[Peetwo]

Not sure about Manning, it could be that he is being distracted by higher profile investigations and hopefully he will get a chance to look at this more closely. Indeed the timing of the release of this report probably meant he would not have been part of the Commissioner's review process.

However I totally agree with Kharon's sentiments on this and cannot believe that this report has sailed through all the checks & balances (reviews/audits etc), all the way through to the Commissioner level without a single STSI, TSI, expert peer reviewer or DIP coming to a similar conclusion (although maybe not quite so animated.. ) as this...

"..should not be allowing ATSB to keep generating these slip-shod, inaccurate, dangerous reports.  It is wrong, it is dangerous, it is illegal – and that's just kissing the CASA arse; wait until an accident happens, watch 'em duck and weave then.."  

IMO the fact this report has been released without so much as a cursory mention of this significant safety issue (even in the 'Contributory Factors' section), should automatically have heads rolling all the way to an executive/Commissioner level.   

This AAI defective report, along with the PelAir report, are not one off aberrations. IMO there are real repetitive systemic issues here that need to be urgently addressed before similar incidents/accidents begin to reoccur due to lack of sufficient risk mitigation where organisational issues & regulatory oversight (or lack of) will be a contributory factor.

For the benefit of Mr Manning - & as a gentle reminder of the lighter end of town.. - have a close look at this report - AO-2010-111 - & this related post off the UP from Leadsled:

Folks,

As an example of how not to do it, read the ATSB report on the last one at Camden, a Twin Comanche, and study the photographs carefully. Read the whole report carefully, it is one short.

Credible eyewitness reports said the aircraft never got above 100-200ft.

Does the prop. on one engine look feathered to you!!

Consider the widely differing reports from the student and the instructor as to what actually happened, and what the aeroplane did, and figure out for yourself what "most probably" really happened.

In your considerations, take account of the AFM note about the fact that recovery from a spin is unlikely with full tip tanks.

Is it probable, given the verifiable facts, and the witness statements, that the CAAP was followed?
What action has CASA taken in this matter??
What pro-active action has ATSB taken, to find out why these accidents keep happening???
What action has ATSB taken to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, further similar fatal crashes --- I will not call them accidents????

Please, anybody, don't suggest I am saying "no asymmetric training", but let's drop the (I was almost going to say macho, but then I realised I know at least two female instructors who also indulge in the seriously risky practice of pulling the mixture "just off the ground") unnecessarily dangerous practices, to almost eliminate the chances of recovery, on the day it all turns to custard.

I was on the aerodrome at YSBK the day of the last fatal. That is not the only similar one at Bankstown when I have been on the aerodrome. Not long after I stated flying, I actually witnessed an Apache crash on an asymmetric missed approach, the PIC was the Piper agent Chief Pilot, fortunately, both lived. Not long after, a Heron crashed on the same airfield, same deal, attempting a physically impossible missed approach, all died, then a best mate died in yet another twin training accident.

I had a blazing row with the pilot responsible for the last fatal at Camden, about two weeks before that accident. The subject of the row was a very close go, virtually a rehearsal for the final fatal crash. We all know the PIC was a high time instructor, but he was an accident looking for somewhere to happen. Finally, it did.

Several people on previous posts have said that the accidents we have had have been inexperienced instructors ---- in every accident, of which I have all too direct knowledge, that was not the case, but all high time and "highly respected" "professionals". There was no shortage of experience on the flightdeck of the Braz at Darwin.The laws of physics and aerodynamics, underlined by real world "human factors" have no respect for hours in log books or popular reputations.

I never cease to be amazed at the ignorance of some very high time instructors of close acquaintance , all Grade 1s, three are ATOs, who, quite frankly, simply do not understand just how un-safe their "SOPs" actually are.

Just because you are still alive doesn't prove your practices are "safe".

The FAA recommendation on the subject make worthwhile reading, but in certain quarters in this country, FAA recommendation are treated with disdain ---- we know better ---- an attitude thoroughly discredited by our actual record.

A quote:

[i]Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.[/i]

Tootle pip!!

 Then coming up in weight, category & operation (but still a training accident) have a close read of this report - AO-2010-019 - & watch the accompanying video translated to YouTube:

Then ask yourself how it is possible for such a tragic training sequence to occur, when all historical evidence suggests this was so out of character for a conscientious, experienced, company CAR217 approved C&T officer. Who reportedly always placed speed & safety buffers on all EFATO training & testing sequences - why the dramatic change?

So, is Manning just warming a seat and collecting the loot, or not there?  Someone has to stop this farce, NOW, not at some point in the future bureaucratic time space continuum.  

  
I seriously hope that Manning is not just another Commissioner Muppet Clone and that he is systematically & seriously sorting the wheat from the chaff at bureau HQ...

Either way I totally agree the farce needs to stop NOW!

MTF..P2