The hidden agenda of PelAir MKII IIC Dr Walker - 
Remember this? Ghost who walks & talks beyond Reason
&..
Well in the course of reviewing the ATSB (Dr Walker) reply summary to two of the DIP DRAFT report comments, coupled with the many glossed over organisational safety issues in the MKII FR (example ref - Pirate code: "..more guidelines than actual rules"); I am firmly of the opinion that the Walker appointment, as the 2nd IIC, was based on purely political (top-cover) expedience and not any sense of conducting the re-investigation in accordance with the ICAO principles and guidelines for proper Aviation Accident Investigation, safety risk mitigation and the essential preservation of safety information (as per ICAO Annex 13 & 19).
"..Karen, like industry, is an irritant and may be treated with open contempt. There is not a hint of ‘humble-pie’ or apology, not a scrap of remorse, not a glimmer of real change to be seen. In short, despite Pel-Air there is no hope of a real attitude change, in fact quite the reverse. They are coming out swinging, not in a mans way, but with snide, smug, self satisfied work round’s, of which they are ‘proud’..."
Keeping the above "K" observation in mind, the following extracts off the 'work in progress' PelAir MKII chronology - see Post 32 - will lead the reader to the damning and obscene conclusion that Dr Walker continued with his 'snide', 'smug', belittling contempt for the DIPs KC and DJ:
Now note the Walker reply to the KC DIP comment on this identified, albeit administrative, safety issue:
Here is a link to the posts that record the extensive research that I conducted into this matter, references - "Out, damned spot!" + PASO, dots, dashes & an unfortunate ditching - Part III :
&..
Dots, dashes & ICAO ADREP aberrations - Part III
Since conducting that research there has, as Walker suggests, been confirmation that the ATSB notified ICAO of the VH-NGA ditching and their intention to investigate that ditching. It is also a fact that a copy of the prelim report was forwarded to the ICAO iSTAR database office. However what Walker omits to say is that prelim report was either; not forwarded until 10 November 2015 by the REPCON Manager E Hargreaves; or it was forwarded but the REPCON Manager has exclusive security access to the ICAO iSTAR database and has made a unexplained modification to the ICAO iSTAR database PDF copy of the original 13 January 2010 prelim report? Of the two options for this administrative glitch. I know which one I would be more inclined to believe.
· Ms Casey has also stated verbally to the IIC that she believed that two other ATSB reports had not been sent to ICAO: AO-2010-043 (Canley Vale) and AO-2013-100 (Mildura). ATSB records show that AO-2010-043 was sent to ICAO as required, and AO-2013-100 was sent to ICAO in early 2017 (although not within the required 30-day period).
& refer: BRB BT: The IR mole & the ADREP cock-up(rort)?
[b]FINDING:
[/b]
The ATSB has been reporting accidents and investigated incidents to the ICAO ADREP data system (Preliminary Reports and Data Reports), however, they are incomplete partly due to the differences in the taxonomy format.
RECOMMENDATION:
Since the ATSB is in the process of acquiring a new accident and incident data reporting system, it is recommended that this new database system be ADREP-ECCAIRS compatible. It is also recommended that further discussions take place between the ATSB database system personnel and the ICAO ADREP system administrator in order to facilitate the reporting to the ADREP using the ATSB existing system before the new ATSB system becomes operational.
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROPOSED BY THE ATSB:
There was some confusion prior to the audit between the ATSB and the ICAO secretariat which meant that the ATSB was not aware of the ADREP reporting problems. The ATSB is currently investigating the feasibility of incorporating an ECCAIRS compatible ADREP into the new accident/incident database. However, a determination is still several months away. As a result of the audit, the ATSB has obtained a copy of the latest ADREP (Form D) and is seeking to create a template that will capture the necessary data applicable. The ATSB is committed to fully meet the ICAO obligation in both the short and longer terms.
ACTION TAKEN BY THE ATSB:
The use of ECCAIRS was considered as an option for the occurrence database module of the ATSB's newly developed Safety Investigation Information Management System. Given that most of the aviation data collected by the ATSB is high-volume, low-detail data, the complexity of the ECCAIRS taxonomy was not considered appropriate. A bespoke taxonomy for safety events and safety factors was developed by the ATSB which better suits its needs, particularly for the purposes of safety research and for the application of its investigation safety analysis methodology. However, a mapping exercise was carried out to ensure that there was comparability between the ATSB and ECCAIRS taxonomies. For the purposes of notification, preliminary and final ADREP data reports, the ATSB continues to provide this information in the ECCAIRS format, including the use of the ECCAIRS taxonomies.
P2 comment - In other words the ATSB will continue to forward only those (PDF copied) reports it deems not politically and (big end of town) industry sensitive for the ICAO ADREP Secretariat to input via the ECCAIRS IT application - and it remains so to this day.
Whatever the reasons for these ATSB administrative glitches it would also appear that there is some serious issues with the ICAO iSTAR receiving office, remembering that the examples mentioned above were only 3 of many that I was able to identify as not existing/filed on the iSTAR/ECCAIRs databases.
Could it be that there are still 'taxonomy' and/or compatibility issues with the current ATSB SIIMS database and the forwarding of safety and accident reports being sent to the ICAO iSTAR database office? Why wouldn't a State endorsed Annex 13 AAI at least check that there are no issues at the receiving end of some important forwarded Annex 13 compliant reports? After all we are talking about the integrity and security of valuable safety information that deserves to be properly disseminated to the worldwide aviation industry as per the good intent and philosophy of ICAO Annex 19.
MTF? Definitely!...P2
Remember this? Ghost who walks & talks beyond Reason
&..
Quote:Hiatus; after the storm.
I quite enjoy a full head of steam, most refreshing, but I do however like to know the root cause. When I got the whole story from Kaz; the blue touch paper started to fizz; certainly the Walker insulting, demeaning behaviour and unbelievable ‘attitude’ created the spark, but I was surprised at the level of fury it generated. Time to think it through; so I did. Ala P2, I put on the research hat, fired up the trusty box, grabbed a fresh ale and went back to the very beginning. From Seaview to Lockhart through to Pel-Air; Mildura, Albury, Melbourne etc. The midnight oil bill took a beating, I finally understood the radicals, but not the Walker trigger. A second ale helped sooth the curiosity bump and the little light came on. The Pel-Air review, the itch I couldn’t scratch.
Totally and completely unnecessary. The Senators (bless) allowed a second chance; with which I have no quarrel; they could hardly take an axe to the entire structure of aviation administration, much as they may like to. So, as an act of grace and forbearance, a second chance was gifted. A chance for both the ATSB and CASA of redemption, an escape from the pit. Furry muff, I can, as a practical man accept that. What I cannot accept is that both agencies have continued, despite a very close shave, to thumb their collective noses at government and industry alike. That attitude clearly reflected in the Walker diatribe against Karen Casey. In a few short moments, he revealed the true attitude of the agency he represents. Karen, like industry, is an irritant and may be treated with open contempt. There is not a hint of ‘humble-pie’ or apology, not a scrap of remorse, not a glimmer of real change to be seen. In short, despite Pel-Air there is no hope of a real attitude change, in fact quite the reverse. They are coming out swinging, not in a mans way, but with snide, smug, self satisfied work round’s, of which they are ‘proud’.
The concerns PAIN raised in supplementary comments, provided to the SSC on the re-investigation of the Pel-Air incident are proving to be founded in reality. Walker’s attitude indicative of fact.
FWIW – the Supplementary comments are available from the AP library – HERE -.
P7 is correct. A weasel worded apology will not serve, the under pinning structure is deeply flawed and an attitude change is necessary. Anything else is simply window dressing, designed to keep the ministerial arse out the public sling. Warning – that will not be allowed to happen; not a second time.
Toot – toot.
Well in the course of reviewing the ATSB (Dr Walker) reply summary to two of the DIP DRAFT report comments, coupled with the many glossed over organisational safety issues in the MKII FR (example ref - Pirate code: "..more guidelines than actual rules"); I am firmly of the opinion that the Walker appointment, as the 2nd IIC, was based on purely political (top-cover) expedience and not any sense of conducting the re-investigation in accordance with the ICAO principles and guidelines for proper Aviation Accident Investigation, safety risk mitigation and the essential preservation of safety information (as per ICAO Annex 13 & 19).
"..Karen, like industry, is an irritant and may be treated with open contempt. There is not a hint of ‘humble-pie’ or apology, not a scrap of remorse, not a glimmer of real change to be seen. In short, despite Pel-Air there is no hope of a real attitude change, in fact quite the reverse. They are coming out swinging, not in a mans way, but with snide, smug, self satisfied work round’s, of which they are ‘proud’..."
Keeping the above "K" observation in mind, the following extracts off the 'work in progress' PelAir MKII chronology - see Post 32 - will lead the reader to the damning and obscene conclusion that Dr Walker continued with his 'snide', 'smug', belittling contempt for the DIPs KC and DJ:
Quote:15 February 2010: ATSB create a PDF of the Preliminary Report to forward to ICAO ADREP database office. However it would appear that this PDF copy was not forwarded to ICAO until 10 November 2015. (ref link - #149 & ICAO1 ) Ps The original VH-NGA Final Report was never forwarded to ICAO.
10 November 2015: PDF copy of 2010 AO-2009-072 Preliminary report ( Aus_Isreal_VH-NGA_18Nov2009_prelim.pdf) is bizarrely modified and added (2126 days after it was created) to the ICAO iSTAR/ADREP database by the ATSB REPCON Manager Elaine Hargreaves. (ref links - 15 February 2010 entry & #56 + https://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking.../17/52003/)
Now note the Walker reply to the KC DIP comment on this identified, albeit administrative, safety issue:
Quote:KC (DIP) comment - ATSB Non-compliance with ICAO reporting of the incident. No further information supplied to ICAO about VH-NGA since Feb 2010. Zero learning. The ditching not on any stats of global aviation incidents. Full hull loss, jet ditching…no learning. A direct link to the ATSB and the question is: what exactly is the ATSBs job if investigations are flawed and learning from the past is not an outcome?The above Walker reply and summary of proactive ATSB inquiries and subsequent administrative actions may sound fair & reasonable, however this attempted downplay by Walker of the seriousness of this DIP identified safety deficiency omits to include some crucial facts.
No change will occur in this far-away land without serious review of current practices.
Walker reply
To summarise this issue:
· The ATSB provided the initial notification to ICAO (November 2009) and the preliminary report to ICAO (January 29010) as required.
· Unfortunately and inadvertently the final report of the original investigation was not sent to ICAO when the report was publicly released in 2012.
· When the ATSB identified this omission in February 2015 it contacted ICAO and advised them of the situation and offered to send them the original report. ICAO said they would wait for the report from the reopened investigation.
· After identifying the problem with the sending of the AO-2009-072 final report, the ATSB also reviewed the status of other reports and found that some other reports had not been sent to ICAO. These were then sent to ICAO.
· Ms Casey has also stated verbally to the IIC that she believed that two other ATSB reports had not been sent to ICAO: AO-2010-043 (Canley Vale) and AO-2013-100 (Mildura). ATSB records show that AO-2010-043 was sent to ICAO as required, and AO-2013-100 was sent to ICAO in early 2017 (although not within the required 30-day period).
Here is a link to the posts that record the extensive research that I conducted into this matter, references - "Out, damned spot!" + PASO, dots, dashes & an unfortunate ditching - Part III :
Quote:Still trying to track down what historical and present entries are actually listed on the iSTAR database for VH-NGA and VH-PGW. However as the ICAO ADREP system is now inter connected via the ECCAIRS IT application tool it is now possible to access a worldwide AAI final report archive. Here is a link for that archive: http://applications.icao.int/e5web/default.asp
Doing a search through the 'query' TAB I was able to locate the following entry for VH-NGA:
Quote: Wrote:Reporting form type: Other (Preliminary Report)
Report identification: AO-2009-072
Report: Aus_Isreal_VH-NGA_18Nov2009_prelim.pdf
What this obviously means is that the ATSB (as per the minion statement in the PT article extract) did report to ICAO the ditching occurrence of VH-NGA and subsequently filed the preliminary report. However the question is did this happen in the required (Annex 13) chronological order? And if it was done as per the Annex 13 book, where is the copy/record of the original AO-2009-072 Final Report?
This brings me to VH-PGW - there is no entry that I can find that would indicate that ICAO have been notified; or have had filed either a preliminary or final report on the fatal accident, near Canley vale Sydney NSW, of VH-PGW - can someone please explain??
&..
Dots, dashes & ICAO ADREP aberrations - Part III
Quote:..In the course of reviewing the ICAO ADREP/ECCAIRS crumb trail to the original VH-NGA (non-)notification, which would appear to be at odds to Annex 13, ch 7, para 7.7...
Quote: Wrote:Incidents to aircraft over 5 700 kg
7.7 If a State conducts an investigation into an incident to an aircraft of a maximum mass of over 5 700 kg, that State shall send, as soon as is practicable after the investigation, the Incident Data Report to the International Civil Aviation Organization.
....but not at odds with paragraphs 7.3 & 7.4...
Quote: Wrote:Language
7.3 The Preliminary Report shall be submitted to appropriate States and to the International Civil Aviation Organization in one of the working languages of ICAO.
Dispatch
7.4 The Preliminary Report shall be sent by facsimile, e-mail, or airmail within thirty days of the date of the accident unless the Accident/Incident Data Report has been sent by that time. When matters directly affecting safety are involved, it shall be sent as soon as the information is available and by the most suitable and quickest means available.
...I happened to notice some strange anomalies with the ICAO/ECCAIRS version of the original preliminary report - Aus_Isreal_VH-NGA_18Nov2009_prelim.
To begin this copy was created two days after the original prelim report was released for public consumption on the 13th of January 2010. From that PDF it would appear that the original report was modified on 10/11/2015 at 8:13:02 am (click 'file' then click 'properties') by 'author' E.Hargreaves (ATSB REPCON Manager & ICAO co-ordinator).
Now remembering that the ECCAIRS IT application is basically a big version of a SMS incident/accident software program and is therefore supposed to be secure from 1st, 2nd and 3rd party modification/amendment after submission. Therefore the question that must be answered is how is it possible for the official ATSB ICAO co-ordinator to go back into 'modify' the original ICAO prelim report??
The obvious answer is that the original prelim report copy, intended for ICAO, was not sent; or was intercepted before reaching the ICAO ADREP secretariat responsible for inputting all forwarded notifications and/or AAI reports.
Since conducting that research there has, as Walker suggests, been confirmation that the ATSB notified ICAO of the VH-NGA ditching and their intention to investigate that ditching. It is also a fact that a copy of the prelim report was forwarded to the ICAO iSTAR database office. However what Walker omits to say is that prelim report was either; not forwarded until 10 November 2015 by the REPCON Manager E Hargreaves; or it was forwarded but the REPCON Manager has exclusive security access to the ICAO iSTAR database and has made a unexplained modification to the ICAO iSTAR database PDF copy of the original 13 January 2010 prelim report? Of the two options for this administrative glitch. I know which one I would be more inclined to believe.
· Ms Casey has also stated verbally to the IIC that she believed that two other ATSB reports had not been sent to ICAO: AO-2010-043 (Canley Vale) and AO-2013-100 (Mildura). ATSB records show that AO-2010-043 was sent to ICAO as required, and AO-2013-100 was sent to ICAO in early 2017 (although not within the required 30-day period).
& refer: BRB BT: The IR mole & the ADREP cock-up(rort)?
[b]FINDING:
[/b]
The ATSB has been reporting accidents and investigated incidents to the ICAO ADREP data system (Preliminary Reports and Data Reports), however, they are incomplete partly due to the differences in the taxonomy format.
RECOMMENDATION:
Since the ATSB is in the process of acquiring a new accident and incident data reporting system, it is recommended that this new database system be ADREP-ECCAIRS compatible. It is also recommended that further discussions take place between the ATSB database system personnel and the ICAO ADREP system administrator in order to facilitate the reporting to the ADREP using the ATSB existing system before the new ATSB system becomes operational.
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROPOSED BY THE ATSB:
There was some confusion prior to the audit between the ATSB and the ICAO secretariat which meant that the ATSB was not aware of the ADREP reporting problems. The ATSB is currently investigating the feasibility of incorporating an ECCAIRS compatible ADREP into the new accident/incident database. However, a determination is still several months away. As a result of the audit, the ATSB has obtained a copy of the latest ADREP (Form D) and is seeking to create a template that will capture the necessary data applicable. The ATSB is committed to fully meet the ICAO obligation in both the short and longer terms.
ACTION TAKEN BY THE ATSB:
The use of ECCAIRS was considered as an option for the occurrence database module of the ATSB's newly developed Safety Investigation Information Management System. Given that most of the aviation data collected by the ATSB is high-volume, low-detail data, the complexity of the ECCAIRS taxonomy was not considered appropriate. A bespoke taxonomy for safety events and safety factors was developed by the ATSB which better suits its needs, particularly for the purposes of safety research and for the application of its investigation safety analysis methodology. However, a mapping exercise was carried out to ensure that there was comparability between the ATSB and ECCAIRS taxonomies. For the purposes of notification, preliminary and final ADREP data reports, the ATSB continues to provide this information in the ECCAIRS format, including the use of the ECCAIRS taxonomies.
P2 comment - In other words the ATSB will continue to forward only those (PDF copied) reports it deems not politically and (big end of town) industry sensitive for the ICAO ADREP Secretariat to input via the ECCAIRS IT application - and it remains so to this day.
Whatever the reasons for these ATSB administrative glitches it would also appear that there is some serious issues with the ICAO iSTAR receiving office, remembering that the examples mentioned above were only 3 of many that I was able to identify as not existing/filed on the iSTAR/ECCAIRs databases.
Could it be that there are still 'taxonomy' and/or compatibility issues with the current ATSB SIIMS database and the forwarding of safety and accident reports being sent to the ICAO iSTAR database office? Why wouldn't a State endorsed Annex 13 AAI at least check that there are no issues at the receiving end of some important forwarded Annex 13 compliant reports? After all we are talking about the integrity and security of valuable safety information that deserves to be properly disseminated to the worldwide aviation industry as per the good intent and philosophy of ICAO Annex 19.
MTF? Definitely!...P2