Even so.
Some good points made there TB; which is why I made mention of the ‘transition’ notes on the ‘Jepp’ and the lack of information regarding the same in the ATSB report. Whatever SOP the crew used – as you say, 10,000 feet/ 10 minutes is a good place to be ‘set-up’ for an instrument approach – time and space to get the loose ends tidied up – the briefing and TOLD things of the past, nothing to do but fly the approach – routine, done a million times a day all over the world regardless of transition. Same - same a ‘stable’ approach; this crew were clearly capable of conducting the approach – and got it right the second time. There can be little doubt over crew competency – but; we need some in depth information, detail related to just how and why the local pressure was not set.
ATSB – “The flight crew did not complete the approach checklist before commencing the non-precision NDB approach into Kosrae, resulting in the barometric pressure setting on the altimeters not being set to the local barometric pressure.”
Yes – But- Why? I believe we should have been offered a detailed explanation in the ATSB report – an analysis – good enough to use for training. It is a ‘rare’ event this one, the incorrect altimeter setting ‘persuasive’ enough to lead to cancelled EGPWS warning; serious stuff. The NDB approach and circling would be occupying the aircrew – particularly when the crew believe all the checks are complete and consigned to the past – routine again – check complete – forget about it –and, on to the next event. The notion to complete one check list item – out of sequence (later) is fraught with peril, particularly where the next event is a demanding one.
Well, the whole event may well be a rare animal – one we hoped was extinct. It did happen, which opens the door for a repeat – I just think the why’s and wherefores are worthy of examination. It all ended happily this time (nod to the gods) but it should never have happened at all. ATSB should be moving to ensure that it never happens again, through correct, thorough detailed analysis of exactly why the event occurred. That flight came as close to disaster as it is possible to get – remind me again – at what height does the EGPWS kick in with a ‘terrain – to low’ warning?
Oh, don’t mind me; the curiosity curse strikes again; what sequence of events and circumstance could promote a departure from basic routine, SOP and habit – then persuade a crew to cancel a ‘terrain’ warning? Then there’s the Rad Alt to back up the call – more puzzles. Me, I’d be reaching for the taps before the lady had finished saying her piece – right or wrong – we’re out of here – TOGA and horsepower – lots of.
"For want of a nail the shoe was lost " etc…..
Toot - toot.
Some good points made there TB; which is why I made mention of the ‘transition’ notes on the ‘Jepp’ and the lack of information regarding the same in the ATSB report. Whatever SOP the crew used – as you say, 10,000 feet/ 10 minutes is a good place to be ‘set-up’ for an instrument approach – time and space to get the loose ends tidied up – the briefing and TOLD things of the past, nothing to do but fly the approach – routine, done a million times a day all over the world regardless of transition. Same - same a ‘stable’ approach; this crew were clearly capable of conducting the approach – and got it right the second time. There can be little doubt over crew competency – but; we need some in depth information, detail related to just how and why the local pressure was not set.
ATSB – “The flight crew did not complete the approach checklist before commencing the non-precision NDB approach into Kosrae, resulting in the barometric pressure setting on the altimeters not being set to the local barometric pressure.”
Yes – But- Why? I believe we should have been offered a detailed explanation in the ATSB report – an analysis – good enough to use for training. It is a ‘rare’ event this one, the incorrect altimeter setting ‘persuasive’ enough to lead to cancelled EGPWS warning; serious stuff. The NDB approach and circling would be occupying the aircrew – particularly when the crew believe all the checks are complete and consigned to the past – routine again – check complete – forget about it –and, on to the next event. The notion to complete one check list item – out of sequence (later) is fraught with peril, particularly where the next event is a demanding one.
Well, the whole event may well be a rare animal – one we hoped was extinct. It did happen, which opens the door for a repeat – I just think the why’s and wherefores are worthy of examination. It all ended happily this time (nod to the gods) but it should never have happened at all. ATSB should be moving to ensure that it never happens again, through correct, thorough detailed analysis of exactly why the event occurred. That flight came as close to disaster as it is possible to get – remind me again – at what height does the EGPWS kick in with a ‘terrain – to low’ warning?
Oh, don’t mind me; the curiosity curse strikes again; what sequence of events and circumstance could promote a departure from basic routine, SOP and habit – then persuade a crew to cancel a ‘terrain’ warning? Then there’s the Rad Alt to back up the call – more puzzles. Me, I’d be reaching for the taps before the lady had finished saying her piece – right or wrong – we’re out of here – TOGA and horsepower – lots of.
"For want of a nail the shoe was lost " etc…..
Toot - toot.