CASA AQON - so far...
Helen, from the RRAT committee Secretariat, replied today to my request for an update on the progress of the Supp Estimates AQON:
Okay so the following is the AQON (for CASA) received and processed so far...
The first AQON is in reply (see above) to Barry O's QON No. 114:
The first one is a classic example of the legalese word weasel confections that CASA LSD (i.e. Dr Aleck) deploy when trying to subvert answering the question honestly...
MTF...P2
Helen, from the RRAT committee Secretariat, replied today to my request for an update on the progress of the Supp Estimates AQON:
Quote:Dear P2,
Happy New Year. We received a number of responses to QONs for CASA, Airservices Australia and the Aviation and Airports division prior to Christmas but after our Secretariat had shut down. I will be publishing these later today. Please note, we are still awaiting some answers to these questions.
Kind regards,
Helen
Okay so the following is the AQON (for CASA) received and processed so far...
The first AQON is in reply (see above) to Barry O's QON No. 114:
Quote:AnswerNow this is where it gets interesting because we actually have the answers for the NX QONs related to the CASA Sydney Regional office 8+ year embuggerance of DJ...
• On 29 September 2017, an email was sent to Ms Landry’s office, seeking confirmation that it was her in video footage obtained by CASA of this event and whether she recalled the operation of the drone and could indicate what she believed to be the distance between her and the drone Mr Ashby was operating.
• On 11 October 2017, having had no response to his email, the CASA Investigator contacted Ms Landry’s office by telephone, at which time he was advised by an office staff member that it was not Ms Landry in the video, but rather, the staff member believed the individual to be the Hon Jane Prentice MP.
• On 11 October 2017, an email was sent to Ms Prentice’s office seeking confirmation that it was her in the video footage and putting the same questions to her as were put to Ms Landry.
• On 13 October 2017, having received no response to his email of 11 October 2017, the CASA Investigator contacted Ms Prentice’s office by telephone. A member of Ms Prentice’s staff advised the Investigator that Ms Prentice was unavailable to speak with him at the time, but that she would respond to his inquiries.
• On 18 October 2017, in the absence of any further response, the CASA Investigator again contacted Ms Prentice’s office by telephone. On this occasion, he spoke with Ms Prentice’s office manager, who advised the CASA Investigator that his email message had not been considered to be genuine.
• On 18 October 2017, the CASA Investigator re-sent his email of 11 October 2017 to Ms Prentice’s office manager. In response, the CASA Investigator was advised by the office manager that it was Ms Prentice in the video footage, and provided the CASA Investigator with contact details of the event organiser, Mr Andy Turnbull.
• On 18 October 2017, the CASA Investigator spoke to Mr Turnbull by telephone, at which time Mr Turnbull responded to the CASA Investigator’s question about the number of people present at the event on 21 June 2017, estimating that number to be have been 50 or 60 persons. Mr Turnbull also provided a group photo of a number of the people present on the day of the event and his estimation of the dimensions of the area in which participants and observers of the day’s event would have been located.
• On 18 October 2017, a further email was sent to Ms Prentice’s office, asking whether Ms Prentice recalled the operation of the drone by Mr Ashby on 21 June 2017, and if so, whether she could provide any information about that operation. No response has been received to this email.
• On 23 October 2017, on the basis of the evidence available and an assessment of the apparent risks involved, in keeping with the applicable enforcement-related protocols it was determined that further investigation was not warranted. Accordingly, a counselling letter was issued to Mr Ashby admonishing him about his drone flight on 21 June 2017. With the closure of the investigation into this matter, no further attempts were made to contact Ms Prentice.
Answered Date
22/12/2017
&..QONs 116 & 117:
Answer
In speaking with Mr Ashby about his operation of a drone at Parliament House on 21 June 2017, the CASA Investigator did not ask Mr Ashby how many people he (Mr Ashby) believed were present at the time, or the identity of any of those individuals who were present.
However, on 18 October 2017, the CASA Investigator spoke to Mr Andy Turnbull (the event organiser) by telephone. Mr Turnbull said the number of people present at the event on 21 June 2017 was estimated to have been 50 or 60 persons.
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Answered Date
22/12/2017
Answer
The CASA Investigator who spoke with Mr Ashby about Mr Ashby’s operation of a drone in the parliamentary precincts on 21 June 2017 kept written record of his exchanges with Mr Ashby.
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Answered Date
22/12/2017
The first one is a classic example of the legalese word weasel confections that CASA LSD (i.e. Dr Aleck) deploy when trying to subvert answering the question honestly...
Quote:QON 119 to 123:
Answer
The standard form recommendation (SFR), as tabled, is incomplete in that the delegate has not indicated on the form whether they agree or disagree with the recommendation and signed accordingly. While a document signed by the delegate that agreed with the action has not been located, the SFR was acted upon in that the condition was added to the flight crew licence.
However, the condition on the flight crew member’s licence was not created by this SFR rather the SFR recommended the condition be printed on the licence. The condition originated from an agreement between the pilot and the Executive Manager CASA Operations contained in a letter to the pilot dated 27 March 2012. The conditions are valid because of this letter, regardless of whether the process to have the condition statement added to the flight crew licence was not completed correctly.
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Answered Date
22/12/2017
Answer
Refer to Committee question number 119.
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Answered Date
22/12/2017
Answer
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s (ATSB) draft report for the reopened investigation into ‘Ditching of Israel Aircraft Westwind 1124A aircraft, VH-NGA, 5 km SW of Norfolk Island Airport on 18 November 2009’ (AO-2009-072) was distributed in accordance with the actions contemplated by sections 9 and 10 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the ATSB and CASA.
CASA personnel to whom copies of the draft report were provided were authorised to review the draft report in accordance with Section 26 (4) of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003, which permits disclosure and copying of draft reports necessary for the purpose of (a) preparing submissions on the draft report; or (b) taking steps to remedy safety issues that are identified in the draft report.
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Answered Date
22/12/2017
Answer
The documents in question were not provided in response to a request made under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act). Rather, in keeping with principles reflected in the FOI Act, CASA provided the documents to the individual involved as personal information pertaining to him, in accordance with an administrative access arrangement, by which agencies are encouraged to release documents in response to requests outside the formal process set out in the FOI Act.
In accordance with the Commonwealth Information Publication Scheme, documents released pursuant to administrative access arrangements are not required to be published in an agency’s FOI Disclosure Log.
Had the documents in question been released to the applicant under the FOI Act, they would have been exempt from publication in CASA’s FOI Disclosure Log under section 11C of the FOI Act because, in CASA’s view, their publication would have involved an unreasonable disclosure of personal information.
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Answered Date
22/12/2017
Answer
CASA has taken no regulatory action against any person identified in the initial ATSB investigation report (AO-2009-072) released on 30 August 2012, or in the final ATSB investigation report published on 23 November 2017, who could be considered as contributing to the accident, other than the Pilot in Command.
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Answered Date
22/12/2017
MTF...P2