[Kharon]

Item #2 on my NY wish list.

Whenever I see Nigeria mentioned, my thoughts always turn to the modest, excellent Smith. This first class Australian way laying the foundations for the Nigerian success story and dramatic reform back when the last two DAS were little more than ‘drivers – airframe’. Considering the bloody awful shambles left behind by the previous incumbents; perhaps it is time Australia considered employing a ‘professional’ man to bring about the changes so desperately needed.

Would it not be a great thing, if Australia could garner the same accolades as Nigeria?

Perhaps when the Can’tberra shuffle is complete; when the MM is safely ensconced in the PMC and ‘Wingnut’ has his feet under MM’s desk, good sense will prevail and a competent, properly qualified DAS, with a track record of getting ‘the job’ done will be brought in.

Toot-toot.

[Gobbledock]

'K';

Perhaps when the Can’tberra shuffle is complete; when the MM is safely ensconced in the PMC and ‘Wingnut’ has his feet under MM’s desk, good sense will prevail and a competent, properly qualified DAS, with a track record of getting ‘the job’ done will be brought in.

Hey, that was MY Xmas wish Kharon, go find your own wish!!!
Ok ok, I will share........

[Kharon]

Cheers GD, don’t know if that was a case of great minds thinking alike; or, fools never differing, both seem extreme. The only thing that doesn’t seem to fit is the lady who ran MM’s seat at last estimates; (forgotten name); she did very well and I have seen a picture or two of same, one where Beaker is looking particularly ‘hang-dog’ comes to mind. No matter, the shuffling of mandarins is only of passing interest; but the appointment of a real DAS is of great interest.

Carmody has done rather well – given the circumstances and the short notice; but is unlikely to initiate the major changes required, fair enough that makes good sense. But one cannot remain in a holding pattern indefinitely. The last Muppet was there for a long while and valuable time has been lost. So I’ll amend my wish to a speedy appointment early in the new year of a top notch DAS and that we may bid a fond farewell, with thanks and our best wishes to Mr. Carmody, to be ever referred to, affectionately, as ‘Wingnut’.

Toot toot.

[Sandy Reith]

"Carmody has done rather well....unlikely to initiate the major changes..."
I beg to differ on the former and would substitute "unlikely to" with "will not".

Carmody has taken over the vehicle that is moving ever more quickly towards the precipice following unexplained departure of Skidmore. If there was the slightest respect for the aviation community, let alone the general tax paying public, an honest explanation would have been given for his resignation.

The loss of experienced personnel in training and maintenance is driving up costs, thousands of GA aircraft are not flying and the market for second hand aircraft has collapsed causing umpteen millions of value down the drain. Pilot numbers continue to drop dramatically. Thousands have migrated to the low weight category, induced not by the suitability of the aircraft to their needs but by a more workable regulatory environment, especially a more rational and affordable medical regime. From an overall safety perspective a poor outcome is guaranteed due to the unsuitability of very lightweight aircraft for many, if not most, of the flying tasks they are put to; being severely limited in range, strength (cannot be IFR), carrying capacity, comfort and general ability in Australia's often windy and turbulent skies.

Reading Carmody's bureaucrat soft soap spiel about the move to reform the disastrous AVMED situation could have been shortened to "CASA remains committed to the present administration of aviation medical oversight".

This would save a new round of time wasting useless submissions and concentrate reform effort towards the only plausible way to cause change, political action and political influence, directly and through media and public awareness. Even a Mike Smith would accomplish very little without Ministerial backup. The hard yards are still in front, sorry to say.

"K" - Spot on Sandy – and we have reflected your sentiments, many times, on other threads.  You will note that I did say ‘done rather well’; I omitted to say who for; which I believe to be self evident.  Cheers.

[Peetwo]

'Yes miniscule' receives international acclaim -

On MH370 & some other high profile investigations with matters of an aviation safety nature, signatory States to ICAO will now be clamouring to the Australian political and bureaucratic elite to garner a 'how to' on obfuscating their obligations to ICAO and still remaining a level 1 ICAO compliant State. Yes indeed a remarkable achievement by the Aussies - Aussie! Aussie! Aussie! OI! OI! OI!   

Referring again to the Nigerian story, I note that the Guardian somewhat expanded that news report (note the quote below... ):
 

Nigeria steps-up in global aviation safety rating[/color]
Guardian
 - ‎Jan 2, 2017‎

“Only two member states-Australia and Sri Lanka- have achieved full implementation of the SSP according to ICAO records. Nigeria is striving to achieve Level 4 which will be 100 per cent by the end 0f 2017,” it said.

And in the Daily Trust:

Global aviation safety rating: Nigeria steps up, at par with US, UK
By Abdullateef Aliyu, Lagos | Publish Date: Jan 2 2017 4:25PM



Nigeria has climbed to level three in the implementation of the State Safety Programme (SSP) Process which places it among world leaders in aviation safety.

The country is at par with countries like the United States of America, United Kingdom etc who are already in this category.

An SSP is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving aviation safety which will be monitored through Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) after such a state has achieved an Effective Implementation (EI) of over 60 percent.

It is required that states that have achieved EI levels of over 60 per cent should endeavour to fully implement SSP by 2019.

Nigeria achieved an EI Level of 67.36% during the immediate past ICAO USOAP Audit in March 2016 which is above world average of 63.54%.

The SSP process was initiated among International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO) member countries in compliance with the organization's requirements as contained in Annex 19 on Safety Management.

It was learnt that ICAO tracks the SSP implementation process of member-states via its Integrated Safety Trend Analysis and Reporting System (iSTARS).

According to the Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), Nigeria has completed its Gap Analysis, implemented 43.6% of the required SSP tasks.

General Manager, Public Relations of the NCAA, Mr. Sam Adurogboye told newsmen in Lagos that the country had developed a detailed action plan for the accomplishment of the outstanding tasks with an established and approved timeline.

So far only two member states-Australia and Sri Lanka- have achieved full implementation of the SSP according to ICAO records.

But the NCAA said Nigeria is poised to achieving Level four which is 100% by the end of 2017.


Read more at http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/busine...oCXBgro.99

It is quite remarkable what Nigeria has been able to achieve in turning around its, previously dismal, aviation safety record and system in less than a decade...

However what is probably equally remarkable is that Australia have managed to bluff and obfuscate ICAO over the same timeframe to believe that all the significant findings of what was a very damning 2008 ICAO audit - read here: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09CAN...081_a.html - have been properly addressed...

Add to that the statement above where it appears that M&M's smoke'n'mirrors bollocks SSP has convinced the rest of the world that we are 1 of 2 State's to have achieved full implementation of the SSP is frankly UDB...

Although M&M's boys and girls seem to be slowly but surely whittling down what got to over 4100 NDs to ICAO, here is a reminder of how bad it all got with the latest update (07 Dec '16) to AIP GEN 1.7: H158/16

Note that most member States are able to contain AIP GEN 1.7 to well within 100 pages but in Australia it got so bad that the AIP only provided links to the individual Annex notified differences.

For example Annex 13 currently has 10 pages and nearly 40 odd listed NDs - http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/...gation.pdf . Add that to recent track record of the ATSB in higher profile incident/accident investigation (besides QF 32) - Mildura, PelAir, etc..etc; coupled with damning Senate Inquiry reports; CTSB peer review report; a less than glowing ASRR report; and now in the ATSB's questionable conduct in oversighting the MH370 SOI search in accordance with Annex 13 - see HERE.

This all leads to a dismal assessment of the effectiveness of the ATSB as a Annex 13 defined AAI and air safety watchdog. Yet the ATSB was self-assessed by Murky and his crew at an ICAO EI level of over 96% for AAI and unbelievably ICAO have accepted this as fact - again UDB!


MTF?- Definitely...P2  

[Gobbledock]

Of alphabet soup agencies, the tipping of money into other peoples pots, and playing the game of obsfucation

I'm going to delve into an area that most others are not comfortable to go - I am now fully convinced that ICAO themselves are just another two-bit crooked hack outfit who are the foundation of a broken system.

P2 said;

ATSB was self-assessed by Murky and his crew at an ICAO EI level of over 96% for AAI and unbelievably ICAO have accepted this as fact - again UDB!

Sadly I find ICAO, itself an alphabet soup agency, to be on par with alphabet soup agencies such as CAsA and our ATsB - utterly incompetent, incapable and embarrassingly lame. All they are capable of is wanking themselves over KPI's and fictitious targets and then producing stupid percentages such as 96% compliant or 43.6% achieved. Here is a percentage for you Mr ICAO - you are 100% fu#ked.

As commendable as it should be for Nigeria to reach new heights, one can't help wonder if ICAO's embracing of Nigeria has got to do with something more like perhaps Nigeria is now contributing more to the UN, ICAO, IMF or some other United Nations arm? The USA alone slips the United Nations $8b per annum, hence the reason you will never see the FAA or any other American brand cop a pineapple worthy of the Guiness Book of Records. Australia also prostitutes itself to the UN, and Kevin Rudd spent mega millions of our dollars trying to buy himself a personal seat at the UN trough! But all for nought as Kevvy, the egotistical arseclown, allowed them to take millions of dollars worth of 'taxpayer contributions' and then they screwed the the pooch! Kevvy got punked and the UN kept the money.

The entire system is not only a facade but it is a non sustainable Ponzi scheme, and eventually the house of cards always comes crashing down.

Tick Tock.......

[Kharon]

A two bob (non combative) ramble.

Gee Whiz GD, that Sir, is a very large worm can you have dragged home; the opening of such is a big task. Perhaps we should begin by visiting first principals and tackling the big questions first.

Is ICAO necessary? My vote would go to the ‘yes’ with a tick in the essential service box. Chaos would reign supreme without such a body. Conventions, contract, and all the paraphernalia which ‘bond’ national air operators to a universal charter makes perfectly good sense – both practically and philosophically. ICAO may well be subject to the usual afflictions of any large ‘corporate’ body, a natural development which may be seen in any large, complex outfit.  Fortune 500 companies for example, are constantly looking for ways and means to stay ‘lean’ – match fit if you like – cleaning up the deadwood left behind from previous decisions which may impinge on the new; in short they either get ‘dynamic’ or doomed.  There is no such incentive for ICAO to evolve; the operational ‘need for corporate speed’ is non existent – as it must be. Operators and governmental agencies across the globe cannot move with ‘speed’.

Time is essential– ICAO must, by default be ‘patient’. Take P2’s favourite drum; the State Safety Program (SSP). Every ICAO country is involved; consider the processes involved. ICAO first of all would need to come up with the first ‘notion’, then develop the notion into an idea. Once the ‘idea’ had been accepted, the ‘system’, in Toto would need to be developed, tested, examined and discussed before it got anywhere near the ‘public’ gaze. Huge task. Once the SSP had been tested and declared legally safe, operationally sound and ‘do-able’ then it must be ‘sold’ to the ICAO states. The time and money clocks have been ticking throughout.  Things like an international agreement for a SSP is a massive undertaking which would probably create problems in any multi national, top flight private sector conglomerate, let alone a politically sensitive operation, dealing with international and domestic law; not to mention governments. So, perforce the ICAO version of ‘urgency’ is set at a different pace; more suited to dealing with ‘their’ world.

Now I ain't saying the situation is not being 'milked'; but you need not look too far to see where the ICAO problems lay. Having developed the SSP, sold it in principal, they now have to deal with the ways and means of implementation, then define ‘compliance’, then monitor not only that compliance but test and monitor ‘the system’ at the same time. It will take years to establish whether or not the ultra ‘expensive’ SSP system actually works; more years to iron out the bugs; more years to correct and have the corrections installed. All this to consider before a crew like CASA and DoIT get their grubby paws on it.

Enough – I can live with ICAO; it is probably too expensive, too fat, too hidebound, etc. But these things are true of even the best run agencies. For my two bob’s worth I would say the perceived ICAO problems can be easily defined.  Compare the NZ and Nigerian willing approach to compliance with the Australian.  Two relatively small nations embracing the idea - and acting; the other, nodding at compliance and sniggering behind the lunch menu.

Not addressing the difference between “how can we make this work” and “how can we be seen to meet minimum compliance” is, IMO, an easily corrected ICAO failing.

There (IMO) is where the problem lays; which begs the question, why is ICAO not kicking seven bells out of Australia? For this alone ICAO need a swift move along from a size 12 boot; but, as for the rest, well ‘tis but the system the world must work with.  

Toot toot.

[Gobbledock]

Indeed Kharon, it is a very provocative assertion I raised. Do we need ICAO? Of course, couldn't agree more. We also need, dare I say; a Regulator. Without such organisations there would be total chaos and non-conformance. However, my concerns included your following question;

There (IMO) is where the problem lays; which begs the question, why is ICAO not kicking seven bells out of Australia? For this alone ICAO need a swift move along from a size 12 boot;

Indeed, why the delay? 8 effing years since the audit, in the meantime we have had Pel Air, a multitude of regulatory issues, a disgraceful MH370 investigation, and the State giving itself a 'self assessment'! FFS. Absolutely pathetic.

[Peetwo]

Taking the Mickey Bliss on Annex 13 & MH370?  

Q/ Is the MH370 search & parallel investigation being conducted in direct contravention of ICAO Annex 13?

References, No1: What now for the JIT Annex13 MH370 investigation? 

&.. 

Peetwo - To follow up on my 'Rosenker the realist' post, while trolling the JW blog I noted a couple of posts from a 'David' that pretty much (IMO) nails down the true 'elephant' or 'blue whale' in the SIO - see HERE - that for some reason the MSM (until recently with the Oz) have conveniently or negligently overlooked...

The elephant:

However they are not the elephant. Were there was a pilot at the end he could have pushed his nose down sharply (if BFO are to be satisfied) then glided beyond search areas past, proposed, or otherwise might be. He could have extended fuel consumption on the way by step climbing. He could have been responsible for both logs-on.

While there is no evidence there was a pilot there is none ruling it out either. Therein I regret to say is a stopper to finding a ‘specific location’ in which there can be confidence.

And the question that was left IMO too late to ask:

After the ATSB decided, necessarily, to make this assumption, for the search area to be practicable, the effect of that on search success probability went unremarked, at least publicly.

Without evidence either way the possibility of there being a pilot was around 50/50. Had it been assumed there had been one the search area would have been multiplied (glide distance say 100 miles) and the prospects of finding the wreckage in the search area settled on would have been less than halved. A 50% chance of there being a pilot still lowers the 90% a good deal and to that should be added the like effect of other assumptions (eg route weightings and simplifications).

The outcome is that had the funders been aware of the much lower search probability they might not have approved the search, that is unless politics overrode. In either case the next-of-kin and public were misled, presumably inadvertently.

   
This is the clanger...

"..So as to your above remark, as things stand there is little prospect of either the three countries or any benefactor standing up and swallowing the cost unless that elephant can be shot..."

IMO there is strong evidence to suggest that certain DIPs to this smelly investigation & search effort, have no intention of that rogue elephant being identified let alone 'shot'...

Why? David either very cleverly or naively points out why:

Were the ATSB search report to reflect on this, and bearing in mind the prospects of there having been a pilot now remain much the same, there might well be grounds to abandon the search for wreckage rather than suspend it on the grounds the prospects are unlikely to improve enough, clearing the way for a final report by Malaysia.

Naturally any unexpected development could lead to reopening of the investigation. There is precedent for this.

Definitely MTF on this and the vagaries of ICAO signatory States potentially interfering/compromising the integrity and independence of an Annex 13 sanctioned international AAI...

Ps Hmm...wonder if the ATSB TSI Act still applies with the MH370 Annex 13 JIT investigation?

24 Offence to hinder etc. an investigation

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:

(a) the person engages in conduct; and

(b) the person is reckless as to whether the conduct will

adversely affect an investigation:

(i) that is being conducted at that time; or

(ii) that could be conducted at a later time into an

immediately reportable matter; and

© the conduct has the result of adversely affecting such an

investigation (whether or not the investigation had

commenced at the time of the conduct); and

(d) the conduct is not authorised by the Executive Director.

Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 6 months.

PAIN & the IOS witnessed, throughout the PelAir cover-up inquiry and Senate Estimates, many instances of where Beaker and the ATSB simply took the Mickey Bliss, let alone the spirit and intent, on many of their so called obligations to ICAO Annex 13.

Example:

Now as much as the ATSB propaganda line seems to imply a degree of separation between the MH370 JIT Annex 13 investigation and the SSWG defined MH370 SIO search, there is much evidence to the contrary that says they are very much inseparable.

Quote from - SECOND HIGH-LEVEL SAFETY CONFERENCE 2015 (HLSC 2015) PLANNING FOR GLOBAL AVIATION SAFETY IMPROVEMENT (Montréal, 2 to 5 February 2015) - Para 1.4 & 1.5 of the paper:

1.4 From that date, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) became the lead agency under Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation to the Chicago Convention for operations in the Australian SRR. AMSA continued to coordinate search operations for floating material until 28 April 2014, when the Australian Prime Minister, the Honourable Tony Abbott MP, announced that the search would transition to an intensified underwater search.


1.5 AMSA and ATSB jointly determined a surface search area strategy, correlating information from a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) located in Malaysia, comprising international specialists and other government and academic sources. AMSA hosted a working group that complemented the JIT, provided additional specialist advice on the likely movement of floating material with weather and ocean currents, and incorporated advice from the United States National Transportation Safety Board and United States Coastguard. Together, these sources permitted AMSA to be fully informed on the optimum search areas.

---

And at 2.2 it states:

On 17 March 2014, Australia agreed to Malaysia’s request to assume responsibility for
the coordination of the search effort for the aircraft within the Australian SRR. In accordance with Annex 13, Malaysia remains the State responsible for the investigation of the occurrence involving MH370.

The ATSB makes a similar claim to compliance with the Annex in their MH370 search oversight in their blurb that accompanies their report webpage for MH370: 

Malaysia, as the country of registration, has investigative responsibility for the accident. In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, the ATSB appointed an accredited representative and a number of advisers (ATSB investigators) to the Malaysian investigation. As part of Australia’s role in leading the search and recovery operation in the southern Indian Ocean, the ATSB has opened an external investigation, AE-2014-054: Technical assistance to the Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia in support of missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 on 7 March 2014 UTC.

Therefore I would argue that any sane international observer and/or DIP, without the PAIN/IOS insight of the PelAir cover-up (like Boeing for example), would logically concur that the ATSB would conduct it's oversight of the MH370 SIO deep search and it's interactions with the SSWG, as per the conditions (spirit & intent) of Annex 13.

PAIN would argue that under Beaker that simply was never going to happen (watch the video again if you have any doubts)...

Okay so for the average international punter, what is it that the ATSB have a difference of opinion on when it comes to ICAO Annex 13?

See HERE the 10 pages of notified differences to A13...  

Also consider the conditions outlined under Annex 13 Chapter 5.12:

Non-disclosure of records

5.12 The State conducting the investigation of an accident or incident shall not make the following records available for purposes other than accident or incident investigation, unless the appropriate authority for the administration of justice in that State determines that their disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic and international impact such action may have on that or any future investigations:

a) all statements taken from persons by the investigation authorities in the course of their investigation;
b) all communications between persons having been involved in the operation of the aircraft;
c) medical or private information regarding persons involved in the accident or incident;
d) cockpit voice recordings and transcripts from such recordings; and
e) opinions expressed in the analysis of information, including flight recorder information.

5.12.1 These records shall be included in the final report or its appendices only when pertinent to the analysis of the accident or incident. Parts of the records not relevant to the analysis shall not be disclosed.

Note.— Information contained in the records listed above, which includes information given voluntarily by persons interviewed during the investigation of an accident or incident, could be utilized inappropriately for subsequent disciplinary, civil, administrative and criminal proceedings. If such information is distributed, it may, in the future, no longer be openly disclosed to investigators. Lack of access to such information would impede the investigation process and seriously affect flight
safety.

And under 5.26:

Obligations

5.26 Accredited representatives and their advisers:

a) shall provide the State conducting the investigation with all relevant information available to them; and
b) shall not divulge information on the progress and the findings of the investigation without the express consent of the State conducting the investigation.

Note.— Nothing in this Standard precludes prompt release of facts when authorized by the State conducting the investigation, nor does this Standard preclude accredited representatives from reporting to their respective States in order to
facilitate appropriate safety actions.

And 6.2:

Release of information — Consent

6.2 States shall not circulate, publish or give access to a draft report or any part thereof, or any documents obtained during an investigation of an accident or incident, without the express consent of the State which conducted the investigation, unless such reports or documents have already been been published or released by that latter State.

In the case of MH370, the clearest example that the ATSB has absolutely zero regard for the spirit, intent and compliance to ICAO Annex 13 was when they released the bogus website statement:

“The last satellite communication with the aircraft showed it was most likely in a high rate of descent in the area of what is known as the 7th arc. This is indeed the consensus of the Search Strategy Working Group.”

Reference: 28/09/16 MH370 Operational Update Bulletin (17-18) PDF: 198 KB

I would argue that not only is this 'not' the consensus of the SSWG it is also in direct conflict of Annex 13 (as per the annex references above). I would also argue that besides the self-interest of the ATSB justifying their limited scoped search priority zone, the premise of the unsubstantiated ATSB evidence/aspersions is at this stage totally irrelevant to the MH370 Annex 13 investigation...

     
MTF...P2  

[Peetwo]

What now for MH370 Annex 13 JIT investigation?

While at the BRB darts comp the other night, points of discussion inevitably turned to MH370. Much speculation revolved around when/how/what/who/if the JIT FR will be released, so much so it might be worth "K" considering running a tote board on the subject - hint...

Out of interest and for any possible clue to what might happen next, I thought it might be worth revisiting the 'official' Malaysian MOT (AAIB) MH370 webpage, because after all Malaysia is still very much firmly in control of the Annex 13 investigation.

This is the introduction from the MOT MH370 webpage:       

AIR INCIDENT INVESTIGATION



MH370

Malaysia is leading the investigation into the disappearance of MH370 as a state of registry. A team of independent investigators was formed on 25th April 2014 to carry out an independent safety investigation in accordance with the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 13 and Malaysia Civil Aviation Regulation 1996 (ICAO Annex 13 and CAR 1996). Seven (7) Accredited Representatives namely from Australia, China, France, Singapore, United States, Indonesia and the United Kingdom.

The Investigation Team released an Interim Statement and Factual Information in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 standards on the first anniversary of the loss of flight MH370. Investigation and search operations are ongoing to find the cause of the accident for further analysis and thereby proposed improvement of safety recommendations.

Besides the web links for reports, press releases etc. it is quite obvious the webpage has not been updated in quite a long time, so no clues there. Perhaps the last line (in bold above) and the recent reports that the Malaysian's AAIB have placed investigators in charge of monitoring and retrieving further possible debris discoveries - see HERE . Plus some of the recent comments from Liow at the Perth (Henderson) MH370 press conference and HERE...

...would strongly suggest that the Annex 13 investigation Final Report will not be released anytime soon.

However I would suggest that unless the possible recent debris findings provide some startling clues possibly causal to the MH370 disappearance then the Annex 13 investigation has stalled,  subsequently until the MH370 fuselage and/or black boxes are found, it is highly unlikely there will be any..

"..proposed improvement of safety recommendations..."

Therefore I expect the Malaysians will have no choice but to release an 'inconclusive' FR on or before the 3rd anniversary of the tragic disappearance of MH370...


MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

 "Captain PM Malcolm you MUST listen!!" 

CASA puts at risk ICAO Cat 1 status and industry bottom-line contribution to GDP.

Slight thread drift here but there is, I think - ,  a method in my madness...

Reference Chester's thread...

Of chalk and cheese and a listening ear

Nice catch P2. Indeed some of the differences to Strayla are most interesting. Let's list some of what Trump actually does understand compared to the prehistoric dinosaurs governing our country now, and over the past decades;

- Trump listens. He has sat with airline executives, not in a manner to coverup systemic issues, but to address their concerns. He even talks shop with his own pilots - smart man. Talk to those at the coal face, not some bureaucrat in Canberra with one pencil in his hand and one in his ass. Picture the difference; Trump talking about aviation with a 30 year veteran Captain, or, one of Golman Sachs Turnbull's minuscules speaking to Jonathan Aleck. Hmmm, see the contrast? One leader is engaged, the other totally disconnected.

- Trump acknowledges trillions spent on wars, with nothing to show, leaving his own country go to waste and become a third world infrastructure disaster. Hallelujah! Trump gets it. Meanwhile we have the dickhead Turnbull propping up $50b for more Subs while our roads, airports and electricity network turn to ruins.

- Trump is slashing the regulatory strangulation grinding their country to a halt! Well done sir. He is a businessman, he understands it. Meanwhile, as an example, we in Australia permit consecutive PMC's to work with the Dr Voodoo's of this world to ensure that our key industry, aviation, is strangled to death.

- Trump understands FAA incompetence and the issues with air traffic management and technology in the USA. Unbelievable! Do you think The Don could sit with NFI Chester, Harfwit and Houston and teach them something?

There seems to be some benefits in having an experienced businessman who has not been a 'Stockholm syndrome politician' for the past 20 years, coming in fresh and managing the country. Yes?

Tick Tock Australia

As per usual, a succinctly nailed down post Gobbles -

FYI Judith Sloan from the Oz also 'gets it...

PM must show some mongrel

JUDITH SLOAN

Red tape and renegade agency chiefs are evidence of a naive and weak leader.

..And after a promising start by the Abbott government to axe a number of wasteful, intrusive and damaging regulations and regulatory agencies, Malcolm Turnbull put his foot on the brake and has instead embarked on a massive program of new regulations, particularly in relation to financial services.


Do you remember Repeal Day? The Prime Minister has repealed it. Evidently, he thinks the deregulation agenda is complete, having made up some large figure — billions of dollars, naturally — to estimate the gains of the deregulation that had already taken place.

In the meantime, many federal regulators are running amok, with the heads of agencies increasingly behaving in brazenly political and activist fashion. Mind you, it is hardly surprising given some of the appointments — mainly reappointments. What was the government thinking when it reconfirmed the positions of so many openly partisan appointees heading key agencies?

Instead of quietly getting on with what should be the routine and low-key task of implementing regulations set down in legislation, far too many regulators think of themselves as players, expressing public views on how legislation should be changed as well as seeking publicity for prosecuting cases (many of which are subsequently lost).

They have sought more funding while pushing political buttons and, sadly, this government has been far too naive and weak to resist these self-serving pleas...

Listen up miniscule DDDD_MNFI a word of advice from JS...

...There are very many other instances I could quote. But the message to ministers is this: wake up and instruct the regulators in your portfolios to pull their heads in. Keep regulation to an absolute minimum and always ensure the compliance costs are as low as possible.

You never know, being a good government could deliver a political dividend.

And 4D if you want some examples from your own department of overburdening regulations and a 'law unto themselves' regulator in action, here is a couple of handy references courtesy of Aunty Pru... : Mythical reform./ Part 61 - For Dummies./ Proof will be in the Pavlova

Update: Comments from Sandy & Arlys...  

Alexander


Judith is correct in pointing to an out of control Commonwealth bureaucracy. There has crept into this bloated body of government machinery a sense that they are the law as they interpret it resulting in bullying behavior and worse. I don't think there is another journalist who has perceived that this is becoming the norm. That this is now what can be expected from Can'tberra, 400,000 of the best paid hell bent on maintaining and improving privilege in the developed world's most soulless socialistic no freehold capital city.

Another example, among several euphemistically styled government business enterprises (GBE), the Civil Aviation Safety Authority created 29 years ago and tasked to rewrite (at its own behest) the aviation rules. Several hundred million later and still not finished but it has managed to smash General Aviation with the loss of thousands of jobs.

Air Services Australia is at present in oversight by a Senate Committee for the manner of tendering a billion dollar airways control system. Consultants being past employees and inside connections are being considered.

The Australian Transport Safety Board has been criticised for ineffectual accident investigation and the aviation industry is waiting after two years for a second, Senate inspired, report on the PelAir ditching off Norfolk Island. The first report was seriously flawed, ATSB being in cahoots with CASA to simply blame the pilot thus deflecting any concerns about institutional failings whether within CASA or within the airline parent company Rex. The same company that made an unusual and substantial donation to the Coalition around the time of the first report. Alex in the Rises.

---

arlys

@Alexander But one Airline, remains untouched.Right? By The Old Boys RAAF Club. Right?

  

In addition to Sandy's comment to the Oz Judith Sloan article, he also emailed JS directly his posted comment. This was Judith's response:
 

Sent: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 21:41:14 +0000
Subject: Re: FWA and so on re your Aus article, my comment, regards, Sandy Reith


Keep up the good work, Sandy.  And thanks for the interest.

Yes, I have heard that CASA is completely out of control, vastly expensive and ineffective. And the salaries at Airservices Australia are out of this world.

The sad thing is that nothing seems to change.

Cheers

Judith

 
Off that same email chain, Bill Hamilton has now weighed into the discussion...

Dear Judith,


The financial depredation caused by CASA are almost incalculable, including, but not limited to, almost eliminating Australian from the global training market for pilots, and driving the great bulk of heavy aircraft maintenance off-shore.


An example of the first is China Southern Airlines abandoning an already large investment is WA, plus an almost US$750,000,000 expansion program, agreed with the WA government, because of CASA behavior. That investment all went to Canada, China Southern has a policy of conducting initial pilot training outside China, in a western environment.


As to aircraft maintenance, CASA justify the loss of heavy engineering in Australia  to "cheap labour", and not CASA ratbag regulation, which is not ICAO compliant, and like nothing else internationally.


Only if you can convince me that Germany is a "low wage" country (given the Qantas A330 and A380 work that goes to Hamburg) will I accept the CASA "low wage" argument, as opposed to the CASA "rules" that demand almost unbelievable (in this day and age) 19th century job demarcation, that prevents labor productivity that is normal in, say, NZ, CA, USA, UK or anywhere in the EC.


All this has nothing to do with "safety", but the public service machine, not limited to CASA, is very adept and very experienced at scaring the bejesus out of the gullible public with the "mystique of air safety", first identified as a "public service" tactic in the report of the first Lane inquiry in mid-1980s.


Indeed, the sad thing is that Australia's air safety record is NOT world beating, and the shortcomings are largely due to Australia refusing to accept internationally recognised developments that have improved air safety outcomes (reduced risk) over the years.


In fact, despite CASA public claims, the Body of (or the culture of) CASA resolutely refused to use modern risk management based and cost benefit justified rulemaking, rather relying of the judgement of "our air safety experts", who are no such thing, and do not become "air safety experts" simply by virtue of being on the CASA payroll.


Indeed, in my view, the lack of relevant knowledge and experience in CASA has reached an appallingly low level, it has long been the "employer of last resort".


If you want an independent assessment of my background, to make these statement, ask Sandy Reith.


Best regards,

W.J.R.(Bill) Hamilton.


PS1: All Boeing and Airbus civil manufacturing in Australia is conducted under the oversight  US FAA or EC's European Aviation  Safety Authority, EASA, NOT CASA.


PS2: Australia is on the threshold (once again) of losing FAA/EASA Category 1 status (an assessment of the effectiveness of national aviation safety regulatory oversight) which would be a financial disaster for Qantas and Virgin groups, US law would require all US airlines to drop code shares and joint timetables with Qantas and Virgin, and that would be just the start.


PS: Needless to say, I am a regular reader of your contributions to The Australian.

"...Australia is on the threshold (once again) of losing FAA/EASA Category 1 status (an assessment of the effectiveness of national aviation safety regulatory oversight) which would be a financial disaster for Qantas and Virgin groups, US law would require all US airlines to drop code shares and joint timetables with Qantas and Virgin, and that would be just the start..."

Okay I think that brings the thread back to ToRs...


MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

FACT CHECK: The true leader of the pack on ICAO non-compliance?

Without going into the semantics of why it is possibly acceptable for the US (being the most aviation active country in the world on any scale) to be highly non-compliant with the ICAO SARPs, I note that is often quoted by aviation safety savvy commentators that the USA is the most non-compliant of any other ICAO signatory State.

Example from '40 Years' off PT:

40years
March 10, 2017 at 9:09 pm
Dan,
What ‘Western Standards’ do you mean?
Do you mean European surveillance and traffic management systems in use in Australia over the last 50 years? Tick!
Do you mean adherence to ICAO SARPS with minimum differences? Tick! ( The USA nominates the most differences from ICAO of any country)
Do you mean appointing a CEO from overseas such as the USA or, god help us, New Zealand? Tick!
What ‘Western’ standards do you mean?
Steve 777: Give examples. We’re sick of Sky-God pronouncements from above.
Put some meat on the bones, or perhaps visit a Centre or two. It may surprise you to find that Pilots do not have all the answers, any more than a driver on the Monash Carpark can provide useful traffic resolution proposals.

Which got me thinking to whether the USA is truly the Kings of ICAO non-compliance? Or whether us Aussies, with our locally modified non-harmonised, non-generic rule-set, coupled with a bureaucratic CYA top-cover modification/amendment service, could still possibly take the top prize for taking the complete and utter piss out of the ICAO SARPs?? 

So first I took a visit to the USA FAA version of AIP GEN 1.7 - see HERE - for a basic page count. Compared to (and to be fair reducing) page count from the latest AIP GEN 1.7 SUP (http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/...7-h24.pdf) with the individual links provided for each ICAO Annex notified differences (i.e. our complicated and extrapolated version of AIP GEN 1.7).

In summary the US FAA have managed to contain their notified differences to ICAO SARPs within the AIP GEN 1.7 reference to 108 pages. In contrast the Aussie Airservices AIP has out grown the GEN 1.7 to the point where they feel the need to create an AIP SUP with individual applicable links for notified differences to each ICAO Annex to a total of 345 pages.

So on a page count us Aussies win hands down by a factor of 3.2 to 1 on non-compliance to the ICAO SARPs... (ps keep in mind this factor is calculated after Murky, and his merry band of minions, started tackling reducing the over 4000 NDs to ICAO)

And if you wondered if it is possibly advantageous for Australia to be so highly non-compliant with the ICAO SARPs, here is Ken Cannane's (AMROBA) considered opinion from their latest newsletter:

Australia’s Obligations under the Chicago Convention.

How close does Australia comply with ICAO [Minimum] Standards prescribed in the Annexes to the Convention? You can see what differences government has notified to ICAO quite simply by clicking on the link: http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/...17-h24.pdf , and open any of the Annex links in the Appendix of AIP H24-17. What it demonstrates is little policy is given to eliminating differences as new regulations and standards are developed and made. Many of the differences are failure to adopt the ICAO international terminology by creating our own or adopting terminology from other countries regulatory system. However, there are many ‘missing’ differences such as Annex 6: "a) the aeroplane is maintained in an airworthy condition". There should be a concerted effort to harmonise with the ICAO standards and practices, including adopting its international definitions. It is time for government to get serious and stop wasting resources. Adopt and harmonise.

   
  
MTF...P2

[thorn bird]

Of course the CAsA sleight of hand in the so called "differences" P2, is where ICAO may advise "A" check, or inspection, or procedure, or standard, CAsA instigates four, then crows "we are just complying with ICAO". When you point out that ICAO only required one, not four, they reply "well Australia's standard is very much higher than the rest of the world". They never consider what cost all their extra's will inflict on industry nor the complexity it adds to our regulations and operations and the difficulty of marrying them with regulations overseas.

I give you an example. forty odd years ago I became involved with a charter company who operated a mixed fleet of piston twins, turbines and a light jet in transport category. All these aircraft were flying around 800 hours a year by around sixteen pilots. Their operations manual was barely a hundred pages and included international operations and RPT.
The company devoted considerable recourses to pilot training and mentoring, by its nature their crews were young and generally inexperienced, their safety record was exemplary.

All the information required to operate an aircraft is contained in the manufacturers pilot operating handbook or flight manual. In those days Australia had its own unique "flight Manual" the "little black book". It had bugger all in it except "P" charts for take off and landing performance. Our regulator at the time refused to accept the manufacturers data based on certification flight testing and insisted on flight tests for first of type to produce these "P" charts, in many cases the performance data produced was less restrictive than the manufacturers certification data. A simple statement in the Ops manual that the company would use the manufacturers operating procedures contained in the Pilot operating handbook was all that was required to comply.

In the modern era of CAsA, operations manuals have expanded to thousands of pages, probably to reflect the thousands of pages of regulation that has been added over the years, it now runs to part A to part H, volumes of what is euphemistically referred to as "Shelfware". These tomes provide CAsA employees a conduit to interfere in the conduct of operations even tinker with manufacturers recommended procedures.
The "Make work" result of this is hundreds of thousands of dollars and years to obtain an AOC, and hundreds of thousands of dollars and months to add a new type to an AOC.
There are many instances where unqualified, inexperienced FOI's have bullied Chief Pilots into promulgating procedures expressly forbidden by the manufacturer. Complaint is futile because your manual must be "accepted",
you have a million dollar machine sitting idle eating dollars, so you accept FOI's instructions, knowing what is being asked is unsafe, that you must accept responsibility for it, the FOI accepts none, because he accepts not approves, you toe the CAsA line or your machine sits idle.

In P2's post 91 Bill Hamilton makes a very relevant statement:

"Indeed, in my view, the lack of relevant knowledge and experience in CASA has reached an appallingly low level, it has long been the "employer of last resort".

The Part B of the modern day CAsA "accepted" operations manual, Aircraft Operating Procedures, runs to hundreds of pages, largely large parts of the flight Manual cut and pasted from the "Flight Manual" with added bits and pieces required by the FOI of the day. Yet the Flight Manual is the "Legal" document, it is mandatory to have a copy on the flight deck, there is no requirement to have Part B on the aircraft. The procedures contained in the flight Manual must legally be complied with, in fact the opening statement in most part B's is "Notwithstanding anything promulgated in this manual, the aircraft Flight Manual takes precedence". One could wonder therefore exactly what is the point of the part B in the first place other than a "Make Work" exercise for FOI's.

All these pieces of "Shelfware" also require continuous revision as the juggernaught of regulatory ineptitude rolls on, thousands of pages added every year for which proof of compliance must be mandated. There is also continuous amendment required where rules already promulgated are found to have unintended consequences and need to be changed. Writing them properly in the first place would save a lot of angst.

CAsA is charged by the government to ensure safety, I don't believe it is any safer today than it was forty years ago, just a hell of a lot more expensive.

[Peetwo]

Harmony? Forget it - the world according to CASA.  

Of course the CAsA sleight of hand in the so called "differences" P2, is where ICAO may advise "A" check, or inspection, or procedure, or standard, CAsA instigates four, then crows "we are just complying with ICAO". When you point out that ICAO only required one, not four, they reply "well Australia's standard is very much higher than the rest of the world". They never consider what cost all their extra's will inflict on industry nor the complexity it adds to our regulations and operations and the difficulty of marrying them with regulations overseas.

I give you an example. forty odd years ago I became involved with a charter company who operated a mixed fleet of piston twins, turbines and a light jet in transport category. All these aircraft were flying around 800 hours a year by around sixteen pilots. Their operations manual was barely a hundred pages and included international operations and RPT.

The company devoted considerable recourses to pilot training and mentoring, by its nature their crews were young and generally inexperienced, their safety record was exemplary.

All the information required to operate an aircraft is contained in the manufacturers pilot operating handbook or flight manual. In those days Australia had its own unique "flight Manual" the "little black book". It had bugger all in it except "P" charts for take off and landing performance. Our regulator at the time refused to accept the manufacturers data based on certification flight testing and insisted on flight tests for first of type to produce these "P" charts, in many cases the performance data produced was less restrictive than the manufacturers certification data. A simple statement in the Ops manual that the company would use the manufacturers operating procedures contained in the Pilot operating handbook was all that was required to comply.

In the modern era of CAsA, operations manuals have expanded to thousands of pages, probably to reflect the thousands of pages of regulation that has been added over the years, it now runs to part A to part H, volumes of what is euphemistically referred to as "Shelfware". These tomes provide CAsA employees a conduit to interfere in the conduct of operations even tinker with manufacturers recommended procedures.

The "Make work" result of this is hundreds of thousands of dollars and years to obtain an AOC, and hundreds of thousands of dollars and months to add a new type to an AOC.
There are many instances where unqualified, inexperienced FOI's have bullied Chief Pilots into promulgating procedures expressly forbidden by the manufacturer. Complaint is futile because your manual must be "accepted", you have a million dollar machine sitting idle eating dollars, so you accept FOI's instructions, knowing what is being asked is unsafe, that you must accept responsibility for it, the FOI accepts none, because he accepts not approves, you toe the CAsA line or your machine sits idle.

In P2's post 91 Bill Hamilton makes a very relevant statement:

"Indeed, in my view, the lack of relevant knowledge and experience in CASA has reached an appallingly low level, it has long been the "employer of last resort".

The Part B of the modern day CAsA "accepted" operations manual, Aircraft Operating Procedures, runs to hundreds of pages, largely large parts of the flight Manual cut and pasted from the "Flight Manual" with added bits and pieces required by the FOI of the day. Yet the Flight Manual is the "Legal" document, it is mandatory to have a copy on the flight deck, there is no requirement to have Part B on the aircraft. The procedures contained in the flight Manual must legally be complied with, in fact the opening statement in most part B's is "Notwithstanding anything promulgated in this manual, the aircraft Flight Manual takes precedence". One could wonder therefore exactly what is the point of the part B in the first place other than a "Make Work" exercise for FOI's.

All these pieces of "Shelfware" also require continuous revision as the juggernaught of  regulatory ineptitude rolls on, thousands of pages added every year for which proof of compliance must be mandated. There is also continuous amendment required where rules already promulgated are found to have unintended consequences and need to be changed. Writing them properly in the first place would save a lot of angst.

CAsA is charged by the government to ensure safety, I don't believe it is any safer today than it was forty years ago, just a hell of a lot more expensive.

Excellent post TB and one that should (but won't) be avidly read by the miniscule, his obfuscating Mandarin and his minions -   

Quite fortuitous that you mention Bill Hamilton because I have been monitoring an email chain that Bill instigated, that provides another classic example of how deeply CASA has diverged from the ICAO accepted standards (SARPs), for in this case maintenance regulations and procedures in relation to the use of lockwire... :

Ken,

Are you across the latest paperwork “policy” of CASA: Every can of lockwire has to have an identity and history raised, and every time you cut off a piece of lockwire, where it went is to be entered on the job sheets by identity. Six lockwired nuts on an assembly equals six multi-line entries to identify said lockwire. In short, all parts and components are to be regarded as Class 1 parts, “fully documented”.
 
At Avalon East, the CASA Airstapo were out in force, the briefed intent to ramp check every arrival was not achieved, another CASA target missed?? I gather the issue of checking tyre pressures under Schedule 8 raised the “requirement” for “ calibration cards for the torque device required to refit the valve caps”. One aircraft had a valve cap missing, I haven’t heard whether CASA finally grounded it, but there were a lot of very unhappy people, and one aircraft was badly damaged because of the state of the east runway.
 
None of those people will ever fly to an airshow again. “Empty Skies are Safe Skies”.
 
Cheers,

Bill H.

---

Friends & Colleagues,


I flew in on the Tuesday, Avalon East around lunch time, probably the last to arrive (all of about 20 aircraft) and sadly missed the attentions of the Airstapo...

I can verify the poor surface of the grass runway which must have been prepared with a corrugated roller back and forth crossways.

Obviously CASA doesn't believe that checking the actual landing area warrants their time, a missing valve cap does. 

The lock wire.  How about spectrographic analysis from a CASA approved laboratory and tensile testing? Delivery between lab and workshop by ArmorGuard truck to avoid any switching or contamination. 

The basics are being lost;  and in the battle for commonsense, let alone reform, we are not gaining ground. Political action could drive policy in the right direction and is the only hope because it's proven over and over that the bureaucrats are totally intransigent. They will not be deflected from increasing their pressure, power, fee gouging and control. 

One downside, apart from the destruction of an industry, is that the incentive to hide maintenance and flying activities outside the system is greatly increased.

Bill thanks for that info.

Sandy

---

Folks,

As some of you will know, there are two US companies that produce just about all the annealed stainless lockwire used in the known western aviation universe, all to an NAS/MilSpec standard.

The two suppliers are distinguished by being in the mid-blue or light blue containers ---- that is the only obvious difference.

For CASA to determine that a completely artificial identity has to be raised for each little container ( each little container starts off at 1lb, from memory) and that must be recorded, as must each little bit cut off ---- what more can I say.

To say this is all about EASA "harmonisation" ---- WTF???

Stand by for the "no, you can't really change a battery" of "no, you can't legally wash your windscreen, only replace it" to get another run ----- remember, 'tis all on the CASA Schedule 8 MR CD.

Cheers,

Bill H.

---

Bill;

 
This is frog shit!
 
No better cause for public disobedience has been demonstrated to date.
 
I challenge everyone to use lockwire that has proven reliable in their own industry to date or make oath to the effect the paperwork has been stolen, misunderstood, (by purposeful and intended ignorance through purposeful ignorance by the end user). or proven to be a Chinese knock off and the responsibility of Barnaby Joyce and his sycophant Minister in Gippsland somewhere over the rainbow.
 
For God’s sake next we’ll have to use certified lock nuts and certified lockwire put in place by a certified 8” non chrome shifter, and yellow platinum pliers.
 
If I still owned my Auster I would seriously remove all lockwire in protest. In lieu I put a pox on the administration. (like yesterday).
 
I have an un certified 8” shifter probably now worthless for sale if anybody is interested. CHEAP!

---

Bill,

 
Until government/CASA Board/CASA commit to adopting the FAR system then GA will continue to struggle.

Maybe just pick up the NZ regulations and computer system to harmonise locally.

CASA needs to send their GA AWIs/FOIs to the FAA training academy in OK city to be properly trained.

Too many have their own interpretation of the rules.
 
GA will not recover until the independent flight instructor is re-introduced to provide competition to the approved training schools like the USA.
 
Independent FIs train 70% of pilots and that provides additional pilots to enter the commercial flying sectors.
 
Regards
 
Ken

---

Ken,


As a matter of interest, this was/is an HCPT matter, not GA, next time around the particular component overhaul contract will go to NZ or US, this was (for these components) the last man (or should that be person) standing in Australia, gone is gone.
I am deliberately being non-specific as to the components, as that would identify who.

Cheers,

Bill H

---

Bill,

 
If that is the case, nothing will turn the youth from entering aviation because of how it is treated.
Oh well, they still have the 457 process to keep our aircraft flying.
Every other industry uses them.
 
Regards

Ken

    
What next? Certifying & recording the use of speed (100 mph) tape? - UDB!

  

MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

NOTAMS - 1920s format in a 21st century?? 

Bob Dylan: "..The times they are a-changin.."  

"..Come senators, congressmen
Please heed the call
Don't stand in the doorway
Don't block up the hall
For he that gets hurt
Will be he who has stalled
There's a battle outside
And it is ragin'.
It'll soon shake your windows
And rattle your walls
For the times they are a-changin'..."

In a day and age of the internet with social media and an APP for just about everything, it is  UDB that our AIP SUPPs & NOTAMs are still littered with outdated, hard to decipher 1920s style abbreviations/aviation terminology that lends itself to confusion and complacency with the average flight crew..

Via the flightservicebureau.org:

The problem of Bullshit Notams
15 March, 2017 / Mark Zee /
This article created a firestorm of engagement – several hundred emails and 127,000 people that visited the blog. Most of it was overwhelmingly positive. Some of it wasn’t. Please read my follow up in response.
It’s absolutely ridiculous.

We communicate the most critical flight information, using a system invented in 1920, with a format unchanged since 1924, burying essential information that will lose a pilot their job, an airline their aircraft, and passengers their lives, in a mountain of unreadable, irrelevant bullshit.

Yes CASA Australia, that’s you. Yes, Greek CAA, that’s you. And you’re not alone.

In an unintended twist of irony, the agencies seeking to cover their legal ass are party to creating the most criminal of systems – an unending flow of aeronautical sewage rendering the critical few pieces of information unfindable.

This is more than just hugely frustrating for each pilot, dispatcher, and controller that has to parse through it all; it’s downright dangerous.

If you’re a pilot, you’ll either have already experienced this, or you’re going to – you stuff something up, and then be told: “but there was a Notam out about that”. Sure enough, there it is in black and white (and in big capital letters). Do you think that “but there were 100 pages of them” is going to be a valid defence?
 
Well, it should be. The same agency conducting your post-incident interview is busy on the other end stuffing the system full of the garbage that prevented you from seeing it in the first place.

There are three parts to the problem: the system, the format, and the content. The system is actually quite amazing. The AFTN network connects every country in the world, and Notam information once added is immediately available to every user. Coupled with the internet, delivery is immediate.

The format is, at best, forgivable. It’s pretty awful. It’s a trip back in time to when Notams were introduced. You might think that was the 1960’s, or the 50’s. In fact, it’s 1924, when 5-bit ITA2 was introduced. The world shifted to ASCII in 1963, bringing the Upper and Lower case format that every QWERTY keyboard uses today, but we didn’t follow – nope, we’ll stick with our 1924 format, thank you.

Read that again. 1924. Back then, upper case code-infested aeronautical messages would have seemed impressive and almost reassuring in their aloofness. But there weren’t in excess of 1 million Notams per year, a milestone we passed in 2013. The 1 million milestone is remarkable in itself, but here’s something else amazing: in 2006, there were only 500,000. So in seven years, Notams doubled. Why? Are there twice as many airports in the world? No. Twice as many changes and updates? Possibly. But far more likely: the operating agencies became twice as scared about leaving things out.

And so onto the culprit: the content. The core definition of a Notam is ESSENTIAL flight information. Essential, for anyone tasked with entering information into the Notam System, is defined as “absolutely necessary; extremely important”. Here’s a game you can play at home. Take your 100 page printout of Notams, and circle that ones that you think can be defined as essential. See how many fit that bill.

So why is all this garbage in the system? Because the questions that the creators of Notams ask are flawed. The conversation goes like this:

– “Should we stick this into a Notam?”
– “Yeah, we’d better, just in case”.

How many are actually asking, “Is this essential information that aircrew need to know about ?”. Almost none. Many ‘solutions’ to the Notam deluge involve better filtering, Q codes, and smart regex’s. This overlooks the core problem. It’s not what comes out that needs to be fixed, it’s what goes in.

Even in 1921, we had much the same problem. Obstacle, 18 feet high, several miles from the runway.


Nobody cares. Unless you’ve parked the Eiffel Tower on the threshold, leave this stuff for the AIP. And nobody cares about kites either. Nor about goat-grazing times. We don’t care if your bird scarer is U/S. We don’t care if there’s a cherry-picker fixing a bulb somewhere. We don’t care when you’re cutting your grass.

Nor do we care about closed taxiways. The only way I can get onto a taxiway is with an ATC clearance, and ATC will not clear me onto a closed taxiway.

We care if the airport is going to be closed when we get there. If we’re going to have to divert because the runway is shut. If someone might shoot at us. If there are new rules. We care about the critical items, but we won’t see them as things stand.
And so, about here is where a normal editorial piece might end with “we hope that the authorities improve the system”, and sign off.
 
But not here.

We’re in the business of doing things here at FSB, not just talking about them.
Last year we wrote a few pieces about the Greece vs Turkey Notam battle. This month we did a group look at Briefing Packages, and it was astonishing to see how many pages of this diplomatic drivel still appeared in all our members’ Briefings. All in all, on average 3 full pages of every briefing for a flight overflying Greece or Turkey contained this stuff.

So, we sent Greece a polite AFTN message on behalf of all of us.


That’s just one piece of a thousand-piece puzzle, and it would be nice to think that one piece at a time we could fix the sytem. Let’s get real. It’s a monster, and it’s out of control.

We don’t think that we can fix the Notam system.

But, we can think about a different solution. And that’s exactly what we’re doing right now in OpsGroup. With almost 2000 members, we can make a difference. Watch this space. Or, if you want to help take action, send your thoughts to goatams@ops.group.

 MTF...P2

[Peetwo]

NOTAMS - 1920s format in a 21st century?? 

Bob Dylan: "..The times they are a-changin.."  

"..Come senators, congressmen
Please heed the call
Don't stand in the doorway
Don't block up the hall
For he that gets hurt
Will be he who has stalled
There's a battle outside
And it is ragin'.
It'll soon shake your windows
And rattle your walls
For the times they are a-changin'..."

In a day and age of the internet with social media and an APP for just about everything, it is  UDB that our AIP SUPPs & NOTAMs are still littered with outdated, hard to decipher 1920s style abbreviations/aviation terminology that lends itself to confusion and complacency with the average flight crew..

Via the flightservicebureau.org:

The problem of Bullshit Notams
15 March, 2017 / Mark Zee /
This article created a firestorm of engagement – several hundred emails and 127,000 people that visited the blog. Most of it was overwhelmingly positive. Some of it wasn’t. Please read my follow up in response.
It’s absolutely ridiculous.

We communicate the most critical flight information, using a system invented in 1920, with a format unchanged since 1924, burying essential information that will lose a pilot their job, an airline their aircraft, and passengers their lives, in a mountain of unreadable, irrelevant bullshit.

Yes CASA Australia, that’s you. Yes, Greek CAA, that’s you. And you’re not alone.

In an unintended twist of irony, the agencies seeking to cover their legal ass are party to creating the most criminal of systems – an unending flow of aeronautical sewage rendering the critical few pieces of information unfindable.

This is more than just hugely frustrating for each pilot, dispatcher, and controller that has to parse through it all; it’s downright dangerous.

If you’re a pilot, you’ll either have already experienced this, or you’re going to – you stuff something up, and then be told: “but there was a Notam out about that”. Sure enough, there it is in black and white (and in big capital letters). Do you think that “but there were 100 pages of them” is going to be a valid defence?
 
Well, it should be. The same agency conducting your post-incident interview is busy on the other end stuffing the system full of the garbage that prevented you from seeing it in the first place.

There are three parts to the problem: the system, the format, and the content. The system is actually quite amazing. The AFTN network connects every country in the world, and Notam information once added is immediately available to every user. Coupled with the internet, delivery is immediate.

The format is, at best, forgivable. It’s pretty awful. It’s a trip back in time to when Notams were introduced. You might think that was the 1960’s, or the 50’s. In fact, it’s 1924, when 5-bit ITA2 was introduced. The world shifted to ASCII in 1963, bringing the Upper and Lower case format that every QWERTY keyboard uses today, but we didn’t follow – nope, we’ll stick with our 1924 format, thank you.

Read that again. 1924. Back then, upper case code-infested aeronautical messages would have seemed impressive and almost reassuring in their aloofness. But there weren’t in excess of 1 million Notams per year, a milestone we passed in 2013. The 1 million milestone is remarkable in itself, but here’s something else amazing: in 2006, there were only 500,000. So in seven years, Notams doubled. Why? Are there twice as many airports in the world? No. Twice as many changes and updates? Possibly. But far more likely: the operating agencies became twice as scared about leaving things out.

And so onto the culprit: the content. The core definition of a Notam is ESSENTIAL flight information. Essential, for anyone tasked with entering information into the Notam System, is defined as “absolutely necessary; extremely important”. Here’s a game you can play at home. Take your 100 page printout of Notams, and circle that ones that you think can be defined as essential. See how many fit that bill.

So why is all this garbage in the system? Because the questions that the creators of Notams ask are flawed. The conversation goes like this:

– “Should we stick this into a Notam?”
– “Yeah, we’d better, just in case”.

How many are actually asking, “Is this essential information that aircrew need to know about ?”. Almost none. Many ‘solutions’ to the Notam deluge involve better filtering, Q codes, and smart regex’s. This overlooks the core problem. It’s not what comes out that needs to be fixed, it’s what goes in.

Even in 1921, we had much the same problem. Obstacle, 18 feet high, several miles from the runway.


Nobody cares. Unless you’ve parked the Eiffel Tower on the threshold, leave this stuff for the AIP. And nobody cares about kites either. Nor about goat-grazing times. We don’t care if your bird scarer is U/S. We don’t care if there’s a cherry-picker fixing a bulb somewhere. We don’t care when you’re cutting your grass.

Nor do we care about closed taxiways. The only way I can get onto a taxiway is with an ATC clearance, and ATC will not clear me onto a closed taxiway.

We care if the airport is going to be closed when we get there. If we’re going to have to divert because the runway is shut. If someone might shoot at us. If there are new rules. We care about the critical items, but we won’t see them as things stand.
And so, about here is where a normal editorial piece might end with “we hope that the authorities improve the system”, and sign off.
 
But not here.

We’re in the business of doing things here at FSB, not just talking about them.
Last year we wrote a few pieces about the Greece vs Turkey Notam battle. This month we did a group look at Briefing Packages, and it was astonishing to see how many pages of this diplomatic drivel still appeared in all our members’ Briefings. All in all, on average 3 full pages of every briefing for a flight overflying Greece or Turkey contained this stuff.

So, we sent Greece a polite AFTN message on behalf of all of us.


That’s just one piece of a thousand-piece puzzle, and it would be nice to think that one piece at a time we could fix the sytem. Let’s get real. It’s a monster, and it’s out of control.

We don’t think that we can fix the Notam system.

But, we can think about a different solution. And that’s exactly what we’re doing right now in OpsGroup. With almost 2000 members, we can make a difference. Watch this space. Or, if you want to help take action, send your thoughts to goatams@ops.group.

Some excellent comments to this 'nail on the head' article... :

Charles Hunt
15 March, 2017 at 9:54 pm

B.S. NOTAMS….100% concur. Our whole world of aviation is being swamped by similar legal ass-covering paperwork. How can ANY pilot be expected to remember all the additional codicils that do NOTHING to improve safety of flight, but rather give an army of lawyers and providers more chances to fleece an already cash-strapped industry?…..Rant over!

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Bill Harrelson
16 March, 2017 at 6:23 am

This information ceased to be “NOTAMs” long ago. Today they are “NOTOLs”, Notice To Litigants. Thanks for making an effort to change this ancient system.

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Fergus
16 March, 2017 at 8:29 am

You are a mind reader.

You captured the issue perfectly and the historical context was excellent. While airspace and aircraft have all continued to develop our most basic system of communicating the status of an airport/airspace has not. I could take that further and say communication with ATC is still by AFTN for the most part.

So now put yourself in the position of dispatcher/FOO working a series of long haul ETOPS Flight. You might have 20 or more departure /Take off alternate station notams, a whole galaxy of FIR/UIR Notams, not to mention all of the ETOP alternates and if you re-dispatch/re-analysis, you will get to do it inflight once again. Now do that 15-20 times depending on workload.

Can you say human data saturation?

This article certainly illustrates the infrastructure issues we face, but it doesn’t come close explaining some of the processes and procedures we have had to put in place to ensure:

1. That we actually get NOTAMS.
2. That we get airport conditions as some countries don’t put them out as Series-S ICAO

NOTAM versus Series-A (Yes, theses are the countries that haven’t fully adopted ICAO standards which were adopted in 1944 and ratified in 1947 by the Chicago convention).

Question: What is the current year?

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Antonio Chialastri
17 March, 2017 at 9:00 am

What is clear is the professional approach to the information received: too many inputs, disorderly given, contextually irrilevant, redundant and unusable.

A kind of “cry wolf” syndrome, making the pilot complacent about such a bullshit.

The very day someone of us is caught in a legal battle for a system-induced mistake leading to a incident, overlooking the NOTAMs will not appear as an excuse.
How to make these information valuable?

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Alan Booth
17 March, 2017 at 4:13 pm

We train the pilots of tomorrow, they are inundated with everything the industry throws at them and the unintelligible Nonsense contained in some NOTAMS are just another accident waiting to happen. With all the technology at our disposal today, the filtering systems, electronics messages systems, integration tools and smart people to think about it, there is a solution out there.

I suppose we just need to make enough noise in the right places to make a change. Oh well best we get started. hmmm, perhaps a NOTAM about change is needed.

MTF...P2

[Gobbledock]

All aboard the ICAO express.....toot toot

Captain Kharon, crank up the Houseboat engines, grab the charts and pack plenty of beer because there are visitors coming....

I now see why NFI 6D Chester appointed another Board trough swiller and released his list of Excrementations - ICAO are coming. A source advises me that finally the ICAO have confirmed the dates and scope of the audit. Now when I started this thread I was aware that the 'conversations had commenced behind the scenes', however bureaucracies work ever so slowly so it has taken awhile to get to this point. Plus on this occasion, unlike last audit, they are asking for 'evidence'. Now a cynic might say 'evidence, of course, it's an audit'. But as we know most audits undertaken by government departments or tick and flick organisations like ICAO are somewhat pissweak. So a request by ICAO for actual 'evidence' is surprising. Nonetheless Murky and his team of turd polishers have managed to fool the ICAO, Senate, Public and every other force of nature repetitively for decades, so I'm not holding my breath.

But wait, there's more;

As an addendum I've also been advised that CAsA have been shitting themselves of late over PelAir, Essendon and the David Black water bomber crash, and Team Voodoo and The Flyingfiend have been very very busy. Lots of panic within the bowels of Sleepy Hollow.

P2, more to follow? I believe so good sir.

TICK TOCK (perhaps)

[Kharon]

GD – “I've been told that CAsA have been shitting themselves of late over Pel Air,”

Nice thought GD, but can’t see it myself; history is against it. CASA sailed through the Pel-Air storm un marked, untouched, unaccountable, not seriously challenged and unpunished - WTD. CASA strolled past the ASRR same-same, with even less ‘bother’.

Another Senate inquiry or even another Royal Commission won’t trouble ‘em overly much. It is time ‘the law’ was used. There needs to be a Judicial Inquiry based on the Pel-Air incident with no purpose other than to examine the actions of CASA officers, top to bottom. This could be expanded to focus on the actions of the Sydney Basin crew during the McConvict era.

Reform of CASA will only be effective when they realize that penalties can and will be imposed, that prosecution for crimes is a reality and that ‘they’ (CASA) are not above the law. A SI or RC may be jolly good fun, but they ain’t the same as the barrister prosecuting asking “is this your signature?” or; “who instructed you to. etc” CASA claim to be pure as the driven snow; I say, let ‘em, prove it. Hell I’ll even draft some of the questions, gratis, just for the fun of it..

Toot toot.

[Peetwo]

Chicken Little: "ICAO is coming!!..ICAO is coming..!!"




Gobbles: "...Plus on this occasion, unlike last audit, they are asking for 'evidence'. Now a cynic might say 'evidence, of course, it's an audit'. But as we know most audits undertaken by government departments or tick and flick organisations like ICAO are somewhat pissweak. So a request by ICAO for actual 'evidence' is surprising..."

'Evidence' ? Well in terms of evidence the ICAO/FAA USOAP team would do well to review this thread and I am sure Aunty Pru would welcome a tea party review of much of the PAIN_Net Sleepy Hollow archives...(hint)

I am also guessing that there will be at least a tick & flick review of the progress of implementation (or obfuscation) of the last (2008) ICAO audit findings and recommendations (i.e. Mount Non-compliance).

 GD: "..Nonetheless Murky and his team of turd polishers have managed to fool the ICAO, Senate, Public and every other force of nature repetitively for decades, so I'm not holding my breath..."  

In order to sort the wheat from the chaff, on behalf of the IOS and PAIN BRB affiliated members and for the benefit of helping facilitate a fully transparent and independent non-conflicted ICAO audit process, here on Aunty Pru we will continue to run a parallel review of the 2008 Mount Non-compliance...

As an example and in light of the recent developments with the ATSB Essendon B200 accident investigation (References: A stitch in time saves - five? nine? ten? twenty? & The three card trick.), I note the following ICAO finding, recommendation and comment from Appendix 1-8-05:

And this was the proposed 'corrective action' plan and comments from Murky and his merry band of minions:

TICK..TOCK 6D, M&M & Comardy, TICK TOCK indeed...



MTF...P2

[ventus45]

An interesting reading list - for the insomniacs ......

#1    #2    #3     #4   #5   #6   #7   #8    #9    #10   #11 - BRISBANE

Saved the best for last.

This graphic says it all really, and is from inside #12



Many will discagree with what follows, but I will say it anyway.

For my money, what concerns me most, is the effect that the sight of looming obstacles (that SHOULD NOT be there) has on a "modern day power pilot's" decision (on take off) to "continue", ie, to try to get into the air and climb over them, when in "former days", "good airmanship" would have dictated (even if slightly after lift off, ie, at a low height) to "abort" - "abort" - and land ahead - specifically accepting an over-run or an excursion into "the ruff" off the side of the strip, as the "very much lesser of two evils" outcome.  But that option doesn't really exist anymore, not for him, not there, that day, because there is no "field of ruff" there any more.

I am speculating for sure, I am not a certified human factors expert (never would want to be either), with a zillion degrees sticking out my arse, just an old glider pilot.  Glider pilots think differently to power pilots.  We have to.

Glider pilots have no options other than "down" if there is a "power loss" or "control problem" on take off.  In this context, our "power is one of, a winch (with cable), a tug aircraft (with rope).  If either the cable or the rope breaks, you are on your own. If the tug suffers a power failure (partial or total) you release immediately, or he pulls his release.  In all 4 possible case, you are "going down". There is "NEVER" an "option" to climb, not even if you run into "lift" off the end of the strip.  You plan accordingly.  You "land ahead" up to a certain point, beyond that you go somewhere else.  Every strip has it's "procedures" and "place to go".

Modern day power pilots on the other hand, are rigidly "GO MINDED" by both training and indoctrination. Take the problem into the air we are told.  Sort it, return, land, taxi-in, blast the LAME, and tell him to fix it, whilst we go have a coffe while he does it. Overly simplistic, but you get the point (I hope). Put bluntly, I think this "GO" mentaility is wrong. It has been "handed down" from the V1 - Rotate - V2 of the "big birds", and is simply not applicable to lighties,(in my view).

I think his repeated "maydays", with no other comment, are highly indicative of his "indecision" at a "critical point".  With some kind of obvious power or control proble (possibly both) apparent, and with left drift developing, he, as a good reliable modern power pilot, saw the DFO looming, and (ultimately) decided to "GO", to get up and over it.  He probably did "the correct thing", by the book, or at least, he tried to, but alas .......

BUT, if the DFO was not there, as in former times, and if the "airfield" was still a "large field with runways on it", instead of "runways poking out into the shopping centre", I am certain that he would have "plonked it back ON".  The YMEN accident would therfore most likely not have been a fatal, just a bent bird and a few bruises.

Moral of the story, ENCROACHING DEVELOPMENT "restricts" a pilot's "options" in critical situations, DECREASING safety, INCREASING the probability of a minor accident becoming a major accident, and DIRECTLY INCREASES the LIKELYHOOD of FATALITIES.

Enough for now.

"K" edit - Key to the Tim Tam cupboard for "V" - no discussion. Top stuff. P2 should get one too; but he already has a gold pass.