The invisible DPM & changing the Act cont/-
Following on from the Senate thread posts on the subject of Dick Smith's frustration with the latest 'do nothing' miniscule in charge of the aviation portfolio...
Via Oz Aviation yesterday...
Back to Ol'Tom's ‘recommendation’ post above, perhaps if REX just wants one thing to hang his hat on, with aviation safety matters, perhaps he should campaign to honour former Senator Nick's simple aviation policy statement (i.e. in bold):
Aviation
A safe and strong aviation sector is vital to Australia's needs. Having our aircraft maintained in Australia is an integral part of ensuring high safety standards and trust in the aviation industry.
What needs to be done:
The following are 3 Senate RRAT References Committee inquiries that were completed in the last 8 years:
Airport and aviation security
List of recommendations
Recommendation 1
2.62 The committee recommends that any future reviews of and amendments to aviation security regulation be risk-based and fit for purpose, with consideration given to the unique challenges faced by regional and rural airports and the overall diversity of Australian airports.
Recommendation 2
3.74 The committee recommends that the Inspector of Transport Security complete and publish its review into aviation security training and education as soon as practicable.
Recommendation 3
3.75 The committee recommends that the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development develop a framework to ensure that subcontracted screening bodies have appropriate employment standards and provide security training and services consistent with those provided by screening authorities under the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005. The framework should take into account any inconsistencies in the training and education as identified by the Inspector of Transport Security.
Recommendation 4
4.53 The committee recommends that the Australian Government amend the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 to make it compulsory for aviation industry participants to report information currently captured under the voluntary reporting scheme.
Recommendation 5
5.80 The committee recommends that the Australian Government review the feasibility of establishing a centralised issuing authority for Aviation Security Identification Cards.
Recommendation 6
5.83 The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider the development of a national automatic notification system for aviation-security-relevant offence convictions of Aviation Security Identification Cards holders.
Recommendation 7
5.88 The committee recommends that the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development update the committee early in 2018, on progress and outcomes, following implementation of Stage Two of the Visitor Identification Card enhancements.
Recommendation 8
5.89 The committee recommends the Australian Government consider mechanisms, including legislative amendment, to strengthen the Visitor Identification Card process, incorporating appropriate background checking where appropriate.
Recommendation 9
6.19 The committee recommends that the Australian Government implement the regional aviation security awareness training package, in accordance with its 2015 commitment.
Aviation Accident Investigations
List of Recommendations
Recommendation 1
3.68 The committee recommends that the ATSB retrieve VH-NGA flight data recorders without further delay.
Recommendation 2
4.41 The committee recommends that the minister, in issuing a new Statement of Expectations to the ATSB, valid from 1 July 2013, make it clear that safety in aviation operations involving passengers (fare paying or those with no control over the flight they are on, e.g. air ambulance) is to be accorded equal priority irrespective of flight classification.
Recommendation 3
4.43 The committee recommends that the ATSB move away from its current approach of forecasting the probability of future events and focus on the analysis of factors which allowed the accident under investigation to occur. This would enable the industry to identify, assess and implement lessons relevant to their own operations.
Recommendation 4
4.69 The committee recommends that the ATSB be required to document investigative avenues that were explored and then discarded, providing detailed explanations as to why.
Recommendation 5
4.78 The committee recommends that the training offered by the ATSB across all investigator skills sets be benchmarked against other agencies by an independent body by, for example, inviting the NTSB or commissioning an industry body to conduct such a benchmarking exercise.
Recommendation 6
4.79 The committee recommends that, as far as available resources allow, ATSB investigators be given access to training provided by the agency's international counterparts. Where this does not occur, resultant gaps in training/competence must be advised to the minister and the Parliament.
Recommendation 7
4.87 The committee recommends that the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 be amended to require that the Chief Commissioner of the ATSB be able to demonstrate extensive aviation safety expertise and experience as a prerequisite for the selection process.
Recommendation 8
4.101 The committee recommends that an expert aviation safety panel be established to ensure quality control of ATSB investigation and reporting processes along the lines set out by the committee.
Recommendation 9
4.103 The committee recommends that the government develop a process by which the ATSB can request access to supplementary funding via the minister.
Recommendation 10
6.41 The committee recommends that the investigation be re-opened by the ATSB with a focus on organisational, oversight and broader systemic issues.
Recommendation 11
6.52 The committee recommends that CASA processes in relation to matters highlighted by this investigation be reviewed. This could involve an evaluation benchmarked against a credible peer (such as FAA or CAA) of regulation and audits with respect to: non-RPT passenger carrying operations; approach to audits; and training and standardisation of FOI across regional offices.
Recommendation 12
6.55 The committee recommends that CASA, in consultation with an Emergency Medical Services industry representative group (eg. Royal Flying Doctor Service, air ambulance operators, rotary wing rescue providers) consider the merit, form and standards of a new category of operations for Emergency Medical Services. The minister should require CASA to approve the industry plan unless there is a clear safety case not to. Scope for industry to assist as part of an audit team should also be investigated where standardisation is an issue. This should be completed within 12 months and the outcome reported publicly.
Recommendation 13
6.58 The committee recommends that a short inquiry be conducted by the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport into the current status of aviation regulatory reform to assess the direction, progress and resources expended to date to ensure greater visibility of the processes.
Recommendation 14
7.15 The committee recommends that the ATSB-CASA Memorandum of Understanding be re-drafted to remove any ambiguity in relation to information that should be shared between the agencies in relation to aviation accident investigations, to require CASA to:
•advise the ATSB of the initiation of any action, audit or review as a result of an accident which the ATSB is investigating.
• provide the ATSB with the relevant review report as soon as it is available.
Recommendation 15
7.16 The committee recommends that all meetings between the ATSB and CASA, whether formal or informal, where particulars of a given investigation are being discussed be appropriately minuted.
Recommendation 16
8.35 The committee recommends that, where relevant, the ATSB include thorough human factors analysis and discussion in future investigation reports. Where human factors are not considered relevant, the ATSB should include a statement explaining why.
Recommendation 17
9.18 The committee recommends that the ATSB prepare and release publicly a list of all its identified safety issues and the actions which are being taken or have been taken to address them. The ATSB should indicate its progress in monitoring the actions every 6 months and report every 12 months to Parliament.
Recommendation 18
9.40 The committee recommends that where a safety action has not been completed before a report being issued that a recommendation should be made. If it has been completed the report should include details of the action, who was involved and how it was resolved.
Recommendation 19
9.42 The committee recommends that the ATSB review its process to track the implementation of recommendations or safety actions to ensure it is an effective closed loop system. This should be made public, and provided to the Senate Regional and Rural Affairs and Transport Committee prior to each Budget Estimates.
Recommendation 20
9.44 The committee recommends that where the consideration and implementation of an ATSB recommendation may be protracted, the requirement for regular updates (for example 6 monthly) should be included in the TSI Act.
Recommendation 21
9.45 The committee recommends that the government consider setting a time limit for agencies to implement or reject recommendations, beyond which ministerial oversight is required where the agencies concerned must report to the minister why the recommendation has not been implemented or that, with ministerial approval, it has been formally rejected.
Recommendation 22
9.77 The committee recommends that Airservices Australia discuss the safety case for providing a hazard alert service with Fijian and New Zealand ATC (and any other relevant jurisdictions) and encourage them to adopt this practice.
Recommendation 23
9.104 The committee recommends that the relevant agencies review whether any equipment or other changes can be made to improve the weather forecasting at Norfolk Island. The review would include whether the Unicom operator should be an approved meteorological observer.
Recommendation 24
9.106 The committee recommends that the relevant agencies investigate appropriate methods to ensure that information about the incidence of, and variable weather conditions at, Norfolk Island is available to assist flight crews and operators managing risk that may result from unforseen weather events.
Recommendation 25
9.108 The committee recommends that the Aeronautical Information Package (AIP) En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) is updated to reflect the need for caution with regard to Norfolk Island forecasts where the actual conditions can change rapidly and vary from forecasts.
Recommendation 26
10.35 The committee recommends that in relation to mandatory and confidential reporting, the default position should be that no identifying details should be provided or disclosed. However, if there is a clear risk to safety then the ATSB, CASA and industry representatives should develop a process that contains appropriate checks and balances.
Pilot training and airline safety; and Consideration of the Transport Safety Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1
2.278 The committee is of the view that an ATPL should also be required for first officers in high capacity regular public transport (RPT) jet aircraft such as Boeing 737, A320 and other aircraft of similar or greater capacity, and that consideration be given to implementing this as a standard.
Recommendation 2
2.279 The committee recommends that for non-jet operations which employ low-experience first officers, operators be required to provide enhanced supervision and mentoring schemes to offset such lack of experience.
Recommendation 3
2.280 The committee recommends that Air Operators Certificate (AOC) holders be required to develop and implement 'green on green' policy positions relating to the use of low experience pilots in RPT operations, to maximise, wherever possible, the collective experience level of flight crew.
Recommendation 4
2.281 The committee recommends that Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) Part 61 ensure that all prospective regular public transport (RPT) pilots be required to complete substantial course-based training in multi-crew operations and resource management (non-technical skills) and human factors training prior to, or in reasonable proximity to, initial endorsement training; the committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) expedite, and assign the highest priority to, the implementation of CASR Part 61.
Recommendation 5
2.282 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) ensure that Part 61 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations currently being reviewed place sufficient weight on multi-engine aeroplane experience as opposed to the current recognition of glider and ultra-light experience.
Recommendation 6
2.283 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) be required to undertake a risk assessment of current simulator training to assess whether the extent, aims and scope of such training is being utilised to achieve optimum safety outcomes rather than minimum compliance objectives.
Recommendation 7
2.288 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Authority (CASA) expedite, and assign the highest priority to, the implementation of Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) Part 141 'Flight Training Operators' and Part 142 'Training and Checking Operators'.
Recommendation 8
2.296 The committee recommends that the Government require the Productivity Commission or another suitable body to undertake a review of the current and future supply of pilots in Australia, with particular reference to the general aviation and cadet training pathways, and HECS HELP and VET FEE-HELP arrangements.
Recommendation 9
2.299 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and Australian aviation operators review the final findings of France's Bureau of Investigation and Analysis into Air France 447, including consideration of how it may apply in the Australian context. Subject to those findings, the committee may seek the approval of the Senate to conduct a further hearing in relation to the matter.
Recommendation 10
3.146 The committee recommends that the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport provide a report to Parliament every six months outlining the progress of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority's (CASA) regulatory reforms and specifying reform priorities, consultative processes and implementation targets for the following 12-month period.
Recommendation 11
3.147 The committee recommends that the Government undertake a review of the funding to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) to ensure that there is sufficient specific funding to support an expedited regulatory reform process.
Recommendation 12
3.149 The committee recommends that, as an ongoing measure, the Government provide the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) with specific funding to enable it to offer salaries that are competitive with industry; in addition, or as an alternative, the Government should consider implementing formal mechanisms for the sharing of expertise between industry and CASA.
Recommendation 13
3.158 The committee recommends that the Transport Safety Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010 not be passed.
Recommendation 14
3.163 The committee recommends that the current prescriptive approach needs to be supplemented with a general obligation to report whenever the 'responsible person' believes that there is an urgent safety risk that must be addressed.
Recommendation 15
3.164 The committee recommends that the Australian Transport and Safety Bureau (ATSB) review its approach to the investigation and publication of human factors with a view to achieving a more robust and useful learning tool for the industry.
Recommendation 16
3.165 The committee recommends that the Australian Transport and Safety Bureau (ATSB) review existing processes for the categorisation of aviation events to ensure that miscategorisation is minimised and opportunities for system improvement are not lost.
Recommendation 17
3.166 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), in concern with Australian Transport and Safety Bureau (ATSB), consider developing and publishing guidance on model reporting to minimise understatement of the actual or potential significance of aviation events.
Recommendation 18
3.169 The committee recommends that Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) require operators to observe the highest standards of incident reporting from their personnel and provide appropriate training as part of the safety promotion function of their SMS.
Recommendation 19
The committee recommends that, in order to enhance 'just culture' and open reporting of incidents, aviation operators should ensure that their relevant managers are adequately trained in procedural fairness.
Recommendation 20
4.89 The committee recommends that, following the release of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) fatigue guidelines, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) should expedite necessary changes and/or additions to the regulations governing flght and cabin crew fatigue risk management as a priority
Recommendation 21
4.90 The committee recommends that, in the event that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) fatigue guidelines do not extend to cabin crew duty limits and fatigue risk management more broadly, the Government should amend the Civil Aviation Act 1998 to include cabin crew fatigue risk management under the Civil Aviation Safety Authority's (CASA) regulatory oversight.
Recommendation 22
4.92 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) specify the type of training and amount of training required for cabin crew, including mandatory English language standards.
There is also the recommendations from the ASRR (Forsyth report):
List of recommendations
The Aviation Safety Regulation Review Panel recommends that:
1. The Australian Government develops the State Safety Program into a strategic plan for Australia’s aviation safety system, under the leadership of the Aviation Policy Group, and uses it as the foundation for rationalising and improving coordination mechanisms.
2. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development plays a stronger policy role in the State Safety Program.
3. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigates as many fatal accidents in the sport and recreational aviation sector as its resources will allow.
4. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority utilise the provision in their bilateral Memorandum of Understanding to accredit CASA observers to ATSB investigations.
5. The Australian Government appoints an additional Australian Transport Safety Bureau Commissioner with aviation operational and safety management experience.
6. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Board exercises full governance control. The non-executive directors should possess a range of appropriate skills and backgrounds in aviation, safety, management, risk, regulation, governance and government.
7. The next Director of Aviation Safety has leadership and management experience and
capabilities in cultural change of large organisations. Aviation or other safety industry experience is highly desirable.
8. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority:
a. reinstates publication of Key Performance Indicators for service delivery functions
b. conducts a stakeholder survey every two years to measure the health of its relationship with industry
c. accepts regulatory authority applications online unless there is a valid technical reason against it
d. adopts the same Code of Conduct and Values that apply to the Australian Public Service under the Public Service Act 1999.
9. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority develops a staff exchange program with industry.
10. Airservices Australia, in conjunction with the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, reconsiders the policy on ‘Assessment of Priorities’ that stipulates that air traffic controllers sequence arriving aircraft based on category of operation, rather than on the accepted international practice of ‘first come, first served’.
11. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority amend the wording of their existing Memorandum of Understanding to make it more definitive about interaction, coordination, and cooperation.
12. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority delegates responsibility for the day-to-day operational management of airspace to Airservices Australia, including the designation of air routes, short-term designations of temporary Restricted Areas, and temporary changes to the classification of airspace for operational reasons.
13. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and Department of Defence (and appropriate agencies) establish an agreed policy position on safety oversight of civil operations into joint user and military airports.
14. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes its regulatory philosophy and, together with industry, builds an effective collaborative relationship on a foundation of mutual understanding and respect.
15. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority continues to provide appropriate indemnity to all industry personnel with delegations of authority.
16. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority finalises its Capability Framework and overhauls its training program to ensure identified areas of need are addressed, including:
a. communication in a regulatory context
b. decision making and good regulatory practice
c. auditing.
17. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority publishes and demonstrates the philosophy of ‘just culture’ whereby individuals involved in a reportable event are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training. However, actions of gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts should not be tolerated.
18. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority reintroduces a ‘use of discretion’ procedure that gives operators or individuals the opportunity to discuss and, if necessary, remedy a perceived breach prior to CASA taking any formal action. This procedure is to be followed in all cases, except where CASA identifies a Serious and Imminent Risk to Air Safety.
19. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau transfers information from Mandatory Occurrence Reports to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, without redaction or de-identification.
20. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau transfers its safety education function to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
21. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes its organisational structure to a client-oriented output model.
22. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority establishes small offices at specific industry centres to improve monitoring, service quality, communications and collaborative relationships.
23. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority shares the risk assessment outputs of Sky Sentinel, its computerised risk assessment system, with the applicable authorisation holder.
24. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority provides full disclosure of audit findings at audit exit briefings in accordance with international best practice.
25. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority introduces grading of Non-Compliance Notices on a scale of seriousness.
26. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority assures consistency of audits across all regions, and delivers audit reports within an agreed timeframe.
27. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority implements a system of using third-party commercial audits as a supplementary tool to its surveillance system.
28. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority establishes a safety oversight risk management hierarchy based on a categorisation of operations. Rule making and surveillance priorities should be proportionate to the safety risk.
29. Recreational Aviation Administration Organisations, in coordination with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, develop mechanisms to ensure all aircraft to be regulated under CASR Part 149 are registered.
30.The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes the current two-tier regulatory framework (act and regulations) to a three-tier structure (act, regulations and standards), with:
a. regulations drafted in a high-level, succinct style, containing provisions for enabling standards and necessary legislative provisions, including offences
b.the third-tier standards drafted in plain, easy to understand language.
31. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority structures all regulations not yet made with the three-tier approach, and subsequently reviews all other Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Parts (in consultation with industry) to determine if they should be remade using the three-tier structure.
32. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority reassesses the penalties in the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations.
33. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority applies a project management approach to the completion of all Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Parts not yet in force, with drafting to be completed within one year and consultation completed one year later, with:
a. a Steering Committee and a Project Team with both CASA and industry representatives
b.implementation dates established through formal industry consultation.
34. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Director of Aviation Safety meet with industry sector leaders to jointly develop a plan for renewing a collaborative and effective Standards Consultative Committee.
35. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority devolve to Designated Aviation Medical Examiners the ability to renew aviation medical certificates (for Classes 1, 2, and 3) where the applicant meets the required standard at the time of the medical examination.
36. The Australian Government amends regulations so that background checks and the requirement to hold an Aviation Security Identification Card are only required for unescorted access to Security Restricted Areas, not for general airside access. This approach would align with international practice.
37. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority amends the current Terms of Reference of the Industry Complaints Commissioner so that:
a.the ICC reports directly to the CASA Board
b.no CASA staff are excluded from the ICC’s jurisdiction
c.the ICC will receive complaints that relate to both the merits and the process of matters
d.on merits matters, including aviation medical matters, the ICC is empowered to convene an appropriately constituted review panel, chaired by a CASA non-executive director, to review the decision
e.while all ICC findings are non-binding recommendations, the original decision-maker is required to give reasons to the CASA Board if a recommendation is not followed.
And finally the recommendations from the TSBC peer review:
Recommendations
The TSB Review is making 14 recommendations to the ATSB in four main areas:
•Ensuring the consistent application of existing methodologies and processes
•Improving investigation methodologies and processes where they were found to have deficiencies
•Improving the oversight and governance of investigations
•Managing communications challenges more effectively.
Recommendation #1: Given that the ATSB investigation methodology and analysis tools represent best practice and have been shown to produce very good results, the ATSB should continue efforts to ensure the consistent application and use of its methodology and tools.
Recommendation #2: The ATSB should consider adding mechanisms to its review process to ensure there is a response to each comment made by a reviewer, and that there is a second-level review to verify that the response addresses the comment adequately.
Recommendation #3: The ATSB should augment its DIP process to ensure the Commission is satisfied that each comment has been adequately addressed, and that a response describing actions taken by the ATSB is provided to the person who submitted it.
Recommendation #4: The ATSB should review its risk assessment methodology and the use of risk labels to ensure that risks are appropriately described, and that the use of the labels is not diverting attention away from mitigating the unsafe conditions identified in the investigation.
Recommendation #5: The ATSB should review its investigation schedules for the completion of various levels of investigation to ensure that realistic timelines are communicated to stakeholders.
Recommendation #6: The ATSB should take steps to ensure that a systematic, iterative, team approach to analysis is used in all investigations.
Recommendation #7: The ATSB should provide investigators with a specific tool to assist with the collection and analysis of data in the area of sleep-related fatigue.
Recommendation #8: The ATSB should review the quality assurance measures adopted by the new team leaders and incorporate them in SIQS to ensure that their continued use is not dependent on the initiative of specific individuals.
Recommendation #9: The ATSB should modify the Commission report review process so that the Commission sees the report at a point in the investigation when deficiencies can be addressed, and the Commission's feedback is clearly communicated to staff and systematically addressed.
Recommendation #10: The ATSB should undertake a review of the structure, role, and responsibilities of its Commission with a view to ensuring clearer accountability for timely and effective oversight of the ATSB's investigations and reports.
Recommendation #11: The ATSB should adjust the critical investigation review procedures to ensure that the process for making and documenting decisions about investigation scope and direction is clearly communicated and consistently applied.
Recommendation #12: The ATSB should take steps to ensure closure briefings are conducted for all investigations.
Recommendation #13: The ATSB should provide clear guidance to all investigators that emphasizes both the independence of ATSB investigations, regardless of any regulatory investigations or audits being conducted at the same time, and the importance of collecting data related to regulatory oversight as a matter of course.
Recommendation #14: The ATSB should implement a process to ensure that communications staff identify any issues or controversy that might arise when a report is released, and develop a suitable communications plan to address them.
All in all there has been 108 aviation safety/security recommendations made and supposedly addressed by the Department and associated QANGOs...
Yet the overwhelming evidence is that there is no real effective change to the status quo with the worst insult, coming from former CASA CEO Skidmore, that the Forsyth report recommendations was.."just someone else's opinion"..
My question on the 57 Senate committee inquiry recommendations is...
Q/ If these Senate recommendations were handed down by a democratically unanimous non-partisan committee process, why do they then go for a Government review and response?
That review and response involves the Minister's office handing the report & recommendations back to the very same bureaucrats that the inquiry was largely investigating/reviewing in the first place.
Which means that the unelected bureaucrats then provide the advice to the Minister on what the Government should or shouldn't accept from the recommendations - WTD?
Therefore REX your campaign should be that the Government response should not involve any consultation with the bureaucrats and aviation safety QANGOs but rather Government should consult with industry experts about how best to proactively address the recommendations and with the Finance Dept on how best to resource proactively addressing the recommendations.
Either that or do away with the Senate committee processes as being a WOFTAM and drain on the GDP of the country - my 2 bob's worth...
MTF...P2
Following on from the Senate thread posts on the subject of Dick Smith's frustration with the latest 'do nothing' miniscule in charge of the aviation portfolio...
Via Oz Aviation yesterday...
Quote:Are changes to the Civil Aviation Act in the pipeline?
April 9, 2018 by australianaviation.com.au
The new minister responsible for aviation says he won’t be rushed into changing the Civil Aviation Act. (Paul Sadler)
New Deputy Prime Minister and Minister Infrastructure and Transport Michael McCormack says he is considering proposed changes to the Civil Aviation Act put forward by Dick Smith.
McCormack told The Australian on Monday he had met with Smith regarding changes to general aviation regulations.
“While I understand Mr Smith’s passion on this matter, my job is to ensure policy changes are given the due consideration needed,” McCormack told the newspaper.
“I will take the time needed to consider options and to have further conversations with industry and my colleagues.
“You cannot rush policy outcomes, especially when it involves people’s safety. If changes are possible, they will be properly considered and broad consultation will be held before any decision is made.”
Smith has proposed changing the wording of the act which says the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has to “regard safety as the most important consideration” in its role regulating the industry.
Instead, CASA would be charged with ensuring the “highest level of safety in air navigation” in addition to having consideration for “an efficient and sustainable Australian aviation industry”.
The proposed changes were designed to support a general aviation sector which the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association of Australia (AOPA) has previously described as been slowly dying and “collapsing under the weight of regulation”.
Smith told The Australian doing nothing would lead to the “complete destruction of our once viable general aviation industry”.
The Australian reported Smith’s proposals had been agreed to by former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Infrastructure and Transport Barnaby Joyce, as well as his opposition counterpart Anthony Albanese.
However, Joyce resigned in February after it emerged he had separated from his wife and started a relationship with a former staffer.
Dick Smith fears the “complete destruction” of the general aviation sector.
![[Image: GA_aircraft-2.jpg]](http://australianaviation.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/GA_aircraft-2.jpg)
Back to Ol'Tom's ‘recommendation’ post above, perhaps if REX just wants one thing to hang his hat on, with aviation safety matters, perhaps he should campaign to honour former Senator Nick's simple aviation policy statement (i.e. in bold):
Aviation
A safe and strong aviation sector is vital to Australia's needs. Having our aircraft maintained in Australia is an integral part of ensuring high safety standards and trust in the aviation industry.
What needs to be done:
- There should be an Inspector General of Aviation that acts as an impartial watch-dog over all aviation regulators - in particular CASA and the ATSB - to ensure that they operate in the public interest.
- Implement recommendations from Senate reports on aviation and safety
The following are 3 Senate RRAT References Committee inquiries that were completed in the last 8 years:
Airport and aviation security
List of recommendations
Recommendation 1
2.62 The committee recommends that any future reviews of and amendments to aviation security regulation be risk-based and fit for purpose, with consideration given to the unique challenges faced by regional and rural airports and the overall diversity of Australian airports.
Recommendation 2
3.74 The committee recommends that the Inspector of Transport Security complete and publish its review into aviation security training and education as soon as practicable.
Recommendation 3
3.75 The committee recommends that the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development develop a framework to ensure that subcontracted screening bodies have appropriate employment standards and provide security training and services consistent with those provided by screening authorities under the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005. The framework should take into account any inconsistencies in the training and education as identified by the Inspector of Transport Security.
Recommendation 4
4.53 The committee recommends that the Australian Government amend the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 to make it compulsory for aviation industry participants to report information currently captured under the voluntary reporting scheme.
Recommendation 5
5.80 The committee recommends that the Australian Government review the feasibility of establishing a centralised issuing authority for Aviation Security Identification Cards.
Recommendation 6
5.83 The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider the development of a national automatic notification system for aviation-security-relevant offence convictions of Aviation Security Identification Cards holders.
Recommendation 7
5.88 The committee recommends that the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development update the committee early in 2018, on progress and outcomes, following implementation of Stage Two of the Visitor Identification Card enhancements.
Recommendation 8
5.89 The committee recommends the Australian Government consider mechanisms, including legislative amendment, to strengthen the Visitor Identification Card process, incorporating appropriate background checking where appropriate.
Recommendation 9
6.19 The committee recommends that the Australian Government implement the regional aviation security awareness training package, in accordance with its 2015 commitment.
Aviation Accident Investigations
List of Recommendations
Recommendation 1
3.68 The committee recommends that the ATSB retrieve VH-NGA flight data recorders without further delay.
Recommendation 2
4.41 The committee recommends that the minister, in issuing a new Statement of Expectations to the ATSB, valid from 1 July 2013, make it clear that safety in aviation operations involving passengers (fare paying or those with no control over the flight they are on, e.g. air ambulance) is to be accorded equal priority irrespective of flight classification.
Recommendation 3
4.43 The committee recommends that the ATSB move away from its current approach of forecasting the probability of future events and focus on the analysis of factors which allowed the accident under investigation to occur. This would enable the industry to identify, assess and implement lessons relevant to their own operations.
Recommendation 4
4.69 The committee recommends that the ATSB be required to document investigative avenues that were explored and then discarded, providing detailed explanations as to why.
Recommendation 5
4.78 The committee recommends that the training offered by the ATSB across all investigator skills sets be benchmarked against other agencies by an independent body by, for example, inviting the NTSB or commissioning an industry body to conduct such a benchmarking exercise.
Recommendation 6
4.79 The committee recommends that, as far as available resources allow, ATSB investigators be given access to training provided by the agency's international counterparts. Where this does not occur, resultant gaps in training/competence must be advised to the minister and the Parliament.
Recommendation 7
4.87 The committee recommends that the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 be amended to require that the Chief Commissioner of the ATSB be able to demonstrate extensive aviation safety expertise and experience as a prerequisite for the selection process.
Recommendation 8
4.101 The committee recommends that an expert aviation safety panel be established to ensure quality control of ATSB investigation and reporting processes along the lines set out by the committee.
Recommendation 9
4.103 The committee recommends that the government develop a process by which the ATSB can request access to supplementary funding via the minister.
Recommendation 10
6.41 The committee recommends that the investigation be re-opened by the ATSB with a focus on organisational, oversight and broader systemic issues.
Recommendation 11
6.52 The committee recommends that CASA processes in relation to matters highlighted by this investigation be reviewed. This could involve an evaluation benchmarked against a credible peer (such as FAA or CAA) of regulation and audits with respect to: non-RPT passenger carrying operations; approach to audits; and training and standardisation of FOI across regional offices.
Recommendation 12
6.55 The committee recommends that CASA, in consultation with an Emergency Medical Services industry representative group (eg. Royal Flying Doctor Service, air ambulance operators, rotary wing rescue providers) consider the merit, form and standards of a new category of operations for Emergency Medical Services. The minister should require CASA to approve the industry plan unless there is a clear safety case not to. Scope for industry to assist as part of an audit team should also be investigated where standardisation is an issue. This should be completed within 12 months and the outcome reported publicly.
Recommendation 13
6.58 The committee recommends that a short inquiry be conducted by the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport into the current status of aviation regulatory reform to assess the direction, progress and resources expended to date to ensure greater visibility of the processes.
Recommendation 14
7.15 The committee recommends that the ATSB-CASA Memorandum of Understanding be re-drafted to remove any ambiguity in relation to information that should be shared between the agencies in relation to aviation accident investigations, to require CASA to:
•advise the ATSB of the initiation of any action, audit or review as a result of an accident which the ATSB is investigating.
• provide the ATSB with the relevant review report as soon as it is available.
Recommendation 15
7.16 The committee recommends that all meetings between the ATSB and CASA, whether formal or informal, where particulars of a given investigation are being discussed be appropriately minuted.
Recommendation 16
8.35 The committee recommends that, where relevant, the ATSB include thorough human factors analysis and discussion in future investigation reports. Where human factors are not considered relevant, the ATSB should include a statement explaining why.
Recommendation 17
9.18 The committee recommends that the ATSB prepare and release publicly a list of all its identified safety issues and the actions which are being taken or have been taken to address them. The ATSB should indicate its progress in monitoring the actions every 6 months and report every 12 months to Parliament.
Recommendation 18
9.40 The committee recommends that where a safety action has not been completed before a report being issued that a recommendation should be made. If it has been completed the report should include details of the action, who was involved and how it was resolved.
Recommendation 19
9.42 The committee recommends that the ATSB review its process to track the implementation of recommendations or safety actions to ensure it is an effective closed loop system. This should be made public, and provided to the Senate Regional and Rural Affairs and Transport Committee prior to each Budget Estimates.
Recommendation 20
9.44 The committee recommends that where the consideration and implementation of an ATSB recommendation may be protracted, the requirement for regular updates (for example 6 monthly) should be included in the TSI Act.
Recommendation 21
9.45 The committee recommends that the government consider setting a time limit for agencies to implement or reject recommendations, beyond which ministerial oversight is required where the agencies concerned must report to the minister why the recommendation has not been implemented or that, with ministerial approval, it has been formally rejected.
Recommendation 22
9.77 The committee recommends that Airservices Australia discuss the safety case for providing a hazard alert service with Fijian and New Zealand ATC (and any other relevant jurisdictions) and encourage them to adopt this practice.
Recommendation 23
9.104 The committee recommends that the relevant agencies review whether any equipment or other changes can be made to improve the weather forecasting at Norfolk Island. The review would include whether the Unicom operator should be an approved meteorological observer.
Recommendation 24
9.106 The committee recommends that the relevant agencies investigate appropriate methods to ensure that information about the incidence of, and variable weather conditions at, Norfolk Island is available to assist flight crews and operators managing risk that may result from unforseen weather events.
Recommendation 25
9.108 The committee recommends that the Aeronautical Information Package (AIP) En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) is updated to reflect the need for caution with regard to Norfolk Island forecasts where the actual conditions can change rapidly and vary from forecasts.
Recommendation 26
10.35 The committee recommends that in relation to mandatory and confidential reporting, the default position should be that no identifying details should be provided or disclosed. However, if there is a clear risk to safety then the ATSB, CASA and industry representatives should develop a process that contains appropriate checks and balances.
Pilot training and airline safety; and Consideration of the Transport Safety Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1
2.278 The committee is of the view that an ATPL should also be required for first officers in high capacity regular public transport (RPT) jet aircraft such as Boeing 737, A320 and other aircraft of similar or greater capacity, and that consideration be given to implementing this as a standard.
Recommendation 2
2.279 The committee recommends that for non-jet operations which employ low-experience first officers, operators be required to provide enhanced supervision and mentoring schemes to offset such lack of experience.
Recommendation 3
2.280 The committee recommends that Air Operators Certificate (AOC) holders be required to develop and implement 'green on green' policy positions relating to the use of low experience pilots in RPT operations, to maximise, wherever possible, the collective experience level of flight crew.
Recommendation 4
2.281 The committee recommends that Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) Part 61 ensure that all prospective regular public transport (RPT) pilots be required to complete substantial course-based training in multi-crew operations and resource management (non-technical skills) and human factors training prior to, or in reasonable proximity to, initial endorsement training; the committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) expedite, and assign the highest priority to, the implementation of CASR Part 61.
Recommendation 5
2.282 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) ensure that Part 61 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations currently being reviewed place sufficient weight on multi-engine aeroplane experience as opposed to the current recognition of glider and ultra-light experience.
Recommendation 6
2.283 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) be required to undertake a risk assessment of current simulator training to assess whether the extent, aims and scope of such training is being utilised to achieve optimum safety outcomes rather than minimum compliance objectives.
Recommendation 7
2.288 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Authority (CASA) expedite, and assign the highest priority to, the implementation of Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) Part 141 'Flight Training Operators' and Part 142 'Training and Checking Operators'.
Recommendation 8
2.296 The committee recommends that the Government require the Productivity Commission or another suitable body to undertake a review of the current and future supply of pilots in Australia, with particular reference to the general aviation and cadet training pathways, and HECS HELP and VET FEE-HELP arrangements.
Recommendation 9
2.299 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and Australian aviation operators review the final findings of France's Bureau of Investigation and Analysis into Air France 447, including consideration of how it may apply in the Australian context. Subject to those findings, the committee may seek the approval of the Senate to conduct a further hearing in relation to the matter.
Recommendation 10
3.146 The committee recommends that the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport provide a report to Parliament every six months outlining the progress of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority's (CASA) regulatory reforms and specifying reform priorities, consultative processes and implementation targets for the following 12-month period.
Recommendation 11
3.147 The committee recommends that the Government undertake a review of the funding to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) to ensure that there is sufficient specific funding to support an expedited regulatory reform process.
Recommendation 12
3.149 The committee recommends that, as an ongoing measure, the Government provide the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) with specific funding to enable it to offer salaries that are competitive with industry; in addition, or as an alternative, the Government should consider implementing formal mechanisms for the sharing of expertise between industry and CASA.
Recommendation 13
3.158 The committee recommends that the Transport Safety Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010 not be passed.
Recommendation 14
3.163 The committee recommends that the current prescriptive approach needs to be supplemented with a general obligation to report whenever the 'responsible person' believes that there is an urgent safety risk that must be addressed.
Recommendation 15
3.164 The committee recommends that the Australian Transport and Safety Bureau (ATSB) review its approach to the investigation and publication of human factors with a view to achieving a more robust and useful learning tool for the industry.
Recommendation 16
3.165 The committee recommends that the Australian Transport and Safety Bureau (ATSB) review existing processes for the categorisation of aviation events to ensure that miscategorisation is minimised and opportunities for system improvement are not lost.
Recommendation 17
3.166 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), in concern with Australian Transport and Safety Bureau (ATSB), consider developing and publishing guidance on model reporting to minimise understatement of the actual or potential significance of aviation events.
Recommendation 18
3.169 The committee recommends that Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) require operators to observe the highest standards of incident reporting from their personnel and provide appropriate training as part of the safety promotion function of their SMS.
Recommendation 19
The committee recommends that, in order to enhance 'just culture' and open reporting of incidents, aviation operators should ensure that their relevant managers are adequately trained in procedural fairness.
Recommendation 20
4.89 The committee recommends that, following the release of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) fatigue guidelines, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) should expedite necessary changes and/or additions to the regulations governing flght and cabin crew fatigue risk management as a priority
Recommendation 21
4.90 The committee recommends that, in the event that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) fatigue guidelines do not extend to cabin crew duty limits and fatigue risk management more broadly, the Government should amend the Civil Aviation Act 1998 to include cabin crew fatigue risk management under the Civil Aviation Safety Authority's (CASA) regulatory oversight.
Recommendation 22
4.92 The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) specify the type of training and amount of training required for cabin crew, including mandatory English language standards.
There is also the recommendations from the ASRR (Forsyth report):
List of recommendations
The Aviation Safety Regulation Review Panel recommends that:
1. The Australian Government develops the State Safety Program into a strategic plan for Australia’s aviation safety system, under the leadership of the Aviation Policy Group, and uses it as the foundation for rationalising and improving coordination mechanisms.
2. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development plays a stronger policy role in the State Safety Program.
3. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigates as many fatal accidents in the sport and recreational aviation sector as its resources will allow.
4. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority utilise the provision in their bilateral Memorandum of Understanding to accredit CASA observers to ATSB investigations.
5. The Australian Government appoints an additional Australian Transport Safety Bureau Commissioner with aviation operational and safety management experience.
6. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Board exercises full governance control. The non-executive directors should possess a range of appropriate skills and backgrounds in aviation, safety, management, risk, regulation, governance and government.
7. The next Director of Aviation Safety has leadership and management experience and
capabilities in cultural change of large organisations. Aviation or other safety industry experience is highly desirable.
8. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority:
a. reinstates publication of Key Performance Indicators for service delivery functions
b. conducts a stakeholder survey every two years to measure the health of its relationship with industry
c. accepts regulatory authority applications online unless there is a valid technical reason against it
d. adopts the same Code of Conduct and Values that apply to the Australian Public Service under the Public Service Act 1999.
9. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority develops a staff exchange program with industry.
10. Airservices Australia, in conjunction with the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, reconsiders the policy on ‘Assessment of Priorities’ that stipulates that air traffic controllers sequence arriving aircraft based on category of operation, rather than on the accepted international practice of ‘first come, first served’.
11. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority amend the wording of their existing Memorandum of Understanding to make it more definitive about interaction, coordination, and cooperation.
12. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority delegates responsibility for the day-to-day operational management of airspace to Airservices Australia, including the designation of air routes, short-term designations of temporary Restricted Areas, and temporary changes to the classification of airspace for operational reasons.
13. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and Department of Defence (and appropriate agencies) establish an agreed policy position on safety oversight of civil operations into joint user and military airports.
14. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes its regulatory philosophy and, together with industry, builds an effective collaborative relationship on a foundation of mutual understanding and respect.
15. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority continues to provide appropriate indemnity to all industry personnel with delegations of authority.
16. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority finalises its Capability Framework and overhauls its training program to ensure identified areas of need are addressed, including:
a. communication in a regulatory context
b. decision making and good regulatory practice
c. auditing.
17. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority publishes and demonstrates the philosophy of ‘just culture’ whereby individuals involved in a reportable event are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training. However, actions of gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts should not be tolerated.
18. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority reintroduces a ‘use of discretion’ procedure that gives operators or individuals the opportunity to discuss and, if necessary, remedy a perceived breach prior to CASA taking any formal action. This procedure is to be followed in all cases, except where CASA identifies a Serious and Imminent Risk to Air Safety.
19. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau transfers information from Mandatory Occurrence Reports to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, without redaction or de-identification.
20. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau transfers its safety education function to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
21. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes its organisational structure to a client-oriented output model.
22. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority establishes small offices at specific industry centres to improve monitoring, service quality, communications and collaborative relationships.
23. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority shares the risk assessment outputs of Sky Sentinel, its computerised risk assessment system, with the applicable authorisation holder.
24. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority provides full disclosure of audit findings at audit exit briefings in accordance with international best practice.
25. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority introduces grading of Non-Compliance Notices on a scale of seriousness.
26. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority assures consistency of audits across all regions, and delivers audit reports within an agreed timeframe.
27. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority implements a system of using third-party commercial audits as a supplementary tool to its surveillance system.
28. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority establishes a safety oversight risk management hierarchy based on a categorisation of operations. Rule making and surveillance priorities should be proportionate to the safety risk.
29. Recreational Aviation Administration Organisations, in coordination with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, develop mechanisms to ensure all aircraft to be regulated under CASR Part 149 are registered.
30.The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes the current two-tier regulatory framework (act and regulations) to a three-tier structure (act, regulations and standards), with:
a. regulations drafted in a high-level, succinct style, containing provisions for enabling standards and necessary legislative provisions, including offences
b.the third-tier standards drafted in plain, easy to understand language.
31. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority structures all regulations not yet made with the three-tier approach, and subsequently reviews all other Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Parts (in consultation with industry) to determine if they should be remade using the three-tier structure.
32. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority reassesses the penalties in the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations.
33. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority applies a project management approach to the completion of all Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Parts not yet in force, with drafting to be completed within one year and consultation completed one year later, with:
a. a Steering Committee and a Project Team with both CASA and industry representatives
b.implementation dates established through formal industry consultation.
34. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Director of Aviation Safety meet with industry sector leaders to jointly develop a plan for renewing a collaborative and effective Standards Consultative Committee.
35. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority devolve to Designated Aviation Medical Examiners the ability to renew aviation medical certificates (for Classes 1, 2, and 3) where the applicant meets the required standard at the time of the medical examination.
36. The Australian Government amends regulations so that background checks and the requirement to hold an Aviation Security Identification Card are only required for unescorted access to Security Restricted Areas, not for general airside access. This approach would align with international practice.
37. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority amends the current Terms of Reference of the Industry Complaints Commissioner so that:
a.the ICC reports directly to the CASA Board
b.no CASA staff are excluded from the ICC’s jurisdiction
c.the ICC will receive complaints that relate to both the merits and the process of matters
d.on merits matters, including aviation medical matters, the ICC is empowered to convene an appropriately constituted review panel, chaired by a CASA non-executive director, to review the decision
e.while all ICC findings are non-binding recommendations, the original decision-maker is required to give reasons to the CASA Board if a recommendation is not followed.
And finally the recommendations from the TSBC peer review:
Recommendations
The TSB Review is making 14 recommendations to the ATSB in four main areas:
•Ensuring the consistent application of existing methodologies and processes
•Improving investigation methodologies and processes where they were found to have deficiencies
•Improving the oversight and governance of investigations
•Managing communications challenges more effectively.
Recommendation #1: Given that the ATSB investigation methodology and analysis tools represent best practice and have been shown to produce very good results, the ATSB should continue efforts to ensure the consistent application and use of its methodology and tools.
Recommendation #2: The ATSB should consider adding mechanisms to its review process to ensure there is a response to each comment made by a reviewer, and that there is a second-level review to verify that the response addresses the comment adequately.
Recommendation #3: The ATSB should augment its DIP process to ensure the Commission is satisfied that each comment has been adequately addressed, and that a response describing actions taken by the ATSB is provided to the person who submitted it.
Recommendation #4: The ATSB should review its risk assessment methodology and the use of risk labels to ensure that risks are appropriately described, and that the use of the labels is not diverting attention away from mitigating the unsafe conditions identified in the investigation.
Recommendation #5: The ATSB should review its investigation schedules for the completion of various levels of investigation to ensure that realistic timelines are communicated to stakeholders.
Recommendation #6: The ATSB should take steps to ensure that a systematic, iterative, team approach to analysis is used in all investigations.
Recommendation #7: The ATSB should provide investigators with a specific tool to assist with the collection and analysis of data in the area of sleep-related fatigue.
Recommendation #8: The ATSB should review the quality assurance measures adopted by the new team leaders and incorporate them in SIQS to ensure that their continued use is not dependent on the initiative of specific individuals.
Recommendation #9: The ATSB should modify the Commission report review process so that the Commission sees the report at a point in the investigation when deficiencies can be addressed, and the Commission's feedback is clearly communicated to staff and systematically addressed.
Recommendation #10: The ATSB should undertake a review of the structure, role, and responsibilities of its Commission with a view to ensuring clearer accountability for timely and effective oversight of the ATSB's investigations and reports.
Recommendation #11: The ATSB should adjust the critical investigation review procedures to ensure that the process for making and documenting decisions about investigation scope and direction is clearly communicated and consistently applied.
Recommendation #12: The ATSB should take steps to ensure closure briefings are conducted for all investigations.
Recommendation #13: The ATSB should provide clear guidance to all investigators that emphasizes both the independence of ATSB investigations, regardless of any regulatory investigations or audits being conducted at the same time, and the importance of collecting data related to regulatory oversight as a matter of course.
Recommendation #14: The ATSB should implement a process to ensure that communications staff identify any issues or controversy that might arise when a report is released, and develop a suitable communications plan to address them.
All in all there has been 108 aviation safety/security recommendations made and supposedly addressed by the Department and associated QANGOs...
Yet the overwhelming evidence is that there is no real effective change to the status quo with the worst insult, coming from former CASA CEO Skidmore, that the Forsyth report recommendations was.."just someone else's opinion"..My question on the 57 Senate committee inquiry recommendations is...
Q/ If these Senate recommendations were handed down by a democratically unanimous non-partisan committee process, why do they then go for a Government review and response?
That review and response involves the Minister's office handing the report & recommendations back to the very same bureaucrats that the inquiry was largely investigating/reviewing in the first place.
Which means that the unelected bureaucrats then provide the advice to the Minister on what the Government should or shouldn't accept from the recommendations - WTD?
Therefore REX your campaign should be that the Government response should not involve any consultation with the bureaucrats and aviation safety QANGOs but rather Government should consult with industry experts about how best to proactively address the recommendations and with the Finance Dept on how best to resource proactively addressing the recommendations.
Either that or do away with the Senate committee processes as being a WOFTAM and drain on the GDP of the country - my 2 bob's worth...
MTF...P2