[Peetwo]

Harfwit goes missing on ATC sickie concerns??

Via the Oz, courtesy that happy little chappie from Tassie, Matthew Denholm...

Air controllers’ sick leave has pilots asking is anyone there?

EXCLUSIVE
MATTHEW DENHOLM
TASMANIA CORRESPONDENT
@MatthewRDenholm

8:40PM SEPTEMBER 22, 2022


The air traffic control tower at Cairns Airport. picture: Brendan Radke

Regional airspace is being left temporarily uncontrolled by air traffic controllers due to “high-level unplanned staff absences”, disrupting aviation companies and creating “confusion”.

The Regional Aviation Association of Australia, as well as individual companies and pilots, told The Australian the problem had been occurring in the past few months across parts of Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia. RAAA chief executive Steve Campbell said the issue had been raised with Airservices Australia. “We’re trying to work with them to minimise disruptions to operators – there are frustrations and it is impacting,” he said. “As things ramp up for Christmas, you don’t want to be seeing this sort of thing. They want to hurry up and get their people sorted.”

Airservices has responded to a high sickie rate by restricting airspace, sometimes to only one plane at a time, and advising pilots to rely on Traffic Information Broadcasts by Aircraft.

Under TIBA, pilots must “self-separate” by talking to each other to monitor each other’s whereabouts in the absence of air traffic controllers.

A Qantas pilot told The Australian TIBA should only be used “as a last resort”, such as a fire or other emergency at an air traffic control centre, and not routinely to deal with staffing issues.

Mr Campbell said Airservices had advised him the practice was occurring “everywhere”. “It is not ideal – the smaller planes don’t have the equipment to see where they are and so it’s back to the old ‘see and be seen’ and ‘look out’ ­approach,” he said.

A post on an online aviation forum says a Jetstar flight from Brisbane to Mackay on August 2 was aborted rather than “deal with the TIBA airspace”, although Jetstar said it was due to weather.

Tasmanian aviation operators said there had been multiple TIBA periods in recent months.
An Airlines of Tasmania time-sensitive nuclear medicine supply flight was delayed on August 31 after approaches to Tasmanian airports were restricted.

The Piper Navajo had to circle Devonport for about 30 minutes, while waiting for another aircraft to land in Launceston.

A pilot school in Launceston has also expressed frustration to RAAA about disruption from ­periods of restricted airspace, Mr Campbell said.

Parts of Tasmanian airspace were again restricted on Wednesday this week, for 45 minutes from 8.45am at high altitudes, with ­reports of confusion among pilots and controllers.

Airservices said the use of ­restricted airspace or TIBA was ­always safe, and did not amount to closing airspace, which was still monitored. “When air traffic management services are temporarily affected, due to short-term, unplanned absences, we only vary the published level of service to ensure our targeted levels of safety are always maintained,” an Airservices spokeswoman said.

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Pilots express safety concerns over disappearing air traffic controllers

MATTHEW DENHOLM
TASMANIA CORRESPONDENT
@MatthewRDenholm

6:43PM SEPTEMBER 26, 2022


AusALPA pilots union president Captain Louise Pole at Brisbane airport. Picture: Glenn Hunt

Pilots are concerned about the safety of increased reliance on uncontrolled airspace due to temporary air traffic controller shortages, blaming a 10 per cent cut in controllers since June last year.

As recently revealed by The Australian, regional airspace is being left temporarily uncontrolled due to “high-level unplanned staff absences”, disrupting aviation and creating confusion.

AusALPA, which represents more than 7000 commercial pilots, on Monday said the issue was unprecedented, worsening and increasing risks to the point some airlines were delaying flights.

Airservices Australia, blaming a high number of sickies, has been advising pilots in some regional areas to rely on Traffic Information Broadcasts by Aircraft (TIBA).

Under TIBA, pilots must “self-separate” by talking to each other via radio in the absence of air traffic controllers.

Pilots said TIBA was meant to be used rarely, as a “last resort” in emergencies, but had become “almost a daily occurrence” in some regions in recent months.

READ MORE:Uncontrolled airspace left crash pilots flying blind in Victoria|Qantas-Alliance deal may not fly as watchdog objects|Revealed: Qld’s biggest business deals this year
This has led to aviation delays in regional areas, notably Cairns, Townsville, Mackay and Rockhampton, in Queensland, Launceston and Hobart in Tasmania, and parts of Western Australian.

AusALPA president and Qantas Link pilot Captain Louise Pole told The Australian some airlines were delaying flights rather than operate while TIBA was in place.

“Today, I’ve just operated into areas where there is concern – Rockhampton and Mackay, areas surrounding those airports – and they are going in and out (of TIBA) for half an hour, sometimes three hours and as long as eight hours,” Captain Pole said.

“Some areas they consider to have a higher level of risk and so companies are not prepared to let aircraft go into that airspace.

“It (TIBA) means the workload for a pilot is a lot higher and that makes your job harder, and it does create more risk because you are not operating in a normal (situation).”

She said in 30 years of flying, she had not flown TIBA until two weeks ago, and had since flown it twice, most recently on Monday.

She believed the loss of 10 per cent of air traffic controllers under an early retirement scheme in the 12 months to June had led to a shortage of suitably skilled controllers in some areas.

Civil Air president and air traffic controller Tom McRobert said 120 controllers had taken early retirement under the program, reducing “resilience” to deal with staffing issues.

He said the scheme had arguably cut twice as many as was wise and this was the “root cause” of the use of TIBA.

“We are seeing more TIBAs in the last six months than I’ve ever seen in my nearly 20 years (in the job),” Mr McRobert said.

Airservices, which insists TIBA is a safe method of separating aircraft, said it had more than enough controllers and 65 in training.

“Our services have been varied less than 0.1 per cent of the total time this year despite the impact of the worst flu season in years and Covid-19,” a spokeswoman said.

“Like most organisations, Airservices has been impacted by Covid-19 and … flu … leading to short-notice, unplanned staff availability issues.”

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

ATCO misses Malaysian Airlines PAN PAN at YBBN - WTD?? 

Via Oz Aviation:

EXCLUSIVE: LISTEN AS AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL MISS MAJOR INCIDENT ON PACKED A330
written by Adam Thorn | October 11, 2022

Australian Aviation has obtained a recording that reveals how air traffic control missed one of the most serious aviation safety incidents in a generation involving a packed A330.

After failing to respond to the first PAN PAN call for help from the Malaysia Airlines first officer, the controller then didn’t respond when the crew of separate aircraft asked if they’d heard it.

The aircraft took off from Brisbane carrying 215 people with its crucial speed sensors covered up in 2018. Similar incidents in 1996 involving 757s led to fatal crashes that killed more than 200 people.

Significantly, it comes after two separate investigations made claims of a toxic culture at Airservices, which oversees air traffic control.

The first, by a Federal Court QC, argued its culture was so poor it could “endanger the lives of air travellers”, while a second revealed an “unacceptable” atmosphere of bullying, sexual harassment and racism.

Airservices said the earlier investigation’s claims were “false and alarmist” but implemented the recommendations of the second, which it commissioned.

Our recording, obtained under Freedom of Information laws, showcases for the first time how air traffic control initially failed to respond to the incident that was the subject of a four-year probe by air traffic investigators.

The ATSB’s final report said that “no reason could be established” for the controller not hearing the PAN PAN message, adding that there were “no other known distractions or issues that could have interfered with the controller’s perception of the urgency call”.

The controller initially didn’t respond to the alert and then again subsequently when the crew of another aircraft taking off asked if they’d heard it.

It was only after the Malaysian Airlines’ first officer made a second call that he was responded to.

A full breakdown of the conversation from the ATSB is at the bottom of this article.

Airservices told Australian Aviation in response there was “no relationship between the incident referred to in the ATSB report and Airservices’ culture, and the ATSB investigation found no evidence of cultural issues influencing the response to this incident”.

The ATSB said in a statement this year its investigation into the incident was “one of its most substantive and complex” in recent years and also highlighted poor decisions made by Malaysia Airlines pilots and crew, alongside those from other organisations.

The situation took place on 18 July 2018, when the Malaysia Airlines Airbus A330, 9M-MTK, took off from Brisbane bound for Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, with 14 crew and 215 passengers on board.

Crucially, the ‘pitot probe’ covers, which act as airspeed sensors, were covered up during takeoff.

The covers are necessary at Brisbane airport due to a problem with mud wasps in the area, which can sometimes fly into them.

It was after discovering the problem that the crew’s first officer made the call to air traffic control for help. Only around a minute and a half later was a second call made and responded to.

In 2020, Australian Aviation reported how a fresh investigation into Airservices Australia by a former sex discrimination commissioner lifted the lid on a culture of bullying along with multiple claims of racism, homophobia and gender discrimination.

Elizabeth Broderick’s report interviewed 2,171 employees and found that 37 per cent of women experienced sexual harassment and 50 per cent of all employees bullying, which, she concluded, must be addressed “as a matter of urgency”.

The investigation, commissioned by the business itself, also published numerous claims by employees, including:

“[My manager said to me once] Why are you staying back at work? Do you want to f**k me? You should wear a dress. We can see your underpants.”

“I have been here for over 20 years. And I’m worn down. I feel unsafe, vulnerable, scared and anxious. I no longer have the resilience to overcome the constant bullying, nastiness and harassment. No one in a leadership position is willing to stand up for what is right.”

“The ATCs here make sexualised, racist and homophobic comments. If you call them out, they set you up.”
Airservices accepted the findings in 2020 and pledged to implement all of its recommendations.

In its last annual report, it claimed to have made “significant progress” and said its reforms included the creation of a ‘Culture Reform Board’ and implementation of ‘Safe Place’, which it said was a “specialised team providing essential psychological, wellbeing and investigative support to our people”.

Chief executive Jason Harfield later told Senators that as a result of investigations, “people have left Airservices”.

However, an earlier report by the Anthony North QC, commissioned by the air traffic control union Civil Air, found the culture at the organisation was so poor it could “compromise the safety of passengers”.

It went on to suggest that “management may upon investigation be found to have been primarily responsible” for the “culture of bullying, discrimination and sexual harassment”.

Airservices said it response then that it “unequivocally” rejected the suggestion safety was being put at risk and said there was “no factual basis for these false and alarmist claims”.

In a new statement in relation to the incident, Airservices said it plays a “critical role in Australia’s aviation safety and cultivates a safety-first culture”.

It added, “As the ATSB report notes, the tower controller believed the PAN PAN transmission had come through during a telephone call between the tower and departures from the speakers at the departures controller’s terminal and accordingly did not respond.

“Importantly, the ATSB found that the departures controller provided effective support to the flight crew after take-off, including taking the initiative to provide groundspeed information.”

ATSB analysis of Air Traffic Control correspondence

*Voices in the video have been changed to protect identities

At 2333:04, immediately after the captain’s read back, the FO suggested they call PAN PAN and the FO then immediately transmitted over the tower frequency ‘PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN, Malaysian one thirty four, we have unreliable airspeed and request maintain runway track and request climb to six thousand [ft] initially’.

The tower controller did not later recall hearing this call and did not respond to it.

Recorded air traffic control (ATC) data shows that the call was received by the ATC radio on the tower frequency. Other recorded data showed that there were no other transmissions or calls around this time.

The PAN PAN call came about 40 seconds after the end of a coordination telephone call between the tower and departures controllers, in which they also briefly discussed equipment upgrades that were being conducted at the time (the tower controller later reported that the upgrades had no adverse effect on their workload or performance).

About 28 seconds after the end of the PAN PAN call, the flight crew of another aircraft requested take-off clearance from the tower controller. The tower controller responded with the clearance.

Immediately after that clearance was provided, the tower controller received a coordination call from the departures controller, who asked if the Malaysia Airlines aircraft could be transferred to the departures frequency, which is normally done shortly after take-off. The tower controller advised that it had already been done, and that they would ask again.

During that call, as the tower controller was speaking, the flight crew of the aircraft taking off asked over the tower frequency if the controller heard the PAN PAN call.

The tower controller thought that this transmission came through the telephone connection from the speakers at the departures controller’s terminal and, accordingly, did not respond.

The tower controller then asked the flight crew a second time to change frequency, which the FO read back.

Through the above period, the aircraft was passing about 3,800ft. The FO called for the Unreliable Speed Indication procedure. No memory items were called by either flight crew, and the captain proceeded to locate the procedure in the quick reference handbook (QRH).

After changing to the departures frequency, the FO made a second PAN PAN call at 2334:21 (passing 5,800ft), asking to climb to 10,000ft and maintain runway track.

The departures controller acknowledged the PAN PAN and provided the requested clearances.

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[Peetwo]

The 925k Harfwit cuts back on Airport Fire & Rescue safety -   

(Ref: Exec remuneration 2021 pg 128)

Via the Oz:

Airport fireys threaten strikes ahead of holiday season




The move could mean more disruption for travellers after a tumultuous year with Qantas and Virgin Australia scrambling to restart flights after a lengthy period of reduced services during the Covid-19 pandemic. Picture: Tertius Pickard

EXCLUSIVE
ROBYN IRONSIDE
AVIATION WRITER
@ironsider

10:45AM OCTOBER 18, 2022
43 COMMENTS
Airports around the country could be thrown into total chaos after fire and rescue teams threatened to go on strike, demanding a 15 per cent pay rise over three years.

The 776 Airservices Australia employees are essential workers, and the Fair Work Commission has greenlit a vote for staff to decide whether to stop work for up to an entire shift.

If approved, that would throw airports including Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane into chaos over the holiday break.

Qantas cabin crew on domestic flights last week threatened to go on strike, applying to the FWC for a similar approval. The move could mean more disruption for travellers after a tumultuous year with Qantas and Virgin Australia scrambling to restart flights after a lengthy period of reduced services during the Covid-19 pandemic.

United Firefighters Union aviation branch chief Wes Garrett said international airlines would not operate to airports without a fire and rescue team, and domestic carriers would also be reluctant.

“We don’t feel like there’s another option and this is something we take extremely seriously,” Mr Garrett said. “We’ve never talked about taking such strong action to try to force Airservices to address our concerns.”

The union says safety is at the heart of the dispute, although the union is also seeking a 15 per cent pay rise for the airport firefighters compared to an 10.5 per cent offer for the next three years which is currently on offer. Employees were also seeking an increase in the superannuation payments – from 14 per cent to 15 per cent.

Under the FWC order, Airservices Australia – which provides operational services to airports – must be given notice of seven days before any strike.

Despite a crew of 17 being considered the minimum for an airport where A380s operate, Sydney Airport was currently staffed by 14 firefighters at any one time, and Melbourne Airport 11, Mr Garrett said. “To cut the service to a point that when planes return you’re unable to live up to your regulatory requirements is a travesty.”

An Airservices Australia spokeswoman said enterprise negotiations with aviation rescue firefighting service employees were continuing “in good faith”.

“Airservices will take all steps necessary to prevent disruptions to flights as a result of the industrial action,” the spokeswoman said. “Our priority is to ensure the safe and efficient continuation of our services to keep Australian aviation moving.”

The decision comes days after the Flight Attendants Association said two groups of domestic cabin crew had filed a similar applications to undertake work bans and strikes.

Last week, FAAA national secretary Teri O’Toole said cabin crew were being threatened with outsourcing unless they signed a new enterprise agreement that “dramatically cut conditions”.

The shift extensions would result in cabin crew working for 12 hours instead of 9.45 hours, and up to 14 hours in the event of a disruption.

Ms O’Toole said crew were at the end of their tether and were standing up to “disgraceful outsourcing threats from Qantas management”.

  

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[Sandy Reith]

Reference P2 #722

The wasps that build mud nests seem to prefer small orifices and dark places. Aircraft have many options for them.

“The aircraft took off from Brisbane carrying 215 people with its crucial speed sensors covered up in 2018.”

Suggest spray some outside surface insecticide around your pitot, static vents, fuel tank vents and anywhere else every few months.

[Peetwo]

Harfwit under seige from Airport Firies - 

Via SkyNews Oz:

Via the Oz:

Airport firefighters target morning peak for strike on December 9

By ROBYN IRONSIDE
AVIATION WRITER
@ironsider
5:49PM NOVEMBER 29, 2022

International airlines have warned the aviation firefighters’ strike next Friday will cause “enormous disruption” and called for the warring parties to resolve their dispute.

The United Firefighters Union Aviation Branch announced on Tuesday members would walk off the job at all airports for four hours on December 9, targeting the busy morning peak period of 6am to 10am.

UFU aviation branch national secretary Wes Garrett said the strike was about “public safety” and insisted industrial action was members’ only option.

He claimed about 100 more firefighters were needed, saying “every day the lives of air travellers across Australia were being put at risk” because of understaffed airport fire stations.

The UFU was also seeking a 15.5 per cent pay rise over three years for members, 4 per cent above what was on offer.

Airservices Australia said the union’s claims of understaffing were highly misleading and and the decision to strike “disappointing”.

“Airservices will continue to work with industry and safety agencies to minimise disruptions to flights as a result of the industrial action,” said a spokeswoman.

The Board of Airline Representatives Australia executive director Stephen Pearse joined airports in urging the UFU and Airservices to return to the negotiating table.

BARA represents most of the international carriers that operate to Australia including Emirates, Qatar and Singapore Airlines, and Mr Pearse said they would be reluctant to land at an airport without fire and rescue on hand.

“As international carriers, we would hope the parties resolve their dispute before action takes place,” he said.

“At the moment we can only say that it would cause enormous disruption.”

It’s understood Qantas was not anticipating any changes to its flying schedule at this point, and a Virgin Australia spokesman said they would continue to liaise with Airservices to ensure the safe operation of flights.

Australian Airports Association chief executive James Goodwin said the strike would be a setback to the industry as it tried to restore confidence in travel.

Already airports were struggling to rebuild international flights to their pre-Covid capacity, with seat numbers at just 56 per cent of 2019 levels in September.

Mr Goodwin said airport operators would encourage parties to continue to work through the issues constructively.

“Australians will be looking forward to being able to visit friends and relatives this holiday season without concerns there could be disruptions to travel because of industrial action,” Mr Goodwin said.

A Sydney Airport spokeswoman said the gateway would have extra staff on the ground next Friday to help passengers.

“We are recommending people follow the advice of their airline regarding the status of their flight,” she said.


Aviation rescue firefighters at Alice Springs airport extinguish a simulated aircraft fire during a drill. Picture: Emma Murray

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority said it was working with “all the relevant parties to understand the impact of the airport firefighters’ strike”.

Only airports with at least 350,000 passengers a year are required to have fire and rescue on site.

In fact of the 60 airports to which Qantas flies in Australia, more than half are without onsite firefirefighters.

The announcement of the strike came as Airservices Australia released data showing the lead up to Christmas would be the busiest for flights in three years.

More than 15,000 services were scheduled from December 20 to 24 at 18 airports, including over 4000 in Sydney, 3291 in Melbourne, 2552 in Brisbane and 1096 in Perth.

Qantas domestic cabin crew have also voted in favour of industrial action but have committed to minimising disruption to the travelling public.

Airport firefighters were seeking a 15.5 per cent pay rise over three years, 4 per cent more than Airservices was willing to pay, and wanted the workforce increased from 776 to 850.

It was expected contingency plans would involve using firefighters from nearby stations to handle any emergencies, in a move that could add critical minutes to response times.

A recent fire emergency at Sydney Airport involving a QantasLink Dash 8 was seized upon by the UFU as “highlighting the role firefighters played”.

Mr Garrett said a larger aircraft fire would have tested “understaffed” crews at Sydney Airport.

“Aviation fuel fires burn hot and fast and it’s critical that firefighters reach a burning aircraft to mitigate the fire with foam controlling the fire and providing the passengers with the best chance of survival,” Mr Garrett said.

“After the initial three minutes of an aircraft fire, the survivability of the passengers is drastically reduced.”

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[Peetwo]

Mangalore OAR final report released?? - 

Via Fort Fumble:

 

Date: 7 December 2022
We have published the final report of the Mangalore aeronautical study. We are now actioning the recommendations.



The study, conducted by CASA’s Office of Airspace Regulation, assessed airspace within 25 nautical miles (NM) of Mangalore from the surface to 8,500 feet (FT) above mean sea level (AMSL). It also assessed the risks identified in safety incident reports provided by the air navigation service provider and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

Consultation on the draft report helped us understand industry and community issues before it was finalised. The feedback highlighted frequency congestion and use of non-standard phraseology as significant issues.

The recommendations have been confirmed, and we are now actioning them:

• The En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) entries for Mangalore, Ballarat, Latrobe Valley and Busselton were updated in September. They removed or clarified requirements that pilots add 1,000 FT to prescribed altitudes during practice instrument approaches.
  
• An ongoing safety education program (including AvSafety seminars in the region) is underway. It focuses on awareness and safety for operations within the vicinity of a non-controlled aerodrome and the importance of precise and concise radio calls. It was also the first topic of our national pilot safety campaign ‘Your safety is in your hands’.
  

Read the final report and feedback on our Consultation Hub.

Plus via the Yaffa:

CASA finalises Mangalore Study

9 December 2022



CASA this week finalised their aeronautical study into the airspace surrounding Mangalore in Victoria, updating the report that the Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) published in July.

Only 28 responses to the draft report were lodged with the OAR during the July-August consultaton period, which has resulted in no changes to the recommendations of the original report.

CASA says it will now implement the two recommendations, which were:

• conduct a safety seminar at Mangalore and surrounding airfields
  
• remove the ERSA requirement to add 1000 feet to the published instrument approach procedure for practice approaches.
  

The second recommendation will also be applied to practice approaches at Ballarat and Latrobe Valley in Victoria, and Busselton in WA.

Mangalore is one of the largest airports in Victoria and sits in a high traffic area that also includes several other CTAFs and sport and recreational aviation areas. In February 2020, it was the site of a fatal mid-air collision between two twin-engined aircraft that were using the airspace for training.

Mangalore has one of the few VORs left in the state that can be used for training, which attracts GA traffic to the Mangalore area.

The final report including published feedback is on the CASA Consultation Hub.

 

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[Wombat]

Does anyone not see the sad irony in that CASA, despite literally thousands of pages of complex and contradictory regulation of every aspect of aviation, enforced by draconian criminal penalties that are a leaden weight on aviation in this country, has the gall to run a safety campaign entitled “ Your safety is in your hands”?

CASA’s sole intent is to handcuff every pilot through comprehensive micromanagement- “your safety is in your hands?” - then what are those thousands of regulations for?.u

The website proudly offers pilots “tips” on safe practices - after how many thousands of pages of black letter criminal law? We need “tips” as well???

[Peetwo]

Harfwit QON unaswered? ; & La'King in the dark on ATCO work sickie shortages?? - 

Courtesy Matthew Denholm, via the Oz:

‘Air safety threatened by sickies, shortages’, say pilots

By MATTHEW DENHOLM
TASMANIA CORRESPONDENT
@MatthewRDenholm
3:55AM DECEMBER 31, 2022


Australian and International Pilots Association president Tony Lucas, an experienced Qantas pilot, says switching controlled airspace to uncontrolled should occur only in emergencies.

Some of Australia’s busiest ­regional airspace has been left uncontrolled, forcing pilots to “self-separate”, at least 340 times since June, often due to shortages of available, adequately trained air traffic controllers.

The Weekend Australian has obtained 340 “occurrence” reports since June, detailing how Airservices Australia has left normally controlled airspace uncontrolled for periods of sometimes hours or even days.

They reveal frequent resorting to tower closures or uncontrolled airspace across key Queensland regional areas Cairns, Rockhampton, Sunshine Coast and Gold Coast.

Also impacted is a range of regional and outer-city airports or airspace across most states, including Karratha and Broome in Western Australia, Avalon in Victoria, Bankstown, Byron and ­Albury in NSW, Launceston in Tasmania, Alice Springs in the Northern Territory and Parafield in South Australia.

Airservices Australia, which blames a 44 per cent jump in unplanned staff absences, chiefly due to illness, insists the practice, requiring pilots to monitor each other’s whereabouts, is safe.

However, some air traffic controllers and pilots argue it is courting disaster in busy areas, and should be used only in isolated emergencies, not as a routine means of dealing with staffing problems.

Australian and International Pilots Association president Tony Lucas, an experienced Qantas pilot, said switching controlled airspace to uncontrolled should occur only in emergencies.

“It increases our operational complexity and that may have an impact on safety, because we are now trying to separate ourselves from other aircraft and it increases our workload,” Captain Lucas told The Weekend Australian.

“These sorts of events shouldn’t be occurring as a matter of course and they certainly shouldn’t be occurring due to resourcing issues. They should only be occurring in near-emergency situations, such as a fire in an air traffic control centre, for a very short period of time.

“For these sorts of things to be happening regularly, it says you are not building resilience into the system.”

Reasons given in the reports for the suspension of controlled airspace repeatedly include “staffing”, the absence of staff to cover mandated breaks, “staff availability”, “staff sick”, “staff not available”, “staffing contingency” and “staff limitations”.

Transport Minister Catherine King said the government took the concerns seriously and was committed to addressing the problem.

“To overcome potential shortages and meet future demand, Airservices Australia is planning for further staffing intakes across 2023-26,” a spokeswoman for Ms King said.

“The minister takes these concerns seriously and will continue to ensure Airservices Australia is sufficiently resourced to deliver its vital airspace management work, which is critical to preserving Australia’s world-leading reputation in transport safety.”

Airservices said while it was facing “staff availability issues”, it did have enough controllers.

“We employ more than 900 air traffic controllers and require 800 air traffic controllers at any one time to fully staff the air traffic management system across the country,” a spokesman said.

“There are a further 65 air traffic controllers in training. Like all other sectors of the economy, we have experienced staff availability issues this year due to the worst flu season in years and Covid-19 infections.

“Over the past 12 months, our air traffic control workforce has taken 19,700 days of unplanned leave, principally due to illness. This is 44 per cent higher than our pre-pandemic average. But despite this, our service level has been varied by less than 0.1 per cent of the total time this year.”

Uncontrolled airspace was not unsafe, the spokesman said. “The airspace continues to be monitored at our major air traffic management centres, access to the airspace is regulated to ensure aircraft separation and pilots follow internationally recognised procedures to ensure separation,” he said.

“These are safe and globally recognised procedures to manage airspace when there are unplanned absences.”

Civil Air, the controllers’ union, said Airservices – which axed about 120 controllers through early retirement in the 12 months to June – was now struggling to train enough staff to cover all positions.

One controller is so concerned that he has risked his job by writing to Ms King, warning of a “very real fear that there will be an incident resulting in multiple fatalities”.

Controllers said the staff database included people who “retired years ago” and a key issue was gaps in staff adequately trained, or “rated”, to work in different types of airspace.

“We have less resilience and so if someone does get Covid and goes out for a week, covering their shifts is a lot more difficult than it used to be,” said Civil Air president and air traffic controller Tom McRobert.

“Some of the people counted as controllers aren’t fully rated, so can’t do all of the bits of airspace or tower positions. So there is no doubt that we are short. For Airservices to say ‘we have enough controllers’ is not right.”

The high number of incidents demanded attention. “That number needs to start going down and there needs to be transparent and good conversation between Airservices and industry about how we are going to achieve that,” Mr McRobert said.

“My concern is that there doesn’t seem to be an end in sight. People are getting tired of doing overtime. There is a level of fatigue. There is no plan for the next 12 months as to how we’re going to get there.”

Mr McRobert believed Airservices cut too many controllers via early retirement, misjudging how quickly the skies would return to near-normal activity after Covid restrictions.

“There’s only one way out of this and that’s training – whether it be cross-training of controllers that we’ve got or training new controllers,” he said.

Harfwit's gold plated crew have only managed to answer a third of the nine QON currently listed on the RRAT Estimates page: (ref: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus...mates/rrat)

194. AIRSERVICES - data on impact of cloud cover for regional airports.pdf (AQON)

195. AIRSERVICES - other technologies at regional airports.pdf (AQON)

196 Download question 

197 Download question

236 Download question

237 Download question

238 Download question

Question

Airservices introduced a Retirement Incentive Scheme (RIS) in 2021 for employees between 56 and 65. Please provide a table outlining how many employees have left the organisation since Oct 2021, including their role, years with AA, and whether they left as part of the RIS.

What was the total cost of the RIS?

How many of the positions / work functions that left since Oct 2021 have been re-advertised by Airservices?

How will Airservices meet the workforce demands for more ATCs, support staff and especially experienced senior flight path designers required to implement the measures Airservices has adopted in the Brisbane draft PIR report?

239 Download question

240. SODPROPS Procedures.pdf (AQON)

Answer:

The documentation which sets out the modes of operation at Brisbane Airport includes:

• Brisbane Enroute Supplement Australia (ERSA) https://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip...EC2022.pdf 
  
• Departure and Approach Procedures (DAP) https://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip...sTOC.htm#B 
  

Temporary Local Instruction TLI_22_0151: Trial of Expanded SODPROPS use was published on 8 July 2022 to clarify roles and responsibilities and support decision-making for Simultaneous Opposite Direction Parallel Runway Operations (SODPROPS) mode selection at Brisbane. The SODPROPS extension of hours trial and TLI_22_0151 are reviewed 3 monthly to ensure the ongoing safety of operations. The last review occurred on 10 November 2022 where Airservices reaffirmed air traffic services were provided in accordance with acceptably safe practices. A copy of TLI_22_0151 is at Attachment A.

Use of SODPROPS increased by 137 hours in the four months following the release of TLI_22_0151 (528 hours between 9 July 2022 and 9 November 2022, versus 391 hours between 9 March 2022 and 8 July 2022). This resulted in an additional 799 aircraft movements being directed over the water (3,664 movements between 9 July 2022 and 9 November 2022, versus 2,665 movements between 9 March 2022 and 8 July 2022).

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Senator McKenzie written QON to Harfwit?? - 

Courtesy the RRAT pages, via the APH website: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus...mates/rrat

QON 247: 

Question Airservices Australia advised1 on 31 August 2022 that they ""will adopt all recommendations in the recently released Brisbane New Parallel Runway Flight Paths Post Implementation Review (PIR) Independent Review Final Report by Trax International (Trax)."" What budget and resources are required and have been allocated to each of the four proposed work packages and over what time frame? How will Airservices resource the additional work required to adopt and implement all the recommendations?

QON 248:

Question Airservices held PIR Community Workshops in various Brisbane locations between 10th and 15th September. Some attendees reported that they only found out about these workshops due to communications received from local community groups or word of mouth. What official marketing, promotion and communication mechanisms were used to notify local communities about these workshops? How did Airservices ensure communities currently not affected by flight path noise but potentially affected in the future due to noise sharing proposals had been adequately informed so they could attend? What budget and resources have been allocated and spent on advertising and promoting these community workshops? Please also provide evidence of all ad copies placed in print, radio, TV or digital media channels. - If Airservices only advertised these workshops on their registration-only "Engage" website, please provide a detailed justification why Airservices sees fit to not make any resources available to advertise these community workshops to affected communities.

QON 249:

Question In Senate Estimates 22 March 2021, Airservices referred to flight path design as their "bread and butter." Why did Airservices fail to implement ANY of the TRAX recommendations for noise mitigation and abatements when the new airspace was launched on 12 July 2020? Why did Airservices have to spend $590,450 (GST exclusive)2 on these external consultants just to be told of recommendations that should be your "bread and butter" - as you say - in the first place? How does Airservices justify this expenditure as value for taxpayers?

QON 250:

Question How many complaints and inquiries relating to aircraft noise at Brisbane Airport has the Noise Complaints and Information Services (NCIS) team received between 12 July 2020 and now? Please provide a monthly breakdown of the number of complaints received online, by phone, and by post, and list the suburbs in which the complainants live.
a. 1 https://engage.airservicesaustralia.com/...se-to-trax- international-final-report
b. 2 Answer to QoN 105, Additional Estimates 2021 / 2022

QON 251:

Question In response to the answer received to QoN #109 (Additional Estimates 2021 / 2022), Airservices states that, "there have been no noise improvement suggestions submitted to the NCIS for Brisbane Airport to date." - This is factually incorrect. Community complaint submissions to the NCIS have included recommendations for noise improvements including calling for an airspace redesign, a curfew, a Brisbane Long-Term Operating Plan, and increasing the time period that SODPROPS are in use.
5.1 Why has the NCIS team not followed its own procedures,3 which state that, "if we identify any noise improvement opportunities in the course of our investigation we will seek to influence and persuade the relevant parties to implement this solution"?
5.2 Section 4.3 of the NCIS procedures states that, "Noise improvement investigations will be documented in an Investigation Report." - How many noise improvement investigations has the NCIS team conducted anywhere in Australia for any airport annually between 2018 and now. Please provide a table outlining the Investigation Report identification number, airspace, nature of the improvement investigation, the outcome of the investigation, and the impact on noise abatement / amelioration / minimisation to date.

QON 252:

Question In response to the answer received to QoN #119 (Additional Estimates 2021 / 2022), CASA tabled ACPs submitted by Airservices and reviewed by CASA OAR since 2019. Please provide a detailed explanation in lay terms of why "an incorrect holding pattern direction for inbound aircraft to Brisbane" had to be fixed in ACP 047-19, and what "oversight associated with the new parallel runway project" had to be corrected with ACP 065-20? What were the safety implications and risk assessments of these flaws and oversights for Brisbane residents and passengers prior to the identification of these issues?
a. 3 Airservices FOI disclosure log, file number FOI-21-2

 
Hmm...good to see that the Harfwit team is consistent, with the rest of the statutory Can'tberra aviation safety bureaucrats, in providing expensive non-consultation to potential affected citizens and industry...     

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Harfwit's Deputy Dog blames ATCOs for staff shortages?? 

Courtesy Ironsider, via the Oz:

Chief blames airspace limits on staff ‘sickies’

EXCLUSIVE
By ROBYN IRONSIDE
AVIATION WRITER
@ironsider
7:25PM JANUARY 26, 2023


Air traffic controllers at work at Brisbane Airport. Picture: Tara Croser

Air traffic controllers have been told that critical staff shortages leading to airspace restrictions in some areas are essentially their own doing, due to an “alarming level of unplanned leave” or sickies.

In a bluntly worded message from Airservices Australia head of airspace services Rod Sciortino, air traffic controllers are told their employer protected them during the Covid downturn so they could protect the flying public when traffic returned.

“We avoided lay-offs and stand downs; we avoided reduced hours and reduced pay,” wrote Mr Sciortino.

“In fact many of you worked significantly less hours on the same pay, while many people in the industry around us were not so lucky.”

He went on to say that now traffic had returned, all efforts were being made to train new recruits “to fill the breach of those that retired”.

“However regardless of the replenishment program, a concerning component of this post-pandemic environment is the alarming level of unplanned leave,” said Mr Sciortino.

“This is adding an enormous amount of pressure to daily rosters in several groups and in turn our collective obligation to deliver a service.”

The air traffic controllers’ union Civil Air responded angrily to the email, telling members not to feel pressured to work if they were not fit to do so.

“All members are advised to keep conversations brief when you have advised that you are unavailable,” said the advisory.

“If management persists, advise your manager that you require union representation before continuing.”

Civil Air raised concerns during the pandemic that the large number of experienced air traffic controllers encouraged to take up an early retirement incentive scheme would lead to shortages.

The union said it was not uncommon in situations of staff shortages for more people to fall ill and suffer fatigue resulting in even fewer staff.

“The longer the staffing levels remain critical, the more unplanned leave will be taken,” said Civil Air.

“It is not safe otherwise. Resolve the staffing levels and increased unplanned leave issue will also resolve.”

Due to the high intensity of their roles, air traffic controllers are permitted unlimited sick leave entitlements under their work agreement.

Qantas pilots recently voiced their concerns about regional airspace being left “uncontrolled” due to staffing shortages in air traffic control.

Australian and International Pilots Association president Tony Lucas called for more resilience to be built into the ATC system, to ensure such events were not happening on a regular basis.

“It increases our operational complexity and workload because we are now trying to separate ourselves from other aircraft, potentially impacting safety,” Captain Lucas said.

“These sorts of events should not be happening frequently and certainly not due to resourcing issues.”

Airservices Australia denied there was a staff shortage among air traffic controllers, with more than 900 on staff, and only 800 required to fully staff the air traffic management system.

“There are a further 65 air traffic controllers in training,” said a spokeswoman.

She said the increase in unplanned leave had seen more than 20,000 “sick days” taken in 2022, compared to 12,000 in 2021 and 13,000 in 2019.

“In 2022 Australia experienced the worst flu season in years and ongoing Covid-19 infections,” the spokeswoman said.

“Despite the significant jump in unplanned leave, only 2277 hours out of 1.1 million total service hours were impacted last year.”

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

Must see this

Brilliant and spot on.

[Peetwo]

Hansard OUT - ASA QON??

Ref: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/sea...nt=Default

Via Youtube:

Via the Hansard:

Senator CANAVAN: Chair, I know we're running out of time, but I've just got a few questions on the radar at the Rockhampton and Mackay airports. Have you seen the reports?

Mr Harfield : Yes, I have.

Senator CANAVAN: The reports are that some unnamed officials—I'm mindful of that—said it was a second-rate radar and that there have been 221 incidents since July last year of aircraft dropping off the radars on approach to Rockhampton or Mackay. I'm particularly interested to know whether or not ADS-B equipment will be installed at these airports soon and, if not, why not?

Mr Harfield : I need to go back to the initial statement. The report that was in the Australian is incorrect.

CHAIR: That's a shock. My God.

Senator WHITE: Oh, who knew?

CHAIR: My God, Murdoch did something wrong.

Senator CANAVAN: Well, hang on. I'm interested in the explanation here. In fairness, it's not a report from the Australian; it's evidently an unnamed official person.

Mr Harfield : Correct, but I just want to say that it was reported in the Australian. Prior to July last year, the airspace around Rockhampton and Mackay was controlled from the tower without the use of any radar. So it was done, how we would call, procedurally. Although they could get some sort of situation awareness, it was actually managed without the radar, even though we had radar coverage there. In July we transitioned not only Rockhampton and Mackay but also Launceston and Hobart, where we are utilising the radar and managing it from either Brisbane Centre or Melbourne Centre, as we do for Sydney, Brisbane or Melbourne, and started running them like we would a capital city aerodrome.

In terms of utilising the radar, radar is a line-of-sight technology, and it cannot always see around mountains. But what it did provide was a safety enhancement because we were able to use the safety alerts that are utilised with our air traffic control system in our centres. For example, one of the safety alerts that was introduced and didn't exist before July was what we would call the minimum safe altitude warning, where the system sends an alert if the pilot goes below the lower safe altitude terrain. That did not exist prior to July.

The reports that are mentioned were conducted at our request. When we put radar in and were starting to utilise it for the first time, it had to be tuned. So we wanted reports from the controllers about where they saw aeroplanes drop out or where there were holes in the coverage. Prior to July, they were being separated without the use of radar and that continues to be done today, even if there is radar coverage and there's a dropout. So there is no issue with safety. The reason we wanted to do that is so that we could tune the radar.

On 3 and 4 March—coming up in a couple of weeks—our techs are going up to the Mount Alma radar, where they will tune the radar, and some of these holes will disappear as a result of re-tuning the radar. In conjunction with that, we are supplementing this with the introduction of ADS-B and continuing that coverage. Further to that, because both radar and even ADS-B are terrestrial-type technologies—you might have seen recently that Skycraft, a company that's a spinoff from the University of New South Wales, put up their first satellite as a proof of concept. We are starting to utilise and explore that so that ADS-B as well as communications are coming from satellite, which means we don't get holes anymore because it's looking down. So we're continuing to try to enhance safety. That's the background to that.

Senator CANAVAN: Apparently this article is saying that air traffic controllers are claiming that Airservices Australia is baulking at the cost of installing a new TAR system and blamed that for the delays in the ADS-B as well. Are you rejecting that?

Mr Harfield : That is not correct. I absolutely reject that.

Senator CANAVAN: Are you saying air traffic controllers are wrong? Have you spoken to air traffic controllers yourself?

Mr Harfield : Yes, I speak to them all the time. This is the first time this has been raised.

Senator CANAVAN: They have not raised that with you?

Mr Harfield : Correct.

Senator CANAVAN: There was a report in The Australian that at least one shift manager had been asked to stop submitting safety reports. Have you investigated whether that is true?

Mr Harfield : I have investigated that. What was asked—this is similar to what Senator McKenzie said about some complaints—was that when we identified a particular gap in the radar coverage there's no point continuing to report on that time and time again, because we have an action in place. Anything new, or something that we have not already got registered, we're happy to take on the report for, but there's no point continuing to report on the same issue when we've got something being done.

Senator CANAVAN: When will the ATSB system be installed in Rockhampton and Mackay?

Mr Harfield : There is some ATSB already in place, so we're making sure that feed comes into the system. Additional sites will come online early next year.

Senator CANAVAN: You might also want to brief the department. They didn't have any idea that this was even reported, which shocked me, given the nature of this article. You'd think people in the aviation policy team would be monitoring the media for these sorts of stories. I thank you very much for your information, Mr Harfield; it's very helpful.

CHAIR: Thank you, Mr Harfield, and your officers. It is a terribly damning headline when you read that, so I thank you very much for clearing that up for us.

Plus tabled by Senator Canavan: Ref - https://www.aph.gov.au/-/media/Estimates...8B8BC53CE6



MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Is Harfwit's bubble about to burst?

In follow up to these posts on the search 4 IP thread: Addendum to last: How many minutes to bingo fuel??  & Let cool heads prevail.

"...There is a rumour floating about (unsubstantiated) that the passengers could have been on the deck a bit earlier had the ATC been more situationally aware and expedited clearance as requested and required. I wonder how close the Skipper came to telling them to 'sod off' or cope with a Mayday. Had the Skipper got cranky and declared an emergency due to ATC being 'difficult' that would become a difficult question for ASA to answer..." 

Via the Oz yesterday: 

All too frequent flight delays at Sydney Airport, blamed on air traffic control sickies



Frustration is growing within airlines and Sydney Airport, after the 18th day of air traffic control-enforced delays since February 17.

Staff shortages at the air traffic control tower due to sickness are most often to blame for the all-too-frequent instances of runway restrictions at Australia’s biggest gateway.

On Monday, flights were again placed into holding patterns or held at their departure airports, in an effort to reduce the arrival rate into Sydney.



Airlines and Sydney Airport confirmed they had been told staff shortages were to blame for Monday’s restrictions, with a number of services experiencing delays of 40 to 60-minutes.

An Airservices Australia spokeswoman said there had been “some short-notice, unplanned air traffic controller leave” in Sydney, but that had no impact on service delivery.

Instead, it was the potential for bad weather that had prompted air traffic control to delay some flights at their departure airport, she said.

“The (ground delay program) is in place due to forecast heavy showers and thunderstorm activity in the Sydney basin and runs until 10pm local time with an average aircraft delay from their point of origin of 13.5 minutes,” the spokeswoman said.

“Airborne delays may still occur depending on weather conditions and airline compliance with GDP.”

In the past 24-days, the ground delay program had been used by Airservices Australia on 18 occasions at Sydney Airport, reducing arrivals from 50 an hour to as little as 32 in peak periods.

Monday’s delays came as the Australian Transport Safety Bureau launched an investigation into a Qantas flight from Chile that was diverted to Newcastle from Sydney on February 18.

The decision to investigate was made after The Australian revealed staff shortages at Sydney’s air traffic control on that day meant the pilots were not given up-to-date weather information.

As a result, the flight burnt up valuable fuel before it became apparent they would have to divert to Newcastle, where there were no facilities to process international passengers.

“During the approach (to Sydney) the aircraft encountered moderate turbulence and high wind conditions and the approach became unstable,” said the ATSB investigation brief.

“The crew conducted a missed approached and advised air traffic control of minimum fuel conditions. The crew diverted the aircraft to Williamtown (Newcastle) where ground handling equipment was not sufficient for the aircraft size.”

The ATSB investigation was expected to focus on the circumstances of the diversion, which saw passengers stranded at Newcastle Airport for seven hours, following the 14-hour flight.

The incident prompted an internal complaint by the Sydney air traffic control manager, about the issues that arose due to three controllers having to do the work of five.

In a formal report to Airservices, the traffic manager said there was “controller overload, failure to report reportable matters, failure to provide flight information and failure to issue a hazard alert”.

“Meteorology products were not disseminated and broadcast as per the flight information service provisions,” said the complaint.

“This information was vital to pilots, including (Qantas flight) QF28, which diverted to Newcastle while operating on minimum fuel.”

Information about an unauthorised drone operating in the vicinity of Sydney Airport was also not followed up, with no hazard alert issued.

Airlines have raised concerns with Airservices about the impact of staff shortages at air traffic control on their own operations, but are yet to get a response.

The ATSB investigation is expected to be finalised by late September.

Plus via Oz Aviation today:

ATSB PROBES WHY QANTAS 787 PASSENGERS WAITED ON TARMAC FOR 7 HOURS

written by Jake Nelson | March 14, 2023



The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has opened an investigation after it emerged the diversion of a Qantas 787 to Newcastle on 18 February was a result of ATC understaffing.

In an internal Airservices Australia report seen by The Australian, the diversion from Sydney – which left passengers stranded on the tarmac at Newcastle for seven hours, as the airport lacked adequate immigration facilities to process the incoming passengers from Santiago, Chile – was found to have resulted from three Sydney ATC staff being made to do the work of five.

Crucially, news of severe storms in the Sydney region was not passed on by “overloaded” air traffic controllers, which led to the aircraft wasting fuel. As Canberra was also affected by the adverse weather, the decision was made to divert instead to Newcastle.

“At approximately 7am, the Bureau of Meteorology advised there was a severe gust front approaching from the southwest. Additionally, there were SIGMETs (significant weather warnings) issued,” said the report.

“These meteorology products were not disseminated and broadcast as per the flight information service provisions. This information was vital to pilots, including (Qantas flight) QF28 which diverted to Newcastle while operating on minimum fuel.”

The ATSB is now investigating the incident and anticipates handing down a final report in the third quarter of 2023.

“During approach, the aircraft encountered moderate turbulence and high wind conditions and the approach became unstable. The crew conducted a missed approach and advised ATC of minimum fuel conditions. The crew diverted the aircraft to Williamtown where ground handling equipment was not sufficient for the aircraft size. The investigation is continuing,” the agency said.

“A final report will be published at the conclusion of the investigation. Should any safety critical information be discovered at any time during the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify operators and regulators so appropriate and timely safety action can be taken.”

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Unclosed safety loops and dots-n-dashes to a decade of a Harfwit's ineptitude?? -    

To begin let's reflect on the Govt response to RRAT References Committee Recommendation 22 to the AAI inquiry completed in May 2013:



Haven't been able to discover (at this stage) how the Harfwit presentation to the 'South West Pacific Safety Forum' in PNG 2013 was responded to by the applicable ANSP PASO nations involved. However I do find it fascinating when you reflect on the Senate AAI inquiry evidence given by Harfwit at the 19/11/2012 Senate Inquiry hearing, that inevitably led to the RRAT Committee generating  recommendation 22: (Reference video segments and Hansard)

Hansard - HERE

Senator NASH: Can we go back to this issue of the provision of the information from New Zealand? What date is the Pacific forum?

Mr Harfield : Let's take it on notice. I think it is in the second week of December, but I will advise.

Senator NASH: Okay. Fingers crossed that it does not happen, but if there were another incident of the same nature between now and a few weeks away, whose responsibility would it be that this issue had not been dealt with immediately? I am just trying to ascertain: if there were another accident and it had been, as it has been, identified that there is this fault line issue—as you said, Ms Staib, it could be addressed better in our planning and that will be done at the Pacific forum—whose responsibility is it when that has not been addressed?

Ms Staib : It seems to me—and, as you will appreciate, I am still learning—that in the first instance the New Zealand regulator would have to step in. What I am saying here is that there is an opportunity for us to work in a better community practice, and that is a good thing. But we all have our specific roles to play.

Senator NASH: I understand that. I take the point that you work within the framework that you have. I take that point completely. But what has been identified is this anomaly.

Ms Staib : Yes.

Senator NASH: I take your point that New Zealand would be responsible, but they are not required to provide this information. That is my whole point. I am trying to understand who is responsible if there is another accident before this issue is addressed—as hopefully it will be.

CHAIR: Whose head do we cut off, in other words?

Senator NASH: Somebody would have to take responsibility for the fact that this issue, having been identified, was not addressed urgently. Who would be responsible for it not having been addressed urgently?

Mr Harfield : The fact that this information is now available—and I am assuming that the ATSB report would have been given to the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand as well as to the regulator in Fiji—and because of their rule set or their regulations, if they have not taken action on it and something occurs then the responsibility would be with that particular jurisdiction. The point I am trying to make is that we do not own the rule set and cannot change the rule set of a foreign jurisdiction.

Senator NASH: We are not blaming you; we are trying to find a resolution. What we need from you and others who appear before us is to get all the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle so that we can put them into a picture. We are not blaming you—that is fine. We understand the rules that you work under. What we are trying to do is to figure out how to resolve it. That is where we are hitting the wall. You attended the Pacific forum. When was the decision made that you should talk to your counterparts from New Zealand and Fiji at the Pacific forum?

Mr Harfield : The Pacific forum is a regular—

Senator NASH: I know it is.

Mr Harfield : It is a regular thing. When those of us with responsibilities and areas of control in the South Pacific come together, we work through the various safety—

Senator NASH: I understand all that. When did you make the decision to raise this issue with Fiji and New Zealand at the Pacific forum? Was it this morning? Was it last week? Was it a month ago? When did you make the decision?

CHAIR: Was it six months ago? Three years ago?

Mr Harfield : Regarding the decision to put that on the agenda, without knowing what is already on the agenda, after this discussion here we will ensure that it is on the agenda.

CHAIR: So it is not on the agenda.

Mr Harfield : But there is a level of assumption that all instances—

Senator NASH: That is fine. I am just trying to ascertain information. So I am correct in saying that because of the discussion this morning at this hearing you have now decided to take this issue to the Pacific forum. Is that correct?

Mr Harfield : We will ensure that it raised at the Pacific forum.

Senator NASH: Okay, so it was not on the agenda before now. If we were not having this particular inquiry, what would have triggered the decision to collectively with your counterparts examine this issue of the fault line and the fact that there is an anomaly? Would it not have happened? What I am trying to get at is this: if we had not asked you these questions this morning—if we had not been discussing it here this morning at this inquiry—would you have raised this at the Pacific forum as an issue.

Ms Staib : My expectation is that that is why we have those sorts of forums: so that we can share lessons learned from incidents that occur.

Senator NASH: Okay. Then why wasn't it already on the agenda?

Ms Staib : I cannot answer that, because I have not seen the agenda.

Senator NASH: What?

Mr Harfield : The fact is that we do not have the agenda in front of us, so we do not know the detail.

Senator NASH: So you get an agenda and then figure out if you are going to add something?

Mr Harfield : No. The agenda is set by—

Senator NASH: No, hang on; Ms Staib just said that she has not seen the agenda.

Mr Harfield : the various coordinators that we have. For example, the manager of upper airspace, who is the manager of the airspace that abuts Fiji and New Zealand, is the representative of Air Services Australia who goes along to the forum. They set the agenda. I do not have the agenda in front of me.

Senator NASH: So do you have any opportunity to have input into the agenda from Airservices?

Mr Harfield : Yes, Airservices has—

Senator NASH: Okay. Airservices does. So who within Airservices would have responsibility for placing this issue on the agenda for the Pacific forum?

Mr Harfield : Our representative at the forum.

Senator NASH: And who is that?

Mr Harfield : It is the manager of upper airspace for Westwind.

Senator NASH: Okay. So why didn't they put this on the agenda before? Why has it taken this committee inquiry to get this on the agenda?

Mr Harfield : We will take that on notice. I am not saying that it was not already on the agenda. We are unaware whether or not it is on the agenda, and we have said that we will ensure that it is. It could already be on the agenda. I am just unaware.

Senator NASH: I find it extraordinary that you do not know whether or not this issue is on the agenda for the Pacific forum. That is extraordinary.

CHAIR: With respect, if your mum or dad or one of your kids was in the plane, I bet it would have been. I have one question. How many Pacific forums have we had since the accident?

Mr Harfield : We would have to take that on notice.

CHAIR: You are a perfect bureaucrat. Senator Fawcett.

---

Senator XENOPHON: You were saying, Mr Harfield, that you rely on what the ATSB says in its recommendations insofar as it relates to Airservices Australia. Is that a relevant—

Mr Harfield : Yes, in the sense that we have usually done our own investigation and we look at it to see whether it supports the findings that we found in our recommendation and whether there are any gaps.

Senator XENOPHON: I might be guided by Senator Fawcett on this if I have got this wrong, but my understanding of the ATSB report into this particular accident is that there was not much said at all about air traffic control, was there?

Mr Harfield : That is correct.

Senator XENOPHON: So, in the absence of the ATSB making recommendations about air traffic control issues, where does that leave you?

Mr Harfield : In this particular case, because this happened in a foreign jurisdiction, we would not necessarily be doing our own investigation into it.

CHAIR: The perfect mushroom!

Mr Harfield : As a result of that, we are very heavily reliant on the ATSB report, because that is our prime source of information as to whether there would be an issue, so therefore—

Senator XENOPHON: I just want to tease this out. Were there or are there any discussions between the ATSB and Airservices Australia in relation to this incident?

Mr Harfield : There would have been. We will have to take it on notice as to what they particularly were about.

Senator XENOPHON: Could you please provide—I take it I have the committee's support—details of memoranda, emails, correspondence, anything produced in writing, even records of phone conversations, with respect to those discussions in respect of this incident? In terms of Airservices Australia's role, Ms Staib—and I appreciate you have only just stepped into this role; how long has it been?

Ms Staib : Just one month.

CHAIR: By the way, we also appreciate that Airservices has been in some sort of disarray for a good while over the various problems you have had with credit cards.

Senator XENOPHON: And, if I could put it on the record, it is noted and I think we all welcome that Mr Houston is chair of Airservices Australia. I think that is a unanimously welcome appointment by the government. What role do you see for Airservices Australia to champion the change to the more proactive procedure that Senator Fawcett has quite rightly pointed out? Does it have a role? It seems to me right now that, unless the ATSB raises the red flag, there does not seem to be much of a role for Airservices Australia. Do you think that is an appropriate response?

Ms Staib : As we have discussed previously, in dealing with that incident there were various regulators involved, various service providers involved. But let us talk moving forward, because that is what I think you are asking me. In terms of looking forward, how do we look at these incidents? I see a role where we would work and talk to the other service providers in the region—and indeed, as I said before, globally—where we can learn lessons, understand what is going on. As I said before, when you have jurisdictions that abut each other, we need to be having open dialogue to make sure that we understand the roles everybody has to play and where we can work together to improve the system.

Senator XENOPHON: In terms of that open dialogue, could you provide as a matter of some urgency to the committee once you have had that dialogue with Fijian air traffic control, and indeed any communication you have with New Zealand, because I think it may well be relevant to the deliberations of this committee. Thank you.

---

CHAIR: So you are the bunnies and the ATSB have, 'Do not ask, do not tell.' Senator Fawcett?

Mr Harfield : Say that again, Senator?

CHAIR: You are the bunnies. None of this affects you because there was nothing in the report upon which you have got to act, even though it is critical to the crash, perhaps. ATSB, for whatever reason, whether it is just to protect the bureaucracy or whether it was adjusted by CASA, which is a possibility, did not mention this critical factor of the nonreporting of the weather change, which leads to a very big question. Senator Fawcett?

Senator FAWCETT: The thing that the committee is struggling to come to is that there have been many witnesses who are pointing fingers of blame at particular incidents. Australia has been a leader in aviation safety for a number of years through its fairly robust adoption of a systems approach, and James Reason is the classic person who has driven that. So, clearly, the actions of the pilot in command and his decisions around flight planning and fuel have a role to play—so do the actions of the company in terms of their checks, training et cetera. But each slice of the Swiss cheese, as the James Reason bowl is often laid out, has the potential to prevent the accident. So the importance that the committee is placing on an incident such as a proactive alert to the pilot that there is now a hazardous situation is not the reason the accident occurred, but it is one of the defences that may well have prevented the accident. If Australia are to remain at the forefront of open, transparent and effective aviation safety then one of the roles of this committee is to make sure that our organisations collectively keep working towards having a very open discussion around that systems safety approach and making sure that each of those barriers is as effective as it can possibly be. That, I guess, is the intent behind a lot of the questioning this morning.

We see that, whatever else occurred, if the pilot had been made aware proactively about the hazardous situation that now existed then perhaps he would have made a different decision. Should he have been there in the first place? Should he have had more fuel? They are all other slices of cheese. We are concerned with this one. The thing we are really trying to establish is, if the ATSB report had had a recommendation that said, 'This was something that could have prevented the accident. Is it possible to have it put in place for the future?' then you would have taken action on that as a matter of course. Is that a correct assumption?

Mr Harfield : That is a correct assumption.

Senator FAWCETT: And without that recommendation being there it is a matter of some conjecture at the moment as to whether or not that would or would not have been raised at a future forum. Is that a fair assumption?

Mr Harfield : That is a fair assumption.

Senator FAWCETT: Under the current model, if ATSB come across in one of those slices of Swiss cheese in the recent model a question of whether or not existing legislation directed a pilot to make a decision that he had to divert if the weather minima went below alternate or landing minima, and they contacted the regulator and said, 'Hey, regulator, here is a critical safety issue' and they thrashed that through, do they have a similar mechanism where if they see another slice of Swiss cheese—that the pilot was not advised of this new hazard—do they come to you as the relevant body? Although it is not your rule set, you are the Australian point of contact to speak to regional players; do they come to you and say, 'We think there is an issue here, can we discuss this?' Did they come to you in this case?

Mr Harfield : In this case I do not recall and I do not think that they did. However, in other instances where things have occurred they have come to us to ask for assistance—for example, with some incidents that have happened in Indonesia.

CHAIR: But no-one cared about the prang off Norfolk Island?

Mr Harfield : That is not correct, Senator; I just do not recall the ATSB coming to us to ask us for assistance in this particular jurisdiction.

CHAIR: How long have you been at Airservices?

Mr Harfield : Nearly 25 years.

CHAIR: I think you need a change of career.

Senator FAWCETT: Can I clarify that if ATSB did come to you in the same way they came to CASA and said, 'Here is something that potentially could be a barrier to a future accident,' that would be a sufficient trigger for you to then take that on corporately and see what action you could take with your regional partners?

Ms Staib : Absolutely.

Senator FAWCETT: That is what we are trying to look at here—we are trying to ascertain what are the things that we can drive into the relationships between departments to make sure that we wrap up the system safety to the best extent possible.

CHAIR: So you will let us know how many Pacific Forums there have been since the crash where this has not even been thought about. Have you been to those Pacific Forums in the meantime?

Mr Harfield : Not personally.

CHAIR: Who goes?

Mr Harfield : The person that reports to me in charge of the airspace that abuts those areas.

CHAIR: Who is that.

Mr Harfield : It is my Manager, Upper Airspace Services.

CHAIR: What is their name?

Mr Harfield : Mr Doug Scott.

CHAIR: He still works for Airservices?

Mr Harfield : Yes, he works with me.

CHAIR: We would be delighted to have him come here and give evidence, Ms Staib, if you would permit that—if you do not, we will subpoena him.

Ms Staib : I do not think you will need to do that.

CHAIR: I am disgusted. Thank you very much for your evidence.

Senator FAWCETT: Chair, whilst you may feel that I do not think that represents the view of the committee. I recognise that there are some failures in the system and we need to work on that—

CHAIR: Can I clarify that I am disgusted not by the officers but by the system that allows this to happen. We are in no way blaming you. I think you are the bunnies.

Senator XENOPHON: Can we get the time line on Hansard for the email trail of communications between Airservices Australia and ATSB in relation to this incident, and indeed if the regulator, CASA, was involved as well, about this incident—any correspondence, communications, notes, memoranda and whatever. How long would that take to dig up?

Mr Harfield : We will do it as soon as practicable.

Senator XENOPHON: I would appreciate that.

Hmm...I find it interesting that in neither the ATSB report MK1 or MK2 was there any safety issues or recommendations generated regarding hazard alert weather information across the FIR boundaries in the Southern Pacific region, although the issue was mentioned in MK2:

During the flight, the weather conditions at Norfolk Island deteriorated below the landing minima. Air traffic services in Nadi and Auckland did not provide the flight crew with all the information that should have been provided.

A further hmmm...so according to Harfwit back then (and presumably now) ASA rely on the ATSB to relay any identified safety issues that may have to be mitigated by ASA and other abutting ANSP authorities. Yet when a comment is made, like the above, that is supposedly disseminated by all the ANSP DIPs to this investigation (IE Fiji, NZed and Oz) there was no proactive proposed safety mitigation feedback in regards to the original and secondary ATSB Pelair ditching investigation processes??

Hansard extract:

Senator XENOPHON: Can you explain that? I am just trying to get the context here. What are our international obligations in regard to the sharing of hazardous weather information with other air traffic service organisations?

Mr Harfield : We have a monitoring system where the Bureau of Meteorology obviously monitors a number of locations around Australia and within the jurisdiction of the airspace that we manage. When we get information provided that is of a differing nature from the forecast, such as a hazardous weather event or the SPECI information that you mentioned previously, that information is then sent to the control positions. It is then relayed to the particular aircraft based on certain parameters where the weather has changed. We call that a hazard alerting service. What we would do, for example, if an aircraft which had a terminal area forecast for Sydney was flying between Melbourne and Sydney and the weather conditions rapidly changed is issue a hazard alert and notify all aircraft going to that destination of the change in circumstances.

Senator XENOPHON: Did that happen in Norfolk Island? Did they deter any traffic?

Mr Harfield : We are unaware because the flight went through different jurisdictions and was in New Zealand airspace.

CHAIR: So that is a fundamental flaw, is it? The evidence we received was that there was a deterioration report on the weather into Norfolk Island, which was not conveyed to the pilot by New Zealand. Is there nothing we can do about it, just tough tits?

Mr Harfield : We were aware of the leg of this particular flight obviously from Sydney to Norfolk Island and also on the return Norfolk Island-to-Sydney leg, which is where there aircraft would transfer to Australian airspace and air traffic control would be managed. The flight between Samoa and Norfolk Island was in another jurisdiction, so we were not aware of what was going on.

CHAIR: For future planning, so we do not have a repeat, have you been in touch with New Zealand bureau of met to get an understanding of what went wrong?

Mr Harfield : No.

CHAIR: Shouldn't you have? Would it not be in your best interest to know if the weather was deteriorating in one incident, which ended up in the sea? If it was evident that New Zealand knew the weather was deteriorating and the pilot did not have that update, wouldn't you be interested to know? Would you not think: shit, we better not let this happen again?

Mr Harfield : Yes and that is why we rely on things like the ATSB reports—to give us that information on how the system was working. If the aircraft did not ditch, we were not aware of that flight, we were not managing that flight, we were not dealing with that flight and so therefore—

CHAIR: Yes, but you would be interested.

Mr Harfield : Correct, we would be interested in the lessons learnt from the incident and we would rely on the ATSB report for that.

Senator XENOPHON: On page 7 of the ATSB report it states:

Nadi ATC did not, and was not required by any international agreement to, proactively provide the 0803 amended Norfolk Island TAF to the flight crew

Does that not seem to be an unsafe practice in that it is tantamount to the withholding of critical safety information that might otherwise prevent a flight from continuing into a dangerous situation, which occurred here?

Mr Harfield : Yes. However, they are the rules for Fijian air traffic control as instructed by Fiji and international agreement. Within the Australian airspace that we manage, we are required to pass that information on to the flight. Those are rules of Fiji air traffic control.

Senator XENOPHON: But we are talking about an aircraft heading into Australian territory though, are we not?

Mr Harfield : It was going to Norfolk Island, yes, but Norfolk Island is managed by New Zealand air traffic control.

Senator FAWCETT: So it is not Australian airspace?

Mr Harfield : It is not Australian airspace.

Senator XENOPHON: Are you saying because it is managed by New Zealand, there is nothing you can do about it?

Mr Harfield : I am not saying there is nothing we can do about it. We can talk to our New Zealand colleagues about—

Senator XENOPHON: Have you spoken to your New Zealand colleagues about the Pel-Air ditching?

Mr Harfield : No, we have not.

Senator XENOPHON: It has been three years and one day since the ditching.

Senator STERLE: I am interested too. You did say, Mr Harfield, that you would do that if there was a recommendation from ATSB? Would you say that?

Mr Harfield : I think we need to put a couple of things into context. You have CASA, which is the air safety regulator that provides the rules and procedures we abide by. We are there air traffic service provider. We provide services based on the rules and regulations that are set by CASA, so we apply the rules as set. When another air traffic service provider has a particular issue, we have discussions with that service provider about the issues that we see. We are surrounded by 11 different flight information regions. We are in constant contact with our neighbouring air navigation service providers. At the end of the day, we can talk about those particular issues but they also work under the jurisdiction of their safety regulator and apply the rules that their safety regulator deems. The fact is, this would be a matter for the civil aviation authority of New Zealand.

Senator FAWCETT: A string of those comments point to the fact that if there were a recommendation coming out of an accident report it would be an enhancement to safety for a neighbouring service provider to proactively push an equivalent of a hazard alert. Then you would act on behalf of the government to talk with your peer, but that would need to come from a recommendation that CASA picked up, which was then put as a requirement. Does that all lead to the fact that ATSB reports should, in fact, have recommendations? If there were no recommendation, where would you take your action from?

Mr Harfield : From our perspective, as an air navigation service provider, we do not just rely on an ATSB report. If we see any particular safety issue we have regular meetings and discussions with our neighbouring air navigation service providers, talking about the number of safety issues that come to our attention. It may not necessarily be in an ATSB report. We are constantly having those discussions with them to try to improve the integrity of the system.

Senator FAWCETT: How long has it been since this accident.

Mr Harfield : 2,00—

Senator XENOPHON: 2,097 days.

Senator FAWCETT: How many meetings have you had with your New Zealand counterparts since this accident?

Mr Harfield : We probably would have them twice a year, but this particular issue is something where we did not know the intent of what was being passed to that particular flight—because it is New Zealand air traffic control with the Pel-Air aircraft. It is the same with Fiji air traffic control with the Pel-Air aircraft. Not until the ATSB report was released were we aware that there could have been a deficiency with the passage of weather. It is something that we would normally discuss. New Zealand air traffic control would be doing their own particular review. I want to make sure it is understood where our role is, reference the rules and procedures of a foreign jurisdiction.

 

Hmm..with the above Hansard extract front of mind, now consider the plight of QF28 having apparently not been issued by ASA any BOM 'hazard alert' information in regards to the rapidly changing wx (hazard)  conditions that occurred at YSSY on February 18th 2023? - 

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

TICK TOCK..goes the Harfwit OnePie doomsday clock?? - 

Via the Popinjay REPCON Aviation webpage:

Concern regarding the implementation of Temporary Restricted Airspace (TRA) at multiple locations, the use of short breaks and proposed enroute conditional endorsement (ECE) procedure

Reporter's deidentified concern

The reporter has raised a safety concern regarding the implementation of Temporary Restricted Airspace (TRA) at multiple locations, the use of short breaks and proposed ECE procedure.

Temporary Restricted Airspace

The reporter states that due to staff shortages, many air traffic controller shifts are unable to be filled resulting in several, normally controlled locations, being designated as TRA. The reporter states that those operating in TRA - line controllers, centre managers, pilots and operators do not have a proper understanding of the TRA procedures.

From an ATC perspective, the reporter states that no-one has received training in implementing or managing TRA and the written procedures provided are inadequate to ensure a consistent application. The reporter states that some controllers manage the space by only authorising one aircraft in at a time. Put more simply, the principal of one aircraft out - one aircraft in. While other controllers permit multiple aircraft into the TRA at one time.

From a pilot/operator perspective, the reporter states that it is evident that most crew do not have any understanding as to what TRA is, or how they are meant to operate within it. The reporter states that one airline does not permit aircraft into TRA due to the safety risks involved and the inability to implement risk controls at short notice, where as others seem oblivious to any changes in the airspace. The reporter gave an example of an international carrier flying out of Cairns in August 2022 during TRA airspace. The reporter states that it was evident that the crew had no idea what was happening. The tower cleared the aircraft for take-off and no further assistance was required to be given to the crew. Given the terrain around Cairns, other aircraft in the vicinity and the crew's unfamiliarity with the airspace rules, the reporter believes the scenario was unsafe.

The reporter's concern is that procedures for implementing TRA are inadequate to outline to controllers the process they should be following. The reporter states that controllers have received no training in TRA procedures, and reading through the procedures on their own, there is no clear guidance as to how access to the TRA should be granted or who is meant to grant the access.

The reporter believes that the ad-hoc approach to TRA airspace is an accident waiting to happen. 

In addition to the TRA procedures, the reporter is further concerned by the use of the short break procedure in the Terminal Control Unit (TCU) environment and the proposed enroute conditional endorsement (ECE).

Short break procedure

The reporter states that the short break procedure allows the endorsed controller to leave the console for a break, and another controller, that doesn't have the endorsement for that sector, monitors the console while the original controller goes on the break. The reporter states that the short break procedure is primarily used in the enroute environment and was designed to be used with no, or minimal traffic and where no separation issues could exist. The reporter states that the short break procedure is now being utilised in the TCU environment, where aircraft taxi at short notice, or VFR aircraft call up unexpectedly. 

The reporter states that many controllers refuse to conduct a short break procedure as their ATC license is effectively being used to control aircraft when they are not present. The reporter is concerned that this procedure is being used more and more frequently in environments it was never intended for, and less experienced controllers are accepting the procedure thinking it is a normal process they are expected to comply with.

Proposed enroute conditional endorsement (ECE)

The reporter further advises that controllers have been advised that an enroute conditional endorsement (ECE) is being proposed as a solution to the staffing shortages.  The reporter states that the ECE is a worse version of the short break procedure, in that a controller that doesn't hold an endorsement for the sector would be allowed to fully control any aircraft in the sector, and be required to perform nearly all the normal duties of an endorsed controller. However, the controller would have no training for the particular sector.

The concern is that the controller does not know the intricacies of the airspace and it is quite likely the controller could miss traffic conflicts that a controller that knows the airspace would never do. The reporter is also concerned that an ECE controller will not correctly identify the lowest safe issues and process aircraft in an unsafe manner, because it is a scenario that the controller would never have encountered before.  The reporter is concerned that the proposal of the ECE is a band-aid approach to a severe staffing shortage and brings additional risks.

The reporter queries the risk assessment to regularly utilise the short break procedure in the TCU environment and the proposed ECE procedure.

Further to the above, the ATSB has received a report from a flight training and charter operator also raising concerns regarding the implementation of Traffic Information Broadbase by Aircraft (TIBA) and TRA procedures at Rockhampton and Mackay.

The reporter states:

• There is little to no notice of TIBA imposition, resulting in circumstances where solo students are operating in the area while TIBA procedures are implemented, and there were no indication of TIBA procedures coming into effect pre-departure.
  
• Controllers (both in Mackay Tower and Brisbane Control Zone) unsure of TIBA procedures, and unable to provide assistance to aircraft who are querying procedures. On one occasion a pilot asked the controller what the implications of the TRA meant for them, and the controller replied 'I don't know'.
  
• Pilot's being unfamiliar with TIBA procedures and inconsistent application of TIBA procedures
  
• Private pilots and non-commercial pilots operating in the area being forced out of the airspace or operating in the airspace with extreme difficulty
  
• Brisbane Control Zone co-ordinating arrival times provide no flexibility on arrival and departure slots, resulting in aircraft not being permitted in the airspace due to unforeseen operational delays enroute, resulting in unscheduled diversions and low fuel events.
  

Named party's response

Contingency Plans including Temporary Restricted Airspace (TRA)

Airservices has published contingency plans for many years. Version 1 of the current National Air Traffic Service (ATS) Contingency Plan was published in 2005 and detailed that TRA will not routinely be used to manage Air Traffic Services (ATS) Contingencies. The approach was based on the premise that airspace retained its ATS Classification, allowing Airservices to control access to airspace.

This premise was altered in 2008 when there was a change in regulation which resulted in determinations in respect of airspace of any class have no effect during any period in which ATS are not provided. As a result of this regulatory requirement, the National ATS Contingency Plan have been amended and it was determined at this time that the use of TRA would be used to encompass high density airspace for the purpose of access control to prevent overload of the contingency system.

The publication of the use of restricted areas in the contingency plans has been in place for over 15 years and the contingency plans are tested on an annual basis unless activated, which can then be used as the review. For 15 years, no issues have been raised in respect of the use of TRA. Airservices also includes contingency plan activation on the annual training plan from time to time.

In recent times, high levels of late notice staff unavailability has resulted in the activation of contingency plans on a more frequent basis than any previous period. Airservices acknowledges that there have been identified issues in relation to controller and pilot understanding of information published in Airservices internal documents and the Australian Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). Work is being undertaken to try and simplify the issue with a meeting being held with Qantas, Virgin and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) on 16 September 2022. A revised version is  due to be circulated for consultation.

It is important to clarify, that if no ATS is available then the airspace has no classification and TIBA procedures, an international standard, apply. As previously stated, Airservices then utilises a restricted area to restrict access. The risk to an aircraft in airspace with no ATS following TIBA procedures would be higher without the protection of a restricted area. In the Cairns example, the aircraft is entitled to depart into the airspace utilising TIBA procedures, regardless of whether the restricted area existed or not, this is a company decision. The restricted area limits traffic but does not change the procedures in use. There is also nothing that precludes an aircraft, in airspace where no ATS is available, flying published departure procedures. Unless being vectored, separation with terrain is always the responsibility of the pilot.

Short break procedure

The short break procedure is not domain specific; has been in place for many years; is subject to formal reviews; and, has been fully consulted with CASA. The reporter is correct in that the short break procedure can only be used when air traffic activity is minimal and does not require air traffic controller action for the separation of aircraft. The short break procedure has additional controls and limits the interaction by a controller who is monitoring the frequency to that detailed by the executive controller. Responses are extremely limited and do cover scenarios indicated. Airservices considers the use of the procedure to be safe.

Proposed enroute conditional endorsement (ECE)

Airservices is following its safety management system and change processes as it works towards a conditional endorsement. Airservices already has location specific conditional endorsements in place. This proposed enroute conditional endorsement is on a broader scale and as such controls are being developed that fit the airspace that the controller is expected to manage. These include checklists, system maps and traffic management.

The proposed endorsement will follow the protocols detailed in the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations part 65 which allows for both location specific and functional endorsements. Airservices has consulted with staff and taken input into the process. CASA has also been briefed on the proposal which will increase the number of available staff and is aimed to prevent airspace being left with no ATS available and being subject to TIBA procedures.

Additional report

In relation to Rockhampton and Mackay, Airservices disputes the statement in relation to notification of the procedures. The NOTAMs indicating the period of no ATS available are published in sufficient time that any pilot would have had access to them when undertaking pre-flight briefing prior to commencing a training flight. As stated previously, Airservices does acknowledge that there is some misunderstanding within ATC regarding the contingency procedures and is working to improve the understanding of its staff. However, the TIBA procedures are published in the Australian AIP and it is not Airservices responsibility to train pilots in relation to procedures contained in the AIP. The NOTAMs contain the information in relation to the restricted area, which is used to control access.

The additional report makes reference to low fuel events. The AIP requires aircraft to report minimum fuel or MAYDAY fuel and also deals with the reporting of such occurrences. Where a pilot reports minimum fuel or MAYDAY fuel, Airservices staff will report such occurrences through CIRRIS and Responsible persons (Pilots) are required to routinely report such matters to the ATSB. Airservices has reviewed its data, and no such occurrences are recorded so we are unable to make any comment on this aspect of the report.

In regard to unscheduled diversions, Airservices is unable to provide comment on this aspect of the report as we are unaware of such diversions by training flights and is in regular contact with Airline operators where we are aware of one such issue due times published on the NOTAM.

Finally, restricted areas are used to limit congestion and reduce the risk of airborne conflict. Slots are provided and normally have a 15-minute window and it is acknowledged that there is limited flexibility if the window cannot be met. Many of the periods of no approach ATS at Rockhampton and Mackay are 30 minutes periods to facilitate a break for a single duty controller. It is acknowledged that there have been periods of longer outages where no staff have been available that may give rise to the statement.

Regulator's response

In relation to the use Temporary Restricted Areas (TRA) with Traffic Information Broadcast by Aircraft (TIBA) procedures as a contingency measure.

As a concept, TRA with TIBA has been in place for over 14 years. In 2008 it was decided that TIBA should not be enacted without a TRA.

However, the rate of application had been limited to approximately 5 TIBA events per year with most in enroute airspace, 2022 has seen significantly many more TIBA occurrences with many in approach/departure airspace.

CASA views the current use of contingency management practices as unsustainable and is actively engaging directly with Airservices Australia (AA) to assist them to address the underlying drivers so that they can deliver services to the expected level. Whilst the contingency practices used do provide an acceptable level of safety performance at the location level, the widespread regular use of contingency practices across the entire system may introduce additional risk which will need to be monitored.  CASA intend to address the root cause of the issues raised, through a combination of surveillance (key focus areas), enforcement and direct consultation.

In relation to the use of the short break procedure in a TCU.

Historically the short break procedure has been principally utilised in the enroute environment; however, there is no restriction as to which ATC stream it applies.  The short break procedures are only to be taken when air traffic activity is minimal and not requiring air traffic controller action for the separation of aircraft.  As the relieving controller is required to reply with phrases, such as 'STAND BY' or 'WILL ADVISE' only, safety is likely to be maintained albeit at the expense of efficiency.  Use of the procedure in the terminal environment does not appear to be in breach of any standards or practices.

In relation to the proposed enroute conditional endorsement (ECE).

CASA is aware that Airservices are considering the development of an ECE; however, no detailed information has yet been provided to CASA.

It is probable AA are seeking to increase the use of what is known as a Restricted Endorsement. Holding a Restricted Endorsement enables an air traffic controller to control additional airspace in which traffic levels or complexity are considered very light. There are limitations on when a Restricted Endorsement can be exercised, which means that its use is often limited to overnight operations only.

In relation to the specific use of TRA with TIBA at Rockhampton and Mackay.

Since the commencement of Increased Surveillance Services (ISS) on 16 June 2022, Coral Approach has experienced contingency procedures most weeks due to staff availability.

CASA issued a Safety Finding to AA on 11 November for failing to ensure there were sufficient qualified staff to provide the air traffic services for Coral Approach.

CASA is working with AA to consider the most appropriate contingency arrangements to make whilst AA address the Safety Finding.

As a matter of interest I note that the RRAT Committee, in particular Senator Canavan, has put down WQON in relation to the many systemic safety issues surrounding ASA ATM:

 

Question on notice no. 156
Portfolio question number: SQ23-003421
2022-23 Supplementary Budget estimates

Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee, Infrastructure,
Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts Portfolio
Senator the Hon. Matthew Canavan: asked the Airservices Australia on 3 March
2023—

Is Airservices planning arrival / departure rates based on scheduled services, or
planning arrival rates based on available staff

---

Question on notice no. 157
Portfolio question number: SQ23-003422
2022-23 Supplementary Budget estimates
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee, Infrastructure,
Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts Portfolio

Senator the Hon. Matthew Canavan: asked the Airservices Australia on 3 March
2023—

Is there a current shortage of air traffic controllers? If so how many? Do you have a
plan to remedy the shortage? Does Airservices need more funding?
Is the shortage impacting the operating rate at major airports around Australia,
including Sydney airport?
Have we seen an increase over the past 12 months of regional airports that are
normally covered by air traffic control reverted to 'see-and-avoid' principle?
Prior to 2020 what was the average amount of overtime worked by air traffic
controllers in Brisbane, Sydney, and Melbourne airports? And what has it been in
2022 and this year?
What recruitment policies have been put in place to ensure that we have enough air
traffic controllers to reduce safety risks?
Are the amount of overtime hours that Air Traffic Controllers having to put in putting
at risk the safety of aircraft in Australia

---

Question on notice no. 158
Portfolio question number: SQ23-003423
2022-23 Supplementary Budget estimates
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee, Infrastructure,
Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts Portfolio

Senator the Hon. Matthew Canavan: asked the Airservices Australia on 3 March
2023—

Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) was identified as the mechanism to ensure Sydney
Airport was able to meet the agreed throughput rate, however, it is currently not being
used. Airservices have previously stated that the reason is the trigger for PRM has not
been reached. What is the trigger for PRM to be used is? With consistent arrival rates
consistently reduced to below 37 arrivals per hour, is there a plan to commence PRM
at Sydney Airport?

 

Much MTF..me thinks?? - P2 

[Peetwo]

Addendum to last - 

Via the Oz Aviation:

QANTAS 737 AND JETSTAR A320 IN DANGEROUS MIDNIGHT RUNWAY MIX-UP

written by Adam Thorn | April 9, 2023



The ATSB has launched an investigation after a Qantas 737 was in the process of leaving Darwin Airport at the same time as a Jetstar A320 was preparing to land on the same runway.

The incident significantly occurred at 12:17 am on Wednesday when the air traffic control tower was closed.

Images from Flightradar24, above, appear to show the outbound aircraft taking a significant detour from its usual route to avoid a collision.

In a statement released on Friday, the ATSB said it would examine “all available evidence” to determine the extent of the communication between the two narrowbody passenger planes.

“A final report will be released at the conclusion of the investigation,” it said. “Should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify relevant partie so that appropriate safety action can be taken.”

The statement is yet to clarify exactly how far into the take-off the Qantas 737 was, but it did state the incident is considered an “aircraft separation issue”. Flightradar24 lists the outbound aircraft’s actual time of departure as 12:47 am and the inbound plane’s landing time as 12:59 am.

It comes just a month after Australian Aviation reported how the ATSB would monitor the introduction of new take-off procedures at Sydney Airport after a British Airways 787 and Qantas A330 flew too close to each other in September last year.

The incident saw the Boeing aircraft’s collision avoidance system become activated before its first officer spotted the Airbus.

A report into the loss of separation occurrence’ revealed how an unusual set of circumstances led to the mix-up, including that the traditionally longer-haul A330-200 was operating a domestic flight meaning it had a higher climb performance.

The ATSB’s director of transport safety, Stuart Macleod, said, “Maintaining separation in high traffic terminal areas, such as Sydney, requires that both controllers and flight crews remain vigilant, maintain open communications, and use the available systems and tools to minimise the risk of errors.

“When sequencing departures, controllers should consider a number of factors, including how the flight duration (and the associated fuel load) will likely affect aircraft climb performance.”

Ref: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/inv...o-2023-015

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

Refreshing - (but scary).

To see a thread on Pprune shaking out of hiding an example of just how deep the official 'safety' system failures extend, across the board, with which the aviation industry must cope (like it or lump it). The least clearly defined being the way in which most of the responsibility for 'safety' is being foisted back onto company SMS and flight crew. So far removed from any form of accountability are the three big agencies that a situation, like the one cited below is allowed, by the 'authorities' to not only exist for even a day, but be virtually ignored. Not good enough; not by a long shot it ain't..

Roller Merlin - “Flew in there the other evening - 3 am Eastern time so we really all should be in bed, but no here we are with six jets all arriving or departing or pushing back and trying to establish what the others are going to do. It’s great that we all have a single frequency to talk on so the radio is going constantly while we are dodging a buildup, configuring the jet, calling checklists over the constant chatter and making sure we are safe to land at a frikin uncontrolled international airport in crap weather with perhaps 1000 souls involved blissfully unaware of the situation and that their government wants to blame the PIC if they are placed at risk. Yeah right.”

This thread kicked off April 08, 2023; after a separation event between two loaded passenger transport aircraft April 05, 2023. That is 19 days ago; Roller Merlin's post clearly defines the complete lack of a action taken by ATSB, ASA or even CASA. The solution is simple enough – put some people on deck, in the tower, approach and departure etc – before someone, somehow gets in a muddle and there's real trouble.

Well done Prune crew; Gentle, Bloggs Missy, TIEW etc for keeping the thread alive, focused and sensible. Will it achieve anything? We shall see; the Tote is open. Short odds on anything being done, this side of Christmas...

Toot toot....

[Peetwo]

Harfwit's AQON - And the answer is? - NO! 

Via the APH, weasel worded confections to Senator Canavan's Supp Estimates QON: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus...mates/rrat

Senator Matthew Canavan asked: 

a) Is there a current shortage of air traffic controllers? If so, how many? Do you have a plan to remedy the shortage? Does Airservices need more funding?
b) Is the shortage impacting the operating rate at major airports around Australia, including Sydney airport? 
c) Have we seen an increase over the past 12 months of regional airports that are normally covered by air traffic control reverted to ‘see-and-avoid’ principle? 
d) Prior to 2020 what was the average amount of overtime worked by air traffic controllers in Brisbane, Sydney, and Melbourne airports? And what has it been in 2022 and this year?
e) What recruitment policies have been put in place to ensure that we have enough air traffic controllers to reduce safety risks? f) Are the amount of overtime hours that Air Traffic Controllers having to put in putting at risk the safety of aircraft in Australia? 

Answer: 

a) Airservices currently employs a total of 926 full time equivalent (FTE) operational air traffic controllers and requires 813 FTE to fulfil operational requirements. Airservices acknowledges there have been staff availability issues and is implementing a resource resilience plan which includes a recruitment drive. Airservices does not need further funding. 

b) See response at a). In regard to network performance at major airports, there are a number of factors that can affect network performance. To ensure greater visibility and transparency, Airservices is publishing daily reports on network performance at Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth airports which is available here: www.airservicesaustralia.com/airservices-newsroom/

c) No.

d) Table 1 shows the average overtime worked by air traffic controllers over these periods.



e) Refer to response at a). A total of 44 ab-initio air traffic controller trainees have become operational since 2020 and a further 12 are expected to become operational by the end of June 2023. Another 80 are due to become operational in financial year 2024. Airservices is planning for ongoing annual recruitment of 80 to 100 ab-initio trainees.

f) No

---

Senator Matthew Canavan asked: 

Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) was identified as the mechanism to ensure Sydney Airport was able to meet the agreed throughput rate, however, it is currently not being used. Airservices have previously stated that the reason is the trigger for PRM has not been reached. What is the trigger for PRM to be used is? With consistent arrival rates consistently reduced to below 37 arrivals per hour, is there a plan to commence PRM at Sydney Airport?

Answer: 

There are no specific triggers for PRM use. PRM use depends on runway demand, available capacity (including people, procedures and enabling systems/infrastructure) and weather conditions.

The maximum rate forecast for runway 16 PRM is 42 aircraft an hour and for runway 34 is 46 aircraft an hour. Dependent on the weather conditions, rates above 37 arrivals an hour can be achieved without the use of PRM. There are currently no plans to recommence PRM at Sydney Airport.

During periods with peak arrival traffic demand and marginal weather conditions, capacity at Sydney Airport historically can be maintained without the use of PRM operations. PRM is a highly accurate surveillance system which allows air traffic controllers to precisely monitor aircraft tracking on their approach paths and enables independent parallel approaches.

The Long Term Operating Plan for Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport and Associated Airspace specifies that PRM can only be used mornings on Monday to Friday.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) amended the rules for parallel approaches in November 2018, which came into effect in February 2020. This aligned with the cessation of PRM with the reduction in traffic due to COVID-19.

The new rules introduced a straight and level flight component for independent parallel operations, utilising PRM, that was not consistent with the airspace design for runways 16L and 16R. This constraint was not identified until traffic levels started to increase. There is no technical constraint on the use of PRM on runway 34. Though demand at Sydney is increasing there have been relatively few occurrences where the use of PRM on runway 16 or 34 could have been utilised to manage an increase in demand.

Airservices has reviewed the airspace changes required and proposed a change to the international rule set for parallel runway approaches. This will be considered by the ICAO Separation and Airspace Safety Panel meeting in May 2023.

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

TIBA/TRA and REPCON RA2022-00053?? - 

Over on the UP they've finally cottoned on to the above REPCON - remember this? Ref: TICK TOCK..goes the Harfwit OnePie doomsday clock?? 

Reporter's deidentified concern

The reporter has raised a safety concern regarding the implementation of Temporary Restricted Airspace (TRA) at multiple locations, the use of short breaks and proposed ECE procedure.

Temporary Restricted Airspace

The reporter states that due to staff shortages, many air traffic controller shifts are unable to be filled resulting in several, normally controlled locations, being designated as TRA. The reporter states that those operating in TRA - line controllers, centre managers, pilots and operators do not have a proper understanding of the TRA procedures.

From an ATC perspective, the reporter states that no-one has received training in implementing or managing TRA and the written procedures provided are inadequate to ensure a consistent application. The reporter states that some controllers manage the space by only authorising one aircraft in at a time. Put more simply, the principal of one aircraft out - one aircraft in. While other controllers permit multiple aircraft into the TRA at one time.

From a pilot/operator perspective, the reporter states that it is evident that most crew do not have any understanding as to what TRA is, or how they are meant to operate within it. The reporter states that one airline does not permit aircraft into TRA due to the safety risks involved and the inability to implement risk controls at short notice, where as others seem oblivious to any changes in the airspace.

The reporter gave an example of an international carrier flying out of Cairns in August 2022 during TRA airspace. The reporter states that it was evident that the crew had no idea what was happening. The tower cleared the aircraft for take-off and no further assistance was required to be given to the crew. Given the terrain around Cairns, other aircraft in the vicinity and the crew's unfamiliarity with the airspace rules, the reporter believes the scenario was unsafe.

The reporter's concern is that procedures for implementing TRA are inadequate to outline to controllers the process they should be following. The reporter states that controllers have received no training in TRA procedures, and reading through the procedures on their own, there is no clear guidance as to how access to the TRA should be granted or who is meant to grant the access.

The reporter believes that the ad-hoc approach to TRA airspace is an accident waiting to happen. 

In addition to the TRA procedures, the reporter is further concerned by the use of the short break procedure in the Terminal Control Unit (TCU) environment and the proposed enroute conditional endorsement (ECE).

Short break procedure

The reporter states that the short break procedure allows the endorsed controller to leave the console for a break, and another controller, that doesn't have the endorsement for that sector, monitors the console while the original controller goes on the break. The reporter states that the short break procedure is primarily used in the enroute environment and was designed to be used with no, or minimal traffic and where no separation issues could exist. The reporter states that the short break procedure is now being utilised in the TCU environment, where aircraft taxi at short notice, or VFR aircraft call up unexpectedly. 

The reporter states that many controllers refuse to conduct a short break procedure as their ATC license is effectively being used to control aircraft when they are not present. The reporter is concerned that this procedure is being used more and more frequently in environments it was never intended for, and less experienced controllers are accepting the procedure thinking it is a normal process they are expected to comply with.

Proposed enroute conditional endorsement (ECE)

The reporter further advises that controllers have been advised that an enroute conditional endorsement (ECE) is being proposed as a solution to the staffing shortages.  The reporter states that the ECE is a worse version of the short break procedure, in that a controller that doesn't hold an endorsement for the sector would be allowed to fully control any aircraft in the sector, and be required to perform nearly all the normal duties of an endorsed controller. However, the controller would have no training for the particular sector.

The concern is that the controller does not know the intricacies of the airspace and it is quite likely the controller could miss traffic conflicts that a controller that knows the airspace would never do. The reporter is also concerned that an ECE controller will not correctly identify the lowest safe issues and process aircraft in an unsafe manner, because it is a scenario that the controller would never have encountered before.  The reporter is concerned that the proposal of the ECE is a band-aid approach to a severe staffing shortage and brings additional risks.

The reporter queries the risk assessment to regularly utilise the short break procedure in the TCU environment and the proposed ECE procedure.

Further to the above, the ATSB has received a report from a flight training and charter operator also raising concerns regarding the implementation of Traffic Information Broadbase by Aircraft (TIBA) and TRA procedures at Rockhampton and Mackay.

The reporter states:

There is little to no notice of TIBA imposition, resulting in circumstances where solo students are operating in the area while TIBA procedures are implemented, and there were no indication of TIBA procedures coming into effect pre-departure.

Controllers (both in Mackay Tower and Brisbane Control Zone) unsure of TIBA procedures, and unable to provide assistance to aircraft who are querying procedures. On one occasion a pilot asked the controller what the implications of the TRA meant for them, and the controller replied 'I don't know'.

Pilot's being unfamiliar with TIBA procedures and inconsistent application of TIBA procedures
Private pilots and non-commercial pilots operating in the area being forced out of the airspace or operating in the airspace with extreme difficulty.

Brisbane Control Zone co-ordinating arrival times provide no flexibility on arrival and departure slots, resulting in aircraft not being permitted in the airspace due to unforeseen operational delays enroute, resulting in unscheduled diversions and low fuel events.

---

Named party's response

Contingency Plans including Temporary Restricted Airspace (TRA)

Airservices has published contingency plans for many years. Version 1 of the current National Air Traffic Service (ATS) Contingency Plan was published in 2005 and detailed that TRA will not routinely be used to manage Air Traffic Services (ATS) Contingencies. The approach was based on the premise that airspace retained its ATS Classification, allowing Airservices to control access to airspace.

This premise was altered in 2008 when there was a change in regulation which resulted in determinations in respect of airspace of any class have no effect during any period in which ATS are not provided. As a result of this regulatory requirement, the National ATS Contingency Plan have been amended and it was determined at this time that the use of TRA would be used to encompass high density airspace for the purpose of access control to prevent overload of the contingency system.

The publication of the use of restricted areas in the contingency plans has been in place for over 15 years and the contingency plans are tested on an annual basis unless activated, which can then be used as the review. For 15 years, no issues have been raised in respect of the use of TRA. Airservices also includes contingency plan activation on the annual training plan from time to time.

In recent times, high levels of late notice staff unavailability has resulted in the activation of contingency plans on a more frequent basis than any previous period. Airservices acknowledges that there have been identified issues in relation to controller and pilot understanding of information published in Airservices internal documents and the Australian Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). Work is being undertaken to try and simplify the issue with a meeting being held with Qantas, Virgin and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) on 16 September 2022. A revised version is  due to be circulated for consultation.

It is important to clarify, that if no ATS is available then the airspace has no classification and TIBA procedures, an international standard, apply. As previously stated, Airservices then utilises a restricted area to restrict access. The risk to an aircraft in airspace with no ATS following TIBA procedures would be higher without the protection of a restricted area. In the Cairns example, the aircraft is entitled to depart into the airspace utilising TIBA procedures, regardless of whether the restricted area existed or not, this is a company decision. The restricted area limits traffic but does not change the procedures in use. There is also nothing that precludes an aircraft, in airspace where no ATS is available, flying published departure procedures. Unless being vectored, separation with terrain is always the responsibility of the pilot.

Short break procedure

The short break procedure is not domain specific; has been in place for many years; is subject to formal reviews; and, has been fully consulted with CASA. The reporter is correct in that the short break procedure can only be used when air traffic activity is minimal and does not require air traffic controller action for the separation of aircraft. The short break procedure has additional controls and limits the interaction by a controller who is monitoring the frequency to that detailed by the executive controller. Responses are extremely limited and do cover scenarios indicated. Airservices considers the use of the procedure to be safe.

Proposed enroute conditional endorsement (ECE)

Airservices is following its safety management system and change processes as it works towards a conditional endorsement. Airservices already has location specific conditional endorsements in place. This proposed enroute conditional endorsement is on a broader scale and as such controls are being developed that fit the airspace that the controller is expected to manage. These include checklists, system maps and traffic management.

The proposed endorsement will follow the protocols detailed in the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations part 65 which allows for both location specific and functional endorsements. Airservices has consulted with staff and taken input into the process. CASA has also been briefed on the proposal which will increase the number of available staff and is aimed to prevent airspace being left with no ATS available and being subject to TIBA procedures.

Additional report

In relation to Rockhampton and Mackay, Airservices disputes the statement in relation to notification of the procedures. The NOTAMs indicating the period of no ATS available are published in sufficient time that any pilot would have had access to them when undertaking pre-flight briefing prior to commencing a training flight. As stated previously, Airservices does acknowledge that there is some misunderstanding within ATC regarding the contingency procedures and is working to improve the understanding of its staff. However, the TIBA procedures are published in the Australian AIP and it is not Airservices responsibility to train pilots in relation to procedures contained in the AIP. The NOTAMs contain the information in relation to the restricted area, which is used to control access.

The additional report makes reference to low fuel events. The AIP requires aircraft to report minimum fuel or MAYDAY fuel and also deals with the reporting of such occurrences. Where a pilot reports minimum fuel or MAYDAY fuel, Airservices staff will report such occurrences through CIRRIS and Responsible persons (Pilots) are required to routinely report such matters to the ATSB. Airservices has reviewed its data, and no such occurrences are recorded so we are unable to make any comment on this aspect of the report.

In regard to unscheduled diversions, Airservices is unable to provide comment on this aspect of the report as we are unaware of such diversions by training flights and is in regular contact with Airline operators where we are aware of one such issue due times published on the NOTAM.

Finally, restricted areas are used to limit congestion and reduce the risk of airborne conflict. Slots are provided and normally have a 15-minute window and it is acknowledged that there is limited flexibility if the window cannot be met. Many of the periods of no approach ATS at Rockhampton and Mackay are 30 minutes periods to facilitate a break for a single duty controller. It is acknowledged that there have been periods of longer outages where no staff have been available that may give rise to the statement.

---

Code:

Regulator's response

In relation to the use Temporary Restricted Areas (TRA) with Traffic Information Broadcast by Aircraft (TIBA) procedures as a contingency measure.

As a concept, TRA with TIBA has been in place for over 14 years. In 2008 it was decided that TIBA should not be enacted without a TRA.

However, the rate of application had been limited to approximately 5 TIBA events per year with most in enroute airspace, 2022 has seen significantly many more TIBA occurrences with many in approach/departure airspace.

CASA views the current use of contingency management practices as unsustainable and is actively engaging directly with Airservices Australia (AA) to assist them to address the underlying drivers so that they can deliver services to the expected level. Whilst the contingency practices used do provide an acceptable level of safety performance at the location level, the widespread regular use of contingency practices across the entire system may introduce additional risk which will need to be monitored.  CASA intend to address the root cause of the issues raised, through a combination of surveillance (key focus areas), enforcement and direct consultation.

In relation to the use of the short break procedure in a TCU.

Historically the short break procedure has been principally utilised in the enroute environment; however, there is no restriction as to which ATC stream it applies.  The short break procedures are only to be taken when air traffic activity is minimal and not requiring air traffic controller action for the separation of aircraft.  As the relieving controller is required to reply with phrases, such as 'STAND BY' or 'WILL ADVISE' only, safety is likely to be maintained albeit at the expense of efficiency.  Use of the procedure in the terminal environment does not appear to be in breach of any standards or practices.

In relation to the proposed enroute conditional endorsement (ECE).

CASA is aware that Airservices are considering the development of an ECE; however, no detailed information has yet been provided to CASA.

It is probable AA are seeking to increase the use of what is known as a Restricted Endorsement. Holding a Restricted Endorsement enables an air traffic controller to control additional airspace in which traffic levels or complexity are considered very light. There are limitations on when a Restricted Endorsement can be exercised, which means that its use is often limited to overnight operations only.

In relation to the specific use of TRA with TIBA at Rockhampton and Mackay.

Since the commencement of Increased Surveillance Services (ISS) on 16 June 2022, Coral Approach has experienced contingency procedures most weeks due to staff availability.

CASA issued a Safety Finding to AA on 11 November for failing to ensure there were sufficient qualified staff to provide the air traffic services for Coral Approach.

CASA is working with AA to consider the most appropriate contingency arrangements to make whilst AA address the Safety Finding.

Here's some comments off the UP in response (so far) to the REPCON...

The Banjo

The short break procedures are only to be taken when air traffic activity is minimal and not requiring air traffic controller action for the separation of aircraft. As the relieving controller is required to reply with phrases, such as 'STAND BY' or 'WILL ADVISE' only, safety is likely to be maintained albeit at the expense of efficiency.

Yer, right, nope.
"centre xxxx requires 20nm right of route due weather"

"STANDBY"

At say 8nm/minute and statistically a minimum of 10 minutes for the brains trust
to have a dump and transit back to the work station (2mins) is say 100 track miles.

I call bulldust on "safety likely maintained".

"Likely"infers a probability and we should not control airspace on the same basis as a toss of a coin.

---

alphacentauri

Lets start here:

CASR 172.110 Personnel

An ATS provider must have, at all times, enough suitably qualified and trained personnel to enable it to provide, in accordance with the standards set out in the Manual of Standards and the standards set out or referred to in Annex 11, the air traffic services covered by its approval.

Then there is this:

CASR 172.150 Contingency plan
(1) An ATS provider must have a contingency plan, in accordance with the standards set out in the Manual of Standards, of the procedures to be followed if, for any reason, an air traffic service being provided by it is interrupted.
(2) The plan must include:
(a) the actions to be taken by the members of the provider’s personnel responsible for providing the service; and
(b) possible alternative arrangements for providing the service; and
© the arrangements for resuming normal operations for the service.

The enactment of a contigancy plan, is a temporary measure, to prevent a temporoary breach of the regs (CASR172.110). However by planning to use TIBA as a day to day mitigator, effectively means that you are planning to breach the reg on a daily basis in advance and hiding behind your contingency plan to do it. If you are enacting your contingency plan daily, then I would have to argue it is no longer a contingency plan, its your normal daily plan. CASA even says it themselves in the response and are concerend about the implications on Aviation Safety. Im disgusted at the regulators response.

What is the new OAR manager doing about Airservices not providing the level of service that his office has directed Airservices to provide? Surely if the level of risk requires a certain level of service to provided as, directed by the OAR, and that service is not being provided, then the OAR also carries the risk.

Alpha

A lot to unpack there but IMO Harfwit's doomsday clock is well and truly ticking...

Ref: Proactive FAA safety summit vs our WOFTAM ICAO Annex 19 SSP?? 

I would also ask the question...why hasn't the State run, ICAO approved (Annex 19) SMS (IE the SSP) kicked into gear?? Surely this issue should be front and centre as the number 1 agenda item on one of the SSP working groups responsible for the proper ICAO compliant administration of the Annex 19 SSP (refer Annex 1 page 37 - HERE)?? -  

MTF...P2 

[P7_TOM]

And; another REPCON – HERE-. Worth as read ---

Re P2's post – (above) – ASA answer para 1 whilst smug and complacent at least makes some sense:-

“Airservices has published contingency plans for many years. Version 1 of the current National Air Traffic Service (ATS) Contingency Plan was published in 2005 and detailed that TRA will not routinely be used to manage Air Traffic Services (ATS) Contingencies. The approach was based on the premise that airspace retained its ATS Classification, allowing Airservices to control access to airspace.”

But the following para :-

“This premise was altered in 2008 when there was a change in regulation which resulted in determinations in respect of airspace of any class have no effect during any period in which ATS are not provided.”

-: just defies understanding – an educated guess could be made – but if push came to shove in a legal stoush related to any sort of 'close encounter' – well.!

Seems to me there are a whole swag of 'get-out-of-jail' cards being played rather than address he core of the matter – to properly provide the service the public and the air services pay for; and that would include Halfwit's and his dodgy accountant mate bonus for running on empty tanks. Well done ATCO's – time for Civil Air to weigh in methinks.