[Peetwo]

No interim report? Plus St Commode's last 'up yours' Senators?

Ducked it or shoved it? - via the 20/20 inquiry webpages: https://www.aph.gov.au/-/media/Committee...7514212FEA

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10 December 2020
Senator the Hon Scott Ryan
President of the Senate
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Mr President,

On 2 December 2019, the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee
self-referred under Standing Order 25(2)(a) an inquiry into Australia's general aviation industry,
with particular reference to aviation in rural, regional and remote Australia. The committee agreed
to an interim report on or before the final sitting day in December 2020, and a final report date on or
before the final sitting day of November 2021.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the inquiry has not progressed as far as the committee had
intended. The committee therefore submits this letter to satisfy the committee's commitment to
report back to the Senate.

Yours sincerely

Senator Susan McDonald
Chair

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Also from the 'Additional Documents' webpage possibly (hopefully) the last 'spin and bollocks' correspondence to the committee from the much maligned St Commode (note that this was posted weeks after the 20 November public hearing - ??? )...  :

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MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Submission 48 - EHMAC (Dic Doc) & Submission 50 - Richard Rudd.

Via APH website:

48 Evans Head Memorial Aerodrome Committee Incorporated (PDF 1542 KB) 

Preamble

My Committee, The Evans Head Memorial Aerodrome Committee Incorporated appreciates the
remit of this inquiry with an appropriate focus on CASA and related agencies and GA and the
aviation landscape. We submit that CASA and other agencies including government departments
cannot be seen in isolation from other critically-important factors and must be seen from a ‘systems’
and historic influence perspective. These factors include inter alia:

1. operation and leadership (political and senior bureaucrat) of the current federal department
responsible for aviation and aviation infrastructure and its predecessor departments and
their legacies,
2. planning departments in various states who hold membership of NASAG for The National
Airports Safeguarding Framework and have, in our view, conflicts of interest with regard to
provision of ‘independent’ advice including issues about safety on and around our airfields.
Their relationship with CASA is unclear and requires further investigation with regard to
lobbying and delay tactics for putting in place appropriate safety measures around our
airfields,
3. political interference from the ‘big developer lobby’ with regard to responsible development
of policy and action to protect the broader ‘public interest’ with regard to aviation and
aviation safety and standards relating to aviation and aviation infrastructure,
4. political interference in the planning process on and around our airports and airfields at all
three levels of government with consequences for GA, aviation and public safety,
5. a fundamental shift in the understanding and execution of what constitutes assessment of
risk not only in aviation but other sectors of the economy. The move to an “Affordable Risk”
model governing the way in which we view aviation and planning around our airfield, and to
the outsourcing of functions associated with risk assessment and accident evaluation are
particularly problematic as they determine the way in which risk is managed and ultimately
costs to society including loss of life and impairment of GA,
6. lack of genuine qualification and experience in the sector from senior decision-makers who
may not have the necessary professional skills to lead and make ‘informed’ decisions about a
very complex industry with many moving parts. Just because you do well at managing, say,
a veterans’ affairs matters, does not automatically mean you will do well at managing
aviation safety. In our view, strong technical knowledge is required in addition to
administrative skill for those working in aviation safety particularly in a leadership role. By
all means refer out to specialists with the appropriate knowledge for assistance but you
need to make sure that the person doing the referring has the necessary knowledge and
experience to make informed choices and decisions in the initial outsourcing process and in
the subsequent assessment of the independent report returned to that person. It is our
experience, and the empirical literature supports this view, that you need to have a good
grasp of the technical issues as well as an understanding of pitfalls and weaknesses of
decision-making in uncertain situations to make good decisions and make appropriate policy
settings.
7. The problem of contract, limited-term employment where those employed on large salaries
have ‘confidential’ workplace arrangements which are not subject to public scrutiny. Such
arrangements fly in the face of free and fair independent advice. If I know my contract has
to be renewed every three years, I am more likely to toe some political line for fear of nonrenewal.
This is a whole issue in its own right beyond the current remit but ultimately
important to it in terms of good decision-making, or in fact any decision-making at all! It
needs to be examined critically. Are we really getting the best advice and value for public
monies with such contractual arrangements? Do the managers at the top really need to be
paid at such high levels commensurate with the private sector to make sure we get the best?
Where is the evidence which supports this view? Is it the case that the high salary levels are
there to make sure that there is no interference in the revolving door between the private
sector and the public service and have nothing to do with attracting the best people to the
job?

(IMHO sub 48 should be required reading...  )

50 Mr Richard Rudd (PDF 144 KB) 

PREAMBLE : So far in this Inquiry and that of 5 years ago there have been a multitude of excellent submissions detailing the failures in all respects of CASA’s “safety” regulatory regime. With a cast of thousands, a cost of billions and thirty years in the making, we have a disastrous outcome, where it is no safer now to fly than it was before, and GA /General Aviation is decimated as a result.

It’s a bureaucratic scandal with national repercussions. Abandoned fuel bowsers and airfields without small maintenance facilities, flying clubs, aircraft or instructors across this wide land where rapid aerial transport and employment should be a ‘must have’.

It proves time and again that the lack of governance by successive Governments and and Ministers over this ‘free-range’ no oversight ‘Authority’ has been a disaster for the Aviation Industry and General and Private aviation in particular.

As a result CASA has developed a culture akin to its own Soviet. “We have the Power” In their dealings with any potential victim they can and do make up stories to discredit, and introduce phoney ‘safety’ issues to help make the case, just like allegations made during the Stalinist regime to get rid of someone.

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Sandy chocfrog comment (nearly missed -  ); plus typical ignorance on the UP - 

Ref:

 

CASA under the Microscope: the Scrutiny begins
26 November 2020
Comments 0 Comments

Amidst the amorphic society that COVID-19 has created, the senate last week pressed ahead with their inquiry into the impact of safety regulation on general aviation, with all but CASA themselves appearing via video link. Even the chairperson, Senator Susan McDonald, was present in the room as a disembodied face on a video screen.

But the difficulties didn't let CASA off the hook.

The public hearing on Firday 20 November was the first for the Senate Standing Committees on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport (RRAT) inquiry into the state of the GA industry, with particular focus on the operation and effectiveness of CASA.

Over the five hours, the inquiry–which included also senators Rex Patrick and Glenn Sterle–heard evidence from nine groups including operators, associations, private individuals and CASA itself. Overall the picture being painted was one of an industry struggling under the weight of regulation and a regulator deaf to the appeals.

From calls to adopt the Federal Aviation Administration system of regulation to accusations of misfeasance and a negative impact on aviation safety, CASA and its system of regulation endured a litany of slings and arrows, with only the Regional Aviation Association, Recreational Aviation Australia and CASA itself providing any tempering input.

John McDermott, of QLD helicopter operator McDermott Aviation, told the inquiry that the complexity of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) was failing to make aviation safer than countries with simpler systems such as Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and the USA, and that it was the GA industry itself that ensured safety.

"CASA doesn't make industry safer; regulations don't make industry safer," McDermott testified. "We make industry safer because there are so many reasons for us to be safe other than just adhering to a regulation, which we've got to do.

"I believe we're safe despite CASA. At the moment I would suggest there are operations in Queensland that are operating outside of CASA's regulations, probably unknowingly, that are operating safely because the regulations that are there at the moment, for example, certifying of some aircraft or various type ratings ... are not being complied with, but are actually being done and being done safely despite the regulations."

McDermott also went on to tell the inquiry they have seen no evidence that the changes to the Civil Aviation Act 1988 that require CASA to take into account cost have made any difference "at the coalface."

That position was later supported by North Queensland Aviation Services' Mary Brown, who admitted the situation had become so tenuous that the company had developed a strategy to exit the aviation industry.

AOPA Australia's Ben Morgan–one of CASA's more strident critics–went so far as to say he thought the decline of general aviation was intentional and reiterated calls for a Royal Commission into safety regulation.

"Over the last four-and-a-half years, I've taken [many issues] to CASA on numerous occasions, and they've been thoroughly ignored," Morgan said, "and so the decline of the Australian general aviation industry is not [an] accidental occurrence, it's an intentional occurrence, because CASA are aware that these things have been driving broad decline in our industry, but they have been unwilling to either listen to industry or even consider that they must change direction in order to stop the industry being forced out the back door."

Phil Hurst, CEO of the Australian Aerial Application Association (AAAA) supported the position that CASA was reluctant to listen to the GA industry, saying that the regulator was the "primary restriction" on GA and that the consultation process was "appalling window-dressing".
"The consultation consists of CASA telling you what they've decided and then you trying to talk them down off the high building," he told the committee. "Sometimes we're successful, sometimes we're not."

Hurst, who sat on the Aviation Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) was also critical of the way CASA used the Technical Working Groups (TWG), in particularly the Part 138 group, claiming there was a disconnect between real risk management and what the regulations call for. He also stated that TWGs were given misleading information on what was to be included in the final regulations.

However, Malcolm Sharp, chairman of the Regional Aviation Association of Australia (RAAA) said that he believed what was hurting general aviation was competition, citing young people finding more exciting things to do, the proliferation of recreational aviation and the rise of low-cost carriers as concerns. RAAA's position according to Sharp is that CASA shouldn't be a "punching bag" for everything.

Sharp supported the AAAA's contention that the work of the TWGs was being "hijacked" within CASA and also said he believed there were people within the regulator who were intentionally blocking reforms and that those people needed to be weeded out.

Sharp also said that as an industry, GA needed to move on because CASA was only part of the issue.

The most passionate evidence came from former Australian Pilot Training Alliance (APTA) boss Glen Buckley, who was scathing in his assessment of CASA to the point of making pointed accusations of misfeasance, and said that he believed CASA "reverse engineered" process in the case of APTA in order to achieve a pre-determined outcome.

In defending his organisation, CASA Director of Aviation Safety and CEO Shane Carmody said that he believed not all the evidence given was accurate.

"Listening to all the statements today, there's certainly been some positive contributions to the debate on general aviation, but there have also been some highly negative statements about CASA, some possibly valid, but some have to be contested because I would argue that they are wildly inaccurate," he said.

Carmody also said that he was disappointed that some of the issue raised were made to sound as if they were current when they had been raised several years ago. He also pointed out that CASA had inherited the regulatory reform program in 1995 and that in the period 2000-10, 22 new regulations were finalised with a further six between 2010-16.

"A number of the people who spoke today were involved with the process from the outset," he pointed out, "and they still might be a bit unhappy with the outcome, but they were involved with the consultation for 15 years. Since 2015, I've created the Aviation Safety Advisory Panel, and within three years we completed the 11 remaining regulations and they have been made.

"The were all consulted under the Technical Working Groups, and some people have made the point that in the past three to four years there has been increased consultation."

Carmody said that suggestions made in submissions that the regulatory reform program was still underway was "disingenuous."

A visibly emotional Carmody went on to address several issues raised directly, indicating that CASA had approved 25,000 aviation medicals and rejected 84, which he believed hardly constituted "systematic abuse" as claimed by AOPA. He also contested Ben Morgan's claim that CASA regularly ignored AOPA, saying they had responsed to him many times.

After several witnesses stated that there had been no change to the way CASA operates after the changes to the Civil Aviation Act 1988 had passed through parliament, Carmody responded to a question by Senator Patrick by saying that CASA genuinely considered cost and had processes in place to try to comply with the legislation.

The senate inquiry is ongoing and is still taking submissions, with an interim report still due on the last parlimentary sitting day of 2020, currently 10 December.

A typical 'nailed it' reply from Sandy...

Sandy Reith • 17 days ago

Where does one start? Is CASA responsible for practically chopping Australia’s General Aviation (GA) down to a shadow of it’s former self? Yes and no, certainly it must bear a great responsibility. But no one should forget that it was government, thirty two years ago, that instituted an experimental form of governance, hiving off a Departmental responsibility to an unelected, independent corporate body which has virtually zero political input.

This has proven to be disastrous move for GA as touched upon by most of the witnesses to Senator Susan McDonald’s inquiry.

Most of the industry witnesses were brave and forthright, with a couple of exceptions where their own bailiwick was evidently tied to a friendly CASA relationship, notably RAAUS. Also I would take issue with Malcolm Sharpe who claimed that there were still private airstrips here and there and so it wasn’t too bad. I could take anyone on a Google Earth tour and show numerous places where strips used to be, and if we account for population growth then the picture for the massive decline of GA looks even more precipitous.

The most outstanding moment of the whole proceeding was the decision made by Senator McDonald. supported by her fellow Senators, to instruct CASA to allow Chief Pilots of helicopter operations the same right to undertake periodic proficiency checks as do their fixed wing counterparts.

How will this instruction play out with CASA, let alone Minister McCormack? Hopefully this will be one of the worst kept secrets of 2020.

Senator McDonald showed what governments should be about, governing, doing something, making a decision. That’s why we elect them and pay them to do. Bravo, we’ve been waiting a very long time.

Next via the UP some posters (IMO) show their ignorance on the Chair Senator McDonald's interim report correspondence:

TBM-Legend

Originally Posted by VH-MLE:

That unsigned letter from Susan McDonald is the clearest example I've seen of the contempt politicians have for their constituents. Furthermore, it epitomises why politicians are despised by so many...

Please explain. Sen McDonald is one of the few "friends" the industry has in the Parliament. The Public Servants are the ones maneuvering behind the politicians backs [just like the Brereton Report]

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VH-MLE

TBM - please read the letter & tell me after the amount of info that’s come out of the Senate hearings to date - particularly in Glen’s case, that you’re happy with that interim report. If she’s a “friend” I’d hate to have her as an enemy! It’s a totally dismissive piece of correspondence - in my opinion anyway...

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Sunfish

The letter is a pro forma one to ensure the Committee is not in contempt of the Senate. They have reported......that their report is not finished. It signifies nothing. There will be many others.

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harrryw

Originally Posted by Sunfish View Post

The letter is a pro forma one to ensure the Committee is not in contempt of the Senate. They have reported......that their report is not finished. It signifies nothing. There will be many others.

Of course contempt of the public does not matter? n fairness I do not place ALL the blame on her.

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Sunfish

Harry, have you considered that maybe the Committee has so much excellent material that it is taking a long time to digest? I think its worth the wait.....

 

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

No interim report? Plus St Commode's last 'up yours' Senators?

Ducked it or shoved it? - via the 20/20 inquiry webpages: https://www.aph.gov.au/-/media/Committee...7514212FEA

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10 December 2020
Senator the Hon Scott Ryan
President of the Senate
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Mr President,

On 2 December 2019, the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee
self-referred under Standing Order 25(2)(a) an inquiry into Australia's general aviation industry,
with particular reference to aviation in rural, regional and remote Australia. The committee agreed
to an interim report on or before the final sitting day in December 2020, and a final report date on or
before the final sitting day of November 2021.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the inquiry has not progressed as far as the committee had
intended. The committee therefore submits this letter to satisfy the committee's commitment to
report back to the Senate.

Yours sincerely

Senator Susan McDonald
Chair

---

Also from the 'Additional Documents' webpage possibly (hopefully) the last 'spin and bollocks' correspondence to the committee from the much maligned St Commode (note that this was posted weeks after the 20 November public hearing - ??? )...  :

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P2 Addendum to above -   

1  Correspondence dated 2 and 5 November 2020 between Mr Shane Carmody, Chief Executive Officer and Director of Aviation Safety, Civil Aviation Authority, and to Senator Susan McDonald, RRAT Legislation Committee Chair.

2 November 2020

Mr Shane Carmody
Chief Executive Officer
Civil Aviation Safety Authority

Via email: ceo@casa.gov.au

Dear Mr Carmody

Aviation Safety Advisory Panel

I write to you on behalf of the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation
Committee (the committee), to bring to your attention to concerns raised with members of the
committee around the makeup of the Aviation Safety Advisory Panel.

Various stakeholders have raised that there are currently no pilots' representatives on the Panel.
Given the Panel's Terms of Reference stipulates that the CEO will 'seek membership
nominations in order to establish the widest possible industry representation and expertise', a
lack of a pilots' representative seems to indicate a significant gap in that expertise.

The committee would be grateful if you could respond to the concerns raised, and explain how
CASA is ensuring all stakeholders' perspectives are represented given this apparent substantial
omission.

If you have any questions concerning this request, please contact the committee's secretariat on
02 6277 3511.

Yours sincerely,

Senator Susan McDonald
Chair

Once again remember that the above correspondence and the outright contemptible reply from St Comodious took place more than 2 weeks before the Senate Inquiry public hearing - 

I guess Senator McDonald could have been less generalised  than "no pilots' representatives" but even Blind Freddy could see that the committee was asking the question on behalf of associations representing both professional and private pilots/owners.

MTF...P2 

ps Thank you to the good and helpful Secretariat for including the committee correspondence to St Comodious - 

[Peetwo]

CASA's Aviation Safety Committee - 

While trolling the 2019-20 CASA Annual Report off this link - https://www.transparency.gov.au/annual-r...2019-20-21 - and referring to 'Part 2 - Annual Performance Statement' under the laughable subheading 'Goal 1 - Maintain and enhance a fair, effective and efficient aviation safety regulation system,' I came across the following interesting revelations (my bold) ??

Measure of success
CASA has effective systems in place to respond to emerging trends in aviation safety risk

On track
 CASA’s Aviation Safety Committee (ASC) continually reviewed data from a variety of sources to inform its decision-making and approach to surveillance and proposed policy development. Aviation safety data and trends were presented and discussed at ASC and CASA Board meetings.

The ASC produced 11 sector safety risk profiles, which are in various stages of completion in accordance with the Sector Safety Risk Profile Program. The program further informs surveillance planning through the National Surveillance Selection Plan. The governance of aviation regulatory and safety risk is managed by the ASC. The ASC met 11 times during the reporting period. The ASC reviews civil aviation safety incidents and accidents and surveillance findings which can lead to the revision of the sector safety risk profiles and/or the launch of sector-specific education activities. 

The ASC- WTD? Personally I had never heard of what is potentially a very influential and powerful internal CASA committee? After much searching for additional references, including off the CASA website itself I ended up stumped. Thinking it was merely my ignorance I then decided to do the ring around and to this point in time I am yet to find anyone with industry cred that has any knowledge of this important (secret squirrel) committee?

Given the pivotal role this committee has, maybe it is time for the RRAT committee (in particular Sic'em'Rex with his FOI knowledge) to ask the questions on the ASC? 

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

Dear reader.

May I suggest that before you contemplate reading this post; you consider the advice provided – HERE. Our very own, much treasured Terrier has, once again, been hard 'at it'. Verbatim I do quote him - “Go to Part 2 Goal 1 and scroll to the 3rd excerpt starting with 'On track'.”

As is his wont; he has been digging about (again) the cryptic message landed with a link to the following – HERE-.

“CASA’s Aviation Safety Committee (ASC) continually reviewed data from a variety of sources to inform its decision-making and approach to surveillance and proposed policy development. Aviation safety data and trends were presented and discussed at ASC and CASA Board meetings.”



“The ASC produced 11 sector safety risk profiles, which are in various stages of completion in accordance with the Sector Safety Risk Profile Program. The program further informs surveillance planning through the National Surveillance Selection Plan. The governance of aviation regulatory and safety risk is managed by the ASC. The ASC met 11 times during the reporting period. The ASC reviews civil aviation safety incidents and accidents and surveillance findings which can lead to the revision of the sector safety risk profiles and/or the launch of sector-specific education activities.”

So, who are these masked men? Where are the minutes? Where are the findings? What 'matters' have been dealt with? The short answer is we have NDI.

“Sector risk profile” is a big deal. IMO it is the nuts and bolts on which 'risk' may be managed and should not  be placed in the hands of those who have no knowledge of the inherent and operational 'risks'; in short, a matter best left to the experts in the field. Take for example a 'long line' heavy sling load from a helicopter, being delivered to a tall building 'downtown'. The potential for catastrophe is immediately apparent. The vast amount of technical and aeronautical experience required can only be gained through 'experience' – on task. I defy anyone who has not 'been there – done that' to identify each and every 'risk' nuance; let alone define a rule set and 'method' of getting a job done without a 'hiccup' – operational or legal.

So, to clearly identify a 'sector risk' and to define risk mitigation, seems to me that the experts in the field should hold a seat at the top table and have a say. It is also seems reasonable that the 'results' of such a gab-fest should be made publicly available; published and identify those making the decisions which benefit all.

The costs associated with an Aviation Safety Committee are borne by industry. Their deliberations are important to industry. It begs the questions; who are they, and what have they produced of value (intrinsic or otherwise) to the aviation industry? We don't know. Time we did, methinks. Perhaps an FOI request for the minutes of meetings (all 11 of 'em) would be in order. That will be fun – won't it?

Toot – toot. + MTF.

[Peetwo]

20/20 update: CASA AQON - 

Via Additional Docs page: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus..._Documents

(Warning: > than 30% probability that a bucket will be required   )

Question 1. I want to know what CASA has actually done. Maybe you can take this on notice and spell out: 'The legislation passed. That caused the board to do this. That flowed down to this activity being carried out and these new KPIs being set.' Maybe that can be done on notice.

Immediately after the legislation was passed, guidance was issued to CASA management and staff outlining the implications of the amendment, including its applicability and the legal meaning of terms. The CASA Board had previously been informed about the anticipated amendment and its implications. In parallel with the issuing of the guidance mentioned above, CASA initiated a review to refine the process for the development of aviation safety standards in the Standards Development Procedures Manual.

CASA also developed and promulgated additional guidance for staff involved in the development of new aviation safety standards providing a means for documenting the consideration of industry sector risk and economic and cost impact. Over time, the principles reflected in this guidance will foster the standardisation of the way in which the application of the provisions of subsection 9A(3) of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 are managed.

In the meantime, and as a practical matter, CASA takes the view that, where a Regulation Impact Statement for a new standard has been prepared, that process effectively satisfies the requirements of subsection 9A(3) of the Civil Aviation Act 1988.

Question 2: I'd also like to know any objectives that have now been set.
See response to the question above.

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The web version (3.0) states a review date of July 2020 – is there a later revised version?

No.

2. The first Guiding Principle is that “Aviation safety regulations must be shown to be necessary”.
Does the application of the Directive require that the proponent must formally state specifically what the “known or likely safety risks” is?

No, a proponent is not required to formally state specifically the “known or likely safety risks”. However, in making a submission for improvement, a proponent is invited to provide an explanation of the probable risks in the event the proposal does not proceed and a description of the scope of the risk/s to be managed. The application of the Directive involves active consideration by CASA to assess the necessity for a change to Aviation safety regulations, having regard to whether a proposal has articulated an identified safety risk or gap.

Does it also require a formal statement outlining why the risk “cannot be addressed effectively by non-regulatory means alone”?

No, a proponent is not required to make a formal statement outlining why a risk “cannot be addressed effectively by non-regulatory means alone”. However, application of the Directive involves active consideration by CASA to assess the necessity for a change to Aviation safety regulations, having regard to whether the proposal can be addressed by non-legislative means.

3a. The second Guiding Principle states that “every proposed regulation must be assessed against the contribution it will make to aviation safety”. Are those assessments formalised?

Application of the Directive involves a consideration by CASA of the desired outcome to be obtained by addressing the change described in a proposal for regulatory change, which may include articulation of the contribution a change may make to aviation safety. As required, the economic and cost impact of a proposed change is assessed by CASA and a regulation impact statement is produced for review by the Office of Best Practice Regulation.

3b. If so, is the level of detail consistent with the level of detail that CASA demands of industry applications?

The level of detail required for industry to meet the threshold for assessment of an application or for CASA to complete an assessment of the matters addressed in the Directive will be variable and proportionate to the relevant application (in the case of industry) or proposed regulatory change (in the case of CASA).

3c. If not, how does CASA maintain corporate knowledge of those assessments and their outcomes?

CASA maintains records in accordance with Australian Government requirements.

...  

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Submission 52; next hearing; and the Scot's Git Acting DAS?? - 

From the 20/20 Inquiry webpages:

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52 Sport Aircraft Flight Academy (PDF 187 KB) 

Next: Upcoming Public Hearings - 28 Jan 2021 QLD 

Finally a heads up for the RRAT Committee Senators if you don't want wholesale mutiny against you from industry you need to put a stop to the aspirations of the Scot's Git to be the next DAS..

Via Oz Flying:

 

CASA appoints Acting Director of Aviation Safety

14 January 2021
Comments 0 Comments


CASA has appointed Group Executive Manager Aviation Graeme Crawford to the position of Acting Director of Aviation Safety (DAS) and CEO until the position can be filled permanently.

Former CEO Shane Carmody left CASA at the end of last year after electing not to renew his contract. The CASA board had not selected a successor before his departure.

"In 2021 Crawford will maintain the focus on the transition of the sectors within the aviation industry to the new flight operations regulations, CASA’s continued organisational transformation, the on-going effective consultation with the Aviation Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) and their Technical Work Groups (TWG) and the evolution of CASA’s culture to become more inclusive," a CASA statement says.

Crawford started his aviation career at Rolls-Royce in Scotland in 1979, and has since held management positions with  Qantas, Pratt & Whitney, Goodrich Aerospace, Air Canada and General Electric. Prior to immigrating to Australia in 2007, he ran commercial aviation operations in Norway, USA, Canada and Scotland.

Crawford is thought to be one of only two people left on the short list to replace Shane Carmody, with some industry commentators believing his appointment as Acting DAS puts him in the box seat to take on the role permanently.

Harden up Senators time to sharpen up the knives in readiness to cut out the evil heart of the CASA Iron Ring and send the likes of the Scot's Git off to the knackers...

MTF...P2

[P7_TOM]

Exodus imminent. 

P2 - “Finally a heads up for the RRAT Committee Senators if you don't want wholesale mutiny against you from industry you need to put a stop to the aspirations of the Scots Git to be the next DAS.

Nah mate, IMO no one has enough puff left for a mutiny – that takes effort, unity and energy. IMO it'll be the same deal as Pharaoh got; when the Israelites folded their tents and buggered off. If and it is a huge IF Crawford did get get the gig, I reckon you'll see an exodus from industry and probably hear a large 'Bang' from Big Q. Smart operators will simply set up shop in NZ and the rest will simply continue to shrink away.

It is to be hoped that the Committee fully realises that the industry is teetering on the very brink of the abyss; so finely balanced that an ill timed fart could blow it over the edge. We may survive the Covid thing but the Crawford thing ain't a cure for what ails this industry. There is a thirty year record detailing why this industry is floundering; there is a record of similar length which reflects not only government inaction and lack of understanding, but the continuing selection of the 'wrong' man (yes, yes or woman) to run the administration. For it is an administration; industry are the 'safety' authority. 

But then, even some of the good selections have been undermined and distracted by the forces within the organisation. It is to this sub strata attention must be paid, before the right person walks into the office; a long time before. The infestation is a chronic one; send in the pest control first.

My two bob's worth.

[Peetwo]

Scot's Git timeline of regulatory incompetence and psychopathic tendencies?? 

2017:

Wingnut on hols, GGG in charge - God help us! 

(GGG: Graeme the Glaswegian Git)

Remember this from last Estimates?

2018: 

While the wingnut is away? - Deputy dog adds fuel to the conflagration...   

Ps Who in their right mind would leave a narcissistic sociopath of this caliber in charge of the Fort?

Hmm...wonder if he has got McComic's mobile number on speed dial? Certainly has many of the pugmarks of former DAS don't you think? How long will it be before this IR stooge starts swinging his dick and dragging up section 9A of the Act... 

Perhaps this is why the FF enforcement manual still contains McComic's moniker on the Director's preface -  

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CASA acting chief Graeme Crawford hits back over reform claims

&.. http://www.australianflying.com.au/lates...tion-on-ga

Comment:

Dave • 2 years ago
So let’s, just for a moment, take Graeme’s statement at face value and agree he believes he is telling the truth.

Not once does he mention cost. Under the WHS 2011 Act, which should govern these things, and be the reason we have “safety regulations” the very last step is to look at the cost of implementing, in this case, regulations. This is the final test of reasonableness of a regulation. Even above he makes no mention that the cost of any regulation is made. Therefore in my mind, he shoots his own argument in the foot. CASA may not have it as a goal to murder GA in this country, but through their own, as stated position on how they regulate in his release above, they achieve the killing of GA because they do not understand or take into account what is reasonable.

Further he states those outside of aviation must have trust in GA. Once again he shows zero understanding that the problem is not with those outside of GA, it is those inside GA.

And then the arrogance to hold up the Basic Class 2 med, in its current form, which is just as onerous, and more so in some areas (such as hearing) than a standard class 2 med, seals his own coffin shut on his understanding of GA.

Graeme, you should hang your head in shame for your comments, as you clearly have zero understanding of GA and what a good and decent regulator that finds a reasonable balance between cost and safety should achieve.

CASA’s regulation of GA on the world stage in an anomaly, and in short it should be completely shut down and a new regulator, with new regs - based on US FAR’s - and more importantly with new people, should be stood up. It is time for a clean sweep. The people have had enough of your complete and utter lack of understanding of GA and you insistence that you are doing it right. The evidence is 100% clear, CASA is a failure.

---

LMH 27/07/18 - Deputy dog's bollocks; Rustle's report; & Bathurst airport win. 

I am not sure CASA coming out and defending itself against accusations of having an anti-GA agenda is a brilliant tactic; they'd be better off just getting on with the job. This week acting CEO Graeme Crawford went there again, and even though the sentiments might be valid, doing so has drawn even more derision. The reason is that the industry still remembers historical instances that could be explained away only by an anti-GA agenda or simply a lack of expertise. Many of these cases remain unresolved through lack of acknowledgment that CASA's treatment of good people was harsh at best and devious at worst. No words are ever going to substitute for corrective action, and a simple statement "No, we're really goodfellas" is tantamount to sticking a finger in a wound yet to heal. The other issue is that ultimately CASA says something that is either inaccurate or causes more wounds. In this case, the newsletter said "We use available aviation sector information such as accident and incident data, surveillance findings and sector risk profiles to develop informed solutions." It's hard to accept that as accurate in the light of the new fuel rules that will apply from November. Not only has CASA not shown their working out on this, but the solution seems to create more problems than it addresses, which hints at guesswork. And if CASA really operated using sector information, they couldn't possibly have come up with the legendary debacle known as CASR Part 61. With all this in hand, the general aviation community is not listening anymore, but it is watching. Words aren't worth actions, and actions are what GA is looking for. There are signs that CASA is starting to take note of the damage its policies have caused in the past, but there's a long way to go yet. We need to get into a position where the GA community tells CASA they're goodfellas, not the other way around.

---

Janus – the two faced god.

“Occasionally words must serve to veil the facts. But let this happen in such a way that no one become aware of it; or, if it should be noticed, excuses must be at hand to be produced immediately.”

Hitch – “I am not sure CASA coming out and defending itself against accusations of having an anti-GA agenda is a brilliant tactic; they'd be better off just getting on with the job. This week acting CEO Graeme Crawford went there again etc.”

When I read in a report, words like those in the Hitch opening sentence (above), I’m never sure whether to grab the AP bucket first - or the key-board. Tragedy it would be,  should I mix up the actions.

Hitch – “doing so has drawn even more derision.

There is only one way to deal with a creature like Crawford. If I ask nicely, I’m fairly sure P2 can provide a whole range of Hansard video featuring the man who is defending the CASA actions. Watch and study first – then, decide whether you believe if this man has the best interests of the industry at heart - or not...

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Commentary addendum  

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And I am just getting warmed up - MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

The Scot Git - Man at the back of the room?? 

Hansard extract: 

"...I would make the point, and I can back this up, that Mr Buckley indicated that the transition from one team to another was the beginning of the change. A number of senators have referred to that. I won't refer to the team leader's name, who has since left the organisation. What I will tell you is that the team leader applied repeatedly from 2015 to 2018 to be removed from the supervision of Mr Buckley's case because he felt that his team was wilting under the demands and behaviours of Mr Buckley and he felt that his team was captured. So he went to his supervisor and asked that Mr Buckley's matter be allocated to another team, and it was allocated to another team, and it was looked at a lot harder. Now, the fact is that Mr Buckley will say that he had a very pleasant journey with CASA employees over a number of years designing his future. The CASA employees didn't quite see it that way. The CASA employees got to the end of that process and felt that they were not delivering the right outcome, and they asked to be removed from that..."

Now in pictures listen while keeping your eye on the 'man at the back of the room'...

You're now probably thinking that I've lost my marbles (I know too late for that -  ) but there is a point when you consider the following extracts from this PDF file: GB16 GRAEME CRAWFORD 16 of 18

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Also consider the email correspondence between the 'team leader' and GB within the period mentioned by the former DAS (patron Saint of Australian Aviation Safety) St Carmodious:

"..What I will tell you is that the team leader applied repeatedly from 2015 to 2018 to be removed from the supervision of Mr Buckley's case because he felt that his team was wilting under the demands and behaviours of Mr Buckley and he felt that his team was captured..."

Ref: GB8 JOHN COSTA 8 OF 18

Q1/ Now with all of that in mind wouldn't you have thought, that given Crawford's position as topdog of all flight inspectorate staff, that if there was any truth to the St Carmodious allegations then he would have conveyed those concerns with at least some mild form of rebuke to GB?

Q2/ If there was/or wasn't any truth to the St Carmodious allegations, wasn't Crawford obliged to either back up/or correct the record while being in attendance as a witness to the Senate GA inquiry?

MTF...P2 

[Sandy Reith]

"..What I will tell you is that the team leader applied repeatedly from 2015 to 2018 to be removed from the supervision of Mr Buckley's case because he felt that his team was wilting under the demands and behaviours of Mr Buckley and he felt that his team was captured..."

In my 55 years of flying, including my professional career in General Aviation(GA), one occasionally comes across a bureaucratic piece of outstanding nonsense. Poor darlings, do you for one minute think that any sane person with even a cursory knowledge of the art of deviation and obscurantism would swallow this pathetic excuse for what might well go down in the annals of Australia’s GA as the greatest worse example of bureaucratic bungling and embuggerence in Australia’s history?

Hard to believe to believe the stupidity, hubris and downright fascist behaviour of a Commonwealth instrumentality, albeit the notorious and ill fated experiment of thirty two years known as the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. The extraordinary salary factory that has wasted a whole industry, cost thousands of GA jobs and businesses and denied countless Australians the badly needed services of a healthy GA industry.

[Kharon]

You have the right to remain silent.

Sandy - “In my 55 years of flying, including my professional career in General Aviation(GA), one occasionally comes across a bureaucratic piece of outstanding nonsense. Poor darlings, do you for one minute think that any sane person with even a cursory knowledge of the art of deviation and obscurantism would swallow this pathetic excuse for what might well go down in the annals of Australia’s GA as the greatest worse example of bureaucratic bungling and embuggerence in Australia’s history?”

Now it is a painful chore; to plough through the raft of correspondence in the 'Buckley Files' – there is a lot of mind numbing stuff to digest and consider. But, there are rewards to be winnowed from the chaff.

"..What I will tell you is that the team leader applied repeatedly from 2015 to 2018 to be removed from the supervision of Mr Buckley's case because he felt that his team was wilting under the demands and behaviours of Mr Buckley and he felt that his team was captured..." etc..

The 'he said – she said' of the Carmody v Buckley bout must be resolved; its a tough knot to untangle – but (in plain language) there is too much embroidery about the facts and far too much wriggle room for a jury to form an unbiased opinion. However; it can, with patience, be resolved. IMO, the Committee must place a Mr. John Costa and Crawford 'on the stand' under oath. In camera if need be. Both men have remained, as is their right, silent. A quick skim read of the Buckley – Crawford correspondence file contradicts almost all of the Carmody statement made at the last hearing. Reading through it all, one gets a sense that it is almost 'too informal'. Certainly not the usual run of the mill stuff between an operator and CASA; which is mostly kept very 'formal' and to the point. I digress.

The Crawford silence from the back row is significant as is the body language. One wonders, had the Committee called him to speak, if the right questions were asked how close toward actual perjury he would have dared sail, even with Aleck whispering in his ear.

There was a tipping point; it coincides with a number of as yet unexplained 'coincidences' which cast a shadow over some ministerial activities, such as doing advertorials for SOAR. Buckley stood well positioned to put a serious dent in the SOAR bubble. Sure, speculation and supposition – but it is a bucket that needs to be examined. In fact there are several buckets which the Committee must examine if there is indeed a political will to arrive at a point where we need have no more Senate inquiry into the pigs ear known as the CASA. The experiment has failed – Asking the right questions will see us arrive at a point beyond reasonable doubt.

Toot – toot. (MTF is a safe bet).

[Peetwo]

Upcoming hearings - Brisvegas

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Thu, 28 Jan 2021
Australia's general aviation industry
BRISBANE, QLD

Time:11:15 AM - 4:00 PM
Location: Royal on the Park, Brisbane, QLD
Contact: Committee Secretary, Phone: +61 2 6277 3511, Email: rrat.sen@aph.gov.au





(Note fm P2: Sterlo's inquiry will take evidence from the AFAP after Sen McDonald's hearing adjourns)   




Fri, 29 Jan 2021
The future of Australia’s aviation sector, in the context of COVID-19 and conditions post pandemic
BRISBANE, QLD

Time:10:00 AM - 4:15 PM
Location: Royal on the Park, Brisbane, QLD
Contact: Committee Secretary, Phone: +61 2 6277 3511, Email: rrat.sen@aph.gov.au

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MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Upcoming hearings - Brisvegas

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Thu, 28 Jan 2021
Australia's general aviation industry
BRISBANE, QLD

Time:11:15 AM - 4:00 PM
Location: Royal on the Park, Brisbane, QLD
Contact: Committee Secretary, Phone: +61 2 6277 3511, Email: rrat.sen@aph.gov.au



(Note fm P2: Sterlo's inquiry will take evidence from the AFAP after Sen McDonald's hearing adjourns)  


Fri, 29 Jan 2021
The future of Australia’s aviation sector, in the context of COVID-19 and conditions post pandemic
BRISBANE, QLD

Time:10:00 AM - 4:15 PM
Location: Royal on the Park, Brisbane, QLD
Contact: Committee Secretary, Phone: +61 2 6277 3511, Email: rrat.sen@aph.gov.au

Update:

Not yet sure whether the Brisvegas hearing today will be televised or be audio only?

However the following is the link for the live proceedings starting from 12:15 EDST :

28/01/2021
12:15AM - 5:00PM AEDT

Senate, Rural & Regional Affairs & Transport Legislation Committee (Australia`s general aviation industry (Brisbane, QLD)) Live

I also note that yesterday in the inquiry additional documents webpage there was added some further answers, to Senator Sterle's written QON, from the CASA Iron Ring (Dr Aleck) that perfectly highlights that there will be no compromise/reform from the current regime's  overbearing, complex and archaic regulatory philosophy - 

Ref: 4  Answers to written questions on notice by CASA taken on 11 January 2021 from Senator Sterle. Received on 27 January 2021.  

---

Questions on notice

Questions to be asked to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) for the Rural and Regional Affairs
and Transport Committee Inquiry into:

The current state of Australia’s general aviation industry.

Background

In 2014 the Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASRR) made 37 recommendations for the Australian
Government to consider. Only recommendation 20 was not agreed to by the government.

The following questions on notice are with reference to recommendations 30 and 31, which are:

1. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes the current two-tier regulatory framework (act and
regulations) to a three-tier structure (act, regulations and standards), with:
(a) regulations drafted in a high-level, succinct style, containing provisions for enabling
standards and necessary legislative provisions, including offences
(b) the third-tier standards drafted in plain, easy to understand language.
2. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority structures all regulations not yet made with the three-tier
approach, and subsequently reviews all other Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Parts (in
consultation with industry) to determine if they should be remade using the three-tier
structure.

Furthermore, many submissions to this inquiry make reference to the complexity and difficulties with
comprehension of the current regulations, including the recently developed CASRs and their
associated Manual of Standards (MOS).

Questions on notice:

1. Does CASA acknowledge that regulatory complexity and difficulties with comprehension of regulations
and standards relate to ASRR recommendation 30 (b)?

CASA is aware that some aviation stakeholders can be frustrated by the complexity of civil aviation
legislation as a whole or with parts of the three tiers of legislation. However, CASA consults all
proposed legislation with industry providing the opportunity for any feedback to be incorporated in the
final legislation where possible.

2. Regarding regulatory complexity and comprehension issues, including the time lost for the
stakeholder’s activities due to this, does CASA acknowledge the legitimacy of the frustrations from
aviation stakeholders and that these relate directly to a divergence by CASA to ASRR recommendation
30 (b) and to paragraph 1 © of s9 of the Civil Aviation Act (1988)?

Refer response to Question 1. In addition, CASA does not agree it has diverged from paragraph 9(1)©
of the Civil Aviation Act and considers we have acted in accordance with the Government’s in-principle
agreement of ASRR recommendation 30(b) and notes that implementation of this recommendation is
continuing.

3. Does CASA acknowledge that the cost impact expressed by many aviation stakeholders is referenced
to and due this complexity of regulations and standards, and that the time wastage and lost economic
activity resulting is a significant cost impact to their activities?

CASA acknowledges that complexity in regulations and other aviation safety standards will in some
cases have an unavoidable cost impact on stakeholders. However, CASA does not agree that this
impact is generally of a significant nature or that time and economic ‘loss’ is fairly attributable to
compliance with unnecessarily complex regulatory requirements.

4. Does CASA include lost time and lost economic activity in its cost impact considerations and if so, how
does CASA make this assessment and will CASA provide detail as to how it calculates and includes the
cost of lost-time and lost business opportunities into its cost impact considerations and calculations?

CASA prepares a Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) for any new or amendment regulation or standard
that may have a significant cost impact on stakeholders. The RIS outlines the total cost impact of the
new or amended regulation, including the cost of lost time for business to comply with the regulatory
requirements. This involves estimating the time that affected businesses are required to devote to
complying with the new or amended regulation. RIS and the incorporated estimates for cost of lost
time are reviewed and assessed by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

5. Given that CASA has actually moved to a four-tier model of regulatory structure, with the fourth-tier
including the development and promulgation of plain English language guides, will CASA acknowledge
that this is evidence that the third-tier, Manual of Standards, have not been developed and
promulgated in “plain, easy to understand language”?

CASA has not moved to a ‘four tier’ model of regulatory structure as guidance material including Plain
English Guides (PEGs) are not the law. The PEGS are a CASA initiative to provide a convenient, simple
and consolidated summary of the rules using graphic illustrations and other aids to help facilitate
another means of understanding for the relevant legislative requirements.

6. Can CASA explain and detail what aviation stakeholder consultation they conducted in order to
establish aviation sector support for such a departure from adopting ASRR recommendation 30 (b)?

CASA’s responses to questions 1, 2 and 5 confirm that CASA continues to act in accordance with the
Government’s in-principle agreement of ASRR recommendation 30(b).

---

Hmm...the above again simply confirms that it is high time that Dr Aleck gathered up his remaining marbles and ASAP frog marched from the building (Aviation House) - 

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Update: 29/01/20

Ref: ...I also note that yesterday in the inquiry additional documents webpage there was added some further answers, to Senator Sterle's written QON, from the CASA Iron Ring (Dr Aleck) that perfectly highlights that there will be no compromise/reform from the current regime's  overbearing, complex and archaic regulatory philosophy - 

---

Ref: 4  Answers to written questions on notice by CASA taken on 11 January 2021 from Senator Sterle. Received on 27 January 2021.  

---

Questions on notice

Questions to be asked to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) for the Rural and Regional Affairs
and Transport Committee Inquiry into:

The current state of Australia’s general aviation industry.

Background

In 2014 the Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASRR) made 37 recommendations for the Australian
Government to consider. Only recommendation 20 was not agreed to by the government.

The following questions on notice are with reference to recommendations 30 and 31, which are:

1. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes the current two-tier regulatory framework (act and
regulations) to a three-tier structure (act, regulations and standards), with:
(a) regulations drafted in a high-level, succinct style, containing provisions for enabling
standards and necessary legislative provisions, including offences
(b) the third-tier standards drafted in plain, easy to understand language.
2. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority structures all regulations not yet made with the three-tier
approach, and subsequently reviews all other Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Parts (in
consultation with industry) to determine if they should be remade using the three-tier
structure.

Furthermore, many submissions to this inquiry make reference to the complexity and difficulties with
comprehension of the current regulations, including the recently developed CASRs and their
associated Manual of Standards (MOS).

Questions on notice:

1. Does CASA acknowledge that regulatory complexity and difficulties with comprehension of regulations
and standards relate to ASRR recommendation 30 (b)?

CASA is aware that some aviation stakeholders can be frustrated by the complexity of civil aviation
legislation as a whole or with parts of the three tiers of legislation. However, CASA consults all
proposed legislation with industry providing the opportunity for any feedback to be incorporated in the
final legislation where possible.

2. Regarding regulatory complexity and comprehension issues, including the time lost for the
stakeholder’s activities due to this, does CASA acknowledge the legitimacy of the frustrations from
aviation stakeholders and that these relate directly to a divergence by CASA to ASRR recommendation
30 (b) and to paragraph 1 © of s9 of the Civil Aviation Act (1988)?

Refer response to Question 1. In addition, CASA does not agree it has diverged from paragraph 9(1)©
of the Civil Aviation Act and considers we have acted in accordance with the Government’s in-principle
agreement of ASRR recommendation 30(b) and notes that implementation of this recommendation is
continuing.

3. Does CASA acknowledge that the cost impact expressed by many aviation stakeholders is referenced
to and due this complexity of regulations and standards, and that the time wastage and lost economic
activity resulting is a significant cost impact to their activities?

CASA acknowledges that complexity in regulations and other aviation safety standards will in some
cases have an unavoidable cost impact on stakeholders. However, CASA does not agree that this
impact is generally of a significant nature or that time and economic ‘loss’ is fairly attributable to
compliance with unnecessarily complex regulatory requirements.

4. Does CASA include lost time and lost economic activity in its cost impact considerations and if so, how
does CASA make this assessment and will CASA provide detail as to how it calculates and includes the
cost of lost-time and lost business opportunities into its cost impact considerations and calculations?

CASA prepares a Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) for any new or amendment regulation or standard
that may have a significant cost impact on stakeholders. The RIS outlines the total cost impact of the
new or amended regulation, including the cost of lost time for business to comply with the regulatory
requirements. This involves estimating the time that affected businesses are required to devote to
complying with the new or amended regulation. RIS and the incorporated estimates for cost of lost
time are reviewed and assessed by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

5. Given that CASA has actually moved to a four-tier model of regulatory structure, with the fourth-tier
including the development and promulgation of plain English language guides, will CASA acknowledge
that this is evidence that the third-tier, Manual of Standards, have not been developed and
promulgated in “plain, easy to understand language”?

CASA has not moved to a ‘four tier’ model of regulatory structure as guidance material including Plain
English Guides (PEGs) are not the law. The PEGS are a CASA initiative to provide a convenient, simple
and consolidated summary of the rules using graphic illustrations and other aids to help facilitate
another means of understanding for the relevant legislative requirements.

6. Can CASA explain and detail what aviation stakeholder consultation they conducted in order to
establish aviation sector support for such a departure from adopting ASRR recommendation 30 (b)?

CASA’s responses to questions 1, 2 and 5 confirm that CASA continues to act in accordance with the
Government’s in-principle agreement of ASRR recommendation 30(b).

---

Follow up to above...

Via Oz Flying yesterday:

Impact of Complex Regulation not Significant: CASA
28 January 2021



The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has told the Senate Inquiry into the General Aviation industry that complexity in regulations has not had a significant impact on stakeholders, according to a statement made public yesterday.

The statement comes in a reply to a question on notice asked by Senator Glenn Sterle in the inquiry in November regarding regulation complexity and the burden on operators and pilots.

"Does CASA acknowledge that the cost impact expressed by many aviation stakeholders is referenced to and due this complexity of regulations and standards, and that the time wastage and lost economic activity resulting is a significant cost impact to their activities?", Senator Sterle asked.

"CASA acknowledges that complexity in regulations and other aviation safety standards will in some cases have an unavoidable cost impact on stakeholders," the response said. "However, CASA does not agree that this impact is generally of a significant nature or that time and economic ‘loss’ is fairly attributable to compliance with unnecessarily complex regulatory requirements."

Several submissions to the inquiry complained about the impact of complex regulations in terms of time and cost, including John McDermott of McDermott Aviation, who stated that the industry was operating safely even though in many cases it was unknowingly working outside CASA regulations.

Senator Sterle also queried CASA about how it assessed the cost impact of regulations on operators and how that was considered in the rule-making process.

"CASA prepares a Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) for any new or amendment regulation or standard that may have a significant cost impact on stakeholders," CASA replied. "The RIS outlines the total cost impact of the new or amended regulation, including the cost of lost time for business to comply with the regulatory requirements.

"This involves estimating the time that affected businesses are required to devote to complying with the new or amended regulation. RIS and the incorporated estimates for cost of lost time are reviewed and assessed by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet."
The senate inquiry is ongoing and all submissions and replies to questions on notice are on the inquiry webpage.

I also note that in yesterday's 20/20 inquiry public hearing, the AFAP also picked up on the CASA AWQON (above) and made pretty much the same OBS in regards to CASA's opinion that they have implemented and are being compliant with the ASRR (Forsyth report) recommendation 30(a):

30. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes the current two-tier regulatory framework (act and regulations) to a three-tier structure (act, regulations and standards), with:
a. regulations drafted in a high-level, succinct style, containing provisions for enabling
standards and necessary legislative provisions, including offences

Which is totally in direct conflict with historical industry evidence/experience in the preceding 6+years since the former Minister Warren Truss presented the Forsyth ASRR report to the Australian Parliament -    

MTF...P2 

ps Note that CASA's self-serving, self-delusional belief that they have implemented and have been compliant with pretty much all the Rev Forsyth's recommendations dates back to 31 July 2017: https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviati...y_2017.pdf
 

Completed – Implementation Ongoing CASA will continue to focus on new regulations and instruments adhering to Commonwealth legal drafting practices and avoiding inconsistencies with other pieces of relevant legislation. Rules will continue to be prepared in accordance with a three-tier regulatory structure and using easy to understand language. CASA is committed to the remaining reform programme regulations drafted for public and industry consultation by the end of 2018. 

[Kharon]

The mathematics of Doom.

Or, the costs of compliance. It took quite a while to set up, model, define and isolate  the true costs associated with 'compliance' – standing alone for the Australian aviation industry. We are now working that data against the same costs in peer nations – Canada, NZ, PNG and the USA. Of course, there is no way the results can be substantiated across the board. We used a 'model' charter company, mixed fleet, typical (if such exists) 'contract' and ad-hoc work mix of revenue; in short, a typical low capacity charter outfit. Acknowledged, it is a blunt instrument, but we were interested not in specific analysis of any one company, but rather in running the same model under different regimes. One of the more interesting results is the ability to recoup the costs of compliance from operating revenue available. Another is 'profitability' - the ability to repay loans and to attract investment. 

No doubt the results could be decimated by bright young things producing a doctoral thesis, with time and support of a University; but, as stated, warts and all, our results so far clearly define one undeniable fact. Profitless prosperity is about the best result for the Australian model operator.

One of the major contributors to a lack of investment interest is the time and cost involved in establishing certification. Working with 'real data' from various operators, Australian certification establishment costs vary between 4:1 and 2.5:1 more than in comparable countries.

The percentage of that Australian cost dedicated to initial 'compliance' costs is truly alarming, the cost of 'on going' compliance and the costs associated in maintaining that compliance impose a serious financial burden for the Australian model. We conservatively estimate that ongoing compliance costs between 18 to 33% over and above that in comparable regimes. 

Given that the reason for these fiscal and legal burdens is touted as being 'safety oriented', (safe conviction as many say) then any comparison of 'safety' statistics should show Australia well ahead of their peers nations. Alas, it just ain't so.

When you take to total cost of providing the 'regulations' then include the cost of the many 'inquiries' into the regulatory debacle, add the cost of the endless re-drafts, the MoS and the latest make work of converting a regulation into 'plain' English; one arrives at a truly staggering figure, one which could remove a large lump from the national debt. Well North of half a Billion, just to produce the regulations - add the rest to that - and be afraid.

No one would mind if all this improved Australia's safety benchmark to an exemplar for the aviation industry world wide. It does not, quite the reverse IMO.

The solution is both inexpensive and sensible; there will never be a better time to ring in the changes. Adopt a cost effective, operationally sensible set of regulations which do not require a degree in law to truly understand. Australian aviation is shrinking and sinking; even those who are doing well could be doing even better, despite the smaller market demographics. Bring in the NZ rules; see the Australian aviation industry return to full potential and flourish, unafraid of a criminal record for farting in church. Aye, mathematics of doom and harbinger of gloom. Enough already,

Toot – toot.

[Peetwo]

Brisvegas public hearing update, 30/01/21 - Hansard out.. 

Via APH Hansard team:

GA inquiry - Download PDF ; or  HERE.

Sterlo's inquiry - Download PDF ; or HERE.

And to back up the P9 OBS above here is a couple of quotes:

1st from Jabiru Business Manager Mrs Susan Woods' opening statement: 

Mrs Woods : Yes, I'll just go through something I've prepared here. The Jabiru is a very small aircraft that looks much like a scaled-down Cessna 172. You would have seen them at many of the regional airports that you've landed in, although you may not have recognised them. There are approximately a thousand in Australia and another thousand scattered across most countries in the world. The Jabiru makes up about 40 per cent of the aircraft in the sports aviation sector in Australia. Jabiru Aircraft—the company—is unique in that we produce airframes, engines and propellers, as well as having the business of maintenance of both aircraft and engines. We produce and supply spare parts as well. This uniqueness makes it very difficult to fit into the box when it comes to regulations. In the aviation world, the light sport sector is near the bottom of the pecking order, although most of the pilots captaining the aircraft you commute in have learnt to fly in either a light sport aircraft or a general aviation aircraft. Our end of the aviation sector produces the pilots of tomorrow. Aviation plays such an important role in our country because we are such a vast country. It is in the national interest to keep the sector alive.

We found over the years that the labour it took to fill CASA's expectations of documentation to support our production certificates was greater than the time to produce the aircraft. It does not make sense to hold a CASA production certificate for this reason. The production certificate is not a saleable asset at the end of the day anyway, because it can't be transferred to another company without CASA's approval.

Although Jabiru has pursued and achieved CASA's type certification for Jabiru models in the past, it is not something that makes business sense. Holding on to type certificates stifles innovation, and, at the end of the day, the type certificates are worthless because they represent an outdated product. It is unthinkable to undertake certification of any new model aircraft through CASA; it will only lead to financial ruin. CASA does not have to meet monetary deadlines.

Our Civil Aviation Act states:

In exercising its powers and performing its functions, CASA must regard the safety of air navigation as the most important consideration.

There are no words in the act for consideration of the cost of safety or differentiation between acceptable risk of commercial airline travel and acceptable risk of sport aviation. The one set of rules is wielded over all sectors of certified aircraft when it comes to the production of aircraft, engines and propellers.

It is not viable for a manufacturer to operate under the CASA production regulations. All companies that have tried in recent times have failed financially, no matter how good their product. The documentation, compliance and auditing are so draining of resources with little to add to safety.

The only way for us to survive has been to give up our CASA production certificates and exclusively produce to the ASTM airworthiness standards for light sport aircraft and to self-certify our products. That way, CASA is relieved of the liability of certification of our products. This is in keeping with CASA's mission to dump their organisational risk, so is accepted by CASA. Because it is not possible for all the sectors of aviation to deliver airline-levels of safety, CASA has taken measures to shed its exposure to the risk of these other sectors.

In our case, at the end of December 2014, CASA took very public action, without consultation, in the form of a CASA limitation that forced our customers and flying schools, among other things, to sign an acknowledgement that there was a risk of death by flying behind our engines. In so doing, CASA could avoid any risk of litigation concerning past approvals given by CASA. This action was driven by Jonathan Aleck, head of the CASA legal department at the time. This action destroyed many flying schools using our aircraft and almost destroyed us, personally, and our business. We were engaged with CASA constantly for two years, until they gained an understanding of our sector of aviation, at our expense. The limitations were then amended to exempt those aircraft compliant to our manufacturer's instructions, but the limitations still stand today. Every time the expiry date comes up, CASA notify us the day before and reissue it for another three years. The justification given is that it is of no extra burden to operators.

While the CASA limitation is in place, it is hard to assign any value to our business. There is little financial incentive and only a whole lot of liability to carry. Not a great business model.

Dick Smith has been brave enough to speak of affordable safety, but it will be tough for politicians to tackle CASA on allowing compliance to be affordable while there is no charter for CASA to do so. Whenever CASA finds themselves on the back foot, they play the safety card. It trumps everyone else without fail.

That's mainly what I've prepared. I have some background of the company et cetera as well. You can ask about that if there is a need to.

Next from the AFAP's Mr Lachlan Gray...

...We know CASA is now developing plain English-language guides so that people can understand the standards. So whilst they might say, 'It's nice to have, and we're doing it as a nice gesture for the industry to help them along,' surely it would not be necessary if recommendation 30(b) were adopted. Recommendation 31 talks about pivoting the regulations and standards, under development at that point in time, to adopt this new methodology. I would suggest that, if that had occurred, this inquiry probably wouldn't even have been called for in the first place, but here we are.

There's certainly a degree of consistency from people talking about this inconsistency. We have a regulator on one end of the scale saying, 'There's not a problem.' For the record, we've read the responses to the questions on notice, which were supplied by CASA on the 27th of this month—only a couple of days ago—and they believe that they are meeting recommendation 30(b) and section 9 of the act, which talks about developing and promulgating appropriate, clear and concise aviation standards. The regulator believes they're already doing it, whereas the aviation community does not. So here's a real point of challenge for the committee. You've got to eventually work out what you're doing on this point, because you can't have the industry believing one thing's happening or not happening and the regulator being in disagreement with that. We suggest that the aviation community has got it right and CASA could do with a rethink, but we also suggest that they're not going to get there on their own. They're going to need direction, hence the importance of putting in a legislative amendment.

Dr Aleck of CASA, who I have high regard for, mentioned at the 20 November hearing that the 2019 amendment to the act suggested to them that the cost and risk based focus was a prominent thing, because it was in a legislative amendment. It's now in the act. So we suggest for that level of prominence about this need for change to get into CASA. It also needs to be at a legislative amendment level. The intent of that should then be articulated within the explanatory memorandum. Whilst someone who's much more legally pronounced than me might suggest that we need a definition of a system of safety, surely we can articulate the intent of it in the explanatory memorandum so we can truly have outcomes based focus and things can be achieved in the real world, as they need to be.

This complexity of regs lean more towards serving an internal purpose, as legal definitions for CASA. That's my perspective. The act talks about them being appropriate, clear and concise, as I said, but what is appropriate? There are different views from different people. If CASA believes that what they've currently got is appropriate, as they've responded to in question 2 in the questions on notice then maybe we need to provide them clear direction that it's actually not appropriate.

In summarising this, the act doesn't oblige CASA to regulate and develop standards that are based on a system of safety, but it does talk about reviewing the system of safety and promoting it, which we put as a secondary things, because how can you review a system when you've not actually developed it with regs and standards in the first place with a focus on the safety system? It also seems out of kilter. If you were to ask the general public that have watched these air crash investigation shows, they would talk about it as being 'amazing that so many things had to go wrong for that accident to occur'. People just have a general pub sort of knowledge that it's a system—that things need to work together and, if they don't, that's when it breaks. I'm sure that the general public would be a little bit aghast to learn that, in our Civil Aviation Act, there is nothing actually obliging CASA to focus on this. So just as a mere matter of need for correction and prominence, this is what we need to articulate in our Civil Aviation Act.

The next thing I'd like to talk about is governance and accountability. I've heard it mentioned before at this hearing, but I will mention again—and it's articulated in our submission—that the industry complaints commissioner is somewhat circular and points inward toward protection and not in an open circle that helps provide accountability. The ICC reports to the CASA board, and part of the CASA board is the CASA CEO and DAS. Obviously, the CEO of any organisation is the person ultimately responsible for all the decisions and the functions of that organisation, so it's circular that the person who's ultimately responsible also gets to decide the outcome of a review by the industry complaints commissioner. To put it quite simply, we're not fixed on who the ICC reports to but it should be to someone external and not to the board. Alternatively, maybe the CEO of CASA should not be on the board. We've got to break this circle just as a mere principle. I'm not particularly aware of any examples; it just seems like a broken means of accountability.

Speaking of the board, and going back to the 2008 review and inquiry, one of the recommendations that came out of that was to increase the composition of the board, and it was to address the issues that had been raised. But here we are again, 12 or 13 years later, talking about the same things. The obvious question is: was that recommendation and reform actually suited to the purpose for which it was intended? We'd suggest no, because here we are again. Whilst we don't have any issues with particular individuals on there, we also suggest that maybe the composition of it needs to be broadened so there are people there without a vested commercial and financial interest. I'm not saying that everyone on there has, but people with organisational backgrounds, rather than employee based backgrounds, are going to come with a different bent. If you want truth based accountability and direction and people willing to speak freely, you've got to diversify the composition of the board...

Well said that man! -  


MTF? - Yes much! - P2 

[P7_TOM]

Welcome back AFAP.

Pre 1989, almost all of us were members of the AFAP. They had knocked out an 'award' - offered unstinting expert support to those who had 'offended' when they believed there had been an 'unfair' decision made and many of 'the other' good things an association (Union if you like) could provide to the membership. It all got a little untidy in '89 and, to many, the AFAP became a target for the anger generated through the events of that dreadful year; see and avoid became the 'word' – unfair or warranted has been the subject of many, many often heated – 'debates'.

When the smoke cleared a bit and things settled down a bit, the AFAP ran smack bang into another rumour which soured the flavour. True or false I don't know – but, legend has it that a sizeable (important) chunk of mainstream AFAP funding came from CASA membership, with numbers and voting rights. This has never been either denied or qualified; but, over many a casual beer with others (old school and new chums) the legend has 'stuck' - becoming fact through repetition, mindless or otherwise.

The industry, that outside of the airlines needs solid, sane, experienced representation through a body all can have 'faith and trust' in. It is essential. However, it is also essential that the representation be for the members and that membership has faith in that 'voice'.

Only my opinion, but at the last Brisbane Senate Inquiry Hearing (mouthful) the AFAP seemed to have returned to it's roots; presenting plain spoken, logical, well argued truths, those which matter, spoken in a language that the political ears which matter can understand..

I say well done AFAP, my faith restored, the past forgotten and my best wishes for a speedy return to having a full voice, where it matters. Messrs Gray and Diamond proven worthy of industry support. Of course no one can afford the membership fees just now, but give it time. It ain't much of a head scratch to decide between AFAP and AOPA for the 'working' (or not)  (or Wannabe) pilot. 

Gray - "...We know CASA is now developing plain English-language guides so that people can understand the standards. So whilst they might say, 'It's nice to have, and we're doing it as a nice gesture for the industry to help them along,' surely it would not be necessary if recommendation 30(b) were adopted. Recommendation 31 talks about pivoting the regulations and standards, under development at that point in time, to adopt this new methodology. I would suggest that, if that had occurred, this inquiry probably wouldn't even have been called for in the first place, but here we are.

Bravo, well said, nicely done and welcome back – to the melting pot...

[Kharon]

Hansard - Page 9 (14 in PDF).

Enter - Heath, Mr Douglas.

If you missed the broadcast, then it is worth the time to read the few pages featuring Heath. From kick off to stumps the calm, reasoned, logical arguments ring true. It certainly impressed McDonald;

Mr Heath: My comment on that one is that the ASQA requirements at the moment for the issue of a commercial pilot licence, flight instructor rating, instrument rating, do not align with the MOS, which is what CASA and the rest of the industry work with, and it should be a direct alignment to make it relevant.

CHAIR: Great. That's a very specific bit of feedback. I'm very keen that we identify the low-hanging fruit that will make practical changes for industry. So we will take that away as a recommendation. Is there anything more that you want to say about that alignment?


The interview continues in much the same vein; the Chair gathering three specifics in the first five minutes, which will become part of the recommendations made by this committee.

CHAIR: So, again, that could be a recommendation that this committee takes away: a better alignment for the government funding, to fund more suitable certification or to fund the students for longer?

Heath provided the committee with exactly what they need. Not only calm, balanced, logical, considered, understandable answers, but expert solutions. No spin, zero bull-pooh, agenda free. No hysterical gabfest from this fellah; just the facts Ma'am.

CHAIR: We'll certainly reflect that in our recommendations, as to the alignment for government funding and the type of training that they're getting. I want to ask you: what do you see as the big opportunities within general aviation that you'd promote to prospective students that would then encourage them to come and study with you?


Those are the sort of words which the industry needs to hear from an inquiry; the Chair's response to the Heath evidence is showing the 'right way' to assist the good Senator. There is not too much a committee can do with a day full of weeping, wailing and teeth gnashing emotion; most Pollies can see through an agenda driven sales pitch, but even the most dense, disinterested would be hard pressed to deny the common sense solutions provided, backed up by tangible evidence.

Anyway – take the time to read Heath; only a few pages, about half a coffee's worth.

Toot – toot.