[Peetwo]

Good news story: Freshwater 40th anniversary!   

Via Skynews Oz:

Comments via Save Manly Ferry Facebook page:

Jeff Keene

At last a positive story on Channel 9. Our flagship Freshwater back in service. After public backlash about the Emerald Class.

---

Douglas Baker

They have been in service on a temporary basis. Maybe now permanently and the emerald class transferred to other duties at Luna Park in the north sydney swimming pool.

---

Jenny Ingham
14 h
  ·
Another amazing day.  MV Collaroy I think it is? 5.16pm 18.12.22.  and 7.19pm MV Freshwater into Manly and MV Collaroy back to Balmain. So good to see both Freshies working. Does this mean we have enough crew able to mann two Freshwater class ferries. Always concerned Transdev
does not let skilled people go and we then find there aren’t enough crew to eventually mann three Freshies on the harbour at the one time. Just a thought.

---

Saw Norman Bwa

4 FW class need to be in service after March is my tip if Labor wins election also dump Transdev like Victoria.

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Geoffrey Lanes

Saw Norman Bwa yep I believe you yep we need 4FW class need to be in service after March is my tip if Labour wins election Yep dump Transdev like Victoria

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Saw Norman Bwa

Geoffrey Lanes Transdev wants to run Ferries like buses one driver to collect fares and tie ropes. FW Class is a large ferry and needs full crew for safety and manned as regulated. Needs education in running Ferries safely and efficiently.

 MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

 'NOTHING to SEE HERE!' L&Ks  Dominic -   

Legend Chris Cowper calls a spade a spade on Emeralds, via Facebook: 

Chris Cowper

It looks like our NSW State Government has dumbed down the so called "Manly Fast Ferry" service for a further 15 years

Just a little history lesson.

Hydrafoils "Sydney" & "Manly" could reach a maximum of 42 knots on the Manly run.

The Government purchased 3 Australian designed and built Jetcats. These would cruise at 33 knots.

Although slower through the water than the big Hydrafoils, the Jetcats could turn around much quicker and both classes of vessels did the Sydney to Manly trip in about 13 minutes.

Yes, I know, in early years Jetcats were notoriously unreliable.

The reason for this was, the Government of the day (Liberal) ordered them with cheap, "throw away" engines.

Eventually, the Jetcats were re-powered with better engines, and a proper maintenance regime instuted.

Bring on the privatised, so called Fast Ferry Service, and their 20 minute service.

Freshwater Class : 28 minutes
Hydrafoil & Jetcat : 13 minutes
NRMA Fast Ferry : 20 minutes

Incidently, Masters on Gen II Emeralds are not allowed, under the threat of death, to complete a Circular Quay to Manly trip in under 22 minutes.

And courtesy Stephen Coulter, via Linkedin:

 

Stephen Coulter
• 3rd+
Consultant and Innovation Leader in Micromobility and Financial Services, Founder of Localift and Zipidi
5h •  5 hours ago

Transport for NSW has extended NRMA's Manly Fast Ferry contract for 15 years and is integrating it into Sydney's Opal Card caps. This is a great outcome as it is faster and more reliable than the trouble-stricken Emerald Class ferries. The announcement should see the Emerald Class reallocated to calmer Inner Harbour routes and the full Freshwater Fleet reinstated while an Australian-built "eFreshwater" is developed as the medium-term replacement.

Transport for NSW Transdev The NRMA Candy Bingham James Griffin MPZali Steggall OAM MP Sydney Ferries Transdev proud operator of Sydney Ferries
#sydney #transport #ferries #backtothefuture



New NRMA Manly Fast Ferries contract heralds the revival of the iconic Freshwater Ferries, while Emerald Class Ferries should be redeployed.

Hmm...interesting promo today courtesy of AMSA??

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
19,987 followers
2h •  2 hours ago

[size=1]Reporting is essential to maritime safety as it helps paint a more informed picture of the risks affecting the industry. Reporting helps us develop more effective safety guidance and advice for owners, operators, and crew to avoid similar occurrences in the future. 

Reporting incidents also helps us to respond quickly and efficiently to an incident when it occurs. 

A sticker is now available to display on your vessel, to remind masters and crew about the importance of incident reporting. You can order a free ‘Don’t ignore it, report it’ sticker for your vessel using our order form: http://ow.ly/RH0b50MnfrG 

Read more about marine incident reporting: http://ow.ly/3qXj50MnfrJ

Hmm...the importance of honest and prompt reporting of safety incidents goes without saying, so how come has a strongly rumoured incident of potential overloading (Master was able to avoid) on the Emerald Class II yet to be made publicly transparent? Surely even under AMSA's (seemingly biased) definition of incident categorisation this incident would have to fall under the 'serious' safety incident category? 

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Chris Cowper (legend) with some disturbing facts about Emerald Gen II peak season loading?? -   

Chris Cowper

THE GEN II EMERALD LOAD LIMIT MYSTERY IS SOLVED.

It has been noted, French owned Transdev, the company contracted by the NSW Government to run the Sydney Ferry network, has recently placed a passenger load limit of 250 on their 400 passenger, Chinese built Gen II Emeralds.

Yes, these vessels are surveyed for 400 passengers.

The truth is: it's all about keeping to the timetable.

Not about carrying fare paying passengers.

If GEN II Emeralds sail with full loads, due to the extraordinary time taken to load and unload, particularly at low tides, they cannot keep to the timetable.

So, Transdev would rather attempt to curry favor with Transport for NSW by keeping to the timetable, than by fulfilling their obligations to the tax paying public, and not stranding customers on the wharf.

Managers, several of whom were former Sydney Ferry floating staff, are constantly monitoring Gen II passenger numbers to make sure Ferry Crews don't get carried away and attempt to move as many passengers as possible.

We should remember, not so many years ago, (2020/2021) we had 4 Freshwater Class vessels on the run in summer, each capable of carrying 1,100 passengers, and they couldn't keep up with the demand on busy days.

Transdev, this is beyond a joke.

Not my photo below.

Still chasing up on the rumoured overload of an Emerald Gen II on the CQ to Manly run? ATM there is no indication of such an incident being reported to the regulator, although there is still no monthly summary of serious incidents for the month of December 2022??: 2022 monthly domestic commercial vessel incident reports

However if the rumour is even remotely true and Transdev, AMSA and OTSI are sitting on this serious incident report then the safety risks (posed by commercial imperatives) are obviously not properly mitigated in a time of high demand (peak period):

"..We should remember, not so many years ago, (2020/2021) we had 4 Freshwater Class vessels on the run in summer, each capable of carrying 1,100 passengers, and they couldn't keep up with the demand on busy days..."

   
The following is a recent AMSA blurb that is IMO extremely relevant: https://www.amsa.gov.au/watertight-and-w...w-standard

Three standards merged into one

The requirements for watertight and weathertight integrity for domestic commercial vessels are currently spread across three technical standards contained in the Uniform Shipping Laws (USL) Code which were developed more than 40 years ago.

Section C2 is a long outstanding section of the NSCV.

We are updating the requirements to align with current technology and international standards and best practice.

Changes to the current USL Code standards will help us manage safety risks.

A number of fatal and serious incidents over the last 40 years have highlighted the need for change.



Purpose of the new freeboard mark

Recent incidents involving domestic commercial vessels highlight the dangers of overloading.



In one example, a landing barge capsized.

The vessel was overloaded and the master was not provided with accurate information about safe loading.

The original maximum displacement was 64.4 tonne, however post incident, its displacement was estimated to be 91.0 tonne. There were also watertight issues associated with the vessel’s main deck hatches that may have contributed to the incident.

Increases in loading conditions impact on the stability of the vessel, and create a significant risk of capsize or foundering. The proposed NSCV C2 includes a new freeboard mark for vessels that do not have a load line mark. This will provide the master and crew with reliable visual loading information, including checking for overloading prior to departure and again on arrival.

The freeboard mark will also assist the owner and master to track any ‘creep’ in displacement from modifications or additional equipment, and provide a point of reference for surveyors in verifying freeboards against the stability documents.

Hmm...so do the Emeralds have a freeboard mark?

I also noted these very relevant comments in regards to limited loading of 250 pax (+ 250 pax) for meeting scheduling purposes:

"Limiting to numbers to stay on schedule and not having reliable controls in place to do that. Schedule to the agreed contract with TFNSW must be a priority issue!"

&..

..the emerald are only loading to 250 so they can keep the time table.
This raises questions about the time to unload in an emergency, if they were to return to full capacity and is this a thing that AMSA takes into account when calculating passengers numbers.”

Finally, I thought it was a requirement under AMSA Marine orders to count all POB on and then count all POB off? 

Every passenger counts
Thursday 2 September 2021

Regulatory changes aimed to improve passenger safety on domestic commercial vessels are now in effect.



If you operate a vessel that carries passengers, you must:

Include a procedure in your safety management system to ensure passengers are monitored and accounted for during a voyage. The procedure must allow the master to be able to identify how many passengers are on board at any time.

Include an emergency procedure in your safety management system that deals with a missing passenger.
Some operators will need to ensure that their procedures include a count of all passengers on board the vessel where one or more passengers embark on, or disembark from, the vessel—including when the vessel departs a landing point along the way or departs a site where passengers may have left the vessel to undertake a water activity.

You must also keep a record of the results of any passenger counts in the vessel’s logbook.
If you have a question about how the changes will affect your operation, you can complete our online form. Read more about the regulatory changes to Marine order 504

 

Hmmm..yeah..nah got to be just a rumour - 

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

'Twas on the good ship Venus -
The head count did deceive us
Three hundred souls we took on board
without record kept of that great hoard.

The wind it blew so very hard,
Our vessel struggled for every yard
Just to get to dock was hard,
For big seas did fight us. very hard.

At last we sighted that circular quay
and what a sight it was to see; 500 waiting patiently.
Sick and weary the hoard stumbled away;
happy to leave that circular quay.

All 'cept one, sad to say. They found young Charlie;
yesterday: 300 souls we took on board
despite the prohibitions. Raw profit was our mission.
Had we counted them off and on,
we may have saved Mother Riley's son.

500 more the corporate shout. Hurry up and turn about;
and 'steering'? 'You can do without'
Back into the wind and brine to make our wages we dared
for no one left behind really cared.  Anon..

Perhaps it's time for Chris Minns to start asking some questions of the very 'suspect' safety management practices, operational edicts and maybe 'strict' compliance with promulgated operational requirements and those charged with oversight of the system.

A fair place to begin the discussion is in defining 'what purpose' the ferry system was intended to provide. Back in the day, the Freshwater Class ferry was purpose built, by folk who knew their business. Built strong to provide for the needs of the travelling public. The boats were 'fit for purpose' and built to a high standard. The design allowed the boat to be 'conned' from either end, which makes perfect sense given timetable and practical operations. The boats were designed and built to withstand the Southerly swells with a full load of over 1000 passengers. They could off-load and load similar numbers and managed, most of the time to meet the demands placed on the 'service' (to the public, by the public and for the public) who paid for that service; through tax and fare. Reliable, safe as houses, robust and sound.

Can the public still place their faith in the 'service' being provided today? The 'new' boats may only be 'conned' from the wheel house; needing to 'back and fill' before heading off; this takes time, which demands a modified schedule; this leads to a reduced schedule or reduce 'payload'. To accommodate this glaring flaw, they are restricted to a mere 250 passengers rather than the four hundred touted. Sure they may – seas permitting, may be able to make up the time due additional 'foot speed' but then there must be, by simple maths, a serious increase in service to meet demand. To accommodate these service shortfalls in the real world, they need their own 'dock'. You can see the problems – to meet the 1000 passenger demand (per run) at peak; restricted to only 250 passengers; you need to quadruple the fleet, then provide docking – at both ends.  This to meet the same service the Freshwater provided – almost effortlessly. It don't make sense from an operational, service or fiscal POV. Not to mention the increased costs and investments must be met by those who use the service. Crazy stuff. Try that with an air service and see how you get on..........

Then, the always lurking spectres of 'money', political credibility, money, influence, money and at the tag end – the 'safety of 'those at peril on the sea' Oh, and money.

Let's begin with money. Transdev ain't by any stretch a 'not for profit outfit' one, be a mug to believe that. Altruistic by nature and default, without a philanthropic bone in their body. I have a rather lovely bridge to sell to anyone who believes that providing the very best service to the travelling public of Sydney is their top corporate goal. Question on Notice – are they on a pro rata pay day; or, a fixed fee for service provided? Does this matter? Course it does. The simple difference between 400 tickets clipped every 90 minutes and 250 tickets clipped in the same time period may, just, perhaps make a small difference. Then there are the government coffers to consider :– who underwrote the design, construction, training and startup costs for the 'new' whizz bang ferry service?. Wouldn't be the tax payer or travelling public carrying that burden would it now – Nah. Wheels within wheels, deals within deals: every body happy except mutt number 251 denied travel, who has to wait 20 minutes for the next one.

It may benefit the minister or Minns to find a watering hole where those who work within the system have a quiet Ale or two even. Always a good yarn or two, (even three on occasion) all the 'goss', rumours, tales and mysteries all quietly spoken of in good fellowship. Should, for some esoteric reason, meeting with the Hoi-Polloi be beyond the pale; there's always the large pile of 'safety' reports and Masters logs to spend an evening with. - Never know, perhaps the rumours of a gross overload may be discovered; or, the very real difficulties of managing the 'new' boats may be revealed. Who knows until the reading is done..

Something is very, very wrong with what should be a very good service to a harbour city. A world wide icon of a harbour, a gateway to a nation, with a third world ferry service to a first world city. Safety and service should be peerless; a thing of national pride. Well, lets all hope that there is never a serious event which has not only a track record of attempted disaster; but unimpeachable evidence that it could all have been avoided. As we say in our game – think safety is expensive – try an accident.

Sods law of the ocean is prime; the clock is ticking and sooner or later, if not remedied soon, the wheel is going to fall off this muddied wagon of 'deliverable' outcomes and deniable responsibility. But then, what's a minister or two in this great land; cannon fodder is cheap in the corporate world, where safety watchdogs are an empire building clerical quango, and very easily (as demonstrated) muzzled. 

Shame on the whole sorry lot; we paid for 'better' – no :: stopping right there; I may just be getting a touch irritated.

Toot – toot....

[Peetwo]

AMSA the good, the bad and the ugly?? 

Via the AMSA Linkedin page:

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
20,116 followers
5h •  5 hours ago

On Tuesday, we were alerted to an emergency beacon activation off Eclipse Island, 17 kilometres south of Albany, WA.

We diverted our Perth-based Challenger aircraft to the scene and reported three people in the water near a capsized vessel.

Marine Rescue Albany was tasked by WA Police with supporting the search and rescue.

All three people were rescued from the water with no serious injuries reported.

We would like to thank the Western Australia Police Force and Marine Rescue Albany for their assistance with this rescue.

This incident highlights the importance of wearing a lifejacket and carrying a registered emergency beacon when on the water. In this case both may have meant the difference between life and death. Find out more at: http://ow.ly/tPUu50MIyNf

#SerachAndRescue #AMSA #SavingLives #SAR

Video via FB: 

 
Next via Linkedin again:

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
20,116 followers
1w •  1 week ago
It’s easy to report a marine incident. Follow these steps. 

1. Notify AMSA 
As soon as reasonably possible* after becoming aware of the incident, you should notify AMSA. This can be done by : 
- completing the online incident alert form 18, or 
- email to reports@amsa.gov.au. 

 2. Submit an incident report 
Within 72 hours after becoming aware of the incident, you must: 
- complete the online incident report form 19, or  
- email the completed form 19 to reports@amsa.gov.au . 

Don’t ignore it, report it. Find out more about how to report an incident: http://ow.ly/FUFT50MuEXf

Plus:

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
20,116 followers
2d •  2 days ago

This month’s safety lesson report examines how regular drills on safety management system emergency procedures led to a person overboard being saved quickly when they became entangled in ropes while setting cray pots.

Every month we share an overview of a domestic commercial vessel incident investigation, and the safety lesson you can learn to ensure safe operations on board your vessel.

Read the monthly safety lesson from marine incident investigation: http://ow.ly/91nL50MzAO2

Finally, again via Linkedin:

 

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
20,116 followers
1h •  1 hour ago

Transparency and collaboration with industry, minimising regulatory impact on stakeholders while maximising safety and environmental outcomes, underpin AMSA’s approach to compliance activities for the next four years. Read more in AMSA’s Compliance Strategy 2023-27: http://ow.ly/pPCM50MF7Sr

#AMSA #SafeSeas

Which brings me to this comment in reply...

David Langbecker
Seafarer
46m

Australian fishing crew regularly work for days without sleep and months without meaningful rest. Current DCV fatigue regulation is just pathetic; vessel owners are simply asked to self-assess fatigue risk. Imagine if these regulations applied elsewhere...

Why is serious fatigue ok on fishing vessels but not ok on other vessels?

It seems to me that the senior leaders at #AMSA are only interested in large ships and foreign ships. Young deckhands on Australian fishing vessels are NOT being protected from fatigue risk.

MTF...P2 

PS: The following is an AIS plot of a turnaround event, involving Emerald Gen II MV Balmoral, that occurred on the 01/01/23:



Q/ Does anyone have any intel (phots, videos, witness statements); or knows/suspects why the Balmoral was turned around on the 1430 scheduled service, 1st January 2023??

[Kharon]

Fractured Ferry Tale #3.

P2 - “Q/ Does anyone have any intel (photos, videos, witness statements); or knows/suspects why the Balmoral was turned around on the 1430 scheduled service, 1st January 2023??”

Well, it couldn't have been anything too serious – could it Shirley. I mean if it was then there would be a report from the Skipper to Transdev through the Safety Management System (SMS) which they would pass along to AMSA, who would do their due diligence and some form of measure would be promulgated – to prevent a repeat performance. Ain't that how a transparent 'safety' system is supposed to work?

Jan 01 is traditionally the busiest day of the Ferryman's year; big crowds wanting to travel, big revenue day for the company. Is the MV Balmoral one of those restricted to 250 passengers due to the time taken to load and unload the full compliment of 400?

I wonder, given the mass of people, at who's discretion may the 'time table' be stretched to provide 'service'? As we all know, more traffic than parking places at the terminal can and does create havoc with 'schedule' – so a decision to uplift 400 rather than 250 passengers could have a knock on effect to the system schedule. So, for a Skipper to turn back to base; as the GPS plot shows, given the disruption to schedule; you could quite reasonably ask 'why'? This is no light weight decision, made just for fun; and yet there is no report available as to the 'why and the how' of it.

I could (but won't) set a Tote board for this event: we can safely rule out most of the field; i.e. the stuff that would have been noticed AND REPORTED.

You see, even if there was a stuff up 'at the gate' and 400 passengers did board; its a 'so what' event – the boat can carry that loading; perhaps the schedule would have been thrown out of whack but – again – so what? Catch up is game we've all played.

That leaves us with only something 'extraordinary'. Odds on bet – something went wrong at the gate – perhaps a few more than 250 souls hopped onto the ferry, it is the only answer to the question begging answers. If so, then we may find an AMSA report on the incident – some time soon – perhaps? In due course - Maybe?

Here endeth today's Fractured Ferry Tale;

If you wake at midnight, and hear a horse's feet,

Don't go drawing back the blind, or looking in the street,

Them that ask no questions isn't told a lie.

Watch the wall my darling while the Gentlemen go by.

Toot – toot...........

[Kharon]

“Clontarf” update.

Chris Cowper wrote :


“Further to my post yesterday morning regarding Monday nights catastrophic (adjective: causing sudden and very great harm or destruction) failure of the Port Main Engine in French owned Transdev’s Chinese built Gen II Emerald, “Clontarf”, those who have more technical ability than me, are of the opinion, her No 5 piston grabbed and seized in the liner, at the top of her stroke, causing the No 5 Con-rod to part company with her piston and continue rotating at around 2,000 RPM (Revs Per minute) in company with the vessels crankshaft”. -

Not enough data. More questions than answers – again. Can we find some of the 'operational' and systems details, from a 'fail-safe' perspective?

Is this a single 'drive' system connecting two engines to a single propeller shaft; or are there separate drives to individual propellers? It matters – from a 'fail safe' perspective. This event speaks well of the remaining engine's ability to continue. If this is a single shaft set up, the potential 'shock load' thrown onto the operating engine is significant and possibly destructive. The last thing needed in rough conditions is a loss of 'drive' leading to a loss of steering (provided that is working).

Is there a 'rapid' shut down system for the engine? A fuel cut off – or a 'kill switch'? Or, in the event of a catastrophic failure is the 'kill' system automatic?

If this is a separate drive to individual propellers; then there are other potential problems which could, in testing weather conditions, lead to an increased risk factor.

Either way; running engines at 100% rated power – even if that 100% is governed back to 80 or 90% is still a false economy. Many pilots have had their day spoiled by a $10 piston ring burning through or breaking up, from there failure is only a matter of time – usually a short time. It this was an aircraft engine 'exploding' on the wing the very least consequence would be a major inquiry, at top level with serious government  involvement. Where is the media? Engines being driven at the very limits, potential for fire at sea; ferry capsized due lack of directional control – 2 or 300 souls to be rescued. Time for some serious attention to applied -

Sod's law requires that it always go wrong at the worst possible time, with the worst possible outcome.

Toot – toot....

[Peetwo]

GEN II Chinese Junk Clontarf engine explosion?? 

Chris Cowper (legend -  ), via FB:

Chris Cowper
1 d 

STOP PRESS. STOP PRESS. STOP PRESS.

Last night,  while on her regular safety drills, the Chinese built Gen II Emerald,  "Clontarf" had a catastrophic engine failure.

Her engine is now only fit for scrap metal.

Her highly experienced Master manoeuvred her to Balmain Shipyard with his remaining 1 healthy engine, where she is berthed behind "Balmoral".

Anyone having a spare Yanmar 6AY-WET marine engine in their shed could probably sell it to Transdev for a premium this morning.

"Clontarf" will probably be out of service for weeks. Maybe months?

 
Plus an update:

“Clontarf” update.

Further to my post yesterday morning regarding Monday nights catastrophic (adjective: causing sudden and very great harm or destruction) failure of the Port Main Engine in French owned Transdev’s Chinese built Gen II Emerald, “Clontarf”, those who have more technical ability than me, are of the opinion, her No 5 piston grabbed and seized in the liner, at the top of her stroke, causing the No 5 Conrod to part company with her piston and continue rotating at around 2,000 RPM (Revs Per minute) in company with the vessels crankshaft.

The crankcase inspection door was smashed off. Her errant conrod was found lying in the sump. It is now possible to look through the engine block, from one side to the other.

Large chunks of Japan’s finest steel was flung around “Clontarf’s” port engine room. At extremely high speed.

Most blades on the Engine Room ventilation fans were destroyed by flying debris.
Hot lubricating oil sprayed everywhere.

If the On Board Engineer, an extremely competent Crewman, had been conducting an Engine Room inspection at the time, he could have been killed.

This is not a joke.

You may well ask, “Why would a quality Japanese built Yanmar engine destroy itself?”
Well. Any competent organisation would specify a vessel to be designed and built with main engines that could maintain its service speed while being operated at 70% -80% of its maximum power.
Not our Transdev.

If they specified an engine of 750 kws (kilowatts) or over, the NSCV rules say they would require an Engineer with an MED I certificate of Competency.

For 749kws, only a MED II Certificate of Competency is required.

So Transdev ordered all their Emerald Class ferries, both Gen I & Gen II, with 749kw Yanmar engines.

To maintain their service speed, and keep to the timetable, as written by Transdev and approved by Transport for NSW, Masters have to operate their vessels at 100% most of the day.

This is particularly so on the heavier Chinese built Gen II Emeralds.

They are run “flat out like a lizard drinking.”

All day.

The correctly specified engines on Freshwater, 1st Fleet, River Cat, Supercat & Harbourcat vessels run at 70 – 80% and last, with maintenance, for around 30,000 hours.

Poor old, or nearly new, “Clontarf” only had 5,600 hours on her port engine when she cried “enough!”
I predict, this will not be the first early detonation of a Gen II Emerald engine.

If Transdev cared about their Crews, they would insist their Engineers do not inspect their engine rooms while the Vessel is running at full speed.

Ref: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/diction...BBZgLUZ5dU

Next from MattO, via the SMH:

‘There was an almighty noise’: New Manly ferry suffers catastrophic engine failure

Matt O'Sullivan

A new Manly ferry has suffered a catastrophic engine failure during regular safety drills, forcing the operator to pull it from service amid growing concerns about the reliability of the vessels purchased to replace Sydney’s larger Freshwater ferries.

The engine failure on the Clontarf occurred on Monday night, and the vessel is now berthed next to another of the new second-generation Emerald-class ferries, the Balmoral, at the Balmain shipyards. The Clontarf’s engine will have to be replaced, which means it will be out of service for weeks.


The Clontarf is wet docked at the Balmain shipyards after suffering a catastrophic engine failure.CREDIT: JAMES BRICKWOOD

Former Sydney ferry master Chris Cowper said the Clontarf’s port engine suffered a catastrophic failure while the vessel was travelling about 20 knots during safety drills on the inner harbour.

“Apparently there was an almighty noise, and an incredible vibration after the engine failed,” he said. “They took it to the shipyard using the starboard engine.”

Four crew were on board at the time of the incident. No passengers were on the vessel.

Transdev, the operator of Sydney’s government-owned ferries, said it was working closely with the engine manufacturer Yanmar to “comprehensively investigate” the cause of the failure.

“The engine will need to be replaced. It is expected to take a couple of weeks before the Clontarf returns to service,” Transdev said in a statement.

The three new Manly ferries have been plagued with defects and steering failures since they entered service on the busy route in late 2021. Internal figures have shown that the three vessels suffered a dozen steering failures between late 2021 and last November.

After a steering failure near the entrance to Sydney Harbour in November, the Fairlight was grounded at the Balmain shipyards – under orders preventing it from carrying passengers until defects were fixed – for weeks late last year.

Labor transport spokeswoman Jo Haylen said it was clear the three Emerald-class ferries used on the Manly route had “serious system flaws” which could not be solved by regular repairs.

“Transport [for NSW] is already conducting an investigation into the root causes of the steering failures that have plagued these ferries. It must now be broadened to look at the other defects too,” she said.

Transport for NSW said it had liaised with Transdev about the Clontarf’s engine failure as a matter of urgency and had been assured that the operator had notified safety regulators. “Importantly, there will be no impact to commuter services, particularly the F1 Manly-Circular Quay services which are operating as per the regular timetable,” it said in a statement.

The agency said it received preliminary findings from an independent assurance review of the ferries, which resulted in Transdev making “some minor technical changes”. It was awaiting the final report after an “intensive trial period” of the mechanical changes.

The problems plaguing the three second-generation Emerald catamarans have reinforced concerns they cannot handle conditions on the Manly-Circular Quay route nearly as well as the larger Freshwater vessels they are meant to replace.

The Narrabeen has been mothballed while the Collaroy is slated for retirement this year, leaving just the Freshwater and the Queenscliff in operation.

Figures show an average of 15,900 trips a day were made on the Manly-Circular Quay route over the last two months, which is up 2 per cent on the busiest day in 2019 before the pandemic.

From P9 above: 

“Clontarf” update.

Chris Cowper wrote :

“Further to my post yesterday morning regarding Monday nights catastrophic (adjective: causing sudden and very great harm or destruction) failure of the Port Main Engine in French owned Transdev’s Chinese built Gen II Emerald, “Clontarf”, those who have more technical ability than me, are of the opinion, her No 5 piston grabbed and seized in the liner, at the top of her stroke, causing the No 5 Con-rod to part company with her piston and continue rotating at around 2,000 RPM (Revs Per minute) in company with the vessels crankshaft”. -

Not enough data. More questions than answers – again. Can we find some of the 'operational' and systems details, from a 'fail-safe' perspective?

Is this a single 'drive' system connecting two engines to a single propeller shaft; or are there separate drives to individual propellers? It matters – from a 'fail safe' perspective. This event speaks well of the remaining engine's ability to continue. If this is a single shaft set up, the potential 'shock load' thrown onto the operating engine is significant and possibly destructive. The last thing needed in rough conditions is a loss of 'drive' leading to a loss of steering (provided that is working).

Is there a 'rapid' shut down system for the engine? A fuel cut off – or a 'kill switch'? Or, in the event of a catastrophic failure is the 'kill' system automatic?

If this is a separate drive to individual propellers; then there are other potential problems which could, in testing weather conditions, lead to an increased risk factor.

Either way; running engines at 100% rated power – even if that 100% is governed back to 80 or 90% is still a false economy. Many pilots have had their day spoiled by a $10 piston ring burning through or breaking up, from there failure is only a matter of time – usually a short time. It this was an aircraft engine 'exploding' on the wing the very least consequence would be a major inquiry, at top level with serious government  involvement. Where is the media? Engines being driven at the very limits, potential for fire at sea; ferry capsized due lack of directional control – 2 or 300 souls to be rescued. Time for some serious attention to applied -

Sod's law requires that it always go wrong at the worst possible time, with the worst possible outcome.

Toot – toot....

Hmm...so where the hell is OTSI?? Ref: https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/ferry/investigations

MTF?? - I reckon...P2 

[Peetwo]

More from Chris Cowper (Legend), via Facebook - 

Ref: https://www.facebook.com/groups/savemanl...&ref=notif 

Chris Cowper

Transdev, “Clontarf” & our 3rd World Manly Ferry service.

After talking to several of my former Crew Mates over the last couple of days, I am absolutely horrified to learn of the condition of safety equipment on board “Clontarf”.

Yesterday morning I wrongly wrote “Most blades on the Engine Room ventilation fans were destroyed by flying debris.”

This was incorrect.

Transdev’s Chinese built Gen II Emeralds have 3 ventilation fans in each engine room.

After the port engine detonated, as a precaution, the Engineer on board “Clontarf” attempted to manually close the port engine room vent flaps.

These flaps are designed to starve an engine room fire of oxygen.

Each flap is fastened to the vessel by 2 hinges.

On board “Clontarf” one flap operated as designed.

The second flap also operated as designed, although it had 1 broken hinge.

The 3rd flap had 2 broken hinges and fell into the forward engine room fan.

The large aluminium flap dropping into the fan sheared fan’s blades off.

What this meant, was, if there had been an engine room fire, the Engineer would not have been able to seal the engine room.

He wouldn’t have been able to starve the fire of oxygen.

His fire suppression system would not have been effective.

The port engine fuel filter had been pierced by hot metal, blown out from the disintegrating engine, and was pouring fuel into the bilge.

In January, a “Clontarf” Engineer had reported this faulty Fire Flap to Transdev’s Maintenance department.

I’ve been told Transdev, and the builder (Birdons?) have been arguing over who pays for repairs and modifications to the Gen II fire flap hinges.

Transdev’s Management don’t understand, or don’t want to understand, what could have happened.
If “Clontarf” had been crossing the heads with 400 passengers on board and her port engine had exploded, and caught fire.

Her Engineer wouldn’t have been able to put out the fire.

Crossing the heads there isn’t anywhere for the Master to run her aground.

Passengers, and Crew would probably have died.

Transdev Management would have gone to prison.

At a minimum, the Master & Engineer would have lost their Tickets.

This is one of the most serious safety breaches I have ever seen.
AMSA and OTSI must get onto this!

At a minimum, all 3 Chinese built Gen II Emeralds should be taken off the run until an independent surveyor inspects all their Fire Flaps and other safety gear.

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

Where the hell is OTSI and AMSA?

The question has to be asked where the hell is OTSI? And why are they apparently refusing to investigate serious systemic safety issues/occurrences involving the Transdev Sydney Ferries operations?

Where the hell is AMSA the safety regulator responsible for overseeing and auditing the SMS for all DCV operations?

The serious safety issues that we are aware of so far:

1) multiple overloading incidents of the Emerald GENII on the F1 route (CQ to Manly)(one of these events was rumoured to have been in excess of 100 pax over the max of 400);
2) a catastrophic engine failure, albeit on a non-revenue RTS run, that Chris Cowper states above could have involved multiple fatalities.

In aviation terms if an aircraft suffers a catastrophic engine failure (think QF32) the National regulator would more than likely ground the airline's fleet of that aircraft type and in some cases they would recommend the entire grounding worldwide of that aircraft type, until initial investigations can establish the level of risk for reoccurrence is low.

Here is the OTSI Ferry safety investigation webpage link: https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/ferry/investigations

This is the preamble that tops that page:

Ferry Safety Investigations

The NSW Passenger Transport Act 1990 allows OTSI to investigate any safety occurrence involving a ferry, with a seating capacity of more than 8 adults, that is involved in providing a public passenger service.

An investigation may be initiated by the Chief Investigator or the NSW Minister for Transport and Roads as the result of a safety occurrence or following the identification of an adverse safety trend.

The purpose of an OTSI investigation is to identify why an accident or incident occurred and to make recommendations to prevent recurrence. OTSI Investigation reports are tabled by the NSW Minister for Transport and Roads in both houses of the NSW Parliament and are also published on OTSI's website.

The nature of OTSI investigations is different to those carried out by safety regulators and enforcement agencies. OTSI applies a 'no blame' approach where the primary purpose is to identify the contributory factors that lead to a safety occurrence, rather than apportion blame or liability. If it is identified that the safety occurrence was the result of a malicious act, then the matter maybe referred to the relevant  authority or Police.

While on that page I was curious to note that the "Rockfish 3 collision with John Cadman 3" final report has been released: https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/ferry/invest...n-cadman-3

In the OTSI introduction it states:

OTSI does not investigate all transport safety incidents and accidents but focuses its resources on those investigations considered most likely to enhance bus, ferry or rail safety. Many accidents result from individual human or technical errors which do not involve safety systems so investigating these in detail may not be justified. In such cases, OTSI will not generally attend the scene, conduct an in-depth investigation or produce an extensive report.

I guess an overloaded Ferry could be regarded as human error and at a stretch a catastrophic engine failure could have been caused by a technical error. However if the present OTSI Chief Investigator and her Senior Management team honestly believe that to be the case with these serious systemic safety issues at Transdev, then have I got a deal for them...  




Coming back to the 'Rockfish 3 collision with John Cadman 3' FR, I note that findings mainly allude to deficiencies inside of both operators' SMS:

Safety actions taken John Cadman 3

2.73 Following the collision, the company and crew conducted a review of their SMS and risk register. This review resulted in several procedural changes and vessel modifications.

These included:
• modifications to the wheelhouse window framing to reduce blind spots
• the addition of double row party lights down both sides of the superstructure to increase the conspicuity of John Cadman 3 to other vessels
• changes to crew induction procedure to include the confirmation of competency, through assessment criteria and a questionnaire
• the development and inclusion of a Transit Zone and reduced visibility look-out procedure. The procedure calls for a lookout to be in the wheelhouse to assist the Master when travelling through the Transit Zone (day or night). It also instructs Masters to utilise extra lookouts as required in time of reduced visibility.

Rockfish 3

2.74 Following the collision, the company reviewed their SMS and in February 2022 incorporated a revised policy for night-time charters. The new policy - Deck Watch – Evening Charter, highlighted that Sydney Harbour was busy. It recommended that both the Master and deckhand (when carrying one) maintained a lookout for hazards and complied with the collision regulations, while operating during dusk and evening conditions. The policy did not detail how this was to occur

These were the findings:

Contributory Factors

3.1 The operators of the involved vessels did not identify all relevant risks and
mitigation strategies when operating in the Sydney Harbour Bridge Transit Zone
at night. Neither operator identified the increased risk of collision or the
associated visual limitations, including their respective vessel viewing
constraints. This resulted in both Masters sighting the other vessel when it was
too late to take action to avoid a collision.
3.2 Neither vessel involved in the collision saw the other vessel so did not adhere to
the relevant COLREGS Rules.
• The give-way vessel in the crossing situation, did not take early and
substantial action to keep well clear.
• The stand-on vessel in the crossing situation, did not respond in time to the
close quarters situation resulting from the give-way vessel’s failure to give
way.
3.3 John Cadman 3’s Master was focused on the overtaking traffic and did not see
the approaching Rockfish 3 on the port bow.
3.4 John Cadman 3’s Master was alone in the wheelhouse, which limited their ability
to maintain a proper look-out in a recognised high traffic location.
3.5 John Cadman 3’s wheelhouse window structure created significant blind spots for
the Master, which likely concealed Rockfish 3.
3.6 Rockfish 3’s Master was navigating the vessel with lowered clears and internal
cabin lights illuminated. Light reflecting off the clears would have significantly
reduced the Master’s ability to maintain a proper look-out.
3.7 Rockfish 3’s deckhand was primarily focused on preparing the vessel for
overnight shut down and was unaware of the approaching hazard.

Other Safety Factors

3.8 The Sydney Harbour Bridge Transit Zone was a recognised location of high
traffic volume with identified navigational hazards and increased risks during
night operations.
3.9 Rockfish 3’s crew were in their 11th hour of continuous operation. While the crew
had completed a short break between charters, the preparation requirements for
the next charter resulted in the crew not having time to leave the vessel and rest
during their duty period.
3.10 Rockfish 3’s SMS did not identify or include mitigation strategies for several
known risks. These included night operations, operating within the Sydney
Harbour Bridge Transit Zone, use of clears and internal cabin lights. The SMS
was generic and was not tailored to the intended operations of the vessel.
3.11 John Cadman 3’s SMS did not identify or include mitigation strategies for some
known risks. These included night operations, operations within the Sydney
Harbour Bridge Transit Zone, timing of engine rounds and wheelhouse line of
sight challenges.
3.12 John Cadman 3’s navigation lights may have blended into the background lighting
of Luna Park. This may have detracted from Rockfish 3’s Master’s ability to
identify John Cadman 3 prior to the collision. The variable lighting conditions in
the vicinity of the Sydney Harbour Bridge likely exacerbated the ability of a lookout to identify hazards and mitigate risks to safe navigation in a timely manner.
3.13 Gaps in the Safety Management Systems (para 2.62 – 2.72) for both involved
vessels were not identified prior to the collision

And the recommendations:

JC III Pty Ltd

4.1 Review their Safety Management System to ensure that:
• the risk register includes relevant risks encountered during charter
operations, specifically identification and mitigation for night operations
and look-out
• relevant competency-based crew induction and ongoing refresher
training are included.

Rockfish Charters

4.2 Review their Safety Management System to ensure that:
• the risk register includes relevant risks for charter operations, specifically
identification and mitigation for extended hours of work, night operations,
cabin lights, clears and look-out
• onboard procedures are relevant to the vessel
• relevant competency-based crew induction and ongoing refresher
training are included.

Domestic Commercial Vessel Operators

4.3 Review their Safety Management System to ensure that the risks involved in
operating in high traffic density areas such as the Sydney Harbour Bridge Transit
Zone are assessed for all operating conditions, day and night. Implement
mitigation strategies to reduce risks for any of the identified hazards.

I also note that AMSA had input as a DIP to this investigation and in 'References' OTSI provide this helpful link: https://www.amsa.gov.au/vessels-operator...-operation

At the bottom of the page there is this link: https://www.amsa.gov.au/vessels-operator...nt-systems

Hmm..so how come there is no reference, review or recommendations in regards to AMSA's oversight responsibilities of both operators, especially when you consider the obvious deficiencies within both operators' SMS?

MTF...P2 

[P7_TOM]

Donks, Donkeys and Sheep.

Sheep first. The Sheep climb inboard everyday; oblivious to questionable welding; skinny design, dubious capability in high seas; unreliable steering; engines being run to max all day everyday and failing (spectacularly); repairs deferred; deflected Safety Management System; cooperative governance, useless OTSI; toothless AMSA; etc. The messaging is as simple as this:- DO NOT travel on theses things; vote with your Opal card; boycott 'em; watch the changes happen. 

Now then, “Donk” is an affectionate term for what are some superb power units designed for aviation use. Even 'Superb' is an understatement; they are remarkable engineering marvels (most of 'em anyway). The term derives from the donkey's pulling the cart; and they do this remarkably well.

Now, robust as they are 'donks' are designed and built to perform reliably within certain clearly defined parameters. The best educational tool for learning to understand the 'limitations' of machinery is the humble baked bean can lid. They can take a hellish pounding when attached to the can (we've all been without the can opener and tried) but detach it and it looses integrity; fold it over in half three or four times each way and see what happens; it will break. Metal has a 'memory' and it 'keeps count' of of every over design stress imposed; when it reaches the 'limit' it simply quits. Depending on where the over stressed/ heated component is located and its design function; the results may vary from minor inconvenience to major, catastrophic, even to dangerous failure of other components.

Those with knowledge of the reciprocating engine may ignore the following 'simple'. But I wonder how many passengers of the Ferries today actually understand what has happened on the 'Clontarf' and what could have happened. So forgive the very rudimentary explanation of why it was so very dangerous.



Lets begin with 'the piston'. I have a small one from an aircraft engine on my desk, it is very battered; diameter about 100 mm; 90 mm deep and weights probably about 1.2 Kg. Cleverly designed for efficiency and, very dependent of a 'tight' fit within the barrel of the cylinder; it has grooves around its circumference to accommodate the 'rings' which prevent oil for coming up and provide a 'gas tight' fit to ensure maximum 'bang for your buck'. Travelling at high speed into a compressive gas; a spark ignites the fuel and the hot, violent hammer blow of combustion drives it out of the compression area. The thing which returns our piston to the 'bang' site is the crankshaft; the connection between the two made by a connecting rod; or 'con-rod. Within each cylinder there is a very precise, tight order in which events happen; there is great force, great heat and great energy – all dangerous if not carefully managed and contained. The real dangers in the 'Clontarf' engine failure are two fold. The con-rod separated from the piston. While the engine was running;  this one long piece of very tough metal could (and did) have knocked a large lump off the engine side; now there is oil, combustion, excess heat and un-burned fuel in the mix. The explosive forces within that engine, at that time, were 'significant' to the point of life threatening.  Make no mistake about that. Was there an automatic 'kill' system which instantly stopped the engine; shut off the fuel and contained the oil? No; well there bloody well should be. Are there engine health displays in the wheel house with alarms and a big red stop button? No? Well repeat the above.

This ain't like the Falcon quitting on Friday night. For those not 'technically' minded or even interested; Let me (as Wombat say's) put that another way. Think of a heavily loaded donkey cart; pulling a huge load; in hot dusty conditions; being unmercifully whipped by the driver – until it drops dead by the roadside. Beautiful Yanmar engines being brutalised every day – until they quit. Rightfully so IMO. Quitting is OK; but exploding while doing so? That is just a little too risky for me. Aircraft engines run for thousands of reliable hours – why: well - just think about it (and the consequences). If you were off to the Barrier Reef for a holiday and the left engine blew up mid flight – what then Sheep? What then?

[Peetwo]

Transdev in the news again for all the wrong reasons - 

Courtesy CH7 & CH9 news, via Youtube:

Hmm...no AMSA to possibly offend with this one, so I wonder if OTSI are investigating? 

Ref: https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/bus/investigations 

At this stage apparently not - 

MTF...P2 

PS: Pardon my ignorance but don't they have engine bay fire bottles mandatorily installed on these things?

PPS: Here's a handy reference on the subject...

Ref: https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/tp/fil...erbrae.pdf

PART 4 RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the following safety actions be undertaken by the specified responsible entities.

Bus and coach operators

4.1 Incorporate into their maintenance regime ongoing inspection of fuel lines and high amperage electrical circuits to reduce the risk of fire.

4.2 Review the placement of fire extinguishers within engine bays with a view to extinguishers being readily accessible during emergencies.

4.3 Incorporate into their maintenance regime the periodic cleaning of engine bays to reduce any potential build-up of combustible material.

Transport for New South Wales

4.4 Consideration be given to the inclusion within TfNSW operational accreditation a requirement to include all buses/coaches be fitted with EBFS

Maybe that's why the Chief Investigator has decided not to investigate IE the 'learnings' have already been made..

[Peetwo]

GEN II Chinese Junks on the nose?? 

Via the Manly Observer:

New Manly ferries make more waves as MV Clontarf’s engine fails

Alec Smart

February 10, 202


MV Clontarf berthed behind another trouble-prone gen 2 ferry, MV Balmoral, in Balmain Shipyard. Photo: Alec Smart

The MV Clontarf, one of the new trouble-plagued 2nd generation Emerald class ferries (Emerald II) on the F1 Manly – City route, suffered ‘catastrophic engine failure’ on Monday 6 February, leading critics to declare it is time to give up on the fleet.

What happened?

The port side engine, one of two aboard each vessel, failed during a training run. There were only four crew members on board at the time, so no passengers were affected.

A spokesperson for Transdev Australasia, the French multinational transport operator that manage the contract for Sydney Ferries, confirmed the breakdown to Manly Observer.

“On Monday 6 February, while the Clontarf engineers were conducting regular safety drills without passengers onboard, one of her two engines failed. The Clontarf returned to Balmain Shipyard using one engine…”

Will the MV Clontarf require an entire new engine refit for both the port and starboard engines?

“The engine will need to be replaced,” the spokesperson confirmed. “It is expected to take a couple of weeks before the Clontarf returns to service.”

A spokesperson for Transport for NSW (TfNSW) also told Manly Observer, “Transport for NSW has liaised with Transdev about the Clontarf engine failure as a matter of urgency. No vessel or vehicle is free of technical or mechanical issues from time to time.

“Transport for NSW has been assured that Transdev has proactively notified AMSA [Australian Maritime Safety Authority] and OTSI [Office of Transport Safety Investigations].

“Importantly, there will be no impact to commuter services, particularly the F1 Manly – Circular Quay services which are operating as per the regular timetable.”


MV Clontarf (right) awaits a new engine in Balmain Shipyard. Photo: Alec Smart

Steerage class

Balmain Shipyard in Mort Bay is the century-old maintenance and repair facility for the fleet of Sydney Ferries that Travsdev began operating in May 2012 (including overnight berthing of several harbour ferries and River Cats that commute up Parramatta River).

MV Clontarf was initially moored at Wharf 3, behind another trouble-prone Emerald class gen. 2 ferry, MV Balmoral.

The MV Balmoral, which a Transdev spokesperson explained was “out of service for planned maintenance (electrical works)” has since returned to duties. However, this is not the first time the pair – and their sister vessel MV Fairlight – were removed from service and consigned to Balmain Shipyard.

The triumvirate was originally projected to take over the F1 City to Manly route after the Freshwater class ferries were permanently retired in 2023, but a range of concerns and technical problems has seen the Freshwaters’ active service extended.

On 26 September 2022, the MV Fairlight suffered steering failure near Fort Denison, which occurred in the sea channel of a departing cruise ship, the Coral Princess, and its escort tug. There was no collision.

The previous day, the MV Clontarf also experienced steering difficulties.

As a result, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) directed that the three Emerald class generation 2 ferries (Clontarf, Balmoral, and Fairlight) must not carry passengers until they were inspected and all steering defects repaired, and that they remain out of service until cleared for redeployment.

New engine?

A Transdev spokesperson confirmed they are working with Yanmar Marine International, the Netherlands-based Japanese multinational that supplied the engines for the three new Emeralds, to resolve MV Clontarf’s engine failure.

Yanmar Marine’s support portal on their website proclaims, “When you choose a YANMAR marine engine, you can be assured that cutting-edge technology and performance come as standard.”

Considering the first of the three Emerald gen 2 ferries, MV Fairlight, was only commissioned in October 2021, and the other two, MV Clontarf and MV Balmoral began operational service several months later after sea trials, for an engine to fail less than a year after it began regular transportation of passengers is… not ideal.

Save Manly Ferry campaigner and Manly ward councillor Candy Bingham, who on 25 March 2021 presented a petition of 22,000 signatures to the NSW Parliament calling for the retention of all four Freshwater Class ferries (which were projected to be retired permanently in 2023), spoke to Manly Observer about this latest engine failure.

Councillor Candy Bingham staged a protest as part of the Save Manly Ferries campaign in October 2021. The former deputy mayor says it’s time to take a new approach to the iconic route.

“From what I understand the engines aren’t up to the task,” she declared, “because they were running them at full capacity all over the [2022-23] summer. I don’t believe that the engines have the capacity to cope with what they were expecting of them.

“Basically, what I’m saying now is: it’s time the NSW Government and Transdev admit that they’ve made a mistake purchasing these ferries. They’re just not suitable for the Manly run.”

How big a wave can a wave piercer pierce?

The three generation 2 ferries were designed by Port Macquarie-based boat builder Birdon (an Australian firm that grew out of a family-run dredging business founded in 1977).

The trio was ‘fabricated’ in China by Jianglong Shipbuilding company, then delivered to Newcastle in late 2020, from where they were towed to Birdon’s marina in Port Macquarie for modifications.


The MV Balmoral, with a ‘wave-piercing hull’, in front of Sydney Opera House, Circular Quay. Photo: Alec Smart

The generation 2 Emeralds succeeded the six generation 1 Emeralds that were built by Tasmanian-based shipbuilder Incat.

These first-generation Emerald class ferries, Catherine Hamlin, Fred Hollows, Victor Chang, Pemulway, Bungare and May Gibbs, entered service between 26 June 2017 and December 2017. However, they were designated ‘Inner Harbour Ferries’ by Transport for NSW as they were not equipped to cope with the occasional choppy sea conditions between North and South Head, when large waves roll into Sydney Harbour from the Pacific Ocean.

The second generation Emerald class ferries were fitted with wave-piercing hulls that are supposed to give them a better buoyancy in rough sea conditions, by slicing through, instead of bouncing upon, choppy waves.

On 12 March 2022, after a series of sea trials, it was announced that the three new ferries were cleared to operate in swells of up to 4.5 metres, although, as Manly Observer reported, in November 2021 the Fairlight suffered rudder damage and a smashed window during one trial.

Commuters who expressed scepticism that the new gen. 2 Emeralds could cope with treacherous sea conditions, including campaigners from Save the Manly Ferry, felt validated by a leaked Transdev document that appeared to confirm their suspicions.

On 10 March 2022, a Fleet Operations Temporary Memorandum issued by Transdev (and anonymously released to the media the following month) warned ferry captains that the new wave-piercing vessels risked becoming ‘airborne’ when steered into large waves.

The memo cautioned: “It was evident during the trials when navigating the Emerald Class generation 2 vessel directly into the waves or on a 45-degree angle to the waves at speeds of round 10 knots, caused the vessel to become airborne and resulted in tunnel slamming. This can be detrimental to the vessel’s integrity and the safety and comfort of the crew and passengers.

“Running ahead of the swell must be avoided, as this may cause ‘trapping’, which results in the vessel bow-diving or broaching, and a loss of control.”


Balmain Shipyard, Mort Bay, Balmain, Sydney CBD behind. Photo: Alec Smart

Cracks and buckles

Then, in another document leaked to the media, an April 2022 assessment of MV Fairlight by independent inspectors discovered cracked coatings and welds, a deformed plate in the port forward bulwark, and buckling to an internal rod, which were not on the vessel during a December 2021 inspection.

The MV Fairlight had only been in operation for six months.

The inspectors theorised the cracks and buckling were caused by heavy wave action on the hull – not collision with a wharf – and warned, “If the damage is simply repaired without addressing the cause, any repairs are likely to be ineffective in the long term.”

Sue Wright has been campaigning against the removal of the Freshwaters for a number of years. She is now the Labor Party candidate for Wakehurst in the March 25 NSW State Elections. Ms Wright issued a media statement on 8 February asking, “When will the LNP government finally admit that the Emerald class ferries are not only unreliable, but a danger to commuters and ferry staff?”

She further claimed, “It was only due to good luck, and extremely experienced staff, that there were no serious injuries or deaths following Monday’s catastrophic engine failure on the Emerald II vessel, the Clontarf. Large chunks of steel were thrown around the engine room, whilst hot lubricating oil was sprayed everywhere. If a crew member had been in the engine room, they would’ve been killed.”

Transport for NSW has defended their “robust system which includes meeting regularly with Transdev to ensure fleet operation, performance, maintenance and safety is of a standard which meets all safety regulations and customer needs.”


Dawn light on Balmain Shipyard reveals two Freshwater class ferries moored at the wharf. Photo: Alec Smart

Emeralds under-performing on passenger numbers

Ms Wright also drew attention to the Emerald gen. 2 ferries operating at 62 percent passenger capacity during peak tourism days, leaving long queues waiting on the wharves.

“We should remember, not so long ago, we had four Freshwater Class vessels on the F1 run; safe, iconic, built for purpose, able to withstand the swells across the heads, each capable of carrying 1,100 passengers,” she declared.

Of the four Freshwater class ferries, launched between 1983-88, the MV Narrabeen has been permanently retired, with MV Freshwater, MV Queenscliff and MV Collaroy currently back in operation, despite TfNSW plans to retire them, although the latter is slated for permanent withdrawal from service sometime this year.

James Griffin, NSW Environment Minister and Manly MP, is among those supporting a retention of the ‘Freshies’. In an August 2022 statement he said, “There is a huge amount of local passion for the Freshwater ferries and having them back in service on weekdays gives commuters and visitors more opportunities to experience the beautiful harbour from one of these iconic ferries.”

Ms Wright continued, “Now the NSW LNP has lumbered us with the Emerald II’s, stated to have a capacity of 400, but actually limited to 250 passengers because the amount of time it takes to unload 400 passengers causes chaos with the timetable Transdev have to adhere to, which is set by Transport for NSW.

“And so they’re discovering that to maintain the timetable during our busy summer time, they basically have to take on 250 passengers, bang, and the send the boat off again.”

Cr Candy Bingham elaborated: “They were only putting 250 people on the Emeralds, rather than the capacity of 400, because they needed a faster turnaround.

“What happens then is that they have to bring in the Freshwaters, so there’s two Freshwaters operating every hour. The Freshwater comes in, fills up with 1000 people, and that clears the queue…

“But we’ve been saying this from day one, the Emeralds are just not efficient. I mean, they [TfNSW] have been saying, ‘We’re going to have three ferries that hold 400 people and they run every 20 minutes.’

“Well, that’s all very well, but if they can’t get on and off the boat fast enough, and they’re only putting 250 people on at a time, that kind of defeats the economics of the whole thing doesn’t it?”


MV Collaroy, the Freshwater ferry facing retirement in 2023, departs Circular Quay in a storm. Photo: Alec Smart

Emerald gen. 2s to be scaled back?

In January 2023, Manly Observer reported that the NRMA will continue to operate the Manly Fast Ferry, the speedy commuter service between Manly and Circular Quay, for another 15 years.

Furthermore, the NSW Minister for Transport, David Elliot, also revealed that the Opal smartcard ticketing system – electronic payment for travel on public transport in Sydney, the Blue Mountains, Central Coast, the Hunter and the Illawarra – will be fully integrated into the private service, with a sensor gate installed at Manly Wharf mid-2023 to facilitate their operation.

Cr Candy Bingham predicted the Emerald ferries will be divested from the F1 Manly – City route soon, at least during peak commuter periods, but not because of their recurring technical faults and vulnerability in choppy seas.

She told Manly Observer, “I expect that Transdev won’t be running the Emeralds in the mornings anymore. The Transport Minister said that they [TfNSW] were going to offer the Opal Card on the Fast Ferry. The reason why they’ve had some commuters using the government ferries in the morning, the Emeralds, was because the Opal card wasn’t available previously on the Fast Ferry.

“From the middle of this year that will be available. So there’ll be no cost savings or benefit in catching the government ferry.

“I’m predicting that morning service on government ferries will be cut, because they’re basically running in competition to each other, aren’t they? Two 20-minute fast ferries arrive at once, so Transdev is in direct competition with the NRMA…

“The NRMA have done a very good job,” she added, “but it’s a total focus on the commuters. And this is what it has been from day one… It’s all about the commuters, you know, if there’s more services for the commuters, the commuters will be happy.

“But there’s absolutely no consideration for the tourist aspect of the Manly ferry, which is what makes it world famous…

“The tourist market is about six months of the year. By separating the two businesses, NRMA is effectively paying for the privilege of running these services, but all the profit has gone to the Fast Ferry and not been reinvested elsewhere.”

(For all the applicable links go to the Manly Observer article link in the headline)

MTF...P2 

[Peetwo]

OTSI a smaller paler version of the ATSB?? - 

Have been monitoring the OTSI Ferry Safety investigation page in anticipation of there being either an extension to the "..Safety and assurance systems for defect management (critical steering controls) in the Emerald Class Generation II Fleet.." investigation; or opened a whole new investigation into the MV Clontarf's catastrophic engine failure and the obvious systemic safety deficiencies inside of the Transdev SMS, as clearly highlighted in the Cowper FB post:

Chris Cowper

Transdev, “Clontarf” & our 3rd World Manly Ferry service.

After talking to several of my former Crew Mates over the last couple of days, I am absolutely horrified to learn of the condition of safety equipment on board “Clontarf”.

Yesterday morning I wrongly wrote “Most blades on the Engine Room ventilation fans were destroyed by flying debris.”

This was incorrect.

Transdev’s Chinese built Gen II Emeralds have 3 ventilation fans in each engine room.

After the port engine detonated, as a precaution, the Engineer on board “Clontarf” attempted to manually close the port engine room vent flaps.

These flaps are designed to starve an engine room fire of oxygen.

Each flap is fastened to the vessel by 2 hinges.

On board “Clontarf” one flap operated as designed.

The second flap also operated as designed, although it had 1 broken hinge.

The 3rd flap had 2 broken hinges and fell into the forward engine room fan.

The large aluminium flap dropping into the fan sheared fan’s blades off.

What this meant, was, if there had been an engine room fire, the Engineer would not have been able to seal the engine room.

He wouldn’t have been able to starve the fire of oxygen.

His fire suppression system would not have been effective.

The port engine fuel filter had been pierced by hot metal, blown out from the disintegrating engine, and was pouring fuel into the bilge.

In January, a “Clontarf” Engineer had reported this faulty Fire Flap to Transdev’s Maintenance department.

I’ve been told Transdev, and the builder (Birdons?) have been arguing over who pays for repairs and modifications to the Gen II fire flap hinges.

Transdev’s Management don’t understand, or don’t want to understand, what could have happened.
If “Clontarf” had been crossing the heads with 400 passengers on board and her port engine had exploded, and caught fire.

Her Engineer wouldn’t have been able to put out the fire.

Crossing the heads there isn’t anywhere for the Master to run her aground.

Passengers, and Crew would probably have died.

Transdev Management would have gone to prison.

At a minimum, the Master & Engineer would have lost their Tickets.

This is one of the most serious safety breaches I have ever seen.
AMSA and OTSI must get onto this!

At a minimum, all 3 Chinese built Gen II Emeralds should be taken off the run until an independent surveyor inspects all their Fire Flaps and other safety gear.

Item next, the Transdev bus fire: Transdev in the news again for all the wrong reasons

Yet a week later, there is no indication that OTSI are even contemplating investigating??  

Finally, 2 days ago, the tragic death of a 14 year old boy run over by a bus:

Same thing again IE OTSI (at this stage) not investigating? Ref: https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/bus/investigations 

Hmm...one has to ask, what the hell is the point of OTSI?

Perhaps the following provides the answer to why the Chief Investigator of OTSI is seemingly ignoring OTSI's legislated statutory obligations to investigate all serious incidents involving NSW Ferry, Bus and train commercial services? Because there is one incident that the OTSI Chief Investigator has agreed to investigate:

Collision and derailment between trains 1150 and T296

OTSI is undertaking this investigation under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (Cth) on behalf of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). Information on the investigation is available on the ATSB website.

 

And from the ATSB website:

An investigation has commenced into the collision and derailment of two trains in Port Botany on 13 January 2023.

At approximately 0605, Pacific National train 1150 (crewed by Railtrain Services) and QUBE Logistics train T296 (crewed by Sydney Rail Services) collided and derailed during a propelling movement. Both trains derailed with the rear of train 1150 coming to rest against a nearby building. There were no injuries but there was significant damage to both trains and local rail infrastructure.

This investigation is being led by the NSW Office of Transport Safety Investigations (OTSI). OTSI conducts rail investigations in NSW on behalf of the ATSB under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

Following the incident, OTSI deployed two investigators to the derailment site and requested further information from the involved parties. After completing preliminary enquiries, it was considered by OTSI that a broader safety benefit may result from further investigation. In collaboration with the ATSB, it was decided the investigation would be completed under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003. As part of the investigation OTSI has begun collecting evidence from involved and other interested parties to determine the factors contributing to the accident.

A final report will be released at the conclusion of the investigation. However, should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, OTSI and the ATSB will immediately notify relevant parties, so that appropriate and timely safety action can be taken.

"..being led by the NSW Office of Transport Safety Investigations (OTSI). OTSI conducts rail investigations in NSW on behalf of the ATSB under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.."

"..After completing preliminary enquiries, it was considered by OTSI that a broader safety benefit may result from further investigation. In collaboration with the ATSB, it was decided the investigation would be completed under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.."

WTF?? What appears to be a something, nothing incident and like the Clontarf a non-RPT operation. So why are they not investigating the Clontarf??

Hmm..perhaps it is purely the association with ATSB (under their rail collaboration agreement) and the relationship with AMSA that is important? While other serious incidents, that maybe politically sensitive, will be ignored until such time  as the ATSB is positioned to take over all forms of NSW's transport safety investigation??   

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

Ref: https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/new-...5cikt.html

OTSI Missing in action?

Or, are they just redundant? Surplus to requirements. I wonder just how much 'grunt' the OTSI has, when push comes to shove? 

P2 - “Perhaps the following provides the answer to why the Chief Investigator of OTSI is seemingly ignoring OTSI's legislated statutory obligations to investigate all serious incidents involving NSW Ferry, Bus and train commercial services?”

Perhaps 'ignoring' is not the under pining reason for the 'hands off' approach; unless invited. The incident with the school bus a good example of 'territorial' limitations where common sense and best resources rule the response. The very first calls made would be to '000' (not OTSI)- first on scene police, followed by ambulance. The police spokesman, not the OTSI investigator managed the media calls and clearly stated that their 'specialist' crash investigators were deployed, he also said that the police were conducting the interviews, collecting statements and compiling the 'evidence'. “the police crash investigation unit will determine what happened”. This seems restrict OTSI somewhat; no doubt the NSW police are the best resource to investigate and manage the event; from the minute 000 was called through to the Coroner. Exit OTSI, stage left....Sensible call methinks..But who will see that the Coroner's rulings are carried out, to the letter – OTSI? Yeah, right.....

The case of the 'burning bus' however is different; clearly a maintenance matter, potentially life threatening and as luck would have it, happened not on a freeway or busy, congested roads making evacuation difficult and restricting the fire service timely arrival. The question is does OTSI have the same capability to forensically determine the cause of the fire as say the police or the fire brigade? The 'quality' and authority of the report will matter when the legal boys get busy.  So who gets to do the investigation and why have OTSI not clearly defined the event, who is investigating, what and when the results are expected: and, what steps have been taken to prevent as far as possible the chance of turning a bus load of kids into a national tragedy? But who will see that the Police investigation results and rulings are carried out, to the letter – OTSI? Yeah, right...

Then we have the train derailment – this time OTSI and the ATSB combine to 'investigate' and call up the TSI Act 2003. Once again; OTSI take the minor role as the heavies roll in, to provide a 'broader safety benefit'. 

Bus and train events out of OTSI hands; that only leaves the Ferries in their bailiwick. AMSA is politely stepping away from deep involvement (gentlemen all) and letting OTSI stew in its own juices. There is inherent danger associated with all forms of transport, from Shanks Mare to Jumbo jet and 'things' can and do go wrong. It is the response to those events that matters; measures taken to prevent a repeat. Clearly all the evidence shows that there are serious, fundamental flaws in the ferry system. Philosophic, operational, mechanical and systematic matters that are not being addressed. OTSI, on paper at least have a large 'clerical' staff to support a very small investigative crew, who seem be be bereft of authority and influence. I've no doubt the OTSI investigative crew 'know' where the problems are. Insignificant things, like the never fixed, inaccurate 'head counter' system which relies on operating crew to determine how many passengers are actually 'on-board' and the many overloads which are not reported, let alone investigated. The worst case, realistic scenario? - Simple to imagine; overloaded ferry; engine failure, explosion and fire; fire suppression failed; steering loss due unconstrained fire; big swell and a capsize; 530 souls on board, not 400. Bring down not only the government but the wrath of every person in this land. Why? Well it could have been prevented; that's why...

Perhaps its time for 'men of good will' to step up and either disband OTSI or give it the horse power it needs to allow their investigators the latitude support and powers they need. It cannot go on as it is; and ATSB is not the right answer; they are a bigger basket case than OTSI.

Toot – toot....

[Peetwo]

OTSI decide to investigate Revesby Coach fire incident?? - 



Ten days after the incident, OTSI finally decide to investigate: 

Ref: https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/bus/investig...ire-tv287a

Incident overview

On 10 February 2023 at approximately 08501 Transdev coach2 number TV287A was operating as a chartered service carrying 38 primary school-aged children and 2 teachers from St George Christian School heading towards Revesby Pool on Uranus Road, Revesby.

During the transit the coach made a routine stop at traffic lights on the corner of River Road adjacent to a petrol station. On signal and departing from the traffic lights, the driver experienced a loss of power and observed smoke coming from the rear of the coach. The driver continued directly into Western Street where the coach stopped, and all passengers were safely evacuated.

During the evacuation smoke was visible inside the rear of the coach. The fire spread rapidly engulfing the vehicle. Fire and Rescue NSW attended the incident and extinguished the fire. The coach was destroyed. No passengers were injured during the incident. Nearby vehicles sustained damage from the heat and smoke generated by the incident.

Scope of the investigation

Based on findings from OTSI’s preliminary enquiries, the Chief Investigator determined that the incident warranted investigation in accordance with Section 46 of the Passenger Transport Act 1990 (NSW). The scope of the investigation includes, but is not limited to:

• Examination of the system for planned and preventative engine maintenance for the coach.
• Examination of fire detection and suppression systems currently in use on NSW buses and coaches.

The Chief Investigator has required the Investigator in Charge (IIC) to:

• Identify the factors, both primary and contributory, which led to the incident including:

• Effectiveness of planned and preventative engine maintenance on the coach, regulatory requirements, and oversight o Effectiveness of any controls that were in place to manage related risks 
  

• Review available fire detection and suppression systems currently in use on NSW buses and report on the effectiveness of such systems for a similar incident
• Advise on any matters arising from the investigation (such as additional controls or preventative actions) that would enhance the safety of bus operations.

The IIC will consult with all Directly Involved Parties (DIPs) throughout the investigation

Hmm...interesting fact is that the above IFS PDF version was created at 3:13 pm yesterday, more than 10 days after the incident occurred. Qs/ So how are the OTSI investigators going to conduct a forensic examination of the site? And how can the IIC now ensure there has been no contamination of the hard (bus wreckage) evidence, circumstantial/documentary and operator records etc..etc??

It should also be noted that although the OTSI Chief Investigator has finally decided to investigate, there is still three outstanding bus fire investigations, one of which dates back over a year, that are yet to be completed?? Doesn't give 'one' a great deal of faith that the Revesby Coach fire incident, which involved evacuating 39 school kids, will be completed anytime soon...  

MTF...P2 

[P7_TOM]

Footnote:-

Watching the video below from a 'risk' perspective there are a few questions to which I think answers should be provided.

That is an intense fire; the fire crew did very well to contain and control; credit to their calling, training and courage. That it was 'difficult' to control (30 minutes) begs many questions. It raises one big question; suppose those kids were on something like Parramatta Rd at that time of the day, or even out of 'bus lane hours'– busy don't quite cover it – the time the fire engine took to get there would, as always be a critical factor; traffic on both sides of the six lane would be at risk; big backed up line of traffic – mayhem; dangerous and chaotic. One bit of good sheer blind luck was the location.

'Mechanical failure' of Transdev's bus is a very 'broad' loose explanation. This was a fast moving, intensely hot fire; it needed a pretty big 'match' to kick it off. The speed at which the entire interior lit up was terrifying; the intense heat and the 'difficulty in controlling the fire speaks to the ferocity of the blaze. But what was burning and, importantly why was it burning so quickly and fiercely? All that is left of that vehicle is the skeleton frame – everything not metal burned away. Nothing in the interior was fire resistant – in fact the results speak of it being anything but. Why; and, who is responsible for the interior design standards for these vehicles.



I would like to know more detail on 'what' actually started the fire; there ain't much in the way of 'flammable' material in an engine bay; bar bits of rubber and plastic and they do not burn in the manner this fire did. This fire needed a serious spark; something like a turbo charger blow out/ back or collapse. The speed at which this went from an engine bay fire into the fire we see is remarkable.

OTSI scope is limited to :-

• Examination of the system for planned and preventative engine maintenance for the coach.
• Examination of fire detection and suppression systems currently in use on NSW buses and coaches.

Good place to start – but what about the cabin fire? How come it caught fire so quickly, burned so intensely and defied the NSW FB best efforts for 30 minutes. Fire in the engine bay basically under control when the engine stops – nothing too combustible in there; but that passenger cabin fire was the real beast seriously dangerous. Be interesting to see what OTSI come up with on the cabin fire and what they can do about the materials used in the public space – like non-flammable materials. No doubt we shall see.

[Peetwo]

OTSI Safety Alerts, Advisories and investigative disconnections?? - 

Reviewing the OTSI investigation pages for all three modes (rail, ferry & buses), there are some strange disconnections that IMO deserve some serious contemplation.

Q/ Unlike any safety transport investigative body that I know of, why does the OTSI published investigative process omit the original IFS (interim factual statement) once the investigation and final report has been tabled in Parliament by the Minister and published on the OTSI website? Shirley in the interests of public transparency and accountability it would be much better to have published both the IFS, subsequent interim updates, media statements, links to safety advisories, alerts, recommendations and ultimately the final report all on the same webpage?

Q/ It was my limited understanding that an IFS was issued preferably within days of the Chief Investigator's decision to continue inquiries into a transport safety incident to a full blown investigation. However there are multiple examples, since the present CI took up the position, of instances where IFS have been issued up to a month after serious safety incidents have occurred? Benefit of the doubt but maybe the CI has already made the decision to investigate and dispatched her investigators well before the IIC has issued the official IFS? If that was the case maybe it would be better if the CI issued a media release stating the fact that OTSI is going to investigate a serious transport safety incident and then subsequently issuing a IFS on a set timeframe, say within 30 days after the incident occurred - again all in the interest of transparency, accountability and proper transport safety investigative processes  

Q/ Also in context with the above, the following is an extract from the 2020 OTSI Annual Report:
 

OTSI has established and provides the following services and functions:

• A 24 hour on call duty officer to whom NSW bus and ferry operators and regulators report the occurrence of accidents and incidents. Notifications of serious (Category A) rail accidents and incidents are provided to OTSI by the ATSB via the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator, in accordance with the provisions of the Rail Safety National Law (NSW), and the Collaboration Agreement.
  
• A 24 hour investigation response team capable of providing immediate deployment to an accident or incident site.
  

 
So did the '24 hour on call duty officer' automatically deploy the '24 hour investigation response team' to the Revesby school Coach fire? If not, why not?  

 Item next, I was interested to discover that, much like the ATSB, OTSI now have webpages (for all three transport modes) that have published links for Safety Alerts and Advisories. Ref: https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/bus-safety-a...advisories & https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/ferry-safety...advisories & https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/rail-safety-...advisories

Here is the bus version:   

Bus Safety Alerts & Safety Advisories

OTSI supports transport operators, regulators and the broader industry to improve safety by identifying immediate and longer-term risks through its investigations and data analysis. In addition to its investigation reports, OTSI produces and disseminates:

Safety Alerts
A Safety Alert suggests action to be taken by bus, ferry or rail operators to address an issue that could pose an immediate safety risk to operations. An alert may be issued in response to a risk that is identified through the course of an OTSI investigation or following the review of an operator’s investigation report.

20 January 2021 - Safety Alert: Risks of Electrical Fires on Volvo Buses with Volgren CR228L bodies (rigid and articulated)

Safety Advisories
 
A Safety Advisory provides advice to operators and other industry stakeholders about longer-term safety issues that have been identified through an investigation or data analysis.

25 November 2022 - Safety Advisory SA05/22: Bus fire safety and emergency incidents in tunnels
15 August 2022 - Safety Advisory SA03/22: Commissioning and servicing of bus and coach fire suppression systems
5 November 2021 - Safety Advisory: Risk of air conditioning system electrical fires on buses
3 June 2021 - Safety Advisory: Accidents involving buses and pedestrians on and near designated crossings

Because of the relevant context (Revesby Coach fire) I extracted the following from the 15 August 2022 SA:

The incident

On Friday 26 June 2022, the driver of a northbound tourist coach operating in NSW was alerted to an active fire within the vehicle’s engine bay by both the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) fire alarm and the Engine Bay Fire Suppression System (EBFSS). Although there was an alarm and panel notification of discharge, the EBFSS did not discharge the suppressant as designed. The driver subsequently extinguished the fire with the assistance of another driver from the same company.

The Office of Transport Safety Investigations (OTSI) later inspected the vehicle and found an isolation device which should have been removed when the fitted system was commissioned. The isolation device remained secured in place to both EBFSS agent tank valve bodies. This device rendered the system unable to discharge the suppressant agent.

Records of the installation and information provided by the EBFSS supplier identified that the system was installed by an organisation known to the supplier that was authorised to service their systems but was neither trained nor authorised to carry out installations of their systems (which included the initial commissioning of the system)

Ok so the serious transport safety incident that precipitated this occurred on the 26 June 2022, yet bizarrely OTSI do not appear to be investigating? Ref: https://www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/bus/investigations

Which brings me to the next bizarre aberration...

Ref: 31 August 2021 - Safety Advisory: Domestic Commercial Vessel (DCV) Steering Systems

Extract:

The incident

On 12 May 2021, a passenger ferry experienced a steering system component failure resulting
in an uncommanded steering input and temporary loss of directional control.

A return spring broke in the helm steering mechanism and when the helm’s wheel was
released, it rotated towards port and engaged the rudder. The vessel was travelling at 14 knots
at the time of the incident. The master unsuccessfully attempted to use alternative steering
controls to correct the uncommanded turn. The master then slowed the vessel before
disengaging the primary steering pumps and engaging the pneumatic backup steering system.

The rudder remained to port for 199 seconds before backup systems were engaged. During
this time the vessel deviated from the intended course and turned to port by approximately 90
degrees across a channel.

The class of vessel involved in the incident had experienced similar return spring failures in
recent times although the causes of such failures along with the appropriate responses to
them were not known to all operational personnel.

Operator follow up

The Chief Investigator requested further information from the operator including their internal
investigation reports, risk assessments, risk registers, training and maintenance records and
vessel data. Following a review of this information and other recent similar incidents, OTSI
wishes to highlight several areas where safety management processes could be improved.

Key points for operators

In 2021, a total of eight incidents relating to problems with DCV vessel steering systems have
been reported to OTSI with varying failure modes. These include mechanical and electrical
component failures, corrosion within primary control switches and maintenance induced faults.
The steering system is critical for safe navigation and ought to be designed and maintained to
ensure its continued safe operation throughout the vessel’s lifecycle. Operators’ safety
management systems (SMS) are the primary means to ensure risks are assessed and
controls are implemented for managing steering system failures. Marine Order 504 sets out
relevant SMS requirements and can assist in SMS design.

Training and emergency response procedures are also essential. They must be developed,
implemented and reviewed at appropriate intervals to ensure failure modes are understood
and appropriate responses are applied. As limitations in design or understanding can result in
delays or unintended consequences when responding to emergencies.

Safety message

DCV operators should ensure that failure modes associated with critical steering systems
(including backup systems) are assessed and appropriate risk controls are implemented.
Maintenance regimes should also effectively monitor asset condition and regular refresher
training should be provided to operational personnel so they are able to successfully respond
to failures should they occur.

Again there is apparently no active or completed investigation that was conducted by OTSI - WTF? 

Although the identity of the operator is not actually stated, not helped by not having an investigation report to refer to, the number of operators that have that level of redundancy on steering systems etc in Sydney could be counted on one hand. But IMO the giveaway here is:   "In 2021, a total of eight incidents relating to problems with DCV vessel steering systems.."

And IMO this part of the statement absolutely nails it:

"..The steering system is critical for safe navigation and ought to be designed and maintained to
ensure its continued safe operation throughout the vessel’s lifecycle. Operators’ safety
management systems (SMS) are the primary means to ensure risks are assessed and
controls are implemented for managing steering system failures. Marine Order 504 sets out
relevant SMS requirements and can assist in SMS design..."

Yet here we are 18 months later and the suspected operator is still IMO having very real systemic operator safety issues that should have been captured and effectively safety risk mitigated by the operator's SMS. Or if not responsibly by the operator, it should have been addressed by the national regulator AMSA, with the assistance of OTSI's firm evidence and recommendations (like the above excellent Safety Advisory) established in a systemic investigation into the operator...  

MTF...P2 

[Kharon]

“To lose one parent, Mr. Worthing, may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose both looks like carelessness.”

“A return spring broke in the helm steering mechanism.”

“The class of vessel involved in the incident had experienced similar return spring failures in recent times although the causes of such failures” etc..

“The master unsuccessfully attempted to use alternative steering controls to correct the uncommanded turn.”

“In 2021, a total of eight incidents relating to problems with DCV vessel steering systems have been reported to OTSI with varying failure modes.”

And, from the big book of the blindingly obvious:-

"..The steering system is critical for safe navigation and ought (MUST) to be designed and maintained to ensure its continued safe operation throughout the vessel’s life-cycle.

No kidding! What an astounding revelation. The use of the word 'ought' says it all - try 'must'. I wonder, is there a carefully researched engineering report anywhere which details 'why' the return spring 'broke' (technical descriptor for ?). Was it fatigue? Sheer stress? Load stress? Corrosion? Manufacturing fault? Installation fault? Operator fault? Where about did the spring 'broke' and what caused that 'brokenness'. Seems to me that there is some sort of 'design' or material specification problem there.

That 'spring' is a critical part of the primary control system (as demonstrated). One incident – fair enough 'stuff happens' - but repetitive incidents smacks of carelessness. Even the 'safety message' alludes to 'training' and and is couched in such a way as to imply ' easy acceptance' of and 'preparedness' for more steering failures; rather than preventing the bloody things getting 'broke' within the normal operational life span. WTD?

Aye; “your safety in our hands” - through OTSI peerless dynamic reporting, speedy investigative system and flawless rectification analysis? I think not. You pay your money and take your chances – new OTSI motto perhaps...Must send a memo to the minister, for immediate action. That should work - Right.....

Toot – toot.

[P7_TOM]

Passing strange disconnection?

P2 - “Yet here we are 18 months later and the suspected operator is still IMO having very real systemic operator safety issues that should have been captured and effectively safety risk mitigated by the operator's SMS. Or if not responsibly by the operator, it should have been addressed by the national regulator AMSA, with the assistance of OTSI's firm evidence and recommendations (like the above excellent Safety Advisory) established in a systemic investigation into the operator”..

Admittedly, only a quick 'dabble' into the publicly available 'safety investigation' reports etc. published. But there seems to be a rather rapid decline in reporting of an 'investigation'  IFS - (basic detail) - and follow up interim updates and safety advisories and final report from within OTSI since the change of band leader.

Rumour has it that 'someone' has stuck their thumb in the Dyke wall to prevent the leak from becoming a deluge. Politics, contracts, money and public perception of how 'safe' their transport system really is do not make for accurate, factual, honest reporting. Not disingenuous or deliberately misleading; but 'soft peddled' through time and system. Time passes and interest fades; what was yesterdays headline becomes tomorrows fish and chip wrapper, particularly in the 'high-speed' / high mass communications world we have today. This applies very much to those who, unlike regulars on the Manly ferry, may only have a vague notion that a bus caught fire, or a ferry lost steering control; or, a bus they don't rely on is late every day.

However, in the 'safety' world there are strict protocols and good reason for those; lots of money spent on these systems and any member of the public who cared to 'check' on how their 'pet' event was investigated and the results from that event's investigation should be able to see 'due process' followed through, in a timely manner, from the initial notification to final recommendations implemented.

Looking back at the OTSI published 'results' from before and after 'the change' (we had to have) leaves you wondering. On the surface there seems to be a big increase in 'clerical' staff, a bigger budget but little in the way of increased investigators and even less in the way of 'meaningful' final reports and safety related ways to prevent an event reoccurring – like ferry steering failures. No doubt they have got it all 'in hand' (given the clerical support) but can we find out exactly how they achieved a better result through published 'investigation' steps to final report? Short answer - 'No'.

Yep; absolutely nothing to worry about here; move along; pay here and hope for the best. Really?