While we continue to examine the many passing strange dichotomies that the PelAir MKII investigation and chronology seem to endlessly throw up (see both the search 4 IP & WTFInc's layman summary on dots & dashes); I thought the SBG might be the perfect place to focus on another alarming issue, that of HVH's growing 'conflict of interest' list... 
Reference search 4 IP post: Hoody's (growing) COI list taints ATCB search for IP
First it is interesting to note the following answer to a NX QON asked at the 18 March 2011 Senate Pilot training inquiry public hearing:
ATSB RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE
– HEARING 18 MARCH 2011
SENATE INQUIRY INTO PILOT TRAINING AIRLINE SAFETY INCLUDING
CONSIDERATION OF THE TRANSPORT SAFETY INVESTIGATION
AMENDMENT (INCIDENT REPORTS) BILL 2010
1. QUESTION: Conflict of Interest Policy
Senator XENOPHON—Is there a requirement within CASA—or, indeed, the ATSB, Mr
Dolan—that if an employee of CASA or the ATSB is going to go somewhere else for
employment to advise CASA that they are going to an airline, for instance, from the date that they know that they have got that job?
ANSWER – ATSB Conflict of Interest Policy:
The ATSB has in place policies and procedures to manage real and perceived conflicts of
interest. The policies and procedures are consistent with the Public Service Act 1999.
Subsection 13(7) of the Public Service Act requires that an Australian Public Service
employee must disclose, and take reasonable steps to avoid, any conflict of interest (real or apparent) in connection with APS employment.
The ATSB Quality System Manuals provide the practical requirements for complying
with this requirement of the Public Service Act. The Investigation Guidelines Manual
advises:
As the transport investigation agency, the ATSB and its staff must be independent of
the transport industry and be seen to be so.
At no time should staff members involved in an investigation, as a team member or
involved in the review process, be seen as being too close to any participant, company
or organisation, including other government agencies.
At the same time, however, the bureau must establish and maintain good relationships
with the organisations and individuals in the wider industry.
Where there is the potential for a real or apparent conflict of interest, or relevant
background of a potentially controversial type – for example, prior employment with
the body being investigated – the investigator must immediately inform the relevant
Manager. The Manager is to inform the appropriate General Manager of the conflict.
If operational requirements of the ATSB require an investigator, who may be
perceived to have a conflict of interest, to investigate the occurrence, a written
declaration by the investigator must be placed on the investigation record together
with the Chief Commissioner’s agreement to continue with the investigator being
involved in the investigation.
Further, the Manual advises:
At the time of an investigator’s six monthly performance exchanges, any potential
conflict must be declared to the relevant Manager. For example, ownership of shares
or a directorship in a company, organisation or body that may be investigated should [i][b]be declared. Managers should advise the ATSB Executive of any such conflicts.[/b][/i]
Outside of the six monthly performance exchanges, investigators are still required to
declare conflicts to their Manager wherever it may arise.
During a very high profile investigation, consideration will be given to placing a
statement on the ATSB website concerning any relevant background of investigators
involved that could be misperceived as a potential conflict.
This action is to ensure transparency so that the independence of the investigation is [i][b]not brought into question by a subsequent inquiry. [/b][/i]
Extract from the Pel-Air: A coverup: a litany of lies? - Version III chronology:
As per the terms of...
...Subsection 13(7) of the Public Service Act requires that an Australian Public Service employee must disclose, and take reasonable steps to avoid, any conflict of interest (real or apparent) in connection with APS employment...
...At no time should staff members involved in an investigation, as a team member or involved in the review process, be seen as being too close to any participant, company or organisation, including other government agencies...
I would argue that due to HVH's significant involvement in the above diabolical segment of the PelAir cover-up that the Chief Commissioner should be precluded from involvement in any active ATSB aviation accident investigation...
The main reason being that while HVH was the CASA Executive Officer ultimately overseeing the enforcement actions against both PelAir and Dominic James I also have, on good authority, information that HVH was also the designated co-ordinator/liaison officer dealing with the FAA audit team and therefore the consequential cover-up of the actual FAA findings that could have led to the possible Cat II IASA rating.
This also means that by association that HVH is also implicated in obfuscating the possible proactive actions/risk mitigation on closing the fatigue safety loop for the better part of nine years...
MTF...P2
Reference search 4 IP post: Hoody's (growing) COI list taints ATCB search for IP
Quote:
AAI & the implications of bureaucratic O&O - Part II
..So did Hoody declare himself possibly conflicted with this investigation as well?? And remembering that he was also involved with the Mildura Fog duckup investigation - so where does it stop??[/color]...
First it is interesting to note the following answer to a NX QON asked at the 18 March 2011 Senate Pilot training inquiry public hearing:
ATSB RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE
– HEARING 18 MARCH 2011
SENATE INQUIRY INTO PILOT TRAINING AIRLINE SAFETY INCLUDING
CONSIDERATION OF THE TRANSPORT SAFETY INVESTIGATION
AMENDMENT (INCIDENT REPORTS) BILL 2010
1. QUESTION: Conflict of Interest Policy
Senator XENOPHON—Is there a requirement within CASA—or, indeed, the ATSB, Mr
Dolan—that if an employee of CASA or the ATSB is going to go somewhere else for
employment to advise CASA that they are going to an airline, for instance, from the date that they know that they have got that job?
ANSWER – ATSB Conflict of Interest Policy:
The ATSB has in place policies and procedures to manage real and perceived conflicts of
interest. The policies and procedures are consistent with the Public Service Act 1999.
Subsection 13(7) of the Public Service Act requires that an Australian Public Service
employee must disclose, and take reasonable steps to avoid, any conflict of interest (real or apparent) in connection with APS employment.
The ATSB Quality System Manuals provide the practical requirements for complying
with this requirement of the Public Service Act. The Investigation Guidelines Manual
advises:
As the transport investigation agency, the ATSB and its staff must be independent of
the transport industry and be seen to be so.
At no time should staff members involved in an investigation, as a team member or
involved in the review process, be seen as being too close to any participant, company
or organisation, including other government agencies.
At the same time, however, the bureau must establish and maintain good relationships
with the organisations and individuals in the wider industry.
Where there is the potential for a real or apparent conflict of interest, or relevant
background of a potentially controversial type – for example, prior employment with
the body being investigated – the investigator must immediately inform the relevant
Manager. The Manager is to inform the appropriate General Manager of the conflict.
If operational requirements of the ATSB require an investigator, who may be
perceived to have a conflict of interest, to investigate the occurrence, a written
declaration by the investigator must be placed on the investigation record together
with the Chief Commissioner’s agreement to continue with the investigator being
involved in the investigation.
Further, the Manual advises:
At the time of an investigator’s six monthly performance exchanges, any potential
conflict must be declared to the relevant Manager. For example, ownership of shares
or a directorship in a company, organisation or body that may be investigated should [i][b]be declared. Managers should advise the ATSB Executive of any such conflicts.[/b][/i]
Outside of the six monthly performance exchanges, investigators are still required to
declare conflicts to their Manager wherever it may arise.
During a very high profile investigation, consideration will be given to placing a
statement on the ATSB website concerning any relevant background of investigators
involved that could be misperceived as a potential conflict.
This action is to ensure transparency so that the independence of the investigation is [i][b]not brought into question by a subsequent inquiry. [/b][/i]
Extract from the Pel-Air: A coverup: a litany of lies? - Version III chronology:
Quote:18 November 2009: Ditching 3 NM south-west of Norfolk Island Aerodrome.
18 November 2009: ATSB notified of accident and ATSB subsequently notify CASA. The
ATSB decide to carry out an investigation and CASA decide to run a parallel
investigation, initiated 19 November.
19 November 2009: Pel-Air voluntarily suspend Westwind operation.
20 November 2009: Quote from page 97 of PelAir MKII Final report - "The ATSB asked CAAF for ATS records for the flight and the weather information that was provided to the flight crew of VH-NGA. CAAF forwarded the request to the ATS provider and then obtained the records in December 2009 to pass on to the ATSB. This included copies of the 0630 METAR, 0800 SPECI and 0830 SPECI."
23 November 2009: Richard White MALIU correspondence to ATSB Director Aviation Safety Investigations, Ian Sangston notifying CASA will be conducting a regulatory investigation into the actions of the flightcrew. Note that there is no reference to 'parallel investigations' under either the 2004 or 2010 MOU (ref link - #122 & #28).
23 November 2009: Richard White receives from Airservices Australia the complete list of Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs) applicable to the occurrence flight timeframe. This included the Nadi non-relayed 0803 AMD TAF, which appears to be underlined (ref link - #122 & #85 )
25 November 2009: Greg Hood file note email (cc'd Jonathon Aleck, Terry Farquharson, John McCormick.). File note No.4 reference to flight recorder recovery would appear to show, at that point in time, that recovery was inevitable (ref link - #125 )
26 November 2009: CASA initiate a ‘Special Audit’ conducted between the 26/11/2009-
15/12/2009 at the Pel-Air Bases in Sydney, Adelaide and Nowra.
30 November 2009: Richard White email to John Barr (cc Roger Chambers) confirming Airservices passed on weather & received flight plan details from PIC Dominic James by phone in Apia. (ref link - #122 )
7 December 2009: Audit team meet with Pel-Air management to discuss a number of
deficiencies within the Westwind Operation. This was backed up by correspondence from
CASA on 9/12/2009.
7 December 2009: FAA/ICAO brief on 'next steps' after poor results/findings in the ICAO USOAP 2008 & FAA Nov 30- Dec 4 2009 Australian audits. (ref links - #53 & WikiLeaks cable PDF: http://auntypru.com/wp-content/uploads/2...ileaks.pdf
8 December 2009: E-mail from ATSB to CASA raising the possibility of contributing to a
joint fund sharing arrangement to recover the black box and CASA advised they didn’t
have the necessary funds.
11 December: Advice from the UK Civil Aviation Authority to CASA providing an assessment of the fatigue scores for the accidental flight (ref link - #122 & PDF 881KB )
16 December 2009: CASA accept the Pel-Air ‘Management Action Plan’ which consisted
of three phases.
16 December 2009: Dominic James was 'informally' interviewed by CASA legal and investigative officers. (ref link - #112 )
18 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 1 items and were able to
recommence domestic operations.
21 December 2009: CASA Special Audit of Pel-Air Fatigue Risk Management System ( ref links - #217 & PDF 5428KB )
23-24 December 2009: CASA overseeing FOI of Pel-Air Eric Demarco issues 14 RCA and
a number of AO. The RCAs needed to be acquitted by 28/01/2010.
24th December 2009: Dominic James notice of suspension of CPL, ATPL, CIR pursuant
to CAR 265(1)(a). Also given notice to undertake examinations under CAR 5.38.
24 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 2 items and were able to
recommence international operations.
As per the terms of...
...Subsection 13(7) of the Public Service Act requires that an Australian Public Service employee must disclose, and take reasonable steps to avoid, any conflict of interest (real or apparent) in connection with APS employment...
...At no time should staff members involved in an investigation, as a team member or involved in the review process, be seen as being too close to any participant, company or organisation, including other government agencies...
I would argue that due to HVH's significant involvement in the above diabolical segment of the PelAir cover-up that the Chief Commissioner should be precluded from involvement in any active ATSB aviation accident investigation...
The main reason being that while HVH was the CASA Executive Officer ultimately overseeing the enforcement actions against both PelAir and Dominic James I also have, on good authority, information that HVH was also the designated co-ordinator/liaison officer dealing with the FAA audit team and therefore the consequential cover-up of the actual FAA findings that could have led to the possible Cat II IASA rating.
This also means that by association that HVH is also implicated in obfuscating the possible proactive actions/risk mitigation on closing the fatigue safety loop for the better part of nine years...
MTF...P2