[Peetwo]

ICAO ICVM Australia FR CAP: Where the bloody hell is it? 

Ref: https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/i...t_full.pdf

Note the following text from the - FINAL REPORT OF THE ICAO COORDINATED VALIDATION MISSION IN AUSTRALIA (9 to 13 October 2017): 

5. FOLLOW-UP ACTION

5.1 In accordance with the MOU agreed to between Australia and ICAO, Australia replied in a letter dated 23 February 2018 that it had no comments on the draft report and also reiterated its commitment to develop its CAPs accordingly.

5.2 According to the MOU, the State undertakes to submit its updated CAPs directly on the USOAP CMA online framework (https://www.icao.int/usoap) within 45 days after receipt of this final report.

5.3 The CAPs should provide specific actions and estimated implementation dates, as well as a responsible office for taking action to correct the deficiencies identified in the findings. Further guidance on how to develop effective CAPs is outlined in the “Guidance for States on Developing Corrective Action Plans (CAPs)”, which can be found in the “CMA Library” of the online framework.

5.4 ICAO will provide Australia with feedback on the acceptability of the proposed updated CAPs. If any proposed corrective actions do not fully address the associated findings, the State will be notified accordingly.

5.5 If no CAP is submitted, ICAO will contact Australia to determine the reasons for not providing a CAP and report its findings to Council.

 
Considering that one of the significant findings of the ICAO ICVM audit team included this under the AGA (Annex 14):

AGA:

Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.

   
Which highlighted a repeated ICAO significant identified safety issue from the 2008 ICAO USOAP audit of Australia:

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This significant safety issue should have been proactively addressed by the supposedly fully compliant Australian Annex 19 SSP more than 6 years ago. This deficiency in the SSP was recently identified in a seriously delayed ATSB investigation: ref- http://www.auntypru.com/forum/thread-30-...ml#pid9476

ATSB finds no application of safety principles

The ATSB carried out an investigation four years later in 2013 into the procedures of these decision-making processes. This was done as a response to a REPCON report received in September 2012 (P2 comment - bizarrely the ATSB REPCON database doesn't appear to go back to 2012??) expressing concerns a proper safety case was not conducted on the proposal. The ATSB’s Final Report concluded that whilst the procedure was compliant with the Airports Act 1996 and the Regulations, it “did not require the application of risk management principles to the Department’s consideration”. This was highlighted as a safety issue.

IMO this not only highlights major deficiencies in Govt departmental and agency processes but also highlights serious flaws and lack of transparency of our supposedly fully ICAO compliant Annex 19 SSP...  ref: https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/s...ction.aspx


MTF...P2