(03-18-2019, 06:23 PM)Gobbledock Wrote: Can you imagine if the 737 Max had been designed and built in Australia?? Nah, neither can I. CAsA would never allow the aircraft to be certified by Boeing or in fact even reach test flight mode. In fact, if it was up to CAsA the Wright Brothers would still be trying to get their ‘aeroplane’ concept certified!!
Safe skies are empty skies
Nail on the head GD -
Quote:Exclusive: FAA to overhaul air safety oversight by July - U.S. inspector generalUnlike here in Australia, I get the impression that no matter what heads will roll and reform will happen, with any identified FAA oversight deficiencies of Boeing being sorted ASAP -
David Shepardson, Tracy Rucinski
WASHINGTON/CHICAGO (Reuters) - The Federal Aviation Administration will significantly change its oversight approach to air safety by July 2019, U.S. Transportation Department Inspector General Calvin Scovel said in written testimony reviewed by Reuters ahead of a U.S. Senate panel hearing.
FILE PHOTO: An aerial photo shows several Boeing 737 MAX airplanes grounded at Boeing Field in Seattle, Washington, U.S. March 21, 2019. REUTERS/Lindsey Wasson
At the same hearing, the FAA’s acting administrator, Dan Elwell, will tell a Senate Commerce Committee panel the agency’s oversight approach must “evolve” after two fatal crashes involving Boeing Co 737 MAX passenger jets since October.
The accidents, which killed nearly 350 people, triggered the worldwide grounding of Boeing’s flagship aircraft and ignited a debate over the proper balance between man and machine in piloting the latest version of the 50-year-old 737.
Scovel’s testimony for the hearing, set for Wednesday, says that in response to a 2015 inspector general report, the FAA agreed to improve its oversight of organizations performing certifications on its behalf.
By July the “FAA plans to introduce a new process that represents a significant change in its oversight approach,” Scovel says in his prepared remarks.
“While revamping FAA’s oversight process will be an important step, continued management attention will be key to ensure the agency identifies and monitors the highest-risk areas of aircraft certification,” he wrote, adding that some issues including how pilots get training to respond when automated flight systems require the FAA’s “urgent attention.”
Elwell will also say the 737 MAX will return to service “only when the FAA’s analysis of the facts and technical data indicate that it is appropriate.”
Elwell’s testimony discloses that Boeing first submitted its proposed anti-stall software upgrade to the FAA for certification on Jan. 21 of this year and that the FAA has tested “this enhancement to the 737 MAX flight control system in both the simulator and the aircraft.”
Boeing is expected as early as Wednesday to unveil more details of the software upgrade. The company said Tuesday it would carefully monitor the hearing.
Separately, National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Robert Sumwalt will tell the panel in written testimony that the board is “examining the U.S. design certification process to ensure any deficiencies are captured and addressed, potentially up to and including NTSB safety recommendations.”
Elwell will tell the panel that the FAA “will go wherever the facts lead us, in the interest of safety.” He defended the FAA’s aircraft certification system, but acknowledged it faces challenges.
The 737 MAX is Boeing’s best-selling plane, with orders worth more than $500 billion at list prices.
The software fix will prevent repeated operation of the anti-stall system and will deactivate it if it receives widely conflicting sensor information, Reuters reported. Boeing will also make standard a previously optional warning light.
“The testing, which was conducted by FAA flight test engineers and flight test pilots, included aerodynamic stall
situations and recovery procedures,” Elwell’s testimony says.
In addition to Scovel’s office, federal prosecutors are also investigating the 737 MAX certification.
“As the aerospace system and its components become increasingly more complex, we know that our oversight approach needs to evolve to ensure that the FAA remains the global leader in achieving aviation safety,” Elwell’s testimony will say.
FILE PHOTO: A wing of the Boeing 737 MAX is pictured during a media tour of the Boeing 737 MAX at the Boeing plant in Renton, Washington December 7, 2015. REUTERS/Matt Mills McKnight/File Photo
Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao said on Monday she was naming a blue-ribbon panel to review the FAA’s aircraft certification program.
Elwell’s testimony defends the certification process that allows Boeing or other companies to act as a representative for FAA.
But Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat, said Friday the program “effectively left the fox guarding the hen house.” Elwell’s testimony says the program “is not self-certification; the FAA retains strict oversight authority.”
Quote:Boeing 737 pilots had 40 seconds to avert plane crash
MARCH 28, 2019
[img=188x0]https://cdn.newsapi.com.au/image/v1/a3ccd731f9992d355bf2664fe58e86d3?width=320[/img]
All pilots of Boeing 737 MAX planes will need extra training before they can fly it again, as part of a remedy package.
By ROBYN IRONSIDE
Unwary pilots flying a Boeing 737 Max would have had only 40 seconds to stop a rogue control system sending the plane crashing to the ground, tests on a simulator have suggested.
The tests have given a clearer picture of the last moments of Lion Air flight 610 in October last year, and probably also of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, which crashed on March 10 near Addis Ababa, with a total of 346 people killed. The second of the two crashes prompted the grounding of all 737 Max jets and plunged Boeing into crisis.
The company has invited 200 pilots, airline managers and regulators to Renton, Washington, today where it will unveil software changes that it says fix shortcomings evident when used by less experienced pilots. Crews will have more control over the 737 Max stabiliser system, which Boeing insists is not flawed. Federal prosecutors and congressional investigators are scrutinising the way the system was developed.
On Saturday pilots from five airlines, including American, United and Southwest, visited Renton, where the 737 is built, to test how the aircraft would have responded to the Indonesian situation and to evaluate how it performs with the updated version of the software.
They confirmed that the pilots would have been overwhelmed by the Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, when it kicked in as a result of faulty data from an airflow sensor, The New York Times reported.
The Indonesian pilots were unaware of the existence of MCAS, designed to prevent stalls, because Boeing had not told its customers about it. Tewolde GebreMariam, chief executive of Ethiopian Airlines, has confirmed that the MCAS was operating on the company’s plane when it crashed. After that crash all Boeing pilots were briefed on the system. The US pilots who simulated the MCAS malfunction were surprised by the force with which the electrically powered stabiliser trim system overruled the crew and relentlessly pushed the aircraft’s nose down, The New York Times said.
The system is designed to pitch down when it detects an imminent stall. It operates only when pilots are flying manually with wing flaps retracted, just after take-off.
With no pilot action a rogue MCAS will send the aircraft out of control within 40 seconds, the tests found. Pilots can win a few minutes by counteracting the system with trim switches. The Indonesian pilots did that, the recorders showed, but the system wins by ratcheting the nose down further.
The remedy, which is standard for all stabiliser problems, is to flick two switches that cut power to the stabiliser. The Indonesian crew did not get as far as that as they leafed through a paper manual to troubleshoot their problem. Even with the stabiliser cut, pilots must briskly crank cockpit trim wheels to save the aircraft.
John Cox, a safety consultant and a former 737 pilot, said pilots had little time to understand the emergency. ‘‘There is a limited window to solve this problem, and this crew didn’t even know that this system existed,” he said.
Boeing said that its revised software “incorporates additional limits and safeguards to the system and reduces crew workload’‘. The fix will stop repeated operation of the MCAS and deactivate it if two sensors which measure the angle of oncoming air disagree. A new warning light is to be installed in cockpits to warn of angle-of-attack problems.
The software will take only an hour to install but Boeing, which has 5,000 737 Max aircraft worth $500bn on order, must convince US, European, Canadian and Chinese regulators that the aircraft is airworthy. Airlines have begun cancelling orders for what is Boeing’s best-selling aircraft.
The Times
Quote:NTSB Chairman Says He Might Have Done as Pilots in Fatal 737 Max Crashes Did
March 28, 2019
America’s top transportation safety official, and a former 737 captain told U.S. senators on Wednesday what he might have done if he was in the cockpit of one of the Boeing 737 Maxs that inexplicably and repeatedly went nose down before crashing in Indonesia and Ethiopia.
National Transportation Safety Board Chairman, Robert Sumwalt replied to that hypothetical question saying, “Well, I flew the 737 for 10 years, and I do believe there is a procedure on the Flintstone version of the 737 I flew, a very old 737, but I do believe the first thing I would do is oppose that motion by pulling the yoke back.” At that point, Massachusetts Senator Roger Wicker interrupted Sumwalt and moved on to someone else.
With the world of aviation divided over whether the problem with the 737 Max lies with the airplane or the people flying it, this reply by a former airline pilot steeped in safety and human factors deserves more attention than it got.
Sumwalt is clear that the 737 he flew back when US Airways was still a thing, is notably less sophisticated than the spanking new Max that is all the rage with airlines. But his reply echoes what many pilots, even those flying the Max say they would have done; pulling back on the yoke to bring the airplane’s nose back up. While the investigations are preliminary, it appears that’s exactly what the pilots of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302 did. But without achieving the intended effect.
There’s a tendency among pilots in first world countries to default to the idea that in other parts of the world, pilots just aren’t as proficient. To accept that isn’t just racist, it is unsafe. What else could it mean that FAA acting administrator Daniel Elwell told senators that while the rest of the world was grounding the 737 Max fleet, American pilots were insisting they could safely fly it. And even if that were true, what good does that do travelers in a global industry like air travel? No, the widely accepted standard is that no procedure should rely on only the very best pilots accomplishing it correctly.
Even as the hearings in Washington D.C. were getting underway, Boeing presented to reporters the fixes for the Maneuvering Augmentation Control System on its 737 Max based on what it is learning from the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines investigations.
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- The MCAS will now compare readings from both of the airplane’s AOA sensors rather than just one which was the case previously. MCAS will not operate if the sensors disagree by 5.5 degrees or more with the flaps retracted. Pilots will also be alerted by a display.
- Even if MCAS is activated it will only push the nose down one time. In the Lion Air accident investigators determined that each time the pilots successfully wrestled control, the MCAS triggered again 10 seconds later. Now, there are no failure conditions that will trigger repeated dives.
- Finally, the stabilizer input will never be so strong as to hinder the pilot’s ability to counter-act it. In Lion Air, it is estimated that the pilots had to exert 100 pounds of pressure on the stick. Pilots will always have the ability to override MCAS and manually control the airplane, according to Boeing.
It is too soon to tell if these two accidents, which together killed 346 people, is the result of poor pilot training or a new software system that hid a catastrophic flaw or both or other factors not yet reported. What we do know is that this software was installed on the Max without being disclosed to the pilots who would fly it. That it operated in such a way as to create an unsafe condition that could lead to a crash according to the FAA.
And now the members of the Senate who claim they want to get to the bottom of the 737 Max’s troubles know that the experienced airman who also happens to be the nation’s top dog on safety, understands from his own experience how the pilots on these two airliners might have been undone by the baffling behavior of their brand new airplanes.
[/size]& a Robert J Boser reply off the Flying Lessons Group FB page:
Quote:Robert J. Boser Another interesting but also controversial article, Christine. I agree with this statement in your article:
1) "'...I flew, a very old 737, but I do believe the first thing I would do is oppose that motion by pulling the yoke back.' At that point, Massachusetts Senator Roger Wicker interrupted Sumwalt and moved on to someone else."
I AGREE: Sumwalt should have been allowed to continue his explanation, because there is MUCH MORE to that story. Here are the required memory items for the "runaway stabilizer" on the -300 version of the 737, and for ALL versions of the 737, prior to the MAX airplanes:
I. Runaway Stabilizer
CONTROL COLUMN - HOLD FIRMLY
AUTOPILOT (if engaged) - DISENGAGE
Do not re-engage the autopilot. Control airplane pitch attitude manually with control column and main electric trim as needed
If the Runaway Continues
STAB TRIM CUTOUT SWITCHES (both) - CUTOUT
If the Runaway Continues
STABILIZER TRIM WHEEL - GRASP and HOLD
---------
Sumwalt was correct in saying he would have pulled back on the yoke, as the FIRST ACTION response to an apparent runaway stabilizer situation, namely because that was the FIRST memory item that all 737 pilots have always been trained to know.
IF, and I repeat "IF," the AP was the cause of the stab trimming ND when it shouldn't have, then pulling back on the yoke would stop the AP from continuing to command HS ND trimming. And, that is the reason for the #2 step of that emergency memory item: "AUTOPILOT (if engaged) - DISENGAGE."
Problem solved (Again, IF it happened because the AP had malfunctioned). No more of that emergency procedure need be carried out, other than to hand fly the plane while using the electric trim switches on the pilot's yoke, to adjust the HS trim as needed, thereafter.
However, if the HS stab trim continued to runaway after the AP was turned off, then the NEXT MEMORY step was to turn off BOTH of the stab trim switches, located on the center pedestal. That would have made it impossible for ANY software of any kind to continue to command improper movement of the HS.
And, that is precisely what the LION AIR 610 Captain FAILED TO DO: He did NOT turn off both of the pedestal electric switches as he should have been trained to do. And, apparently the Ethiopian 302 Captain ALSO failed to carry out that EMERGENCY step too. THAT is why BOTH airplanes crashed, because both of those "Third World" Captains failed to turn off those two pedestal switches.
Stating that amounts to a legitimate FACTUAL OBSERVATION and it has NOTHING TO DO WITH "Racism" of any kind.
No more than it being racist statements when pointing out why these flights crashed:
-- AVIANCA, JFK, Jan 25, 1990,
-- Indian Airlines, Bangalore, Feb 14, 1990,
-- KAL, Daegu, June 13, 1991,
-- China Air, HKG, Nov 4, 1993,
-- China Airlines, Nagoya April 26, 1994,
-- The ALMOST CRASH of a KAL 747, Zurich, Sept 22, 1994,
-- Garuda Indonesia, Jakarta, June 13, 1996,
-- KAL, Guam, Aug 6, 1997,
-- China Airlines, Taipei, Taiwan, Feb 16, 1998,
-- KAL 747 freighter, London Stanstead, Dec 22, 1999,
-- Turkish Air, Schiphol Polderbaan, Feb 25, 2009,
-- Asiana 214, SFO on July 6, 2013,
-- Tatarstan Airlines, Russia, Nov 17, 2013,
-- Indonesia Air Asia, Java Sea, Dec 28. 2014,
-- Flydubai , Russia, March 19, 2016.
They all crashed because incompetent (improperly and/or inadequately trained) pilots were at the controls. I could list hordes more of those types of accidents which occurred when incompetent pilots, that were trained with "third world" standards, caused those crashes.
I can also list quite a few accidents, from the olden days, caused by American (USA) pilots acting improperly in the cockpit, and I have done so many times in other articles I have written. But, no one ever gets accused of being "racist" for daring to blame those crashes on incompetent pilots. That kind of allegation seems to only happen if the pilots are not WASPS...
If ANY pilots have not had adequate and proper training and that was a causal factor in any crash, then it is ALWAYS PROPER to point that out, regardless of the ethnicity or gender of the incompetent pilots.
Quote:Congress holds fiery hearings on Boeing 737 Max 8 approvalMTF...P2
UPDATED ON: MARCH 28, 2019 / 1:04 PM / CBS NEWS
https://www.cbsnews.com/video/faa-acting...x-crashes/
Congress held two combative hearings on Wednesday on the FAA's oversight and approval process of the Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft. The Max 8 was the type of plane involved in the deadly crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 in October and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 earlier this month.
Senate embers specifically pressed FAA, NTSB, Transportation Department chiefs for answers about the FAA's approval of Boeing's MCAS anti-stall safety system. Scroll below to read the running update CBS News kept of the hearings held yesterday by two different Senate committees.
Sen. Markey has fiery exchange with FAA head
Sen. Edward Markey, D-Massachusetts, had a fiery exchange with Daniel Elwell, the Acting Administrator of the FAA.
Senator Markey asked him, "Do you believe Boeing's practice of selling the Angle of Attack Indicator and warming lights as separate optional features may have contributed to the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes? Yes or no."
Elwell said, "The AOA is not an optional piece on the airplane. We look at a certification process that we've using for decades, that we've refined over 130 times, is geared toward one thing, the safest possible aircraft --"
"Should all of these safety features been mandatory that could've alerted pilots and mechanics to issues with the sensors? Yes or no," Markey interrupted.
"Senator, safety critical pieces on an aircraft are mandatory, that's what certification does."
"So you don't think they should've been mandatory? Is that what you just said? They should not have been mandatory?"
"Sir, I'm saying that any safety..."
"Yes or no? Should they have been mandatory? Yes or no?"
"Sir, the distinction between what goes in a flight deck and what stays out is a discussion, and whether or not a display is safety critical or not, is a distinction FAA is qualified to make."
FAA head on "duty to warn" about software update after Lion Air crash
Senator Jerry Moran, R-Kansas, asked the FAA's Daniel Elwell if pilots and airlines around the world should have been warned that Boeing was updating the MCAS software on 737 Max planes following the Lion Air Crash in October.
"Is there a corresponding duty to warn either on the part of Boeing corporation or the FAA, either pilots or airlines, a duty to warn that there may be something wrong and a fix is on its way?" Moran asked.
Elwell said nine days after the Lion Air accident, the FAA put out an emergency airworthiness directive to all flying authorities around the world, calling it "a reminder" for pilots of the Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft to follow standard procedures if experiencing a problem with the anti-stall system. But when asked specifically about the software update, he said:
"The software update that you're referring to -- Boeing came to us with this and we talked with them about it, we accepted their applications and began work -- but we determined the issues that this software update was making, the things that it was improving upon for MCAS, did not warrant anything more than the announcement that this was in progress."
FAA, NTSB heads asked what they would have done at the controls
In an exchange with Senator Roger Wicker, R-Mississippi, neither Robert Sumwalt, the chairman of National Transportation Safety Board, nor Daniel Elwell, the FAA acting administrator, could answer how they would have taken control of Lion Air Flight 610, a Boeing 737 Max 8, when the nose of the plane dipped down 21 times before crashing. Both men are certified airline pilots with decades of flying experience between them.
After recounting how the pilots of Lion Air Flight 610 experienced the MCAS system kicking in, pushing the nose down some 21 times, Senator Wicker asked, "What should the pilots have done there?"
NTSB chair Sumwalt answered, "Well, I flew the 737 for 10 years, and I do believe there is a procedure on the Flintstone version of the 737 I flew, a very old 737, but I do believe the first thing you would do is oppose that motion by pulling the yoke back. That should engage the stab break. Now, apparently that feature was not on the Max."
Senator Wicker heard enough and asked, "Mr. Elwell, what should the pilots have done based on 21 times of the system kicking in and pushing the nose down?
"Well, Mr. Chairman I did not fly the 737, so I can only speak to all the different airplanes I flew," Elwell said.
"But I'm actually asking about this aircraft," Senator Wicker said. "Do you know? If you don't know that's fine."
"Sir, I'd have to get back to you on the specific, there is a non-normal checklist," the FAA head said.
Questions about training for faulty sensor readings
FAA Acting Administrator Daniel K. Elwell said he did not believe the certification process of the Boeing 737 Max 8 included training for an angle of attack sensor malfunctioning or the reporting of faulty data in any of the simulated pilot training scenarios.
Senator Ted Cruz, R- Texas, asked, "Mr. Elwell you told Senator Sinema that part of certification was based on pilots flying simulators in multiple different scenarios: did any of those scenarios include Angle of Attack (AOA) sensors malfunctioning and reporting the wrong data?"
Elwell answered, "Sir, I can get an answer for you on that but I don't believe so."
FAA head: "Flight training was not needed"
Senator Krysten Sinema, D-Arizona, asked why information about the MCAS system was not required in pilot training materials for the Boeing 737 Max 8.
The FAA's Elwell began by answering that during new certification there is a Flight Standardization Board of experts, pilots and engineers whose responsibility is to determine if the handling characteristics of a new aircraft require flight training. Elwell said, "What the MCAS did was correct for some very slight modification that the Max had. The Max has slightly larger diameter engines," compared to earlier Boeing 737 models.
The FAA "put pilots in these simulators and fly the aircraft that's being amended and the new aircraft and after many scenarios, flights in all regimes of these pilots, there was a consensus opinion from the pilots, European, American and Canadian pilots, that there was no market difference in the handling characteristics of these two aircraft," he said.
"That is what we need to determine what kind of flight training was not or needed. And there was by the recommendation of the Flight Standardization Board -- understand this is a board that has been used dozens and dozens of times -- their unanimous opinion was flight training was not needed, and they didn't flight test the MCAS per say because the MCAS is a device that is supplement to another system."
FAA head: "I am confident in the MCAS system"
In response to questions from Senator Ted Cruz, R-Texas, FAA Acting Administrator Dan Elwell said pilots did not have specific instruction on the MCAS system in the online course they were required to take before flying the Boeing 737 Max 8. Elwell also said he was confident in the controversial MCAS system.
Cruz asked, "Was there any information on the MCAS that was included in the short, self-administered online course that pilots were required to go through?"
Elwell replied, "There was not specific instruction on the MCAS, to my knowledge, specifically because it was not a system that went directly to what the pilots flew on the Max, the difference between the Max and the NG," referring to Boeing's Next Generation, the previous models of 737s.
Cruz asked, "How did FAA come to the conclusion that it was appropriate to certify an anti-stall software system, the MCAS, that drew data from a sensor that had a history of problems but also didn't have redundancy?" The sensor he referred to is the angle of attack sensor, or AOA, which is supposed to detect the plane's angle in the sky.
Elwell answered by noting that angle of attack is an input to the MCAS system and that the MCAS is not an anti-stall system, but a supplement to the speed-trim system. When pressed on question, Elwell said, "Sir, it is still yet to be determined if the malfunctioning of the AOA (angle of attack) caused the crash. We actually don't yet know what caused the crash."
He added, "I am confident in the AOA veins that are produced and put on airplanes and I am confident in the MCAS system."
FAA head: "Safety is at the core of the FAA"
FAA Acting Administrator Daniel K. Elwell extended his deepest sympathies to the families of the victims of the two recent plane crashes and said, "safety is at the core of the FAA."
"Safety is not just a set of programs that can be established or implemented," he said. "It is a way of living and working."
In his opening statement, Elwell said the FAA was "fully involved" in the certification of the Boeing 737 Max 8, including "133 of the 297 flight tests."
"The FAA continues to seek and evaluate any additional data that might help us understand the underlying factors that led to the recent 737 Max accidents. We will take immediate and appropriate action based on the facts," adding that airline operators are "relying on the FAA get it right."
"The 737 Max will return to service for U.S. carriers only when the FAA's analysis of the facts and technical data indicate that it is appropriate to do so."
Secretary Chao: "I'm concerned about allegations of coziness"
https://www.cbsnews.com/video/transporta...-with-faa/
When asked by Senator Susan Collins at the morning hearing about the cooperative relationship between FAA and Boeing regarding safety certification, Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao said that while the relationship is necessary, she was "concerned about any allegations of coziness."
"The FAA is the one that certifies," Chao said. "The FAA does not build planes. They certify. But this method of having the manufacturer also be involved in looking at these standards is really necessary because once again the FAA cannot do it on their own."
"Having said that, I am of course concerned about any allegations of coziness," she added.
Elaine Chao takes questions from Congress
https://www.cbsnews.com/video/transporta...stigation/
In her opening remarks Wednesday morning, Secretary Chao said, "Let me emphasize that safety is always number one at the Department of Transportation."
Chao said the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has taken two actions to help determine what went wrong with Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.
"First, I've asked the Department's Inspector General to initiate an audit to compile a detailed factual history of the activities that resulted in the certification of the Boeing 737 Max 8 involved in the accident. Second, on Monday I announced the formation of a special advisory committee to provide independent, impartial advice on ways to improve the FAA safety oversight and certification process."
Office of the Inspector General announces Boeing 737 Max audit
The Office of the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation announced it will be conducting an audit of the FAA's certification process of the Boeing 737 Max 8.
"The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for overseeing the safety and certification of all civilian aircraft manufactured and operated in the United States," the statement said. "While FAA has maintained an excellent safety record, two recent accidents involving Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft have raised significant safety concerns."
It continues, "Our audit objective will be to determine and evaluate FAA's overall process for certifying the Boeing 737 MAX series of aircraft. In addition, we will identify and undertake future areas of work related to FAA's actions in response to the crashes as needed."
Senators ask Boeing's CEO about safety features
Sen. Edward Markey, D-Massachusetts, and a number of colleagues drafted a letter to Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg asking him to respond to several questions concerning the 737 Max aircraft, including some extra safety features the company provided for an additional fee.
"One feature -- the angle of attack indicator -- displays the readings of the system's sensors in the cockpit. The other feature -- a disagree light -- alerts the pilots if the plane's sensors are providing different readings, which could help pilots and mechanics detect a sensor malfunction," the letter reads. "The FAA and other aviation regulators did not require these features to come standard on the 737 Max 8 and 9 ... We write to request answers about Boeing's ongoing practice of charging airlines extra for safety-critical systems important to the operation of an aircraft."
The letter requests the Boeing CEO respond by April 16.
"Safety must be a standard part of our fleets, engrained in every bolt, sensor, and line of code on an aircraft," the letter urges. "Boeing should include all safety-critical systems instrumental to the safe operation of an aircraft as part of the standard cost to the airlines of purchasing their aircraft. Safety features on jets that fly hundreds of passengers should never be sold as a la carte add-ons."
House Transportation Chair writes letter to FAA head
In a letter to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Acting Administrator Daniel K. Elwell, Rep. Peter A. DeFazio, D-Oregon, the Chairman of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, requested an independent, third-party take control of the review of any technical modifications being proposed for the Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft.
DeFazio's letter comes as the public has become increasingly concerned about the airworthiness of the 737 Max 8 aircraft. The plane has been grounded worldwide.
"In order to provide this level of assurance, we urge you to engage an independent, third-party review composed of individuals with technical skills and expertise to objectively advise on any measures being considered requiring the safety certification of new and novel technology, as recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board," DeFazio wrote. "To be clear, we believe this proposed third-party review should be separate from the recently established Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory Committee, which Congress required in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018."
Boeing 737 Max-8 grounding causing canceled flights
A Southwest Airlines Co. Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft sits at Midway International Airport in Chicago, Illinois, U.S., March 13, 2019.
REUTERS
Southwest Airlines and American Airlines are canceling dozens of flights per day and will continue to do so as the grounding of the Boeing 737 Max-8 affects air travel.
Southwest is canceling up to 130 flights a day due to the grounding of its 34 Boeing 737 Max-8 airliners. Affected passengers are being contacted five days before their flight to be rebooked or refunded. The Dallas-based airline had been flying about 180 Max flights per day prior to the grounding. Southwest keeps up to 20 planes in reserve to serve as backups so does not have enough reserve aircraft to cover the flights.
American Airlines is canceling about 90 flights a day due to the grounding. The world's largest airline, American has 24 Boeing 737 Max-8 planes. The airline is planning for the grounding to last until at least late April.
It is estimated that the cost to airlines is $150,000 a day per plane that's grounded. Factoring in the costs to own and lease the planes along with the lost revenue from cancelled flights, the cost is easily in the many millions a month for each carrier.
Kris Van Cleave contributed to this report
First published on March 27, 2019 / 1:30 PM
Quote:The ATSB has been nominated as an accredited representative to the Japan Transport Safety Board’s investigation of an abnormal engine behaviour occurrence involving Boeing 787-8 VH-VKJ on 29 March 2019.
At approximately 15,000 feet during descent into Kansai International Airport, Osaka, Japan, the flight crew received an engine thrust warning on the number 2 engine, which subsequently started to surge. The crew then received an engine fail indication on the number 1 engine, without any shift in parameters indicating any engine power loss.
That warning was followed by an engine fail warning on the number 2 engine. The number 2 engine auto relight activated and the engine continued to surge during the descent.
Quote:Jetstar pilots faced 'engine fail' warnings minutes before landingMTF...P2
By Matt O'Sullivan
April 3, 2019 — 4.51pm
The pilots of a Jetstar 787 passenger jet received "engine fail" and "engine thrust" warnings during their approach to land at Osaka's main international airport on Friday.
The details about the problems faced by the pilots with both of the Boeing 787's engines in the crucial minutes before they landed the plane at Kansai International Airport come as Japan's air-safety officials rated the incident as "serious".
Japan's Transport Safety Board has taken the lead in the investigation into Jetstar Flight JQ15's "abnormal engine behaviour" and will be supported by Australian investigators.
A Jetstar 787, similar to the one pictured, suffered engine problems while on descent into Osaka on Friday.
The Jetstar 787-8 Dreamliner, which is powered by two General Electric GEnx engines, was flying from Cairns to Japan's third largest city.
When the plane reached about 15,000 feet on the approach to Kansai Airport, the pilots received an "engine-thrust warning" on the 787's number-two engine, which subsequently began to surge, according to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
The pilots then received an "engine fail indication" on the number-one engine "without any shift in parameters indicating any engine power loss".
The Jetstar 787 remains grounded at Kansai International Airport.CREDIT:KANJI HIWATASHI
That warning was followed by an "engine fail warning" on the number-two engine, and its "engine auto re-light activated". The engine continued to surge during the descent into Kansai Airport, which is located on an artificial island in Osaka Bay.
A spokeswoman for Japan's Civil Aviation Bureau confirmed on Wednesday that the mid-air incident had been classified as "serious".
"Japan Transport Safety Bureau ... is investigating the cause of the serious incident," she said.
The fact the engine problems occurred during the final approach to Kansai is a concern because the final minutes of any flight are the riskiest.
The Jetstar aircraft, which is registered VH-VKJ and can carry as many as 335 passengers in economy and business class, has been grounded at Kansai since Friday. Engineers from Jetstar, General Electric and Boeing have been inspecting the 787 to determine the cause.
A line of inquiry has been the possibility of a microbiological contaminant entering the plane's fuel, which could have become congealed in filters and disrupted the flow of fuel to the engines.
The aircraft was fuelled in New Zealand before it was flown to Cairns to pick up passengers for the onward journey to Osaka on Friday.
A fuel sample has been sent for testing at a laboratory in Japan to determine whether it was contaminated. It is likely to be the end of the week before the results are completed.
However, it has been suggested that inspectors are already starting to discount fuel contamination as a cause of the mid-air incident.
A report by investigators is not expected to be completed until about mid next year.
Quote:Ethiopian Airlines crash pilots’ actions questionedAnd from Ironsider & co, via the Oz:
By ANDY PASZTOR
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
11:01AM APRIL 9, 2019
An Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 8 sits grounded in Addis Ababa. Puic: AP
Crash investigators believe an automated flight-control system that went haywire led to last month’s fatal crash of a Boeing 737 MAX in Ethiopia.
But some pilots, industry officials and air-safety experts are also raising questions about the actions of the cockpit crew as detailed in last week’s preliminary accident report.
Ethiopian aviation officials and executives at the plane’s operator, Ethiopian Airlines, have said the pilot and co-pilot followed all the steps that Boeing laid out to cope with a misfire of the plane’s MCAS stall-prevention system. The system is suspected in another fatal nosedive of a 737 MAX aircraft in Indonesia last October.
Both events have also put the spotlight on pilot actions to counter the MCAS’s faulty activation. In the case of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, which crashed March 10, killing all 157 aboard, the plane maintained an unusually high speed during part of its short flight. The pilots also reactivated the suspect anti-stall system after manually overriding it -- raising questions about why.
The system, called MCAS for Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System, is designed to automatically push the plane’s nose down when it is at risk of stalling. In both 737 MAX crashes the system misfired, and pilots, battling repeated “nose-down” commands from the system, lost control of the plane.
Indonesian investigators probing last year’s Lion Air 737 MAX crash highlighted piloting and maintenance issues that required safety scrutiny, in addition to calling attention to the MCAS issue.
The Ethiopian airliner’s high speed would have made it harder for pilots to manually pull the jetliner out of its dive, according to pilots and others participating in or closely tracking the probe. These experts also question why the pilots -- contrary to Boeing’s emergency checklist -- would have re-engaged a system that they had identified as causing the plane to pitch downward in the first place.
Such questions don’t change or undercut the crux of the findings in preliminary reports issued in both crashes pointing to errant MCAS activation due to faulty data from a single sensor. Boeing has said it is working on changes to the system’s software to prevent such misfirings and to make it easier for pilots to identify and respond to a problem with the system. Regulators around the world have grounded the 737 MAX pending safety certification of that fix.
Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg last week said “it’s our responsibility to eliminate this risk,” adding “we own it and we know how to do it.”
The Federal Aviation Administration last week said “as we learn more about the accident and findings become available, we will take appropriate action.”
The questions over pilot actions in the Ethiopian flight comes amid simmering tensions between Ethiopian investigators and their American counterparts -- friction that came to the surface shortly after the crash when the two sides disagreed over where to have the plane’s so-called black boxes sent for analysis.
Neither Boeing nor FAA officials, who are formally participating in the probe, reviewed the final version of the 33-page preliminary accident report by Ethiopian investigators prior to its release, according to people in the U.S. briefed on the details. The Ethiopian transport ministry didn’t respond to requests for comment for this story.
A spokesman for Ethiopian Airlines said “the preliminary report confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that the crew followed the right procedures as per the recommendation of the manufacturer and the approval of the regulator.” He added that “the investigation is still in its starting point, and there are a lot of questions which need further analysis.”
Taken together, the plane’s high speed and the re-engagement of MCAS appear to have further complicated the pilots’ cockpit challenges and, according to pilots and safety experts, likely made it harder for them to get out of their predicament. Many of the same people added that with the cascade of warning sounds, alerts and other emergency messages, the crew likely was inundated with sometimes conflicting information that would have been extremely difficult to sort out.
Robert Graves, a pilot who has flown the MAX for a major US carrier, said the high speed was tantamount to a driver experiencing a sudden blowout on the highway and not lifting the foot off the accelerator.
The report, made public last Thursday, found the pilots didn’t reduce engine thrust during the short flight. Data extracted from the black box recorders indicated the plane instead sped along at takeoff power, despite the problems with the flight control system, and eventually reached a speed well beyond its normal operating range.
Pilots who have read the report say that is unusual. A pilot would normally moderate speed if encountering problems like the ones faced during Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, they said. The accident report said the crew didn’t change thrust settings once the plane had become airborne. The plane, within about three minutes, reached its design speed limit and continued to accelerate, according to the accident report.
“The excessive speed is a huge issue” since it made it more difficult for manual commands to move flight-control surfaces on the tail, according to John Cox, a retired 737 pilot, ex-crash investigator and former senior union safety official in the U.S. “I don’t think I have ever seen a 737 that far over maximum speed” envisioned by the manufacturer, he said.
The pilot of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, Yared Getachew, was young but had racked up 8000 hours in the carrier’s cockpits, ranking him as an experienced flyer -- though only 103 of his hours were in 737 MAX jets. Colleagues said he was a respected captain. His co-pilot, Ahmed Nur Mohammed, was a newcomer, having completed roughly 360 hours flying Ethiopian aircraft, with 56 hours behind the controls of a MAX.
The Ethiopian Airlines spokesman said “the crew are our heroes.”
Ethiopian officials didn’t address the aircraft’s high speed at a press conference last week disclosing the initial report and didn’t raise pilot actions as an issue requiring more scrutiny. The Ethiopian Airlines spokesman said the high rate of speed can be attributed to the crew’s intention to continue the plane’s climb, not to level off. He said there was no indication of excessive speed at the start of the flight, before problems started.
The report said that after experiencing flight-control difficulties, the pilot disengaged the MCAS system. Before hitting the cutout switches, the crew electrically trimmed the plane, to push the nose back up, following Boeing’s procedure. But safety experts and pilots who read the report said the crew didn’t appear to follow the procedure fully, failing to sufficiently push the nose up and bring the aircraft into a stable configuration before turning off power to the electric system.
In the wake of the Ethiopian crash, some pilots have said Boeing’s instructions on how to handle the problem were confusing.
When the crew apparently tried to use a manual wheel to pull up the nose, they were unable to do so. Barely seconds before the fatal plunge -- with the pilots seemingly unable to raise the nose -- they reactivated the errant MCAS system.
The pilot also clicked on the plane’s autopilot when a separate stall-warning system was vibrating the control column -- a warning about a loss of lift called “the stick shaker.” Typically in such a situation, a pilot would keep the plane in manual mode. It isn’t clear why the crew followed such a step, and investigators haven’t released cockpit-voice recordings potentially capable of shedding more light on the events.
Wall Street Journal
Quote:Apology ‘signals settlement’MTF...P2
By NIVELL RAYDA and ROBYN IRONSIDE
9:31PM APRIL 8, 2019
In this file photo taken on March 11, 2019 people stand near collected debris at the crash site of Ethiopia Airlines which killed 157 people. Picture: AFP
An apology from the Boeing CEO for the lives lost in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes has boosted hopes of a significant out of court settlement for the families of the 346 people killed.
In his response to the preliminary report on the Ethiopian Airlines’ crash, Boeing chief Dennis Muilenburg said he was “sorry for the lives lost in the recent 737 MAX accidents”.
Lawyer Michael Indrayana who is representing 60 Indonesian families, said he took Mr Muilenburg’s apology very positively because it signalled Boeing was committed to settling the matter “hopefully out of court”.
“It is unprecedented for a company the size of Boeing to make such statements,” Mr Indrayana said.
“This is a big case, perhaps the biggest in world aviation history.
“I hope families who were earlier hesitant will now be more confident in suing.”
Mother of three Mediana Agustin, who lost husband Eka Suganda in the Lion Air crash, said the last six months had been hard for herself and her three children.
She said Lion Air had provided no compensation to date, instead insisting next of kin sign a release and discharge statement.
“The document would waive all rights to sue anyone who might be responsible which includes Lion Air, Boeing and 200 other companies which may have direct or indirect links to the crash,” Ms Agustin said.
“I am offended that they demand that I sign the document if I want to be compensated. I lost a husband. But the airline is treating this case as if I have lost a luggage and keep making excuses not to compensate us.”
Lawyer Harry Pontoh said as well as the lawsuit against Boeing, Lion Air was being pursued for appropriate compensation for next of kin.
He said the law stated that families of victims must be compensated by the airline, and that each family was entitled to the equivalent of $130,000.
“The law also clearly states that receiving compensation does not waive the next of kin’s right to sue whoever they feel is responsible for the death of their loved ones,” Mr Pontoh said.
“By requiring next of kin’s to sign the document, Lion Air is actually breaking the law. We have sent a letter to Lion Air threatening them with a lawsuit if they keep stalling the compensation.”
Preliminary reports released for both crashes revealed the role of the “manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system” activated by erroneous information from an angle of attack sensor.
Boeing is now working on a software update to address issues with the MCAS, including making it reliant on information from both AOA sensors.
The aircraft manufacturer will also provide an extra feature at no extra cost, alerting pilots to a disagreement between the sensors.
Neither Lion Air nor Ethiopian Airlines took up the “optional extra” believed to cost about $80,000.
A revised training package for pilots of 737 MAX aircraft is also being prepared.
All 737 MAX 8 and 9 aircraft were grounded after the Ethiopian Airlines crash on March 10 and Boeing has slowed its rate of production for the planes to 42 a month, instead of 52.
The company has more than 4600 orders for the aircraft.
Quote:Boeing's billion-dollar bungle has tainted American aviation prestige — how will it recover?
By Alan Weedon
Updated about 2 hours ago
PHOTO: Boeing's aircraft, particularly its 747, have been a familiar sight for generations of travellers. (Flickr: Doug Bull)
If air travel has been a part of your life, chances are one of the planes you've flown on has been made by American manufacturer Boeing.
Key points:
- Boeing's 737 MAX series was involved in two fatal crashes killing over 300 people
- The issue appears to stem from an automated system that pilots were unable to override
- Boeing is testing a software patch, but questions are being raised about certification
From the world's best-selling commercial jet, the 737, to the world's first jumbo jet, the 747, Boeing's aircraft have defined the modern aviation era and international travel for many around the globe.
But in recent months, the company has hit unprecedented turbulence after two separate air crashes involving its 737 MAX jets killed over 300 people within five months, which resulted in global suspensions of the fleet.
Each month the fleet continues to be suspended it's estimated that Boeing will lose between $US1.8 billion and $US2.5 billion in revenue (roughly $2.5–3.5 billion), according to analyst estimates, though it could recoup those amounts once the plane is back in the air.
The preliminary investigation reports into the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines disasters both noted that the pilots fought repeatedly against automated plane controls that pushed the plane down.
More on Boeing's 737 MAX:
- American Airlines cancels 737 MAX flights until mid-August as Trump urges Boeing to fix plane
- Boeing's 737 MAX production cuts hit Wall Street
- Boeing cuts 737 MAX output in wake of Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines fatal crashes
- Ethiopian Airlines crash victim's family files lawsuit against Boeing over defective flight control system
- Boeing rolls out software fix for flight control systems scrutinised after deadly 737 MAX crashes
"This is quite spectacular given that it involves Boeing's most popular aircraft [series] in history," said Dr Chrystal Zhang, a senior lecturer and research director in aviation at Swinburne University.
Boeing's clipped bird
The 737 MAX has been banned from flying in most countries after the Ethiopian Airlines crash. What will the company do when airplanes start cluttering up its Seattle factory?
Quote:"No one is immune from brand and reputation damage, especially after these fatal crashes … bad memories always last much longer."
She explained that the MAX series only makes up 2 per cent of the global fleet of narrow-body aircraft — the ones that fly between Australia's capital cities on a regular basis — but it may grow to 5 per cent.
It's unclear if the MAX will still reach that estimated market share, as some carriers are reviewing their orders while Garuda Indonesia has cancelled its order of 49 jets altogether, citing passenger fears.
But how did the MAX 737 slip through regulators? Who is to blame? And what lies ahead for the aviation giant?
From the start: Competitors spark race for better planes
PHOTO: Boeing's direct competitor, Airbus, spurred Boeing into action by announcing an efficient update to its A320 short-haul fleet. (Flickr: Kevin Hackert)
To understand how Boeing has found itself in this predicament, it pays to get familiar with the story of the 737's direct competitor, the Airbus A320.
In 2010, the European manufacturer announced plans to create a new version of the aircraft, the A320neo (short for "new engine option"), which promised airlines greater fuel efficiency at a time when the Boeing 737 models in service — the Next Generation series launched in 1993 — could not compete.
PHOTO: Advanced manufacturers such as Boeing add to the US's industrial prestige. (Flickr: US State Department)
So, a race quickly ensued after Airbus fired the starting gun.
At this point, Boeing found itself at a crossroads: make a new version of the 737 from scratch or retrofit the existing Next Generation series with newer technologies?
What we know about the 737 MAX
Boeing's newest version of its most popular plane, the 737 MAX, is again in the spotlight after another deadly crash minutes after take-off.
Boeing went with the latter, which meant that an existing 737 frame was fitted with larger, more fuel-efficient engines that altered its aerodynamics in a way that made it prone to tilt up during flight.
Boeing engineer and cockpit designer Rick Ludtke told the New York Times that the 737 MAX's designers were told they "could not drive any new training that required a simulator".
Quote:"They wanted the minimum change to simplify the training differences, minimum change to reduce costs, and to get it done quickly," he told the paper.
When contacted by the ABC about Mr Ludtke's claims, a Boeing representative said they "followed a [design] process that was absolutely consistent with introducing previous new airplanes and derivatives".
'High angle of attack': The suspected MCAS fault
YOUTUBE: CBC's 'The National' revealed that the 737 MAX's MCAS system was only listed in the pilot manual's glossary.
In the weeks after the Ethiopian Airlines crash, Boeing has come under fire from pilots who alleged that they were not told about an automated system, known as the Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), when the plane was introduced.
This system was designed to automatically tilt the plane down to prevent a stall if it detected that the plane was climbing at too steep of an angle, known as an angle of attack.
A report from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) found that the system was only mentioned once in the aircraft manual, which was in the glossary, explaining the MCAS acronym — an omission Boeing did not deny to the CBC.
A Boeing spokesperson told the ABC that MCAS's function was referenced in the MAX's flight crew operations manual, where it outlined what the plane would do "in the rare event that the airplane reaches a high angle of attack".
They added that they had discussed MCAS's functionality with more than 60 airline operators since 2016.
'Weaknesses' in the certification process: Who's to blame?
VIDEO: The acting US FAA chief explains why the 737 MAX fleet was grounded. (ABC News)
Subsequent reports have found that the US Federal Aviation Authority's (FAA) safety approvals of the 737 MAX were done by Boeing staff, and this proximity has given cause for concern about who is doing the regulating.
"It's not just the product that has caused the [reputational] damage at this stage, because people are now questioning the relationship between Boeing and the FAA," Dr Zhang said.
As part of the fallout, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Canada's Transport Safety Board announced they would no longer heed the advice of the FAA, while China has set up a task force to review any further Boeing changes to the 737 MAX.
Quote:
[/url]Sully Sullenberger
✔@Captsully
Yet more evidence that @FAANews has delegated way too much aircraft certification oversight to manufacturers, which makes me wonder what other safety problems do we not know about. https://bit.ly/2UfsMg5 @dominicgates @SeaTimesAero @seattletimes
9:21 AM - Apr 17, 2019
With close industry ties, FAA safety chief pushed more delegation of oversight to Boeing
Two fatal crashes of Boeing’s 737 MAX have brought new scrutiny to the close-knit relations between the regulatory agency and the industry, to the FAA’s practice of delegating most safety analysis...
seattletimes.com
At a [url=https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=9943D207-2819-446F-9470-8CE154C700F9]US Senate hearing into the 737 MAX crisis, Calvin Scovel, the inspector-general of the US Department of Transportation, acknowledged that the FAA had "weaknesses" in the oversight of manufacturers.
Quote:"Clearly, confidence in the FAA as the gold standard for aviation has been shaken," Mr Scovel said.
In response, the FAA has built an international coalition to review the 737's MCAS system.
However, Dr Geoffrey Dell, a safety scientist and associate professor at Central Queensland University, said the close relationship between Boeing and the FAA is to be expected.
"There are no regulators on the planet who get the funding to have [a level of] expertise that is greater than [Boeing's]," he said.
"The regulators do not have the capability to have someone who can second-guess the entire design, or sit around to wait for another plane to be produced."
When asked by the ABC if Boeing believed it was reasonable for the company to review the 737 MAX's safety on behalf of the FAA, it said:
"The long-standing collaborative engagement between the FAA, Boeing, its customers and industry partners has created the safest transportation system in the world.
Quote:"The regulatory requirements defined by the FAA provide the requirements, policies and procedures which ensure that Boeing employees serving in this capacity act independently on behalf of the FAA when performing in this role."
Last month, acting administrator of the FAA Daniel Elwell told US senators that parts of the 737 MAX's safety approval was delegated to Boeing representatives.
The FAA echoed Boeing's sentiments when asked by the ABC about whether it was appropriate to delegate safety checks to an aircraft manufacturer.
"The FAA's aircraft certification processes are well-established and have consistently produced safe aircraft designs," a statement read.
Quote:"FAA has never allowed companies to police themselves or self-certify their aircraft.
"With strict FAA oversight, delegation extends the rigor of the FAA certification process to other recognised professionals, thereby multiplying the technical expertise focused on assuring an aircraft meets FAA standards."
Software fix: Temporary solution or permanent resolution?
PHOTO: Boeing's Seattle factory has been a home for modern aviation, with its first production lines making the 747. (Flickr: Jetstar Airways)
At the time of writing, Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg said the company had tested a software fix for the 737 MAX across 120 flights, and added that 85 per cent of carriers using the plane had tested the update in simulator sessions.
It remains unclear when the 737 MAX suspension will be lifted, but Boeing told the ABC that it was "confident in the safety of the 737 MAX and is continuing to take the necessary actions to ensure that going forward".
While questions will continue to be asked about why a manufacturer known for its admirable safety record let a crucial flaw through its design process, Dr Dell said more questions needed to be asked about how automated systems are tested.
Quote:"On the face of it, you could say that [Boeing] did not test [the 737 MAX] long enough, but then you get into a situation where you ask, 'How long is a piece of string'?," he told the ABC.
"It raises a question of how do you effectively test software to ensure there is not a rogue code or a programming anomaly that will only reveal itself under specific circumstances.
"So you could theoretically test for an infinite amount of time and still not have those [MCAS] circumstances pop up."
PHOTO: Boeing's global 737 MAX fleet has been suspended since March. (AP: Elaine Thompson, file)
Quote:Pilot killed in small-plane crash at Fullerton Municipal Airport
By JACLYN COSGROVE
APR 18, 2019 | 10:25 PM
A small plane crashed Thursday evening at Fullerton Municipal Airport, killing the pilot. (OnScene.TV)
The pilot of the small plane that crashed Thursday evening at Fullerton Municipal Airport died in the accident, authorities said.
The pilot was the only person on board, a spokesman with the Federal Aviation Administration said. The pilot was pronounced dead at the scene.
(Los Angeles Times)
The twin-engine, six-seat Beechcraft Duke crashed under unknown circumstances while departing from Runway 24.
The plane was traveling about 80 mph and had just left the ground when it veered left, crashed and exploded, Fullerton Fire Department Division Chief Kathy Schaeffer said at a news conference.
Quote:FAA to host briefing of civil aviation officials on Boeing 737 MAX
written by australianaviation.com.au April 26, 2019
A file image of the Boeing 737 MAX tail and winglets. (Boeing)
The United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has invited leading civil aviation officials from around the world to a meeting on May 23 to discuss the grounding of Boeing 737 MAX aircraft after two fatal crashes, media reports say.
The meeting was “intended to provide participants the FAA’s safety analysis that will inform its decision to return the 737 MAX fleet to service in the US when it is made”, the Reuters news agency reported on Thursday (US time).
Meanwhile, the FAA told Agence France-Presse the session would “discuss the agency’s activities toward ensuring the safe return of Boeing 737 MAX to service”.
The FAA said the meeting would be for regulators only, with no participation from industry.
This May 23 gathering in Washington DC was in addition to international authorities and experts from aviation regulatory bodies in nine countries – Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) included – starting a 90-day review of aircraft safety on April 29 following the crashes of two 737 MAX aircraft operated by Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines in October 2018 and March 2019 respectively, killing 346 passengers and crew.
Officials from China, the European Aviation Safety Agency, Canada, Brazil, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates will take part in that 90-day review chaired by former National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Chris Hart. They will focus on the certification of the 737 MAX’s automated flight control system.
Given that 90-day timeframe, the grounding of the aircraft globally is unlikely to be lifted until late July. However, the FAA has previously said a decision on whether to lift that grounding was separate to the review.
A file image of a Boeing 737 MAX flight deck. (Boeing)
Boeing has been working on a software update to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) following the crash of a Lion Air 737 MAX 8 in October 2018. It has still to submit that software to the FAA for approval.
The airframer said recently it had completed the final test flight with the updated software. There is still a certification flightwith the FAA to come.
Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg on a 737 MAX 7 test flight for the MCAS software update. (Boeing)
A supplied picture of a Boeing 737 MAX 7 landing on April 17, 2019 after a technical demonstration flight for the MCAS software update. (Boeing)
Norwegian delay
Meanwhile, low-cost carrier, Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA has arranged with Boeing to delay the purchase of 14 737 MAX aircraft due for delivery in 2020 and 2021.
It presently has 18 737 MAX aircraft lying idle because of the grounding. Norwegian chief executive Bjorn Kjos told media this week the impact of the grounding could cost the airline US$60 million (A$85.5 million).
Quote:At least 4 potential whistleblower calls made to FAA about Boeing 737 Max
BY KRIS VAN CLEAVE
APRIL 29, 2019 / 4:15 AM / CBS NEWS
https://www.cbsnews.com/video/4-potentia...-max-jets/
The Federal Aviation Administration has received at least four calls from potential Boeing employee whistleblowers about issues with the company's new 737 Max jetliner, CBS News has confirmed.
The calls began coming in within hours of Ethiopian investigators releasing a preliminary report on the second of those crashes, that of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 last month.
A source familiar with them confirms the April 5 calls were from current and former Boeing employees alleging possible issues related to the angle of attack (AOA) sensor and the MCAS anti-stall system that relies on data from the sensor.
Both have been linked to the two deadly 737Max crashes that killed nearly 350 people and lead to the grounding of the aircraft worldwide.
One of the claims deals with damage to the wiring of an AOA sensor from a foreign object.
Boeing said it could not verify the report but in a statement tolds CBS News, "Safety and quality are absolutely at the core of Boeing's values. Speaking up is a cornerstone of that safety culture and we look into all issues that are raised."
A Boeing source was skeptical of that particular whistleblower allegation, saying that as far as he knows, there have been "no reported issues...at all" with foreign object debris damage to AOA sensors or their wiring.
But, as CBS News confirmed last week, Boeing has had issues with foreign object debris (FOD) being found in the company's 787 Dreamliner assembled at its South Carolina plant, including metal shavings discovered by the FAA in aircraft Boeing certified as debris-free as recently as 2017.
Twice this year, the U.S. Air Force stopped accepting delivery of the 767-based KC-46 aerial refueler because FOD was found inside the newly delivered aircraft. The KC-46 is built in Everett, Washington.
Another of the potential whistleblower calls dealt with concerns over the shutoff switches for MCAS.
The four calls were made to call came in through a special hotline setup by the FAA for employees or the public to report problems. They are being evaluated by FAA investigators as part of ongoing probes into the 737 Max and its certification.
If true, it's possible the allegations could lead to additional investigations.
The hotline submissions were first reported by CNN and confirmed to CBS News.
Earlier this month, the Senate Commerce Committee launched an investigation into the FAA certification process, citing whistleblower claims of improperly trained FAA inspectors working on the Max.
House Transportation and Infastructure Committee investigators have reportedly been speaking with potential whistleblowers. The committee has not responded to a CBS News request for comment.
It's unclear if any of these whistleblowers overlap.
Boeing's CEO was expected to attend the company's annual shareholder meeting Monday and participate in his first media availability since the crash of Ethiopian Airlines crash. He was expected to take reporters' questions.
Quote:Virgin defers 737 MAX orders, hours after Boeing CEO survives battle to keep job
By business reporter David Chau, wires
Updated about 10 hours agoTue 30 Apr 2019, 10:38am
![[Image: 5471018-3x2-340x227.jpg]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/image/5471018-3x2-340x227.jpg)
Photo: Virgin will delay taking delivery of Boeing's 737 MAX aircraft by at least 1.5 years. (ABC News: Giulio Saggin, file photo)
Related Story: Ethiopian Airlines flight repeatedly nose-dived before crash, but pilots not to blame
Related Story: Lion Air pilots were scouring handbook and praying when plane crashed
Virgin Australia has confirmed it will defer taking delivery of its first Boeing 737 MAX aircraft, from November 2019 to July 2021, due to safety concerns.
Key points:It follows last month's Ethiopian Airlines crash and the Lion Air crash in October 2018 — which involved Boeing's 737 MAX planes crashing shortly after take-off and killing hundreds of people on both flights.
- Aside from deferring the first delivery, Virgin is shifting its order to more 737 MAX 10s and less MAX 8s
- Virgin says, "We will not introduce any new aircraft to the fleet unless we are completely satisfied with its safety"
- Boeing's dual CEO and chairman Dennis Muilenburg held on to both roles despite backlash at a fiery shareholder meeting
"Safety is always the number one priority for Virgin Australia," said the company's chief executive Paul Scurrah.
Quote:"We will not introduce any new aircraft to the fleet unless we are completely satisfied with its safety.
"We are confident in Boeing's commitment to returning the 737 MAX to service safely and as a long-term partner of Boeing, we will be working with them through this process."
The company has ordered 48 of Boeing's 737 MAX aircraft.
Its first MAX 8 was meant to be delivered in November 2019 — but has now been delayed to February 2025.
But it has brought forward the delivery of the first MAX 10 to July 2021, which was originally slated for a January 2022 delivery.
Virgin also shifted its order towards the larger MAX 10 (of which it now plans to buy 25, instead of 10), while cutting its order of the MAX 8 (from 38, down to 23).
In a statement to the ASX, the company said there would be financial benefits from deferring its Boeing aircraft order.
"This includes a significant deferral of capital expenditure by extending the use of existing aircraft given the relatively young age of our fleet," it said.
Boeing CEO keeps his job
Virgin's decision was announced hours after Boeing's chief executive and chairman Dennis Muilenburg survived a shareholder motion to split his two roles.
He later told reporters he would continue to lead the company through a crisis that has triggered the grounding of Boeing's fastest-selling plane, lawsuits, investigations and lingering concerns over the 737 MAX's safety.
"I am very focused on safety going forward," he said after the meeting when reporters asked if he had considered resigning.
Quote:"I am strongly vested in that. My clear intent is to continue to lead on the front of safety, quality and integrity."
However, Boeing will need to win back the trust of customers, passengers and regulators following the crashes.
The aviation giant, worth $US214 billion, has experienced a 10 per cent slump in its share price since the Ethiopian Airlines crash in March.
What we know about the 737 MAX
![[Image: boeing-737-max-data.jpg]](https://www.abc.net.au/cm/lb/10888606/data/boeing-737-max-data.jpg)
Boeing's newest version of its most popular plane, the 737 MAX, is again in the spotlight after another deadly crash minutes after take-off.
Boeing is under pressure to deliver a software fix to prevent erroneous data from triggering the plane's anti-stall system MCAS (the Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System).
The company has acknowledged that the accidental firing of the software based on bad sensor data was a common link in the chain of events leading to the two accidents.
Last week, Boeing abandoned its 2019 financial outlook, halted share buybacks and said lowered production due to the 737 MAX grounding had cost it at least $US1 billion so far.
Shareholders have filed a lawsuit accusing the company of defrauding them by concealing safety deficiencies in the planes.
The model is also the target of investigations by US transportation authorities and the Department of Justice.
ABC/Reuters
:Quote:Letter to Dennis A. Muilenburg, CEO of Boeing
By Ralph Nader
April 25, 2019
Dennis A. Muilenburg
Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
The Boeing Company
100 North Riverside
Chicago, IL 60606
Dear Mr. Muilenburg:
On April 4, 2019 you somewhat belatedly released a statement that “We at Boeing are sorry for the lives lost in the recent 737 MAX accidents. These tragedies continue to weigh heavily on our hearts and minds….” You added that a preliminary investigation made it “apparent that in both flights” the MCAS “activated in response to erroneous angle of attack information.”
These and other remarks reflect years of mismanagement by Boeing executives, now tragically bearing bitter fruit. Your acknowledgement of the problems with the 737 MAX somehow escaped inclusion in your messages to shareholders, the capital markets and the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is now stunningly clear that your overly optimistic outlook on January 20, 2019 – after the Indonesian Lion Air crash – was misleading. Whatever the public learns, day after day about the troubles of your company, it is still far less than what Boeing knows will come out day by day, and not just about the deadly design of the 737 MAX.
Your narrow-body passenger aircraft – namely, the long series of 737’s that began in the nineteen sixties was past its prime. How long could Boeing avoid making the investment needed to produce a “clean-sheet” aircraft and, instead, in the words of Bloomberg Businessweek “push an aging design beyond its limits?” Answer: As long as Boeing could get away with it and keep necessary pilot training and other costs low for the airlines as a sales incentive.
Boeing kept on this track until the competition from its only competitor, Airbus, came along with its A320neo. The year 2011 was a crucial period for the company. Top management was into preliminary work on a new aircraft and then panicked over Airbus’s success. To compete with Airbus, Boeing equipped the 737 MAX with larger engines tilted more forward and upward on the wings than prior 737’s. Thus began the trail of criminal negligence that will implicate the company and its executives. The larger engines changed the center of gravity and the plane’s aerodynamics. Boeing management was on a fast track and ignored warnings by its own engineers, not to mention scores of other technical aerospace people outside the company. The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) software fix or patch with all its glitches and miscues is now a historic example of a grave failure of Boeing management. Yet, you insist the 737 MAX is still safe and some alteration of the MCAS and other pilot advisories will make the aircraft airworthy. Aircraft should be stall-proof, not stall-prone. Trying to shift the burden onto the pilots for any vast numbers of failure modes beyond the software’s predictability is scurrilous. Deplorably you are still pushing to end the grounding for the 737 MAX and resume delivery of nearly 5000 orders worldwide. The Boeing 737 MAX must never be permitted to fly again – it has an inherent aerodynamic design defect.
No matter your previous safety record of the 737 series, Boeing doesn’t get one, two or more crashes that are preventable by adopting long-established aeronautical knowledge and practices. You are on the highest level of notice not to add to your already extraordinary record of criminally negligent decisions and inactions. Result – 346 innocent people lost their lives.
A reckless salesman, driving dangerously to reach a customer and close a deal, causing a collision and death of a family in another motor vehicle, does not get to be exonerated from a manslaughter prosecution by saying he has a 25 year good driving record.
Boeing management’s behavior must be seen in the context of Boeing’s use of its earned capital. Did you use the $30 billion surplus from 2009 to 2017 to reinvest in R&D, in new narrow-body passenger aircraft? Or did you, instead, essentially burn this surplus with self-serving stock buybacks of $30 billion in that period? Boeing is one of the companies that MarketWatch labelled as “Five companies that spent lavishly on stock buybacks while pension funding lagged.”
Incredibly, your buybacks of $9.24 billion in 2017 comprised 109% of annual earnings. As you well know, stock buybacks do not create any jobs. They improve the metrics for the executive compensation packages of top Boeing bosses. Undeterred, in 2018, buybacks of $9 billion constituted 86% of annual earnings.
To make your management recklessly worse, in December 2018, you arranged for your rubberstamp Board of Directors to approve $20 billion more in buybacks. Apparently, you had amortized the cost of the Indonesian Lion Air crash victims as not providing any significant impact on your future guidance to the investor world.
Then came the second software-bomb that took away control from the pilots and brought down Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10, taking the lives of 156 passengers and crew. At the time, you were way overdue with your new software allegedly addressing the avoidable risks associated with the notorious 737 MAX.
Don’t you see some inverted priorities here? Don’t you see how you should have invested in producing better aircraft, if you wished to compete with Airbus, whose engineers were allowed to do their job and avoid design instabilities? Instead, your top management was inebriated with the prospect of higher stock values, through stock buybacks and higher profits by keeping your costs lower with that “aging design” of the Boeing 737s. It now is apparent that you guessed wrong – big time for your passengers as well as for your company and its shareholders.
Boeing is in additional trouble that reflects poor management. On March 22, 2019, the Washington Post reported that NASA’s Administrator, Jim Bridenstine said “the agency is considering sidelining the massive rocket Boeing is building because of how far behind schedule it is.”
According to a second Washington Post, March 22, 2019 article, the delay in the “scheduled maiden launch in June 2020” and the “billions of dollars over budget” had NASA’s leaders in a fury. Last year, NASA’s inspector general excoriated your company, revealing it has already spent over $5 billion and is “expected to burn through the remaining money by early this year (2019), three years too soon, without delivering a single rocket stage,” wrote the Post.
On March 13, 2019, Bridenstine said “although NASA still steadfastly supports the massive rocket, known as the Space Launch System (SLS), the agency would consider sidelining it and instead using commercially available rockets for the mission known as Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1).” This announcement before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee “set off shock waves… a major blow to NASA’s flagship rocket program and its main contractor, Boeing.”
And now, the agency is about to announce another major delay in the high-profile spacecraft Boeing is building to fly astronauts to the International Space Station.
On March 28, 2019, the World Trade Organization (WTO) after 14 years, issued a final ruling that Boeing received an illegal U.S. tax break from the state of Washington in prohibited subsidies under international trade rules. Boeing has long been a recipient of various kinds of extensive corporate welfare before and after it became a U.S. monopoly.
Then on April 21, 2019, the New York Times in a lengthy front-page story, based on “internal emails, corporate documents and federal records, as well as interviews with more than a dozen current and former employees,” reported that your South Carolina factory, which produces the 787 Dreamliner, “has been plagued by shoddy production and weak oversight that have threatened to compromise safety.” These problems have persisted notwithstanding two documentaries, commencing in 2013, produced by Al-Jazeera investigators reported similar problems. The Air Force last month temporarily stopped deliveries of the KC-48 tanker after finding random objects inside the new planes, causing Will Roper, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force to exclaim “To say it bluntly, this is unacceptable.”
It is not as if you are receiving anything but top dollar payments for these civilian and military aircraft. Or, you are underpaid at over $23 million in 2018 which comes to over $12,000 an hour.
In the midst of these accusations, whistleblower lawsuits, alleged retaliations by management, the Times reports your pace of production “has quickened” and that you are eliminating “about a hundred quality control positions in North Charleston [South Carolina].”
Boeing shareholders and your compliant Board of Directors should be advising you that the scheduled one hour annual shareholder meeting is not nearly enough time for you to explain these matters to shareholders in Chicago on April 29, 2019. Big corporations are run like top-down dictatorships where the hired hands determine their own pay and strip their shareholder owners of necessary powers of governance. Do not push this envelope, further. Your Board of Directors should disclose what you told them about the 737 MAX and when they knew it.
Already, corporate crime specialists are making the case for you and other top Boeing managers, having refused to listen to the warnings of your conscientious engineers, regarding the redesign of the 737 MAX, to face criminal prosecution. Note BP pleading guilty in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, to eleven counts of manslaughter in 2013.
Already, the kindly corporate crisis specialists are issuing warnings, along with the mild ones by the shareholder service firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which urges separation of the roles of the Chairman of the Board and CEO, both of which you hold. Further, Glass Lewis urges removal of Boeing audit committee head Lawrence Kellner for “failing to foresee safety risks with the 737 MAX aircraft,” reported the Financial Times, on April 16, 2019.
Consider, in addition, the statement of two Harvard scholars—Leonard J. Marcus and Eric J. McNulty, authors of the forthcoming book, You’re It: Crisis, Change, and How to Lead When it Matters Most. These gentlemen did not achieve their positions by using strong language. That is why, the concluding statement in their CNN article on March 27, 2019, merits your closer attention:
“Of course, if Boeing did not act in good faith in deploying the 737 Max and the Justice Department’s investigation discovers Boeing cut corners or attempted to avoid proper regulatory reviews of the modifications to the aircraft, Muilenburg and any other executives involved should resign immediately. Too many families, indeed communities, depend on the continued viability of Boeing.”
These preconditions have already been disclosed and are evidentially based. Your mismanagement is replete with documentation, including your obsession with shareholder value and executive compensation. There is no need to wait for some long-drawn out, redundant inquiry. Management was criminally negligent, 346 lives of passengers and crew were lost. You and your team should forfeit your compensation and should resign forthwith.
All concerned with aviation safety should have your public response.
Sincerely,
Ralph Nader
P.O. Box 19312
Washington, DC 20036
(04-30-2019, 06:45 PM)Peetwo Wrote: Via Oz Aviation:
Quote:FAA to host briefing of civil aviation officials on Boeing 737 MAX
written by australianaviation.com.au April 26, 2019
The United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has invited leading civil aviation officials from around the world to a meeting on May 23 to discuss the grounding of Boeing 737 MAX aircraft after two fatal crashes, media reports say.
The meeting was “intended to provide participants the FAA’s safety analysis that will inform its decision to return the 737 MAX fleet to service in the US when it is made”, the Reuters news agency reported on Thursday (US time).
Meanwhile, the FAA told Agence France-Presse the session would “discuss the agency’s activities toward ensuring the safe return of Boeing 737 MAX to service”.
The FAA said the meeting would be for regulators only, with no participation from industry.
This May 23 gathering in Washington DC was in addition to international authorities and experts from aviation regulatory bodies in nine countries – Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) included – starting a 90-day review of aircraft safety on April 29 following the crashes of two 737 MAX aircraft operated by Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines in October 2018 and March 2019 respectively, killing 346 passengers and crew.
Officials from China, the European Aviation Safety Agency, Canada, Brazil, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates will take part in that 90-day review chaired by former National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Chris Hart. They will focus on the certification of the 737 MAX’s automated flight control system.
Given that 90-day timeframe, the grounding of the aircraft globally is unlikely to be lifted until late July. However, the FAA has previously said a decision on whether to lift that grounding was separate to the review.
Boeing has been working on a software update to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) following the crash of a Lion Air 737 MAX 8 in October 2018. It has still to submit that software to the FAA for approval.
The airframer said recently it had completed the final test flight with the updated software. There is still a certification flightwith the FAA to come.
Norwegian delay
Meanwhile, low-cost carrier, Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA has arranged with Boeing to delay the purchase of 14 737 MAX aircraft due for delivery in 2020 and 2021.
It presently has 18 737 MAX aircraft lying idle because of the grounding. Norwegian chief executive Bjorn Kjos told media this week the impact of the grounding could cost the airline US$60 million (A$85.5 million).
& via CBS News:
Quote:At least 4 potential whistleblower calls made to FAA about Boeing 737 Max
BY KRIS VAN CLEAVE
APRIL 29, 2019 / 4:15 AM / CBS NEWS
https://www.cbsnews.com/video/4-potentia...-max-jets/
The Federal Aviation Administration has received at least four calls from potential Boeing employee whistleblowers about issues with the company's new 737 Max jetliner, CBS News has confirmed.
The calls began coming in within hours of Ethiopian investigators releasing a preliminary report on the second of those crashes, that of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 last month.
A source familiar with them confirms the April 5 calls were from current and former Boeing employees alleging possible issues related to the angle of attack (AOA) sensor and the MCAS anti-stall system that relies on data from the sensor.
Both have been linked to the two deadly 737Max crashes that killed nearly 350 people and lead to the grounding of the aircraft worldwide.
One of the claims deals with damage to the wiring of an AOA sensor from a foreign object.
Boeing said it could not verify the report but in a statement tolds CBS News, "Safety and quality are absolutely at the core of Boeing's values. Speaking up is a cornerstone of that safety culture and we look into all issues that are raised."
A Boeing source was skeptical of that particular whistleblower allegation, saying that as far as he knows, there have been "no reported issues...at all" with foreign object debris damage to AOA sensors or their wiring.
But, as CBS News confirmed last week, Boeing has had issues with foreign object debris (FOD) being found in the company's 787 Dreamliner assembled at its South Carolina plant, including metal shavings discovered by the FAA in aircraft Boeing certified as debris-free as recently as 2017.
Twice this year, the U.S. Air Force stopped accepting delivery of the 767-based KC-46 aerial refueler because FOD was found inside the newly delivered aircraft. The KC-46 is built in Everett, Washington.
Another of the potential whistleblower calls dealt with concerns over the shutoff switches for MCAS.
The four calls were made to call came in through a special hotline setup by the FAA for employees or the public to report problems. They are being evaluated by FAA investigators as part of ongoing probes into the 737 Max and its certification.
If true, it's possible the allegations could lead to additional investigations.
The hotline submissions were first reported by CNN and confirmed to CBS News.
Earlier this month, the Senate Commerce Committee launched an investigation into the FAA certification process, citing whistleblower claims of improperly trained FAA inspectors working on the Max.
House Transportation and Infastructure Committee investigators have reportedly been speaking with potential whistleblowers. The committee has not responded to a CBS News request for comment.
It's unclear if any of these whistleblowers overlap.
Boeing's CEO was expected to attend the company's annual shareholder meeting Monday and participate in his first media availability since the crash of Ethiopian Airlines crash. He was expected to take reporters' questions.
& via ABC News:
Quote:Virgin defers 737 MAX orders, hours after Boeing CEO survives battle to keep job
By business reporter David Chau, wires
Updated about 10 hours agoTue 30 Apr 2019, 10:38am
Photo: Virgin will delay taking delivery of Boeing's 737 MAX aircraft by at least 1.5 years. (ABC News: Giulio Saggin, file photo)
Related Story: Ethiopian Airlines flight repeatedly nose-dived before crash, but pilots not to blame
Related Story: Lion Air pilots were scouring handbook and praying when plane crashed
Virgin Australia has confirmed it will defer taking delivery of its first Boeing 737 MAX aircraft, from November 2019 to July 2021, due to safety concerns.
Key points:It follows last month's Ethiopian Airlines crash and the Lion Air crash in October 2018 — which involved Boeing's 737 MAX planes crashing shortly after take-off and killing hundreds of people on both flights.
- Aside from deferring the first delivery, Virgin is shifting its order to more 737 MAX 10s and less MAX 8s
- Virgin says, "We will not introduce any new aircraft to the fleet unless we are completely satisfied with its safety"
- Boeing's dual CEO and chairman Dennis Muilenburg held on to both roles despite backlash at a fiery shareholder meeting
"Safety is always the number one priority for Virgin Australia," said the company's chief executive Paul Scurrah.
Quote:"We will not introduce any new aircraft to the fleet unless we are completely satisfied with its safety.
"We are confident in Boeing's commitment to returning the 737 MAX to service safely and as a long-term partner of Boeing, we will be working with them through this process."
The company has ordered 48 of Boeing's 737 MAX aircraft.
Its first MAX 8 was meant to be delivered in November 2019 — but has now been delayed to February 2025.
But it has brought forward the delivery of the first MAX 10 to July 2021, which was originally slated for a January 2022 delivery.
Virgin also shifted its order towards the larger MAX 10 (of which it now plans to buy 25, instead of 10), while cutting its order of the MAX 8 (from 38, down to 23).
In a statement to the ASX, the company said there would be financial benefits from deferring its Boeing aircraft order.
"This includes a significant deferral of capital expenditure by extending the use of existing aircraft given the relatively young age of our fleet," it said.
Boeing CEO keeps his job
Virgin's decision was announced hours after Boeing's chief executive and chairman Dennis Muilenburg survived a shareholder motion to split his two roles.
He later told reporters he would continue to lead the company through a crisis that has triggered the grounding of Boeing's fastest-selling plane, lawsuits, investigations and lingering concerns over the 737 MAX's safety.
"I am very focused on safety going forward," he said after the meeting when reporters asked if he had considered resigning.
Quote:"I am strongly vested in that. My clear intent is to continue to lead on the front of safety, quality and integrity."
However, Boeing will need to win back the trust of customers, passengers and regulators following the crashes.
The aviation giant, worth $US214 billion, has experienced a 10 per cent slump in its share price since the Ethiopian Airlines crash in March.
What we know about the 737 MAX
Boeing's newest version of its most popular plane, the 737 MAX, is again in the spotlight after another deadly crash minutes after take-off.
Boeing is under pressure to deliver a software fix to prevent erroneous data from triggering the plane's anti-stall system MCAS (the Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System).
The company has acknowledged that the accidental firing of the software based on bad sensor data was a common link in the chain of events leading to the two accidents.
Last week, Boeing abandoned its 2019 financial outlook, halted share buybacks and said lowered production due to the 737 MAX grounding had cost it at least $US1 billion so far.
Shareholders have filed a lawsuit accusing the company of defrauding them by concealing safety deficiencies in the planes.
The model is also the target of investigations by US transportation authorities and the Department of Justice.
ABC/Reuters
Quote:‘Carry-on bags drove death toll’
- ROBYN IRONSIDE
AVIATION WRITER
@ironsider
- 11:15AM MAY 6, 2019
- 43 COMMENTS
A slow-moving fire service and passengers retrieving carry-on bags are thought to have pushed the death toll higher following the fiery landing of an Aeroflot flight at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport.
Forty-one of the 78 people on board the Russian-made Sukhoi Superjet-100 died when Flight SU-1492 to Mumansk returned to Sheremetyevo minutes after takeoff on Sunday at 6.02pm (1.02am yesterday AEST) and landed heavily, bouncing twice.
As a result, the main landing gear collapsed and the fuel tanks ruptured, leaving the aeroplane to careen off the runway on its nose gear and engines, resulting in a massive fire. With the flames spreading along the fuselage, two emergency slides were deployed from the front exits and passengers began fleeing the aircraft, many with bags in tow.
The scenes horrified aviation experts including Australian cabin safety consultant Susan Rice, who said there was no question in her mind that passengers grabbing bags would’ve cost others their life.
“For people to be standing in the aisle retrieving their bags from the overhead lockers, that could mean seconds between their own life and death,” Ms Rice said.
“That’s a conscious decision to hold up other people and I can’t comprehend it.”
Concerns were also raised about the length of time taken for fire crews to appear on the scene, with experts describing the response at Moscow’s largest airport as “extraordinarily poor”.
[font=Helvetica, Roboto,]
Quote:
[/url]Breaking Mash@BreakingMash
Видео из салона самолета Москва-Мурманск, сгоревшего при посадке в Шереметьево.
Люди в панике, огонь охватывает почти все за бортом.
[url=https://twitter.com/intent/like?tweet_id=1125122866150871040]166
5:39 AM - May 6, 2019
Veteran aviation commentator Neil Hansford said once a mayday was called, as in this instance, firefighters should have been mobilised. “It looks like they hadn’t even left the fire station when the plane touched down,” he said.
It took 45-minutes for the fire to be extinguished, not helped by the large amount of fuel on board for the 2½ hour-flight to Murmansk.
Exactly what caused the initial problems was unclear, although some Russian reports blamed a lightning strike for disabling radio communications and prompting the return to Sheremetyevo.
US aviation safety consultant John Cox said modern airliners were generally built to withstand lightning strikes. “I have had several, all with minimal damage,” Captain Cox said.
“If they did take a strike and had a problem with the aeroplane, it would be very unusual. The European Aviation Safety Agency standards are strict and effective.”
A statement from Aeroflot said malfunctions occurred shortly after departure prompting the flight to urgently return to Moscow and make an emergency landing, during which the plane’s engines caught fire on the runway.
The five crew did everything to save the passengers, who were evacuated in 55 seconds, it said.
One crew member was among the victims but the captain and first officer escaped unhurt. “The aircraft commander left the burning car last,” Aeroflot said.
The airline operates about 50 Sukhoi Superjets, which have a reputation for poor reliability, partly due to US sanctions that have forced US-made parts to be replaced with Russian equivalents.
Previous incidents involving the aircraft include a crash in Indonesia during a demonstration flight in 2012 that killed everyone on board, and more recently a runway excursion at Yakutsk Airport, Russia, in which the main landing gear collapsed but there was no fire.
Ms Rice said she hoped the latest incident would be a catalyst for change in the way passengers behaved in an emergency.
“I do think we’re coming to a point where education of passengers needs to become more of a priority for our regulatory authorities as well as the airlines,” she said.
“I’ve been in the industry for well over 40 years and in years gone by people didn’t take cabin baggage with them. Is it a mark of today’s society that it’s just ‘me, me, me’?”
Apart from the potential delays in an emergency, Ms Rice said taking luggage on to the emergency slide could cause injuries or even damage the inflatable slide.
“Now there’s talk of having the ability to lock the overhead lockers but if people are that determined to get their bag, they might hold up others even more, trying to get them open,” she said.
Mr Hansford said perhaps it was time for a marketing campaign asking: “Is your cabin bag more important than your life?”
Moscow’s Inter-regional Transport Prosecution Office announced an investigation into the Aeroflot incident. President Vladimir Putin reportedly offered his condolences to the victims’ families, to whom compensation of 1 million roubles ($22,000) was to be paid.
![[Image: D05ZtSnWoAAfBWZ.jpg]](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D05ZtSnWoAAfBWZ.jpg)
Quote:FLIGHT DATA RECORDER REVEALS FATE OF CRASHED SUPERJET
written by Australianaviation.Com.Au May 21, 2019
The flight data recorder on board Aeroflot flight SU 1492 has revealed key information about the final minutes of the ill-fated Sukhoi Superjet 100 that crashed and burned at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport on May 5.
Forty-one people died in the crash, with a further 10 taken to hospital.
The aircraft, with 73 passengers and five crew on board the flight from Sheremetyevo to Murmansk, was forced to return to Moscow after 30 minutes.
The Superjet had reached FL100 when the crew reported a lightning strike and loss of radio communication. They declared an emergency via their transponder and set course for an emergency landing.
Eyewitnesses reported seeing the aircraft hit the runway hard before bouncing into the air, hit the runway again and burst into flames.
The reports were later borne out by ground observer footage.
Moscow’s Inter-regional Transport Prosecution Office opened an investigation into the accident which will include an assessment of the actions of the crew.
Meanwhile the Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) has completed work on the contents of the black boxes recovered from the wreckage which show multiple issues during the emergency landing procedure.
According to The Aviation Herald the data was revealed by Rosaviatsia (the Russian equivalent of CASA).
It reported that the flightdeck crew on SU-1492 consisted of the captain (43, ATPL, 6,844 hours total, 1,570 hours on type) assisted by a first officer (36, CPL, 773 hours total, 623 hours on type).
“About 30-40km (16-21nm) west of Sheremetyevo Airport there was rain in clouds, the clouds extended to a height of 8,000 to 9,000 meters (FL262-295) and contained a thunderstorm. The aircraft was climbing through 7,900 feet at 15:08Z when an electrical failure occurred, the flight control system (FCS) degraded to “DIRECT MODE”, the autopilot automatically disconnected; the aircraft was in the middle of thunderstorm activity.
“The captain assumed manual control of the aircraft until the end of the flight. Radio communication, that had taken place on VHF #1 radio so far, became unavailable, the crew was able to partially restore communication via VHF #2 on the emergency frequency only. The crew set the squawk for loss of communication.
“The crew decided to return to Sheremetyevo and performed a manual ILS approach to runway 24L. At the time the aircraft intercepted the glideslope the aircraft’s mass was 42,600kg, which was 1,600kg above the maximum landing weight. The crew deployed the flaps to 25 degrees in accordance with the flight crew operating manual for flight with minimum mode (DIRECT MODE) of the FCS as well as landing above MLW.
“At 15:26Z the crew set the emergency transponder code. Vapp was determined to be 155 KIAS, the descent on the glideslope was stabilised and without any deviation from Vapp.
“Winds during the approach came from 190 degrees at 30 knots. Descending between 1,100 and 900 feet the crew received 5 cycles of predictive windshear warnings ‘Wind Shear ahead, go around!’ Descending through 260 feet AGL the aircraft began to deviate below the glide slope, a ‘GLIDESLOPE’ warning occurred.
“Descending between 180 to 40 feet the engine thrust was increased causing the aircraft to accelerate to 164 knots. At 16 feet AGL the speed was 170 KIAS. A Terrain Awareness Warning System aural signal ‘Retard’ occurred, the engine thrust was reduced to idle.
“At that point the captain began to apply oscillating pitch inputs with increasing amplitude which changed the pitch angle up to +6 and -2 degrees. The aircraft made a “three point” touchdown 900 meters past the runway threshold at 158 KIAS and a vertical load of +2.55G and bounced up to 6 feet AGL. The spoilers did not deploy. In DIRECT MODE they are not permitted to operate automatically and need to be extended manually, however the spoilers were not manually extended by the crew.
Two seconds after the first touchdown the aircraft touched down a second time with the nose gear first at 155 KIAS and +5.85G. The aircraft bounced off again to 18 feet AGL.
“A third touchdown occurred at 140 KIAS in excess of +5G resulting in the destruction of the construction, a fuel spill and fire. While the aircraft was skidding along the runway at 100 KIAS a first fire alarm triggered in the aft cargo compartment, 16 seconds later in the tail section of the aircraft. The aircraft came to a stop 20 seconds after the first fire alarm. Forty seconds after the first fire alarm the fire extinguisher in the tail section was activated. The engines continued to run until end (at 15:31:04Z) of the FDR recording 47 seconds after the first fire alarm.”
A passenger recorded a video of the final approach and landing up to the point of the first bounce.
“The MAK is conducting the investigation which focuses also on the predictive wind shear alerts and the reaction to them.”
(Report with The Aviation Herald).
Quote:9.2.27 The operational objective of the rescue and firefighting service shall be to achieve a response time not
exceeding three minutes to any point of each operational runway, in optimum visibility and surface conditions.
Quote:If you ever wanted a better example of why it is the miniscule McDo'Naught will not even entertain the thought that his aviation safety bureaucracy is taking the Mickey Bliss out of both him and the ICAO muppets, while the slices of Swiss cheese are 'thinned to the absolute minimum required by law' and serious identified aviation safety issues continue to be effectively ignored, then go no further than the following article in the Oz...![[Image: dodgy.gif]](https://auntypru.com/forum/images/smilies/dodgy.gif)
Quote:..The aircraft made a "three point" touchdown 900 meters past the runway threshold at 158 KIAS and a vertical load of +2.55G and bounced up to 6 feet AGL. The spoilers did not deploy, in DIRECT MODE they are not permitted to operate automatically and need to be extended manually, however, the spoilers were not manually extended by the crew. 2 seconds after the first touch down the aircraft touched down a second time with the nose gear first at 155 KIAS and +5.85G, the aircraft bounced off again to 18 feet AGL. A third touchdown occurred at 140 KIAS in excess of +5G resulting in the destruction of the construction, a fuel spill and fire. While the aircraft was skidding along the runway at 100 KIAS a first fire alarm triggered in the aft cargo compartment, 16 seconds later in the tail section of the aircraft, the aircraft came to a stop 20 seconds after the first fire alarm...
Quote:...Following the sustained left sideslip, the aircraft began to descend and at 0858:48 the pilot transmitted on the Essendon Tower frequency repeating the word ‘MAYDAY’ seven times in rapid succession. Approximately 10 seconds after the aircraft became airborne, and 2 seconds after the transmission was completed, the aircraft collided with the roof of a building in the Essendon Airport Bulla Road Precinct -Retail Outlet Centre (outlet centre), coming to rest in a loading area at the rear of the building...CCTV footage from a camera positioned at the rear of the building showed the final part of the accident sequence with post-impact fire evident; about 2 minutes later, first responders arrived onsite. At about 0905 and 0908 respectively, Victoria Police and the Metropolitan Fire Brigade arrived...MTF...P2
Quote:May 30, 2019And:
Aviation
Aussie law firm targets Boeing
By Robyn Ironside
An Australian law firm has been engaged by an airline pilot to sue Boeing and the US Federal Aviation Administration over their production and certification of the now-grounded 737 Max 8.
International Aerospace Law and Policy Group principal Joseph Wheeler said “Pilot X” came to them as a Max-certified pilot and others were expected to join what would be a class action.
He said Pilot X had been significantly impacted by the strong feeling that “it could have been me” following two fatal crashes involving near-new Boeing 737 Max 8s in five months.
A total of 346 people lost their lives in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes, which were both attributed to a feature of the 737 Max known as the manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system (MCAS).
Pilots were unaware the system had been installed by Boeing to compensate for a shift in the aircraft’s centre of lift because of the placement of heavier, larger engines.
“Pilot X, whose identity shall remain private, is disgusted and bewildered as to how a critical safety system like MCAS, with its shortcomings, could be certified and deployed, but its presence withheld from the knowledge of pilots until so many deaths triggered disclosure,” Mr Wheeler said. “Our team is preparing an action for damages in US state courts, and relevant notices of claim against the FAA for damages, including punitive damages, on behalf of pilots led by Pilot X.
“The more who join the action, the more likely it will lead to a positive change for all pilots.”
IALPG would work with the US-based firm PMJ to seek compensation from Boeing and the FAA on the pilot’s behalf, and other affected Max-certified pilots, Mr Wheeler said.
PMJ managing partner Patrick Jones said the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes had left a lot of pilots wondering “what else did they not tell us about?”
“For pilots like Pilot X, the fear of ending up in a situation like Flight ET302 is now far too real and has caused serious distress,” Mr Jones said.
“These types of concerns could affect retirement decisions and the ability to take up options to move up on fleets with carriers who insist on retaining the Max.”
Mr Wheeler said the matter would be pursued on behalf of the pilots on a no-win, no-fee basis.
“In our view, it is only the voice of pilots that will ensure changes to the broken system that permitted (crash flights) JT610 and ET302 to happen,” he said. “After all, pilots are the ones entrusted to keep passengers safe.”
Boeing is already facing more than 30 lawsuits over the two 737 Max 8 crashes, mostly brought by relatives of the people killed.
Boeing chairman Dennis Muilenburg has previously apologised for the lives lost, and acknowledged that in both cases MCAS had activated.
Quote:May 29, 2019
Aviation
Timing key for 737 MAX return
A synchronised global return of Boeing’s 737 MAX will help boost confidence in the troubled aircraft, airlines say.
By Robyn Ironside
Airlines have called for the reintroduction of the Boeing 737 MAX to occur at the same time worldwide to help restore public confidence in the aircraft.
Speaking ahead of the International Air Transport Association annual general meeting in Seoul this weekend, director-general and CEO Alexandre de Juniac said it would be unhelpful for the current global grounding to go on for too long.
“We are urging the regulators to have the most comprehensive, consistent and collaborative approach, to have the same timeline if possible. Otherwise it will create disruptions,” Mr de Juniac said.
He said it was important the 737 MAX was not returned to service too quickly. But nor should the grounding go on for too long.
“The compromise is to find the appropriate time frame, not be too short to threaten safety and not be too long,” said Mr de Juniac.
“Ten to 12 weeks would be the minimum delay [for a return to service] but we cannot speak authoritatively on the appropriate delay. It is in the hands of the various regulators and agencies to ensure the delay is the right one.”
More than 370 Boeing 737 MAX 8 and 9 aircraft have been grounded worldwide since late March, following the second fatal crash in five months.
Boeing is expected to deliver its software fix and upgraded training package for the aircraft to the US’ Federal Aviation Administration for approval within weeks or even days.
US carriers, like American Airlines, have indicated they expect the 737 MAX to be back in service from mid to late-August.
No Australian airlines operate the aircraft as yet. Virgin Australia has deferred delivery of its first 737 MAX 8 until 2025, with a 737 MAX 10 to arrive in 2021.
Mr de Juniac flagged the grounding of the 737 MAX, as one of range of issues that had made 2019 the most challenging for the airline industry since the global financial crisis.
“Rising costs, trade wars and other uncertainties are likely to have an impact on the bottom line,” he said.
“The prolonged grounding of the 737 MAX is taking its toll and aviation like all industries is under intensified scrutiny for its impact on climate change.”
New data released by IATA showed the amount of freight carried by airlines continued to fall in April but the number of passengers grew 4.3 per cent in the month compared to the same time last year.
Mr de Juniac described the passenger growth as “solid but not exceptional”.
“This partly is owing to the timing of Easter but also reflects the slowing global economy,” he said.
“Global trade is falling and as a result we are not seeing traffic growing at the same levels as a year ago.”
Quote:JUNE 15 2019 - 2:35AM
Investigators to identify MH17 suspects
Criminal proceedings are expected to the launched against those suspected of shooting down MH17.
Investigators will next week announce criminal proceedings against suspects in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 five years ago, allegedly by pro-Russian separatists, two leading Dutch broadcasters report.
MH17 was shot out of the sky over territory held by separatists in eastern Ukraine as it flew from Amsterdam to the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur, killing all 298 people on board.
There were 38 Australians, one New Zealander, 193 Dutch, 43 Malaysians and 12 Indonesians were aboard, as well as 10 British passengers.
The other passengers were from Germany, Belgium, the Philippines and Canada.
Dutch prosecutors said on Friday a multinational investigation team would present its latest findings to media and families on June 19. A spokesman for the national Dutch prosecution service declined to specify what would be announced.
Citing anonymous sources, broadcaster RTL reported that the public prosecution service had decided to launch a case against several MH17 suspects.
National public broadcaster NOS also reported that criminal proceedings will be announced against individual suspects.
No suspects were named in the reports.
The Joint Investigation Team, which seeks to try the suspects under Dutch law, has said the missile system came from the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Brigade, based in the western Russian city of Kursk.
Investigators had said their next step would be to identify individual culprits and to attempt to put them on trial.
Dutch officials have said Russia has refused to cooperate.
Russia is not expected to surrender any potential suspects who may be on its territory and authorities have said individuals could be tried in absentia.
The Joint Investigation Team was formed in 2014 by Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Ukraine to investigate collaboratively.
The Netherlands and Australia hold Russia legally responsible. Moscow denies all involvement and maintains that it does not support, financially or with equipment, pro-Russian rebels fighting Ukrainian government troops.
Australian Associated Press
Quote:DETAILED FLIGHTDECK INSIGHT INTO FATE OF CRASHED SUPERJET
written by Australianaviation.Com.Au June 15, 2019
A detailed initial preliminary report by Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) has revealed key information about the final minutes of the ill-fated Sukhoi Superjet 100, Aeroflot flight SU1492, that crashed and burned at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport on May 5.
Forty-one people died in the crash, with a further 10 taken to hospital.
The aircraft, with 73 passengers and five crew on board the flight from Sheremetyevo to Murmansk, was forced to return to Moscow after 30 minutes.
The Superjet had reached FL100 when the crew reported a lightning strike and loss of radio communication. They declared an emergency via their transponder and set course for an emergency landing.
Eyewitnesses reported seeing the aircraft hit the runway hard before bouncing into the air, hit the runway again and burst into flames.
The reports were later borne out by ground observer footage.
Now the preliminary investigative report paints a detailed picture from both the flight data and cockpit voice recorders of what happened in the lead up to the landing.
The findings are reproduced here as written (in English) and with minimal editing, courtesy of the Aviation Herald website, avherald.com
The MAK report stated the captain (42, ATPL, 6,800 hours total, 1,570 hours on type, 1,428 hours in command) was pilot flying, the first officer (36, CPL, 765 hours total, 615 hours on type) was pilot monitoring.
The MAK reported that examination of the fuselage revealed typical traces of “lightning impact” on the right side angle of attack sensor, the right temperature probe and right ice detector.
The MAK reported the sequence of events stating the crew performed a normal departure though noticing flashes to their right, and were cleared to climb to FL070.
The MAK wrote:
At 15:07:10, the «HEADING» / «HDG» mode was engaged in the lateral control channel, and the selected heading was set to 327°. According to the Vnukovo doppler weather radar, the aircraft was flying through the active thunderstorm area (Fig. 3), that was moving from the southwest to north-east with the speed of 40-45 km/h. The transition to the selected heading mode caused the aircraft to initiate the right turn earlier than it is prescribed by SID KN 24E. The crew did not requested the active thunderstorm area avoidance clearance.
On contacting the Approach controller, the crew was instructed to climb to FL90. At 15:07:21, the crew set the new selected altitude of 8,992 ft (2,741 m) and activated the “CLIMB” / “CLB” mode.
During the period from 15:07:30 to 15:07:33, the following conversation between the crew members was recorded: PIC: “We are going to get shaken”, FO: “Damn it.”, PIC: “Nothing to worry about”.
At 15:07:34, the approach controller instructed the crew to climb to FL100. At 15:07:39, the selected altitude was 9,984 ft (3,043 m), with “CLIMB” / “CLB” mode continued to be engaged in the longitudinal control channel.
At 15:07:43, the “LATERAL NAVIGATION” / “LNAV” mode was engaged again in the horizontal plane. By that time, the aircraft was flying with heading of 317°, the right roll of 24° and the indicated speed of 250 kt (463 km/h).
At 15:08:03, the approach controller instructed the crew to climb to FL110. When the FO confirmed receiving the instruction, recorded by the CVR, (a) sound effect lasting for 1.5 seconds, starting from 15:08:09.7, was recorded. Most probably, at this stage, an atmospheric electricity impact affected the aircraft. Three seconds prior, the FDR started to record the single commands, indicating the engagement of the permanent ignition on the both engines.
At 15:08:11, the crew set new selected altitude of 11,008 ft (3,355 m) and the new selected vertical speed of 3,281 ft/min (16.7 m/s), and the “VERTCIAL SPEED” / “VS” mode was engaged.
At 15:08:11.9, the disengagement of the autopilot occurred, accompanied by the corresponding aural alert and the switching of the automatic flight control system into the “DIRECT MODE with the audio alert “DIRECT MODE. DIRECT MODE”. After the sound effect, simultaneously with the autopilot disengagement, the emotional exclamation of one of the crew members was recorded: “Wow!”. The auto throttle continued to be engaged. The aircraft was in 20° right roll, crossing FL89 (2,700 m) in climb.
Starting from 15:08:12, during 15 seconds, the FDRs incorrectly recorded single commands and the analog parameters, which are usually recorded via the electronic interface unit, EIU-100. Two single commands and, “EIU1 FAULT” and “EIU2 FAULT”, were recorded simultaneously.
The conducted examinations have shown that, most probably, at that stage, a reboot of the data concentrator units occurred, which caused the switching of the automatic flight control system into the «DIRECT MODE». According to the “List of special situations for the RRJ-95B aircraft” during the certification this event had been classified as a “complicated situation”
After the switching to the “DIRECT MODE”, the “FLAPS ICE” configuration (slats 0°, flaps 1°) was engaged automatically.
Starting from 15:08:16, the aircraft control was switched to manual control from the lefthand side pilot station. During the period of approximately four seconds, starting from the moment of the autopilot disengagement and till the PIC took over the aircraft control, the right roll decreased to 13°, pitch attitude increased (from 11° to 12°). The PIC’s first control input was affecting the roll channel, the sidestick was declined to 11.7° to the left (which is for more than half of its travel range), after that the sidestick was advanced to 6.8° (which corresponds to the half of its pitch-down travel range). Further sidestick control movements both in the roll and in pitch channels was of an abrupt and intermittent character. At 15:08:22, the aircraft was turned to the right via multiple impulse deflections of the sidestick ranging from 30% to 65%. To set the roll of ≈20° the pilot performed more than 10 roll deflection movements of the sidestick during the period of 18 seconds. Moreover, at different moments of the further flight the PRIORITY / APOFF8 button was pressed momentarily (for approximately 1 second) on the left sidestick 6 times.
The aircraft continued to develop the right turn in accordance with the KN 24E chart and continued to climb. At 15:08:47, the auto throttle was disengaged by the overriding movement of the thrust lever. At 15:09:17, the aircraft was put out of the right roll mode and was set to the heading of about 60°.
After short discussion with the FO, the PIC made the decision to return to Sheremetyevo and ordered the FO to report PAN-PAN. After several failed attempts to contact the controller on the working frequency via VHF-Station 1 (the one that was used from the beginning of the flight), at 15:09:32, after the discussion, the crew set the 7600 squawk code (for lost radio communication).
At 15:09:35 radio-contact was restored at the emergency frequency (121.5 MHs) via VHFStation 2. After that, at 15:09:39, the FO reported the approach controller: “Moscow-Approach, request return of 14-92, radio lost, aircraft in direct mode”. The controller issued an instruction to descend to FL 80. Maximum altitude the aircraft gained was 10,600 ft (3,230 m) (QNE).
The crew responded: “Aeroflot 14-92, heading 0-57, descending to FL 8-0”. The controller confirmed the clearance for the descent with the maintained present heading. Further flight till the moment of the glideslope capture was performed by means of vectoring.
At 15:09:52, the crew set the selected altitude of 8,000 ft (2,438 m) and disengaged the FMS speed control mode, set the selected speed of 250 kt (463 km/h) and put the aircraft into the descent mode. In descending, the PIC maintained the indicated air speed by changing the pitch angle and the thrust levers’ positions.
Later into the descent while intercepting the localiser the MAK writes:
At 15:15:34, the controller cleared the crew for the ILS Yankee approach, RWY 24 left.
After the permission confirmation, the FO started reading section QRH “F/CTL DIRECT MODE”, inter alia: “… Auto throttle should not be used, fly smoothly. … Balance manually. … Speed brake no less than a half. … use Flaps 3. TAWS, landing gear, Flaps 3 on. V approach, V reference plus 10. Landing distance – increase by 1-34. … Speed brake set to full after touchdown. Go-around lever to NTO”.
At 15:16:54, the controller instructed: “… proceed right heading 210 till localiser capture …”.
At 15:17:39, the FO, after the command from the PIC, reported to the controller that the crew was not ready to perform landing approach and requested an orbit, but then corrected himself: “the circuit” and the controller responded: “… heading 360 to the right”.
At 15:18:53, the PIC tried to contact the controller himself: “Aeroflot 14-92, holding area above Kilo November, if possible”.
The message was not recorded by the controller’s recorder. The PIC did not raise this question again.
When performing an orbit flight at 600m QFE, the PIC could not maintain the altitude precisely. During right turns with roll up to 40°, the deviation from the selected altitude exceeded ±200 ft (60 m), and that triggered multiple aural alerts. The PIC was aware of that, at 15:22:53: “How come… plus-minus 200 feet”.
During the orbit flight performance, the FO was reading out the QRH “OVER MAXIMUM LANDING WEIGHT LANDING” section.
The weight of the aircraft was about 42,600 kg which exceeded the maximum landing weight by 1,600 kg. To gain the maximum thrust in order to be able to perform the go-around, the crew switched off the engine air bleed supply to the conditioning system. The FO also read out that the maximum vertical speed of descend before the touchdown must be no more than 360 ft/min (1.8 m/s). During the standard approach and landing (the Standard Procedures)) the vertical speed recommended by FCOM is 150-200 ft/min (from 0.76 to 1 m/s).
At 15:20:41, the crew started the APU.
At 15:21:38, at 225 kt (415 km/h) the crew initiated the flaps deployment to FLAPS 1 (slats 18°, flaps 3°).
At 15:23:03, after the PIC’s order, the FO reported the controller that the crew was ready for landing.
At 15:23:19, at 190 kt (350 km/h) the crew initiated the flaps deployment to FLAPS 2 (slats 24°, flaps 16°).
At 15:23:58 the crew started the landing gear extension.
At 15:24:02, the crew armed the speedbrake system.
Note: Automatic speedbrake deployment mode which can be engaged during the landing and which is inactive when the Remote Control system is in the “DIRECT MODE”. At 15:24:20, at 170 kt (315 km/h), the crew set the flaps into the landing configuration, FLAPS 3 (slats 24°, flaps 25°).
During the landing gear and flaps deployment, the PIC performed stabiliser trimming manually. When the aircraft was set to the landing configuration, the stabiliser deflection angle was ≈3.5° pitch-up and it almost did not change until landing (one short pitch-up pressing was recorded during the glideslope descent).
The aircraft was put to the landing heading at the distance of more than 20km from the RWY24L threshold. The final approach fix is located at the distance of 9.3 km.
At 15:24:38, the crew responded to the controller’s request that they would perform the ILS approach. By 15:25:57, the crew had finished the “DURING LANDING” section checklist.
The crew performed neither the before-landing briefing nor the “APPROACH” checklist.
At 15:26:05, the crew had the following conversation: the FO “Should I set the transponder to 7700? Or leave as it is? Ok, roger.” The PIC: “We could have done it long before, actually.” The CVR record does not provide us with clear understanding of the PIC’s decision. Nevertheless, at 15:26:31 the crew set the transponder to 7700.
At 15:27:20, the glideslope descent was initiated. The go-around altitude was not set by the crew.
During the approach about 2 minutes prior to landing the MAK describes:
At 15:28:26, at 1,600 ft (490m) QNH (at the radio altitude of 1,100 ft (335 m)) the “WINDSHEAR” warning was recorded. It is generated by the crew alerting system based on the windshear forecast data of the weather radar, accompanied by the voice message “GO-AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD”. This warning informs the crew about the possible windshear enroute. The alert lasted for 11 seconds and included 2.5 warning cycles (5 voice messages, each cycle consisting of 2 messages one after another, with the 1 second interval in-between). The crew had no discussion of this warning triggering.
Note: In the QRH “W/S AHEAD” Section (1.18.8) states that the triggering of this warning during the approach indicates that the crew must initiate the go-around procedure. At the same time in the beginning of the section, there is the notice that if the crew is sure that there is no windshear hasard and there are no other signs of windshear, and the RWS is operative, this warning may require no responsive actions from the crew. The same provisions are incorporated into the Flight Operations Manual.
The MAK continued:
At 15:29:22, the FO called out that the landing decision height was close. The PIC confirmed continuing the approach.
At 15:29:31, at 270ft (82 m) the aural annunciator system informed the crew on reaching the landing decision height minimum, it was repeated by the FO. Starting from that moment, there were noted fast increase of the downward glideslope deviation (up to minus 1.4 dots), which caused the TAWS “GLIDESLOPE” alert to indicate the glideslope deviation The alert was on for 4 seconds. The PIC confirmed hearing the alert by saying “Advisory”.
The MAK added that FCOM states the GLIDESLOPE warning below decision height is “advisory”, hence a go around was not required.
The MAK then continues the sequence of events:
Simultaneously with the warning triggering, the PIC increased engines power (the trust levers were set to 24° to 23°, which caused the N1 increase up to 77 to 74%). The increase of the engine power caused the increase of the indicated air speed: when the aircraft was passing RWY threshold: at 40ft (12 m) it was up to 164 kt (304 km/h), and by 16ft (5m) it was up to 170kt (315 km/h). According to FCOM, the required landing approach speed for the actual conditions was 155kt (287 km/h). This speed was set by the crew as the selected speed. The airline’s Flight Operations Manual contains the value plus 20kt as the criterion for the stabilised landing approach (Section 1.18.9).
Over the RWY threshold, the glideslope deviation was minus 0.9 dot (i.e. below the glideslope). After passing the RWY threshold, the vertical speed of descent was decreased.
At 15:29:54, at 17 ft (5.2m) aural alert “RETARD. RETARD” informed the crew on reaching the height recommended for the thrust levers to be set to “IDLE” during the flare. The PIC started to change thrust levers positions simultaneously with the alert triggering.
Almost simultaneously with the thrust levers positions changed to “IDLE”, the PIC initiated the flare by pulling the sidestick by 8.8° (65% of its travel range). Further on, the PIC’s pitch sidestick inputs were recorded up to the both maximum advanced and maximum retarded positions with a relatively long holding period in the both maximum positions. These inputs caused counter-reversal pitch change (+6…-2º).
At 15:30:00, at a distance of ≈900 m from the RWY threshold at indicated air speed of 158kt (293km/h), first touchdown occurred. The touchdown occurred at the pitch angle close to zero (7 pitch up rate; at the moment of the touchdown, the sidestick was in the maximum retarded position; and during the landing within 0.4 seconds, its position was changed for the maximum advanced), for “threedots”, with vertical g-force of no less than 2.55 g.
In “DIRECT MODE”, the automatic deployment of the speedbrakes (spoilers) is not provided by the design, and the manual speedbrakes deployment was not engaged by the crew. After the touchdown, the aircraft bounced up for the a height of no more than ≈ 5-6 ft (2 m).
After the aircraft was bounced up, the sidestick continued to be held in the maximum advanced position, which caused the pitch downward rate of up to 10.5°/s, the rapid downward pitch angle decrease to 4° and the repeated touchdown with the nose landing gear touching the ground first.
The second touchdown occurred 2.2 seconds after the first touchdown, at the indicated air speed of 155kt (287km/h).
Landing performed with the nose gear touching the ground first, with the high vertical speed and the fully retarded sidestick immediately before touchdown, caused the intensive pitch-up rotation of the aircraft. The maximum pitch rate recorded was ≈25°/s and the vertical g-force was no less than 5.85 g. As the result, the angle of attack and the pitch angle increased, which, due to the remaining significant value of the indicated air speed, caused the repeated bouncing (“progressing bouncing”), despite the sidestick fully advanced position at bouncing up.
During the first bouncing up, when the aircraft was in the air, the PIC switched the thrust levers to the “Maximum Reverse” mode but the thrust reverser doors did not deploy, as there were no weight-on-wheel (WOW) signals. Upon receipt of the left and right main landing gears WOW signals, the reverser doors started to deploy, which was completed after the second aircraft bouncing up movement off the RWY. There was no engine power increase as at this moment, there was no WOW signal again.
During the second bouncing up, the aircraft reached the height of ≈ 15 – 18 ft (5-6 m). In 2-3 seconds after this repeated bouncing up, the thrust levers were set to “Takeoff” mode and the sidestick was pulled to the maximum retard position. This actions may be interpreted as an attempt to perform the go-around, as before that the thrust reverser system was engaged (the reverser doors were in the open position, though starting to close), the engine thrust did not increase.
At 15:30:05, with the indicated air speed of 140kt (258km/h), the third touchdown occurred with vertical g-force of no less than 5g. The type of the markings left on the RWY after the third touchdown, indicate that the main landing gears were by that moment already partially destroyed. The main landing gears collapsed, further on, the aircraft structural disintegration with fuel spillage and fire occurred.
With respect to the oscillating control inputs the MAK wrote:
The Commission carried out preliminary comparative analysis of the approaches performed by the PIC manually (with disengaged autopilot) in «NORMAL MODE», with the emergency flight … (it) shows that the sidestick movements for the pitch in the emergency flight are characterised by significantly wider amplitude, and are oscillatory, which caused significant changes of longitudinal motion parameters. Similar “sweeping” movements were observed during landing performed in «DIRECT MODE» by other crews of the airline. Reasons of these peculiarities are being analysed.
The MAK reported with respect to weak links in the airframe design:
There are safety pins in the RRJ-95 landing gear design which are the elements of a certain level of strength, and they are the first to be destroyed upon the impact of a single design load, determined basing on the load application conditions given in aviation regulations, it is proved by calculations and tests. Destruction of the safety pins causes the gear to move up and backwards and does not cause the damage to the wing box.
The RRJ-95 safety analysis concerning the fuel leakage from the wing box upon the main landing gear destruction was carried out during design studies by modelling of the process of gear destruction when the calculated loads on the landing gear are exceeded. The conditions of application of the load listed in the certification requirements were considered. The certification report was issued. Basing on the calculations, the strength and design requirements for safety pins in the gear hinge fitting were determined. In production the safety pins are particularly important parts, the blanks are under special control, and the parts themselves undergo periodic testing.
During operation, the confirmation of the compliance of the serial design to the design parameters was established as a result of an investigation of a serious incident – a very rough landing of the aircraft MSN95032 with a vertical acceleration of about 4g, as a result of which the safety pins of the right main landing gear were destroyed. The corresponding report has been issued on this incident. In the course of the accident with RA-89098 there were three consequent touchdowns to the RWY with accelerations not less than 2.55g, 5.85g, 5.0g. The airframe endurance design vertical acceleration is 3.75g.
The acceleration of 2.55 g did not exceed the value calculated for the cut off of the safety pins of the main landing gear hinge brackets on the rear spar, so at the acceleration of 5.85g the cut off of the safety pins of the right and the left main landing gear to the rear spar of the wing occurred. At the third runway touchdown, with the allowable vertical loads exceeded, the structure condition did not allow the gear to absorb the loads of the landing and they broke down, (the) wing structure was destroyed in the areas of the hinges of the hydraulic cylinders. The aircraft went “low” and (onto) the nacelles and the rear part of the fuselage. The situation described above is not provided for in the current airworthiness standards.
In accordance with the certification rules, the evaluation of secondary impacts of the airframe on the ground after the destruction of the landing gear is not required.
A full report will be released in due course.
A passenger recorded a video of the final approach and landing up to the point of the first bounce.
(Report with The Aviation Herald).
Comment:
GLEN TOWLER June 17, 2019 - 8:36 am
The good old Swiss cheese model all the holes lined up just right. There so many things they done wrong like flying through a thunderstorm, ignoring windshear warnings, wild control input and not using checklists. The PIC didn’t seem to know how to fly the aircraft in direct mode.
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