[Peetwo]

Civil Air submission 21 (PDF 145 KB) - A reasoned approach


While continuing to review some of the more informative and considered submissions to the UAV/RPA inquiry, the following AvHerald article link is particularly relevant in light of  submission 21: 

Drone vs B737 radome -

To what is tick, tocking towards a regular event via Avherald.. :  

Incident: LAM B737 at Tete on Jan 5th 2017, collision with a drone

By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Jan 6th 2017 12:22Z, last updated Saturday, Jan 7th 2017 21:39Z

A LAM Linhas Aereas de Mocambique Boeing 737-700, registration C9-BAQ performing flight TM-136 from Maputo to Tete (Mozambique) with 80 passengers and 6 crew, was on final approach to Tete when the crew heard a loud bang, no abnormal indications followed. The crew suspecting a bird strike continued the approach for a safe landing.

A post flight examination revealed a drone had impacted the right hand side of the radome.

The airline confirmed the occurrence, a replacement aircraft was dispatched to Tete to perform the return flight. The occurrence aircraft is being repaired.

In the region there are frequently drones weighing around about 10kg/22lbs operated for mining survey. Ground witnesses describe those drones are being operated without regard for the aerodrome and aircraft traffic.

The radome damage:


The damage stretches down the right-hand side of the fuselage (Photo: The Aviation Herald)

From the beginning the Civil Air submission makes it very clear, without being sensationalist or overly dramatic, where the ATCO association's concerns and obligations lie in regard to mitigating risk with the operations of RPAs in and around ATC controlled airports and/or airspace:

...Whilst Civil Air acknowledges the commercial and recreational requirements of RPAS users, and the future social and economic impacts, these are best left for those with expertise in these areas to advocate on their behalf. Equally, Civil Air has limited expertise in the areas of manufacture, design, compliance, insurance and privacy issues and therefore these issues are beyond the scope of this submission. The purpose of our submission is to provide Committee members with information we feel is necessary to ensure that ATCOs can continue to provide a safe, orderly and expeditious air traffic control system...

Civil Air also quietly remind the regulator of their obligations, under the CAA, and highlight why it is important for CASA to write considered, understandable, firm but fair 'risk based' regulations:

..Civil Air acknowledges that CASAs function is to regulate civil air operations in Australia through the development and promulgation of clear and concise aviation safety standards. Relevantly, CASA must have regard to the safety of air navigation as its most important consideration. Therefore, Civil Air submits that while there are other important concerns regarding the integration of RPAS into the aviation environment, these are secondary to the safety of air navigation.

Civil Air endorses a risk-based approach to the regulation of RPAS. Baseline risk should be assessed and, if not acceptable or as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), appropriately mitigated until it is acceptable and ALARP. CASR Part 101, with an associated Manual of Standards, is appropriate to regulate the operation of RPAS to manage risk. Furthermore, it should be clear to all affected parties that CASA maintains overall responsibility for that risk. While it is reasonable to prescribe regulations imposing requirements on affected parties including RPAS pilots, manufacturers, business operators, ATCOs, etc., it is important that these regulations are reasonable. It is our contention that unreasonable or onerous regulation will result in conscious non-compliance increasing the risk above what has been assessed as acceptable.

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...In light of the absence of separation standards between RPAS and manned aircraft, Civil Air understands that Airservices Australia is currently developing ‘segregation standards’ for ATCOs to apply. While Civil Air supports the development of these standards, we remain concerned that these are only necessary because there is no regulation in this area. Civil Air strongly submits that clearly defined rules for the separation or segregation of RPAS and manned aircraft must be promulgated by the regulator to ensure not only the safety of pilots, passengers and the public on the ground, but give certainty to ATCOs as to their responsibilities...

   
The Civil Air submission also reiterate, general industry advocate (The ABCs) concerns, that CASA should be putting more effort into basing their 'safety case' for regulation on a much wider international and independent purview:

..Two commonly referenced elements of risk are the likelihood and consequences of a hazard occurring. Civil Air agrees that the classification of the RPAS according to weight is an appropriate method to assess the consequences of a collision between an RPA and a manned aircraft. However, the analysis used to determine the classification should be independent, transparent and supported by evidence. As far as possible, analysis should be supported international research. Provided the categories of RPA currently being considered by the Part 101 amendment are supported by this analysis, Civil Air has no objection to them being used as one element of a risk mitigation strategy. Together with the consequences of RPAS colliding with manned aircraft, the likelihood of this occurring should form the basis of any regulation. Civil Air submits that the most important element when considering the likelihood of a collision between an RPA and a manned aircraft is the airspace in which the RPA will operate...

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..The regulation of RPAS is in a state of flux as States undertake similar processes to Australia. It is unlikely that ICAO will develop comprehensive guidance in time to be considered for wholesale adoption by Australia. However, the risk analysis performed by CASA, and assumptions that underlie them, should be tested against the research by other regulators. This will not only provide more confidence that Australian regulations will be strong and suited to their purpose, but will also ensure that Australia can influence international debates and rule-making thereby reducing transition issues when ICAO implement universal standards...

The Civil Air submission also goes to areas of discussion for possible solutions to help mitigate risk in and around CTR zones and/or airports:

...As submitted above, limiting RPAS operations in CTRs to those for hire and reward has two advantages. It limits the number of RPAS operations in busy airspace and provides the opportunity to place a higher regulatory burden on operators. This burden would not be onerous but having more stringent education and licensing requirements would result in a higher standard of operator in busy airspace where the risk of collision with manned aircraft is highest. Of course, the opposite also holds that less experienced and/or competent operators would not be conducting RPAS operations inside busy control zones.


Civil Air also submits that private RPAS operators should also be regulated albeit not to the same degree as commercial operators. Education of the regulatory regime under which RPAS operate would be the bare minimum required. Registration could also be used a method of identifying and therefore communicating with private RPAS operators.


One of the most important tools an ATCO has to safely separate aircraft is surveillance. Generally speaking, surveillance in Australia is provided by Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) or Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). Both require the aircraft to be fitted with a ‘transponder’ that allow air traffic control to ‘see’ the aircraft. Recent developments in the miniaturisation of ADS-B have resulted in smaller transponders particularly suited to RPAs. The addition of ADS-B to RPAs conducting operations around busy aerodromes could enable ATCOs to more effectively monitor and/or apply separation between RPAs and manned aircraft. It could also provide another safety barrier for unauthorised RPAS in the form of a safety alert to manned aircraft (workload permitting). Regulation would also be required to ensure that altitude and position information transmitted by ADS-B had sufficient integrity for ATC to provide the required level of service to manned aircraft...

P2 verdict: Just like the AAAA submission, this contribution from Civil Air should be required reading for the good Senators and I would suggest Civil Air should be invited to provide further evidence in any future public hearing - choc frogs all round to the ATCO crew...



MTF...P2