My two bob’s worth.
Agree with the above – however the following lines from the ATSB put an eccentric spin on what actually happened, and they are arse about face:-
1) - ATSB – “The crew's belief that the EGPWS alerts were due to a decreased navigational performance and not terrain proximity led to the crew’s decision to inhibit the first EGPWS alert and not correct the flight path.”
2) - “The flight crew initiated a missed approach when they lost visual contact with the runway”.
Turn those two statements about, in sequence:-
1) – ATSB - “The flight crew initiated a missed approach when they lost visual contact with the runway”.
2) - ATSB – “The crew's belief that the EGPWS alerts were due to a decreased navigational performance and not terrain proximity led to the crew’s decision to inhibit the first EGPWS alert and not correct the flight path.”
Suddenly, it all starts to make ‘operational’ sense – the crew appear to have been in visual contact with the ‘land’ (one may even guess the runway) when the EGPWS warnings were discarded – fair enough some would say – particularly if the ATSB had dug about a bit to see if spurious EGPWS warnings were a ‘feature’ of the approach conducted. The crew could actually ‘see’ where they were -. The missed approach was initiated when the crew lost ‘visual contact’ and the missed approach procedure was executed. Once again – fair enough – good airmanship – lost visual + EGPWS warnings – no messing about ‘go around’ initiated.
Another small, but troubling item ignored by ATSB is the actual ‘value’ of the islands NDB as a primary navigation tool. From the CPL ground school days any instrument pilot who can’t name the four potential ‘dangers’ to navigation which can be produced by a NDB/ ADF system should not be allowed to fly. We have a coast line + high hills + Sunset /Night + Rain – all of which affect the NDB/ADF system how? ATSB don’t mention the power and range of the NDB or any noted diminished performance due the effects of where it is situated or the time of day. I wonder, does the operating company mention these old times killers?
Just small points which, IMO the ATSB should have covered – if only to ‘eliminate them from our inquiries’ so to speak. But then, I’ve just read the load of bollocks provided on behalf of Qantas and the 737 into Canberra.
Send that bucket this way when you’re done with it son; meanwhile - I’ll get the beers in. My two bob, spent as pleased me best.
Agree with the above – however the following lines from the ATSB put an eccentric spin on what actually happened, and they are arse about face:-
1) - ATSB – “The crew's belief that the EGPWS alerts were due to a decreased navigational performance and not terrain proximity led to the crew’s decision to inhibit the first EGPWS alert and not correct the flight path.”
2) - “The flight crew initiated a missed approach when they lost visual contact with the runway”.
Turn those two statements about, in sequence:-
1) – ATSB - “The flight crew initiated a missed approach when they lost visual contact with the runway”.
2) - ATSB – “The crew's belief that the EGPWS alerts were due to a decreased navigational performance and not terrain proximity led to the crew’s decision to inhibit the first EGPWS alert and not correct the flight path.”
Suddenly, it all starts to make ‘operational’ sense – the crew appear to have been in visual contact with the ‘land’ (one may even guess the runway) when the EGPWS warnings were discarded – fair enough some would say – particularly if the ATSB had dug about a bit to see if spurious EGPWS warnings were a ‘feature’ of the approach conducted. The crew could actually ‘see’ where they were -. The missed approach was initiated when the crew lost ‘visual contact’ and the missed approach procedure was executed. Once again – fair enough – good airmanship – lost visual + EGPWS warnings – no messing about ‘go around’ initiated.
Another small, but troubling item ignored by ATSB is the actual ‘value’ of the islands NDB as a primary navigation tool. From the CPL ground school days any instrument pilot who can’t name the four potential ‘dangers’ to navigation which can be produced by a NDB/ ADF system should not be allowed to fly. We have a coast line + high hills + Sunset /Night + Rain – all of which affect the NDB/ADF system how? ATSB don’t mention the power and range of the NDB or any noted diminished performance due the effects of where it is situated or the time of day. I wonder, does the operating company mention these old times killers?
Just small points which, IMO the ATSB should have covered – if only to ‘eliminate them from our inquiries’ so to speak. But then, I’ve just read the load of bollocks provided on behalf of Qantas and the 737 into Canberra.
Send that bucket this way when you’re done with it son; meanwhile - I’ll get the beers in. My two bob, spent as pleased me best.