[Peetwo]

10 years on - Let's not do the timewarp again... 

I see that over on the embuggerance thread - ref: http://www.auntypru.com/forum/thread-57-...ml#pid9605 - that Ol'Tom has started up a tote on the 'Race to the Bottom Cup':

So, boys and girls, the rules are the same as always – you pays your money and you takes your pick.  


There is a side book running:-

Judicial Inquiry. 15/1.
Royal Commission. 5/1.
Senate Inquiry. 4/1.
Sweet Duck All. Odds on.

Happy punting………………"Yes please; same again; thank you"..............

 
Which brings me to the following 2008 SMH article on the infamous, shelf-wared and Iron Ring obfuscated, Senate Inquiry into the administration of CASA (ref: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus...casa/index )

SMH link: 

On a wing and a prayer

By Richard Baker
21 July 2008 — 6:43pm

Are we safe up there? Damning evidence to a Senate inquiry suggests the Civil Aviation Safety Authority may be failing as a safety watchdog.

SENIOR executives from Australia's air safety regulator were disgruntled when they fronted a special Senate inquiry earlier this month. Surprised by the Federal Government's decision to call a snap inquiry into their administration of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, they made their displeasure clear.

"After we had given our evidence at the last estimates (in May), the inquiry was announced and certainly I was disappointed ... a number of these issues have been ventilated quite a lot," CASA's deputy chief Shane Carmody told the senators.

Carmody's comments highlight the friction that has developed between members of the Senate's Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee and CASA management in recent years.

Labor's Kerry O'Brien and CASA chief Bruce Byron have been particularly prickly combatants, with the Tasmanian senator pursuing the Howard-government appointee over his expensive overseas travel, his scheduling of time-off to coincide with Senate hearings and his $350,000-plus annual salary.

In addition to showing their displeasure at being the subject of an inquiry, CASA's leadership let it be known they were disappointed that the many changes they had introduced to the organisation - including reform of its approach to safety regulation and a 50% staff turnover - had not been "broadly recognised in the community".

While it may be true that most Australians are unfamiliar with CASA's reforms, the policy changes - particularly regarding safety regulation - have not been lost on pilots, engineers, former CASA staff, families of air crash victims and other industry participants.

In fact, Byron's mission to have CASA seen as a "valued partner" of the aviation industry rather than a "nanny regulator" is a topic that features prominently in many of the 50 submissions received by the inquiry.

Critics of Byron's policy argue that the move towards self-administration is worrying, particularly as airlines look to cut costs to cope with soaring oil prices and a bleak global economic outlook. Submissions from pilots, unions and former CASA officials said such times demanded a rigorous regulator.

But Byron, an experienced pilot and former airline executive, has made little secret over the past three years of his desire to introduce a "more sophisticated" approach to CASA's role as safety regulator. It is, he said last year, "something that has really been dear to my heart for some time".

Looking to the aviation regulatory regimes in the US, Canada and Europe for inspiration, Byron has pushed CASA in the direction of educator rather than enforcer. "CASA will not be knocking on your door armed with the regulations and a plan to dig around until breaches are found," he said in 2006.

The desire for a smooth relationship with industry is evident right across CASA. Even its job advertisements contain the sentence: "CASA works to be a valued partner with the aviation industry."

Byron and his management team reject criticisms that this approach has led to a cosy relationship between CASA and the aviation industry. "When at times we have to be a firm regulator, that is what we have to do," he told the inquiry.

CASA's ostensibly firm hand was on display soon after the Senate inquiry was announced late last month, with the authority ordering a safety check of air operations in northern Australia, where in one of the nation's worst air crashes 15 people were killed at Lockhart River in Queensland in 2005.

However, the initiative was not well received by some of the families of the Lockhart victims, who regarded it as a cynical attempt to appear tough as the organisation faced parliamentary scrutiny.

What the Senate inquiry has made clear is that CASA's approach to safety regulation has been the cause of considerable debate and angst within the organisation. Deputy chief executive Carmody revealed an almost 50% turnover in staff, with some choosing to move on and others going "because we no longer had a place for them".

Byron linked some of the 134 redundancies at CASA to the cultural change he and his team have tried to implement.

A victim of that change is the man who was its general counsel between 1995 and 2006, Peter Ilyk. The lawyer told senators that CASA was treading on dangerous ground by playing down its responsibility for safety regulation.

"It (CASA) was not set up to be a partner with industry. It was not set up to promote industry. It was not set up to bow to industry pressure. CASA was set up to regulate the industry and enforce the safety rules," Ilyk argued.

CASA's decision to stop publishing air operator suspensions or cancellations on its website suggests a dangerously close relationship between the regulator and industry, according to Ilyk. "Such publication would not be in the spirit of partnership," he said.

Ilyk told senators that governance failures had flourished under the new arrangements, including a reluctance to tackle the big operators such as Qantas. He said he had brought these to Byron's attention but "not long after raising my concerns, I was terminated".

"I think there was a lot of industry pressure to get rid of particular people that happened to criticise industry or took a tough stance," Ilyk said.

"Towards the end of my career, the CEO simply ignored all of my emails ... One of the ones I sent to the CEO at the time outlining my concerns about governance failures in CASA was never answered formally. We had a CEO meeting about three months later and the only response I got from the CEO was, 'Don't you ever send me a minute like that again.' At that point I knew I was on the slippery slope out."

Asked about Ilyk's claims, Byron said that to the best of his knowledge he always responded to concerns raised by senior staff, either by accepting what they said or rejecting it. He did not recall ever telling people not to send him certain material again and reminded senators that ex-CASA staff making submissions might be "disaffected".

Another former CASA employee, Joseph Tully, who was a policy manager in the general aviation group, supported Ilyk's criticisms.

Tully told the inquiry that four senior CASA technical staff had been forced out of the authority since 2005 after registering concern about CASA's approach to safety regulation.

Rod Bencke, a CASA veteran of 21 years, was blunt in his assessment of the authority's standing: "It is my belief that CASA will not be an effective regulator until its operations and ethos have been comprehensively reviewed and effective correction action taken."

On what has CASA based its controversial new regulatory approach?

The answer is a mix of the "partnership" models adopted by aviation regulators in the US, Europe and Canada in recent years.

Unfortunately for CASA, these regimes, which emphasise industry self-administration, have this year come in for strong criticism from law-makers and public sector watchdogs in their respective countries.

In April, James Oberstar, the chairman of the US House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, said the US Federal Aviation Administration had shown a dangerous lack of compliance with inspection requirements, resulting in thousands flying on potentially unsafe aircraft.

Oberstar's comments came after a congressional investigation revealed a discount airline was flying 737s that had defects which should have been detected by FAA inspections.

"It reflects an attitude of complacency at the highest levels of FAA management, a pendulum swing away from vigorous enforcement of regulatory compliance towards a carrier-friendly, cozy relationship with the airlines," he said.

Two months ago, the Canadian Auditor-General Sheila Fraser criticised Transport Canada's decision to let the aviation industry conduct its own safety inspections without first assessing any of the risks involved. Fraser said the policy "could have sweeping implications for air safety in Canada".

In Australia, it is not just former CASA employees who are worried by the authority's push for better relations with industry while moving away from the traditional role of a watch-dog style regulator.

Captain Ian Woods, president of the Australian and International Pilots Association, told senators that CASA had failed to meet required standards in enforcing industry compliance with safety regulations.

This failure, he said, meant CASA was "unable to act as a necessary counterweight to balance shifting economic and regulatory frameworks".

"Some people would say that it is never possible for the one organisation to balance safety regulation with commercial necessity and they should be separated," Woods said.

"A number of occurrences I have personally witnessed lead me to conclude that CASA gave due consideration to its obligations there and at times confused those obligations and was not clear and definitive enough standing up for safety regulation."

Adding weight to criticism of CASA's relationship with industry is its refusal to release its audits of the overseas facilities, mainly in Asia, that are increasingly used by Qantas and Virgin Blue to maintain their jets. This has caused the Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association to accuse CASA of putting the interests of foreign-owned companies before those of the Australian public.

Though the Senate inquiry has been a bruising experience for CASA executives, they have not been without support. Qantas and Virgin Blue applauded CASA's regulatory policy.

"The shift by CASA to a risk-based approach to safety, where the focus is on safety outcomes, with the responsibility for managing day-to-day safety risks resting with industry, is supported," Qantas said.

Importantly, Byron can point out to his critics that Australia still enjoys an airline safety record the envy of the world. "I am the first to say that we, CASA, do not have an easy job, but I stand by the record of my organisation over the last few years. We do not expect to receive bouquets for the work we do, but I would like to believe that most of the industry, from time to time, and on considered and calm reflection, acknowledges that CASA delivers real safety outcomes," said Byron, who is not seeking re-appointment as CASA chief.

But critics, such as CASA's former chief lawyer Peter Ilyk, suggest Australia is more than ever in need of a strong aviation regulator, given the growing pressure on airlines to cut costs and the possible negative effect that could have on safety and maintenance standards.

"The fact that there have not been any accidents and the fact that people have not died does not mean that there is no safety problem."

Very troubling when you consider the current status quo on aviation safety administration and not to mention that the same core of Iron Ring executives are still to this day scurrying around and permeating the halls of Aviation House with their self-serving, rotting stench of corruption and evil malevolence...

As an example take the current embuggerances of Clinton McKenzie (see: http://www.auntypru.com/forum/thread-17-lastpost.html ) and Bruce Rhoades (see: http://www.auntypru.com/forum/thread-57-...ml#pid9594 ) then consider the following QON Hansard text and the subsequent CASA(Dr A) AQON from the 2008 Additional Estimates: 

Senator O’BRIEN—I am told that CASA provided advice for a letter signed on
9 May last year by the former Attorney-General, through his Queensland counterpart, in relation to the Transair 15 fatality accident that: ‘The Civil Aviation Act 1988 which CASA operates provides a regulatory framework for the maintenance and improvement of safety in civil aviation and relates to the prevention of aviation accidents and incidents, not their prosecution.’ Does that accord with your understanding of the sort of advice that you would provide?

Mr Carmody—I am afraid I am not familiar with that letter or that advice.

Senator O’BRIEN—Indeed, it would be wrong, would it not, because you are responsible for the initiation of prosecutions under the Act in some cases.

Senator O’BRIEN—And CASA, if it discovered—for example, with an organisation like Transair—transgressions of the law, it would be responsible for referring those matters to the DPP.

Mr Carmody—Senator, if we are going to a bit of detail on the legalities of the Act, I would prefer to have Mr Aleck, our General Counsel, come to the table because he is better equipped to answer these questions than I am.
Senator O’BRIEN—It is up to you.

Dr Aleck—I do not want to speak in detail about that letter at this point; I want to take it on notice. I do recall some questions were raised by the Queensland
Attorney-General’s office, if I am not mistaken, about the basis on which CASA might initiate action, and as I recall it was against Mr Wright himself. I think the view that we put at the time, and I would want to confirm this, is that there was no basis under our legislation, and I would maintain that that is so, on which we could recommend prosecutorial action against Mr Wright at that point.

Senator O’BRIEN—So, what you are suggesting is that you would not have given advice to suggest that in a general sense under the Act which CASA operates your regulatory framework was to do with prevention of accidents and incidents, not prosecution?

Dr Aleck—No, I would not agree with that, and I would be surprised if what we said was precisely that in the letter. Virtually every provision of the civil aviation regulations and most of the requirements specified in the Act contain offences and penalties which are designed to be amenable for prosecution should the occasion arise. CASA’s responsibility is to investigate these matters and, when the evidence supports it, to make recommendations to the Director of Public Prosecutions to commence prosecution.

Again, I am a little uncomfortable speaking without that letter in front of me, but I remember the discussion at that time and it had to do with the propriety of pursuing action against Mr Wright, which we said (a) was really a matter for State authorities and (b) in the circumstances, and it is so, there was nothing in our legislation that would permit us to initiate prosecutorial action successfully or recommend such action against Mr Wright. I have seen nothing since then that would suggest that that is so.

Senator O’BRIEN—So, I guess if the passage that I refer to exists in a letter from the Commonwealth Attorney-General to his State counterpart, it would not be on the basis of advice from CASA?

Dr Aleck—If the Commonwealth Attorney-General wrote a letter to the Queensland Attorney-General stating that CASA’s legislation is not oriented towards or permissive of prosecutorial action, then that would be incorrect. I would be very, very surprised if that statement would have been made on the basis of any advice coming from CASA. But, as I said before, I will take that on notice and review that letter.

Senator O’BRIEN—Sure. The passage that I am referring to states the following: that ‘the Civil Aviation Act of 1988 under which CASA operates provides a regulatory framework for the maintenance and improvement of safety in civil aviation and relates primarily to the prevention of aviation accidents and incidents, not their prosecution’.

Answer:
One of the primary aims of compliance with aviation safety regulation is the avoidance of aviation accidents and incidents. Where an accident or incident can be attributed to a failure to comply with aviation safety regulation, offences and penalties are set out in the civil aviation safety legislation to support prosecution wherever it is appropriate.

Now think on this?

.."After we had given our evidence at the last estimates (in May), the inquiry was announced and certainly I was disappointed ... a number of these issues have been ventilated quite a lot," ...
 
The same man that defended CASA with that statement is now the (part time) top dog at CASA and was also presumably the same man that was first privy to the findings/recommendations of the ICAO Audit team in 2008 - see: https://amroba.org.au/wp-content/uploads...rt2008.pdf - and now some ten years later is supposedly instrumental in writing up and actioning the Australian CAP addressing the findings/deficiencies in the March 2018 ICAO final audit report - see: https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/i...t_full.pdf .

Analysis
Considering the overall results outlined in Figures 1 and 2, the information below has been developed to assist the State in prioritizing its remedial actions.
High Priorities:

LEG:
1) Review the processes, procedures and/or arrangements in place to ensure that all relevant State safety oversight and investigation authorities (particularly with respect to Annexes 3, 12 and 13 to the Chicago Convention) are involved, in a coordinated manner, in the processing of adopted Annex amendments, with a view to:
a) identifying all differences between the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and the State’s regulations and practices; and
b) determining any need to amend the State’s legislation.
2) Ensure a timely and consistent update of national regulations whenever amendments to Annexes 1, 6 and 18 are received.
3) Ensure a consistent, thorough and documented review of the State’s enabling airworthiness-related regulations and national standards subsequent to an Annex amendment or an amendment by the originating State/organization, if applicable, to decide on the next course of action.
4) Establish requirements regarding the documents to be carried on board, to include the journey logbook.
5) Establish requirements, based on scientific principles, knowledge and operational experience, for flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations applicable for cabin crew.
6) Establish requirements for human factors principles to be observed in the design and application of maintenance programmes.
7) Amend the State’s legislation to require the re-opening of an investigation if new and significant evidence becomes available.

ORG:
1) Include all required training in the training programmes established for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)’s airworthiness inspectors and engineers, and ensure the effective implementation of such training, in particular during the on-the-job training (OJT).
2) Finalize the recruitment and training of additional investigators to ensure that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) can meet its national and international obligations with respect to aircraft accident and incident investigations.
PEL:
None.

---

High Priorities: (cont.)
OPS:

1) Establish and implement procedures to ensure that air operators develop instructions to preserve flight recorders to the extent possible, in the event that the aeroplane becomes involved in an accident or incident and to keep flight recorders and associated records in safe custody pending their disposition.
2) Establish a system to ensure that air operators implement and maintain requirements, in the operations manual, to establish flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations for cabin crew.
3) Establish a system to ensure full compliance of air operator certificate (AOC) associated operations specifications with the elements and the format/layout outlined in the relevant provisions of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.
4) Establish and implement a system to ensure that procedures for the approval of operations specifications are fully defined and implemented.
5) With respect to the transport of dangerous goods by air, ensure that procedures for the surveillance of authorized or non-authorized air operators, national and foreign operators are fully defined and implemented, and include regular and random inspections.

AIR:

Airworthiness Inspection:
1) Establish and implement procedures for the approval of leases among commercial air transport operators.
2) Review procedures/guidance for adequacy and, where possible, use standardized terminology to minimize misinterpretation.

Design Certification and Production:
None.

AIG:
Fully implement the ATSB’s action plan to ensure that all accident and incident investigation reports are completed within the established timelines.

ANS:
None.

AGA:
1) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements on Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) at aerodromes.
2) Ensure full implementation of Annex 14, Volume I requirements for the provision of rescue and firefighting (RFF) services at aerodromes, which take into account the aerodrome location and the surrounding terrain.

---

Other Priorities:

LEG:
1) Amend the State’s primary aviation legislation to include explicit provisions to recognize as valid personnel licences, certificates of airworthiness and radio station licences issued/renewed by the State of the Operator under an Article 83 bis agreement between two third-party States.
2) Ensure that the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) contains all significant differences, not only with the SARPs, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS)-OPS and PANS-ATM, but also with all other PANS and the Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS).

ORG:
Ensure that aerodrome inspectors are provided with training related to the regulation, acceptance and surveillance of the safety management system (SMS) which is customized to suit to specificities of aerodromes.

PEL:
None.

OPS:
None.

AIR:

Airworthiness Inspection:
Clarify the procedures, including associated flowcharts, which describe the granting of the noise certificate.
Design Certification and Production:
1) Review the documentation published on CASA’s intranet to ensure that obsolete documents (in particular AEB Form 002) are not available to staff, in order to minimize inadvertent use.
2) Enhance the control of existing forms and checklists by including revision/issue control reference in addition to date of revision.

AIG:
None.

ANS:
None.

AGA:

Ensure that the State has a coordinated mechanism to ensure full and effective implementation of the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) at aerodromes, including arrangements to prohibit any building developments which could create an obstacle to aircraft operations.

Above AGA (Annex 14) refer Airports thread post:

Federal Govt continues to obfuscate decades old airport safety issue?   

IMO it is deeply disturbing that many of the 2017 ICAO audit identified 'High Priority' and 'Priority' safety issue deficiencies were also identified some ten years before by the 2008 ICAO audit team and yet there Carmody and Dr Aleck still sit with impunity presiding over a draconian regulator that is still firmly of the belief that they are a law unto themselves:

MTF...P2