs, Friday 2nd December from 10am, at which we will be raising concerns and opposing the creation of a central issuing body for the ASIC/MSIC program.

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Some comments in reply:

Terry Manderson
  · 10:41

this has (imho)nothing to do with data protection, if it did the real information security and privacy posture would be to purge said data when it is no longer valid or has expired. (look to GDPR data retention as an example) This speaks solely to the government's digital ID which is a bigger step to overreach and the ASIC is just a small cog in the machine. The government will reject all attempts to see reason, sadly. so now i have to wait 2 months to get my flight review back, 3 months for a medical, and god knows how long to have a red asic just in case i land at a controlled airport.

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David Bennett
  · 8:35

Thanks Ben great job. Keep ‘em honest Mate. This ASIC thing is BS. I have a wallet full of Licenses and a Passport all identify me as me and I’m the same me I was 2 years ago and 2 years prior to that 2 years. In fact I’m me for the last 60 years of my life so why do I need to renew as the old ID has not changed. I need only to pay a renewal fee and update changes like any renewal. Its less heart ache to renew my Pass Port then my ASIC. At least my PP allows me to leave and return to my country. Let’s use that document its better than an ASIC because its used to ID me. Bureaucrat’s gone mad.

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Tim Bowler
  · 11:03

The hypocrisy of Aviation security in Australia is a joke, as a professional pilot operating in and out of Australia’s largest airports of the last 10 years and regularly moving around the domestic tarmac spaces I have only once been asked by an official to see the validity of my ASIC, yet whilst working as a LAME in a remote corner of a regional airport during COVID, the department of home affairs stomped around taking pictures of our ASIC cards and threatened the operator with fines for non-compliance in relation to airside access and signage etc yet baggage handlers at major domestic airports aren’t subjected to the same screening process as Pilots and the general public.

 
Next via RRAT Estimates yesterday:

Senator Canavan uncovers that Department Officials weren't aware of the "Passenger security screening enhancements – case studies on financial impacts at six regional airports"  that was completed in 2019 by their own department ie THEM - WTF?  Ref link: https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/...leased.pdf

MTF...P2 

[Sandy Reith]

How dreadful this is such a sorry saga. Eight years? How are businesses supposed to operate, improving their services, purchase equipment, market their businesses, attract and employ people and obtain finance with this level of security of tenure?

[Peetwo]

Good news story: Bega Shire recognises value of investment in GA -   

Via Bega Valley:

Airport precinct Expression of Interest open

Bega Valley Shire Council is calling for expressions of interest from airport or aviation-related businesses to set up shop at the new Merimbula General Aviation Precinct.



The first stage of the Merimbula Airport General Aviation Precinct is complete
18 November 2022

Bega Valley Shire Council is calling for expressions of interest from airport or aviation-related businesses to set up shop at the new Merimbula General Aviation Precinct.

Project Services Manager, Daniel Djikic said the recently finished first stage of the precinct is now ready for a wide range of aviation-related businesses.

“The precinct offers a flexible design to accommodate a wide range of uses,” Mr Djikic said.

“This may be anything from light aircraft owners wanting to lease a parking place for their plane, to larger commercial operations requiring the construction of hangers.

“Given its location on one of Australia’s most beautiful coastlines, it would also be the perfect opportunity to expand aviation services currently offered to our growing tourism industry.

“With approximately 60,000 passengers passing through Merimbula airport each year; this is a golden opportunity to establish a business at a prime spot with full access to the airport aprons and taxiways.

“We’re opening doors to facilitate discussion on the many uses the site can accommodate, starting with an Expression of Interest and moving later to a Request for Proposals.

“We have staff ready to discuss your ideas so please feel free to contact us should you need advice or have any questions.”

For more information and to submit an Expression of Interest, visit Council’s Vendor Panel webpage.

Expressions of interest should be submitted by 14 December.

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Sunshine Coast under siege on NAP -   

Via Oz Flying:

Sunshine Coast Noise Model overlooked GA: Review

17 February 2023



An Airservices Australia post-implementation report (PIR) into new flight paths at Sunshine Coast Airport released last week found that the noise modeling used presumed general aviation would remain on the old runway.

New flight paths were created when the expanded runway 13/31 opened in June 2020, and the noise modeling used in the 2018 Targeted Environmental Impact Assessment (TEIA) assumed some GA operations would remain on runway 18/36. However, that runway was decommissioned, transferring all GA movements onto the new runway.

The change is significant, given that GA accounts for nearly 80% of movements at Sunshine Coast.
The PIR also said an aircraft type new to the airport also changed noise levels in some locations.

"The PIR found that actual number of 70 decibel events was consistent with the TEIA across all modelled locations, but that the number of actual 60 decibel events was higher than modelled in Eumundi, Weyba Downs and Castaways Beach," the report states.

"The key reasons for this were found to be the introduction of a new aircraft type that was not flying in this airspace at the time of the modelling – the SF34, and that the modelling had assumed some General Aviation (GA) operations would continue to occur on the existing runway.

"This runway was decommissioned at the time of the opening of the new runway, with the GA traffic that was expected to use this runway shifted to the new runway."

The PIR recommended Airservices investigate a number of changes to the 13/31 arrivals and departures flightpaths, as well as considering an additional VOR/DME non-precision approach for training on the new runway. All changes arising from the recommendations will be put through Airservices' flight path change process.

Airservices has made the PIR available for public comment until Sunday 12 March.

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

CM's Aviation Fairytale; & miniscule asks for more info on YMMB MP?? -   

Via the UP: https://www.pprune.org/11435465-post1.html

Clinton McKenzie

An Aviation Fairy Tale

Once upon a time, in a land far, far away, the citizens got together and paid for an airport to be built on land the citizens own as common wealth. Let’s call the airport ‘Bairnfair’.

Bairnfair became a base for part of the country’s Defence Force as well as a facility for all of the citizens of the land to use for air transport, flying training and other civil aviation activities. Soon there were a couple of Defence Force squadrons and numerous civilian general aviation charter and flying schools operating along with the airlines operating flights in and out of Bairnfair.

The citizens were happy because Bairnfair was part of and contributing to the common wealth. Many other airports in the land far away were also built on common wealth land at the cost of the common wealth.

Then one day someone in the government of the land far away came up with a brilliant idea: Why not lease Bairnfair to someone, so that the someone would maintain and operate the airport while paying money to the common wealth in return? What could possibly go wrong? Let’s lease lots of these common wealth airports to someone!

The government of the day wasn’t stupid. No way. It passed an Act called the Land Far Away Airports Act, the first object of which is to “promote the sound development of civil aviation”. The lessees of these common wealth airports would be obliged under the Act to maintain and operate the airport in accordance with a master plan approved by a government Minister. The Minister would be obliged under the Act to have regard to the extent to which carrying out the plan would meet present and future requirements of civil aviation users of the airport, before approving the plan.

Surely civil aviation would not only survive but thrive at these common wealth airports under this brilliant plan in the land far away!

The government then went about the process of implementing its brilliant plan. In the case of Bairnfair, a 50 year lease with a 49 year option was granted at a reported cost to the lessee of $65 million. On those numbers, that’s nearly $650,000 a year paid to the common wealth. What a great outcome!

But then…

One dark day the Defence Department received a rent bill for the land on which its facilities were built at Bairnfair. The rent bill was about $1.2 million per month. (Yes children, that’s $1.2 million per month.) The Defence Department also received a bill for landing and parking charges for Defence Force aircraft using Bairnfair. That bill was about $160 thousand per month.

This perturbed the Defence Department somewhat. The Defence Department – part of and paid for out of the common wealth – occupying land owned as common wealth and using facilities that were built at the cost of the common wealth – was now liable for around $1 billion in rent and aircraft landing and parking charges over the remaining life of a lease, for which the lessee will pay the common wealth $65 million.

What a bargain for the citizens! $65 million paid to the common wealth and only $1 billion paid out of the common wealth for a common wealth Department to occupy and use common wealth land!

But that billion is chicken feed in this land far away. The Defence Department occupied only a small area of Bairnfair.

In a different part of Bairnfair, the citizens involved in civil aviation received their own new rent bills and landing and parking charges. Most could not afford them and eventually moved out. No flying training organisation remained.

This suited the lessee of Bairnfair’s interests, because a lot of this civil aviation activity was nowhere near as lucrative as the output of the work of building offices and shops and other things that had nothing to do with civil aviation but produced new rivers of gold. Alas, no part of those rivers flowed into the common wealth. They flowed mostly into the pocket of a single citizen who slowly climbed the far away land’s ‘rich list’.

Where aviation facilities interfered with these lucrative non-aviation developments - not lucrative for the common wealth, mind you - the aviation facilities were sacrificed. Runway getting in the way of more lucrative property development? Shorten the runway! At some common wealth airports, runways inconvenient to non-aviation developments were simply bulldozed. These airports shouldn’t have been clogged up with all these pesky runways in the first place. After all, how many do you need?

The airlines flying in and out of Bairnfair received similar treatment. At one point the CEO of the far away land’s flag carrier, Satnaq, likened the lessee of Bairnfair to “a crew of Somali pirates” after – according to Satnaq – the lessee effectively ransomed one of Satnaq’s aircraft by parking an escort vehicle in its way, blocking its take off, until an $18,000 fee was paid to the lessee by credit card because the aircraft had to divert to Bairnfair at short notice. What a wonderful way for the citizens on board the aircraft to be treated at an airport which is part of their common wealth. They rejoiced at the opportunity to be in the middle of a willy-wagging competition between obscenely rich people. After all, that’s why these common wealth airports exist in this land far, far away.

And where was the Minister of the day and the Minister’s department administering the Land Far Away Airports Act in all this? Surely the only way the Minister could have proper regard to whether carrying out the master plan for Bairnfair would meet present and future requirements of civil aviation users, would be to consider independent analysis of what those requirements were first. Alas, the Minister of the day and the Minister’s department simply accepted the airport lessee’s own assessment of those requirements, as well as the lessee’s assertion that more non-airport property development was necessary to ‘support’ the aviation activities of the airport. No independent analysis was done or considered by the Minister or the Minister’s department. Why bother? After all, the common wealth Minister and the common wealth public service in this far away land are not there to administer the common wealth Land Far Away Airports Act to achieve its objects.

And so it was at many other common wealth airports across the land far away. They were milked for private gain while many of the citizens who had been involved in civil aviation at those airports were charged into the wilderness.

But then the citizens thought really hard about it. They wracked their brains and couldn’t recall anyone who had become a millionaire on the back of the common wealth airports when they were maintained and operated by the government.

And then it struck the citizens: Individuals now had the opportunity to become not just millionaires - but billionaires - on the back of these airports, this being an obvious manifestation of the efficiency of the free market (in monopoly assets comprising vast open spaces of flat land which only entrepreneurial geniuses would be able to perceive were being wasted on pointless civil aviation trivia).

Hooray! cried the citizens!

This success so inspired the government of the land far away that it set up an Air Navigation Service Provider whose executives accumulate millions even if vast tracts of airspace are, through incompetent mismanagement, frequently declared TIBA. The citizens were not worried, though, because the Land Far Away Aviation Safety Authority, whose executives also accumulate millions, said there is nothing to worry about.

And everyone in the land far away lived happily ever after, comforted in the knowledge that ever-increasing amounts of common wealth were ending up in an ever-diminishing numbers of hands.

THE END

(Don’t worry kiddies: These sorts of things would only happen in the kinds of places where governments hound poor and defenceless people for money that isn’t lawfully owed. If these sorts of things happened in Australia, people would start losing faith in politicians and government institutions.)

Next, via Oz Flying:

Minister calls for more Information on Moorabbin Master Plan

16 May 2023



Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development Catherine King earlier this month asked for more information on the Moorabbin Airport master plan.

The original Preliminary Draft Master Plan envisaged significant loss of aviation infrastructure, but was rejected in March 2022 by then minister Barnaby Joyce, forcing Moorabbin Airport Corporation (MAC) to present a Fresh Draft Master Plan (fdMP) in March this year.

In a letter sent to the Moorabbin Airport Community Aviation Consultative Group (CACG) on 3 May, the department said it was seeking more information about consultation, something aviation businesses on the airport have consistently criticised.
"On 28 April 2023, under ss.80A(2) of the Airports Act 1996, the Minister’s delegate requested further information from MAC about the consultation undertaken on the fdMP," the letter says.

"MAC have been requested to provide this information by 26 May 2023.This request for additional information ‘stops the clock’ on the 50-business day statutory timeframe in which the Minister has to make a decision on whether to approve or refuse to approve the fdMP."

The department has said that if MAC hits the deadline for providing the information, Minister King will make a decision whether or not to approve the fdMP by 6 July this year.

In December last year, MAC told airport businesses that the revised master plan would use the original western boundary, which effectively reprieved hangars and apron area from planned destruction.

MAC also promised GA growth initiatives at Moorabbin Airport during the life of the new master plan, including apron and aircraft parking enhancements with more than 10,000 sqm to be improved.

MTF...P2 

[Sandy Reith]

In Clinton McKenzie’s Far Away Land there are great flocks of sheep. The dingoes have one quite regularly but majority of the flock don’t notice because there’s so many of them and they are content, for the most part, in lush pastures.

Australian Members of Parliament must swear allegiance to our King and this perpetuates the hierarchical concept that we need government to look after us. We put up with so called compulsory voting, herding us to the voting stations, about the only country in the world with such a law, yet it’s supposed to be a secret ballot.

It seems that the vast majority of people never engage with their MPs and even fewer go to the trouble of joining a political party.

So how to inspire a movement that will encourage our MPs to make decisions and reforms? They will naturally opt for the safety of the well known flat paddock with its sturdy fences. Take for myself in London yesterday I went to Australia House thinking go inside, but no, not allowed, even though there’s a fancy bag X-Ray machine. Why? “Security” I’m told by the doorman. How about I present my passport and under go a rigorous physical examination? No go. Fair dinkum!

Sorry this is ‘off topic’ but frustration must have its outlet.

[Kharon]

Of Nonsense; that spoke and that writ.

For example:-

“The ACT Government has launched Australia’s first fixed-site health and drug checking service as a six-month pilot.

The CanTEST Health and Drug Checking Service is operated by Directions Health Services with technical assistance from Pill Testing Australia.

This is a free service.

Drug checking is a harm reduction service (also known as pill testing) that analyses the contents of drugs to help service users better understand the unknown and potentially dangerous substances in illicit drugs.

Appropriate information, counselling and advice are provided to service users based on their specific test result, to encourage choices that reduce overall drug use and the harms associated with taking illicit drugs.”

Can you believe this crap -So, after one knocks off(15;30) has a few libations (16:00 – 1830) and gets togged up to go a 'music' event (21:00); the first stop is to pay the illicit drug dealer for your particular favourite 'goodies' – BUT before you ingest said 'goodies' your caring public is funding a testing service to ensure that the chemical confection, illicitly purchased, from a criminal, is SAFE not only for you to imbibe, but to ensure you can perform your duties the morning after. BOLLOCKS....

"Beware the Jabberwock, my son

The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!

Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun

The frumious Bandersnatch!"

So, what about some funding (lots of) for a 'harm reduction' program associated with tax payer funded airports being leased out to property developers and the ludicrous amounts of money being charged to not only the industry, but our defence forces like the RAAF (which we also pay for) to use the publicly owned aerodromes? Take a little time and listen to the AOPA discussion, based on information provided under FOI request, as to how much it costs for our RAAF to operate from a publicly funded (owned and paid for) airport – the numbers are staggering – and the tax payer provides those outrageous fees; the government happily approve the bill and - sign the cheques for; with a straight face????

It is gross nonsense; aviation companies, on Commonwealth land, operating aviation business are being beaten off land the tax payer already owns; and then the public is paying many millions to keep part of our defence force (which they pay for) operational. Yet we can fund a system to ensure that 'you' are safe when taking illicit, illegal drugs when the Commonwealth gives them the OK. Are we going mad? Or is it just me watching an industry collapsing as the minister hides in Albo's shadow, relying on the great white paper elephant to make it all better.

Its BOLLOCKS, its a nonsense, and it is very, very defiantly not Australian; not by a long shot it aint.

“Does a man of sense run after every silly tale of hobgoblins or fairies, and canvass particularly the evidence? I never knew anyone, that examined and deliberated about nonsense who did not believe it before the end of his enquiries.”

Aye, more to follow related to 'intimate knowledge' of white paper and the sole use thereof.

Toot –its nucking futs – toot.  And we not only put up with it, but pay for it all...............

[P7_TOM]

“K” -Scribbled this a few weeks ago -

"It is gross nonsense; aviation companies, on Commonwealth land, operating aviation business are being beaten off land the tax payer already owns; and then the public is paying many millions to keep part of our defence force (which they pay for) operational. Yet we can fund a system to ensure that 'you' are safe when taking illicit, illegal drugs when the Commonwealth gives them the OK. Are we going mad? Or is it just me watching an industry collapsing as the minister hides in Albo's shadow, relying on the great white paper elephant to make it all better."

"Its BOLLOCKS, its a nonsense, and it is very, very defiantly not Australian; not by a long shot it ain't. "

How the government pays the RAAF is, or should be of great concern to the tax paying public; the government can at least afford to be gouged and ripped off – it's not really their money they are lashing out. But for 'private' small business' any increase in 'operating costs' can spell the end of the business; which leads to less taxable revenue from that business and any one it employs; not to mention their suppliers loose a client. The forced closure, due to unsustainable cost increases of any moderately successful (not millions, but solid enough) small outfit is a blow; this is particularly applicable to the non airline operating aviation companies.

I wonder, could the minister possibly explain how the white paper – or even ministerial damage control is going address one of the very real, serious causes underpinning the demise of non airline aviation sector; the loss of taxable revenue employment and training. The facts are clearly supported; the future outlook grim and  a once thriving, essential industry is being driven off their home ground. It may not be clearly apparent to the minister; so I shall explain – you cannot have an aviation industry without aerodromes to operate from – just not possible.

Quoted below are words within a letter from John Cameron Aviation to the incumbent minister for transport. There's a little more than that presented here – however, it will suffice to make the point. 

Dear Catherine,

"We need to bring to your urgent attention the latest moves by Property Developers that are controlling our aviation industry.

It would appear that they have worked out the land tax on our Airport and divided it by the number tenants.

Our increase goes from $930 per year to $5,400 per year. This will further be one the things to destroy our aviation industry." Etc.

Perhaps the minister could have one of her minions read the following letter to her and explain what the consequences of this outrage being allowed to continue, unchecked are (in small easily understood words) - . I concur  - It is gross nonsense; it is BOLLOCKS, it is a gross nonsense, and it is very, very counter productive.

[Peetwo]

TICK TOCK goes the GA Secondary airport doomsday clocks?? - 

In a follow up to Ol'Tom's post above - “K” -Scribbled this a few weeks ago - I noted the following adjournment speech from Labor MP Mr Zappia that I believe tolls the death bell for all our secondary GA airports...  

Parafield Airport

Mr ZAPPIA  (Makin) (19:35): Parafield Airport, located 18 kilometres north of the Adelaide CBD and a major landmark in the Makin electorate, is the principal general aviation and pilot training airport in South Australia. Established in 1927 and occupying 437 hectares, it was Adelaide's main airport until the opening of Adelaide Airport in 1955. The airport has four runways, varying in length between 992 and 1,350 metres. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Adelaide Airport Ltd, which in 1998 leased both Adelaide and Parafield airports for 50 years with a further 49-year option.[/font]

Over recent decades, both Parafield Airport and the surrounding area have substantially changed. Originally located well outside of Adelaide's residential suburbs, today the airport is almost entirely surrounded by homes. Airport activities have also changed, with flight training, including helicopter flight training, dominating aviation use. Much of the airport land has now been sold off for housing or leased to commercial and retail businesses. Another section is used for water harvesting and recycling by the City of Salisbury. On average, the airport manages around 4,000 aircraft movements, mostly flight training, every week. It has a reported yearly capacity of around 450,000 movements, more than double the current usage.

Not surprisingly, flight training with noisy aircraft circulating above houses—or, even worse, the chuntering of helicopters—has over the years caused considerable angst amongst residents. For shift workers, young mothers with newborns, people recovering from illness or families hoping for a quiet sleep-in on a public holiday or weekend, the relentless droning of aircraft flying at relatively low altitudes overhead can be incredibly disruptive and stressful. The airport's Fly Friendly policy is not obligatory, merely a guide which operators are simply encouraged to adhere to. Nor do complaints to airport management or Airservices Australia reflect the extent of community angst that I detect as I speak with residents. It seems that many people grudgingly put up with the disruption, knowing that their complaints will be ignored. Furthermore, being on federal government land, the airport is exempt from SA Environment Protection Authority noise controls, which place greater restrictions on other noise-emitting industries in the area than the voluntary Fly Friendly airport code places on aircraft.

Whilst I don't have access to the figures, I expect that the airport's income and estimate of economic value to the region is derived overwhelmingly from the retail businesses which continue to expand into airport land. Those businesses are not the problem, and they are here to stay. In summary, over the years, the airport has changed from being a general aviation airport to a commercial business precinct, with flight training—predominantly for overseas students, who I understand account for around 90 per cent of student flight training—now left as its primary aviation use. That raises the question as to whether the economic benefits of flight training for overseas students justify the social disruption that thousands of local residents live with daily and the impact on house values.

The periodical review of the airport master plan is now underway and, I understand, must be submitted by 18 June 2024. I also note that an aviation white paper is being developed for the minister. I believe that the time has come for the long-term future of Parafield Airport to be considered. In particular, could the international flight training school be relocated to another general aviation airport? Alternatively, what measures, including the use of electric planes, could be taken to reduce noise impacts on residents? It has also been suggested that the entire airport could be relocated. If it were, what options for future land use that preserved the open-space nature of the airport might be possible, and how would existing airport aviation businesses be supported? The airport lease is halfway through it's initial term, and the reliance on overseas students provides no long-term security. The current masterplan that's being reviewed should therefore consider all options about the long-term future of the airport, and they should all be explored.

 
MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

P2 - Damning Fragrantly Obfuscated.(DFO)..

While we all wait with bated breath for the aerodrome 'expert' at AOPA to provide comment on the Essendon Fields DFO event; there is other information of interest to consider.

It is worth downloading the PDF version of the ATSB report – HERE – it may assist in avoiding 'a rabbit hole the size of the Grand Canyon'. You can actually skip through and read the ATSB 'blue and green shaded boxes, which seem to assist in clarifying the 'other' stuff written above.  Well done Hitch; it was a big job ploughing through the whole thing; seems only fair to offer the 'Hitch' opinion first; not too shabby an effort – Choc Frog... 

HITCH - “The ATSB looks like it has been down a rabbit hole the size of the Grand Canyon in its efforts to find out why a DFO was built so close to a runway at Essendon. After five years of investigation and compiling a 146-page report, the ATSB has laid out all its findings, but tellingly has made no recommendations. Here's my summary as I see it. The DFO was built so close to runway 26 because CASA told them the OLS could be based on a 180-m wide runway strip, as was the width of the runway that had been published for a number of years. However, no-one can remember why the runway width was ever set at 180 m and no records can be found. Had the required 300-m width been enforced at that time, the DFO would have had to have been set back further, unless an exemption was granted. What all this tells me is that somehow, some way, the system failed to raise a red flag at a crucial time in the approval process. The runway width is still set at 180 m despite it being less than standards required because of the grandfathering provisions of Part 139. It's important to note that this grandfathering happened during the course of this investigation, and now shores up the legitimacy of the runway width. Despite sifting through the minutiae of Australian and international airport standards, the ATSB has been unable to flag any changes that could prevent such a thing happening again. And you can be assured that sometime in the future, one of the operators of the Commonwealth leased airports will want to build something closer to a runway than the standards allow. At that time, we will see if any lessons have been learned from the Essendon DFO.”

Of course, for those who prefer the 'nut-shell' version, ATSB shaded boxes :-

“In response to a previous draft version of this investigation report, CASA indicated that ‘Aircraft operators and pilots need to assess the suitability of the aerodrome for their intended operations based on published information’. This was consistent with former regulation 92 of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 and currently in section 91.410 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998, which placed the onus on pilots and aircraft operators to determine the suitability of an aerodrome or other place for take-off or landing.”

Just about sums up CASA attitude to any and all real admission of responsibility. All care but no responsibility seems to be a feature of the regulatory philosophy. The really short version of that philosophy seems to be 'you pays your money and takes your chances'. No matter; grab the PDF version, scroll through to the 'blue' shaded boxes, before reading the 'black and white' bits – interesting stuff – or not, depending on your POV....Some ATSB 'blue box' examples (below) follow my scribble:-

“In response to a previous draft version of this investigation report, CASA indicated that ‘Aircraft operators and pilots need to assess the suitability of the aerodrome for their intended operations based on published information’. This was consistent with former regulation 92 of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 and currently in section 91.410 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998, which placed the onus on pilots and aircraft operators to determine the suitability of an aerodrome or other place for take-off or landing.”

“The approach and transitional surfaces worked together to provide obstacle protection to aircraft in the final stages of the approach to land and during a missed approach. The ICAO Secretariat advised that this would be achieved using their interpretation of the standard in ICAO Annex 14 with the surfaces aligned by the inner edge of the approach surface. Advice provided by CASA acknowledged the Australian standards may allow for misalignment on a case-by-case basis. However, they have also advised that the transitional surfaces and inner edge of the approach surface must be consistent with the actual (published) runway strip width.”

“The actions taken by ICAO in 2018 were changes to the dimensions in the standards. By contrast, in 2020, the ICAO Secretariat’s advice to the ATSB was about the application of the standards as they were drafted.”

“The ATSB notes that, under ICAO Annex 14 the dimensions of the inner edge of the approach surface were determined by the aerodrome reference code applied to the runway and not by the dimensions of the runway strip width. This was similarly the case in the Australian standards for the RPAs, MOS Part 139 and Part 139 MOS 2019.”

“Under the RPAs, MOS Part 139 and Part 139 MOS 2019, CASA interpreted the standard so that the lower edge of the transitional surface alongside the runway strip moved inwards when the strip width was reduced to less than that required by the standards. The part of the transitional surface alongside the approach surface would no longer be aligned if the dimension of the inner edge of the approach surface remained unchanged. CASA noted there was no explicit requirement in the Australian standards for alignment.”

“ICAO’s interpretation of the ICAO Annex 14 standard would ensure the transitional surface did not move when the runway strip width was reduced. However, it was observed that this would create an unexplained space between the side of the published runway strip with its reduced dimensions and the lower edge of the transitional surface.”

“Neither ICAO nor CASA published guidance in support of their stated expectations for interpreting the standards. However, ICAO noted that there was an opportunity to consider guidance with work on reviewing the OLS.”

“Changes to the alignment of the transitional surface for runway 26 with variations in the published runway strip width and inner edge of the approach surface are discussed in subsequent chapters. Application of both the Australian standards and the international standards are also considered.”

“The basic ILS surfaces were based on the standard dimensions of the runway strip and the OLS in ICAO Annex 14. They were not determined by the dimensions in the Australian aerodrome standards or what an aerodrome operator published as the actual runway strip and OLS. Therefore, changes to the runway strip and/or OLS could result in a gap between the transitional surfaces components of the PANS-OPS basic ILS surfaces and the OLS surfaces. There was therefore the potential for penetrations of the transitional surface component of the PANS-OPS basic ILS surfaces to not be identified due to the obstacle monitoring requirements in the Australian aerodrome standards only applying to the OLS established in accordance with those standards.”

“There were differing conditions attached to the varying means for accepting an aerodrome operator’s non-compliance with a standard. All the means for obtaining acceptance, apart from grandfathering, required consideration of the safety effect by the regulator. Grandfathering was permitted by the standards without a formal requirement to seek approval from the regulator with consideration of the safety effect.”

“The wording of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Annex 14 and the
Australian standards for the transitional surfaces was not clear on how they should be applied when the runway strip width (as permitted) was less than the standard. Both standards worked in practice where the strip width and associated OLS met the standard dimensions. However, the wording of the respective standards was open to different interpretations for addressing the misalignment between the runway strip width and the inner edge of the approach surface. Neither ICAO or the Civil Aviation Safety Authority provided guidance in support of their respective interpretations.”

“With a runway 08/26 strip width of 180 m and approach inner edge of 300 m (for runway 26), as detailed in the OLS diagram and per the CASA 2 October 2003 advice, the buildings associated with the Bulla Road Precinct did not infringe the respective transitional surface. These dimensions were used for the basis of the major development plan.”

“Since 1972, successive aerodrome operators had published a 180 m strip width for runway 08/26. However, in 2005, when the Bulla Road Precinct was developed, it was unlikely that the aerodrome standards against which the strip width was based had been adequately determined to assure compliance against those standard.”

“In 2005, the transitional surfaces were likely being maintained in accordance with the standards applicable at the time, which were interpreted to allow part of the transitional surface to be located alongside the approach surface and the other part alongside the published runway strip. With the different dimensions of the inner edge of the approach surface and runway strip, the transitional surfaces were misaligned.”

There are many more, mostly worth the time – and they do help clarify the bulk. IMO the only two questions which really need to be answered go begging. MTF..

Toot – toot.

[MrPeaBody]

And on page 61 of the report we find this from the 2014 Audit:

Runway 26, which was a code 4 precision approach runway, did not have a 300 m wide
strip as required by the standards (notice ‘708937’).

Runway 17/35, which was a code 3 non-precision approach runway, did not have a 300 m
wide strip as required (although beyond the scope of this investigation).

WHY Beyond the scope of this investigation!! Because it would take another 5 years or because it would inconveniently interfere with a previous bullshit report!

[Peetwo]

Popinjay's DFO cover-up report: Part II 

Mr PB said:

And on page 61 of the report we find this from the 2014 Audit:

Runway 26, which was a code 4 precision approach runway, did not have a 300 m wide
strip as required by the standards (notice ‘708937’).

Runway 17/35, which was a code 3 non-precision approach runway, did not have a 300 m
wide strip as required (although beyond the scope of this investigation).

WHY Beyond the scope of this investigation!! Because it would take another 5 years or because it would inconveniently interfere with a previous bullshit report!

Apologies Mr PeaBody I have been offline for a number of days (due too a dopey backhoe operator running his bucket through the street's NBN cable) so I'm a bit slow to respond but IMO your reference to that part of the report is key to revealing the extent of the cover-up of incompetence and total disconnection of compliance with the ICAO safety standards as documented in Annex 14.

To begin let's start (above your reference) on pg 60 under the heading CASA surveillance:

Surveillance 2005 to 2012

In February 2005, when EAPL was seeking certification for Essendon Fields Airport, CASA conducted an audit of the airport. At the time, the aerodrome manual was found to require substantial revision for it to be in compliance with that required of a certified aerodrome. EAPL subsequently submitted a revised aerodrome manual to CASA for approval. This was assessed as being compliant with the regulations and standards, and accepted by CASA.

Part of CASA’s process included the completion of a checklist. Included within that checklist was a requirement to check that the physical characteristics of the aerodrome (including the runway strip) were compliant with MOS Part 139. These were marked as acceptable.

A 2007 CASA audit also included a checklist for verifying aerodrome data against MOS Part 139. This aerodrome data covered both the physical characteristics of the aerodrome and the OLS. Both items were marked as acceptable. CASA completed 2 further audits prior to 2012. There were no compliance issues noted with the runway strip or the OLS.

To the above the ATSB investigator(s) made this (blue box) observation:

ATSB observation

Following the letter provided by CASA in 2003 that was used by EAPL to form the view that they could retain a 180 m runway strip for runway 08/26, there were further opportunities for the regulator to address the standards against which the strip width was based to assure compliance.

No shit Sherlock - so why didn't they??

Then the 2012 audit where this CASA AO was made:

Notwithstanding previous CASA advice [the 2 October 2003 letter], MOS Part 139 paragraph 2.1.2.2 requires (that) an aerodrome facility must comply with the standard applicable to it. Audit Observation 720 147 advises that unless the historic standard that preceded MOS Part 139 can be identified [‘grandfathering’], MOS Part 139 is deemed to apply. In the latter case, a request can be made to CASA to draft a legislative instrument of exemption. Any such request will need to be supported by a suitable safety case...

 
When the ATSB investigators (in 2019) put these historical disconnections to CASA. this was their response:

In March 2019, CASA advised the ATSB that the 2012 audit observation was raised as a result of a ‘mismatch’ between the information contained in the EAPL aerodrome manual and the existing aerodrome infrastructure. The purpose of the observation was to provide EAPL with the ‘opportunity to analyse the identified deficiency through their Safety Management System (SMS) and update their manual accordingly’. However, EAPL chose not to ‘grandfather’ the runway and runway strip at that time.

 
  'Update their manual accordingly'?? - FDS!   

This was followed by Mr PB's reference for 2014 audit which followed up with this soft soap response from CASA:

On 8 November 2022, in response to a draft of this report, CASA emphasised they now consider that the non-compliance notice was incorrectly issued in 2014. CASA said it should have been issued as an administrative non-compliance to EAPL for not having documented information in the aerodrome manual about the standards the runway strip and OLS complied with.

    
Regardless of all that word weasel confection the actual ICAO Annex 14 standard for a code 4 Precision approach runway has not changed - Quote from CAAS (CAA Singapore):

7.2.4.3   A strip including a precision approach runway shall extend laterally to a distance of at least:
— 150 m where the code number is 3 or 4; and
— 75 m where the code number is 1 or 2;
on each side of the centre line of the runway and its extended centre line throughout the length of the strip.[/b]

And as Mr PeaBody quite rightly points out, Runway 17/35 as a code 4 non-precison runway also has to meet those standards:
 

7.2.4.4   A strip including a non-precision approach runway shall extend laterally to a distance of at least:
— 150 m where the code number is 3 or 4; and
— 75 m where the code number is 1 or 2;
on each side of the centre line of the runway and its extended centre line throughout the length of the strip.

Even if EAPL had proposed to downgrade to a code 3 or lower runway standard for RW 17/35 the MOS 139 introduced in 2019 reset RW strip width to a higher standard: Link - https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-u...-standards

Why have the standards changed?

Australia is a signatory to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) which established the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). ICAO’s mandate is to achieve as much as possible, international uniformity in civil aviation regulations, standards and procedures.

The changes have been made to ensure that Australian aerodromes are in line with international standards.

Impact on runway strip widths

The changes to the CASR and the new MOS in some cases will require the widening of the area adjacent to either side of the centreline of the aerodrome runway known as the ‘runway strip’. This determines the Obstacle Limitation Surface (OLS) which area needs to be clear of obstacles.

Airports are coded having regard to the runway width. For example a code 3 non-precision runway strip, which is quite common for smaller aerodromes, previously had to be 150m wide but is now required to be 280m wide.

Finally on the 'Grandfathering' clause, I note the following from CASA June 2020 advisory circular, titled  'Application of Aerodrome Standards':

8.1 What is grandfathering?

8.1.1 Grandfathering allows the operator of an existing certified, or an existing registered aerodrome, to maintain their aerodrome facility and the OLS of an existing runway, to the standard that applied: − at the time the facility was constructed or − if the facility had been replaced or upgraded since it was constructed, to the standard that applied to the facility at the time it was replaced or upgraded.

8.1.2 Grandfathering may be applied to any previous aerodrome standard such as: − previous revisions of the Manual of Standards Part 139 - Aerodromes (Part 139 MOS) − Rules and Practices for Aerodromes (RPA) − Airways Engineering Instructions (AEI) − Airport Instructions (API) − Airport Engineering Instructions (APEI)

8.1.3 A grandfathered facility is an existing aerodrome facility (and for a runway, its associated obstacle limitation surfaces) that complies with the aerodrome standards that were in force immediately before commencement of the MOS, as long as the aerodrome manual documents how the facility does not comply with the MOS.

8.1.4 For these physical aerodrome facilities, including existing runways and their associated obstacle limitation surfaces, the standards in the revised Part 139 MOS only apply if the grandfathered facility is replaced, or upgraded, or not maintained in accordance with the requirements under the MOS for the same kind of facility. Until then, the standards that previously applied to the aerodrome facility continue to apply. However, for processes that are not physical aerodrome facilities, the standards in the revised Part 139 MOS apply to the operators of all existing aerodromes from the commencement date of the MOS.

8.1.5 Provided the grandfathering provision has been correctly applied and the required information is documented in the aerodrome manual, CASA will continue to recognise the standard that was in place at the time the facility was first built, or the standard which otherwise applied at the time it was last replaced or upgraded.

8.1.6 Grandfathered facilities will continue to have grandfathered status until they are next upgraded or replaced by the aerodrome operator

Clear as mud?? - Err...maybe not - 

Much MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

Of metaphors, both mixed and muddled.

Well, not really metaphors; but it is a close descriptor to the jumble of 'information' and analysis the 'Essendon DFO' event has created. That the aircraft collided with one  of the buildings is beyond doubt. The ATSB have produced two reports; one into the flight path and etc. One into the legal aspects of where the buildings are located. Both (IMO) inconclusive muddled word pools. There are two clearly separate stories here, each should be considered and analysed as 'stand alone' items, for clarity.

“How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?”

The first element of the event is the aircraft and the flight path; take the DFO building out of the picture for a moment and ask – could control have been regained before a collision with terrain occurred? From almost the moment power was applied, the aircraft began diverging from the centre line. The subsequent events and the radio calls leave the impression that there was something amiss within the cockpit. When taken in conjunction with the events at Mt Hotham; it is reasonable to consider and investigate if there was some form of medical condition existing; perhaps undetected or even undeclared. The first event perhaps a clear warning that all was not well; the second event in a more critical environment. The glib assertion that 'full left rudder trim' was the radical cause is a nonsense; post, pre-flight, pre-take off checklists almost eradicate the possibility; over 20 knots IAS the error would be become apparent and quickly rectified. The shocking lack of detailed examination in the ATSB report begs many questions. Questions which should begin from the application of take-off power; through the track along the runway, into the radio calls and on through to the collision event. Hood's hasty appearance 'on-site', potential for contamination of site and quick pronouncement of 'rudder trim & pilot error' leave a faint, but unmistakable odour and cast a shadow over the probity of subsequent investigation. It all leaves a major question unanswered – Pilot error v Pilot incapacitation, - never fully answered, but quickly used to distract from the notion that the buildings have no right to be there under the existing runway classification.

“There are works which wait, and which one does not understand for a long time; the reason is that they bring answers to questions which have not yet been raised; for the question often arrives a terribly long time after the answer.”

Consider the cynical, buried line in the manual – Aircraft operators must determine the suitability of the aerodrome for their operation (paraphrased). In short all responsibility rests with the air operator – you use it – your risk – (hope you noted the reduced margins for the insurance company). Which leaves us with two questions.– Had the building not been there, could a control recovery have been affected? Two schools of thought on that. But secondly should the DFO and the Dan Murphy edifice have ever been allowed to be built within the safety (ICAO promulgated) margins? Chicken and egg job that – if treated together; simple enough if separated, as it stands the margins are blurred together, muddled and obfuscated..

The aerial shot provided by the ATSB on the front cover of their 'report' is deceptive. Shots taken along the runways would present a much clearer, accurate picture of the impingement of a 'wall of concrete' up close and personal on both runways. Irrespective of the DFO event those building have not been proven to be ICAO 'black letter' legal; there  is enough evidence of 'sharp' practice and liberty taken to demand a serious inquiry. The citing of 'grandfather' clauses is slippery and hard to justify if one tracks back through ICAO data. For example the 'approved' use of a 180 mt wide 'strip' notification (overlooked) has never been 'attributed' or substantiated or even verified; it seems to have morphed as fact and been ratified – but its origins cannot be determined; certainly not under the ICAO grandfather guidance material. So where did it come from and how did it become not only 'accepted' but 'missed; during the many approval checks required before building and operational approval?  But, to me the big question is why were the buildings located where they are. The highway gives you a clue; the hope of the developers is 'if you build it – they will come'. But how will they get there? The shortest, least expensive 'access' road leads to the exact spot – take look at the overhead shots – build anywhere else and the costs and headaches escalate. So slip in a reduced runway strip width and Bob's your uncle, bonus all round. All good until – something goes wrong. The gods were smiling that day – a hour later and ten foot lower – the carnage would shock the nation.

Not good enough; not by a country mile it ain't; made worse by the avoidance of responsibility and shunning of probity...

Hitch - in a nut shell:-

The ATSB looks like it has been down a rabbit hole the size of the Grand Canyon in its efforts to find out why a DFO was built so close to a runway at Essendon. After five years of investigation and compiling a 146-page report, the ATSB has laid out all its findings, but tellingly has made no recommendations. Here's my summary as I see it. The DFO was built so close to runway 26 because CASA told them the OLS could be based on a 180-m wide runway strip, as was the width of the runway that had been published for a number of years. However, no-one can remember why the runway width was ever set at 180 m and no records can be found. Had the required 300-m width been enforced at that time, the DFO would have had to have been set back further, unless an exemption was granted. What all this tells me is that somehow, some way, the system failed to raise a red flag at a crucial time in the approval process. The runway width is still set at 180 m despite it being less than standards required because of the grandfathering provisions of Part 139. It's important to note that this grandfathering happened during the course of this investigation, and now shores up the legitimacy of the runway width. Despite sifting through the minutiae of Australian and international airport standards, the ATSB has been unable to flag any changes that could prevent such a thing happening again. And you can be assured that sometime in the future, one of the operators of the Commonwealth leased airports will want to build something closer to a runway than the standards allow. At that time, we will see if any lessons have been learned from the Essendon DFO.

Toot – toot..

[Peetwo]

Dots-n-dashes on the road to Popinjay's DFO cover-up report??? - 

Still trying to get my head around the level of bureaucratic obfuscation and arse-covering (including miniscule rump) deployed by those responsible for the administration, oversight and safety risk mitigation of our aviation industries...  

In the case of the Essendon Fields, airport aviation safety risk mitigation (highlighted by the still standing DFO complex) has taken a serious backward step in preference for non-aviation development illegally encroaching on the internationally accepted standards (IE ICAO Annex 14 Vol 1) for airports able to accommodate the safe operations of international and domestic bizjet arrivals and departures. 

IMO this whole cover-up charade was clearly highlighted by (the combined pilot union) AusALPA back in September 2020:

AusALPA believes that deep and latent safety problems exist in the system of airports regulation where aviation safety considerations are made secondary to development objectives. AusALPA asserts that the regulatory system is flawed due to an inappropriate bias that mandates that development proposals or airspace penetrations must be granted unless almost impossible to achieve risk thresholds are breached.

AusALPA hopes that the final report also addresses other related matters that have occurred at Essendon since the commencement of this investigation, AusALPA calls for the establishment of a high level Government Review to address the safety and economic regulation issues of Australia’s airports with an aim to genuinely reform airspace protection and other operational safeguards at Australia’s airports.

        
Obviously the AusALPA calls for a 'high level Government Review' fell on very deaf and dumb (under the bubble) bureaucratic ears because all we got in response to the HVH splintered off AI-2018-010 investigation was this from the duck-up fairies in the Department of everything (including transport):

The Department acknowledges the views of CASA were not included in the Bulla Road Precinct MDP submitted to the Minister for consideration in 2004. However, the Department’s method of mitigating risk from not receiving the CASA advice within the statutory timeframe was to recommend a condition be imposed on the development. This condition required Essendon Airport Pty Ltd ‘to consult with CASA during the construction of the proposed development and comply with any safety requirements specified by that agency’.

The Department’s MDP process now includes an arrangement with CASA and Airservices for seeking advice on safety in accordance with the requirements under the Act. A specific format for receiving these views in the assessment of MDPs is not prescribed in the Act. This ensures advice from CASA and Airservices is in a format that is flexible and fit for purpose.

The Department has received confirmation from CASA and Airservices of their ongoing commitment to provide safety and operational advice on Master Plans and MDPs. The Department will continue to work closely with CASA and Airservices to ensure the existing approach remains fit for purpose.

 And this from Su_Spence, as a DIP to the investigation, less than a year ago:

On 8 November 2022, in response to a draft of this report, CASA emphasised they now consider that the non-compliance notice was incorrectly issued in 2014. CASA said it should have been issued as an administrative non-compliance to EAPL for not having documented information in the aerodrome manual about the standards the runway strip and OLS complied with.

So less than a year ago (under the now Albo Govt and his aviation la'King miniscule) CASA suddenly decides to backtrack on their previously issued (8 years before) NCN to EAPL. The disconnections within both the Department statement (safety issue) and the CASA 'emphasised' statement above is quite remarkable and hard to reconcile given that in all this time the ICAO standard dimensions (RWS width, approach transitional slope etc..etc) for a grade 4 precision approach runway has not changed in I believe at least 70 years. Quote from ICAO Annex 14 1st edition:    

1.2.3 Width.

1.2.3.1 RECOMMENDATION. - Instrument runways. The strip including an instrument runway should extend to a distance of at least 150 metres (500 feet) on each side of the centre line of the runway throughout the length of the strip.

For quick reference and to keep all the to and fro bureaucratic obfuscation and arse-covering in perspective here is the ATSB produced report timeline:



  Quote: "1970- 1971 Domestic regular public transport and international flights transferred from Essendon to Tullamarine (Melbourne Airport). The runway 08/26 strip width was reduced from 300 m to 180 m..."  

To put the above in context the period between 1971 to 1996 the oversight and regulation of airports switched between DCA, the Department of Transport and then to the start of the Airport privatisation policy of the Hawke Government with the formation of the FAC in 1988. This meant that for the better part of 30 years, despite RW26 being reduced to a RWS width of 180m, any non-aviation building development proposals, that could possibly intrude on any ICAO Annex 14 OLS requirements for any of the Essendon Airport runways, would have to have been approved by the applicable regulator at the time. Perhaps this was the reason that the reduction in the RW 26 strip width was tolerated or simply forgotten about?? 

Next POI on the timeline - quote: "2001 The inner edge of the runway 26 approach surface (part of the obstacle limitation surfaces) was changed from 180 m to 300 m..."

Perhaps with the transition of the Federally owned airports to privitisation, alarm bells suddenly rang for some in the aviation bureaucracy that the EAPL airport leasees might exploit the obvious legal weaknesses of the Airports Act 1996 to fuel their greater ambitions for a lucrative urban development carve up, starting with the Annex 14 illegal RW26 reduced runway strip width?? Therefore by increasing the runway 26 approach surface to 300m had the same effect for upholding the Annex 14 OLS standards for a precision approach runway. 

Next the proof is definitely in the pudding - quote from timeline:

2003 The EAPL airport master plan was approved, which included a proposal for a retail centre at the Bulla Road Precinct, alongside runway 08/26.

---

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) provided advice to EAPL indicating that the part of the transitional surface (another part of the obstacle limitation surface) alongside the runway 08/26 strip was based on the published 180 m strip width (while the inner edge of the approach surface had to be 300 m for runway 26). This information was used by EAPL in their major development plan for the Bulla Road Precinct.

 
Which as history now shows led to EAPL finally getting Ministerial approval for their masterplan in 2004: "..The major development plan was approved by the Minister for Transport and Regional Services. The Bulla Road Precinct was located proximate to runway 08/26 to avoid infringing a transitional surface and strip width based on 180 m..."
  
That tick and flick process was what ultimately led to this interpretation and final outcome for the edge of the DFO complex alongside runway 26: 



....  

We then ffwd to the 2012 and 2014 CASA audits with findings and a NCN issued with now EAPL non-compliance with the required runway strip width OLS requirements. 

This ultimately led to CASA issuing a exemption: "..CASA issued instrument 153/15 to EAPL. This required runway 08/26 to have a published strip width of 300 m, and any obstacles that penetrated the obstacle limitation surfaces to be illuminated and notified in the En Route Supplement Australia for pilot/aircraft operator awareness. With the 300 m strip width, the northern portions of buildings from the retail centre infringed the transitional surface and were now considered obstacles.." 

We then go full circle back to the ridiculous Grandfathering clause that EAPL have seemingly interpreted to their ultimate advantage: "..EAPL stated in their aerodrome manual that the runway 08/26 strip width had been grandfathered against the Airport Engineering Instructions (1970). The width was returned to 180 m and the part of the transitional surface alongside the strip was moved inwards with this change. The inner edge of the approach surface for runway 26 remained at 300 m.."

And: CASA accepted the grandfathering and revoked instrument 153/15. With the 180 m strip width, the retail centre no longer infringed the transitional surface. The lighting and notification requirements were subsequently removed. 

The underlined is simply unbelievable, for what it effectively is saying is that pilot(s) conducting an ILS approach (or RNP) in anger have ICAO Annex 14 OLS protection up unto the point of crossing the runway threshold. After that point all bets are off...  



Finally perhaps the following was influential in why EAPL (plus all the Federal powers to be) have seemingly backtracked on their plans to chop and dice YMEN to some kind of GA airpark or (God forbid) mega-vertiport...  

Via Austrade:

Aerospace servicing takes off as Bombardier expands in Australia

June 2021

Business jet manufacturer Bombardier is investing in Australia to grow its aircraft aftermarket support network in the Asia-Pacific region.

Australia’s burgeoning demand for business aircraft convinced the company to invest in a $25 million Maintenance Repair Overhaul (MRO) facility at Victoria’s Essendon Fields airport.

In this case study, Vice President and General Manager for Bombardier’s Parts and Services, Christopher Debergh, discusses how the Melbourne project got off the ground, including:

• why Australia is a good fit for Bombardier and vice versa
  
• how Austrade helped Bombardier to set up faster in Australia than in other countries
  
• the importance of a local partner and a supportive regulatory environment.
  

Debergh says Austrade was instrumental in helping Bombardier set up in Australia.

‘Austrade helped put together the pieces that go into setting up successful operations in another country. We knew exactly where to go, who to talk to, which agencies we needed to align ourselves with, and how the labour market worked.’

Why Australia for aerospace

Australia has been at the forefront of aviation and aerospace innovation for 100 years. This is due to the vast distances between major cities and the transport needs of thousands of remote communities.

‘Australia is a key market for Bombardier, and we’ve got close to 100 Bombardier aircraft here,’ says Debergh. ‘It’s a huge country and there are a fair number of smaller business aircraft already in the air. Our Learjet and Challenger aircraft, for example, are often used as medevac aircraft.

‘Because of its remoteness, you need large aircraft to fly from Australia to other major continents. We’ve got the Global 7500, the largest business jet you can get, which has a range of 7,700 nautical miles (14,260 km). So, from a customer perspective, Australia is a very good, solid base for us.’

A new aerospace centre of excellence for Australia, New Zealand the Pacific

The new 4,700 m2 Melbourne Service Centre is due to commence operations in early 2022. It will provide a major boost for the Australian aviation sector.

The mid-tier site will deliver a number of services to Bombardier aircraft across the region, including scheduled and drop-in maintenance, modifications, avionics installations and ground support. The centre will be able to service two luxury Global 7500 aircraft at the same time.

‘It is also going to be one of our parts distribution depots,’ says Debergh. ‘We have five of these in the world, and this one will be the central depot for Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific.’

---

Via ABN:


September 27, 2022
Aviation
Bombardier Expands Worldwide Footprint with Grand Opening of New Service Centre in Australia

• New state-of-the-art facility in Melbourne will further enhance Bombardier’s customer service footprint in Asia-Pacific
  
• Melbourne Service Centre will provide quick and efficient maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capabilities for all Bombardier business aircraft, including a parts depot and back shop capabilities
  
• An important market for Bombardier, Australia is also part of a comprehensive worldwide aftermarket network expansion
  

Bombardier today announced the grand opening of its new Melbourne Service Centre at Essendon Fields Airport in Melbourne, Australia. The new facility is a testament to Bombardier’s commitment to the Australian market and establishes a key building block in its growing global customer support network. At full capacity, the new OEM-operated Melbourne Service Centre will add 65 aerospace jobs in the community, including more than 48 highly skilled technicians and boost Bombardier’s customer service footprint in Asia-Pacific by some 50,000 square feet.

Australia is a key market for Bombardier with more than 80 aircraft in its Australian business fleet. Bombardier is also the OEM with the largest percentage of deliveries in Australia, representing 31% of the market (47% for medium and large business jets). This new, highly efficient facility will serve as an important gateway to Asia-Pacific, serving as a key focal point for customers in the region and for future growth prospects of the Bombardier fleet.

“The addition of the Melbourne Service Centre is the latest in a series of worldwide infrastructure investments aimed at enhancing Bombardier’s customer service capacity in line with our 2025 plan,” said Éric Martel, President and CEO, Bombardier. “In the past year, we have added close to one million square feet of service capacity in several key locations, solidifying our plan to bring more Bombardier jets home no matter where they operate.”

     
I'd say a pretty good reason for EAPL maintaining RW26 as a precision approach runway (even if internationally illegal)...  

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Airport public safety risk mitigation - Oz style?

To begin I note some commentary via the relevant UP thread... :
 

Clinton McKenzie

The ATSB investigation details a 2003 email it uncovered, in which an Essendon Airport management officer advised that CASA had agreed verbally to the airport applying a strip width of 180 metres rather than 300 metres.

“This should open up about 36,000 square metres of new land for development,” the email says.

Essendon Airport relied heavily on a letter from a CASA officer confirming that interpretation a month later, but CASA told the ATSB investigation that advice was wrong and had no legal validity.

This is another example of CASA apparently ‘disowning’ responsibility for its own officer’s inconvenient actions.

It appears that the only way in which to have confidence that anything written by any CASA officer is CASA’s position is to write to the CEO and seek confirmation that the CEO acknowledges and accepts that what the CASA officer said is CASA’s position.

---

Mach E Avelli

The airport owner (and CASA, if implicated) will argue that the buildings had no influence on the outcome of the King Air crash. In this particular case they would be right, but it was sheer luck that no one was there on the ground to get hurt.

If a heavier bizjet plows into the shopping centre and kills a dozen or two seeking some retail therapy, Essendon Airport will close overnight. It will briefly open for ferry flight take-offs only. CASA will claim to have eliminated the risk.

The developers will circle like sharks, hangars will become trendy apartments, and the runways will make very convenient parking areas for new high rise buildings.

How to destroy valuable aviation infrastructure 101.

Don't forget the other interested parties - Airservices,  the Department (DITRDC&A) and by association Popinjay's cover-up crew??



Not that anyone can challenge it but apparently Popinjay was attributed to saying this bollocks:

“This complex investigation made nine findings pertaining to the acceptance of grandfathering in non-standard circumstances, review of safety cases, limited guidance for some safety standards, and assurance processes between federal agencies for airport planning relating to the Bulla Road Precinct,” said ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell.

“We note that both CASA and the airport operator have maintained that there is an acceptable level of safety with the current status of the runway strip, obstacle limitation surfaces, and publication of information to pilots. It was not the role of the ATSB to do a separate risk assessment, but we have noted the type of risk information that should be taken into account by aerodrome operators and regulators.”

And then a real Popinjay quote, via the Patrick Hatch Age article: Ref - Finally MSM catch up on Essendon DFO cover-up report??

ATSB chief commissioner Angus Mitchell said the safety authority’s investigation did not find that the DFO was unsafe or should not have been built, but the bureau could not confirm how the airport determined the development was compliant with the rules.

“We can’t say it was in breach, or it was in accordance, because of that uncertainty of what standard applied and what was being used at the time,” Mitchell said.

Ah yes...??

From all the factual evidence, weasel words (above); and indeed the 146 page Popinjay cover-up report itself; it is obvious that all the relevant Federal bureaucratic authorities and agencies are totally prepared to operate the Essendon airport runways in:

a) total non-compliance with the ICAO Annex 14 international standards; and..
b) with the miniscule risk of there ever being "a heavier bizjet" plowing into the DFO shopping complex during peak trading hours!! -    (P2 - Gotta wonder about the insurance companies take on this??)

However back to this observation from Popinjay: "..safety authority’s investigation did not find that the DFO was unsafe or should not have been built.."

Despite the fact that it is not the ATSB's role to provide opinion, or to decide whether a building should or shouldn't have been built, I find it staggering that this so called 'systemic' investigation has been pigeon-holed to 'defined' parameters that seemingly contradict the original intent of the ATSB investigation - quote from the Age January 2019 article: Essendon Airport DFO plans call safety planning into question

It comes as the Australian Transport Safety Bureau is close to completing a major investigation into how Essendon's DFO complex was designed and approved. The probe was launched in the wake of a fatal crash in 2017 when a light aircraft ploughed into the rear of the centre.

“The very fact that it was allowed to be built is a safety concern for our system," said Captain Marcus Diamond, a safety and technical officer at the Australian Federation of Air Pilots (AFAP).

"It means that inappropriate buildings can be built not just at Essendon, but at other airports.

"There’s more risk, and we need to know how that was justified.”

This brings me to the obvious omission to Popinjay's systemic investigation...err...'safety study' report. Why no mention/reference to the DITCRD (the Dept of everything) NASAG's implementation of the NASF (National Airports Safeguarding Framework), in particular:

Guideline B: Managing the Risk of Building Generated Windshear and Turbulence at Airports PDF: 1005 KB DOC: 653 KB

Guideline F: Managing the Risk of Intrusions into the Protected Airspace of Airports PDF: 160 KB DOC: 71 KB

Guideline I: The new National Airport Safeguarding Framework (NASF) Guideline I on Public Safety Areas (PSAs) was agreed by Ministers at the Transport and Infrastructure Council on 9 November 2018.

PSAs are designated areas of land at the end of airport runways within which certain planning restrictions may apply. The new PSA Guideline was developed to mitigate the risk of on-ground fatalities from an aircraft incident, by informing a consistent approach to land use at the end of Australian airport runways.

• Guideline I PDF: 1938 KB DOCX: 2122 KB
  

   
 Interestingly enough in 2019 the Dept of Everything put in place a review of the 'implementation of the NASF'- Google reference: 

 

The Review considered implementation of the NASF across jurisdictions; and sought submissions from all levels of government, industry and community stakeholders. During 2020 the Review was delayed due to temporary reallocation of resources in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

- 

The Review report was eventually released in October 2021: https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/...report.pdf

 

Executive Summary

The National Airports Safeguarding Advisory Group (NASAG) was established in 2010 as a cross jurisdictional advisory body to progress work on developing a national approach to land use planning around airports in Australia. The group is chaired by the Commonwealth Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, and is comprised of state and territory planning and transport departments, Department of Defence, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), Airservices Australia (Airservices), and the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA).

In 2012, Ministers of the then Standing Council on Transport and Infrastructure endorsed the first iteration of the National Airports Safeguarding Framework (NASF) which included seven overarching Principles and six Guidelines.

Between 2012 and 2018, three additional Guidelines were endorsed by the Ministers and added to the NASF. Current NASF Guidelines consider aviation-related issues such as aircraft noise, building induced windshear and turbulence, wildlife hazard management, wind turbines, pilot lighting distraction, airspace protection, protection of air navigation equipment, protection of strategic helicopter landing sites, and public safety areas near the end of runways. NASF has implications for the general public as well as those working in town planning, residential or commercial development, building, development and aviation related industries.

With a view to ensuring the functionality and currency of the NASF, an external implementation review process was agreed to by NASAG in 2019. This report provides a summary of the NASF Implementation Review process undertaken in 2019, and captures NASAG’s Recommendations for further action on airport safeguarding following consideration of this information. Due to COVID-related resourcing limitations this report has been delayed 18 months. Recognising the amount of time that has elapsed since jurisdictions first provided a status update on implementation of the NASF in 2019 the opportunity to provide a 2021 update on implementation was provided as part of the final drafting process. These jurisdictional updates, provided on a voluntary basis, are included in the Appendices to this report.

Public consultation conducted as part of the review sought comments from NASAG members, the aviation industry, and over 600 local government and community stakeholders regarding the implementation of the NASF to date. The consultation period ran for 12 weeks and 42 submissions were received.

Key matters raised during consultation included:

Awareness of airport protection issues continues to increase, with land use planning decisions increasingly referencing NASF and consideration of its implications.

Each of the states/territories have incorporated some form of planning requirements into their respective planning frameworks relating to at least two of the nine NASF guidelines. However, for local governments, the incomplete introduction of planning mechanisms to address NASF-related issues continues to be a hindrance in the consideration of development applications in the vicinity of airports.

Industry bodies and local governments indicated that a jurisdiction not introducing NASF-related provisions into high level planning policy, or providing clear policy direction on the use of the NASF, is a fundamental obstacle to implementation of the framework.

The lack of understanding within the building/development industry regarding safety implications of development near airports continues to be a challenge.

Across many submissions, it was suggested that industry/planning bodies could benefit from a targeted education program on the NASF guidelines, and the economic benefits that airports bring to communities through economic development and employment.

The establishment of airports as statutory referral authorities would be beneficial in providing supporting technical expertise for planners when assessing potential risks to or from aviation activities.

The review found that increasing awareness of the NASF since 2012 has yielded positive results for communities and airports. Moving forward, there are opportunities to further expand awareness and increase the uptake of the NASF through industry networking, legislative/policy approaches, and education activities for practitioners and industry. These themes have been reflected in the eight Implementation Review Recommendations to be taken forward by NASAG.

 
Hmm...note the timing for consideration of implementation of the NASF is 2027! - WTF??

Since the release of the report in October 2021, all other meaningful progress on the NASF seems to have again stalled...  

Are we surprised?? -   

However, focusing on the submissions to the review, for the Gold Star and Choccy Frog award and possible reasons for downplaying the review final report, here is a link and quotes from the 'nailed it' AusALPA submission 34...   

 

Legislative Implementation of the NASF

In the absence of a clear safeguarding endpoint, legislative implementation is doomed to be fragmented and potentially inconsistent, if not counter-productive.

AusALPA does not believe that the hopeful adoption of the Guidelines in State or Territory legislation, regulated individually by those jurisdictions in the absence of umbrella Commonwealth legislation is a viable model. The absence of any vestige of enforcement by DITCRD at the leased Commonwealth airports hardly sets an appropriate example for other levels of government. Unfortunately, a range of effective ownership and control issues mean that a simple single solution is not practicable.

While noting the much narrower focus of this review, AusALPA considers Australia’s airports as strategic national assets in the first instance, with their economic benefits following close behind. Notwithstanding that recent events at Essendon indicate little effective Commonwealth control over leased assets, the privatisation of all but the 22 leased Commonwealth airports has complicated the strategic management by governments of all our airports. Considering both Defence and Disaster Management implications means that strategic outcomes will necessarily remain a multi-jurisdictional issue. On the other hand, economic outcomes should remain with the relevant jurisdiction within which the airport is situated or which retains legal control.

However, in order to achieve our goal of a standardised national approach to airport safeguarding that applies to all airports in all jurisdictions, AusALPA believes that there needs to be a single authority that is ceded all necessary powers by each of the jurisdictions to enforce the intended safety outcomes. With the exception of Guideline A Measures for Managing Impacts of Aircraft Noise, AusALPA considers the remaining Guidelines to be all safety-related and amenable to the application and enforcement by one agency.

SCOTI/TIC has undertaken a number of such exercises previously: on 19 August 2011, the Council of Australian Governments signed Intergovernmental Agreements to establish the national maritime regulator, the national rail safety regulator and investigation system and the national heavy vehicle regulator. While AusALPA surmises that the compromises and concessions required in those spaces were relatively simple compared to the complexity of airport safeguarding, as far as we are aware there are no Constitutional challenges from the States and Territories to the current position that the Commonwealth covers the field in regard to aviation safety matters. Despite our reservations, CASA emerges as the least worst option as the choice of a single agency that all jurisdictions accept as the standard setter for most safety outcomes at airports.

While CASA has proven to be particularly weak in airspace protection, the reality is that they are weak regulators in all of the safety-related Guideline areas. More often than not, CASA hides behind a lack of legislated authority - but even where they do provide advice, as best as we can tell, it rarely if ever reflects any philosophical strength.

AusALPA considers this weakness to be primarily a function of the constraints placed on CASA by DITCRD, which clings to the legacy of the encroachment on safety matters of the Airports Act 1996 as well as to an apparent over-sensitivity to Constitutional matters related to land use planning despite the aviation safety consequences. Although ICAO does not provide standards for the safety-related Guideline topics, that absence is no impediment to Australia imposing its own standards.

We believe that CASR Part 139 is the natural home for these standards.

Nonetheless, the protection of prescribed airspace needs a complete overhaul. At the moment, the only protection of prescribed airspace is empowered by Part 12 of the Airports Act 1996 and the Airports (Protection of Airspace) Regulations 1996, of which paradoxically Guideline F at paragraph 23 outlines a workaround. That legislation only affects the 22 leased Commonwealth airports and is regulated by DITCRD, not CASA – at all other airports, CASA imposes a duty on the airport operator to prescribe and protect the OLS and PANS-OPS surfaces notwithstanding the lack of authority and power of the airport operator to protect that airspace.

AusALPA has no visibility of the extent to which State, Territory or local governments provide protection of that airspace from encroachment, if at all.

The Opacity of Implementation and Decision-making

AusALPA’s greatest difficulty is that, as the primary users most exposed to the safety risks, we continually need to force our way into the various debates and consultations.

Our greatest disappointment is that DITCRD, CASA and airport operators all actively frustrate scrutiny of compliance with the NASF – a complete failure to act in the public interest and to accept public accountability for actions, decisions and outcomes.

With very few exceptions, airports exist to serve the Australian public and the safetyrelated standards and processes exist so that we can make their travel as uneventful as possible. None of the safety-related standards and processes exist for the benefit of officers of DITCRD, CASA or the airport operators – AusALPA strongly believes that a total change of mindset is required.

Currently, the only visibility of the application of the NASF that we get is through the MDP process at the leased Commonwealth airports. Only Canberra and Sydney proactively engage with us, otherwise we have to hope that our very limited resources detect the notification of a pdMDP on individual airport websites within the relevant consultation window. We do not believe that such a hit-or-miss system for those major airports is the best that can be done in the interests of aviation safety.

Complicating the MDP issue a little further, the recent Airports Amendment Act 2018 increased the monetary threshold for MDP treatment to $25M, fortunately somewhat less than the $35M proposed. Our view is that environmental and operational risk consequences are not well correlated with project size and complexity and that increasing the threshold only hides more projects from public scrutiny.

AusALPA recently engaged with the Airport Building Controller (ABC) at Essendon in regard to a building that was under construction in close proximity to the runway and which appeared to penetrate the published OLS within even the inappropriately truncated Guideline B assessment area. The development was not subject to an MDP and consequently there was no public consultation.

It took considerable effort to gain any information from the ABC, whose first step was to consult with DITCRD. Although the next step was to suggest that the legislation prevented the release of any information to us, we eventually gained a response to some questions on notice. One of those questions was about a Guideline B turbulence and windshear analysis – the ABC advised us that no such study had been conducted.

Subsequently, in separate correspondence, CASA advised us that a study had been conducted. It was never volunteered which agency had requested the study or who had conducted it, but it was most apparent that such a request was neither a standard requirement by the ABC nor the supervising section within DITCRD. In the end, we were left to surmise that there was nothing untoward in this assessment in CASA’s possession – we were unable to confirm the technical details for ourselves and the building is now complete and occupied. While the solution to the OLS penetration issue was for the airport operator to artificially shrink the OLS, there is no such “smoke and mirrors” solution to mitigating the likelihood of building induced turbulence in the vicinity of the threshold of runway 08. There was absolutely no transparency of the building approval process and AusALPA has no evidence available to us that suggests that either CASA or DITCRD has the technical capability or interest in verifying the Guideline B analysis.

The only documented process for safety-related development analysis of which we are aware relates to the 22 leased Commonwealth airports. If we then consider the effective absence of any public scrutiny of the remaining airports in Australia, the combined outcome frustrates the public interest and is totally unacceptable.

Impediments to Full Implementation

Notwithstanding our continuing concerns about the content of some of the Guidelines, in the absence of evidence AusALPA has little or no faith that the Guidelines are being properly applied, even at all of the airports subject to the Airports Act 1996. Given that the Essendon ABC is a company providing the same services at a number of airports, it seems reasonable to conclude that their corporate knowledge and procedures do not extend to applying some (or any) of the Guidelines to minor developments, regardless of the potential hazards.

If, as it appears to us, the DITCRD system doesn’t work, then what models are the other levels of government intending to apply to what types of developments and with whom do they intend to consult in the process?

Recently, we heard that DITCRD is embarking on what anecdotally is their first enforcement action in airspace protection, despite many historical non-compliances, some of which were apparently egregious in their disregard for the existing legislative framework. In our experience, a track record of appeasement has never improved compliance. One story had it that, in order to avoid both embarrassment and the need for enforcement action, DITCRD attempted to retrospectively approve a serious OLS penetration but failed to complete the process before the crane was removed after many months of illegal operation.

If true, what enforcement models can we expect the other levels of government to apply given the Commonwealth’s example?

Further to the likelihood of different enforcement models being applied according to the politics of State and Territory economic development, there is also the likelihood of significantly different pathways for administrative and judicial review or other forms of dispute resolution. The NASF is silent in this regard.

A Way Forward

To be clear, AusALPA recognises that the economic decisions surrounding airports, i.e. determining the balance between the economic benefits of developments and the detriments to the accessibility, efficiency and capacity of an airport, rest entirely with the relevant jurisdiction within which the airport is situated or which retains legal control. The issues of enforceability and dispute resolution of development approvals would remain consistent with those jurisdictional norms.

However, contrary to current practice, we are proposing that the assessment, mitigation and enforcement of the safety consequences of all relevant developments be ceded by those jurisdictions to CASA as an independent decision-maker.

Consequently, CASA needs to change its model of how airport standards are applied and enforced so as to obviate the gaming of the system so exemplified by the Essendon experience or by the uncontrolled expansion of the thousands of airspace penetrations at Sydney. As a further consequence, DITCRD should seek major amendments to the Airports Act 1996 that change the current subservient and excessively constrained role attributed to CASA and that also clarify the safety considerations that ABCs must undertake in regard to minor developments.

Furthermore, we are proposing that the visibility of developments affecting the safety outcomes at airports is vastly improved in all jurisdictions.

The public interest is best served by accepting that the potential hazard created by a development is on or near an airport not a function of cost but rather the amalgam of the issues set out in the Guidelines. Each jurisdiction should commit to a public register of development proposals that may present a potential hazard to safe airport operations, enhanced by a published list of stakeholders who are alerted to each new relevant development submitted to the jurisdiction for approval.

Yours sincerely,

Hmm...next on PSAs (Public safety zones) and NASF guideline I - quote from Californian Transport Department 'Airport Land Use Planning':  https://dot.ca.gov/programs/aeronautics/...e-planning

Responsible Land Use Planning

When making land use decisions, it is important that the type and density of land use and its cumulative impacts are given careful consideration so that appropriate decisions are made for the airport, its context, and its environment. Acknowledging this need, in 1967 the California State Legislature authorized the creation of Airport Land Use Commissions (ALUC), to protect the “public health, safety, and welfare by encouraging orderly expansion of airports and the adoption of land use measures that minimizes exposure to excessive noise and safety hazards within areas around public airports to the extent that these areas are not already devoted to incompatible uses.” Generally speaking, ALUCPs look at an area two-miles around an airport.

The law requires each county’s ALUC type to prepare an Airport Land Use Compatibility Plan (ALUCP) with a twenty-year planning horizon. Ideally, the ALUCP should be updated every 5-10 years to ensure consistency with General Plans, Specific Plans, etc. The primary focus of an ALUCP is on broadly defined noise and safety impacts. In addition, ALUCs make compatibility determinations for compliance of all proposed development around an airport. A local government body may override an ALUC compatibility determination for any proposed incompatible land use by a two-thirds majority vote; however, they must notify the Division of Aeronautics and the ALUC of this intent 45 days prior to approving the override. The Division would then respond within 30-days to the local agency’s overrule comments.

Ground and Airspace Safety

A fundamental concern in achieving airport land use compatibility involves safety in the air and within the vicinity of the airport. Aircraft accidents happen infrequently, but the consequences can be severe. The concept of risk is central to the assessment of safety compatibility. The overall objective of safety compatibility is to minimize risks associated with potential aircraft accidents. There are two components to this strategy - safety of people and property on the ground and the protection of navigable airspace from hazardous obstructions to ensure the safety of aircraft occupants. The primary ground strategy is to limit the intensity of use by minimizing residential and non-residential densities and activities that attract people in locations most susceptible to an off-airport aircraft accident. Certain risk-sensitive uses, such as schools and hospitals, and aboveground storage of flammable or hazardous materials, should be avoided regardless of the number of people involved.

For additional information on federal regulations regarding airspace safety, refer to: Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 77 and the California Public Utilities Code Sections 21658 and 21659.

 
In summary, the US State of California has had in place for 56 years an effective legislated airport safeguard framework that has subsequently been successfully duplicated by a majority of US States ever since: Ref - https://dot.ca.gov/-/media/dot-media/pro...k-a11y.pdf

Yet here we are in Oz still trying to subvert and obfuscate the international standards and decades of airport safety risk mitigation techniques and knowledge of the world's most prolific first world aviation nation the USA - UFB!   

MTF...P2 

PS: On Guideline I FAQ note the following reference to the SSP:

Q: What other measures are in place to minimise the risk to public safety near airport runways?

A: Safety at aerodromes is enhanced in a variety of ways and is governed by Australia's Aviation State Safety Programme (SSP), as required by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The SSP sets out Australia’s arrangements for maintaining and improving aviation safety. Under the umbrella of the SSP, Australia's aviation agencies and the aviation industry have significant roles to play in delivering quality safety outcomes. For example, runway safety is enhanced by airport operators through investment in infrastructure such as longer, wider landing strips; Runway End Safety Areas; dual taxi lanes on aprons; installation of runway stop bars; and upgraded approach lighting.

Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) also plays a key role in aviation safety through regulatory oversight of such functions as pilot licencing, aircraft operations and maintenance, and through safety education and training while Airservices Australia contributes to the safety of aircraft operations at and near airports through the provision of a range of air traffic management and advisory services. It is also important to note that airports around Australia already take into consideration aircraft crash risks and general public safety through their airport master planning processes.

Much like the non-involvement of the so called SSP in the current Airservices critical shortage of properly qualified ATCOs, the safeguarding of Airports in the areas of building windshear, OLS ICAO and PAN-OPS non-compliance and indeed the obfuscation of Public Safety Area risk mitigation around airports apparently, unlike the statement above,  does not rate a mention within our supposedly full functioning and ICAO compliant SSP? AIOS strikes again:


Ref: AIOS - & the 21st Century??

[Peetwo]

A shout out to the GAAAI -  

Via the General Aviation & Airports Association Facebook page in recent days:

On YMEN airport:

GAAAI - General Aviation & Airports Association

What would happen to infrastructure and to the businesses that rely on roads infrastructure, and to trucking companies like Linfox - if roads were privatised and they could no longer use them?

The road usesrs probably have the ear of government.

Not General Aviation (GA). Successive governments have ignored the many issues failing our industry.

The irony is one of the owners of Essendon Airport is Lindsay Fox and he is doing exactly that together together with Max Beck and the respective families that run the airport, and it is causing and has caused, immense harm to the true blue aviation companies that form the General Aviation sector in accordance with the ICAO definition. The members provide a concerning tapestry of reports.

The Essendon Airport CEO, Brendan Phian told Member airport companies they could go to Baccus Marsh, and the future of Essendon airport is big jets. Four of our Members witnessed this at a user group meeting.

Essendon Airport did illegal deals with recievers on leases rents, and so so so much more in the property chess game that sees members livelihoods adversely effected.

The CEO said they are about ‘property economics’. And they are a law unto themselves.
Members state they have maintained that position by threatening the livelihoods of those who disagree or seek government assistance it was one of the only airports in the country that didn’t have a chamber of commerce, members had formed a view they would be selected for targeting if they sought to negotiate, if they complained, as they had seen happen to mates they had been working shoulder to shoulder with. Livelihoods have ended along the way, community work, eye surgery for kids, mapping, fire spotting, innovation, engineering, smaller charter operations.

Many of those who have protested the corruption over the years have been marched out.

Fox came to the Labor party because he disagreed with what happened to Ansett. Altruism? No.

The legacy is one of total corruption if we consider the conduct at Essendon Airport. And it is no different to what our melbera report at Moorabbin, Archerfield, Jandakot and many regional airports.
 
Marching out Property Managers when they point out the other legal instruments
And compliance issues (Essendon was devoid of a property manager for 6 months when she was marched out by the CEO), no aviation department, no property manager for 6 months (and silencing them by forcing them into agreements against entitlements).

Tenants have said how they were celebrating with families  and children on Christmas Eve (tanants more than one), were served eviction notices and others invoices with deals made with recievers on false leases never been shown to the tenant, the reason to ruin this special time with family?

Because the tenants would not have access to lawyers over the shut downs period. And the out of offices are immediately switched on after sending. Members have described the most horrific adverse actions. Blowing up power boards then conducting an electricity compliance and failing them, forcing the tenants to use generators (more than 4 Members) that were four times the price of other companies - because why-The electricity company is owned by family - Active electricity. There are also instances of tenants saying they felt they had no other option than to use this company.

The board know this and the CEO is still there, the corruption runs deep, this isn’t just a rogue CEO.

Site leases being charged at building rent (and emails going back to 2006 saying they would not renew the lease unless it was so). And keeping the FAC policy a secret, from those whose leases it applied to.

Stating in writing the reason rent reviews are more than two years late is because of high staff turnover. More than three years late because they hoped another company would fall over.

What a mess. And it’s a story our 400 plus members are repeating around the country.

Where are the roads for GA? Hangars and airports are the equivalent. The government privatised airports and trusted corporations with minimal oversight. It failed. It failed infrastructure. It failed aviation. It failed the men and women of industry. It failed Australia. 

Plus:

GAAAI - General Aviation & Airports Association

For 22 million Max Beck and Lindsay Fox felt they were entitled to revert the site leases, while the tenants had been guaranteed renewals for 25 years with the Associated Airport Sale Documentation - and previous policy clarifications by the FAC - 3x25 year renewalst [75 Years] before reversion. This slipped through proper governance via inadequate management of operators, requirements for auditing and compliance management.

The FAC and sale documents governing the sale were disappeared from tenant access. In recent times they were shared with GAAAI and proved what the smaller operators were saying was correct. The airports were gaslighting the sites lease tenants, lacking transparency, actively conspiring against some of the hardest, most specialised businesses and workers in Australia. The airport operators misrepresented the reduction in landings to the government to support Master Plans (which went into decline while profits went up) saying it was lack of need. The airport were misrepresenting the industry requirements and reducing access to infrastructure in a variety of ways, including maxing landing fees, absolute abuse of Market Power against hangar tenants.

One by one General Aviation businesses shut down and airports became confident in the lack of oversight, they engaged in blatant trickery to fix the rents, take the hangars and redetermine the definition of General Aviation. They misrepresented the facts on the reduction of small aircraft landings, saying it was a reduced requirement which so happened to coincide with the privatisation, lacking transparency in withholding the commercial facts and underhand tactics, how they had made it near impossible for that sector of the industry with increased outgoings, taking over hangars, and astronomical landing fees.

Operators redefined airports, they breached regulations, airports were reclassified, they increased non aviation development. The privatised model vision didn’t involve the smaller operators performing critical infrastructure tasks. The government lacked any matrix by which to effectively audit the industry. The hard working men and women suffered immeasurably. The private airport operators went to great lengths to do this plotting strategy against tenants, behaving recklessly to industry sectors and without focus towards the harm this would create. Strong arming, threatening, abusing, exerting an imbalance of power.

Refusing to recognise legal rights, legal bodies, legal site rent Hangars. Pushing tenants into legal corners with unconscionable conduct then laughing in their offices, and marching out staff who didn’t agree with the approach and who had history in Airport management. Some who speak out about what they have seen and the level of scheming that goes on in these under-regulated offices of airports.

How good they are at the decisive chess game management of airport property economics. Airport Management smirking to employees about how they ‘had it in the bag’ when referring to another hangar tenant they were posturing for eviction to replace with non aviation development or to convert a site lease, or to even leave empty to teach a lesson to those impassioned enough to speak out.

Unconscionable conduct, and more than that, lack of care, honour, responsibility and regard to airport sale conditions.

It is a story repeated by our Members from airports around the country in similar tales.

United we Stand.

MTF? - Definitely! P2 

[Peetwo]

AFAP - ATSB DFO report on social media?? -   

Via LinkedIn:

Australian Federation of Air Pilots (AFAP)
5,504 followers
6h • Edited

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has found the private operator of the Essendon Airport largely ignored modern safety standards when it built a shopping centre close to the runway.

While investigating the crash [of a Beechcraft King Air into the DFO shopping centre on 21 Feb 2017] the ATSB discovered the #DFO was within 150m of the southern runway, in an apparent breach of safety standards in place since 1987, which mandated a 300m “stripwidth” on such a runway, or a 150m buffer zone on each side.

"… the ATSB said it could find no evidence the Civil Aviation Safety Authority had given the airport a concession to use that 180-metre clearance zone" … [and] "could not confirm how the airport determined the development was compliant with the rules."

“… the ATSB report largely agreed with the federation’s concerns that the airport largely ignored regulations intended to protect aviation activity and safety … pilots were increasingly concerned about overdevelopment at airports nationwide.”

A comment in reply:

Adrian Young
2h

Certainly not the first airport where the strip has been infringed upon. It must also be remembered that at the edge of the strip an imaginary slope starts (transitional slope) through which objects should not penetrate. The shopping centre penetrated both the strip and the transitional.
Clear safeguarding rules and their consistent implementation are key here.

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

And, the final arbiter is?

Feeling a little like Oliver Twist asking for more, I wonder if some of the 'grown ups' can shed some light into a dark corner. I suspect (thankfully) that like most of us my experiences with insurance companies is limited to paying the fee and hoping that 'it' never happens. But, the business at Essendon has the curiosity bump operating at full throttle and without enough knowledge to solve the puzzle, not funny.

So, to begin: it is reasonable to expect that the King Air was properly insured, that the AOC was valid and the pilot properly licensed and technically fit for duty, insofar as would satisfy the court. It would also seem reasonable that the DFO building was fully and legally approved;and, covered for the routine stuff, but would it have a specific 'clause' or policy against collision with an aircraft? Then there is the aerodrome operator's coverage to consider. This is all 'on-the-surface' stuff, with deep roots leading back to several layers of 'approvals' being issued, those underscored by 'compliance' with the pertinent regulation and ICAO requirements attached, etc. 

Now that the ATSB and CASA have done their homework and 'published' their eloquent 'not my fault' papers with enough nebulous wriggle room to keep a battalion of lawyers engaged until pension day; who will the 'other side' tackle on the compensation side of the ledger? Should they win the day, who will the insurers then tackle to recoup the loss? Or will they? Will the loss be passed on up the insurance food chain and be absorbed into the great pool of 'that's the cost of doing business'.

I've no idea – but it seems to me (in layman ignorance) there are three separate possible avenues for action – A. the easy minimum cost/loss and least embarrassment way; B. big cost with more expense to follow; C. mission impossible against the government position.

A. It was simply 'pilot error' the impact with the innocent DFO unfortunate; all quickly tucked up, neat tidy and at minimum expense. Was the pilot/company and insurer  aware of and accepted the risks that the reduced runway margins imposed? Did the operating company carry any written insurance rider to cover this shortfall? Did the CASA approved (accepted) operations manual specifically mention operations at aerodromes with less than ICAO promulgated requirements? You can see where that is heading; the current story line clearly lighting the way.Out of pocket payment for the aircraft; life insurance for the occupants – the DFO repairs – neat, clean and cost effective, leaving the government agencies and developers with a clean slate and no red faces and little in the way of 'expenses'.

B. Was the DFO an innocent bystander or was it, in part, responsible for the deaths? Had there been a couple of hundred shoppers and children killed or injured at the time of the event, what would the insurance case be then? Had that building been destroyed, who would be in the insurance payout recovery gun sight? Then the question of whether the DFO was 'legal' or not so much – that becomes a legal brangle of epic proportions and serious money. Is ICAO compliance simply lip-service – applied as and when convenient – or is this country serious about world best 'safety' practice? The lodged differences with ICAO make a small mountain of paper; the rampant development on Commonwealth land is unchecked. Had this event been just a little more lethal than it was; would the insurer pool then roll out the big guns and take it on more seriously? Seems to me there is a case to answer, just below the surface of that murky pool.

C Was the commonwealth in any way responsible for the approval process? You could bet your best Sunday go-to-church boots on the No answer. Yet there is a responsibility there; diffused, diluted and kept a long way away from the 'corridors' of real power to be sure; nevertheless, it does exist. Would any right minded insurance consortium tackle the might of a government or even a body remotely attached, over the Essendon event? Unlikely. Will ICAO weigh in – unlikely.

So whats left – who's to bless and who's to blame is a valid question, but it ain't the core issue is it. Is the DFO building 'legal' and compliant? Are the developers taking sanctioned liberties? We just don't know; what we do know is that somehow, some way an aircraft carrying passengers travelling in 'good faith' collided with a building, all died and the potential for many more deaths was and remains very, very real. It will be for the insurance brokers and the court to decide the outcomes. But a few millions spread about, the last nail hastily put into the coffin of this event, followed by a swift burial will not resolve the potential for a repeat performance. The best that can be expected is insurance premiums will be jacked up to cover the minor shortfall created by an 'unfortunate' accident caused by 'pilot error'.

Will the 'names' of the great insurance pools give a monkeys? Probably not. Will the developers care a hoot? Probably not. Is CASA off the hook? Has ATSB got any skin in the game? Is the DoIT under the pump? Has the minister any notion that the event even occurred? Who cares the most that the DFO is still standing? Yep, you've  guessed it.

Toot – toot...

[Peetwo]

Addendum: LinkedIn comments cont/-

AFAP - ATSB DFO report on social media?? -   

Via LinkedIn:

Australian Federation of Air Pilots (AFAP)
5,504 followers
6h • Edited

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has found the private operator of the Essendon Airport largely ignored modern safety standards when it built a shopping centre close to the runway.

While investigating the crash [of a Beechcraft King Air into the DFO shopping centre on 21 Feb 2017] the ATSB discovered the #DFO was within 150m of the southern runway, in an apparent breach of safety standards in place since 1987, which mandated a 300m “stripwidth” on such a runway, or a 150m buffer zone on each side.

"… the ATSB said it could find no evidence the Civil Aviation Safety Authority had given the airport a concession to use that 180-metre clearance zone" … [and] "could not confirm how the airport determined the development was compliant with the rules."

“… the ATSB report largely agreed with the federation’s concerns that the airport largely ignored regulations intended to protect aviation activity and safety … pilots were increasingly concerned about overdevelopment at airports nationwide.”

A comment in reply:

Adrian Young
2h

Certainly not the first airport where the strip has been infringed upon. It must also be remembered that at the edge of the strip an imaginary slope starts (transitional slope) through which objects should not penetrate. The shopping centre penetrated both the strip and the transitional.
Clear safeguarding rules and their consistent implementation are key here.

Via LinkedIn:

Naseer Mohammad Nazir (MIE Aust, NER, RPEQ, IRSE)
Locomotive Design Engineer - Electrical
2d

Now the question is who approved the construction and how CASA inspectors missed such a grave breach of safety regulations.

This has to be probed further.

This finding means over construction structures must be demolished?

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Gregory Holland
EASA/CASA part 147/Part 145,Part 42/Part 66 L.A.M.E Consulant at TAFE SA
2d

Sounds cynical but it's one way to close an airport by building close to or infringing minimum standards then plead for forgiveness whilst leaving the structure in place still infringing the standard.

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Simon Hatfield
Airworks Consulting - Airport Operations/ Masterplans/Designs simon@airworksconsulting.com.au

1d
I think this article misses a number of key points. Take into consideration the aircraft that crashed was a Beech 200 Kingair and only requires a strip width of 140m overall under the CASA Part 139 rules - not 300 which is a requirement for a an A380 sized aircraft. The weight of the aircraft exceed takeoff (but did not contribute to the crash) it was put down to the flight control trim tabs being set incorrectly.

Hmm...what Simon says maybe technically correct from a CASA Part 139 ruleset POV (Ref: CH6 para 6.17 Table 6.17 (4)). However what Simon says neglects the fact that runway 17 is a code 3 (non-precision) runway and runway 26 is a code 4 (precision approach) runway, which (even under the 468 pg CASR Part 139 MOS) requires a runway strip width of 280m.

As for the comment that the cause of the accident.. "was put down to the flight control trim tabs being set incorrectly" ..please refer to P9's latest post..

Perhaps, not so elementary.


 
MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

AFAP - “The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has found the private operator of the Essendon Airport largely ignored modern safety standards when it built a shopping centre close to the runway.”

Good work from the AFAP – this part - “ largely ignored modern safety standards” - got me thinking. The 'parapet wall', the one the Be200 collided with first, the one which 'deflected' the aircraft to the roof, rather than through a window. It cannot possibly have been 'cheap' to build, it ain't an elegant enhancement to what is a butt ugly building; so why does it exist?

The cynic could postulate that being well aware that a risk existed, due to close proximity, of an unwanted aircraft visit, spoiling the shopping 'experience' - the structure was designed and built as an outer protection against just such an event. Were the developers actually fully aware that there was a possibility? If so, then do intent and malice aforethought get a hand in the game?



Toot - just saying – toot..