PelAir MKII: SMS a lip service exercise - Part II
Extracts from CASA PelAir Special Audit Report March 2008: (Ref - foi-ef12-10004.pdf)
One of the fundamental elements for an effective CASA approved FRMS, is the commitment by the Operator to embrace the philosophy of a 'just culture' within the context of a (now mandatory) CASA Safety Management System. This includes the ability for operational crew and maintenance personnel to submit hazard alert reports on fatigue related incidents, without fear of internal company retribution/reprisals.
Keeping the above historical (Malcolm Campbell signed) CASA 'safety alert' in mind, can anyone else spot the huge disconnect (in CASA oversight of the PelAir FRMS/SMS), when we revisit the following extracts (from page 266) - under the heading CASA oversight of specific system elements (prior to 18 November 2009) - of the PelAir MKII final report??
"...There was no evidence these actions were communicated in writing to the operator, and no indication the operator formally responded. As far as could be determined, the nominated safety officer did not undertake FRMS training and no additional information was provided to pilots...
...Yet...
...Following the March 2009 meeting, CASA were satisfied the operator’s FRMS was operating satisfactorily and it reapproved the operator to conduct operations according to its approved FRMS for another 24 months..." - WTD??
Q1/ I wonder if the March 2009 meeting included the input from it's former PelAir overseeing FRMS specialist, and/or the former Human Factors manager Mr Ben Cook?
On reading Ben Cook's finding in his FRMS SAR I would suggest not, reference: CASA Special Audit of Pel-Air Fatigue Risk Management System, received 10 October 2012;(PDF 5428KB)
Then we have further proof that Wodger, and his merry band of Sydney Office psychopaths, further white washed the many documented and specialist identified deficiencies of the PelAir FRMS/SMS...
Extracts from pages 275-276:
Hmm...what say you "K" how does that stack up against one Airtex or Barrier AOC embuggerance?
MTF...P2
Extracts from CASA PelAir Special Audit Report March 2008: (Ref - foi-ef12-10004.pdf)
Quote:
One of the fundamental elements for an effective CASA approved FRMS, is the commitment by the Operator to embrace the philosophy of a 'just culture' within the context of a (now mandatory) CASA Safety Management System. This includes the ability for operational crew and maintenance personnel to submit hazard alert reports on fatigue related incidents, without fear of internal company retribution/reprisals.
Keeping the above historical (Malcolm Campbell signed) CASA 'safety alert' in mind, can anyone else spot the huge disconnect (in CASA oversight of the PelAir FRMS/SMS), when we revisit the following extracts (from page 266) - under the heading CASA oversight of specific system elements (prior to 18 November 2009) - of the PelAir MKII final report??
Quote:
"...There was no evidence these actions were communicated in writing to the operator, and no indication the operator formally responded. As far as could be determined, the nominated safety officer did not undertake FRMS training and no additional information was provided to pilots...
...Yet...
...Following the March 2009 meeting, CASA were satisfied the operator’s FRMS was operating satisfactorily and it reapproved the operator to conduct operations according to its approved FRMS for another 24 months..." - WTD??
Q1/ I wonder if the March 2009 meeting included the input from it's former PelAir overseeing FRMS specialist, and/or the former Human Factors manager Mr Ben Cook?
On reading Ben Cook's finding in his FRMS SAR I would suggest not, reference: CASA Special Audit of Pel-Air Fatigue Risk Management System, received 10 October 2012;(PDF 5428KB)
Then we have further proof that Wodger, and his merry band of Sydney Office psychopaths, further white washed the many documented and specialist identified deficiencies of the PelAir FRMS/SMS...
Extracts from pages 275-276:
Quote:"...When the Sydney region manager advised CASA senior management of the safety alert, he noted he did not think the matter would escalate to a need to consider a ‘serious and imminent risk’, given that the operator was demonstrating a willingness to address the issue. However, he was considering what further action may be necessary..." Still waiting?? - Obfuscation 101: "Simply deny there is an issue, worst case if some disgruntled employee kicks up a fuss and attempts to submit a HAZARD report; or leak again to some CASA HF expert; we'll slam the individual with some petty enforcement threat; or if there is an occurrence then we'll just throw the book at the pilot"
Hmm...what say you "K" how does that stack up against one Airtex or Barrier AOC embuggerance?
MTF...P2